ASAT program of China

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China's anti-satellite (ASAT) program has been under development since 1964.[1] The ASAT program has since been moved from Program 640 to Program 863, the General Armaments Department and the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND, formerly known as Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense).[2] Since its inception, the ASAT program has made progress on the development of three ASAT capable Systems: direct fire, directed-energy weapon, and microsatellites. Tests of these systems have either been directly acknowledged by the PRC, or reported on as ASAT capable. China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counterspace capabilities, which includes direct-ascent antisatellite missiles, co-orbital antisatellite systems, computer network operations, groundbased satellite jammers, and directed energy weapons.[3]

People's Liberation Army has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles.[4]

History[edit]

China has worked on technologies applicable to Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weaponry since 1964. For much of the 1960s and 1970s the majority of funding and development of ASAT capabilities were run through Program 640.[1] The initial purpose of Program 640 was to develop anti-ballistic missiles and SAM sites, but in 1970 Program 640 began an ASAT program.[citation needed] The program's progress was hampered by the effects of the Cultural Revolution, because many of the prominent scientists associated with the program were among those purged by the younger generation. A review of the scholarly articles from China in the 1970s demonstrates that one prominent scientist wrote the majority of information regarding ASAT systems.[5]

In 1980, Program 640 was abandoned. The projects under Program 640 were not publicized until 1986, when Program 863 was introduced as the PRC's newest technological research and development program.[2] Program 863 has since been closely tied to the operations of the General Armaments Department's Project 921 and COSTIND (now known as SASTIND) of the People's Liberation Army.

In 2008, during the development of the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, it was reported that China was considering modifying the missile to accommodate an anti-satellite warhead to give it a sea-based anti-satellite capability.[6]

A 2016 US Congress report warns about China developing space weapons to destroy American satellites.[7]

Systems[edit]

Three kinds of ASAT systems have been under development and/or active tests by the PRC. The systems are not acknowledged by the PRC as being strictly ASAT, but they are capable of destroying or disabling a satellite.

Direct fire systems[edit]

A Direct Fire System refers to the instrumentalities required for a land or vehicle based missile to strike a satellite. A Direct Fire System is a kinetic kill system designed to physically destroy or damage a satellite, instead of electronically disrupting its orbit or mission. The PRC demonstrated its ability to launch a land-based kinetic kill vehicle into a satellite when it fired a SC-19 missile into an aging Fengyun series satellite and destroyed it on January 11, 2007. No known tests of a vehicle-based Direct Fire System have occurred, but it has been reported that the new Jin-class submarine will have the ability to launch the SC-19 or a similar type of missile.[8]

Directed-energy weapons[edit]

A directed-energy weapon (DEW) is a high powered laser or microwave weapon designed to either disrupt or damage a satellite. These weapons are part of the PRC's New Concept Weapons program.[9] One directed-energy weapon, a high powered laser, has been under development since 1995 and was tested on orbiting US satellites in 2006.[10] According to the United States Department of Defense, the "PRC defense research has proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite components." The same report predicts that, by mid- to late-2020s, the PRC will be capable of fielding higher power DEW systems to threaten non-optical satellites.[11]

Microsatellites[edit]

A microsatellite is defined as any object orbiting the Earth that has a mass greater than 10 kg and less than 500 kg.[12][full citation needed] This includes man made satellites and natural satellites, like debris. While man made micro-satellites are primarily peaceful, they are easily weaponized. Because of a satellite's high relative velocity to another satellite, any collision would destroy both satellites, and micro-satellites have the advantage of being cheaper, more maneuverable and harder to track. In 2001, a Chinese newspaper stated that the PRC was testing a parasitic micro-satellite that could latch onto another satellite and destroy it on command.[13] While no evidence has been found to demonstrate the development of such a parasite system, in 2008 the BX-1 micro-satellite released by the PRC passed dangerously close to the International Space Station at a relative speed which would have destroyed both objects had they collided.[14] This close call raised awareness of the PRC's ability to use micro-satellites as a kinetic kill ASAT system.

Associated government organizations and personnel[edit]

General Armaments Department[edit]

The General Armaments Department (GAD) of the PRC, established in 1998, has three major responsibilities. The first is to develop, maintain, and distribute all weapon systems in the PLA. The second is to manage the nation's nuclear program. The third is to oversee all space programs. The GAD has authority over all weapons development programs, including ASAT weapons. It also is responsible for space related activities, such as Project 921 (the crewed spaceflight program) and the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre.[15] Every ASAT program developed by the PRC must be developed and tested by the GAD. The GAD also includes the development branch of SASTIND, and oversees the operations of Program 863.

Chen Bingde[edit]

General Chen Bingde was the Director of the GAD in 2007 during the first successful test of the Chinese Direct Fire ASAT System. Being the head of all of the PRC's military involvement in space, Chen would have overseen the development of the SC-19 and authorized its deployment on January 11, 2007. Shortly after the system's success, Chen was promoted to Chief of the General Staff.[16]

Chang Wanquan[edit]

General Chang Wanquan was promoted to the position of Director of the GAD after General Chen Bingde accepted the position of Chief of the General Staff. Wanquan has been in charge of development and tests of the PRC's ASAT since mid-2007.[17]

SASTIND[edit]

The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND, formerly known as COSTIND) is the scientific branch of the PRC's military and was absorbed into the GAD when it was formed in 1998.[15] The institution has changed over the years, and continues to change, but there are five major responsibilities within their jurisdiction.

  • To provide policy recommendations on anything regarding science, technology, and industry for national defense.
  • To organize the structure of the science, technology, and industry community in regards to national defense.
  • To research and develop new technologies for national defense.
  • To manage the safety regulations, quality standards, technical reports, and promotion of all national defense projects in the area of science, technology, and industry.
  • To deal with foreign interactions in the realms of science, technology, and industry.[18]

Since ASAT technology is considered a tool of national defense, SASTIND is responsible for the development of ASAT programs, and all matters regarding policy recommendations, safety regulations, organization and the projects' global images.

Zhang Yunchuan[edit]

Zhang Yunchuan was director of SASTIND from 2003 to 2007. He received his degree from Harbin Military Engineering Institute, and spent most of his political career as a governor. Shortly after the successful ASAT test in 2007 he was promoted to Chairmen of the People Provisional Congress.[19]

Zhang Qingwei[edit]

Zhang Qingwei followed Yunchuan as director of SASTIND from 2007 to 2009. He received a master's degree in Engineering and has spent most of his career working on the crewed space flight program.[20]

Chen Qiufa[edit]

Chen Qiufa replaced Qingwei as director of SASTIND in 2009. He has served in a leadership role at SASTIND since the first Direct Fire ASAT test in 2005, and he was also promoted in 2007 after the successful SC-19 test.[21]

Operations[edit]

All operations listed here have either been acknowledged by the PRC, or reported by a foreign government.

2006 – Directed Energy[edit]

In 2006, the United States government reported that the PRC had marked US observation satellites with a high power laser.[10] No significant damage to the satellites was reported; it is possible that none occurred and that the lasers used were low-power and designed for ranging, to determine exact satellite orbits, and not as ASAT weapons to blind or disrupt the satellites.

Direct Fire incidents[edit]

Failed Attempts[edit]

There were two failed attempts made by the PRC to use a Direct Fire ASAT weapon. The first was on July 7, 2005, and the missile did not get close to the satellite. The second was on February 6, 2006, and the missile got close enough to the satellite for observers to question whether an intentional miss was the PRC's intent.[22]

2007 – SC-19[edit]

From Main Article: 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test

The 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test was conducted by China on January 11, 2007. A Chinese weather satellite—the FY-1C polar orbit satellite of the Fengyun series, at an altitude of 865 kilometres (537 mi), with a mass of 750 kg[23]—was destroyed by a kinetic kill vehicle traveling with a speed of 8 km/s in the opposite direction[24] (see Head-on engagement). It was launched with a multistage solid-fuel missile from Xichang Satellite Launch Center or nearby.

Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine first reported the test. The report was confirmed on January 18, 2007, by a United States National Security Council (NSC) spokesman.[25] At first the Chinese government did not publicly confirm whether or not the test had occurred; but on January 23, 2007, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officially confirmed that a test had been conducted.[26] China claims it formally notified the U.S., Japan and other countries about the test in advance.[27] The Chinese claim is consistent with a sharp rise in queries from American sites concerning FY-1C on at least one space-related Web site starting about 24 hours before the actual intercept.[citation needed]

2008 – BX-1[edit]

In September 2008, the PRC sent three men into space on the Shenzhou-7. During their time in orbit the astronauts released the BX-1 micro-satellite. Within 4 hours of its release the micro-satellite flew within 27 miles of the International Space Station at a relative speed of 17,000 mph. The International Space Station will move if anything gets within 1,000 miles of its position, and the micro-satellite was well within this range and dangerously close to the Station. A collision between the BX-1 and the Station would have destroyed both objects and been fatal to the astronauts aboard the Station.[14] The BX-1 did not strike the Station, but demonstrated China's ability to develop and deploy a micro-satellite with ASAT capabilities.

2010 – SC-19[edit]

On January 11, 2010, the PRC directed another SC-19 (雙城-19) missile at a moving target and destroyed it. This time the target was a CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile launched from Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center. While using the same systems as the January 11, 2007 test, it is not clear what the function of the 2010 test was. This test is considered to be a continuation of the PRC's ASAT testing because it employed the SC-19 system, but because the target was a missile and not a satellite the test may have been directed towards re-purposing the SC-19 missile as an ABM.[28]

Dong Neng series[edit]

On 13 May 2013, the PRC conducted a test launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center referred to as 'Kunpeng-7.[29] The launch was subsequently identified by the US as a test for the Dong Neng/动能-2 (DN-2) ASAT interceptor.

On 23 July 2014, the PRC was reported to have conducted a successful land based missile test.[30] However, the US said that the test was a 'non-destructive' test of an anti-satellite weapon.[31]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b "Chinese Anti-Satellite Capabilities". www.globalsecurity.org. Archived from the original on 27 February 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  2. ^ a b "Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China". www.most.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 5 February 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  3. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 8 January 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  4. ^ Majumdar, Dave (7 March 2018). "Russia and China Would Gun for America's Achilles Heel in a War: Satellites". The National Interest. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  5. ^ "Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in Chinese Open-Source Publications" (PDF). ucsusa.org. Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 March 2012. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  6. ^ Gertz, Bill (18 January 2008). "Submarine ASAT". Washington Post. Retrieved 18 May 2015.[dead link]
  7. ^ "China developing space weapons to destroy American satellites — US congressional report - Missile ThreatMissile Threat". Archived from the original on 13 January 2016. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
  8. ^ Galrahn. "Chinese Submarine Launched ASAT Program". informationdissemination.net. Archived from the original on 13 September 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  9. ^ "AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA'S ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACE WARFARE PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND DOCTRINES" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 March 2011.
  10. ^ a b "Satellite Laser Ranging in China". ucsusa.org. Archived from the original on 20 June 2012. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  11. ^ 2022 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress (PDF). Arlington, VA: United States Department of Defense. 2022. p. 93.
  12. ^ "What is miniaturized satellite? - Definition from WhatIs.com". WhatIs.com. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  13. ^ "FY04 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRC MILITARY POWER" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 June 2011.
  14. ^ a b "Closer Look: Shenzhou-7's Close Pass by the International Space Station". International Assessment and Strategy Center. Archived from the original on 28 September 2011.
  15. ^ a b "Sino Defense". Archived from the original on 8 March 2011.
  16. ^ "IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE TEST FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY SURFACE FORCE" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 August 2011.
  17. ^ "China Vitae : Biography". www.chinavitae.com. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  18. ^ "China - Countries - NTI". www.nti.org. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  19. ^ "China Vitae : Biography". www.chinavitae.com. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  20. ^ "China Vitae : Biography". www.chinavitae.com. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  21. ^ "China Vitae : Biography". www.chinavitae.com. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  22. ^ Gordon, Michael R.; Cloud, David S. (23 April 2007). "U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, but Kept Silent". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 15 May 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  23. ^ Nicholson, Brendon (20 January 2007). "World fury at satellite destruction". The Age. Archived from the original on 1 February 2012.
  24. ^ "Is China's Satellite Killer a Threat? (Tech Talk)". Archived from the original on 15 September 2008.
  25. ^ BBC News (2007). Concern over China's missile test. Retrieved January 20, 2007. Archived 12 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  26. ^ "China admits satellite shot down". BBC News. 23 January 2007. Archived from the original on 29 January 2011. Retrieved 23 January 2007.
  27. ^ "China confirms anti-satellite missile test". The Guardian. London. 23 January 2007. Archived from the original on 28 January 2007. Retrieved 23 January 2007.
  28. ^ "China Taps Antisatellite Weapon for Missile Defense: Cable". china-defense-mashup.com. Archived from the original on 20 March 2011. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  29. ^ "中国再次高空科学探测试验：高度更高数据更多-中新网". www.chinanews.com. Archived from the original on 10 August 2014. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  30. ^ "China achieves success in land-based anti-missile test". eng.mod.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  31. ^ "U.S. State Department: China Tested Anti-satellite Weapon". SpaceNews.com. 28 July 2014. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
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