The proposed Arab state deficit- background[edit]

^[1] ^[2] ^[3] ^[4] ^[5] ^[6]

cabinet resolution signified abandonment of the partition proposal[edit]

^[7] ^[8]

Notes[edit]

References

^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 27. " It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews".
^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 29. "Of the total Arab cultivable land about 2*4 per cent, consists of citrus and banana plantations".
^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 29. if the Arab rural population continues to increase at its present rate, the demand for such supplementary employment, and even the pressure to leave the land and seek for whole-time employment in the towns, will be intensified—quite apart from any further acquisition of land by the Jews, (iii) And thirdly, that since such employment can only be provided by capital, and, with few exceptions, capital is only likely to be invested in Palestine by Jews, the future for the Arab population is already menacing—unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue.
^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 30. The Arabs would be no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital. The alternative possibility of assistance by the United Kingdom Government may, we feel sure, be ruled out, for we cannot imagine that, if Jewish immigration were to be completely closed down in Palestine, His Majesty's Government would be willing to provide funds from the British taxpayer's pocket for the sake of enabling a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine.
^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 127. " there would be much to be said for a pause or standstill of several years during which no further acquisition by the Jews of agricultural land whatever …would be permitted outside the Jewish State. This standstill would give time for the present bitterness of feeling between the two races to die down…But if there is to be no assurance of further Jewish agricultural settlement beyond what can be done on the land which the Jews already possess, it cannot be expected that His Majesty's Government will be willing to spend the United Kingdom taxpayer's money on the development of the land for the sole benefit of the Arabs ; the Jews obviously will not do s o ; and it is quite certain that the revenues of the Mandated Territory alone will not be adequate for the purpose".
^ "Woodhead commission report". p. 246. " It found that "it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget".
^ Itzhak Galnoor (1 February 2012). The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY Press. pp. 53–. ISBN 978-1-4384-0372-4. The cabinet held a secret discussion on December 8, 1937, and accepted Prime Minister Chamberlain's proposal to delay all immediate action for more than a year ...In retrospect, this cabinet resolution signified abandonment of the partition proposal, although this would be...
^ Benny Morris (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49–. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. However, within weeks, the Peel recommendations were dead in the water. The Arabs, unappeased, renewed their revolt, and the British Government, taking fright, secretly voted against partition on 8 December 1937 and then appointed yet another ('technical') committee, ostensibly to look into the praxis of implementing the Peel proposals but in reality to bury them. TheWoodhead Committee, set up in March 1938, presented its findings in November

[woodhead-p27-1] "Woodhead commission report". p. 27. " It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews".

[woodhead-p29citrus-2] "Woodhead commission report". p. 29. "Of the total Arab cultivable land about 2*4 per cent, consists of citrus and banana plantations".

[woodhead-p29-3] "Woodhead commission report". p. 29. if the Arab rural population continues to increase at its present rate, the demand for such supplementary employment, and even the pressure to leave the land and seek for whole-time employment in the towns, will be intensified—quite apart from any further acquisition of land by the Jews, (iii) And thirdly, that since such employment can only be provided by capital, and, with few exceptions, capital is only likely to be invested in Palestine by Jews, the future for the Arab population is already menacing—unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue.

[woodhead-p30-4] "Woodhead commission report". p. 30. The Arabs would be no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital. The alternative possibility of assistance by the United Kingdom Government may, we feel sure, be ruled out, for we cannot imagine that, if Jewish immigration were to be completely closed down in Palestine, His Majesty's Government would be willing to provide funds from the British taxpayer's pocket for the sake of enabling a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine.

[woodhead-p127-5] "Woodhead commission report". p. 127. " there would be much to be said for a pause or standstill of several years during which no further acquisition by the Jews of agricultural land whatever …would be permitted outside the Jewish State. This standstill would give time for the present bitterness of feeling between the two races to die down…But if there is to be no assurance of further Jewish agricultural settlement beyond what can be done on the land which the Jews already possess, it cannot be expected that His Majesty's Government will be willing to spend the United Kingdom taxpayer's money on the development of the land for the sole benefit of the Arabs ; the Jews obviously will not do s o ; and it is quite certain that the revenues of the Mandated Territory alone will not be adequate for the purpose".

[woodhead-p246-6] "Woodhead commission report". p. 246. " It found that "it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget".

[Galnoor2012p53-7] Itzhak Galnoor (1 February 2012). The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY Press. pp. 53–. ISBN 978-1-4384-0372-4. The cabinet held a secret discussion on December 8, 1937, and accepted Prime Minister Chamberlain's proposal to delay all immediate action for more than a year ...In retrospect, this cabinet resolution signified abandonment of the partition proposal, although this would be...

[Morris2004p49-8] Benny Morris (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49–. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. However, within weeks, the Peel recommendations were dead in the water. The Arabs, unappeased, renewed their revolt, and the British Government, taking fright, secretly voted against partition on 8 December 1937 and then appointed yet another ('technical') committee, ostensibly to look into the praxis of implementing the Peel proposals but in reality to bury them. TheWoodhead Committee, set up in March 1938, presented its findings in November

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