Winter War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search
Winter War
Part of World War II

Finnish machine gun crew during the Winter War.
Date 30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940
Location Eastern Finland
Result Interim Peace
Territorial
changes
Moscow Peace Treaty
Belligerents
Flag of Finland
Finland
Flag of the Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Commanders
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim Kliment Voroshilov
Kirill Meretskov
Semyon Timoshenko
Strength
337,000–346,500 men[Notes 1][1][2]
32 tanks[Notes 2][1]
114 aircraft[Notes 3][3]
1,000,000 men
6,541 tanks[4]
3,880 aircraft[5][6]
Casualties and losses
25,904 dead or missing [Notes 4][7]
43,557 wounded[8]
1,000 captured[Notes 5][9]
957 civilians in air raids[7]
87,506+ dead
188,671 wounded & contused
39,369 captured and missing
58,370 sick
17,867 frostbites[10][unreliable source?]
2,268+ tanks[11]
(Soviet estimate)

The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, Russian: Зимняя война[12], Swedish: vinterkriget) began when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939, three months after the invasion of Poland by Germany (and later USSR) and the start of World War II. Because the attack was judged as illegal, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on 14 December.[13] Russian historians prefer the name Soviet–Finnish War (Russian: Советско-финская война).

The Soviet forces had four times as many soldiers as the Finns, 30 times as many aircraft and 218 times as many tanks.[5] However, the Red Army had recently been subjected to a drastic purge in 1937 that crippled it, reducing its morale and efficiency shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.[14] With up to 50% of army officers executed/in custody, including the vast majority of those of the highest rank, the Red Army in 1939 had many inexperienced senior officers.[15] Due to a combination of these factors, and an extremely high commitment and morale in the Finnish forces, the Finns were able to resist the invasion of their country with great success and for far longer than the Soviets had expected.

Finland held out until March 1940, when it signed the Moscow Peace Treaty, ceding about 9% of its pre-war territory and 20% of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union. Soviet losses on the front were large, and the country's international standing also suffered. Moreover, the fighting ability of the Red Army was questioned, a factor that may have contributed to Adolf Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their primary objective of the conquest of Finland but gained sufficient territory along Lake Ladoga to provide a buffer for Leningrad. The Finns retained their sovereignty and gained considerable international goodwill.

The 12 March peace treaty thwarted a half-hearted Franco-British plan to send troops to Finland through northern Scandinavia (the Allied campaign in Norway). One of the Allied operation's major goals was to take control of northern Sweden's iron ore and cut deliveries to Germany.

Contents

[edit] Background of the Finnish politics before the War

Chronology: 1917–1932[16]
  • 7 November 1917: Bolshevik revolution breaks out in Russia.
  • 6 December 1917: Finland declares independence from Russia.
  • 27 January 1918: Finnish Civil War between German-supported White Guards and Soviet-supported Red Guards.
  • 15 May 1918: Finnish Civil War ends with a victory by the White Guards under C.G.E. Mannerheim.
  • 17 July 1919: Finland adopts a democratic constitution. Finland was the first country in Europe to give women the right to vote.
  • 14 October 1920: Soviet Russia and Finland sign the Treaty of Tartu, which provides for mutual de jure recognition and a settlement of the border.
  • 21 January 1932: The Soviet Union and Finland negotiate a non-aggression pact.
The League of Nations aimed preventing war through collective security. Finland joined the organisation in 1920 and the Soviet Union in 1934.

[edit] First steps of the Republic

Finland had long been the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom when Imperial Russia conquered it in 1809 during the Napoleonic Wars, converting it to an autonomous buffer state in the Russian Empire to protect Saint Petersburg, the imperial capital. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy and its own Senate until the turn of the century, when Russia began attempts to assimilate Finland as a part of a larger policy to strengthen central government and unify the Empire by Russification. The attempts ruined relations and increased the support of Finnish movements vying for self-determination.[17]

The outbreak of The First World War gave Finnish a window of opportunity. They sought aid from both Germany and the Bolsheviks. On 6 December 1917 the Senate of Finland announced declaration of independence. The government of new Soviet Russia was weak and soon the Civil War would break out. Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin could spare no troops or little attention for Finland. Soviet Russia recognized the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration. In 1918 the Finns fought a short Civil War, where the Red Guards was armed by some 40,000 Russian soldiers stationed in Finland.[17]

After the First World War, an inter-governmental organization the League of Nations was founded. The League's goals included preventing war through collective security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation and diplomacy.

[edit] Finnish–Swedish co-operation

After the 1917 Finnish independence and the Civil War, the Scandanavian countries would have been candidates for a political alliance. Unfortunately, during the Civil war Sweden occupied the Åland Islands, and the dispute was resolved by the League of Nations in 1921. Other reasons for the reserved relations was the question of Finnish Jäger troops, who received their military training in Germany. Nevertheless, Finnish–Swedish relations improved consistently before the Winter War.[18]

In 1920, Finland joined the League of Nations. Finland sought security guarantees from the League, but Finns did not have high expectations. In the mid-1920s Finns established particular planning committee, the so called Committee of Erich. It consisted of top politicians and military persons, and the Committee defined possible military collaborations of Finland. The prime goal was co-operation with the Scandinavian countries.[18]

Military co-operation between Finland and Sweden was wide, but in practice it was more focused on the exchange of military information and a defence planning for the Åland islands, than military exercises or materiel. The Government of Sweden was aware of a military co-operation, but it carefully avoided commiting itself to Finnish foreign policy.[18]

[edit] Finnish–German relations

Finnish Jäger troops were volunteers from the German-influenced circles, such as university students, during the World War I.

Germans trained the Finnish Jäger troops during World War I. The troops played a key role during the Finnish Civil War. Also Germans sent their own troops at the end of the Finnish Civil War. These operations created close ties to Germany. Still, Scandinavian relations were closer and the main goal of the Finnish foreign policy.[18]

After the National Socialist rose to power, relations with Germany diluted – Finns admired the Imperial Germany, not the radical Nazi Germany. In time, Finnish consevatives did not accept the state violence and church policy of the Nazis. Still, there was sympathy for Nazi Germany, although the offical Finnish policy was reserved. Finnish nazis and ultranationalist parties such as Patriotic People's Movement had only a minor support in multiple elections, especially after the Mäntsälä rebellion in 1932.[18][19]

[edit] Secret militarial co-operation with Estonia

Finnish–Estonian relations had its peak in a diplomatic level after the Estonian Freedom War in 1920s. The diplomatic relations lowered later, but the military relations remained high. In Finnish point of view, the close relations with Estonia did not exclude the the Scandinavian neutrality policy. Nevertheless, the military relations were top secret, and countries held joint military exercises. Estonia sought public security guarantees and signed the Baltic Entente in 1934 with Latvia and Lithuania.[18]

[edit] Relations with the Great Britain and France

Finns ordered 18 British Bristol Blenheim BL-129 light bomber in 1936.

After the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1919, Finns sought new political partners. Great Britain had been a significant trading partner from the 18th century and Finns warmed the relations for the next two decades. In the 1930s Finland purchased Thornycroft boats from Great Britain, but did not buy bombers from Germany because of protests from Great Britain. Finland also bought modern Bristol Blenheim planes from Great Britain which later served successfully during the Winter War.[18]

Relations with France had an important role after World War I and in the 1920s. France had a leading role in the arrangement of a new European security. In the 1930s France started to fear new Nazi Germany and began to approach the Soviet Union, which strained Finnish–France relations. However, during the Winter War France was one of the most important suppliers of military materiel.[18]

[edit] Soviet Union and the Treaty of Tartu

Soviet Russia supported the Red Guards during the Finnish Civil War in 1918.

The relationship between the Soviet Russia and Finland had been tense— the two periods of forced Russification at the turn of the century and the legacy of the failed Soviet-backed socialist rebellion in Finland. Also group of Finnish nationalists made expeditions – the Viena expedition in 1918 and the Aunus expedition of 1919 – Russian East Karelia.

On 14 October 1920 Finland and Soviet Russia signed Treaty of Tartu. It confirmed that the Finnish-Soviet border would follow the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia. Additionally Finland received Petsamo, with its ice-free harbour on the Arctic Ocean. In 1923 countries signed the Border Peace Agreement, which controlled border incidents. These agreements normalized the border. Still Finns felt the Soviet Union as a military threat.[18]

The Soviet Union started collectivization in Ingria from 1928. During the collectivization and the ethnic cleansing Soviets captured, killed and deported ingrian peasants. The event was widely criticized by the Finnish media in 1930. Two years after the event, the Lapua Movement unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Finnish government in the Mäntsälä rebellion.[18]

Nevertheless during the 1930s the relationship between Finns and Soviets had occasionally better moments. From the 1920s, the Soviet Union had offered different non-aggression pacts with Finland but they were all rejected. Now the pact was offered as a net of pacts around western border countries of the Soviet Union. In 1932 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland. The agreement was re-affirmed in 1934 for ten years.[18]

The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934, and accepted also other "progressive forces" beside Communist parties. Partly the changed attitude of the Soviet Union, and partly the internal politics in Finland, enabled that countries had a short thaw in 1937.[18]

[edit] Finnish defence plans

The Finnish Defence Forces, as any army, had defence plans against any intruders. The General staff's military operation plan against Soviet Russia was named as Venäjän keskitys (VK) in 1920s. In the latest 1934 plan, the Finns saw two possible scenarios. In the VK1 scenario, Soviets levy in all its Western Front, and it had a limited army against Finland. The Finns would make manouvers cross the border. Other, the VK2 scenario was much unfavourable. The main defense line would be in the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns would repell Soviet attacks in favouvarble positions, and destroy the enemy by counterattacks. In the Winter War, VK2 scenario was flexible and its basis were right, but the Finnish General staff badly underestimated a count of the Red Army.[20]

Finland had a small defence budget during its independence and especially in 1930s. The Finnish Defence Forces was lacking of military materiel almost in all branches. Also, materiel was old-fashioned, and later during the Winter War, even unsuitable for the field. During the Winter War material situation became better, but still it was never near of the modern and well-equipped Red Army.[1]

[edit] Soviet Union demands and preparations for the War

Chronology: August 1939 – November 1939[16]
  • 24 August 1939: Russo–German non-aggression pact signed. Secret protocol places the Baltic region and Finland within the Soviet Union's sphere of interest.
  • 17 September 1939: The Soviet Union invades Poland.
  • 22 September 1939: Estonian foreign minister invited to Moscow.
  • 29 September 1939: Soviet–Estonian mutual assistance pact signed.
  • 1 October 1939: Latvian foreign minister invited to Moscow.
  • 3 October 1939: Lithuanian foreign minister invited to Moscow.
  • 5 October 1939: Soviet–Latvian mutual assistance pact signed. The Soviet Union invites Finns to negotiate territorial adjustments.
  • 9 October 1939: Finland orders a mobilization under the name Additional Refresher Training.
  • 10 October 1939: Soviet–Lithuanian mutual assistance pact signed.
  • 11–12 October 1939: Finnish delegation meets V.M. Molotov and J.V. Stalin in Moscow, and receives demands of concessions.
  • 31 October 1939: Molotov's speech before the Supreme Soviet.
  • 13 November 1939: Negotations are broken off.
  • 26 November 1939: Soviets stage the Mainila shots.
  • 30 November 1939: Helsinki bombed, and the Soviets troops cross Finnish border.
The NKVD officer Boris Yartsev A.K.A. Boris Rybkin arranged secret negotiations with the Finnish government in 1938.

[edit] First demands in 1938

In April 1938 the Soviet Union was no longer satisfied with the status quo of its relations with Finland. A junior diplomatic official named Boris Yartsev contacted the Finnish foreign minister Rudolf Holsti and prime minister Aimo Cajander. According to Yartsev, the Soviets did not trust Germany, as war was considered possible between the two countries and Germany might have used Finland as a base for operations against the Soviet Union. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the borderline but would rather "advance to meet the enemy". If Finland were to fight against Germany, then the Soviet Union would offer all possible economic and military assistance. The Soviets would also accept the fortification of Åland islands. The Soviet Union needed "positive guarantees".[18][21]

The Finns assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality, and the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev was not satisfied with the reply, given Finland's military weakness. He suggested that Finland would cede, or lease, some islands in the Gulf of Finland along the seaward approaches to Leningrad. Finland turned down the offer.[18][21] Earlier in the mid-1930s the Leningrad party leader Andrei Zhdanov and the leader of the embassy of the Soviet Union in Helsinki Eric Assmus presented a similar proposal.[18]

Negotiations continued during Autumn 1938. The Soviets had reduced their demands; the Red Army operation was not an option anymore and the focus was securing the Gulf of Finland. The Soviets wanted keys to the Gulf blockade, the military concept by Finns and Estonians. Furthermore Yartsev suggested that Finns could fortify the Suursaari island, but the Soviet would take care of its defence. By the winter of 1939 the Soviets further reduced their demands and sent Boris Stein to negotiate. The Finnish foreign minister Eljas Erkko met him five times. Erkko declined offers and replied, the Soviet demands would mean the end of the Finnish neutrality policy and displease the Germans. The chairman of the Finnish Defense Council C.G.E. Mannerheim was informed of the negotations. In his opinion the Finns should give up the Suursaari islands because they would not be able to defend them anyway during a war. Mannerheim's arguments did not persuade the majority of the Finnish government.[18]

The Finns had many reasons to turn down Soviet offers. Finland had started a military co-operation negotiations with Sweden, and Finns had great hopes for the Finnish–Swedish joint-defense for the Ålands islands. The Finnish government did not want to jeopardize these negotiations. Also the collectivization, purges, trials and death penalties in the Stalin's Soviet Union had a bad reputation. Furthermore, the Finnish Communist elite in the Soviet Union was executed during the Great Purge. The Soviet Union did not seem to be the most reliable contracting party.[18]

The Soviet Union itself had violated the Treaty of Tartu in 1937, by blockading Finnish merchant ships navigating between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland.

[edit] Soviet–German alliance and Soviet–demands in 1939

The Soviet Union and Germany signed Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939, by the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Nominally, the pact was a non-aggression treaty, but it included a secret protocol in which the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were divided into spheres of interest of the parties. Finland was under the Soviet interest.[18]

After the Pact, the Scandinavian countries and Finland were relieved. Germans and Soviets were allied, and there is no German-threat against the Soviet Union. But shortly afterwards Germany invaded Poland in September and Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. Next, the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and later Moscow requested that the Baltic countries allow them to establish military bases and to station troops on their soil. The government of Estonia accepted the ultimatum, signing the corresponding agreement in September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October.[18]

Counsellor of state J.K. Paasikivi leaving for Moscow for a first round of negotiations on 9 October, 1939. Seeing him off are Prime Minister A.K. Kajander, speaker of Parliament Väinö Hakkila and Mrs. Alli Paasikivi.

On October 5 the Soviet Union called Finland to negotiate in Moscow. The Finnish government did not hasten time, as the Estonian government did earlier. Unlike the Baltic countries, the Finns started a gradual mobilization under the name "additional refresher training". The Finnish government did not send the foreign minister, but its ambassador in Stockholm J.K. Paasikivi to negotiate in Moscow. The action was made on purpose to limit the jurisdiction of the Finnish negotiator. In the Soviet side, Paasikivi met Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin in Moscow.[18]

The Soviet Union demanded the frontier between Russian and Finland in the Karelian Isthmus region be moved westward to a point only 30 kilometers east of Viipuri, the line between Koivisto and Lipola. Also the Finns should destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland should cede to the Soviet Union the island of Suursaari, Tytärsaari, and Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland. From the north the Soviets demanded Kalastajansaarento peninsula. Furthermore, the Finns should lease the Hanko Peninsula for the thirty years, and permit the Soviets to establish a military base. To same extent the Soviet Union would cede Repola and Porajärvi from the Eastern Karelia; areas twice the side the Soviets demanded.[18][22]

The Soviet offer shared the Finnish government. The foreign minister Eljas Erkko and the defence minister Juho Niukkanen rejected the offer, and they were backed up by the president Kyösti Kallio. J.K. Paasikivi and C.G.E. Mannerheim supported the Soviet offer. Also beside Paasivi the later appointed negotiator Väinö Tanner supported a policy of conciliation. The Finns relied on the military assistance from Sweden, and Eljas Erkko took part of the Stockholm assembly of Scandinavian leaders between October 18 and October 19. Erkko met the Swedish foreign minister Rickard Sandler in private, and Sandler assured that he will persuade the majority of Swedish government to assist Finland during the possible war. Later Sandler failed the task and resigned.[18]

On October 30 in the assembly of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov announced Soviet demands in public. The Finns made two counteroffers – the first in 23 October and the second on 3 November. In both offers Finland would cede the Terijoki area to the Soviet Union, which was far less than Soviet-demands. The Finnish delegation returned home on 13 November, taking for granted the negotations will continue in the future.[18]

[edit] Soviets start military and political attack

Commander of the Leningrad Military District Kirill Meretskov ran the operation against Finland. In mid-winter he was called off, due to extensive failures and heavy casualties.

The Soviet Union had started an intensive rearmament near Finnish border in 1938–1939. Necessary assault troops deployments and commandments had been initiated not until October 1939, though military operation plans on September aimed the attack on November. Stalin was sure that the Finns will change their opinion under the Soviet demands and cede its territories.[23] The Soviet General Staff under Boris Shaposhnikov and Alexander Vasilevsky planned for an offensive.

On 26 November, the Soviets staged the shelling of Mainila, an incident in which Soviet artillery shelled areas near the Russian village of Mainila, then announced that a Finnish artillery attack had killed Soviet troops.[24] The Soviet Union demanded that the Finns apologize for the incident and move their forces 20–25 kilometres from the border. The Finns denied any responsibility for the attack and rejected the demands, which the Soviet Union then used as an excuse to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.

On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 27 divisions, totalling 630,000 men, bombed civilian boroughs of Helsinki and quickly reached the Mannerheim Line. Legally, the Soviet attack without declaration of war violated three different non-aggression pacts; Treaty of Tartu signed 1920, the Non-aggression Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed 1932 and again 1934, and further the Charter of the League of Nations signed 1934.[18] C.G.E. Mannerheim became Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish army after the Soviet attack. Furthermore the Finnish government changed as Risto Ryti was appointed as new prime minister and Väinö Tanner as foreign minister.[25]

On 1 December, the Soviet Union installed a new government for Finland, the Finnish Democratic Republic. It was a puppet regime headed by O. W. Kuusinen. The goverment was also called "The Terijoki Government", since the village of Terijoki was a first place "liberated" by the Red Army. The puppet regime was unsuccesful, and it was quietly buried during winter 1940. From the begin of the regime, the working-class Finns standed beside the legal government.[26] The national unity againt the Soviet invasion was later called the spirit of the Winter War.

[edit] Soviets advance to Mannerheim Line

Chronology: December 1939[16]
  • 1 December 1939: The puppet goverment of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" is conjured.
  • 3 December 1939: Finland makes appeal for intervention by the League of Nations.
  • 7 December 1939: Soviets reach main line of Finnish resistance on the Karelian Isthmus.
  • 14 December 1939: The Soviet Union expelled from League of Nations.
Major Soviet offensives of 30 November – 1 December 1939.
Soviet T-26 light tanks and Komsomolets armored tractors of the Soviet 8th Army, during its advance into Finland.

[edit] Soviets order of battle

In the beginning of the war, Stalin was not worried about the result. After all, the Red Army had just finished inundating the east of Poland, at a cost of less than a thousand casualties. He was backed up by Andrei Zhdanov and Kliment Voroshilov. However, there were some doubts among strategists. The chief of staff of the Red Army Boris Shaposhnikov advocated a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander Kirill Meretskov reported at the start of the hostilities: "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests... The proper use of our forces will be difficult". However, these doubts did not shown in his troop deployments. Meretskov announced publicly that the Finnish war campaign requires two weeks at most. At the beginning of the war, Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.[27]

Because of Stalin's purges, the commanders of the Red Army had suffered significant peacetime losses, including 3 of its 5 marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks;[28] fewer than half of the officers remained in total.[29] These were commonly replaced by people less competent but considered more "loyal" to their superiors, since Stalin had superseded his commanders with political commissars or officers.

The Soviet military generals had been impressed by the success of the German's blitzkrieg tactics. They did not pay regard to fact that the blitzkrieg was tailored to central European conditions: a familiar landscape with network of modern roads. Armies fighting on mainland Europe had clearly recognized centers of supply and communications, which are excellent targets for armored vehicles. Finnish army centers were deep inside the country and the terrain has only few roads but lots of forest. Also Red Army did not appreciate the tactical coordination between the components arms, network of communications, and instill its frontline commanders individual initiative. Instead battlefield decisions had to be seconded by a political commissar, "politruk".[27]

The Soviet forces were positioned as follows:[27]

  • Seventh Army was located on the Karelian Isthmus; comprising twelve to fourteen divisions. The objective was city of Viipuri. Later, the force was divided into the Seventh and Thirteenth armies.
  • Eight Army was located on north of Lake Ladoga; comprising six rifle divisions and two tank brigades. Its mission was to circling around Lake Ladoga and striking to the Mannerheim Line from the rear.
  • Ninth Army was located on middle of Finland; comprising five rifle divisions. The mission was to thrust westwards and to cut Finland in half.
  • Fourteenth Army was based in Murmansk; comprising three mediocre divisions. The objective was to capture artic port of Petsamo and later advanced to the town of Rovaniemi.

[edit] Finnish order of battle

The Finnish strategy dictated in geography. The frontier with the Soviet Union was a thousand kilometers long, and it was mostly impenetrable except along a handful of unpaved roads. In prewar calculations, the Finnish General staff estimated seven Soviet divisions on the Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. It that case the ratio for an attacker would been three-to-one. But the main problem would be a long period of time if attacks keep continue, but there was always hope for outside help. In reality, the situation was much worse. For example the Soviets deployed twelve divisions north of Lake Ladoga, as the Finns had planned defense against only five divisions.[27]

Even bigger problems than men was material. Foreign shipments of antitank and aircraft were arriving in small quantities. The ammunition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartridges, shells and fuel only 19–60 days. The Finnish tank forces were operationally nonexistent. The ammunition shortage seldom allowed Finns the heavy counterbattery or saturation fire. The Finns established wartime headquarters in the town of Mikkeli.[27]

The Finnish forces were positioned as follows:[27]

[edit] First battles

The war situation on 7 December 1939. The Soviets have reached the Finnish main defense line, the Mannerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus.[Notes 6]      Mannerheim Line     Finnish Division (XX) or Finnish Corps (XXX)     Soviet Division (XX) or Soviet Army (XXXX) -XX- Finnish Divisional Boundary
-XXX- Finnish Corps Boundary

In the Karelian isthmus front, the Finns were entrenched mainly to the Mannerheim Line. There was a buffer zone 20–60 kilometers deep between the frontier and the Mannerheim Line. The Finns had employed about 21,000 men, whose mission was to delay and cause damage for the Red Army. As Soviets reached the combat range, the biggest cause of the confusion among Finnish soldier was Soviet tanks. The Finns did not have enough anti-tank materiel, and training against modern tanks. The Soviet armored tactics was very simple straight-ahead charge, which later proved its weakness, as Finns learned to handle the tank problem. Finns learned that close-range tank could be dealt with many ways – logs and crowbars to bogie wheels often immobilized a tank. Soon, Finns manufactured a better weapon, the Molotov Cocktail. It contained a bottle blend of gasoline, kerosene, tar and chloride with a ampule of sulfuric acid taped to the bottle's neck. Molotov cocktails were eventually mass-produced by the Finnish Alko corporation at its Rajamäki distillery, bundled with matches to light them. Eighty Soviet tanks were destroyed in the border-zone fighting.[31]

By 6 December all the Finnish covering troop had withdrawn into the Mannerheim Line. The Soviets begin the first major blow against the Line in Taipale – area between the ashore of Lake Ladoga, the Taipale river and the Suvanto waterway. Along the Suvanto sector the Finns had a slight advantage of elevation and a dry ground to dig in. Also, the Finnish artillery had ranged and fire planned the area in advance. The battle of Taipale began by the Soviet heavy artillery preparation. After a forty-hour artillery fire, the Red infantry attacked, but it suffered heavy casualties in a open ground. From 6 December to 12 December the Red Army tried to engage using only one division. Next, the Red Army strengthened its artillery, and brought tanks and another division, the 10th Division, to the Taipale front. On 14 December, stronger Soviet troops launched a new attack, but again the Red Army was pushed back. A third Soviet division entered the fight, but it performed poorly and panicked under shell fire. The attacks continued without success and caused heavy losses. For example one typical Soviet attack during the battle lasted just a hour, but left 1,000 dead and twenty-seven tanks strewn on the ice.[31]

North of the Lake Ladoga, in the Ladoga Karelia front, the Finns relied on the nature of the geography. Ladoga Karelia did not have road networks for the modern Red Army, but just a large forest wilderness. However, the Soviet Eighth Army had extended a new railroad line to the border, and it could double the supply capability on the front. The Soviet 139th Division, supported by the 56th Division, attacked against road net at Tolvajärvi.[25]

In the central and northern Finland, roads were few and terrain hostile. The Finns did not expected large-scale Soviet attacks. Instead Soviets sent eight divisions, heavily supported by armor and artillery. In Lieksa, the Soviets attacked by 155th Division. And further north in Kuhmo, the attacker was 44th Division. The town of Suomussalmi was in the middle of Finland, and the Finnish side offered a fair road directly to the city of Oulu. The Soviets deployed 163rd Division and give it the mission to cut Finland in half marching via Raate Road. In the Finnish Lapland, in Salla, the Soviets attacked by 88th and 122nd Divisions. In the arctic port of Petsamo, 104th Division attacked by sea and land, supported naval gunfire.[25]

In the beginning of the Winter War, Finland placed the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. The League expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939.[26]

[edit] Finns repel all Soviet attacks

Chronology: December 1939 – January 1940[16]
  • 23 December 1939: Finns organized unsuccessful counterattack.
  • 25 December 1939: Finns win the battle of Tolvajärvi
  • 7 January 1940: Finns win the battle of Raate road
  • 8 January 1940: Finns win the battle of Suomussalmi
Finnish ski troops in Northern Finland on 12 January 1940.
Soviet troops trying to maintain their tanks in severe sub-zero temperatures.

[edit] Weather freezes

The winter weather between December 1939 and March 1940 was exceptionally cold. The record was broken on 16 January 1940 when the temperature dropped to 43 Celsius degress below zero in the Karelian Isthmus. At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who were in active service at the time had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which was their normal winter clothing in many instances, with a semblance of an insignia added. Also the Finns had great skill in skiing.[32]

To the Finnish soldiers, the cold, the snow, the forest, and the long hours of darkness were all factors that could be turned on their advantange. The Finns dressed in layers and the ski troopers wore a lightweight snow cape. This snow-camouflage made the ski troopers invisible as the Finns made guerilla attacks against Soviet columns. At the beginning of the war, the Soviet tanks were painted olive drab and men were dressed in regular khaki uniforms. Not until late January did the Soviets paint their equipment in white and issue snowsuits to their infantry.[33]

The Soviets on the whole had proper winter clothes, but this was not the case in every unit. For example, in the battle of Suomussalmi, many Soviet soldiers died of frostbite. The Soviet troops lacked skill in skiing, so troops were restricted to movement by road and were forced to move in long columns. Furthermore, the Red Army lacked proper winter tents and men had to sleep in improvised shelter.[32] In some units the Soviets took casualties as high as 10% due to frostbite even before they crossed the Finnish border[33]. On the other hand, the cold weather conferred some advantage; Soviet tanks moved more easily on frozen terrain and bodies of water, rather than being immobilized in swamps and mud.[32]

For many of the encircled Soviet troops in a pocket, a motti, just staying alive was an ordeal comparable to combat. The men were frozen and hungry, and endured poor sanitary conditions. The Soviet soldier had no choice. If he refused to fight, the Politruck would shoot him. If he snuck through the forest, he would freeze to death. And surrender was no option for him; Soviet propaganda had told him how the Finns would torture prisoners to death.[33]

[edit] Mannerheim Line and "Sisu"

In the front from the north of Lake Ladoga to the Artic port of Petsamo, the Finns used guerrilla tactics on a massive scale. The Red Army was superior in men and material, but the Finns used the advantages of speed, daring, and economy of force. However, the terrain on the Karelian Isthmus did not allow the exercise of guerrilla tactics, so the Finns used a fortified line with its flanks protected by large bodies of water, later named the Mannerheim Line. Soviet propaganda claimed that it was as strong as or even stronger than the Maginot Line. Finnish historians have belittled the line's strength, insisting that it was mostly conventional trenches and log-covered dugouts; the real strength of the line was stubborn defenders with a lot of sisu – the Finnish idiom roughly translated as guts.[34]

The Soviet troops stopped at the Mannerheim Line. They suffered from poor morale and a shortage of supplies, and their officers worked overtime as troops refused to participate in more suicidal frontal attacks. The Finns decided to launch a counterattack and encircle three Soviet divisions into a pocket, motti, near Viipuri on 23 December. The plan of General Harald Öhquist was bold, but it failed. The Finns lost 1,300 men, and the Soviets were later estimated to have lost a similar number.[35]

[edit] Battles in the north of Lake Ladoga

Battles in the Ladoga Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga. The attack of the Eighth Army of Red Army has been stopped at the the Finnish defense on 12 December 1939.

The number of the Red Army in the north of Lake Ladoga, in the Ladoga Karelia, suprised the Finnish general staff. The Finns deploeyed two divisions, 12th Division lead by Lauri Tiainen and 13th Division lead by Hannu Hannuksela, and they had a support group of three brigades, making number total strength over 30,000 uniforms. The Soviets had a division in almost all road leading to west of the Finnish border. The Eighth Army was lead by I. N. Habarov, but on 4 December he was replaced by V. N. Kurdyumov. The mission was to destroy the Finnish troops in the area of Ladoga Karelia and advance to the area between Sortavala and Joensuu within ten days. The Soviets had an advantage of three-to-one ratio in men, five-to-one in artillery and air supremacy.[36]

The Finns panicked and retreated in front of the overwhelming Red Army. The commander of the Finnish Fourth Army was replaced by Woldemar Hägglund on 4 December. In middle of the Ladoga Karelian front, the Finns retreated near the small stream of Kollaa on 7 December. The waterway itself did not offer any protection, but along it rose ridges up to ten meters. The battle of Kollaa lasted until the end of war. A memorable quote "Kollaa lasts" (Finnish: Kollaa kestää) – "They shall not pass" – became a legend among the Finns. Also the legendary sniper Simo Häyhä, the White Death, served in the Kollaa front. Up to north the Finns retreated from Ägläjärvi on 5 December to Tolvajärvi, and repelled all Soviet attacks in the battle of Tolvajärvi on 12 December.[36]

Down the south, in the northern coastal road of Lake Ladoga, two Soviet division were united. Similarly, these divisions were in a trap as the Finns could make counterattacks from a north to columns flank. The Finns made counterattacks in all fronts but did not successed, however the Red Army was now on the defensive. On 19 December the Finns interrupted assaults as men were exhausted. The Finns made again major offensive between 6 January and 16 January 1940, and cut the Soviet division in to different size of mottis.[36]

Unlike the Finns had expected, the Soviets did not try to breakthrough to east but they stayed put and entrenched. The encircled Soviets divisions expected auxiliary troops and service shipments by the air. Instead the Finns repelled all efforts of the Soviet Eighth Army and the encircled troop did not get enough supplies from the air. Either the Finns did not have right sort of military equipments, such as heavy artilley, and they were short of men, so The Finns just had to eliminate most dangerous fire nests first and wait in time. There were some Finnish soldiers who were specialised in to eliminate mottis, the most know was major Matti Aarnio, "Motti-Matti". In spite of the cold and hunger, the Soviet troops did not surrender easily but fought bravely and many times tanks were entrenched to be used as pillboxes.[36]

[edit] Battle of Raate road

One of the most remarkable losses in military history, the so-called "Battle of Raate-Road", occurred during the month-long Battle of Suomussalmi. The Soviet 163rd and 44th Infantry Divisions, comprising 25,000 troops, were almost completely destroyed by a Finnish ambush as they marched along the forest road. A small unit blocked the Soviet advance, while Finnish Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division of 3,600 troops cut off the retreat route, split the enemy force into smaller fragments, and then destroyed the remnants as they retreated.[37] The Soviets suffered nearly 18,000 casualties, while the Finnish lost only 250 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured 85 tanks, 437 trucks, 1,620 horses, 92 artillery pieces, 78 anti-tank guns, 20 tractors, 13 anti-aircraft guns, over 6,000 rifles, one airplane, and much-needed ammunition and medical supplies. Col. Siilasvuo was later promoted to General in recognition of his leadership.[38]

Following this battle, on 7 January, for the disastrous failures, Kliment Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war (and four months later as the People Commissar [Minister] of Defense as well).

[edit] Breakthrough of Mannerheim Line

Chronology: February 1940 – March 1940[16]
  • 1 February 1940: Soviets start all-out offensive on the Karelian Isthmus.
  • 5 February 1940: Britain and France agree intervene in Scandinavia.
  • 11 February 1940: Soviets score decisive breakthough of Mannerheim Line.
  • 12 February 1940: Finns seek peace terms.
  • 1–5 March 1940: Fighting in and around city of Viipuri (Viborg).
  • 9 March 1940: Finns retreat from last toeholds in Gulf of Viipuri.
  • 12 March 1940: Peace agreement signed in Moscow.
  • 13 March 1940 Cease-fire goes into effect.
Fallen soldiers of the Red Army

By the end of the winter, it became clear that the Finnish forces were becoming exhausted, and German representatives, not knowing that the negotiations were already ongoing, suggested that Finland should negotiate with the USSR. Soviet casualties had been high, and the situation was a source of political embarrassment for the Soviet regime. With the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests, and a draft of peace terms was presented to Finland on 12 February. Both the Germans and the Swedes were keen to see an end to the Winter War; the latter feared the collapse of its neighbor. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustaf V made a public statement, in which he confirmed having declined Finnish pleas for support from Swedish troops.

By the end of February, the Finns had depleted their ammunition supplies. Also, the Soviet Union had finally succeeded in breaking through the Mannerheim Line. On 29 February, the Finnish government agreed to start negotiations. By 5 March, the Soviet army had advanced 10–15 kilometres past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. The Finns proposed an armistice on the same day, but the Soviets wanted to keep the pressure on and declined the offer the next day. Indeed, the fighting continued up to noon (Leningrad time), 13 March, half a day after the peace treaty was signed, according to the terms of the protocol.

After the war, the situation of the Finnish army at Karelian Isthmus at the end of the war had created significant discussion. The orders were already given to prepare a retreat to the next line of defence in the Taipale sector. The estimates of how long the enemy could have been held in these kinds of retreat-and-stand operations varied from a few days[39] to a couple of months,[40] most averaging around a few weeks.[41]

It is speculated that Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus during the purges, thus damaging the effectiveness of spies in Finland and other countries, as well as cowing operatives into writing the kind of reports they thought Stalin wanted to read. Thus he was not aware of the real situation in Finland and amongst the Western Allies.[42][43]

Soviet intelligence sources were informing their leadership of the Allied plans to intervene in the war, but not of the details or the actual unpreparedness of the Allies. Therefore, the Soviets felt forced to seek a premature end to the war before the Allies intervened and declared war on the Soviet Union.

During four months of fighting, the Soviet Army suffered huge losses. One Red Army General remarked that "we have won enough ground to bury our dead". Casualty estimates vary widely — from 48,000 killed, died from wounds, and missing in action, as quoted by Soviet officials immediately after the war, to 391,800 according to some recent research.[44] According to Nikita Khrushchev, 1.5 million men were sent to Finland and one million of them were killed, while 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored cars and an enormous amount of other war materials were lost.[45][46] The most reliable current estimate puts the figure at 126,875.[10] Finland's losses were limited to 26,662 men.[47]

[edit] Aerial warfare

Soviet Tupolev SB bombers appears on the sky above Helsinki 30 November 1939.

[edit] Soviet bombings

The aerial activity was, as ground battles, one-sided struggle. The Soviet Air Forces, supporting Red Army invasion about 2,500 aircraft, was something of a flop. The material damage by the raid of bombers was slight and Finland did not offer many valuable targets for strategic bombings. Very often targets were small village depots with small value. The country had only few modern highways in the interior and therefore railway system were main target for bombers. The rail tracks were cut thousands of times, but they were easy to repair and Finns usually had trains running in a matter of hours.[48]

The capital of Finland Helsinki received it worst plastering on the first day of the war, and was the target of raids only a few times thereafter. Finland lost only 5 percent of total man-hour production time due to Soviet bombings. Nevertheless, bombings effected thousands of civilians as the Soviets were recorded 2,075 bombings attacks in 516 localities.[48] Air raids killed 957 Finnish civilians.[7] The city of Viipuri was almost leveled by nearly 12,000 bombs. The most common Soviet aircraft in the skied over Finland was the Tupolev SB-2.[48]

[edit] Small Finnish Air Force

At the beginning of the war, Finland had a very small air force, with only 114 combat airplanes fit for duty. Whereupon the fact, missions were also very limited and fighter aircraft were mainly used to repel Soviet bombers. Strategic bombings were also chance of military observation. Old-fashioned and few numbered aircraft could not offer support for Finnish ground troops. In spite of losses the number of Finnish Air Force climbed over 50 percent by the end of the war. Most new aircraft shipments arrived during January 1940.[3]

Many times Finnish fighter pilots dived with their motley collection of planes into Soviet formations that outnumbered them ten or even twenty times. Finnish fighters shot down 240 confirmed Soviet aircraft, against the loss of 26. Many times a Finnish forward air base consisted of frozen lake, a windsock, a telephone set and some tents. Air-raid warnings were given by Finnish women organized by the Lotta Svärd. Finnish antiaircraft brought down by ground fire range from 314 to 444 confirmed kills. The Soviet airforce learned from their early mistakes, and by the late February they were using better tactics before the war ended.[48]

[edit] Naval warfare

Finnish coastal defence ship Väinämöinen in 1938

[edit] Navies in freeze

The naval activity during the Winter War was low. The Baltic Sea had started to freeze by the end of December, which made the movement of warships very difficult and in mid-winter only ice-breakers and submarines could still move. The other reason for low naval activity was the role of the Soviet Navy. The Baltic Fleet was a provincial coast defense force which did not have training, logistical structure, or the landing craft to undertake large-scale operations. Furthermore, in technologically the Soviet Navy was very much behind either the British Royal Navy or the German Kriegsmarine.[25] Still, the Baltic Fleet was strong; it had two battleships, one heavy cruiser, almost twenty destroyers, 50 motor torpedo boats, 52 submarines and other vessels. The Soviets used naval bases in Paldiski, Tallinn and Liepāja for their attacks.[49]

The Finnish Navy was a coast defense force with two coastal defence ships, five submarines, four gunboats, seven motor torpedo boats, one minelayer and six minesweepers. The two coastal defence ships, Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, were moved to the harbour in Turku where they were used to stiffen the air-defences. Their antiaircraft guns knocked down one or two planes over the city, and ships remained there for the rest of the war.[25] Beside the costal defense, the Finnish Navy also protected Åland islands and merchant vessels in the Baltic sea – only a minor part of the fleet could execute offensive warfares.[49]

Furthemore, the Soviet aircrafts bombed Finnish vessels, harbours and dropped mines to seaways. Still, the Finnish casualties were relatively low as they lost 26 merchant vessels, where only four were lost inside the Finnish territorial waters.[49]

[edit] Coastal artillery

In addition to its navy, Finland had its coastal artillery batteries guarding important harbours and naval bases along its coast. Most batteries were leftovers from the Russian period, the 15.2 cm gun being the most numerous, but Finland had modernized its old guns and installed a number of new batteries, the largest a 305 mm gun battery originally intended to block the Gulf of Finland to Soviet ships with the help of batteries on the Estonian side.

The first naval battle took place near the island of Russarö, five kilometers south of Hanko. On the 1 December, there were fair weather conditions and a visibility was excellent. The Finns noticed the Soviet cruiser Kirov and two destroyers. After the convoy was at a range of 24 kilometers, the Finns opened fire by 234mm coastal guns. After short five minutes firing by four costal guns, the cruiser was hit and it retreated. Destroyers remained undamaged and Kirov was repaired in the naval base, but it lost 17 men and about 30 wounded. The Soviet knew locations of the Finnish coastal artilleries, but it became surprise that a fire range was much longer than expected. The Coastal artillery was old-fashioned, but the Finns managed to modernize and improve it.[50]

The Coastal artillery had its greatest effect upon the land war. Batteries near the front were in well-protected fixed positions, with a higher rate of fire and greater accuracy than mobile artillery. Land batteries near the coast helped steady the defence of the Karelian Isthmus in conjunction with army artillery. In March, as the Soviets had broken through the front, all reserves were thrown into the fighting near Viborg. The Soviets tried to cross the ice of the Gulf of Viipuri and come up behind the city, but the Finnish coastal artillery fired their heaviest guns, breaking the ice under the Soviets and preventing a clean breakthrough.

[edit] Foreign support

World opinion at large supported the Finnish cause. The World War had not yet begun in earnest and was known to the public as the Phony War; at that time, the Winter War was the only real fighting in Europe besides the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, and thus held major world interest. The Soviet aggression was generally deemed unjustified. Various foreign organizations sent material aid, such as medical supplies. Finnish immigrants in the United States and Canada returned home, and many volunteers (one of them future actor Christopher Lee) traveled to Finland to join Finland's forces: 1,010 Danes (including Christian Frederik von Schalburg, a captain in Christian X of Denmark's bodyguard and later commander of the Free Corps Denmark (Frikorps Danmark), a volunteer unit created by Nazi Germany in Denmark during WWII), 8,700 Swedes, about 1000 Estonians , 725 Norwegians, 372 Ingrians, 346 Finnish expatriates, 366 Hungarians[51] and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over. Foreign correspondents in Helsinki wrote, and even greatly exaggerated, reports of Finnish ingenuity and successes in combat.

[edit] Franco–British plans for intervention

Franco-British support was offered on the condition their armed forces be given free passage through neutral Norway and Sweden instead of taking the difficult passage from Petsamo. It was alleged by some that French and British governments sought to occupy the iron ore districts in Kiruna and Malmberget.
(Borders as of 1920–1940.)

Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider abandoning the operation, and on 29 January 1940, via intermediaries in Sweden, Finland's government was approached on the subject of preliminary peace negotiations. Until this point, Finland had fought for its existence as an independent and democratic country. However, at the news that Finland might be forced to cede its territory or sovereignty, public opinion in France and Britain, already favorable to Finland, swung in favor of intervention. When rumors of an armistice reached governments in Paris and London, both decided to offer military support.

In February 1940, the Allies offered to help: the Allied plan, approved on 4–5 February by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March under the condition that the Finns first make a formal request for assistance (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped that Allied intervention would eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany — although Hitler had by December declared to the Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.

When France and Britain realized that Finland was considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer of 50,000 troops, if Finland asked for help before 12 March. Through Soviet agents in the French and British governments, indications of Franco-British plans reached Stalin, and may have contributed heavily to his decision to increase military pressure on the Finnish Army, while at the same time offering to negotiate an armistice. Because of the Soviet Union's vast numbers of troops and reserves, it has been argued that without massive Allied intervention, nothing could have deterred the Soviet Union from conquering the entirety of Finland.

[edit] Peace of Moscow

Winter War: Finland's Concessions

In the Moscow Peace Treaty of 12 March 1940, Finland was forced to cede the Finnish part of Karelia. The land included the city of Viipuri (the country's second largest), much of Finland's industrialized territory, and significant parts still held by Finland's army: over 10% of pre-war Finland. Some 422,000 Karelians—12% of Finland's population—lost their homes. Military troops and remaining civilians were hastily evacuated; only a few score civilians chose to remain under Soviet governance.

Finland also had to cede a part of the Salla area, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 30 years. While the Soviet troops had captured Petsamo during the war, they returned it to Finland according to the treaty.

As a whole, the peace terms were harsh for Finland. The U.S.S.R. received the city of Viipuri, in addition to their pre-war demands. Sympathy from the League of Nations, Western Allies, and from the Swedes in particular, did not prove to be of much help.

Little more than one year later, hostilities resumed with the Continuation War and a new chapter in the history of Finland began.

In 1948, Stalin wrote in Falsifiers of History that "there could hardly be any doubt that the leading circles of Finland were in league with the Hitlerites, that they wanted to turn Finland into a springboard for Hitler Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R."[52] Regarding the start of the war, Stalin also wrote, "In the war which the Finnish reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government to continue hostilities."[53]

Nikita Khrushchev, who had been a party leader during the winter war, remembered later on the war: "In our war aganist the Finns we could choose the location of the war and the date of its start. In number we were superior to the enemy, we had enough time to get ready for the operation. But on these most favourable terms we could win through only huge difficulties and incredibly great losses. In fact this victory was a moral defeat. Our people certainly never got knowledge of it because we never told them the truth." [54]

[edit] Post-Soviet demands for return of territory

After the war, Karelian local governments, parishes and provincial organizations established Karjalan Liitto in order to defend the rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a solution for returning Karelia. During the Cold War, President Urho Kekkonen tried several times to get the territories back by negotiating with the Soviet leadership, but did not succeed. No one openly demanded return. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, disputes were revived. Some minor groups in Finland have been actively demanding the peaceful return to Finland of the ceded territories. The most active group in this field is ProKarelia. In the latest polls, these demands have met with 26– 38% support in Finland.[55] Although the peaceful return of Karelia has always been on its agenda, Karjalan Liitto has, for the most part, stayed away from these demands.

[edit] In popular culture

The 1940 play There Shall Be No Night by American playwright Robert E. Sherwood was inspired by a moving Christmas 1939 broadcast to America by war correspondent Bill White of CBS. The play was produced on Broadway in 1940, and won the 1941 Pulitzer prize for Drama.

The 1940 story Biggles Sees It Through by W.E. Johns is set during the final stages of the war.

In 1989, the Finnish movie Talvisota was released. This film tells the story of a Finnish platoon of reservists from Kauhava. The platoon belongs to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, which consists almost solely of men from Southern Ostrobothnia.

The 2006 documentary Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia shows how the Winter War influenced World War II and how Finland mobilized against the world's largest military power.

Swedish heavy metal band Sabaton recorded the song "Talvisota", about the Winter War, on their 2008 album The Art of War.

In a 1992 column in Pelit, "Wexteen" (Jyrki J. J. Kasvi) lamented the difficulty of modelling the war in interactive entertainment. According to Wexteen, if the game mechanics are based on troop strengths, troops will march through Helsinki; if on historical events, through Moscow. The Winter War was featured in a scenario of the grand strategy game Hearts of Iron 2 and received dedicated games in the wargame Squad Battles: Winter War and the educational real-time strategy game Talvisota: Icy Hell.

Finnish black metal band Impaled Nazarene has a song Total War - Winter War on its Suomi Finland Perkele CD.

The 2007 novel The Burnt-out Town of Miracles by Roy Jacobsen (Author), Don Bartlett and Don Shaw (Translators) tells the story of the Winter War through the eyes of one man, Timo the woodcutter, and the small Finnish town of Suomussalmi where he lives.

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ At the beginning of the war, Finns had 337,000 men. The Finnish army had only 250,028 rifles (total 281,594 firearms), but White Guards brought their own rifles (over 114,000 rifles, total 116,800 firearms) to the war. The Finns reached the maximum strength at the beginning of March 1940 with 346,000 in uniform.
  2. ^ Since 1919, the Finns had had 32 French Renault-tanks and few lighter tanks. These Tanks were unsuitable for the War, and they were used as fixed pillboxes. The Finns bought 32 British Vickers-tanks during 1936–39, but without weapons, as these were meant to be manufactured and installed in Finland. Only ten tanks were fit for combat at the beginning of the War.
  3. ^ Situation in 1st December 1939. The Finns had 114 combat airplanes fit for duty and 7 airplanes for communication and observation purposes. Also there were less than hundred planes for flight training purposes, not suitable for combat, and some planes were under repair. In total, the Finns had 235 aircraft.
  4. ^ Finnish detailed death casualties: Dead, buried 16,766; Wounded, died of wounds 3,089; Dead, not buried later declared as dead 3,503; Missing, declared as dead 1,712; Died during prisoner of war 20; Other reasons (diseases, accidents, suicides) 677; Unknown 137
  5. ^ After the War, the Soviet Union returned home 847 Finns. Finnish and Russian researchers have estimated total number of POWs between 800–1,100 Finns, and the number of deaths 10–20. See more: Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union
  6. ^ A Soviet division consists of 17,500 men, 14,000 rifles, 419 light machine guns, 200 machines guns, 261 infantry mortars, 40 mortars, 48 anti-tank guns. A Finnish division consists of 14,200 men, 11,000 rifles, 250 submachine guns, 250 light machine guns, 116 machine guns, 18 mortars, 18 anti-tank guns. A Soviet division had more men and it was better equipped.[30]

[edit] References

[edit] Citations

  1. ^ a b c Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 299-335. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  2. ^ Juutilainen, Antti; Koskimaa, Matti (2005). "Maavoimien joukkojen perustaminen". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 77-88. ISBN 951-0-28690-7. 
  3. ^ a b Peltonen, Martti (1999). "Ilmasota talvisodassa". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 606-649. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  4. ^ Kantakoski, Punaiset panssarit—Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945, p. 260
  5. ^ a b Tomas Ries, Cold Will—The Defense of Finland, 1988, ISBN 0-08-033592-6, Potomac Books
  6. ^ Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 952-90-5251-0, Kirjaneuvos, using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to Finnish front
  7. ^ a b c Kurenmaa, Pekka; Lentilä, Riitta (2005). "Sodan tappiot". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 1150-1162. ISBN 951-0-28690-7. 
  8. ^ Lentilä, Riitta; Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Talvisodan uhrit". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 816-828. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  9. ^ Malmi, Timo (1999). "Suomalaiset sotavangit". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 792-802. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  10. ^ a b (Russian) G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, 1997, ISBN 1-85367-280-7, Greenhill Books
  11. ^ Kantakoski: Punaiset panssarit—Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945 p. 286
  12. ^ (Russian) В.Н. Барышников. От прохладного мира к Зимней войне. Восточная политика Финляндии в 1930-е годы. Санкт-Петербург, 1997.; В.Н. Барышников, Э. Саломаа. Вовлечение Финляндии во Вторую Мировую войну. In: Крестовый поход на Россию. М., 2005.; О.Д. Дудорова. Неизвестные страницы Зимней войны. In: Военно-исторический журнал. 1991. №9.; Зимняя война 1939-1940. Книга первая. Политическая история. М., 1998. – ISBN 5-02-009749-7; Эрик Ковалев. Зимняя война балтийских подводных лодок (1939–1940 гг.). In: Короли подплава в море червонных валетов. М., 2006.; М. Коломиец. Танки в Зимней войне 1939-1940. In: «Фронтовая иллюстрация», 2001; Александр Широкорад. Северные войны России. М., 2001.; Владимир Холодковский. Эта Зимняя война. In: Ленинская правда. 1990. 4 янв., c. 3.
  13. ^ Resolution of Council of League of Nations
  14. ^ http://www.redarmystudies.net/0411030.htm, citing Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 489.
  15. ^ Glantz, David M., Stumbling Colossus, p. 58.
  16. ^ a b c d e Trotter 2002, pages 271–274
  17. ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 3–7
  18. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 13-46. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  19. ^ Statistics of Finnish elections 1927–2003: http://pxweb2.stat.fi/sahkoiset_julkaisut/vuosikirja2004_suppea/excel/vaali_02.xls
  20. ^ Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Puolustussuunnittelmat 1930-luvulla". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 65-69. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  21. ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 12–13
  22. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 14–16
  23. ^ Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet ennen talvisotaa ja sen aikana". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 141-148. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  24. ^ Tanner, Väinö, The Winter War, 1957, Stanford University Press
  25. ^ a b c d e Trotter 2002, pages 48–57
  26. ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 58–61
  27. ^ a b c d e f Trotter 2002, pages 33–47
  28. ^ Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. 40th anniversary ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008, p. 450.
  29. ^ Dmytryshyn, Basil. USSR: A Concise History. 2nd ed. New York: Scribners, 1971, p. 181-182
  30. ^ Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen, page 332
  31. ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 67–84
  32. ^ a b c Paulaharju, Jyru (1999). "Pakkastalven kourissa". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 289-298. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  33. ^ a b c Trotter 2002, pages 143–149
  34. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 62–66
  35. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 85–90
  36. ^ a b c d Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 501-529. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  37. ^ The Finnish Winter War 1939-1940 Feldgrau
  38. ^ Hjalmar Siilasvuo WWII Database
  39. ^ Laaksonen, Lasse, Todellisuus ja harhat, 2005, ISBN 951-20-6911-3, Gummerus
  40. ^ Wolf H. Halsti, Talvisota 1939-1940, 1955, Otava
  41. ^ Paasikivi, J.K., Toimintani Moskovassa, 1959, WSOY
  42. ^ C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40, 1997, London: Frank Cass
  43. ^ Rentola, Kimmo, Residenttimme ilmoittaa..., Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 2002
  44. ^ A.E.Taras, Soviet-Finland 1939-1940 war, Minsk, 1999.
  45. ^ "The Finnish Winter War"
  46. ^ Mosier, John, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II, HarperCollins, 2004, ISBN 0-06-000977-2, page 88
  47. ^ Winter War Website
  48. ^ a b c d Trotter 2002, pages 187–193
  49. ^ a b c Elfvegren, Eero (1999). "Merisota talvisodassa". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 677-693. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  50. ^ Silvast, Pekka (1999). "Merivoimien ensimmäinen voitto: Russarö". in Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 694-696. ISBN 951-0-23536-9. 
  51. ^ Tapani Kossila: Foreign volunteers in the Winter War
  52. ^ Soviet Information Bureau, Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, 272848, page 48
  53. ^ Soviet Information Bureau, Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, 272848, page 50
  54. ^ Mihail Heller – Alekszandr Nyekrics: Orosz történelem, II. kötet: A Szovjetunió története.; Osiris Publ. Ltd., Budapest, 2003., page 320 (ISBN 963-389-546-4)
  55. ^ Karjala-lehti and MC-Info Oy 2005 (36 % vs. 52 %), Karjalan Liitto and Taloustutkimus 5.- 7.4. 2005 (26 % vs. 57 %)[1], HS-Gallup: Selvä enemmistö ei halua Karjalaa takaisin 21.8.2005 (30 % vs. 62 %)[2], STT / Suomen Gallup 2.7. 2004 (38 % vs. 57 %)

[edit] Bibliography

  • Andersson, Lennart B3 Junkers Ju86 i Sverige
  • Cox, Geoffrey (1941) The Red Army Moves (Victor Gollancz, London).
  • Engle, Eloise & Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-2433-6.
  • Jakobson, Max (1961). The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press.
  • Öhquist, Harald (1949). Talvisota minun näkökulmastani. Helsinki: WSOY. (in Finnish)
  • Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-08-033592-6.
  • Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and the Russo-Finnish War. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.
  • Tanner, Väinö (1957) The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940 Stanford University Press, California; also London.
  • Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) [1991]. The Winter war: The Russo–Finno War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1 85410 881 6. "First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40" 
  • Upton, Anthony F. (1974). Finland 1939-1940 (University of Delaware Press, Newark: part of series The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War) ISBN 0-87413-156-1
  • Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
  • Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
  • "Finland i Krig 1939-1940" - multiple authors. ISBN 951-50-1182-5

[edit] External links

Personal tools