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Polylogism

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Polylogism is the belief that different groups of people reason in fundamentally different ways (coined from Greek poly 'many' + logos 'logic').[1] The term is attributed to Ludwig von Mises,[2] who used it to refer to Nazism, Marxism and other class based social philosophies,[3] before the writings of Thomas Kuhn and others made relativism a mainstream doctrine.[4] In the Misesian sense of the term, a polylogist ascribes different forms of "logic" to different groups, which may include groups based on race,[1][5] gender, class, or time period. It does not refer strictly to Boolean logic.

Types of polylogism

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A polylogist asserts that different groups reason in fundamentally distinct ways, employing unique "logics" for deductive reasoning. Normative polylogism posits that these varying logics are equally valid, suggesting that no single logical system holds supremacy over others. In contrast, descriptive polylogism is an empirical claim that acknowledges the existence of different reasoning methods among groups but does not necessarily grant equal validity to these methods.[6] A descriptive polylogist may recognize a universally valid form of deductive logic while empirically noting that some groups use alternative (and potentially incorrect) reasoning strategies.

In the Misesian context, an adherent of polylogism would be considered a normative polylogist. Such a person might evaluate an argument as valid within a specific logical framework, even if it contradicts the logic used by the analyst. As Ludwig von Mises stated, "this never has been and never can be attempted by anybody," highlighting the inherent challenges in reconciling different logical systems.

Proletarian logic

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The term 'proletarian logic' is sometimes taken as evidence of polylogism.[citation needed] This term is usually traced back to Joseph Dietzgen in his 11th letter on logic.[7][8] Dietzgen is the now obscure philosophical monist of the 19th century who coined the term 'dialectical materialism' and was praised by communist figures such as Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin.[9] His work has received modern attention primarily from the philosopher Bertell Ollman. As a monist, Dietzgen insists on a unified treatment of mind and matter. As Simon Boxley puts it, for Dietzgen "thought is as material an event as any other". This means that logic too has "material" underpinnings.[further explanation needed] (But note that Dietzgen's "materialism" was explicitly not a physicalism.)

Racialist polylogism

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Racialist polylogism is often associated with the Nazi period,[10] where Nazi leaders in both politics and the scientific community made concerted efforts to distinguish between what they considered "German physics" and "Jewish physics."[11] For example, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Philipp Lenard asserted that scientific thought was influenced by "blood and race," accusing other scientists like Werner Heisenberg of teaching "Jewish physics." This racialist perspective sought to delegitimize the work of Jewish scientists, such as Albert Einstein, whose theory of relativity was disparaged as a product of inferior racial heritage.

"Relativity theory was a particular target both for its alleged repudiation of a “classical,” “German,” and “Aryan” physics, which was held to be rooted in experiment and common sense, and for its alleged encouragement of a more general relativism in morality, culture, and politics."[12]

In contemporary discourse, similar accusations of racialist polylogism have surfaced in various contexts. For instance, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has been accused of espousing a form of racialist polylogism when she suggested that a "wise Latina" might reach different legal conclusions than a white male. While this comment is generally interpreted to mean that diverse life experiences can enrich one's understanding of legal issues, some commentators have argued that it implies Latinas have a distinct "logic."[13][14]

Marx' class-based polylogism

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Karl Marx argued that individuals born into different social classes undergo irreversible changes in their perception and understanding of reality. He posited that a person's class position fundamentally shapes their worldview and consciousness. For instance, someone raised as an aristocrat or factory owner perceives the world through the interests and perspectives inherent to their class. In contrast, a laborer develops a perspective shaped by their experiences and struggles within the working class. Marx believed this divergence in class perspectives leads to a lack of mutual understanding or 'class consciousness.' Consequently, individuals from different classes are often unable to fully grasp each other's experiences and viewpoints, resulting in distinct 'logics' that align with their respective class interests. In Mathematical Manuscript Marx attempted to reconstruct the foundations of calculus without relying on traditional methods, demonstrating his belief that different historical and social conditions could lead to different approaches in even the most abstract fields of thought. This suggests that this class-based differentiation extends even to areas like mathematics and logic, where different classes might reach different conclusions based on their material conditions and class interests.[15]

Marx's dialectical method, which he used in his critique of political economy, highlights a difference between formal logic, which he associated with bourgeois thought, and dialectical logic, which he saw as more aligned with a revolutionary understanding of societal change. Dialectical logic involves understanding contradictions within social systems, a concept that he argued was often neglected or misunderstood by conventional, formal logic.[15]

While Marx did not directly claim that different classes would produce different logical systems, his writings suggest that he believed social and historical conditions significantly influence intellectual frameworks, including in areas like mathematics and logic. This nuanced perspective aligns with his broader critique of how ideology and material conditions shape human thought.

Comparison to Kuhn's incommensurability

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Some proponents of polylogism argue that different groups may indeed develop distinct scientific theories and frameworks, drawing on the work of Thomas Kuhn in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions." Kuhn introduced the concept of paradigm shifts, suggesting that scientific progress is not a linear accumulation of knowledge but rather occurs through revolutionary changes in paradigms. According to this view, a paradigm encompasses the accepted theories, methods, and standards within a scientific community, and when a paradigm shift occurs, the new framework is often incommensurable with the old one—meaning that the two paradigms cannot be directly compared or reconciled.[16]

In this context, proponents of polylogism argue that different cultural, social, or ideological groups may operate under entirely distinct paradigms, leading to divergent scientific theories and understandings. The incommensurability of these paradigms implies that what one group considers scientific truth may not be seen as such by another, as each group’s theories are deeply embedded in their specific conceptual frameworks and assumptions. Therefore, they suggest that scientific theories can indeed be different for different groups, not merely as a matter of interpretation but as fundamentally distinct ways of understanding the world.

The two ideas are not mutually exclusive, however, as Kuhn's concept of the incommensurability of different paradigms differs from the Misesian notion of polylogism. Kuhn's idea suggests that scientists working within different paradigms are often unable to fully understand or evaluate each other's work due to differing foundational assumptions. In contrast, Mises' attack on polylogism refers to the belief that different groups, such as races or classes, think differently. The Nazis did not reject Einstein's work because they had a fundamentally different scientific framework; rather, they dismissed his conclusions because they believed that, as a Jew, he was inherently incapable of sound reasoning.[11] This was not a matter of different scientific paradigms but of a prejudiced ideology that disregarded the validity of his work based on racial grounds.

To use Kuhn’s terminology, one could frame the Misesian concept of polylogism as the belief that members of different races or classes are inherently unable to contribute effectively to solving puzzles within the framework of ‘normal science,’ due to presumed deficiencies tied to their identity. Polylogists argue that these groups operate under fundamentally different cognitive frameworks, which preclude them from engaging in the same scientific paradigm as others. Alternatively, one might argue a certain group or classes innalienable traits force them to be stuck in certain paradigm’s long surpassed by more superior groups.

References

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  1. ^ a b Percy L. Greaves Jr. (1974). "Glossary, Panphysicalism - Pump-priming". Mises Made Easier. Retrieved 2011-01-13.
  2. ^ Perrin, Pierre (2005). "Hermeneutic economics: Between relativism and progressive polylogism". Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. 8 (3): 21–38. doi:10.1007/s12113-005-1032-3.
  3. ^ Ludwig von Mises (18 August 2014). "Chapter 3, Section 1". Human Action (PDF) (1996 ed.). pp. 72–75.
  4. ^ "Thomas Kuhn". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2004.
  5. ^ Alexander Moseley (2002). A Philosophy of War. Algora Publishing. p. 239. ISBN 978-1-892941-94-7.
  6. ^ Roderick Long. "Anti-Psychologism in Economics: Wittgenstein and Mises" (PDF).
  7. ^ Emmett, Dorothy (1928). "Joseph Dietzgen: The Philosopher of Proletarian Logic". Journal of Adult Education. Vol. 3. pp. 26–35.
  8. ^ The Positive Outcome of Philosophy; Letters on Logic, Especially Democratic Proletarian Logic.
  9. ^ A Dictionary of Marxist thought
  10. ^ Joseph W. Bendersky (2000). A history of Nazi Germany: 1919–1945. p. 140.
  11. ^ a b Gimbel, Steven. Einstein's Jewish Science: Physics at the Intersection of Politics and Religion. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
  12. ^ Illy, József. The Practical Einstein: Experiments, Patents, Inventions. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4214-0457-8.
  13. ^ Rich Lowry. "How Sotomayor Misspoke".
  14. ^ Peter Wehner. "Judge Sotomayor, in Her Own Words".
  15. ^ a b Marx, Karl (2006). "Dialectic and contradiction".
  16. ^ Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1st ed., University of Chicago Press, 1962.
  • Boxley, Simon, (2008), Red, Black and Green: Dietzgen's Philosophy Across the Divide. http://www.anarchist-studies-network.org.uk/documents/Conference%20Papers/Simon%20Boxley.doc
  • Ollman, B. (1976) Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Ollman, B. (2003a) Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method, Chicago: University of Illinois Press
  • Ollman, B. (2003b) ‘Marx’s Dialectical Method is more than a Mode of Exposition: A Critique of Systematic Dialectics’ in Albritton, R. & Siloulidis, J. (Eds.) New Dialectics and Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Perrin, Pierre, "Hermeneutic economics: Between relativism and progressive polylogism", Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Volume 8, Number 3, 21–38, doi:10.1007/s12113-005-1032-3
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