Talk:Francis Harvey

Comment

Man oh man, what a man!!! Seminumerical 06:08, 9 June 2006 (UTC)

Excellent article. Joshdboz (talk) 14:21, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Nomination

GA review (see here for criteria)

1. It is reasonably well written.

   a (prose): b (MoS):

2. It is factually accurate and verifiable.

   a (references): b (citations to reliable sources): c (OR):

3. It is broad in its coverage.

   a (major aspects): b (focused):

4. It follows the neutral point of view policy.

   Fair representation without bias:

5. It is stable.

   No edit wars etc.:

6. It is illustrated by images, where possible and appropriate.

   a (images are tagged and non-free images have fair use rationales): b (appropriate use with suitable captions):

7. Overall:

   Pass/Fail:

<DREAMAFTER> ^<TALK> 01:33, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

Question about a sentence

This sentence is difficult:

As soon as the turret had been hit the captain had ordered Q magazine doors closed and the magazine flooded, the order passing to the Transmitting Station below the armoured deck where Stoker 1st Class William Yeo was entrusted with passing the order on.

It takes more than one reading to follow. Is the second clause really needed? Kablammo (talk) 02:23, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

I've come here about this. It makes it sound as if the captain gave the order when he saw the damage, independently of Harvey, yet Harvey is credited with saving the ship. This needs to be clarified. Ty 03:43, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

It can't be clarified, at least not without doing much original research (and at any rate I am in no position to publish anyway). There are some rather interesting anomalies concerned here, which I laid out in the article, and have just added some more below on this discussion page. The problems lie with the actual "eyewitness" accounts, as I've laid down below;

Private Willons. Station: "Q" Magazine. Stated that he heard Harvey say "CLOSE MAGAZINE DOORS—Q TURRET OUT OF ACTION". He and a corporal closed the door and left, having been preceded by the shell handing party from the deck below.

Captain Chatfield. Station: Bridge. Stated in his memoirs written decades later (p.142 The Navy and Defence); "Realising that the magazine might be in danger, I told the C.T. [conning tower] to order "Q" magazine to be flooded immediately. My order, however, had been forestalled by Major Harvey, R.M.L.I., the turret commander."

Lieutenant Chalmers. Station: Bridge. Quoted his own account, which is not wholly accurate, in his life of Beatty, p. 232; "With his dying breath he [Harvey] gave the order to close the magazine doors and flood the magazines."

Chatfield admits giving the order to flood the magazine. Campbell, a renowned technical historian, says that his order was carried out (as stated in the article). A man who was one of only three to survive the turret did not mention any order from Harvey to flood the magazine which would logically have followed in the same breath as the order to shut the magazine door. On the face of it, there is a big jump from this to a Victoria Cross citation. Chatfield, in his Report of Proceedings sent in on 4 June makes no mention of Harvey. Jellicoe, having received extensive details of Lion's damage from Rosyth on 16 June makes no mention of him in his memorandum on the same day. There is a big jump from this to the Victoria Cross citation.

Having said all this, I personally have no problem with Harvey being credited with saving Lion - I just wish some of the facts were clearer. So in answer to the first question, the second clause is needed. If it can be reworded but convey the same information, then fine. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 23:13, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

I think I would have to say you can't have a featured article which contains an internal self contradiction, which this currently does, so either something has to be deleted, or the source of the contradiction explained. From the quote above, Chatfield seems to be saying that he ordered the magazine flooded, but found it had already been done. Chalmers says Harvey ordered it. No problem there about who did it. Where does Stoker Yeo come in, did he just run across the deck with a message - if so, then he didn't do anything much? Harlesbottom, your technical comment below suggests that if Willons was closing the door, then he couldn't have flooded the magazine, because the flood controls were from either the deck above him, or the main deck. Would there be different voice pipe connections to different decks so someone else would be ordered to do the flooding, or might one man be ordered to close door then go up and flood?

I don't know where willons account can be found or what it says, but I have an account by 'the gunnery officer of HMS Lion', whoever that might be? from 'Fighting at Jutland' by Fawcett available here [1]Sandpiper (talk) 21:59, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

London Gazette cites

I believe the page number in these cites should be the number shown on the .pdf of the actual journal page, not the page number shown in the box at the top of the webpage. See the final two corrected Gazette cites. Kablammo (talk) 03:41, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Yes, it should be the original page number shown in the top corner on the page or in the title bar. I have fixed them all now, thanks. Woody (talk) 11:31, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

I don't know if this is an issue of requiring to be regstered to see the pages, but the links don't work for me. Sandpiper (talk) 23:06, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

One of the best ships for gunnery?

Is there a source for the statement that "Harvey turned the ship into one of the best ships for gunnery in the Royal Navy"?

All my reading about Jutland and naval operations in WWI indicates that the gunnery of the Battle Cruiser Force as a whole was notoriously bad, partly because of an obsession with a fast rate of firing as opposed to accuracy. Indeed, the preoccupation with rate of fire may well have contributed to the loss of 3 battlecruisers by leaving important doors open in the ammunition supply chain in the interests of keeping up the rate of fire. Lion's chief gunner's mate apparently also noted how out of date and unstable a lot of the cordite was and managed to get it replaced, which may have helped to save his ship from the fate of the others.

This does not, of course, detract from the personal heroism of Major Harvey, but it would be useful to have a reference for the statement.

Ken Garland —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.137.40.171 (talk) 07:48, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Artillery specialist of the Royal Marine Light Infantry?

Article makes it clear that Harvey's service branch was Royal Marine Light Infantry, on the other hand it is also made very clear that he was an artillery specialist. This sounds interesting or even strange, as I have always thought that shipboard guns are manned by sailors, not marines - at least not infantry marines as there is also a artillery branch in marines. I think some background information about this would be good to add to the article. Was it usual or a even a standard procedure to have marines as Instructors of Gunnery in the Royal Navy? Or did Harvey simply made an unusual career? SGJ (talk) 16:27, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

It was customary for one of the turrets in major warships in the Royal Navy to be manned by Royal Marines. In the days of the sailing navy, larger warships carried a detachment of Marines for hand-to-hand fighting, landing parties and keeping order on board ship. With the development of modern naval warfare, these functions became less in demand and I guess the Marines asked for something else to do and were given the turret duty! Kennethgarland (talk) 19:32, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

I have yet to see a decent explanation of what the official duties of the Royal Marine Light Infantry and Royal Marine Artillery were at sea. Bandsmen were, I gather, counted as separate from both branches and were used in places such as the Transmitting Station operating fire control equipment. Both R.M.L.I. and R.M.A. officers and men saw service in turrets so they all must have been trained to a fair standard, the officers especially, as they would be expected to direct the turret's fire. At least one Royal Marine officer I know of directed half one battleship's secondary armament at Jutland, which suggests a comprehensive knowledge of gunnery.

For example, the turret officer of "X" Turret in H.M.S. Tiger at Jutland was Captain Alan Bourne, R.M.A., the Second Captain of Turret was a Sergeant Gliddon, R.M.A., and a Private Percival Lambert, R.M.L.I. who was in the working chamber made a suggestion which Bourne regarded as an "excellent idea", and he afterwards received a Russian decoration.

Some R.M.A. officers specialised in fortification (an officer was appointed to teach the subject at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich), and by WWI it had become common practise for certain R.M. officers to become wireless specialists - a Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Gardiner, R.M.L.I. became Fleet Wireless Officer of the Grand Fleet. If anyone has more information I'd love to hear it. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 22:10, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Flooding procedure?

Was the flooding a common procedure? Did the men carry buckets or hoses to execute the order or was flooding the chamber a feature of the device requiring the opening of a valve or something similar? 67.62.15.241 (talk) 17:09, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

It certainly wasn't common, it being a last resort of sorts. "A" magazine had been partly flooded by mistake during the Dogger Bank action, which led to (according to N.J.M. Campbell) the questioning of the order to flood "Q" magazine. I have seen no source which describes the location of the equipment for flooding the magazine, which would certainly have required valve(s) being opened. Once the magazine door had been shut, nothing else but air or water from the flooding mechanism could get in.

It is interesting to note that in his report, "Q" Turret survivor Private H. Willons, R.M.L.I. states that he heard Harvey order "Close Magazine Doors - Q Turret Out of Action." - and nothing about flooding the turret. Willons and a corporal were the ones who clipped shut the magazine door, and by his account (reproduced in The Beatty Papers Vol. I pp. 353-356) he and this corporal were the last men up the trunk, the shell handing party from below having preceded them. But then, in The Life and Letters of David Beatty, p. 233 W.S. Chalmers, then a Lieutenant and Assistant Navigator on Lion states that the sergeant who made it to the bridge said ""Q" turret has gone, sir. All the crew are killed, and we have flooded the magazines." while Captain Chatfield states that all he said was ""Q" turret knocked out, Sir." (Chatfield, The Navy and Defence, p. 143)

The actual memoirs of Alexander Grant, as opposed to the snippet on the internet, is going to be published in a form edited by his grandson by the University of Stellenbosch at some point in the near future. They may shed some light on the matter. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 22:36, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

I consulted a well-respected technical author. This was his answer; "Flooding of the magazines was done remotely via spindles operating the flood valves - these were opened from the main deck with alternative local position on the deck above the magazine." The matter of Harvey is discussed on p. 118 of John Roberts' Battlecruisers. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 07:49, 24 September 2008 (UTC)

Questions from Sandpiper

I have moved this here from my talk page as the more appropriate place for this discussion--Jackyd101 (talk) 23:22, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

I was just reading 'Fighting at jutland: the personal experiences of forty five officers and men of the british fleet' by Fawcett and hooper, which is available online at [2]. The book had a couple of US copyright expired photos of damage to Q turret which I have added to the article. It also has the following description (p.45):

Cordite Fire in "Q" Turret, H.M.S. "Lion." This description of events was ivritten by the Gunnery Officer of H.M.S. " Lion." He obtained the details after the action from the evidence of the two men who were the only survivors of the turret's crew. As the indirect result of a German shell penetrating the roof of the turret, 10 minutes after the action started, a cordite fire occurred in " Q " turret which nearly resulted in the magazine and so the ship blowing up. It appears that all the occupants of the gun-house proper, most of the silent-cabinet's crew, and most of theworking chamber's crew situated directly below the gun-house, were killed or severely wounded by the detonation of this shell in the gun-house. The Officer of the Turret, though himself severely wounded, realised that his turret was out of action and on fire, and also that the fire might reach the magazine. He accordingly passed his orders by the direct-voice pipe down to the handing-room below, to close the magazine doors and open the magazine flood valves. This order was promptly carried out, and did in fact prevent the flash from the cordite charges reaching the magazines, and so the ship from being blown up. After giving his orders to the handing-room the Officer of the Turret sent his Sergeant, who although very badly burnt and wounded was conscious and capable of movement, to make a personal report to the Captain to the effect that the turret was definitely out of action, and that the flooding of the magazine had been ordered. The Sergeant succeeded in clambering to the bridge and made his report. There were only two others of the turret's crew who escaped with their lives The damage and loss of life caused by the actual explosion of the German shell did not extend to the magazine handing-room and shell-room crews, none of whom were wounded, but unfortunately all of them lost their lives through the cordite fire which followed a few minutes afterwards. An inspection of the "state" in the turret, as soon after the action as was possible, indicated that this serious cordite fire originated in a curious way. The lever which controls the working of the left breech was blown to the rear, i.e., in the direction "open the breech," and accordingly the breech opened. The gun was loaded, and the shell in the gun being unseated by the shock of the hit slid down towards the breech, falling, with its cordite charge, down into the well which is in rear of the breech, and up which ammunition is supplied. The projectile and a half-burnt powder igniter from the cordiibe charge were found here afterwards. The burst of the enemy shell had started a fire in the gun-house, probably of men's clothing, or in fact of any inflammable material, and this must have reached down to the naked charge of cordite lying in the gun-well. This

cordite caught fire and, burning, passed the ignition to cordite which was waiting in both gun-loading cages, and so down the main ammunition supply trunk. The resulting flash is that shown in the photograph (facing this page), as it took its easiest course to escape namely, upwards through the roof of the turret by the hole made by the enemy shell-burst. The flash also passed down the main trunk into the shell-room and handing-room, and up the escape trunk into the switchboard compartment. In this latter compartment were stationed, besides the switchboard men and certain of the electrical repair party, the after medical party under the charge of a surgeon. All these men, together with the magazine and shellroom crews, were killed by the cordite fire. It is to be remarked that the clothes and bodies of these men were not burnt, and in cases where the hands had been raised involuntarily, palms forward, to protect the eyes, the backs of the hands and that part of the face actually screened by the hands were not even discoloured. Death to these men must have been instantaneous.'

It should be noted that the version which appears in that popular edition of Fawcett and Hooper is a much shortened version of the original in the 60-reminiscences edition, which is essentially based on a report by Lieutenant-Commander Longhurst, Lion's gunnery officer (and incidentally the man more concerned with Lion's gunnery efficiency than anyone else). There are more details on "Q" turret, such as the survival of the sick berth attendant. EDIT: Whoops, having just re-read the pertinent section of the original Fawcett and Hooper, Longhurst did mention 3 survivors of "Q" turret, the Marine sergeant, Willons and the un-named Sick Berth Attendant who survived the turret fire. Longhurst also seems to have believed that Harvey oorded the opening of the magazine flood valves, which he wrote "was promptly carried out." However, if Grant is to be believed all was not at well with certain aspects of Lion's gunnery arrangements, which would certainly have fallen on Longhurst's shoulders. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 10:36, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

yes I was wondering what was missing in the shortened version of the book, and also whether the reasons for shortening were to make it more readable, or, frankly, whether it had to do with getting Beatty's endorsement as first sea lord not to oppose publication. Sandpiper (talk) 12:15, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

While Beatty was capable of some despicable things (and one can't help feel he was partially responsible for Commander Seymour's suicide as well), I doubt that Beatty had anything to do with the excisions to the copy. Economy is the only logical explanation (not that everything can be pigeonholed as "logical" I grant you). There may be some connection perhaps in the fact that 1921, the year the original compilation was privately published, was the year that Longhurst himself died at the relatively early age of 39. He would have been the most likely person to have given Fawcett and Hooper his own account of the "Q" turret disaster, so with his death they may have felt unable to publish the whole thing. It is also interesting to note in his service jacket the commendation after Jutland which ended "and inflicted immense damage on the enemy." --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 13:02, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

I was sent on this line of argument by the introduction to 'Fighting at Jutland'(short version) where it says 'Our thanks are due to the admiralty for offering no obstacles whatsoever to the publication of these naval experiences.' Which to me suggests that the admiralty, under Beatty, could have done so and that this was a consideration for the authors. Beatty has a history of doctoring reports. I am very bugged about his much quoted 'there seems to be something wrong with our ships today'. I personally think he felt at least in some measure responsible and was very concerned to make sure he presented informmation in the most favourable light for himself. I mean, that memoir by Grant, had it been published at the time explaining how Lion (and presumably other ships) was a floating bonfire waiting for a match, is (ahem) dynamite. Self destructing ships, because someone ordered propellant stockpiled in the handling rooms? On Beatty's flagship? For years? Can you imagine such a report being allowed to be published nowadays, never mind then? I admit I need more info about the books history to follow this up. If you have the long version, does it have a publication date, and the same wording towards the end of the introduction? I understand the first printing was done privately. The history of other books I have seen suggest that the controvesial bits are the first to go when being shortened.

I don't know precisely where to follow this up but the scenario is: Beatty believes fast firing is essential. Pushes his men. It is established and agreed practice on his flagship to stockpile ammo in the handling room. His other ships do the same. Grant comes along and tactfully makes a fuss. Provides an alternative safer way of fast firing by good training. Lion is saved. This info has yet to reach the rest of the Battlecruisers which are still stockpiling ammo. This would be the unsafe practice which Beatty afterwards says has been discontinued? Thus the ships blew up not for bad design, but as an unintended consequence of his drive for rapid firing? Sandpiper (talk) 14:51, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

Reading this account and then the wiki article I was struck by the issue of what part the captain and stoker yeo had in this. If the captain gave the order to flood and yeo carried it out, what exactly did Harvey do and why would he get a VC?

I have recently been reading Brooks: Dreadnought gunnery and the battle of Jutland, which discusses the accuracy of gunnery on Beatty's battlecruisers, and says it was awfull. It is hard to reconcile this with the article statement that Under her new commander, Admiral David Beatty, Harvey turned Lion's gunnery into among the best in the fleet . It wasn't, ergo he couldn't have. Someone else commented on this on the talk page.

I am also struck by the claim Harvey was responsible for specific hits on Seydlitz, which initially stikes as unlikely. Harvey seems to have been commander of this one turret out of 4. These normally fired together, so how could anyone tell that Harvey's guns had been responsible for the hit on Seydlitz?

I am not quite clear exactly where Harvey was when the shell hit, thus his survival when everyone in the gun house was killed. Nor really, from the above, how severely he was wounded. The above suggests he might not have been prticularly injured before the cordite blast finished everyone off.

I'm slightly confused as to exactly where the shell struck. The pictures of the turret (from the above book) seem to suggest a hit on the join of the front plate and roof plate between the two guns.

There are some more comment on the talk page. Sandpiper (talk) 21:34, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

Right, to answer your questions as best I can:

1) there are currently two versions of what happened. firstly is the more widely known account, which is that the mortally wounded Harvey gave a desperate order for the main magazines to be sealed and flooded which prevented an already severe cordite fire from causing a catastrophic explosion and destroying the ship. The second is that the order to flood the magazine came from Captain Chatfield through Stoker Yeo as an immediate precaution once the shell had struck. These two accounts exist beside one another and have not been properly reconciled in any source I have read or has been raised here so far. My personal opinion based on my reading is that probably both Harvey and Chatfield gave the order more or less simultaneously. As the sailors who actually physically closed and flooded the magazines were killed shortly afterwards (an account that was in the article at one point described them as having died with their hands still on the doors), it is impossible to know precisely who they got the orders to do so from. Harvey was awarded the VC for having the presence of mind to give the order despite severe mortal wounds.

The quote posted above by harlsbottom says Chatfield gave the order, but found out Harvey had already flooded the magazine? I havn't read the sources, but this does not exactly sound like a contradiction? The cited online reference of memoirs of Chief Gunner Alexander Grant seems to have him wandering about the ship on his own initiative and chatting to people in the handling room about the shell in the turret, but before the fire. No mention of captains orders. If Grant is to be believed, that the turret crews were in the habit of piling up charges in the handling room, which he put a stop to, then the ships would have blown to pieces,Harvey or no Harvey, without him. The ref specifically states that all the officers in charge of turrets (which must include harvey) were against Grant's propsed changes. Slightly off topic, but one might presume this practice applied generally and might explain other ships blowing up? Sandpiper (talk)

2) The information about Harvey's gunnery comes from the Snelling book, which does describe Harvey's effect on the ship's in the terms given in the article. Whether this is an entirely accurate depiction is up for debate, as it is generally accepted that British gunnery as a whole was terrible throughout the war.

Jellicoe is on record as reprimanding (politely) Beatty for the terrible gunnery of his squadron as compared to the rest of the fleet. Beatty promised it would be fine on the day. (Brooks, presumably et al) I see snelling is listed published 2002. Does he say where his information came from?Sandpiper (talk)

3)You are right, that hit was ascribed to Lion, not to Harvey especially. This looks like a misattribution I made in my original write up that I missed when making corrections, apologies.

Ok, see you changed 'Harvey' to 'Lion, but that paragraph still starts by claiming 'harveys guns caused damage', and the exact same argument seems to apply here. Only 1/4 were his guns and I don't see any argument he was responsible overall for ships gunnery? Is there any evidence he did anything except command his own turret? Brooks quotes Beatty and Chatsfield disagreeing on whether they should fight at long or short ranges in light of the Dogger bank experience: not obvious Harvey had any input into strategy or training? Sandpiper (talk)

4)Harvey was in the "silent-cabinet" chamber at the rear of the turret, which is why he survived the initial blast albeit badly wounded (he is the "officer of the turret" mentioned above. Although the sources dispute the exact nature of his wounds (from losing both legs to very severe burns), all that I have seen agree that his injuries were terrible and that he probably died from them before the cordite explosion.

5)You are correct, and there used to be a short section on this in the article. The shell struck the joint between the front plate and the roof plate, in an area which was later shown to be of very weak construction (it has been suggested that this problem also caused the loss of Queen Mary and Invincible) and punched stright through, exploding inside the turret and beginning the fire that caused the cordite explosion.

The photo of the plate in question shows the damage on an edge, but it looks to me sufficiently off-edge to demonstrate the shell was quite happily boring a hole through without help from pushing open a seam. The turret photo, on the other hand, doesnt seem to show much holding the top plate on, so it might be relatively easy to blow off, either the shell coming in pushing it up or the internal explosion. The book doesn't say whether the turret top plate has been removed by engineers or disappeared in the battle. It says they removed the front plate with the shell hole. Sandpiper (talk)

Hope these answers helped.--Jackyd101 (talk) 23:22, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

There is no absolutely no doubt that Harvey ordered the magazine doors shut; vide the testimony of Private Willons, R.M.L.I., who recollected after the battle "Standing by the magazine door I heard the Officer of Turret give the order (CLOSE MAGAZINE DOORS—Q TURRET OUT OF ACTION)." (Beatty Papers, I, p. 354.) The late N. J. M. Campbell, who is also one of the few people to write thoroughly on British battle cruisers, obtained his version of events from Jellicoe's memorandum of 16 June, 1916, later reproduced in the Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo Order 15 (or 167, depending on the series). In it, Jellicoe referred to Harvey only in this sentence: "Sergeant-Major was sent by Officer of Quarter to bridge with a message to say turret was out of action." (ADM 137/2134). However, ccording to John Roberts, probably the finest Royal Naval technical historian still around, in his Battlecruisers, p. 116, from the official account one also gets the impression that it was Alexander Grant who ordered the magazine flooded, but that his order was superseded by that from the bridge (and Captain Chatfield). So one now has THREE possible people who ordered the flooding of the magazine; Harvey, Grant and Chatfield. Due to the standing order after Dogger Bank and the accidental flooding of "A" magazine, it would seem likely however that even if an order were given by either Harvey or Grant, it would have been delayed while it was confirmed, and that Chatfield's (the Captain of the Ship) order to flood would be the one obeyed. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 09:16, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

As I just posted above in edit conflict with you, Grants memoir online says he found the magazine had already been flooded on Harveys order, no mention of captains orders. Sandpiper (talk) 10:21, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

That conflicts with the account of "the Chief Gunner's" actions as described in the afore mentioned memorandum by Jellicoe, according to which when Grant arrived on the scene the magazine had NOT yet been flooded and no orders received from anyone. Grant was writing many years later, and I'm sure like most people he would prefer the idea that Harvey had ordered the magazine flooded to stand. Sounds slightly conspiratorial, but I would believe the earlier account than the later one (which incidentally is being published in the near future). --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 10:27, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

its six of one and half a dozen of the other: Presumably Jellicoe was only in a position to comment on what he had been told through the chain of command, whereas Grant (nearly) saw it happen.Sandpiper (talk) 12:31, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

Since Jellicoe's report specifically mentions Grant and what he did, one can only assume that Grant had reported on his activities, and in part Jellicoe based his comments on these. I find it far more likely that Grant's later account (written in the 1940s I understand) is faulty as compared to anything he would have reported on immediately after the battle. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 12:46, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

Can't honestly say I know much about how navy chains of command work, but I don't get the impression grant would have just popped in to Jellicoe to tell him what he had been doing. Thus any report must have gone via others, who may have re-written anything they cared to. Or not, of course. Butit is equally unreasonable to assume that because a memoir by Grant only appeared in that form 20 years later that he had no notes, diaries, letters, draft reports, whatever which he might have made much earlier. These military chaps seem to have walked away with libraries full of paperwork. Sandpiper (talk) 14:51, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

You may have a point Sandpiper, however Grant would have been busier than your usual letter-writing officer, being expected as Chief Gunner to be here there and everywhere in the ship.

At any rate, on Friday I found an account in the Liddle Collection of Great War reminiscences which backs up Campbell's version of events. Midshipman Frederick Clayton Woodhouse, Royal Navy was the assistant to the Officer of the Turret in "A" Turret in Lion during the battle. Lion, by the Report of Proceedings written by Captain Chatfield, opened fire at 3.47. Woodhouse, who "was writing notes as well as I could", has the ship opening fire at 4.47 (the discrepancy in time standard aside, the times match). Not long afterwards, on page 4 of his account written soon after the battle, he writes: "At 5.0 we heard from the T.S. the order to flood Q magazine." By any standard account of what happened to Lion at Jutland, that suggests that the order to flood was given immediately, and rather likely it came from the bridge.

Out of pure interest, here is Woodhouse's version of what happened in "Q" Turret;

“ I did not go to see it till after the action when most of the bodies had been removed. The shell burst on top of the left gun & blew off the front & roof. The inside of the turret caught fire & the major, who was not badly wounded sent the sergeant major to report the turret out of action. 10 minutes later the cordite in the gunloading cages & waiting trays exploded & the flash travelled right down the trunk & exploded the cordite in the hoppers & also went into the shell room & killed everybody there. The [7] magazine doors had just been closed, a fact which saved the ship. Everyone in the handing room was killed & the flash travelled up through the hatches to the switchboard, killing Dr Moon, Mr Good [Goad?] & all the men there, then went right up & along the mess deck, & the blast of it was noticed by the people in the wireless office. Another hit by the canteen had wiped out nearly the whole of the after repair party. ”

I still can't follow precisely what action or behaviour of Harvey earned the VC. The account says he gave an order to flood the magazine. That can't be the whole story : he was doing his job, even if mortally wounded. Without wishing to sound cynical or unfeeling, in what way did he go beyond normal expectations to give the order ? There must be more to it. Was he actually in the magazine he had ordered to be flooed, i.e. was he facing being drowned ? Even if that was the case, I would assume that with the lives of 1000 others possibly at stake this was an officer's duty. Was this a case of the top brass saying "our gunnery was shite, our shells didn't explode, our ships did... we need some VCs to distract the public" ? Rod Rcbutcher (talk) 12:25, 11 November 2008 (UTC)

I must agree it does sound a bit like that. Sandpiper (talk) 09:27, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

At the top of this page is a quote by Harlsbottom from Captain Chatfild's memoirs, where Chatfield says that although he ordered flooding, it transpired Harvey had already done it. So there would be no inconsistency in people hearing and passing on the captains orders to flood, both having given such orders. I am concerned that your quote above states harvey was not much injured. Alexander Grant's account (referenced on the page) says he was wandering about the ship inspecting things and went to Q turret, which he discovered by talking to people in the handing room that the turrett had been put out of action. He noted that enough time had elapsed since an order was given by someone and action taken, for the magazines to now be flooded. He then went to inspect X magazine, stayed not very long, then returned to Q just in time to nearly be killed in the explosion. Campbell/Jutland says Lion was hit on Q turrett at 1600 and it caught fire at 1628. So, hearing an order to flood at exactly 5.0 (presumably 1600 in the shifted time scheme) seems extraordinarily quick...unless harvey's orders would have gone directly to the transmitting station where the witness heard them? I can hardly see the captain ordering flooding so quickly, especially when one or other account says the bridge werent even aware immediately that there was a problem with Q turrett. Is there any evidence in the account, or does anyone know how the telephone system worked, which might suggest a general order to flood by Harvey would have gone to the TS as well as the magazine? Logically, if he was reasonably unhurt and communications still working, he would have reported ordering flooding by phone himself.

As to why Harvey got a VC, i was in a bookstore the other day looking at a book on WWI naval VCs and couldn't find him at all. I didnt read it all, obviously, but he didn't seem to be where I would have expected to find him. Sandpiper (talk) 22:04, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

shell room

just a note that there is a further account by private Willons (mentioned above) that the shell room was not flooded untill later.

He says the handling room switchboard, flat and shell room were completely burned out, the crew were lying in all directions, some still hanging on the ladder in a last attempt to get out. On finding that it was impossible to salve any of the projectiles for use in the other turrets the shell room was flooded. The captain of marines sent for me then to go to the gunhouse to find the major and remove some of the casualties. I got into the the gunhouse through the manhole on top and assisted by another marine got out seven people from the right cabinet. tThe chaplain was one of these. The major was in the rangefinder position close by the voice-pipe. There was a great deal of smoke coming from behind the ready use shell bin and we gave the alarm that four common shell were being roasted and were likely to cause another explosion. With the assistance of several more marines the fire was put out and the remainder of the casualties were removed. They were then taken aft, identified if possible and sewn into hammocks. This carried on most of the night of the 31st May.

So the shell room wasn't flooded, and indeed had a fire in it. Sandpiper (talk) 07:59, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

The first part of the quote should read, "The Handing Room, Switchboard, Flat and Shell Room were completely burned out..." The shell-room wasn't flooded because the likelihood of flash setting off shells was unlikely. It was flooded afterwards as a precaution. The ready use shell bin referred to was in the gun house and not in the shell room below. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 16:42, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

This should not be a FA

I have to say I do not think this article reflects well on wikipedia and therefore should not be a FA. It starts with a blunt inaccuracy, which has remained there for some time despite pointing it out. Lion was one of the worse ships in the fleet as regards gunnery, thus Harvey can hardly have made it one of the best, and since he was just commander of one of its turrets, could hardly have been responsible for its overall performance anyway. Either fix it, or I am going to request its demotion. The text goes on to be somewhat contradictory, not surprising since accounts of what really happened are somewhat contradictory. Fine, if that's what the situation really is, then we report it, but as things stand we do not explain this complex mess. Sandpiper (talk) 09:32, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

As the person who built it up to FA I will respond, but I'm afraid that at the moment I don't have the time, sources or patience to deal with the issues involved in this article. The two principal problems you raise are important ones, but not insurmountable provided someone is willing to put the work in. The first, regarding gunnery, is relatively simple: Snelling, the book used to source most of the information about his life not relating to the Battle of Jutland, praises Harvey's work on Lion very highly and also quotes a number of official reports that praise his standard of gunnery. However these reports, although used in association with his time on Lion, actually date from 1913 and earlier. If you can provide a source that criticises Lion's gunnery and contradicts this then I think that would be a good addition to the article. Harvey's position on aboard ship is also a little unclear to me (maybe Harlsbottom, who knows far more on the subject, can help with this). He was certainly the senior Royal Marines officer on board, but I am unclear on what his status as regards the overall gunnery of the ship was. I have rephrased two sentences of the article to reflect this uncertainty (at least until it can be cleared up).

The second problem is far more serious and I'm afraid that I cannot solve it. It seems there are several conflicting accounts of what happened in the turret. I have access to three (from which I originally wrote the article), but it seems the debate is wider than I realised and that there are other, contradictory, sources that I did not consult. I suggest someone more familiar with the events and better able to source them tackles this to try to provide greater balance. As mentioned above, I will not be able to participate much in this article's further improvement and if it has to be delisted from FA as a result then unfortunately that will have to be the case. Regards--Jackyd101 (talk) 23:11, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

By coincidence I've started work on an article on the mass of contradictory evidence here. I started it yesterday in answer to someone on a forum who refused to accept Wikipedia as a source so I got bitchy and started plugging in all the information I've been collecting on it. UPDATE: The number of conflicting accounts from people who were actually there is enough to drive one around the bend. Everything written after is just indescribable.

I would hate an FA article to be possibly demoted, especially after all the work Jackyd101 put into it as well as putting up with my edits to it. Harvey's role is peculiar, as he seems to have just acted as a very senior turret officer (Majors ranked with Commanders, i.e. second-in-commands, on board large warships). Other Royal Marine officers in other big ships at Jutland were given gunnery duties such as control officer for secondary armament or as spotting officer. Harvey had a deputy in the person of Captain Francis R. Jones, R.M.L.I. who presumably could have acted as turret officer in the event Harvey was given another task, which he evidently wasn't. One can only assume that his role in Lion's gunnery was minimal, especially after the introduction of director firing. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 09:13, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Can't tell you exactly what page, but the last book i was reading on this, Gordon 'rules of the game', goes into the issue of bad gunnery by the battlecruiser fleet generally, which Jellicoe had written to beatty about. It would seem to follow from this, that the ship could not have been noted for good gunnery, but entirely the reverse. others comment that 'Queen mary' was the best battlecruiser at gunnery. Specifically, three battlecruisers had been sent away for gunnery practice at the time of the battle because of this problem. (not, i think, because they were worst, but because they made up one complete squadron)

I notice someone has removed the particularly objectionable sentence from the intro, but the next sentence also is objectionable, the guns under his command sank two german cruisers. How could anyone know, when he was commanding just 2 of 8 guns firing simultaneously at the same target using the same targeting coordinates? Similarly, later, it says Harvey's guns again caused severe damage to a German force at the Battle of Dogger bank . They did, did they? And what about serving on many large warships as gunnery training officer and gun commander. Define 'many'. I think I have seen descriptions from at least a couple of gunnery officers senior to harvey on Lion, and the fact of him ending up as a turret commander after this long career as an instructor makes you wonder how come, if he really was any good at it. The conflicting evidence suggests to me that whatever source provided the info extolling Harvey's fame, has seriously been laying it on with a trowell trying to puff up his reputation. Ok, wiki simply quotes other people, but in this situation it seems likely this was WWI propaganda and we are still propagating it. I am afraid I would not have wished to see this article on wiki's front page as it stands now. Superficially it seems perfectly fine, untill you start considering the statements carefully. I am left with the suspicion that beatty's own propaganda war to enhance his own reputation may have taken up the cause of Harvey. (though admittedly the admiralty as a whole was desperate for heroes at the time) User:Sandpiper 23:46, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Although I was sympathetic to your objections above, this reads like a lot of OR and supposition. Accurate or not, there is a source that backs up the statements you criticise and that source is referenced in the article. It is up to you to provide alternative sources contradicting it if you disagree. I'm not saying that you may not have a point, but Iam saying you need to provide more convincing proof that the article is currently inaccurate.--Jackyd101 (talk) 00:39, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

Are you suggesting that as commander of just one turrett, it is possible to say that harvey's guns were responsible for sinking two cruisers? The statement strikes me as simply impossible to determine, which coupled with the other refutable statements discredits the entire source as containing demonstrable inaccuracies. Think about it, just how could it be determined his shells hit and the others missed? Do you disagree that it was (1) an incorrect statement that Lion's gunnery was good, or (2) that the suggestion he was personally responsible for the sinkings is not credible, or (3) that all in all this places considerable doubt on the entire source (assuming this comes from the same place, which seems likely from its tone). By the way, did you look at Harlesbottom's draft page which sets out some of the issues about this?

Incidentally, re-reading the article, Lion's gunnery was terrible at the battle (as was that of most of Beatty's battlecruisers, and lion was certainly not responsible for nearly sinking Seydlitz. I don't have the right refs to hand to check exactly who did hit her. User:Sandpiper 18:32, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

The question is none of the above, instead resting on the issue of exactly what degree of command, responsibility or control Harvey had over Lion's gunnery. If, as the source suggests, he had a great degree of responsibility, then the claim that he was at least partially responsible for sinking two cruisers (at Heligoland Bight) and nearly destroying Seydlitz (at Dogger Bank, not Jutland: you are confused about which battle is being discussed) is accurate. If, as you claim (although without providing any references), that Harvey was only in charge of one turret, then the claim should be more qualified: i.e. he may have done these things, and his shells may have caused these things. I am not saying that the source I used is definately accurate: it certainly makes some unusual ommissions and becomes confused at times in its description of the Battle of Jutland. However, until you can provide a source that contradicts it then your statements are OR, supposition and not grounds to make widespread changes to the article. I did read Harlsbottom's article and I thought it was interesting but not really relevant to the above since it was about a seperate problem within the article: the events at Jutland.--Jackyd101 (talk) 21:02, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

While I see your point about lack of references, I'm not impressed by what can only be called Snelling's ignorance. The man responsible to the Captain for Lion's gunnery was and always would have been the Gunnery Officer. That's the sort of statement that doesn't need citing, it's so obvious. This statement for example, if lifted from Snelling, is absurd: "Lion had eight 13.5-inch guns and Harvey was stationed in an office under Q turret directing their operation and fire." The gunnery officer directed the fire of the ship from either the conning tower or the spotting top. The only thing Harvey was directing was "Q" turret from his "silent cabinet" in the back of the gun house - you couldn't direct anything else from there. There is an offical cross-section of "Q" turret from sister-ship Queen Mary in Battlecruisers by John Roberts, p. 108. There are no offices beneath the revolving structure and beneath the trunk there is the ship's bottom. Unless Snelling specifically states that "Q" turret scored hits on ships at Heligoland Bight and Dogger Bank, statements like "Harvey's guns" should be removed. How many errors does a source have to have nefore it is declared unreliable? --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 10:43, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

I think it probably does need citing for non-experts actually, and if you want to replace the source with something else then please go ahead. As I said, I don't really have the time to deal with this article at the moment.--Jackyd101 (talk) 12:09, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

You're quite right, I misunderstood that the article was not referring to Jutland, which was harvey's claim to fame, when talking about Seydlitz. A slight rephrase is perhaps needed to make clear which battle was meant, but this is less important than the issue of how harvey might reasonably be credited with the near kill. I quote you a pge of Brooks, 'Dreadnought gunnery and the battle of Jutland p. 226-227, where he discusses Dogger bank,

“ Dreyer was also unimpressed by other aspects of the gunnery of Beatty's ships at the Dogger Bank.

"The unsupported Spotting of the Battle Cruisers does not seem to have been very good."

In fact, it is clear that, in general, `their reputation for gunnery was very very shaky indeed' and `that the Battle Cruisers' shooting was rotten'.

An officer posted to Invincible reported back to Barham's first lieutenant that `he was shocked by the standard of efficiency he encountered. 159

Undoubtedly, the battlecruisers, based in the Forth, found practice hard to get." However, there also seems to have been a feeling in the Grand Fleet that they did not try hard enough.

Ships from the Forth, visiting Scapa for gunnery drills, found that `the Battle Cruisers' name up here is mud, owing to the inefficiency of their gunnery and the general casualness and lack of concentration with which they appear to treat the war.160

In November 1915, Jellicoe wrote to Beatty:

I am afraid you must have been very disappointed at Lion and Tiger's battle practice results. I can't understand how a control officer of experience could have made such a blunder as that made by Lion's ... I fear the rapidity ideas were carried to excess in one case (Queen Mary I think). Also the RF operators were bad. It is most difficult for you to give them proper practice I know.

Even before the war, Beatty's battlecruiser orders had emphasised the importance of maximising the rate of hitting and had recommended breaking into rapid independent after the first or second straddle.162 Now Beatty responded, with the same complacency that he had shown after the Dogger Bank:

Yes indeed it was a terrible disappointment the battle practice of Lion and Tiger ... The other three were not bad but undoubtedly as you say we could do with much more practice at sea ... I do not think you will be let down by the gunnery of the battle-cruisers when our day comes. ... on the subject of rapidity of fire [I] feel very strongly ... and think we should endeavour to quicken up our firing ... the Germans certainly do fire 5 to our 2.

”

(thats a quote from captain Frederic Dreyer, something of a a gunnery expert}. From what you say above, then, Snelling does not produce evidence of harvey's good gunnery post 1913, and other sources claim the ships gunnery generally was rotten. Hmm. Sandpiper (talk) 23:06, 1 March 2009 (UTC) By the way, the intro says he 'ordered the blazing magazine to be flooded'? Once again, naturally off the top of my head, if the propellant had already been 'blazing' we would not now be having this debate because the ship would have exploded. The magazine, as i understand it, did not contain shells at all. It contained propellant. The shells were stored in a different room on a different deck and as the other quote above indicates, apparently did suffer a fire without exploding. However it would seem, from the quote by grant, that harvey was well dead before that fire. The battle of heligoland bight might better be described as confused than bitter. The German cruisers were outgunned and outclassed by the British battlecruisers, Hipper's battlecruisers were still in port and unable to go to sea untill the high tide. Beatty had to be very careful to leave before they could get out. I don't think Lion dropped back to engage Blucher, it just dropped back. The problem at Dogger bank was exactly that Beatty got left behind and his ships mistakenly went after Blucher. Had he been there as well, he might have been able to order them after the fleeing germans. This again reads like a puff piece designed to exaggerate the importance of Lion/beatty/Harvey, British propaganda. 'Staggering across the wreckage of the turret'? Did they check the security video afterwards? Harley, i don't know if you mighy know, but i am suspicious of the claim the magazine doors were saved by the weight of water behind them. Yes, i know it would be virtually impossible to open a door against the weight of water, but it would also be virtually impossible to buckle it by hand. I am uncertain how the force required to buckle the unaided door might compare to the force required to move the water. Sandpiper (talk) 01:05, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

quote from stoker maclachlan

there is a quote in Jutland 1916 by steel and hart from stoker maclachlan about events after the the battle. It seems to be from a recorded interview, so might have been some time after the events,

“ Three of us went into the turret, we knew who had saved us with his dying breath. We found a charred piece of humanity near where the voice pipe was. We stood still, dazed, knowing that to him we owed our lives. It seemed at the same time we had better get something special to put these poor remains in. We went down to the nearest officers cabin that was intact and we found some linen. We took it up with us and we wrapped him in that. We took him down to the after deck and told the officer in charge there. ”

Which doesnt go to explain much about the timings, but I suppose does say that the crew at the time believed he had saved the ship. Sandpiper (talk) 07:44, 31 March 2009 (UTC)

It says that one crew member believed he saved the ship. Maybe the other two with Maclachlan believed it, maybe his mess. Not the crew. I'm assuming (without my copy of Steel and Hart to hand) that Maclachlan's account is taken from the I.W.M. collections. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 07:52, 31 March 2009 (UTC)

I'm away at the moment, but I think it just said it was an IWM recording and quoted a ref number. Yes, it literally may only say that he and his immediate companions knew Harvey had saved the ship. I am thoroughly skeptical about the dying breath bit. From what the other witnesses have said, I think the charring must either have been post-mortem (if it literally was his dying command some time before the fire), or he ordered the flooding and then sat about waiting for rescue and was later killed by the fire. But if these people believed Francis had given orders that saved the ship, someone must have told them this, which is what makes me think this suggests it was widely believed on the ship. Alternatively, when Maclachlan says 'we' he might mean the entire crew. I think this was supposed to be all happening after the battle, when people finally had time to go round collecting bodies and tidying up. So time enough for everyone to have discussed what had happened.

I'm not sure what I personally think about this incident or how I might have described it if I was the captain making a report. It isn't really a selfless act of bravery, doing something which was presumably part of your duties, which put you at no extra risk and which might prevent you personally from being blown to pieces. On the other hand, he might have saved the ship and that would have deserved credit. I think it possible that official accounts might have underplayed his part prcisely because it was not very heroic, just having important consequences. That is, presuming he was instrumental in the early flooding, over which there also appears some confusion. Sandpiper (talk) 09:00, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

You are still making unsubstantiated assumptions based on guesswork: these ideas cannot be incorporated into the article until you provide reliable sources backing them up.--Jackyd101 (talk) 10:54, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

So? I clearly state what is my opinion. My opinion is that the content of this article is suspicious. Any wiki editor would take such comments seriously, particularly in a FA, and strive to ensure the content was accurate. we are not here to get stars for articles accepted as FA, but to ensure those articles are correct. It reflects very badly on wikipedia, not to mention its editors, if we claim an article is the best possible when, irrespective of whether it is nominally sourced according to the rules, it has doubtful content. The sources discussed so far are less than clear and significantly contradictory. Sandpiper (talk) 21:11, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

(outdent) I've not looked at this issue for a few weeks now due business. I've looked at the contemporary accounts of three officers from Lion and none mention Harvey as having saved the ship. Private Willons' account is not dated but one cannot imagine that a copy of his account would find its way into Beatty's papers many years later. Most if not all I.W.M. accounts (including Grant's) were written decades later and there is always the danger that they incorporate more than actual memories.

I'm just reading through a doctoral thesis written in 1998 about the Jutland Controversy, and there is some fascinating hitherto unpublished information in it. For example, when Arthur Marder first made use of Grant's memoir in the 1966 edition of From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume III, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake was moved to write to the editor of The Naval Review that Grant must have invented some of the oft-quoted material about Lion's cordite precautions or lied to him when they spoke immediately after the battle as none of it was mentioned. (Letter to Vice-Admiral Mansergh, 13 February, 1967. Blake Papers at the National Maritime Museum, BLE 13) The circumstances of their meeting were that Jellicoe sent three gunnery experts down to Rosyth after the battle to check the B.C.F.'s gunnery records. Dreyer, Iron Duke's Captain and probably the most accomplished gunnery officer in the navy at that time; Commander Charlie Forbes, Jellicoe's Flag Commander and gunnery expert; and Blake.

Blake was Gunnery Officer of Iron Duke at Jutland and later went on to be one of the most promising officers in the navy before a pulmonary thrombosis compelled him to resign in 1938. The Admiralty literally begged him to stay on, such was its opinion of him. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 19:31, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure exactly which bits of Grants account you mean. If you mean about the mess of mixed up cordite and it being stacked all over, I don't think i would find it inconsistent if grant did not mention this to someone making enquiries about procedures on the ship. From what I remember, Grant said he went to some pains to avoid upsetting people when he got the cordite replaced and procedures changed. Is he likely to 'shop' his commanding officer(s) for incompetent handling of ammunition when an inspector came around? Would an officer in that nepotism ridden navy be on his commander's (Beatty) side in a scandal, or set himself against the man best placed to destroy his career? One of the nicer things about accounts after the event is that sometimes people may feel freer to say certain things they could not have said at the time, though I agree with you that memories may not be reliable or they may be pushing some other agenda. I don't know if Blake explained more about the circumstances, whether this was something he was specifically investigating, or it was just incidental chatting. Admittedly, most of the navy was at Jutland, but the three officers you describe sound like a hand-picked jellicoe hit squad, which might have made it all the more likely for Beatty's people to close ranks against them.

This is arguably beyond the scope of wiki, but my internal list of unresolved issues still has an item for Beatty's handling of cordite, whether his views influenced his captains and whether this affected cordite handling generally throughout the battlecruisers. It has not been exlained to my satisfaction why Lion failed to explode, when two others did. OK, the magazine was probably flooded when the major fire broke out, but she survived the initial shell which destroyed the turrett. Havn't got round to 'admirals in collision' yet, but this whole battle was a scene of cover-up's right left and centre and I'm not convinced the navy had changed since camperdown sank victoria by following unchallenged incompetent orders. I havn't investigated Harvey's tale either, but the impression I get from what I take to be a reasonable source used here, is that his deeds were grossly hyped. It might be they were hyped officially because generally heroes were wanted, or he could possibly have been put forward as the official explanation of how Lion survived when others did not. Do you know what happened to Grant's later career, did Beatty in his later radiance shine upon him? Is it known what sort of report Blake made at the time? Did Blake feel Grant was a liar on the latter occasion, or earlier occasion? Either way, there is the difficulty that Blake would have a vested interest in arguing Grant's later statements were wrong, because if not it implies Blake was hoodwinked at the time? Sandpiper (talk) 22:38, 15 April 2009 (UTC)

Yates

As a more modern cut on this, heres a quote from a phd about Jutland by James Yates, p.358, 'The Jutland controversy: a case study in intra service rivalry', hull university,1998

“ In 1934, Beatty noted that the loss of the battlecruisers was "not the fault of anybody in them, poor souls, but of faulty design... [the German battlecruisers] were too stoutly built whereas ours went up in a blue flame on the smallest provocation. " (unacknowledged quote in Tarrant, p. 98).

It would seem that, even in 1934, Beatty was totally unaware of what had saved Lion. Although known to those directly involved, it seemed that Lion's ammunition handling system was very much Chatfield's and Grant's secret. This was largely responsible for leading people into thinking that the ships' design was at fault and this gained universal acceptance, but it also clouded understanding of the manner in which the BCF had worked and performed. This quote from Beatty could not be more wrong, yet he had to believe it. After the war, Seydlitz's experience at Dogger Bank, when 62 charges had ignited and jeopardised the ship, was common knowledge. Lion adopted similar precautions against igniting explosives before Jutland, but not many ever seemed to make the link to the causes of the losses, which was a very painful thing to admit to. It was sufficient to most to accept the first remotely plausible answer, that the BCF were let down by poor shells and bad ship design.

”

He also seems to think Grant saved the ship, although if Beatty wasn't aware of this at the time, it might mean other senior people werent and thus made it more likely Harvey would get credit. If I went into conspiracy theory mode, it might even be the case that Harvey was the acceptable explanation of how Lion survived when other ships exploded. If simply handling ammunition better had saved Lion, then perversely heads might have rolled if it was felt something could have been done to save the other ships and had not been. Sandpiper (talk) 07:59, 31 July 2009 (UTC)

Possible mistake?

This sentence regarding HMS Queen Mary: "just minutes after that HMS Queen Mary exploded "like a puffball" in one huge column of grey smoke, killing 1,275 sailors". The article about HMS Queen Mary says the following: "1,266 crewmen were lost; eighteen survivors were picked up by the destroyers HMS Laurel, HMS Petard, and HMS Tipperary, and two by the Germans.", so there seems to be a possible mistake regarding how many sailors lost their lives. Ulflarsen (talk) 20:42, 23 September 2017 (UTC)