Design and capability of aircraft carriers during World War II

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Main article: Aircraft carrier operations during World War II

Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea.[1][2][3] Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa.[4][failed verification] Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of materiel, food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union,[a] her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for the Red Army to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk.[5][6][7][unreliable source?][8][9]

Without victories at sea in the Pacific theater, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Saipan, The Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft.[10] Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez canal, and through the Panama Canal. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian Admiral Herbert Richmond stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".[11]

Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles,[12] supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones.

Design considerations[edit]

Aircraft carrier design involved trade-offs between offensive striking power and defensive survivability. The more carrier tonnage allocated to guns and armor for protection, the less was available for carrying and launching aircraft, the warship's principal weapon. Combatant nations of World War II placed varying emphasis on these factors depending upon conditions in their principal operating theater, their preferred operating tactics, and their industrial capability. Experts continue to debate whether increasing carrier survivability through increased anti-aircraft armament and armored flight decks was optimal during World War II since adding the weight to do so necessitated reductions in the number of carrier aircraft available to inflict damage upon the enemy. For example, would designing the USS Yorktown so that it was more likely to survive the punishment it took at the Battle of Midway have been desirable if its carrying a smaller air group resulted in fewer Japanese carriers being sunk?[13]

Initial constraints on design[edit]

Aircraft carrier design prior to the outbreak of World War II had been constrained by limitations of international agreements among the major naval powers which were intended to avoid an arms race over capital ships. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited individual carrier displacement for the five parties to 27,000 long tons, except that each could convert up to two existing battleship hulls to carriers with displacements up to 33,000 tons. Armament for carriers was limited to a maximum of ten guns with a maximum caliber of 8 inches (203 mm). Aircraft carriers were defined as having displacements of at least 10,000 tons and used exclusively for launching and landing aircraft. The total tonnage limit for carriers was 135,000 tons for UK and America, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 tons for Italy and France.[14] Any carrier built could not be replaced for twenty years but carriers already built were deemed "experimental" and could be replaced at any time. Carriers under 10,000 tons were not included in the definition. .[15]

"Experimental" designs[edit]

Only four aircraft carriers were in service or under construction at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was agreed to. These four were considered "experimental" and not included as part of the treaty's overall tonnage limitations. They were relatively small in size and carried a relatively small number of aircraft. These were HMS Argus (the first full deck aircraft carrier), USS Langley (a converted collier), IJN Hōshō (the first purpose built carrier to enter service), and HMS Hermes (the first purpose designed carrier).[b]

Evolving design emphasis by each combatant[edit]

Japanese aircraft carriers[edit]

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) emphasized offensive capability consistent with their strategic vision of orchestrating and winning a single, decisive battle. Limited by treaties to having fewer capital ships than the US and UK, Japan's planning emphasized ways to degrade enemy fleets before they arrived at battle by extending the capability of IJN weapon systems. Aircraft as well as torpedoes had longer ranges than American or British counterparts.

The following table shows some key performance parameters for Japanese aircraft carriers. Carriers are listed in order of commissioning date within each carrier type (fleet, light, escort).

Characteristics of Japanese aircraft carriers[c]
Commission date[d] Class Standard
displacement[e] 		Length
(ft) 		Speed
(kn) 		Range
(nmi)[f] 		Crew Operational

aircraft[g]

Reserve

aircraft

Lost to
Fleet carriers
1 Akagi 25-May-27 Akagi 36,500 855 31 8,200 1,630 66 15 1 bomb[h]
2 Kaga 30-Nov-29 Kaga 38,200 812 28 10,000 1,708 72 18 4 bombs
3 Soryu 29-Sep-37 Soryu 15,900 746 34 7,750 1,103 63 8 3 bombs
4 Hiryu 05-Jul-39 Soryu 17,300 746 34 10,330 1,103 57 16 4 bombs
5 Shokaku 08-Aug-41 Shokaku 26,675 845 34 9,700 1,660 72 12 4 torpedoes
6 Zuikaku 25-Sep-41 Shokaku 29,800 845 34 -- 1,660 72 12 9 bombs+7 torp
7 Junyo 03-May-42 Hiyo 24,100 718 25.5 10,000 1,224 48 5 --
8 Hiyo 31-Jul-42 Hiyo 26,949 718 25.5 10,000 1,224 48 5 2 torpedoes
9 Taiho 07-Mar-44 Taiho 29,300 855 33 10,000 1,751 75 0 1 sub. torpedo
10 Unryu 06-Aug-44 Unryu 17,150 742 34 8,000 1,595 57 6 2 sub. torpedoes
11 Amagi 10-Aug-44 Unryu 17,460 742 34 9,700 1,595 57 6 many bombs
12 Katsuragi 15-Oct-44 Unryu 17,260 742 33 9,700 1,595 57 6 --
13 Shinano 19-Nov-44 Shinano 64,800 873 27 10,000 2,400 47 0 4 sub. Torpedoes
Light carriers
1 Hosho 27-Dec-22 Hosho 7,470 551 25 8,680 550 21 0 --
2 Ryujo 09-May-33 Ryujo 12,732 590 29 10,000 924 48 0 4 bm+1 torp
3 Zuiho 27-Dec-40 Zuiho 11,262 712 28 9,236 785 30 0 many bm +2 torp
4 Shoho 30-Nov-41 Zuiho 11,262 674 28 9,236 785 30 0 13 bm+7 torp
5 Ryuho 28-Nov-42 Ryuho 13,360 707 26 8,000 989 30 0 --
6 Chitose 01-Nov-43 Chitose 11,190 631 29 11,000 1,500 30 0 3 torpedoes
7 Chiyoda 21-Dec-43 Chitose 11,190 631 29 11,810 1,500 30 0 4 bombs + gunfire
Escort carriers
1 Taiyo 15-Sep-41 Taiyo 17,830 591 21 8,500 850 23 4 1 sub. torpedo
2 Unyo 31-May-42 Taiyo 17,830 649 21 8,500 850 30 0 1 sub. torpedo
3 Chuyo 25-Nov-42 Taiyo 17,830 591 21 8,500 850 30 0 2 sub. Torpedoes
4 Shinyo 15-Nov-43 Shinyo 17,500 651 22 8,000 948 27 6 4 sub. Torpedoes
5 Kaiyo 23-Nov-43 Kaiyo 13,600 546 23 7,000 587 24 0 bombs
RANGES
Fleet
Low 15,900 718 26 7,750 1,103 48 0
High 64,800 873 34 10,000 2,400 75 18
Light
Low 7,470 551 25 8,000 550 21 0
High 13,360 712 29 11,810 1,500 48 0
Escort
Low 13,600 546 21 7,000 587 23 0
High 17,830 651 23 8,500 948 30 6

Notes:

  • This table includes only ships that operated between July 1937 and August 1945 and that had flight decks for both launching and recovering aircraft at sea.

American aircraft carriers[edit]

Americans perceived their principal operating theater would be the Pacific, where immense distances between refueling bases placed a premium on carrier speed and range. Threats were likely to come from other warships, either as enemy aircraft or ship's guns, rather than from land-based planes or batteries. Carrier-launched strikes would involve fewer aircraft and each would carry less of a payload, consisting of 250 lb and 500 lb bombs, compared to land-based aircraft. Also, war-games indicated the ability to strike first and decisively was important for success. Strong first strikes against enemy carriers were expected to reduce or eliminate their ability to counter-attack, reducing the need for strong defensive measures. As a result of these considerations, Americans placed greater emphasis on aircraft striking power than upon survivability when attacked. Accordingly, carriers were designed to carry more aircraft and aircraft components at the expense of more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor. To further increase the number of aircraft carried, large numbers of them were kept on the flight deck in addition to those kept below in hangars. In the Pacific, storms that could toss or wash deck-park aircraft overboard were uncommon and could theoretically be navigated around. Finally, within a year of the beginning of the Pacific War, America's industrial capacity enabled them to rapidly make good their carrier losses, enabling them to take greater risks with their carriers to achieve greater success.[13]

British aircraft carriers[edit]

Main articles: 1942 Design Light Fleet Carrier, Armoured flight deck, Illustrious-class aircraft carrier, Implacable-class aircraft carrier, and Aircraft maintenance carriers of the Royal Navy

The British also operated in the Pacific but, for most of the war, their principal areas of carrier operation were the coastal Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. In these areas, there were no enemy carriers. The threat was from land-based, potentially multi-engine, heavy bombers in potentially overwhelming numbers that could deliver heavy payloads consisting of 1,000 lb bombs or more and be protected by equally large numbers of fighter aircraft. Unlike with relatively few and small enemy attacking aircraft in the Pacific, it was almost assured that some attacking aircraft would penetrate a fighter and anti-aircraft screen. Further, attacks from land bases could be sustained after airfield repairs, unlike in the Pacific where the launch platform could be sunk or sufficiently damaged to require an immediate return to dry-dock facilities. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on surviving an attack such that a counter-attack could be launched. Survivability was enhanced with more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor at the expense of larger aircraft groups on board. Additional anti-aircraft armament also made carriers more self-sufficient for defense and less reliant upon other warships for screening. Finally, heavy weather was more common and less avoidable in the Atlantic theater than in the Pacific. and deck-parking to increase aircraft group size was less common.[13]

All carriers[edit]

The table below shows the specifications and capabilities for aircraft carriers of all combatants as they evolved over time. During the war, warships received modifications and upgrades, including increasing anti-aircraft guns. There were other aircraft carrier designs built during the war which only entered service just prior to or after the end of hostilities such as the British Light Fleet Carrier, or the US Midway-class. There were also cancelled carriers such as the French Joffre-class, British Malta-class, the German "Aircraft carrier II" or Jade-class.

Carrier Date commissioned Carrier class Country Standard displacement (t) Full displacement (t) Length w/l
(ft) 		Length o/a
(ft) 		Beam o/a
(ft) 		Draft
(ft) 		Speed (kn) Range (nmi) H. AA L. AA Belt Arm. Deck Arm. Aircraft Crew
HMS Argus 1918 UK 14,680 16,028 565 68 23 20 3,600 6 15-18 495
USS Langley 1922 Langley US 12,900 14,100 542 65 25 16 3,500 4 36 631
IJN Hōshō CVL 1922 Japan 7,590 9,646 552 59 20 25 8,680 6 15 512
HMS Hermes CVL 1923 UK 11,020 13,900 600 70 23 25 5,600 9 3 1 20 566
HMS Eagle 1924 converted battleship UK 22,200 668 115 27 24 4,800 14 4.5 1-1.5 25-30 791
HMS Furious 1925 modified Courageous UK 22,900 26,000 787 88 25 30 7,480 16 2-3 .8-3 36 795
IJN Akagi 1927 Japan 37,100 42,000 855 103 29 32 10,000 12 14 6 3.1 66 1,630
USS Saratoga 1927 Lexington US 37,000 43,746 888 106 30 33 10,000 20 5-7 .8-2 78 2,791
USS Lexington 1927 Lexington US 37,000 48,500 888 108 33 33 10,000 20 5-7 .8-2 78 2,791
Béarn 1927 France 22,501 29,000 599 116 31 22 7,000 14 16 3.1 1 35-40 865
HMS Courageous 1928 Courageous UK 24,600 27,420 735 786 91 28 30 6,630 16 2-3 .8-3 48 1,217
IJN Kaga 1929 Japan 38,813 812 33 31 28 10,000 26 22 6 1.5 90 1,708
HMS Glorious 1930 Courageous-class UK 25,370 27,859 735 787 91 28 30 5,860 16 2-3 .8-1 48 1,283
IJN Ryujo CVL 1933 Japan 7,900 9,990 590 67 18 29 10,000 12 24 48 600
USS Ranger 1934 US 14,810 17,859 730 769 109 22 29 10,000 8 40 2 1* 86 2,461
IJN Sōryū 1937 Japan 16,200 19,100 748 70 25 34 7,750 6 14 63+9 1,100
USS Yorktown 1937 Yorktown US 20,100 25,900 825 109 26 33 12,500 8 40 2.5-4 80-90 2,217
USS Enterprise 1938 Yorktown US 19,800 25,500 770 825 110 26 33 12,500 8 40 2.5-4 90 2,217
HMS Ark Royal 1938 UK 22,000 28,160 722 800 95 28 30 7,600 16 64 4.5 .8-3.5 50-60 1,580
IJN Hiryū 1939 Japan 17,600 29,570 746 73 26 34 10,330 12 21 3.5-6 1-2.2 64+9 1,100
USS Wasp 1940 Wasp US 14,900 19,423 688 741 109 20 30 12,000 8 30 3.5 100 2,167
HMS Illustrious 1940 Illustrious UK 23,369 710 740 96 29 30 10,700 16 48 4.5 3.0 36-57 1,299
HMS Formidable 1940 Illustrious UK 23,369 710 740 96 29 30 10,700 16 48 4.5 3.0 36-57 1,299
IJN Shōkaku 1941 Shōkaku Japan 26,087 32,620 845 85 34 9,700 16 32 72 1,660
USS Essex 1942 Essex US 27,500 36,960 872 148 33 20,000 12 78 3-4 1.5 95 2,600
HMS Implacable 1944 Implacable UK 32,630 767 96 33 6,720 16 104 4.5 3.0 48-81 2,300

SELECTED ESCORT CARRIERS

Long Island aircraft: 16 hangar + 46 flight deck Audacity: no hangar; aircraft stored on flight deck

Carrier Name Date Comm. Carrier Class Std. Displ Full Displ Length f/d Length o/a Beam o/a Draft Speed (kn) Range (nmi) H. AA L. AA Belt Arm. Deck Arm. Air- craft Men
USS Long Island June 1941 Long Island 404 492 70 25 17 10,000 62 856
HMS Audacity June 1941 converted cargo liner 12,000 450 467 56 28 15 1 9 6+8 480
IJN Taiyō Sep 1941 Taiyō 18,116 20,321 591 73 25 21 8,500 8 14 27-30 850
IJN Un'yō May 1942 Taiyō 18,116 20,321 591 73 25 21 8 8 30 850
USS Sangamon August 1942 Sangamon 11,600 24,665 553 114 32 18 2 20 25 830
USS Bogue September 1942 Bogue[i] 9,800 496 112 26 18 2 24 890
IJN Chūyō November 1942 Taiyō 18,116 591 73 25 21 8,500 8 8 30 850
USS Casablanca Jul 1943 Casablanca 7,900 11,077 490 w/l 498 65-108 22 19 10,240 1 20 27 916
HMS Pretoria Castle July 1943[j] converted liner 23,450 594 76 29 18 21
IJN Shin'yō November 1943 converted liner 17,500 20,586 621 26 26 22 8 30 27+6 942
IJN Kaiyō November 1943 13,600 16,483 546 71 26 23 7,000 8 24 24 829
HMS Vindex December 1943 Nairana 13,671 524 68 21 17 2 32 15-20 700
HMS Nairana Dec 1943 Nairana 14,280 529 69 21 17 2 32 15-20 728
USS Commencement Bay Nov 1944 Commencement Bay 11,100 557 75 31 2 36 34 1,066

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ Britain and America shipped war-sustaining goods to the Soviet Union via Arctic Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Pacific Ocean routes.
  2. ^ construction of Hermes started in 1918 but her design was being modified as a result of experiments with Argus and Eagle; the last revisions made in 1921 and it was not commissioned until 1924 [16]
  3. ^ Values shown here are typically for the 1942 to 1944 time frame
  4. ^ The date first commissioned as an aircraft carrier
  5. ^ the weight - in tons - of the ship with full load of stores and ammunition, but with no fuel, lubricating oil, or reserve feed water.[17]
  6. ^ the maximum distance in nautical miles possible on a load of fuel at optimal speed, which is typically much less than maximum speed.
  7. ^ the number that could be launched for attacks or combat air patrol. It excludes spares and cargo aircraft.[18]
  8. ^ Set fires which became out of control. Scuttled the following day
  9. ^ Attacker-class in British service
  10. ^ used for trials and training only

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ Mawdsley, Evan (2019). The War For The Seas- A Maritime History of World War II. London: Yale University Press. p. 478. ISBN 978-0-300-19019-9.
  2. ^ Overy, p. 61
  3. ^ Symonds, Craig L. (2018). World War II At Sea. United States: Oxford University Press. p. 641. ISBN 9780190243678.
  4. ^ Overy, Richard (1995). Why The Allies Won. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. p. 18. ISBN 0-393-03925-0.
  5. ^ Overy p. 19, 254, 321
  6. ^ Mawdsley, p.478
  7. ^ Baranov, Sergey (14 March 2018). "Lend-Lease: How American supplies aided the USSR in its darkest hour". Russia Beyond. TV-Novosti. Archived from the original on 2016-03-20. Retrieved 29 August 2019.
  8. ^ Hill, Alexander (July 2008). "Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans". History.net. Retrieved 28 Aug 2019.
  9. ^ Toland, John (1965). The Last 100 Days. New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. ISBN 0-553-34208-8.
  10. ^ Symonds, WWII at Sea, p. xi-xii
  11. ^ Mawdsley, page=xxxix, 477
  12. ^ Symonds, p. 268
  13. ^ a b c Pocklington, Alexander (aka "Drachinifel") (2 Jan 2019). "'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers: Survivability vs. Strike Power". Five Minute Guide To Warships WWI & WWII (more or less). Retrieved 31 Mar 2019 – via YouTube.
  14. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (29 December 2017). "Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922". NavWeaps. Retrieved 31 Mar 2019.
  15. ^ Article XX part 4, Article VIII
  16. ^ Friedman, 1988 p83-84
  17. ^ Stille, p. 61
  18. ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 478

References[edit]

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