Draft:Douglas Haig in 1914-15

Field Marshal The Right Honourable Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig KT GCB OM GCVO KCIE ADC
Field Marshal Douglas Haig
Born	19 June 1861 Charlotte Square, Edinburgh
Died	29 January 1928 (aged 66) London
Allegiance	United Kingdom
Service/branch	British Army
Years of service	1884–1920
Rank	Field Marshal (1917)

Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, KT, GCB, OM, GCVO, KCIE, ADC, (19 June 1861 – 29 January 1928) was a British senior officer during World War I. He commanded the British I Corps in 1914 and the British First Army in 1915.

1914

Outbreak of War

Map of the Western Front in 1914.

During the Curragh Mutiny (March 1914) Haig urged caution on his chief of staff John Gough, whose brother Hubert Gough (then a cavalry brigadier, later GOC Fifth Army in WW1) was threatening to resign rather than coerce Ulstermen into a semi-independent Ireland. Haig stressed that the army’s duty was to keep the peace and urged his officers not to dabble in politics. Sir John French was forced to resign as CIGS after having made the error of putting in writing a promise that officers would not be required to coerce Ulster; Haig respected Gough’s principled stance but felt French had allowed himself to be used as a political tool by Asquith..

When war broke out in August 1914, Haig helped organize the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), commanded by Field Marshal Sir John French. As planned, Haig's Aldershot command was formed into I Corps, giving him command of half of the BEF. In a letter to Haldane (4 August) Haig predicted that the war would last for months if not years and begged Haldane to return to the War Office (Asquith had been holding the job since the resignation of Seeley during the Curragh Affair - it was given to Kitchener), and delay sending the BEF to France until the Territorial Army had been mobilized and incorporated.

Haig attended the War Council (5 August), at which it was decided that it was too dangerous to mobilize forward at Maubeuge, as British mobilization was running three days behind that of France and Germany (i.e. the BEF might be overrun by the Germans as it formed up). There were no other contingency plans - Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in Amiens. Sir John French (who was keen to fight as he had been advised by Henry Wilson that the war would be brief, who had confidence in Belgium's many fortresses, and who appeared to think that the Dutch were already in the war on the Allied side – they would in fact remain neutral throughout) suggested landing at Antwerp, which was vetoed by Churchill as the Royal Navy could not guarantee safe passage. A critical biographer writes that Haig was “more clear-sighted than many of his colleagues”.

In his much-criticized memoirs, “1914”, French later claimed that Haig had wanted to postpone sending the BEF, which may be partly true in view of what he had written to Haldane the day before. Haig was so angry at this claim that he asked Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey to correct French’s “inaccuracies”. However, Haig also rewrote his diary from this period, possibly to show himself in a better light and French in a poor one. The original manuscript diary for early August does not survive, but there is no positive evidence that it was actually destroyed, and it has been pointed out that it is just as likely that the typed version was prepared from dictation or notes now lost. Hankey’s notes of the meeting record that Haig suggested delaying or sending smaller forces, but was willing to send forces if France was in danger of defeat or if the French wanted them (which they did), and that Haig predicted that the war would last several years and that an army of a million men (the size originally intended for the Territorials, and which would give Britain a stronger voice at the peace conference), trained by officers and NCOs withdrawn from the BEF, would be needed.

Haig was appointed Aide-de-Camp to King George V in 1914. During a royal inspection of Aldershot (11 August), Haig told the King that he had "grave doubts" about the evenness of the French’s temper and military knowledge. In his diary, for that day he wrote “in my own heart I know that French is quite unfit for this great command”. He later claimed that these doubts had gone back to the Boer War, but there appears to have been an element of later embellishment about this: Haig had in fact praised French in the Boer War (he had criticized Kitchener, Roberts, and others) and had welcomed his appointment as CIGS in 1911.

Mons to the Marne

Haig crossed over to Le Havre. The BEF landed in France on 14 August and advanced into Belgium, where French took up positions on the left of General Lanrezac's French Fifth Army at Charleroi. Haig was irritated by Sir John French (influenced by Henry Wilson into putting his faith in a French thrust up from the Ardennes) who was only concerned with the three German corps in front of the BEF at Mons and who ignored intelligence reports of German forces streaming westwards from Brussels, threatening an encirclement from the British left.

Charteris recorded (16 August) “D.H. … is greatly concerned about the composition of GHQ. He thinks French quite unfit for high command in time of crisis … He says French’s military ideas are not sound; that he has not studied war; that he is obstinate; that he will not keep with him men who point out even obvious errors. He gives him credit for good tactical powers, great courage and determination”.

Although II Corps fought off the German attack at Mons on 23 August (the first British encounter with the Germans) the BEF was forced to withdraw after Lanrezac ordered a retreat exposing their right flank as well. The retreats of I and II Corps had to be conducted separately because of the Mormal Forest. Both corps were supposed to meet at Le Cateau but I Corps under Haig were stopped at Landrecies, leaving a large gap between the two corps.

At Landrecies DH had been treated with a strong emetic which had had an “immediate and volcanic” effect, leaving him pale and weak all day. Haig's reactions to his corps' skirmish with German forces at Landrecies (on the night of 25/26 August, during which Haig led his staff into the street, revolvers drawn, promising to "sell our lives dearly") caused him to send an exaggerated report to French, which caused French to panic. I Corps headquarters came close to being captured, and Haig believed that the 4th Brigade had been completely lost (this was in fact not the case), sending Charteris to ask for help from the French on his right. At 1:35 am on 26 August Haig reported that the situation was very critical, then at 3:50 am he asked for help from Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps, 8 miles to his left. Sir John also sent a message to the French at 5 am, asking them to assist Haig. Lanrezac agreed to do so, but in the event, their help was not needed.

The following day (26 August) Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Corps engaged the enemy in the Battle of Le Cateau, which was unsupported by Haig. This battle slowed the German army's advance. Terraine argued that Sir John might usefully have prevailed upon Haig to come to Smith-Dorrien’s assistance, although he notes that in fairness Haig’s headquarters was almost impossible to locate that day – two RFC lieutenants sent to find him were only able to do so by landing their plane under the eyes of German cavalry.

Haig retreated along the east bank of the River Sambre, increasing the gap between himself and Smith-Dorrien’s right. However, a critical biographer writes that too much has been made of the "moment of panic" at Landrecies and that the 200-mile retreat, over a period of 13 days, is a tribute to the “steady and competent leadership” of both Haig and Smith-Dorrien.

On 25 August the French commander Joseph Joffre ordered his forces to retreat to the Marne, which compelled the BEF to further withdraw. Haig was irritated by the high-handed behavior of the French, seizing roads which they had promised for British use and refusing to promise to cover the British right flank. He complained privately of French unreliability and lack of fighting competence, a complaint which he would keep up for the next four years. He wrote to his wife that he wished the British were operating independently from Antwerp, a proposal which he had rejected as “reckless” when Sir John French had made it at the War Council on 4 August.

The retreat caused Sir John French to question the competence of his Allies resulting in further indecision and led to his decision to withdraw the BEF south of the Seine. On 1 September Lord Kitchener intervened by personally visiting the French and ordering him to re-enter the battle and coordinate with Joffre's forces. The battle to defend Paris began on 5 September and became known as the first Battle of the Marne. Haig had wanted to rest his Corps but was happy to resume the offensive when ordered. He drove on his subordinates, including Ivor Maxse when he thought them lacking in "fighting spirit". Although Sir John French praised Haig’s leadership of his Corps, Haig was privately contemptuous of French’s overconfidence prior to Mons, and excessive caution thereafter. The BEF did not participate in the battle until 9 September. The following day the battle ended when the German advance was defeated. The Germans abandoned the Schlieffen Plan and they were forced to withdraw to the Aisne, where - despite Allied hopes of chasing the Germans out of France altogether - the front stabilized on 15 September.

First Ypres

On 15 October, later than proposed after two weeks of friction between British and French generals, Haig’s I Corps was moved to Ypres in Flanders as part of the “Race to the Sea”. In the belief that the German northern flank was weak, Haig was ordered to march on Ghent, Bruges, and Courtrai in western Belgium, but the new German Chief of Staff Falkenhayn was trying to do the exact opposite, and roll up the Allied northern flank. Haig's Corps marched headlong into a thrust westward by fresh German forces, and the result was the First Battle of Ypres. German forces, equipped with 250 heavy guns (a large number for this early stage in the war), outnumbered Haig’s Corps by two to one and came close to success. At one point Haig mounted his white horse to encourage the men of 1st Division, who were retreating around Gheluvelt, although in the event the town had just been recaptured by a single battalion of the Worcesters before Haig’s ride. Haig cemented his reputation at this battle, and Ypres remained a symbolic piece of ground in later years. Haig was influenced by the fact that the Germans had called off their offensive when they were on the verge of success, and he drew the lesson that attacks need to be kept up so long as there was any chance of success.

After a fortnight of intense fighting, Haig’s I Corps had been reduced from 18,000 men to just under 3,000 effective by 12 November. After six days of bickering between British and French generals I Corps was relieved by French troops, Haig being very suspicious of the pro-French sympathies of Henry Wilson. Following the success of the First Battle of Ypres, French, who had been ordered by his doctor to rest to relieve the strain on his heart, recommended Haig for immediate promotion to full general. Haig traveled to London on the French's behalf (23 November) to consult Kitchener about the plan to expand the BEF and reorganize it into two armies. The next day he saw the King who wanted to retain troops in the UK to defend against a possible invasion - Haig told the King that invasion was best deterred by maintaining a large British force in France.

At this point, it was thought that the war would soon end once the Germans were defeated by the Russians at Lodz (in the event, they were not), and the difficulties of attacking the Western Front were not yet appreciated. A failed attack by Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps on Messines-Wytschaete (14–15 December) was blamed on poor GHQ staff work, and on 18 December Haig met French, who said he wanted to sack the BEF chief of staff Murray, whose performance had been unsatisfactory throughout the campaign, and promote his deputy Henry Wilson. Haig thought that Wilson, besides being too pro-French, had “no military knowledge” and recommended Quarter-Master General “Wully” Robertson for the vacancy. This was also the view of Lord Kitchener, so Robertson received the promotion.

On 26 December 1914, the expansion of the I Corps into the British First Army (I, IV, and Indian Corps) became effective and Haig was given command. This force of 8 divisions was already twice the size of the original BEF of August.

1915

Neuve Chapelle

Like French, Haig wanted to push along the North Sea Coast to Ostend and Zeebrugge, but Joffre did not want the British acting so independently.

After the removal of Murray as Chief of Staff to the BEF in late January 1915, Churchill suggested Haig as his replacement, but Asquith replied that it would be impossible to find a replacement First Army commander.

Germany had recently sent 8 infantry divisions to the Eastern Front (as well as 12 newly-raised divisions), reducing their net strength in the west from 106 divisions at the time of First Ypres to 98, so French and Joffre, thinking that the war would be won by the summer, agreed that a French offensive in Artois and Champagne should be accompanied by a British offensive at Neuve Chapelle – French entrusted Haig with this, as he trusted him more than Smith-Dorrien after the latter’s failure at Messines in December.

Joffre canceled planned the French component of Neuve Chapelle but Sir John French decided to go ahead anyway. At Neuve Chapelle Haig wanted a quick bombardment, his subordinate Rawlinson (GOC IV Corps) a longer and more methodical one. Haig rejected Rawlinson’s complex plan and demanded one based on “simple common sense” (25/2/15), and also demanded the capture not just of Neuve Chapelle but also the whole of Aubers Ridge. Shortage of shells meant that only a thirty-five-minute bombardment was possible, but the small front of the attack gave it the concentration to succeed. The attack featured 340 artillery pieces, the weaponry of four divisions plus extra guns from Britain. Haig displayed great interest in the potential of aircraft - he met with Major Trenchard of the Royal Flying Corps (16 Feb) to organize photographic air reconnaissance, and a full map of German lines was obtained; aircraft were beginning to be used for artillery spotting – signaling to British batteries by Morse - observing enemy troop movements, and bombing German rear areas.

Four British divisions attacked on 10 March and penetrated to a depth of 1,500 meters, but there were communications problems – 23rd Brigade had got stuck but had pushed on by the time Rawlinson was able to send help, whereas in the south 25th Brigade had pushed through but while it was halted and waiting for reinforcements the Germans were able to seal off the breach. On the afternoon of 10 March the renewed attack failed as the artillery was too weak and not registered, some even falling on the newly-won British positions, and the Germans were able to bring in reinforcements. Casualties were around 12,000 on each side. The Official History later claimed that Neuve Chapelle was to show the French the attacking ability of British troops (this was true of all the 1915 offensives) and was the first time German line had been broken.

Whilst Rawlinson felt that the offensive should have been halted after the first day, Haig felt that reserves should have been committed quicker, and on Rawlinson’s suggestion came close to sacking Major-General Joey Davies (GOC 8th Division) until it emerged that the latter had been holding back on Rawlinson’s orders – Haig then gave Rawlinson a severe reprimand although he thought him too valuable to sack. This may have made Rawlinson reluctant to stand up to Haig thereafter.

Aubers Ridge, Festubert & the Shells Scandal

French and Joffre still expected victory by July. Whilst the Germans attacked Smith-Dorrien at the Second Battle of Ypres (April), new Allied offensives were planned by the French at Vimy and by Haig at Aubers Ridge (9 May). It was believed on the British side that the lessons of Neuve Chapelle had been learned – reserves were ready to exploit and mortars were ready to support attackers who had advanced beyond artillery cover - and that this time success would be complete, not partial. However, the attack was less successful than Neuve Chapelle as the forty-minute bombardment (only 516 field guns and 121 heavy guns) was over a wider front, making it only a fifth of the density of Neuve Chapelle, further weakened by poor weather and worn artillery barrels, against a triple German defense line. Haig toned down Aubers Ridge as he had less strength (lack of shells, reinforcements diverted to Gallipoli and Second Ypres) than he’d hoped, but was still focussed on winning a decisive victory by capturing key ground rather than amassing firepower to inflict maximum damage on the Germans, but he resisted French calls to keep attacking to divert German attention from their attack on Vimy Ridge, as he realized that a “long, methodical bombardment” would be needed (11 May 1915).

Renewed attacks (Festubert, 15–25 May - only intended as a diversion) gained 1,000 meters over a front of 4,000 meters, with 16,000 British casualties to around 6,600 German. Sir John French was satisfied that the attacks had served to take pressure off the French at the latter’s request, but Haig still felt that German reserves were being exhausted, bringing victory nearer. There was another minor offensive at Givenchy in June 1915.

Lack of shells at these offensives was – along with Admiral Fisher’s resignation over the failed Dardanelles attack - one of the causes of the fall of the Liberal Government (19 May). Haig did not approve of the Northcliffe press attacks on Kitchener, whom he thought a powerful military voice against the folly of civilians like Churchill (despite the fact the Kitchener had played a role in planning the Gallipoli expedition and was an opponent of the strong General Staff which Haig wanted to see). French had been leaking information about the shell shortage to Repington of “The Times”, whom Haig detested and which he likened to “carrying on with a whore” (possibly a deliberately-chosen analogy in view of French’s womanizing), as well as to the Conservative leaders, and to Lloyd George who now became Minister of Munitions in the new coalition government, and Haig was asked by Clive Wigram (one of the King’s press staff) to smooth relations between French and Kitchener. At Robertson’s suggestion, Haig received Kitchener at his HQ (8 July – despite French’s attempt to block the meeting), where they shared their concerns about French. The two men met again in London (14 July), whilst Haig was receiving his GCB (awarded on French’s recommendation after Neuve Chapelle) from the King, who also complained to him about French. Over lunch with King Haig remarked that French was "a source of great weakness to the army and no one had confidence in him any more", and that the best time to sack him would have been after the retreat to the Marne – it was agreed that the men would correspond in confidence, and when Haig told Kitchener, in a meeting that afternoon, of the King’s joke that this was inviting Haig to “sneak” like a schoolboy, Kitchener replied that “we are past schoolboy’s age”.

Haig had long thought French petty, jealous, unbalanced (“like a bottle of soda water … incapable of thinking … and coming to a reasoned decision”), overly quick to meddle in party politics and easily manipulated by Henry Wilson, and was increasingly irritated by French’s changes of orders and mercurial changes of mood as to the length of the war, which French now expected to last into 1916. Haig still thought Germany might collapse by November, although at the same time he was sending a memo to the War Office recommending that the BEF, now numbering 25 divisions, be equipped with the maximum number of heavy guns ready for a huge decisive battle, 36 divisions strong, in 1916.

Loos

The war was not going well – besides the failure at Cape Helles (landing 25 April), Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers (Serbia was soon overrun) and Italian attacks on the Isonzo had made negligible progress. Allied attacks in the west were needed to take pressure off the Russians, who were being flung out of Poland (Fall of Warsaw, 5 August). The original plan was to attack in July. At Joffre’s insistence the offensive was planned next to the French Tenth Army at Loos.

Haig inspected the Loos area (24 June) and expressed dissatisfaction with the ground (slag heaps and pit head towers which made good observation points for the Germans). French later did the same and agreed. French and Haig would have preferred to renew the attack at Aubers Ridge. Joffre was not pleased and called another conference (11 July) to urge a British attack on Loos. Haig pushed for Aubers Ridge again (22 July) - French at first agreed until dissuaded by Foch (29 July), who felt that only a British attack at Loos would pull in enough German reserves to allow the French to take Vimy Ridge. French wrote to Joffre saying he was willing to go along with these plans for the sake of Anglo-French cooperation, but then wrote to Joffre again (10 August) suggesting an artillery bombardment with only limited British infantry attacks.

This was not what Joffre wanted. Kitchener, who had been invited to tour the French army (16–19 August) listened sympathetically to Joffre’s suggestion that in the future Joffre should set the size, dates, and objectives of British offensives, although he only agreed for the Loos attack for the moment. Kitchener met with Haig first and then with French. It is unclear exactly why Kitchener and then Haig agreed to go along with Joffre’s wishes - possibly the disastrous plight of the Russians, but it may be that a promise that poison gas could be used may have persuaded Haig. Having got their own way, the French then postponed the attack as they picked new attacking ground in Champagne and arranged for extra shelling at Vimy, in both cases because of the very reasons – German-held villages and other obstructions – to which the British generals had objected.

Haig interfered little with Rawlinson’s planning, but only 850 guns (110 of them heavy) were available, too few for concentrated bombardment over a frontage far wider than at Neuve Chapelle (in 1915 the Germans had 10,500 guns of which 3,350 were heavy, whilst the British had only around 1,500, not to mention the shortage of ammunition), making the bombardment 20% as intense as at Neuve Chapelle.

There was also an argument over the placement of the reserve (Haking’s XI Corps – 21st and 24th Divisions – both inexperienced New Army Divisions) which Haig wanted close to the front after what had happened at Neuve Chapelle. Despite not originally wanting the offensive, Haig had persuaded himself that decisive victory was possible, and it may be that the French wanted to keep control of the reserve to stop them being thrown into battle needlessly. French tried in vain to forbid Haig to discuss his plans with Kitchener (on the grounds that Kitchener might leak them to politicians). The battle began (25 September) after Haig personally ordered the release of chlorine gas (he had an aide, Alan Fletcher, light a cigarette to test the wind).

The attack failed in the north (Hohenzollern Redoubt) but in the center, (Loos) 15th Division broke through and took Hill 70 despite heavy losses – but still faced an intact second line with little artillery cover. On the right 47th Division achieved its goals and served as a flank guard. The reserves, tired after night marches (to reach the front in secrecy), were not available until 2 pm but were thrown into battle against the German second line in the center without success on the second day, although it is not clear that they would actually have accomplished much if available on the first day as Haig wanted. The battle dragged on until mid-October with 50,000 British casualties (German losses were about half of this).

Haig replaces French

The reserves now became a stick with which to beat French, who by now was talking of making peace before “England was ruined”. Haig wrote a detailed letter to Kitchener (29 Sep) claiming “complete” (sic) success on the first day and complaining that the reserves had not been placed as close to the front as agreed (this turned out to be untrue) and that French had not released control of them when requested (in fact he had done so, but delays in communications and traffic control as they moved up to the front through other formations had meant that they were not available until 2 pm). French protested that time for the commitment of reserves had been on the second day; when told of this by Robertson (2 Oct) Haig thought this evidence of French’s “unreasoning brain”. Haig strengthened his case by reports that captured enemy officers had been astonished at the British failure to exploit the attack, and by complaining about the government’s foot-dragging at introducing conscription, and commitment of troops to sideshows like Salonika and Suvla Bay (6 August), at a time when the Germans were calling up their 1918 Class early.

The failure of Loos was being openly debated in the British press. Kitchener demanded a full formal report (6 October) and Lord Haldane (former Cabinet Minister) was sent to France to interview French and Haig. French in turn demanded a full report from Haig, in particular, his claim to have penetrated the German lines (16 Oct). Haig claimed in his diary that a proposal that he is sent to report on the Gallipoli bridgehead was shelved because of the imminence of French’s removal.

Lord Stamfordham, the King’s Secretary, telephoned Robertson to ask his opinion of French, and Robertson conferred with Haig – who was pushing for Robertson to be appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff – before giving his opinion. The King also discussed the matter with Haig over dinner on a visit to the front (24 October) - Haig again told him that the French should have been sacked in August 1914 and that Robertson should go home and become CIGS. Robertson told the King (27 October 1915) that Haig should replace French. Whilst he was inspecting troops (28 October) the King was injured when thrown by one of Haig’s horses and had to be evacuated to England on a stretcher, which caused Haig some embarrassment.

By now French was reduced to having his orders releasing the reserves published in “The Times” (2 November), along with an article by Repington blaming Haig. Haig demanded a correction of French’s "inaccuracies" about the availability of the reserve, whereupon French ordered Haig to cease all correspondence on this matter, although he offered to let Haig see the covering letter he was sent to London in his report, French's fate was sealed by now. Robertson told Haig from London (15 November 1915), where he was seeing the King and Kitchener, “the first thing is to get you in command”.

Haig met with Prime Minister Asquith (23 November) and Bonar Law (Conservative Leader) the next day. By now. rumors were rife that the French was to be sacked. Matters had been delayed as Kitchener was away on an inspection tour of the Mediterranean and French was sick in bed. Kitchener returned to London (3 Dec) and at a meeting with Haig that day told him that he was to recommend to Asquith that Haig replace French. French recommended Robertson as his successor and Kitchener told Esher (4 December) that the government intended to appoint Robertson Commander-in-Chief, although to Esher’s disappointment “dear old R” was not appointed. This would probably have led to Haig's appointment as CIGS instead, but Repington had warned Bonar Law (16 November 1915) that Haig “is incapable of conveying his orders to subordinates by word of mouth, as you can judge if you get him before then War Council and examine him yourself”. Asquith wrote to Stamfordham (6 December) “(French) suggests Robertson as his successor, but I assume that we shall have to take Haig”. Robertson was willing to relinquish his claim if Haig, his senior in rank, a front line commander since the start of the war, and the most experienced candidate, got French’s job.

Haig’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief BEF was announced on 10 December, and almost simultaneously Robertson became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, reporting directly to the Cabinet rather than to the War Secretary – Haig and Robertson hoped that this would be the start of a new and more professional management of the war. Monro was promoted to GOC First Army in Haig’s place, not Rawlinson whom Haig would have preferred, and for reasons of seniority Haig was forced to accept the weak-willed Lancelot Kiggell, not Butler, as chief of staff BEF in succession to Robertson. Even Terrraine admitted Kiggell “never was, nor aspired to be, more than a mouthpiece for Haig” Haig and French, who seemed ill and short of breath, had a final handover meeting (18 Dec, the day before the formal change of command) at which Haig agreed that Churchill – recently resigned from the Cabinet and vetoed from command of a brigade – should be given command of a battalion. It should be noted that although the King - who as Head of State and (nominally) of the Armed Forces took seriously the concerns which were raised with him about French's performance - was involved in the moves against French, the ultimate decision was a political one, taken by the Prime Minister and the War Secretary.

The BEF had numbered 120,000 in August 1914, 986,000 by the end of 1915, 1.5m by July 1916, and around 1.8m (of whom usually just under half were combat infantry) in 60 divisions for the rest of the war. Haig was thus director of an organization bigger than any British city apart from London, and the efficiency with which it was run and supplied may have been one of the reasons why Britain was the only initial combatant of 1914 never to suffer a major mutiny. Another reason given for sacking French was that his shortcomings would become more pronounced with the continuing expansion of the BEF

Bibliography

• Bond, Brian and Cave, Nigel (eds) Haig – A Reappraisal 70 Years On. Pen & Sword. (2009 edition). ISBN 184415887
• Carlyon, Les The Great War (Sydney: Pan MacMillan, 2005)
• Corrigan, Gordon. Mud, Blood & Poppycock (London: Cassell, 2002) ISBN 0-304-36659-5
• Dixon, Dr. Norman F. On the Psychology of Military Incompetence Jonathan Cape Ltd 1976 / Pimlico 1994
• Duffy, C. (2007). Through German Eyes, The British and the Somme 1916. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-7538-2202-9.
• French, David Raising Churchill's Army Oxford 2000
• Gollin Alfred Milner : Proconsul in Politics (Macmillan, London, 1964)
• Green, Andrew – Writing the Great War, (Frank Cass, London, 2003), ISBN 0-7146-8430-9
• Hart, Peter (2008). 1918: A Very British Victory, Phoenix Books, London. ISBN 978-0-7538-2689-8
• Holmes, Richard (2004). The Little Field Marshal: A Life of Sir John French. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-84614-7.
• Holmes, Richard. Tommy (London: HarperCollins, 2004) ISBN 0-00-713752-4
• Keegan, John. The First World War. Pimlico. 1999. ISBN 0-7126-6645-1
• Neillands, Robin The Death of Glory: the Western Front 1915 (John Murray, London, 2006) ISBN 978-0-7195-6245-7
• Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (Headline Review, 2002), p. 263
• Travers, Tim The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and The Emergence of Modern War 1900–1918 (Allen & Unwin 1987)
• Travers, Tim How the War Was Won (Routledge, London, 1992) ISBN – 0-415-07628-5; (Pen and Sword, London, July 2005), ISBN 978-1-84415-207-0

Biographies

• Arthur, Sir George Lord Haig (London: William Heinemann, 1928)
• De Groot, Gerard Douglas Haig 1861–1928 (Larkfield, Maidstone: Unwin Hyman, 1988)
• Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7
• Jeffery, Keith (2006). Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820358-2.
• Marshall-Cornwall, General Sir James Haig as Military Commander (London: Batsford, 1973)
• Mead, Gary, The Good Soldier. The Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic Books, 2008) ISBN 978-1-84354-281-0
• Reid, Walter. Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Birlinn Ltd, Edinburgh, 2006.) ISBN 1-84158-517-3
• Sheffield, Gary, “The Chief” (Aurum, London, 2011) ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8
• Sixsmith, E.K.G. Douglas Haig (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
• Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Hutchinson, 1963) ISBN 0-304-35319-1
• Terraine, John (1960). Mons, The Retreat to Victory. Wordsworth Military Library, London. ISBN 978-1-84022-240-1.
• Warner, Philip Field Marshal Earl Haig (London: Bodley Head, 1991; Cassell, 2001)
• Woodward, David R. "Field Marshal Sir William Robertson", Westport Connecticut & London: Praeger, 1998, ISBN 0-275-95422-6
• Winter, Denis Haig’s Command (London: Viking, 1991)

Primary sources

• Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Field Marshal Earl Haig. (London: Cassell, 1929)
• Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Haig. (London: Duckworth, 1933)
• Haig, Countess The Man I Knew (Edinburgh & London: The Moray Press, 1936)
• Haig, F-M Sir Douglas Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915-April 1919). Ed. by Lt.-Col. J.H. Boraston, OBE, Private Secretary to Earl Haig. Dent. 1919
• Secrett, Sergeant T Twenty-Five Years with Earl Haig (London: Jarrods, 1929)
• Sheffield, Gary & Bourne, Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-18, (Phoenix, London, 2005) ISBN 0-7538-2075-7

External links

• Hansard 1803–2005: contributions in Parliament by the Earl Haig
• Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. (Accessed 30 March 2006.)
• Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig (1861-1928), Field Marshal: Sitter in 41 portraits (National Portrait Gallery)
• Tim Travers’s Haig: A Deist Being
• Bob Bushaway Haig and the Cavalry Journal of the Centre for First World War Studies
• Haig
• GALASHIELS WAR MEMORIAL (1925) (archive film of Field Marshal Earl Haig from the National Library of Scotland: SCOTTISH SCREEN ARCHIVE)
• SCOTLAND ON SCREEN (Earl Haig Unveils Peebles War Memorial (1922) - archive film and learning resources)

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