Péter Krekó

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The native form of this personal name is Krekó Péter. This article uses Western name order when mentioning individuals.
Péter Krekó
Born (1980-03-20) 20 March 1980 (age 44)
Budapest, Hungary
NationalityHungarian
CitizenshipHungarian
Academic career
FieldPolitical science

Péter Krekó (born 20 March 1980) is a Hungarian economist, political psychologist, political scientist, and professor. He currently serves as the Director of the Political Capital Institute, and as a senior external researcher for the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Early life and career[edit]

Krekó was born on 20 March 1980 to Béla Krekó Jr. and Ildikó Kupa. His grandfather Béla Krekó was a mathematical economist. Currently, Péter Krekó is the supervisor of the Doctoral School of Psychology at Eötvös Loránd University. His areas of research include: conspiracy theories, fake, political populism and extremism, Russian soft power influence, and intergroup conflicts.

Notable works[edit]

  • Web of Science has published 10 studies. h-index 4. Average citations per item 7. Number of independent citations 68.[1]
  • Péter Krekó. 32 Publications, 12,289 Reads, 245 Citations.[2]
  • Faragó Laura-Ferenczy-Nyúl Dávid- Kende-Anna-Krekó Péter-Gurály, Zoltán: Criminalization as a justification for violence against the homeless in Hungary. JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 161 Paper: OnlineFirst. 15 p. (2021) [3]
  • Kende-Anna-Krekó Péter: Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe. CURRENT OPINION IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 34 pp. 29–33. 5 p. (2020)
  • Countering conspiracy theories and misinformation. In: Butter, M; Knight, P (szerk.) Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories. Abingdon, Egyesült Királyság / Anglia : Routledge, (2020) p.[4]
  • Faragó-Laura-Kende, Anna-Krekó, Péter: We only Believe in News that We Doctored Ourselves: The Connection between Partisanship and Political Fake News. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 51. 2 pp. 77–90. 14 p. (2020)[5]
  • Russia in Hungarian public opinion. In: Tóth István György (szerk.) Hungarian Social Report 2019.Budapest, Magyarország. Tárki Társadalomkutatási Intézet Zrt., (2019) pp. 358–371. 16 p.[6]
  • Krekó Péter-Molnár Csaba-Rácz András: Mystification and demystification of Putin’s Russia: Research summary: 26 p. (2019) Budapest. Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute Kiadó.[7]
  • Faragó Laura-Kende, Anna-Krekó Péter: Justification of intergroup violence – the role of right-wing authoritarianism and propensity for radical action. DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT: PATHWAYS TOWARD TERRORISM AND GENOCIDE 12. 2 pp. 113–128. 16 p. (2019)[8]
  • The relationship between populist attitudes and support for political violence in Hungary and Poland. Paper. (2018) [9]
  • Mass Paranoia: The Social Psychology of Conspiracy Theories and False News. (in Hungarian); Budapest, Magyarország, Athenaeum Kiadó (2018), 350 p.
  • Péter Krekó-Attila, Juhász: The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, Political Supply, and International Context. Stuttgart, Németország. Ibidem-Verlag (2017) 260 p.
  • Conspiracy Theory as Collective Motivated Cognition. In: Bilewicz, M; Cichocka, A; Soral, W (szerk.) The Psychology of Conspiracy. London, Egyesült Királyság. Routledge. (2015) pp. 62–75., 8 p.

References[edit]

  1. ^ Krekó Péter Web of Science 2021-04-03
  2. ^ "Profile: Peter Kreko". ResearchGate.
  3. ^ Faragó, Laura; Ferenczy-Nyúl, Dávid; Kende, Anna; Krekó, Péter; Gurály, Zoltán (January 20, 2021). "Criminalization as a justification for violence against the homeless in Hungary". The Journal of Social Psychology. 162 (2): 216–230. doi:10.1080/00224545.2021.1874257. PMID 33470185. S2CID 231653347 – via Taylor and Francis+NEJM.
  4. ^ Butter, Michael; Knight, Peter, eds. (2020). Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories. Taylor & Francis. doi:10.4324/9780429452734. ISBN 9780429452734. S2CID 219132481. Retrieved 2021-02-03.
  5. ^ "Faragó-Laura-Kende, Anna-Krekó, Péter: We only Believe in News that We Doctored Ourselves: The Connection between Partisanship and Political Fake News".
  6. ^ "Krekó Péter: Russia in Hungarian public opinion" (PDF).
  7. ^ Krekó Péter-Molnár Csaba-Rácz András: Mystification and demystification of Putin’s Russia
  8. ^ Faragó, Laura; Kende, Anna; Krekó, Péter (May 4, 2019). "Justification of intergroup violence – the role of right-wing authoritarianism and propensity for radical action". Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. 12 (2): 113–128. doi:10.1080/17467586.2019.1576916. hdl:10831/46381.
  9. ^ "Krekó Péter: The relationship between populist attitudes and support for political violence in Hungary and Poland" (PDF).
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