Talk:American Airlines Flight 96

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A couple questions regarding the validity of this.

As a previous employee for the Buffalo Airport, I had been under the impression that DC-10 aircraft were unable to land at Buffalo due to the runway length.

If not mistaken, the runway was lengthened a bit in the 80's, but still not to DC-10 requirements.

Am I right, or am I learning something new?

Additionally, it's listed on here as a commuter flight. In a DC-10?

Anyone have documentation verifying this for an adjustment?

[[allamericanbear]allamericanbear]]

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Actually, the DC-10 was a great airplane for short runway airports. It could land on runways that would put a real stress on a 727, to get stopped in time. The old runway at KONA (prior to 1993) was less than 7,000 ft long, but the DC-10 was able to go in there on a regular basis. I know, because I was flying those flights for UAL. EditorASC (talk) 22:53, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Shouldn't there be an "air accident" template like the one on Gottröra accident? --80.63.213.182 19:43, 4 September 2006 (UTC)

Captain Bryce McCormick was an amazing pilot and quite possibly a hero. This should be mentioned. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.112.184.21 (talk) 02:25, 30 December 2008 (UTC)

Definition of "Accident" Vs "Incident"

We have had a constant problem with Wiki aviation articles, where well-meaning editors use the word "incident" when the correct nomenclature is "accident." That is probably the result of the popular press using the word "incident" so often, when they are writing a story on an aircraft accident. The correct definitions, for Wiki Aviation articles, are the ones given by ICAO, the American NTSB and the American FAA. You can find that in ICAO Annex 13, [1]. For that reason, I have gone thru this article and changed the word "incident" to "accident," where appropriate. Thanks, EditorASC (talk) 23:03, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Nothing about this was an accident, corporate shill 2A01:799:1B9B:FA00:3DFF:2767:6138:5C14 (talk) 19:18, 17 March 2023 (UTC)

Introduction section

I re-wrote the first paragraph to correct some erroneous information, the worst of which was the claim that the collapse of the floor had ruptured the hydraulic systems. Not true. they all remained full of fluid (page 10 of the accident report). The problem was that some cables leading to flight and engine controls were jammed, or restricted or severed. That caused some of the hydraulic actuators to be limited in how much they could move the control surfaces.

Ironically, the pilots did not know that they still had full function of the horizontal stabilizer, via the trim switches on their control yoke. Those switches send ELECTRIC signals to the HS hyd control modules, which were still working properly. But, because the cable to the HS trim indicator on the center console was broken, and because the cable to one-half of the manual backup "suitcase" handles for the HS, was also broken, the pilots believed the HS was jammed too. It was, as far as that manual backup system, but the HS was still operational with the electric switches on their control yokes. But, since they did not realize that, they used higher landing speed, combined with both pilots pulling back real hard, to get an adequate landing flare. Had they known the HS could still be trimmed with the yoke electric switches, they could have landed at a slower speed, and with a lot less force being necessary to get adequate landing flare.

This is not a criticism of the pilots. They did a magnificent job of saving the lives of all on board. But, it is not uncommon for pilots to overlook some possibility that would improve the situation, when they are overloaded with a horde of factors in a true emergency situation. It simply is a result of the overload limits of the human brain, when time is very limited and the factors to be analyzed are many.

In another accident, where the pilots preformed magnificently, in spite of tremendous odds of total failure (United Airlines Flight 811), they forgot to turn off the fuel dumping system, before they landed. Thus, when all the passengers evacuated on the runway, they were surrounded with fuel still gushing out of the dump valves. Very lucky that it wasn't set off with one tiny lil spark.... EditorASC (talk) 03:36, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

Whilst you have a point, there are times when experimentation can make the situation worse, especially if you do not know what damage has occurred, or the severity of it, such as Alaska Airlines Flight 261, if the crew had simply turned around and landed immediately while they still possessed substantial control of the aircraft instead of trying to 'fix' the jammed tailplane they might have avoided the accident that killed everyone on board. Unfortunately it can be very difficult at the time to decide which action is correct, and which is the lesser of two evils. It often comes down to just that. Sometimes a pilot will be presented with a situation where he/she has to decide between doing something potentially dangerous, and something potentially extremely dangerous, with no other options. The above accident could have been prevented at the design stage if the designers had simply provided a physical stop in the tailplane incidence travel that physically prevented the tailplane moving to a position that could not be counteracted by full up (or down) elevator.

As recent events have shown, allowing extreme ranges of tailplane trim that cannot be countermanded by the pilot using the control column is not a good idea, — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 10:03, 18 February 2020 (UTC)

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