Talk:Austrian school of economics/Archive 2

Criticisms section

A number of the criticism were being presented as if simply valid, whereas some of them are overly broad, and one of them is down-right mathematically incompetent. While what neoclassical economists call “ordinal utility” is only very weakly quantified, it has been demonstrated with formal mathematics (by an Austrian School economist, in spite of claims that none of us are mathematical!) that there are economically rational preferences to which no quantification, however weak, can be fit. (See “The Austrian Theory of the Marginal Use and of Ordinal Marginal Utility”, to which I referred in correcting the section.) Thus, these weak quantifications are not purely ordinal, as they impose structure beyond total ordering. Essentially a supposition has transitioned to a mainstream dogma, in spite of a complete lack of anything resembling a proof — which proof never arrived because the supposition was false. —SlamDiego_←T 01:09, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

McCulloch's paper, BTW, nicely illustrates the distinction between a claim of the mainstream and verifiable claim. —SlamDiego_←T 03:23, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

The current article presents the Austrian assertions as it were the truth, and the Mainstream viewpoint as if it were proven wrong. I point this out in the hopes that it will be fixed and balanced. LK (talk) 16:18, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

As to the article as a whole, I've not reviewed it. That doesn't change the fact that the “Criticism” section wasn't neutral, and at a point where a mainstream article of faith has indeed been verifiably proved wrong, it was instead being treated as plainly true. (This is a matter of pure math, not of interpretation of data.) Balance is not found in lending any credence to popular fallacy. —SlamDiego_←T 23:49, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

A claim has been made in a paper written by proponents of a heterodox school that the mainstream orthodox framework is lacking. The article uses this to support a plain statement that mainstream microeconomics methodology has been proven wrong. The paper in question was not published in a major mainstream journal, nor was it peer-reviewed by anyone except proponents of the heterodox school. Wikipedia should not use this to present as a fact, that orthodox mainstream methodology has been proven wrong. I ask that you (or another editor) balance the presentation in that section. LK (talk) 08:02, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

Utterly wrong. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie is a well-established mainstream journal, amongst those published the highly respected Springer-Verlag. (Nowadays, it is better known by the name “Journal of Economics”, but in 1977 it was still using its original name.) It has never been a journal of any school, and the peer-review there was and is no more likely to be by heterodox economists than that at any other mainstream journal. (McCulloch himself, BTW, was from September 1983 to September 1991 the editor of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.)

You are confusing your own grossly uninformed conjecture with plain fact. Time to back off. —SlamDiego_←T 08:31, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

I stand corrected. Given that the link given was to mises.org (and that the title had 'Austrian' in it), I assumed that it was from one of the journals sponsored by them. I have just gone through the paper (albeit rather quickly). I don't see how it supports your contention that Caplan's view (which is essentially the mainstream view) is somehow proven wrong by the paper. Caplan's assertion is that the AS criticism of the mainstream for using cardinal utility is incorrect, because the AS criticism ignores the mainstream methodology of checking that theorems hold true for monotonic transformations. He argues that this methodology means that the mainstream view and the AS view concerning utility are actually not that different, and the AS proponents overstate the difference. As far as I can tell, the McCulloch paper shows that there is a difference between merely specifying a choice ordering, and looking at all possible monotonic transformations of a cardinal utility function. I don't see how this disproves Caplan's assertion. LK (talk) 09:46, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

And the answer is that the weak quantifications are plainly not purely ordinal, as Caplan apparently claims (I trust that you have not misrepresented Caplan); and the parenthetical note does no more than to note that they are not. The parenthetical note does not claim that any other criticism by any member of the Austrian School on the issue of ordinality v. cardinality is fully vindicated, let alone that every such criticism is vindicated. Unfortunately, I am unaware of any “reliable” source that carefully walks through the actually very different notions inconsistently labelled “ordinal” and “cardinal” just amongst mainstream authors, let alone one that then breaks-down just where and how various Austrian School economists get some things right and some things very wrong with respect to these different notions; absenting that, we'd be awash in original synthesis if we handled this issue in an otherwise proper way. Economics — both mainstream and Austrian School — desperately needs a proper critique. But Wikipedia itself cannot provide it for anyone (until it is provided by a “reliable” source).

As to the title having “Austrian” in it, one should suspect original synthesis if it didn't. (In fact, McCulloch's article is an adaptation of work in a paper from Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg, and so, were original synthesis here permissible, Caplan's claim could be refuted even had McCulloch never written his.) And, as to the link to mises.org, it is well established that some of material that they provide is peer-reviewed &c. —SlamDiego_←T 10:08, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for pointing out why I shouldn't have assumed that the paper was from a mises.org sponsored journal. LK (talk) 10:28, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

BTW, the Mises Institute didn't come into existence until 1982; you can take it as a given that they didn't sponsor the publication of anything before then. —SlamDiego_←T 10:39, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

I've just had a quick glance though Caplan's essay, some of Rothbard, and the paper in question. Caplan's point is that Rothbard accuses mainstream microeconomists of basing their models on Cardinal utility, and rejects mainstream micoreconomics based (in large part) on that objection; and that Rothbard's objection ignores the fact that results are usually checked for all monotonic transformations, and are hence based on Ordinal utility. The term Ordinal utility here is used as per the mainstream definition, that is, a theorem holds for Ordinal utility, if it holds for the set of all utility functions that can be obtained by all possible monotonic transformations of the utility function in question. The point of McCulloch's article is that this definition of Ordinal utility is not exactly the same as the concept of 'choice orderings' which is the definition of Ordinal utility used by Austrian economists. This does not mean that the conception of Ordinal utility as used by mainstream economics is incorrect, nor does it show that Rothbard's objection to mainstream microeconomics is correct. It just shows that there is some basis for disagreement between Austrian and standard theory, as the two start with different assumptions about what is reasonable to assume about utility theory. LK (talk) 05:53, 12 October 2009 (UTC)

Your analysis here is fallacious. What shows the mainstream incorrect is (as that parenthetical edit noted) that there are economically rational choice orderings to which even a weak quantification cannot be fit. (Which is shown by McCulloch as well as showing that there is difference between the notions of the two schools.) The economic mainstream has made a guess about the mathematics, which guess is incorrect.

(It wasn't even a good guess. Mathematicians should have been expected to long ago have noted that total ordering were sufficient for quantification if such were true.)

Certainly the weak quantifications could be supported by some assumption other than the falsified assumption that total ordering were sufficient. But such assumptions need to be clearly acknowledged and would subject the mainstream to a line of Ockhamistic critique. (And of course persisting use of the term “ordinal” would become a source of embarassment, a reminder of an earlier confusion, regardless of any prerogative to redefine words.)

As I stated above, “I trust that you have not misrepresented Caplan”. If Caplan's criticisms were more modest — declared to be a response to the specific views of Murray Rothbard rather than to the Austrian School more generally — then the section needs to be rewritten and may not be appropriate to this particular article.

As to whether Rothbard were correct, you ought to have read more carefully what I wrote earlier. As I noted, “various Austrian School economists get some things right and some things very wrong with respect to these different notions” and “Economics — both mainstream and Austrian School — desperately needs a proper critique”, but we lack a “reliable” source here, and “absenting that, we'd be awash in original synthesis if we handled this issue in an otherwise proper way”.

I will say (on this Talk page rather than in the article) that the general tendency is for the mainstream to think that they are making weaker assumptions than they are, and for the Austrian School to think that the mainstream is making stronger assumptions than it is. —SlamDiego_←T 23:19, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

BTW, I do not regularly follow this article or its talk page, so if someone wants a timely response from me then he or she should wave me down on my own talk page. —SlamDiego_←T 03:35, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

As I read the McCulloch article, it showed that there are economically sensible (I'll avoid "rational") preferences to which even a weak quantification cannot be fit. Once you actually look at the kinds of choices those preferences induce, they appear to be the same thing you'd get out of a standard quasiconcave utility function. I'm not sure if that's just McCulloch's illustrations, but I'm far from convinced there's any implications of this more roundabout-but-mathematically-pure way of modeling things. Diving into this would be WP:OR of course, so I think we need to stick to a "he said"/"he said" approach. (From my point of view arguments about how nice it is to avoid cardinality are pretty silly if you adopt cardinality wholesale once uncertainty enters the picture.) CRETOG8(t/c) 03:40, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

(I'm using “economically rational” as per the standard definition. Frankly, I wish that this weren't the standard term, it only works as a name, and not as a description. The assumption(s) that distinguish(es) it from rationality more generally is/are not peculiarly economic. The problem with “economically sensible” is that it isn't a standard name, and isn't very helpful as a description.)

The fact that many major results are the same with and without quantification is to be expected; were that not so, then one of the schools would have fallen earlier, and distinction would have been plainer to the neoclassicals sooner. But there are other results of quantification that are less subject to potential empirical falsification, and overlooking assumptions as such leaves one unaware that there has already been a stretch before some further or stronger assumption is made.

Indeed, to whatever degree quantification is jointly adopted later, to deal with uncertainty or for some other purpose, arguments over it at an earlier stage would seem to be moot. But, on the other hand, not everyone accepts something such as EU maximization. (In particular, EU maximization, which is the mainstream model of choice under uncertainty, does not fit the behavior of real persons, and runs into major difficulties as a normative theory.) And I would not think it advisable to call the level of quantification then required wholesale “cardinality”, as some mainstream sources thus call this degree of quantification “ordinal”, as does not need quantification unique beyond an affine transformation, and isn't sufficient for interpersonal comparison. (Really, the neoclassicals have totally clobbered-up the nomenclature here.) —SlamDiego_←T 04:24, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

SlamDiego seems to be saying that utility functions are "weakly cardinal," and the only basis explicitly mentioned so far is the idea that utility functions may not be inclusive of all ordinal sets --- on the surface, I find that argument no more convincing than claiming that the function f(x)= 4*⌊x⌋ has a solution set that is "weakly odd" just because it is not inclusive of all of the even numbers. I'll have to look into whether McCulloch backs your link between "incompletely ordinal" and "weakly cardinal" or whether that's your own synthesis; it'd also help to see whether the "Austrian theory of utility" has received any mainstream application. BigK HeX (talk) 20:34, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

Speculatively charging me with “original synthesis” is not a good idea, especially as I've provided links both the Kraft &alii and to McCulloch.

Before you, no one here has used the term “incompletely ordinal”, it's not transparent what you might mean by it, and I could immediately think of two plausible interpretations.

As to whether the Austrian School theory of marginal utility has received mainstream application: No, it hasn't. —SlamDiego_←T 22:48, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

If the following resembles your claim, then which of your sources directly notes anything to the effect that "mainstream economists rely on preferences which exhibit (at least) a 'very weak cardinality _{[your words below]}'"? (Page number would be helpful, since I don't feel like rooting too far through a theory that has little interest outside of Austrian circles.) BigK HeX (talk) 23:34, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

The source that I provided in the first place, McCulloch, notes as much. (As I stated, Kraft &alii did not note the significance of their proof for utility theory. I provide that link for those who want to see the original mathematics in its first appearance.) Relevant passages appear through-out McCulloch's article, and I don't owe you the courtesy of narrowing things further. —SlamDiego_←T 23:49, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

He notes no such thing. The strongest statement McCulloch makes that is relevant to your criticism is that "It seems plausible that all unrelated orderings, at least on finite sets and sufficiently reasonable infinite sets, must be essentially cardinal". This most certainly does NOT match any unequivocal claim along the lines of "mainstream economists use orderings of 'weak cardinality.'" Making the claim unequivocal (and relating it to utility functions) based on McCulloch as a source is ORIGINAL RESEARCH.

(I'll be interested in seeing whether the above constitutes yet another "attack".) BigK HeX (talk) 00:40, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

The sentence that you quote, appearing on page 273, is part of a paragraph that, in full, reads

It seems plausible that all unrelated orderings, at least on finite sets and sufficiently reasonable infinite sets, must be essentially cardinal. In fact, in 1949 the Italian statistician B. de Finetti conjectured that this is true. If so, it would seem to be mere quibbling to retain an ordinal approach once it is assumed that wants are unrelated, fur we could then derive all properties of the ordering from a few numbers which we can manipulate in familiar ways, In any case, it could then be argued that the Austrian utility theory is only superficially ordinal, that their assumptions amount to the same thing as cardinality.

In the very next paragraph (which is on page 274), McCulloch notes

For a decade de Finetti's conjecture remained unsolved. In 1959, Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg finally proved it false by publishing a counter-example. [....]

in application to probability orderings; and in that same paragraph, McCulloch applies the same mathematics to preference orderings (using a previously presented example to serve as his counter-example).

McCulloch (before and after that paragraph beginning on page 273) identifies “cardinality” as arisal from a measure; not, mind you, from being fit by one-and-only-one measure, but simply from being fit by some measure. (I believe that the first instance of McCulloch doing this is on page 267.)

Simply put, McCulloch says that it seems like it should be possible to fit quantities to all the relevant orderings, but that it's not. You've treat McCulloch as if he endorsed a claim which he in fact he merely called “seemingly plausible” only to almost immediately show it was false. The rest of the paper (before and after those two paragraphs) is largely devoted to setting-up those points, exploring some of their implications, and noting their limitations. (For example, the proof applies only to finite orderings.)

(A claim that I am engaged in “original synthesis” based upon a careless reading is problematic, but not nearly so much so as one based on speculation.) —SlamDiego_←T 03:50, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

I don't treat him like he's endorsed anything. If anything, I'm pointing out what he does not endorse, which is that I can't find an endorsement of claims similar to those you've made in this talk page. You've suggested that Brian Caplan's understanding of utilities is flawed, and that this is because (roughly) mainstream economists use utilities that are (very weakly) cardinal. Your source does not make such assertions about mainstream economists, that I can find. BigK HeX (talk) 04:44, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

The claim that mainstream economists use quantified utility is found in Caplan himself. Caplan notes

Modern neoclassical economists habitually use “utility functions” to describe individuals' preferences. For example, they may posit that an individual's utility U=a*ln(quantity of apples)+(1-a)*ln(quantity of oranges).

plainly applying arithmetic operations and logarithms, which are mappings from quantities to quantities. Caplan's reference to rescaling is likewise about mappings to quantities. The fact that the specific passage by McCulloch you cite doesn't note that particular point isn't very interesting. —SlamDiego_←T 05:20, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

"Quantified" .... interesting mutation of the discussion at hand. Unfortunately, that is still not the same as your claims regarding cardinal utilities which prompted you to suggest that Caplan is ... I believe the word used was "incompetent." Sorry.

Per my promise, I'm going to leave the matter alone for now. The last word will be all yours...... BigK HeX (talk) 05:27, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

It's not in the least a mutation. Here's what I first wrote:

The problem with Caplan's position is that he thinks that something is purely ordinal that is not. About 50 years ago, it was proved that there are some orderings, of the same mathematical form as economic rationality (though the authors did not note as much), to which no quantification can be fitted; a bit more than 30 years ago, the application of this point to utility theory was identified, though this has gone largely unnoticed. When economically rational orderings to which a quantified proxy cannot be fitted are excluded, a distinct assumption resulting from quantification is imposed. Hence, what most economists have called “ordinal” is not. The term “ordinal” is then at best an oxymoron — a failed description that continues to serve as an unfortunate name.

(Underscores added.) And even had I not explicitly expressed myself in terms of “quantity”, cardinality is quantification. I refer to the sort of cardinality that mainstream economics mistakes for pure ordinality as weakly cardinal because only some of the properties of an given quantification are used, but even just those properties are not found simply in total ordering. And, indeed, the appropriate word for Caplan's critique here is “incompetent”. —SlamDiego_←T 05:40, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

I wonder if WP:BLP includes the injunction not to badmouth people on the talk page? LK (talk) 08:53, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

One can bad-mouth them in article space if the bad-mouthing can be properly substantiated. (Indeed, you've been party to bad-mouthing a few people in article space.) Perhaps some people need to improve their knowledge of English, by looking-up the word “incompetent”. (And, please, no one engage in the eristic ploy of finding one definition that doesn't fit while ignoring that which does. I am so tired of that one.) —SlamDiego_←T 09:14, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

I've just noticed this attack on my editing standards. Please substantiate it. Produce one diff where I have bad-mouthed anyone in any article on Wikipedia, or retract your statement. Or stand as a proven prevaricator. LK (talk) 10:33, 21 January 2010 (UTC)

Note that the comment repeatedly links “bad-mouth” to the Merriam-Webster entry for same. Read it. —SlamDiego_←T 00:43, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

Something tells me that the requested diffs are unlikely to be found on Merriam-Webster. I'm mildly curious to see them.... BigK HeX (talk) 01:02, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

Once Lawrence Khoo is up-to-speed on the English term “bad-mouth”, if he still wants to claim that that he's never been party to bad-mouthing in article space, then I'll provide diffs if he'll agree to apologize when they're produced. As to your mild curiosity, I don't really want to wade into his edit history just to satisfy it. —SlamDiego_←T 01:24, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

I'm being a bit presumptuous, but I'm rather confident that LK was quite familiar with the term "bad mouth" when he asked for diffs to support the accusations leveled against him. I guess I'll let you two hash it out, though. BigK HeX (talk) 04:46, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

Ah, were he properly familiar with the term “bad-mouth” then he'd know

• that the answer to his query was obvious, that WP:BLP does not forbid bad-mouthing; and
• that nothing is said about the merit (nor conformance to policy or guidelines) of his edits in noting that he's been party to bad-mouthing in article space.

His query, of course, could just be an attempt at irony. But his subsequent expression of outrage, if made in good faith (as I assume), implies that he was abidingly mistaken about the meaning of “bad-mouth”, in spite of my redundant linkage to the Merriam-Webster entry.

Indeed, whatever may have been his intention in his insinuation that I have been bad-mouthing on this talk page, the fact is that the insinuation is perfectly accurate, that I have been bad-mouthing, but that my bad-mouthing has been accurate and supported; meanwhile, I said nothing about whether his bad-mouthing in article space were accurate or properly supported. On some level you might call his description of me as bad-mouthing or my description of him as bad-mouthing an “accusation” (as you have indeed done in the latter case), but it's at best an odd use of the word “accusation”. —SlamDiego_←T 05:17, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

I ask you again. Produce a diff where I have bad-mouthed someone in article space, or admit you are wrong, or stand exposed as a liar. LK (talk) 13:37, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

Will you apologize if a diff is produced that establishes that you have been party to bad-mouthing, given the actual definition of “bad-mouth”? According to Merriam-Webster, it is no more or less than

to criticize severely

That's the one and only definition that they provide. I'll produce a diff in which you were party to severe criticism in article space before I remarked on your doing so, if you'll agree to apologize once I've done so. I've already produced a diff below of your being party to severe criticism in article space more recently. Escalating by calling me a “liar” isn't going to work in your favor. —SlamDiego_←T 17:02, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

I ask one last time. Produce the diff or be a proven liar. LK (talk) 03:33, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Again, will you promise to apologize if I produce a diff? If I can't produce a diff, then the promise costs you nothing. Without the promise, the only thing proven will be that you were averse to making such a promise. —SlamDiego_←T 04:22, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

The "actual definition" of bad mouthing includes "To criticize or malign, especially unfairly or spitefully," [American Heritage Dictionary] which is certainly the connotation invoked as I read the accusation against LK, and the usage preceding it. But, by all means .... continue grasping at semantic straws in order to defend the characterizations of Bryan Caplan which kicked off this mess. BigK HeX (talk) 08:43, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

I linked to the reference that I was using at each point that I used the term “bad-mouth”, and that reference (the very standard Merriam-Webster) makes no reference to unfairness or to spite. If either were intrinsic to the definition, then Lawrence Khoo's original insinuation that I were “badmouthing” would have been in violation of Wikipedia policy on personal attacks. But, using the definition provided by Merriam-Webster, or even just accepting the definition that you cite, but noting the difference between “especially” and “always”, it was not. You cannot have it both ways, and I trust that Lawrence Khoo will not try to have it both ways. We'll interpet his use of “badmouthing” as not implying malice on my part; and since my every use was literally linked to the definition provided by Merriam-Webster, we'll certainly interpret it as having just that meaning. The grasping at straws here is yours, and you're not actually getting one. —SlamDiego_←T 09:12, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

It's interesting that you think because you began a semantic shuffle after the point was raised, that you get some sort of credit for doing so. Also, if LK were insinuating that your commentary on Caplan was spiteful, IT WOULD VIOLATE NOTHING. Multiple Wikipedia officials have already advised you about the judgment you make on what constitutes a "personal attack." Trying to fallback on to that accusation will prove just as ineffective this time, I'd imagine. BigK HeX (talk) 09:37, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Nope, claiming that I engaged in severe criticism that were unfair or spiteful would be disparging me without sufficient evidence, and that's plainly against WP:NPA. The response to a complaint might well have been that it would be better to let it slide, but it would still be a violation of policy. And I wasn't falling-back at all. As I've said, my links established unequivocally what definition of “bad-mouth” I was using. It's simply an added absurdity that his use of “badmouth” would be seen as acceptable and mine of “bad-mouth” as an offense. —SlamDiego_←T 09:53, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Accuser refuses to retract false accusation

SlamDiego has stated that I have on multiple occasions bad mouthed people in article space. And yet cannot provide even one instance where I have done so, and still he refuses to retract his accusation. It is clear from his prevarication that he is unable to provide any proof of his false accusation, and yet he still refuses to retract his accusation. I ask all to take note of this.

This is clear proof of his character. I have twice been the victim of his habit of casting unfounded aspersions, and his tendency to twist words and situations while refusing to recognize the plain truth. Since he will no doubt go running to the wikiquette notice board to complain about this post, I will save him the trouble and post there myself. LK (talk) 13:12, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Lawrence Khoo's complaint to WQA has been rejecteed as not filed in good faith. I reïterate my willingness to provide a diff showing him to have bad-mouthed in article space, on condition that he apologize should I produce the diff. Anyone may infer what they will about character from my insistence on such a conditional promise, and from his unwillingness to give it. —SlamDiego_←T 19:12, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Forget about LK. The closure of the WQA specified that you were both guilty. If you have evidence of misconduct please provide it at the appropriate venue as continued accusations of misconduct without proof of such are likely to be seen as personal attacks. Weakopedia (talk) 20:49, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Oh dear! A central point is that I did not accuse Lawrence Khoo of misconduct. I used “bad-mouth” exactly as per the definition to which I linked at the time, and subsequently, and I have offered to provide a diff to show that he has been party to severe criticism in article space. —SlamDiego_←T 21:19, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

You refuse to produce a diff because you cannot do so. I have never bad mouthed people in article space. That statement is a lie. Not only do you make false accusations, you refuse to retract it even when its proven to be a lie. Go on and prove me a liar. Post a diff. LK (talk) 09:51, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Again: I reïterate my willingness to provide a diff showing Lawrence Khoo to have bad-mouthed in article space, on condition that Lawrence Khoo agrees to apologize should I produce the diff; and calling me a liar isn't truly helpful to him. —SlamDiego_←T 17:39, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

I said that the accusation you made was a false statement. By the same convoluted logic that you have previously used, I didn't call you a liar, and I can demand that you retract and apologize for that false accusation. As you are still hiding behind that fig leaf of wanting an apology if you can produce a diff, (which is totally unreasonable), let me assure you that you shall have my most humble apology if you can produce a diff where I have bad-mouthed a real person in article space. Go digging Diego, let me know what you find! LK (talk) 10:24, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

I'm glad that you've finally agreed to the precondition. Now, note that the definition to which I linked said nothing about validity or about substantiation, and certainly nothing about Wikipedia policy. Indeed, of Wikipedia policy, I wrote “One can bad-mouth them in article space if the bad-mouthing can be properly substantiated.” Claiming that a group of alleged scientists reject scientific method is a severe criticism (your edit didn't ascribe the claim as such to some third party; it just presented it as a bald fact) and here are more examples of severe criticism in article space: [1] & [2].

(Tangentially, let's look at the two cited sources for that bald claim about rejection of the scientific method: Steve Kangas' “Liberal FAQ” and an essay by “Joe D”, described as “a physics student”. Not exactly the sort of “reliable” sources one normally wants.)

The precondition concerning an apology wasn't a fig leaf; I hope to have some effect on your future behavior. As to what you call “convoluted logic”, there isn't any symmetry here; I don't deny having said that you'd bad-mouthed someone. And, really, if you thought the word “bad-mouth” to be insulting, then you never should have applied it to another editor. —SlamDiego_←T 20:37, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

TLDR; more hot air, still no diff. LK (talk) 11:18, 27 January 2010 (UTC)

I think that readers can count the three diffs that I presented. —SlamDiego_←T 17:29, 27 January 2010 (UTC)

3 diffs where I tried to introduce sourced criticisms about a school of thought. Unless BLP is reinterpreted to apply to schools of thought, and 'bad mouthed a real-person' is reinterpreted to mean 'introduced sourced criticisms about a school of thought', I think you are way off the mark there. Really, I mean have you actually read the diffs? Keep on digging, SD. :P LK (talk) 12:02, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

First, the Austrians School is that group of economists who participate principally in a tradition of thought. Second (though the issue isn't whether you violated WP:BLP, but whether you bad-mouthed people in article space), WP:BLP is in fact already interpreted to apply to groups as well as to individuals taken singly. Third, I note again the point that I made at the start of the comment to which you objected: “One can bad-mouth them in article space if the bad-mouthing can be properly substantiated.” You demanded a diff, and once you promised that you'd apologize, I delivered. I'm not surprised that you haven't. —SlamDiego_←T 17:58, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

I do not see any severe criticisms in any of those diffs, but even so, I will gladly apologize if you can show me where it says in WP:BLP that it applies to a school of thought. Hmmph. LK (talk) 07:12, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

First, as I have more than once noted, rather than saying that any edits had violated WP:BLP, the comment to which you object began by noting “One can bad-mouth them in article space if the bad-mouthing can be properly substantiated.”; WP:BLP controversy is perfectly irrelevant to your promise to apologize should I offer a diff in which you had bad-mouthed someone in article space.

Secondly (since this may be relevant to other matters), WP:BLP makes no exception for people taken as groups. WP:BLP objections have, for example, been raised over named purported charitable organizations (at “List of charities accused of ties to terrorism”) and over the naming of fraternity chapters in criminal cases. Were someone to say “The Beatles killed Kurt Cobain”, this would be as much a violation as an unsupported claim that just Paul McCartney had done so. Demanding a specific reference in WP:BLP to those in a school of thought is no more reasonable that demanding a specific reference to people who reside in Hong Kong (for which there is also no exception). —SlamDiego_←T 08:58, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

Much like LK, I don't see any "bad mouthing" done by LK in those links --- even by your watered-down definition of the term. BigK HeX (talk) 22:20, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

It's not my definition it's the Merriam-Webster definition; the one to which I linked ab initio, and the one that an American court of law would treat as the default. And the significance of your refusal to acknowledge severe criticism as such is much like the significance of your imputing Merriam-Webster's definition to me and trying to wave it away as “watered-down”. —SlamDiego_←T 23:04, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

And SIMILARLY any criticisms in LK's edits are almost certainly not HIS criticism, but acceptably verifiable criticisms from a person authoring the secondary source --- you'd think someone so talented at semantic dancing would recognize that. So, unless you found LK engaging in original research your entire diversion here is unfounded -- I imagine it would be treated as such even by the standards of your hypothetical "American courts."

So, there has still been no substance provided to back your accusation. Without that, in the end, you've have done nothing more than fill every expectation that this asinine attack on LK would be a waste of time. Feel free to prove me wrong. BigK HeX (talk) 18:33, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

If I say “Joe is a fat-head”, I'm criticizing, though it may not be my idea — I may have arrived at that view because someone else (reliable or otherwise) told me that Joe were a fat-head. As previously noted, Lawrence Khoo presented the criticism as bald fact, rather than as opinion (as in “Paul claims that Murray is a fat-head”). The semantic dancing here is purely yours. I didn't claim or insinuate that Lawrence Khoo had invented the criticism.

(And, again tangentially, the sources ([3] & [4]) for the severe criticism that I noted in that first diff fall far short of the standards of Wikipedia policy (VERIFY & WP:RS); so it wasn't there a matter of “acceptably verifiable criticisms”. But whether they were bad-mouthing is a question distinct from that of verifiability.) —SlamDiego_←T 19:19, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

Clarity - Does non-mainstream Equal Fringe?

Just wanting clarity on the debate that settled the topic of using "non-mainstream" and therefor its impact on the use of people associated with Austrian School for other WP pages as being considered as "fringe" by some and then argued that they be discounted for inclusion as a valid sources. Old archives I found seem to conclude "fringe" wasn't appropriate which, I'm guessing, is reflected in the choice of "non-mainstream". Theosis4u (talk) 19:10, 6 February 2010 (UTC)

No one seems to want to help you out, so it looks like I'm left to clean this up. There are multiple discussions on this issue in the archived section of the talk page (click on "1" at the top of the page). The discussions can be seen clicking here and here and here and here. Make up your own mind. Non-mainstream/heterodox does (normally) mean "fringe". The question is whether AS is "genuinely" non-mainstream. If it is, it is fringe. If it isn't, it isn't. It's probably the most "non-fringy" heterodox School in economics today, if that makes any sense. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.104.54.8 (talk) 12:15, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

In economics, non-mainstream does NOT mean "fringe". See Heterodox economics. (In the perspectives of John Davis and of Colander, Holt, and Rosser, "mainstream economics" and "orthodox economics" are not equated.) 209.217.195.110 (talk) 08:43, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Please see Wikipedia:Scientific consensus for a discussion of this issue. Essentially, there is:

• The mainstream majority view.
• Minority views that are still accepted by the mainstream. (eg. Ricardian Equivalence)
• Questionable science: Theories which have a substantial following, but which some critics allege to be pseudoscience.
• Generally considered pseudoscience: Theories which have a following, but which are generally considered pseudoscience by the scientific community.
• Obvious pseudoscience.

LK (talk) 11:18, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Thank god Keynesian wiki economists are here to inform the readership that Austrian economists aren't considered mainstream! [sarcasm]Without the disclaimer, people might be fooled into believing that Austrian economics is actually a legitimate field of study.[/sarcasm]

Keynesian economists should not be commenting or authoring articles pertaining to Austrian economics AT ALL. There are highly qualified Austrian economists that can better inform the readership on the subject than the Keynesian gatekeepers. --158.61.151.200 (talk) 00:31, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Dear Karmaisking, If you really want to contribute to Wikipedia, it would help if you could try not to reply impolitely to politely written comments. LK (talk) 01:04, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Oddly enough, it's completely unclear who he's supposed to be directing his sarcasm at, since neither LK or the IP editor before him said anything about "Austrian economists aren't considered mainstream." It seems his zeal for attacking "Keynesians" induces him to even fabricate reasons for doing so. As for his feelings on "appropriate editing" ... since KarmaIsKing is free to start his own competing wiki project, it's a mystery why he continues to trespass here when he is so clearly in disagreement with the principles set forth by the private owner of this PRIVATELY-RUN website --- entrepreneurship and competition (instead of trespass and dealing out abuse) .... isn't that what the Austrian School is supposedly after?

Either way, I must say that it amuses me to think of the informational "value" a project like this would have if "only astrologists could edit Astrology articles," or "only Flat Earthers could edit articles on the Flat Earth theory," or only passionate advocates like Scientologists could edit the Scientology articles, etc. BigK HeX (talk) 07:00, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Being a tertiary source (which is indeed privately owned as BigK HeX notes above), en.Wikipedia falls to its knees on controversial subjects, as sources having to do with them may (or may not) lag a lot longer than some editors would like. Although fringe may be out of the mainstream, out of the mainstream is not fringe and both terms spin up through overuse (and worse) to become meaningless labels, dialectics. WP:Fringe is not policy, WP:NPOV is policy. Keynesians with a COI are welcome to edit here and they do have an edge as to sourcing at this time. Even the slightest edge can be overwhelming in outcome. All editors should understand that reliable sources are reliable only as to verification of published content and its background. None of this has anything to do with truth. Meanwhile, this website is meant to be edited by volunteers working together and the first step towards doing this is to follow the civility policies. No matter how daunting things get, please comment only on sources and how to echo them in the text, do not try to thwart other outlooks or sources by talking about other editors. Gwen Gale (talk) 08:33, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

BigK sarcastically suggests only allowing Flat Earthers to edit Flat Earth articles - I see no problem with that. If people who believe the earth is flat want to present their case, why must others see to it that their case is discredited? Isn't that the job of the readership to make up their own minds on such matters? Why is it any editors business to inject criticism of a theory into a wiki topic? At most, I could see adding a one line link to a separate wiki page offering such criticism, but I don't see how injecting such criticism into any article offers the readership any value at all. Theories presented should be offered by the best respective experts in the topics at hand and criticism of the theories should be relegated to separate articles or barred entirely. It is the readers job to determine the validity of a theory, not the editors job.--158.61.151.200 (talk) 19:58, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

I thoroughly understand what you're getting at but nonetheless I don't think bringing up Flat Earth (as in not shaped like a ball) and the Austrian School as if they have the same encyclopedic weight is helpful. Gwen Gale (talk) 21:54, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

The relative weighting (of Flat Earth and the Austrian School) is quite besides the point. The suggested examples merely highlight the "sensibility" of Karmaisking's suggestion to characterize editors and then limit their edits based on said characterization. As for things that aren't helpful ... I'd question banned editors arguing against the fundamental policies of this site while repeatedly throwing around sarcasm and ad hominems and presumptuous characterizations of other editors. BigK HeX (talk) 04:07, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Karmaisking ... you can rage against the machine, but undue weight is part of a fundamental Wikipedia policy. Accept it or don't, but I'm sure you'll find that the community will continue to enforce it, especially since your wondrous interactions here have garnered you such a dedicated "fan club." BigK HeX (talk) 04:12, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Could you two please stop defaming me. I am most definitely NOT anon IP 158.61.151.200. I openly admit I WAS 122.104.54.8 above, and I made a fairly innocuous contribution, actually stating that "non-mainstream" = "fringe" (which, ironically, others have denied!). How's that for a "golden" display of my encyclopedic objectivity! I even fooled BigK Hex, who then assumed I was attacking myself! Ha Ha Ha! LK, check the geolocation of 158.61.151.200 to confirm this. I'm surprised you assumed this dude was me - he doesn't even write like me. Perhaps everyone who isn't a Keynesian zealot looks the same to you (exterminate! exterminate! exterminate!). Yet another reason why you should CHECK BEFORE BANNING EDITORS - and why "Karmaisking" should be re-instated. At least then you can track me easily and you'd know when it was me. Remember, I promised to edit only as Karmaisking if you re-instated me. But then the admins made their fateful decision and the rest is history (or at least sockppt heaven).

Please see the Quack test (WP:DUCK) for identifying sockpuppets. IP made an argument that KiK has made before, and has been impolite in a way similar to how KiK has been impolite. LK (talk) 10:20, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

You're not fooling anyone, except possibly yourself. BigK HeX (talk) 13:15, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

IP, if need be, I'm willing to delete your posts or semi-protect talk pages in this topic area for short times if you keep showing up. Begone, you're not helping anything or anyone here. If you want Karmaisking unblocked, take it to that user talk page or email an admin, or arbcom, although it's highly likely you'll be asked to stay away from the website altogether for a few months before this could even be brought up. Meanwhile article talk pages (like this one) are meant for talking about sources, how to echo them in the text and otherwise build articles. Gwen Gale (talk) 11:17, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Yeah I've run into this problem of being called a sockpuppet before. Its an easy way for mods to justify banning a person that doesn't accept the majority opinion. My beef isn't so much with the article, its far more about wiki's policy of criticism in general. Its not just alternative economic theories that suffer from this scientific gate-keeping. We saw the same with a wiki super editor blocking out or deleting over 5 thousand edits pertaining to global warming recently.

To the Keynesian gate-keepers, there will be more people like myself stopping by here as Austrian theory begins to gain traction in light of its recent string of predictive successes. So do not jump to conclusions about sock-puppetry so fast.--158.61.151.200 (talk) 23:26, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Academic and political background

Academic and political background section still not making much sense. It is a collection of loosely related topics. I've extracted the methodology parts, paragraphs purely about the methods, into a new section. The rest still should be dealt with.

From top down, these are the topics included: value neutral vs small/no government recommendation, entrepreneurship, cost theory, a mix of interest theory and business cycles. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Krisztián Pintér (talk • contribs) 12:13, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

I guess you weren't the original author, but it still needs reliable citations. BigK HeX (talk) 17:31, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

SlamDiego and McCulloch ... third time's a charm?

I am again requesting clarification of SlamDiego's edits.

• A) At least one instance of McCulloch refering to the utilities of mainstream economists as "weakly quantified," and
• B) an instance of McCulloch describing the inapplicability of mainstream utility functions to possible preference sets.

Thanks BigK HeX (talk) 19:46, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

This has already been asked and answered.

Multiple standard, mainstream sources identify utility functions as real-valued and subject to arithmetic. For example, Peter Fishburn, in “Utility and probability” in Utility and Probability (editted by Eatwell, Milgate, and Newman) writes

Let $\succ$ denote the relation is preferred to on a set $X$ of decision alternatives, outcomes, commodity bundles, or whatever. Suppose preferences are ordered and can be represented by a real valued function $u$ on $X$ as

$x\succ y\Leftrightarrow u\left(x\right)>u\left(y\right)$,     (1)

for all $x$ and $y$ in $X$. We then say that $u$ is an ordinal utility function if it satisfies (1) but is subject to no further restriction.

A similar definition can be found in an standard intermediate or graduate-level microeconomics text. That is why Caplan illustrates his notion of a utility function with the decidedly arithmetic “U=a*ln(quantity of apples)+(1-a)*ln(quantity of oranges)”. There is nothing new here. If some editor insists that “weak quantifications” be replaced with a bald “quantifications”, that's not of much importance, except that it would the mainstream look more foolish than it is. But synonymy is not synthesis, original or otherwise.

McCulloch notes in the first paragraph beginning on page 274 that the ordering in Table 4 (page 257) cannot be fit to any such function, and in the next paragraph explicitly states

Since unrelatedness does not imply measurability, it follows that the Austrian theory of the marginal use is intrinsically ordinal. It admits of situations where no cardinal utility function is possible.

(Underscore mine.) —SlamDiego_←T 20:42, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

McCulloch specifically addresses the Austrian theory in his paper, and yet you keep asserting it as a reference to your claims regarding mainstream utility theory. I must continue to treat your usage as improper synthesis. BigK HeX (talk) 20:45, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

McCulloch addresses multiple theories, including those of Hicks and Allen, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Friedman and Savage (1948), comparing or contrasting these with the Austrian School theory. Your claims of “original sythesis” are simply not tenable. —SlamDiego_←T 21:04, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

I have been unable to verify your claim, and when you are asked for such verification, you provide a passage specifically limiting itself to conclusions about the Austrian theory [i.e. "...it follows that the Austrian theory of the marginal use is intrinsically ordinal. It admits of situations where..."]. Without a source that you can draw upon more lucidly, I do not see how your claims meet WP:V standards. My position on the acceptability of your claims about mainstream utility remains unchanged. BigK HeX (talk) 21:13, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

McCulloch noted that no quantification could fit the preference ordering of Table 4. That point is plainly not specifically limited to the Austrian School Theory. (He further shows that this point isn't applicable ot the Austrian School notion, in direct contradiction to your claim.) —SlamDiego_←T 21:37, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

[The comment to which the next is a reply was deleted.]

As we've discussed, McCulloch identifies the concept of essential cardinality with arisal from a measure, not with having a unique relationship to some particular measure. Thus, when he notes that

The unrelated ordering of Table 4 cannot be essentially cardinal.

This is no more or less than the point that no quantification can be fit to it. That claim is not specific to the Austrian School theory; indeed it doesn't fit the Austrian School theory at all. But it immediately applies to mainstream theories, and he does discuss the cardinality of these theories, as when, for example, he repeatedly notes the quantification entailed in expected utility models, and explicitly notes (p 276) that they cannot be reconciled with preferences to which quantifications cannot be fit. —SlamDiego_←T 22:24, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

• This is no more or less than the point that no quantification can be fit to it.

It's largely irrelevant whether you think McCulloch's statement can be used in part to derive your conclusion AND also that it would apply to mainstream theories. It is clear that:

A) McCulloch does NOT explicitly make the assertion (as well as it being pretty questionable whether the point is made implicitly),

B) McCulloch's intent with the passage you cite is clearly different from your attempt to use it.

Both of these represent a misuse of the source (i.e., "Drawing conclusions not evident in the reference is original research regardless of the type of source"). Though you've expended praiseworthy effort in explaining how you arrive at your synthesized conclusion, you have yet to show McCulloch actually making the assertion you want to attribute to him as a source. You've typed a dozen+ responses on this single issue, and none of them show McCulloch stating that "mainstream utility theory is inapplicable to Table 4," much less where McCulloch states that "here is my formal proof of preferences for which the theories of microeconomic theorists are inapplicable."

Apparently, I'm beating a dead horse at this point, so I'll exit this thread until such time as you actually provide the requested verification from McCulloch. In the meantime, I'll have to enforce WP:SYN as indicated earlier. BigK HeX (talk) 22:53, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Your argument is akin to claiming that an article should let stand unchallenged a claim from a website that polar bears live in Antarctica on the grounds that the only reliable source says that no bears live there, but does not specifically mention polar bears. You are simply wikilawyering in order to protect a falsified claim supporting your PoV. I won't bother to present formal warnings, as you've been around long enough to know what happens when such editing is recognized. —SlamDiego_←T 05:08, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Actually, my argument is "akin" to someone drawing conclusions not evident in the reference .... oh, actually, that is my exact "argument". The only one needing wikilawyering is the one repeatedly attempting to justify their violation of the Wikipedia guidelines.

If you want to make up irrelevant analogies, at least keep them halfway applicable ..... which would in this case be Source X specifically drawing conclusions about brown bears and how no brown bears are found in Antarctica, but then an editor comes along to make assertions about black bears because of that editor's completely unsourced assertions that "Source X is really referring to black bears, too, since I'm telling you that black bears are 'weakly brown.'" If you think useless analogies will justify your violation of policy, then please do "formally warn" me. I'm amused when you concoct such threats, especially given your weak position.

Anyways, your attempt at that whacky analogy was just too rich to pass up, but I'm done talking about the matter with you, as it's clear you are not going to present an actual RS basis for your claims. The fact that your very first post in response to this thread was a reference to a completely different source, which you're trying to tie in with McCulloch was most telling as to whether you're attempting a synthesis. Your repeated failure to be able to quote a source making the assertion you do is also quite problematic, so you can trust that your WP:OR will be dealt with appropriately. BigK HeX (talk) 06:02, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

No, the analogy is not wack, but your modification is inappropriate. To continue with it, we would have a reliable source that demostrated that no bears were found in Antarctica, in the course of discussing the presence of some variety of penguin, and you'd be arguing that he had only said that there were no bears so long as we were thinking about penguins; that, were we thinking about something else, then bears might be their. And you'd be insisting that I was engaged in “synthesis” for claiming that any paper about penguins could be used to refute a claim about bears, even if it indeed have reported that there were no bears. —SlamDiego_←T 04:41, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

It is abundantly clear that McCulloch's purpose is to describe the Austrian theory and whether it can be regarded as "essentially cardinal" which makes your attempts to use McCulloch as a reference against mainstream utility theories even more questionable. In any case, the section that you cited[page 274] as drawing conclusions about Table 4 explicitly states only, "the unrelated ordering of Table 4 cannot be essentially cardinal." It does NOT present relationship to mainstream theory or neoclassical utility functions. Your attempts to substitute mainstream utility theory within McCulloch's assertions constitutes a synthesis of your contrivance, and I must treat it accordingly. BigK HeX (talk) 21:50, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

The fact that McCulloch's primary purpose is to explore the Austrian School theory does virtually the opposite of negating the point that part of that exploration repeatedly involves comparing or contrasting it with alternate, mainstream theories. And, again, elsewhere (as on page 276) McCulloch draws attention to the inability of alternate theories to handle “intrinsically ordinal” preferences. —SlamDiego_←T 22:24, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Mainstream economists do not claim that all preference relations can be represented by a utility function anyways. For a preference relation to be represented by a utility function, it must not only be a total order, it must also satisfy a certain continuity axiom. Lexicographic preferences are an example of a preference relation that cannot be represented by a utility function. (See Debreu (1959) or, for example, the 2nd edition of Varian's grad textbook for cites for the above.) What mainstream economists claim, roughly, is that when a preference relationship can be represented by a utility function, economists confine themselves to statements whose truth value is invariant to monotonic increasing transformations of the utility function. This is what it means for utility to be ordinal. (Cite: the literature on Measurement theory, including Von Neumann and Morgenstern.) I don't see how McCulloch noting that some preferences cannot be represented by a utility function challenges any of the above, even if he does find a use for the term "marginal utility" when preferences cannot be represented by a utility function.

I think SlamDiego's use of McCulloch on a whole cluster of entries for Marginalism, Marginal use, Marginal utility, etc. is more problematic on the grounds of undue weight. I'd like to see a recent survey article in economics that covers McCulloch, Lancaster (1971), S. Abu Turab Rizvi (2001), and the literature on menu-choices to see some demonstration of McCulloch's weight. -- RLV 209.217.195.164 (talk) 07:39, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

I agree that SlamDiego's usage may be problematic as to weight (especially since he's blatantly disregarding the context of the McCulloch source). However, my more pressing issue is how SlamDiego insists on a sort of 3-phase conflation, wherein he uses no sources to relate "cardinal utility" with this "weakly quantified" phrase that he seems to have invented, and then he goes through the further contortion of applying any findings related to the above to the "mainstream utility theories" discussed by Caplan.... all without a source that explicitly makes such conclusions (and really without a source that even makes the conclusions implicitly, either). BigK HeX (talk) 17:08, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Your harping on the term “weakly quantified” is a deliberate red herring, as I've already made plain that I have no commitment to this specific term. We simply need to have some term that isn't opaque to the reader. McCulloch plainly does apply the proof to the von Neumann-Morgenstern construct, contrary to [User:BigK HeX|BigK HeX]]'s claim that McCulloch applies it only to the Austrian School model.

Further, Caplan's claim is presented in the article as a refutation of the claim “the Austrians contend that one can only rank preferences and cannot measure their intensity”. Even were McCulloch's article somehow applicable only to the Austrian School model, it is exactly this model that Caplan is being used there to attack. —SlamDiego_←T 04:41, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Robert seems to have lost sight of the fact that McCulloch's article has been presented as refuting Caplan's claim. While there might be some further use for citation of McCulloch in this article, that's the only use that has been advanced so far. No editor (be it I or someone else) has proposed that any article contain the bolder claim that all mainstream economists have been refuted by McCulloch's article. Other aspects of Robert's comment are problematic, but tangential to the issues here. —SlamDiego_←T 04:41, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I said nothing about "all" mainstream economists having been refuted. I don't even see where Caplan disputes that “the Austrians contend that one can only rank preferences and cannot measure their intensity”. Caplan agrees that the Austrian school economist Rothbard says something like that. What he disputes is that, typically, when a mainstream economist uses utility functions, he is claiming an ability to measure intensities. In showing that not all preferences that can be ranked can be represented by a utility function, McCulloch is not refuting any claim that Caplan is making. And McCulloch does not claim to be refuting any such claim, either. SlamDiego is enaging in Original Research and Synthesis here and elsewhere, including with his usage of the phrase "weakly quantified." I'm much more prone to let go strict violations of Wikipedia policy here that make the entry more sympathetic to the Austrian school, at least in contrast to how I think SlamDiego's use of McCulloch bends other entries all out of shape. (There's other issues with those other entries.) -- RLV 209.217.195.164 (talk) 06:40, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Indeed, you studiously avoided quantifying your reference to mainstream economists with an “all” or with a “some”. The original assertion that “The article uses this to support a plain statement that mainstream microeconomics methodology has been proven wrong.” came from another editor, not I. Given his conception of the mainstream and given my conception of the mainstream, this assertion is correct, but what you consider the mainsteam might be different; however, no editor has proposed that the article claim that anything to be called the “mainstream” has been refuted. Rather, the claim purportedly from Caplan should not be presented as plain fact (as once it was), and the point from McCulloch should be noted if the claim is reported.

As to whether Caplan has been fairly represented, I have twice now raised that question, the first time obliquely, and since more explicitly.

If a cite from Rothbard or from some other “notable” Austrian School economist can be found where he claims that contemporary orthodox economists typically presume that utility is measurable, then I am all for providing a refutation from some source (even if that source were not thinking of the Austrian School at the time). And if no such Austrian School citation can be found, it might still be noted that the orthodoxy had moved-on, so long as this weren't misrepresented as a refutation.

Once again, the issue of the term “weakly quantified” is a red herring, and deliberately thus. As I have repeatedly said of this description (it is a description, rather than a name) that another term can be used, and there is in any case no synthesis in synonymy. McCulloch plainly identifies economically an economically rational ordering to which no quantification can be fit; if Caplan does not claim what he is reported to claim, then the McCulloch citation is simply out-of-place, but Caplan's claim also would need to be fairly reported. —SlamDiego_←T 07:46, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

It looks like we feel similarly about SlamDiego's engaging in WP:OR. And even regarding potential weight issues, I, too, wouldn't have much problem with McCulloch being mentioned in the text somewhere, but we both agree on the point (with regards to SlamDiego's attempted usage) that "[...] McCulloch is not refuting any claim that Caplan is making." Perhaps, you also agree that there's no reason it should be written in as if it were some sort of refutation. BigK HeX (talk) 07:56, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Any silly analogies aside, I'll conclude my observations here. I believe there is a violation of WP:SYN#Using_sources. SlamDiego made this edit:

• "McCulloch, however, has formally shown that there are economically rational preferences to which none of [ mainstream microeconomic theorists' ] weak quantifications can be fit."

and when pressed about it failing verification, he apparently describes how he based his statement on text from page 274 of his source which discusses "Table 4." The only relevant conclusion about a "Table 4" there is the following:

• "the unrelated ordering of Table 4 cannot be essentially cardinal."

....that's it. The passage in the editor's source makes no mention of mainstream theories, much less describing them as "weakly quantified," and we have certainly NOT been presented with evidence of McCulloch equating all things "essentially cardinal" with things that the editor refers to as "weakly quantified."

Given SlamDiego's contested edit, it seems that he is using the source as if it read, "the unrelated ordering of Table 4 cannot be realized by the weak quantifications of the mainstream microeconomic theorists described by Bryan Caplan" He has substituted the source's concept ("essentially cardinal") with his own concept (of what can be "realized by the 'weak quantifications' of mainstream microeconomic theorists").

In regards to the context of the source, it is clear that the author, McCulloch, wrote that passage with the express aim of building his conclusions about a non-mainstream theory there [the Austrian theory of utility], which makes SlamDiego's use of that passage as a reference for assertions about mainstream theory even less defensible. BigK HeX (talk) 07:05, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

BigK HeX keeps trying to make something of the term “weakly quantified”, but no editor has expressed commitment to using that particular term in the article. The only reason that I used it in the first place is to acknowledge that the use of quantification by mainstream economists is limited; if there is no felt need to make that acknowledgment, then a balder term can be used.

Contrary to BigK HeX's “that's it”, McCulloch explicitly notes the incompatibility of “intrinsically ordinal” preferences

So, that deliberate red herring aside, here are the relevant questions:

• Is Caplan's unreviewed webpage a reliable source for its use in the “Inter-War Period” section?
• Is the claim attributed to Caplan a fair summary of what he has actually said?
• Given an affirmative answer to those previous two questions, should the claim attributed to Caplan appear twice in the article — both in the “Inter-War Period” section and in the “Criticism” section?
• Should McCulloch's proof that no quantification can be fit to some economically rational preference orderings be noted any any or all of the points that the claim attributed to Caplan appears?

—SlamDiego_←T 04:41, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

i took some time to read the cited materials (Caplan and mcCulloch). my point of view is this. Caplan's observations are rather irrelevant here. Austrians does not reject cardinal values on the basis that such a concept is self contradictory or otherwise mathematically incorrect. but because it is not observable, so such assertations are not verifiable, thus artificial and unnecessary. Caplan's remark is not a refutation, merely a statement that the mainstream approach is logically equivalent. but we also can make algebraic representation of geometry, and it does not make geometry less valuable or correct.

mcCulloch also seems inappropriate, because the only relevant part to this topic is a citation from Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg [1959]. it is a claimed counterexample, an ordinal ranking that can not emerge from an underlying cardinal ranking. my knowledge about the mainstream utility functions are rather limited. but the cited example seems very simplified, using a linear utility function. i feel it is not strong enough to refute what mainstream (and Caplan) says.

my opinion: neither sources are relevant at this place of the article. Krisztián Pintér (talk) 22:58, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I appreciate your willingness to dive into this rather dry subject matter! It's good to have another set of eyes. I do have one comment in response, though. You conclude that "Caplan's observations are irrelevant" .... I'm curious about that assessment, since Caplan is very clearly offering a refutation of assertions that he reads from Rothbard, in regards to Austrian vs mainstream theory. Being that it is a direct criticism of Rothbard's assertions about Austrian vs mainstream theory, it seems pretty relevant. Perhaps, you have concluded that Caplan's refutation is flawed....? The way I read your comment above, this seems to be the case, although that would be a bit of a different problem from Caplan being irrelevant.

[As an aside, I'll note that it's not quite the case that Caplan was focusing on whether "Austrians reject cardinal values" on mathematical (or any other) basis, so starting from that premise might lead one to believe Caplan's refutation there had flaws of some sort. Another reading of the Caplan ref might help, but one risks dying of boredom.....]

In any case, its good to have another person willing to dissect the sources that are relevant to this dispute. BigK HeX (talk) 23:30, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

i believe you take it the wrong way how Austrians reject cardinal value. they don't say it is impossible or false. they say that it is impossible to measure, so any claim about cardinal values are fantasies. this is further amplified by the fact that utility functions can be transformed monotonically. that suggests that they don't have underlying meaning, but artificial constructs. that does not mean they are wrong, or can't be useful in a certain application, but Austrians choose not to use them.

let me give an example. assume someone comes along, and gives us a function that tells the mean distance of planets from the Sun, in the form of d = f(p) where p is the number of the planet, earth is 3, mercury is 1, etc. f(3)=150,000,000,000. the function is a real-real function, so one can compute f(3.1) which happens to be 167,000,000,000. it makes no sense of course, but the function nevertheless is useful for its purpose. one can argue, on the other hand, that this function, though correct, does not capture the logical structure of planetary distances. a more natural and straightforward way to simply list them. the function contains no more information, and only obscures the essence.

Rothbard's cited arguments, in my read, never question the possibility of cardinal rankings, but question the need or rationale for them. like "Those writers who have vainly attempted to measure psychic gains from exchange" - asks for empirical evidence, or "Utilities are not quantities, but ranks..." - about the essential structure of preferences, not an impossibility to define cardinals, or "its absurdity clearly, since utilities are not quantities and therefore cannot be divided." - a simple recitation of the Austrian term of utility, which is not dividable. this argument does not try to disprove the cardinal theory, just stating that it is not how reality appears to us.

so my conclusion is as above: this article does not tell us anything about or against the Austrian school. it is much more a refutation attempt to a criticism of the mainstream by an Austrian.

Krisztián Pintér (talk) 19:24, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

"i believe you take it the wrong way how Austrians reject cardinal value."

Hmmm ... I did not state any opinion on the Austrian rejection of cardinal values. It's actually my point that it seems that Bryan Caplan did not endeavor to state any such opinion either. I guess there is more subtlety to Caplan's criticism than that, but his concern is not really focused on the Austrian rejection of cardinal utilities. I suggested that a second reading of the Caplan ref might clear things up. BigK HeX (talk) 19:35, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

if two readings didn't help, i doubt a third one would. so i guess it is up to you this time to show me how Caplan's article is relevant to the Austrian School, especially at the current place in the article. Krisztián Pintér (talk) 20:00, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Not really sure about your request. As mentioned before, I'm still unclear how the Caplan paper (or the similar web article) could be considered irrelevant to the Austrian school; the paper is decently respected and pretty clearly addresses Austrian school-related assertions attributed to prominent Austrian thinkers -- I'm very unclear as to what could be more relevant than something like that. As I mentioned, if you think Caplan's reasoning is flawed, that's a different matter. As for it's position in the article, Caplan's paper discusses mainstream ideas about utility theories, so it would likely be appropriate to mention at points in the article which touch on utility theories.

Now, if you're asking for clarification on the issues that Caplan is discussing, just for your own curiosity, then we may be able to coordinate something, but I think you have a grasp on the matter, since you conclude, "it is much more a refutation attempt to a criticism of the mainstream by an Austrian." BigK HeX (talk) 21:07, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Sigh. Okay, from another direction. Look at the debated sentence itself. "that mainstream theorists since then have shown that their results hold for all monotonic transformations of utility, and so also hold for ordinal preferences." What that's got to do with anything? At best, it says that mainstream economics are also sound in that regard, only maybe more roundabout. So? Why would we care if some other theory is isomorphic to the Austrian school in some way? Krisztián Pintér (talk) 21:37, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

We care about such an "isomorphism" when Austrian school proponents repeatedly assert that there is a radical difference (and do so even to this day [see: SlamDiego]). [edit: I wouldn't really call it isomorphic, but it doesn't distract too terribly from the point at hand. Anyways...] We especially care, if there is a prominent perspective [i.e., the mainstream view] which might be subject to conflicting characterizations from a minority perspective. BigK HeX (talk) 21:47, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I for one do not want to assert the Austrian school approach to describing preference as a hierarchy of needs is isomorphic or equivalent to mainstream approaches to utility theory. Caplan asserts that Austrian school economists mistakenly describe the typical mainstream treatment as requiring utility to be cardinal. By the way, you can see Rothbard being silly in Section 9, Chapter 4 in Man, Economy, and State. That section is titled, "Some Fallacies Relating to Utility". I find this particularly stupid: "Another, even more curious doctrine holds that in equilibrium the ratio of the marginal utilities of the various goods equals the ratio of their prices. Without entering in detail into the manner by which these writers arrive at this conclusion, we can see its absurdity clearly, since utilities are not quantities and therefore cannot be divided." And I agree that SlamDiego is using McCulloch to attack a straw person. -- RLV 209.217.195.173 (talk) 22:13, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I guess I should clarify that I would not assert the mainstream theory of utility to be equivalent to Austrian theories (especially with the conflicting approaches to indifference among other issues), but the point mentioned in the article is that the difference on ordinality is not so radical as Austrians have proposed, and I believe it to be a relevant point to gaining an encyclopedic understanding of contentions related to the Austrian school. We've seen a PRIME case here this past week over what can happen if those "overstated"^{[Caplan 1998]} characterizations about mainstream theory are allowed to persist. BigK HeX (talk) 22:38, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

define radical. in my above example, it is a radical difference to list the planet distances instead of using a function? in some way no, in some way yes. btw Austrians are well aware that mainstream uses cardinals in the way they do. look at a lecture by Robert Murphy, he even makes a reference to the Caplan article. also states that cardinalism often misleads people to actually use value as real cardinal. i stress one more time, that Austrians oppose cardinal utility not on practical, but more philosophical basis. Caplan's article does not apply, especially not in the "Inter War Period" section. Krisztián Pintér (talk) 22:20, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

From a different perspective, Murphy's lecture might be yet another reason to ensure that Caplan's point is included. As for the "Inter-war period," I've already mentioned above my feelings on the matter (namely, that the mainstream perspective "would likely be appropriate to mention at points in the article which touch on utility theories," see also WP:STRUCTURE) BigK HeX (talk) 22:47, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

this debate could continue indefinitely. i don't think there is any reason to reference that text at that point. it adds nothing, refutes nothing stated there. some references from the inter war period might be useful, this just clouds things. maybe a rephrasing would help, but i still have no idea what is the purpose of this reference. but since agreement does not seem to be achievable, and others don't seem to be interested, i will not push it any more. the article has other important problems. Krisztián Pintér (talk) 21:28, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

NOTICE: One of SlamDiego's fundamental assertions has been challenged. Hopefully, this issue will be resolved soon. Feel free to weigh in on the matter at the noticeboard. BigK HeX (talk) 15:57, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

The unpublished factor of Caplan's work is a possible issue. He has made similar points in the peer-reviewed "The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations" (jstor link free *.doc link). CRETOG8(t/c) 17:00, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Also, Caplan's "socialist calculation" rebuttal has been published in "Critical Review." BigK HeX (talk) 17:48, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

It may be noteworthy that that the unpublished web version of Caplan's arguments [the "Why I'm not..." article] is cited within peer-reviewed works, and is often recognized as a well-constructed critique of Austrian economics. The article itself is, of course, a notable webpage related to the topic of the Austrian School. (Of lesser note, the link to Caplan's article ranks higher than Peter Boettke's Austrian economics blog in Google searches.) BigK HeX (talk) 17:58, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Some of my comments above may misrepresent McCulloch (1977). McCulloch's Table 4 does not present a preference relation that cannot be represented by a utility function. In fact, McCulloch gives a utility function, defined up to monotonically increasing transformations. The argument of this utility function is a subset of the set of all wants. What McCulloch says is that that utility function cannot be derived, in this case, from a ranking of the set of wants. It remains the case that McCulloch is not disputing any claim that the Wikipedia entry is alleging that Caplan has made. Nor does McCulloch say he is refuting any such claim. SlamDiego is engaging in original research to use McCulloch to attack a strawperson. (Mainstream economists do know of preferences relations that cannot be represented by utility functions: e.g., lexicographic preferences when the space of commodities is a continuum.) -- RLV 209.217.195.115 (talk) 09:05, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Citation Needed for Interwar Neoclassical Version of Utility Theory

I think this statement from the article needs a citation: "the Austrians contend that one can only rank preferences and cannot measure their intensity, in direct opposition to the neoclassical view at the time." As I understand it, J. R. Hicks Value and Capital exhibits a certain continuity with Pareto's work on indifference curves. And Hicks, at least, claims utils only achieve an ordinal level of measurement. -- RLV 209.217.195.120 (talk) 23:03, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Original Research

The methodology section dispute has been listed at the NOR/N for uninvolved editor comment. Weakopedia (talk) 11:34, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

Reorganized the lead

The lead wasn't very well organized, jumping from topic to topic, and did not reflect the body of the article very well. I've reorganized it, removing a few redundant sentences, and tried to follow the organization of the article itself. This is per the manual of style, and I hope is not controversial. The sections "contributions" and "criticisms" were not adequately represented in the old lead, and would need to be added to the new lead. LK (talk) 07:06, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Thanks for helping out. I am more concerned about the 'Criticism' section which has become the venue of a lot of Original research. I don't want to edit war over it (we've already been to AN/E and Nor/N and had the article protected for a week without getting much uninvolved editor input or consensus) so I am working through the Wikipedia:Dispute resolution process to see where we go from here. Weakopedia (talk) 09:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Personally, I don't like isolating criticisms to a particular section, if they can be integrated into the article itself, keeping the current weight for the various pro/con arguments. But I'm not sure that Austrian school advocates would agree to such a change. LK (talk) 03:03, 21 April 2010 (UTC)

I think the criticism section is, once again, original research, synthesis, and oddly weighted. -- RLV 209.217.195.114 (talk) 06:08, 21 April 2010 (UTC)

I agree that having criticisms in an isolated section within a minority POV topic creates unnecessary NPOV concerns (as described in WP:STRUCTURE). I'd guess that the article would need a moderate rewrite to incorporate the criticisms more properly. BigK HeX (talk) 07:05, 21 April 2010 (UTC)