Talk:Bombing of Tan Son Nhat Airport/GA1/redraft

Bombing of Tan Son Nhat Air Base
	Part of the Vietnam War
	; On April 28, 1975, Tan Son Nhat Airport became the target of North Vietnam's first successful air-attack against a South Vietnamese target in Saigon.
Date	April 28, 1975
Location	Tan Son Nhat Airport, South Vietnam
Result	North Vietnamese and PRG victory
Belligerents
South Vietnam	North Vietnam; Provisional Revolutionary Government;
Commanders and leaders
Nguyen Huu Tan	Nguyen Van Luc
Units involved
5th Air Force Division	Quyet Thang Squadron
Strength
1 air force division	1 squadron
Casualties and losses
24 aircraft damaged or destroyed	None

The bombing of Tan Son Nhat Air Base, on 28 April 1975, occuring just two days before the Fall of Saigon, was one of the final blows in the encirclement of Saigon. The bombing operation was carried out by the Vietnam People's Air Force Quyet Thang Squadron, which was manned by North Vietnamese pilots and South Vietnamese defectors.

In the years following the withdrawal of American military forces, South Vietnamese Air Force operations were severely curtailed due to declining U.S. military aid. Thus pror to the final North Vietnamese campaign in 1975, morale in the South Vietnamese Air Force had sunk so low that some of their personnel defected to the Communist side. In a well-known incident, South Vietnamese pilot Nguyen Thanh Trung chose to bomb the Presidential Palace in Saigon. Less than a month later, the same pilot led a flight of captured South Vietnamese A-37 aircraft and bombed Tan Son Nhat Air Base.

Background[edit]

Shortly before the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1973, the United States Government spent a total of $753 million on strengthening the Army of the Republic of Vietnam through the Operation Enhance and Enhance Plus programs.^[1] The South Vietnamese Air Force, formally known as the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF), was a major beneficiary; by the end of 1972 South Vietnam possessed the fourth largest air force in the world, with 2,075 aircraft and over 61,000 personnel, previously in 1964 it had only had 280 aircraft and 11,276 personnel.^[2] While seemingly impressive on paper, this failed to enhance South Vietnam’s ability to withstand North Vietnamese attack. South Vietnam lacked the economy support the operation of such vast aircraft numbers,^[3] and its personnel did not have the training to fly some aircraft given, such as the F-5E Tiger II.^[3] Also, the United States had decided against providing advanced aircraft on the basis that it would enable a South Vietnamese offensive against North Vietnam.^[4]

Although the Paris agreement was supposed to end the war in Vietnam, fighting continued between South and North Vietnam as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government, also known as the Viet Cong. Even though U.S. President Richard Nixon had pledged his continued support for South Vietnam, between 1974 and 1975 U.S. military aid to South Vietnam was sharply reduced.^[5] South Vietnamese Air Force operations was severely affected by cutbacks, forced to reduce flying hours by half and placed 224 aircraft into storage. Furthermore, as fuel and ammunition stocks declined, Air Force Command decided to halve average bomb loads.^[6] In contrast, North Vietnam had continued to build up forces in the South. With the threat of U.S. airpower removed, anti-aircraft (AA) units were moved into South Vietnam, and the North had been able to enlarge Khe Sanh airfield to enable limited jet operations.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).

By April 1975 the lack of support from the United States, in combination with the devastating losses suffered by the South Vietnamese military during the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, had taken a severe toll on the operations of the South Vietnamese Air Force. Half of the surviving South Vietnamese aircraft had to be grounded, so spare parts could be cannibalized for operating other aircraft.^[7] More critically was morale, which had fallen so low that some personnel deserted, or defected to either North Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government.^[8]

Events[edit]

Attack on the Presidential Palace[edit]

A high-profile defection occured on April 8. A formation of three South Vietnamese F-5E Tiger fighter-bombers lined up at Bien Hoa Air Base, each armed with four 250-pound bombs, in preperation for an attack on North Vietnamese positions in Binh Thuan Province.^[9] First Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Trung, who piloted the third F-5, took off with the squadron, but flew towards Saigon instead of joining the formation.^[9] At around 8.30am Trung dived upon on the Presidential Palace and dropped two bombs; the first bomb landed on the Palace grounds and caused some damage, but the second bomb failed to explode. Trung climbed to over 1,000 meters (3,300 ft) before making a second pass, this time both bombs exploded, causing minor structural damage but no casualties.^[10]

Trung flew his aircraft from Saigon to Phuoc Long Province, which was occupied by the Provisional Revolutionary Government since North Vietnamese troops captured it earlier in the year, where he was warmly received by North Vietnamese soldiers.^[10] The North Vietnamese claimed that Trung had been a Viet Cong agent since 1969, and had infiltrated the South Vietnamese Air Force. Trung later revealed that he was originally from Ben Tre Province in the Mekong region, where his father had served as the district secretary of the Communist Party.^[11] In 1963 Trung’s father was killed and his body was mutilated by the South Vietnamese police. Angered by the death of his father, Trung vowed to take revenge on the South Vietnamese Government, so in 1969 he secretly joined the Viet Cong after he had been accepted into the South Vietnamese Air Force.^[12]

Preperation for the mission[edit]

Prior to the bombing of the Presidential Palace, North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung and his field commanders had been discussing the possibility of deploying units of the Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF), to attack high-value South Vietnamese targets in support of North Vietnamese ground troops. Use of the Soviet MiG-17 fighter was considered, North Vietnamese pilots already had signficant familiarity and combat experience with the type.^[13] However, moving MiGs from their bases in North Vietnam was problematic; South Vietnamese defenses were falling much faster than anticipated, there was simply little time in which to deploy the MiGs in support of North Vietnamese units encircling Saigon. However, the North Vietnamese had captured a large number of U.S.-made aircraft from the South Vietnamese Air Force following their earlier victories at Ban Me Thout and Da Nang, so it was decided to use captured aircraft instead.^[14]

The decision to use the captured aircraft presented a challenge for the North Vietnamese Air Force, because they lacked experience in flying U.S.-made aircraft. Furthermore, North Vietnamese pilots were not proficient in the English language, most had trained on Soviet equipment using the Russian language.^[15] Upon receiving news of Trung’s actions on April 8, Dung decided that Trung would provide conversion training so that a group of North Vietnamese pilots would be able to fly the A-37 Dragonfly, the type selected for an upcoming operation. Trung was sent out to Da Nang where he was joined by Lieutenants Tran Van On and Tran Van Xanh, both were former fighter pilots of the South Vietnamese Air Force, captured alive when Da Nang capitulated on March 29. Trung, Xanh and On was tasked with translating manuals from English to the Vietnamese language, as well as translating instructions onboard the A-37 to Vietnamese.^[16]

On April 19, the North Vietnamese Air Force Command was ordered to prepare for an operation in South Vietnam, so a group of North Vietnamese pilots from the 4th Squadron of the VPAF 923rd Fighter Regiment was selected to undertake conversion training in Da Nang and form a new squadron for the operation. The selected group was led by Upper Captain Nguyen Van Luc along with Tu De, Tran Cao Thang, Han Van Quang and Hoang Mai Vuong.^[13] Together with former South Vietnamese pilots Trung and On, the selected group of North Vietnamese pilots would form the Quyet Thang (“Determined to Win”) Squadron. On April 22 the North Vietnamese pilots arrived in Da Nang and began training on two A-37 aircraft, restored to flying condition, with support from Trung, On, Xanh and a few South Vietnamese technicians who were also captured during the Hue-Da Nang Campaign. In just five days, North Vietnamese pilots were able to independently fly the A-37 without support from the former South Vietnamese Air Force personnel.^[16]

As the North Vietnamese pilots were completing the final phases of their conversion training, the VPAF Command chose to attack Tan Son Nhat Airport, primarily the military section of the airport. On the afternoon of April 27 the North Vietnamese pilots, together with the South Vietnamese trainers, were flown out to Phu Cat Air Base in Binh Dinh Province where Major-General Le Van Tri—commander of the Vietnam People’s Air Force—briefed them on the upcoming operation.^[13] Tri also instructed the pilots to ensure that their bomb loads should not hit civilian areas in Saigon. From the original group of trainees, Luc, De, Quang, Vuong, Trung and On were selected to take part in the attack on Tan Son Nhat. Meanwhile, On and Xanh were also instructed to test-fly five captured A-37 bombers, which would be the mainstay of the Quyet Thang Squadron. On the morning of April 28, the Quyet Thang Squadron became operational with Luc as the squadron’s commander, when it was transferred to Thanh Son airfield in Ninh Thuan Province.^[16]

The attack[edit]

At Thanh Son airfield, Luc submitted the squadron’s plan of attack to the VPAF Command. Accordingly, Trung would lead the formation in the first aircraft because he was familiar with the skies over Saigon. De were positioned behind Trung in the second aircraft, followed by Luc in the third, Vuong and On together in the fourth and Quang were to be the last aircraft in the formation.^[17] At around 4.05pm on April 28, the five A-37 bombers of the Quyet Thang Squadron, each armed with four 250-pound bombs, took off from Thanh Son airfield and each aircraft flew between 600 meters (2,000 ft) and 800 meters (2,600 ft) apart from each other. To save fuel over the 400 kilometers (250 mi) distance between Thanh Son and Saigon, the five-aircraft formation had to fly at a height of just 1,000 meters (3,300 ft). Their first navigation point was Vung Tau, from where the formation would turn towards Tan Son Nhat Airport. When the squadron flew over Bien Hoa Air Base, two South Vietnamese AD-6 Skyraiders were sighted conducting bombing sorties near the area, but they were not allowed to engage.^[14]

Shortly after 5.00pm the North Vietnamese-operated A-37 formation were able to approach their target openly, which was crowded with military aircraft, as they were still wearing South Vietnamese code numbers. From about 2,000 meters (6,600 ft) above the target Trung dived down on the military section of Tan Son Nhat Airport, but the bombs could not be released from the pylons, so Trung was forced to pull his aircraft up again.^[16] Next in line was De, who was able to drop his entire bomb load on the target. Luc dived upon on the target, but he too experienced problems with the weapons release system, so only two bombs were dropped. After the last two aircraft piloted by Vuong, Quang and On had successfully hit their targets, they continued to strafe aircraft on the ground with gunfire. Trung and Luc made another pass, but again their bombs could not be released from the pylon.^[16]

By that stage the South Vietnamese had already responded by firing their anti-aircraft guns, so Luc ordered the squadron to withdraw as Trung made one final attempt at dropping his load using emergency mode. A few South Vietnamese F-5A Freedom Fighters scrambled to give chase, however the attackers escaped without damage.^[17] On the return trip Quang led the formation, followed by Luc, De and Vuong and On. Trung, who had flown back for the third bombing attempt, was trailing the rest of the group. As they flew over Phan Thiet, they had to fly at a lower attitude to avoid mistakenly being hit by North Vietnamese anti-aircraft weapons.^[16] When the formation came within 40 kilometers (25 mi) of Thanh Son airfield, De was granted permission to land first because he only had about 600 liters (130 imp gal; 160 U.S. gal) of fuel left.^[16]

Aftermath[edit]

Just after 6.00pm all the pilots of the VPAF Quyet Thang Squadron had gathered at Thanh Son airfield, which marked North Vietnam’s first successful air attack against Saigon during the entire Vietnam conflict.^[18] The attack on Tan Son Nhat generated hysteria and panic, as the airport was one of the few remaining routes of escape still open for the South Vietnamese during the final days of the Vietnam War. The true extent of the damage is unknown, but 24 South Vietnamese aircraft were either destroyed or damaged. Official Vietnamese history claimed that about 200 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the attack.^[14] In spite of the bombing, some South Vietnamese Air Force pilots continued to sortie against the North Vietnamese troops encircling Saigon during the last days of the war.^[7]^[19] At least some South Vietnamese aircraft were still operational to participate in the Operation Frequent Wind; dozens of fighter aircraft equally escaped to neighbouring Thailand.^[20]

References[edit]

Citations

^ Tambini 2001, p. 28
^ Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 60
^ ^a ^b Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 53
^ Momyer & Des Bisray 1985, p. 55
^ Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 61
^ Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 62
^ ^a ^b Cite error: The named reference Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 78 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Darling 2005, p. 43
^ ^a ^b Tambini 2001, p. 38
^ ^a ^b Tambini 2001, p. 39
^ Burchett 1978, p. 186
^ Van 1977, p. 171
^ ^a ^b ^c Boniface 2008, p. 155
^ ^a ^b ^c Van 1977, p. 172
^ Van 1977, p.170
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g Boniface 2008, p. 156
^ ^a ^b Darling 2005, p. 45
^ Boniface 2008, p. 157
^ Head 2007, p. 236
^ Momyer & Des Brisay 1985, p. 79

Bibliography

Boniface, Roger (2008). MiGs over North Vietnam: The Vietnam People’s Air Force in Combat, 1965–75. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811706964. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Burchett, Wilfred G. (1978). Catapult to Freedom. Charlottesville: Quartet Books. ISBN 9780704321564. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Darling, Kev (2005). Tweet and the Dragonfly the Story of the Cessna A-37 and T-37. La Vergne: Lightning Source Inc. ISBN 1411647483. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Duong, Hao (1980). A Tragic Chapter. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House. OCLC 10022184.
Heat, William P. (2007). Shadow and Stinger: Developing the AC-119G/K Gunships in the Vietnam War. Houston: Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 9781585445776. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Momyer, William W. (1985). The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975: An Analysis of its Role in Combat and Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang. Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History. ISBN 0912799285. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
Tambini, Anthony J. (2001). F-5 Tigers over Vietnam. Boston: Branden Books. ISBN 0828320594. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Van, Tien Dung (1977). Our Great Spring Victory: Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 9780853454090. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)