Talk:Democratic peace theory/Layne and Doyle

Layne, Christopher 1994. “Kant or Cant.” International Security 19: 5-49.

Article Purpose: A critique of the of the democratic peace theory by using the theory’s causal logic and to ask whether democratic peace theory or realism is a better predictor of international outcomes (6).

The basis of Layne’s argument is that democratic peace theorists’ argue that the absence of war between democracies is a result of two assumptions: first, the effects of public opinion and the domestic checks and balances inherent in democratic states preclude them from going to war against each other; second, a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes also precludes democratic states from waging war with one another. Layne argues that using four “near miss” case studies, democratic peace theory’s causal logic will be found to not be supported by empirical data.

I. The Case for a Democratic Peace: Its Claims and its Logic

a. “Democratic peace theory does not contend that democratic states are less war-prone than non-democracies; they are not (7).”

i. Democratic peace theory does claim that never (or rarely) go to war with each other.

ii. When democracies come into conflict with each other, they only threaten to do use force. To use force would be ‘illegitimate’ (8).

b. Causal logic of democratic peace theory

i. Institutional constraints

1. The theory advanced by Michael Doyle states that democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their citizenry.

2. The “checks and balances” theory holds that states with “executives answerable to a selection body, with institutionalized political competition, and with decision-making responsibility spread among multiple institutions or individuals, should be more highly constrained and hence less likely to go to war (9).”

ii. Shared norms

1. Democratic states make certain assumptions about other democratic states that lead them to believe that they will both subscribe to pacific methods of resolving disputes and political competition (9).

2. Democratic states develop positive perceptions of each other.

c. The democratic ethos is based upon the idea of “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise.” Accordingly, this explains the absence of armed conflict between democracies, and why democracies, “…behave in quantitatively different manner in their relations with each other than they do in their relations with non-democracies (10).”

II. The Realist Case: The Same Things Over and Over Again

a. International political behavior is characterized by continuity, regularity, and repetition by the international systems unchanging structure (10).

i. International politics in an anarchic, self-help realm.

ii. In an anarchical system a states’ first goal is survival.

1. In order to survive state must maximize power relative to rival states.

2. Because military power is inherently offensive, by increasing military power in order to assure self-defense capabilities, a state my inadvertently threaten another state.

3. Fear and distrust of other states in a normal state of affairs in an anarchical system.

b. If the structural makeup of a state changes, the international system remains unchanged. Changes in the individual units does not change the constraints and incentives imbedded in the overall system (12).

c. Survival and security are always at risk, and democratic rivals will respond no differently than non-democratic rivals in protecting their self-interests.

III. Testing Democratic Peace Theory

a. Layne posits that democratic peace theory is not sufficiently explained by institutional constraints (12). By Layne’s estimation, if the citizens and policy makers of a democracy were particularly sensitive to the costs of war, this would be manifest in its relations with non-democracies as well. Layne also does not feel that the “checks and balances” theory holds up either, as if focuses on an “independent variable…that is associated, but not exclusive to, democracies (12).”

b. For those reasons Layne states that the democratic peace theory falls short, especially with regard to its main thesis that between two democracies a specific out come will occur – peace. In order to test this idea, Layne proposes to look at four “near misses”, where democracies almost when to war but did not, by using a process-tracing method (opening the “black box”) (13).

i. If the democratic peace theory is valid, then it should account for the fact that crises between democratic states ended in a “near miss” rather than in war.

ii. If democratic norms explain this phenomenon then their should be several indicators of this:

1. Public opinion should be overwhelmingly pacific.

2. Policymaking elites should refrain from making military threats against other democracies and should refrain from making preparations to carry out threats.

3. Democracies should be especially keen to accommodate each other in a crisis.

iii. A realist explanation would show a different set of accounts:

1. Realism would not belie the importance of a state’s national interests: “The more important the interests a democracy perceives to be at stake, the more likely that its policy will be shaped by realist imperatives rather than by democratic norms and culture (14).”

2. When national interest is at risk, democracies should not feel inhibited toward the use of force, regardless of regime.

3. Geopolitical considerations pertaining to the state’s position in the international arena should account significantly for outcomes.

iv. To illustrate this, Layne chooses four “near misses”: the US and Great Britain in 1961 (“the Trent affair”; the US and Great Britain in 1895-96 (the Venezuela crisis); France and Great Britain in 1898 (the Fashoda crisis); and France and German in 1923 (the Ruhr crisis) (14).

c. The Trent Affair, 1861

i. This crisis stemmed from a Union blockade of Confederate ports during the American Civil War. The USS San Jacinto, acting without specific orders from Washington, intercepted the British mail ship Trent that was ferrying two of the Confederacy’s commissioners-designate to Great Britain and France who were placed under arrest, though the two commissioners-designate had boarded a neutral vessel, the Trent, in a neutral port, Havana, Cuba. The Trent was allowed to continue its voyage, while the two arrested men were transported on the USS San Jacinto to Boston, MA where they were ultimately incarcerated.

ii. In response Great Britain used military threats in order to coerce the US into capitulating diplomatically. An ultimatum was also drafted by the British demanding that the arrested individuals be released and that the US government issue an apology to Great Britain in seven days. In addition Britain embargoed saltpeter, arms and ammunition; the Cabinet created a special committee to oversee strategic planning and war preparations; and Britain over doubled their troops and naval forces in North America (17-18).

1. This strong response is characterized by Layne as a response to Britain’s perceived national interests of the time, insofar as it believed that its’ credibility, resolve, and reputation were at stake.

2. Britain’s hard-line response was in keeping with their national interests in the region.

iii. The Union had a difficult decision. Many Americans saw the declaration of neutrality by Great Britain earlier that year as a de facto recognition of the Confederacy. The decision by the US to give in to British demands, however, were colored by the fact that the Union army was currently facing many setbacks, most notably having just lost the first Battle of Manassas, the US could not afford for the British to come in on the side of the Confederacy, nor could the US, by knowing that France supported the British in this matter, foresee how the French might take advantage of an Anglo-American war in North America.

iv. Layne posits that this “near miss” is hardly explained by the democratic peace theory, but by realism. Britain believed that its vital reputational interests were at stake, which would in turn affect its global strategic posture. The US stance is simply dictated by cost-benefit analysis: ‘diplomatic humiliation’ was preferable to a war with Britain that could have ultimately secured the Confederacy’s independence.

d. Venezuela, 1895-96

i. This crisis arose out of an obscure diplomatic dispute over the Venezuela-British Guiana border. This dispute is based in the United States asserting its’ claim to geopolitical primacy in the Western hemisphere.

ii. The US asserted that its national interests were being subjugated and that the Monroe Doctrine gave the US, “not only the right to intervene in the Venezuela affair but also a more general right to superintend the affairs of the Western hemisphere (23).” As a result of the assertion the US offered Britain an ultimatum for Britain to back down and to submit the border dispute to arbitration. The arbitration plan called for the US to establish a commission to investigate the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute and the US would take no steps until the commission’s report was made.

iii. The British government responded in 1895 by sending the US a rejoinder flatly rejecting the arbitration proposal as well as stating that the Monroe Doctrine had no standing as an international treaty and, as such, was not applicable in this case. However, in 1896 Britain reversed its’ policy, submitting to arbitration with crisis reaching an amiable end by November of that year.

iv. This sudden turn events is explained by Layne as a result of several factors: due to British interests elsewhere, a lack of available resources to wage war in the Western hemisphere; fears that Canada could be conquered by the US in a prolonged war; deteriorating Anglo-German relations (25).

v. Layne suggests that in this instance that the democratic peace theory cannot explain this outcome due to a lack of evidence supporting that there was either a public outcry against a Anglo-American war on either side or any major public opinion influence in the respective administrations. Layne insists that this “near miss” is best explained by Britain’s strategic policies not supporting this cause for war (28).

e. Anglo-French Struggle for the Nile: Fashoda, 1898

i. The Fashoda crisis was the culmination of the Anglo-French struggle for supremacy over Egypt and the headwaters of the Nile (28). Until 1882 Egypt had been administered by an Anglo-French condominium, however in 1882 Britain intervened in unilaterally to suppress a nationalist revolt and was to extricate itself in the region immediately. However, due to the regions importance in its’ overall strategic interests, Britain remain in place in order to exert its’ control over the entire River and valley.

ii. France sought to compel Britain to remove itself from the region, as France the British occupation of Fashoda as an affront. In 1896, an overland expedition was formed in order to exert French control on Fashoda. The aim was to either compel Britain to abandon its hold on Fashoda or to drive it to the negotiation table where a final agreement could be reached on Egypt.

iii. In response to reports that France was driving on the upper Nile, British troops were ordered to advance on Fashoda, and upon meeting the French forces to do nothing. When the French and British forces met in Fashoda their meeting quickly deteriorated into a diplomatic crisis over their respective standings as Powers (30). Britain had no intention of relinquishing control of the region to France and was prepared to go to war. The decision for the British was clear; either the French could withdraw or go to war.

iv. According to Layne, the results of this crisis are fully explained by realism. Frances’s decision to withdraw from the region was not in its’ interests, however their naval forces were seriously anemic compared to that of Britain. The diplomatic embarrassment seemed to the French a better alternative than a decisive military defeat.

f. Franco-German Crisis: The Ruhr, 1923.

i. The Ruhr crisis was a result of France’s policy of security and Germany’s policy of seeking revision in the Versailles Treaty system (34). Although reparations were a significant factor in this crisis, the region was also economically (iron and coal) and symbolically (Franco-Germanic geopolitical competition) significant.

ii. France saw its’ continuing occupation of the Ruhr as key in fulfilling the Versailles Treaty and that it would eventually lead to the breakup of Germany into smaller states with France, Belgium, and Holland occupying the left bank of the Rhine (34). The French also saw its occupation of the Ruhr as a lever to renegotiate the Treaty when Germany defaulted on its reparation payments, so long as Germany remained in default France felt free to continuing to occupy the Rhineland. Additionally, the French government and public opinion was obsessed with a “looming German security threat (35-36).” In fact, the French did not hesitate to use its’ military in the Ruhr to advance its’ security interests.

iii. France’s rejection of “second image” arguments that a democratic German would actually assist France in its’ security interests, did little more than to inflame the situation in Germany. Frankly, a Franco-German war did not occur due to the Ruhr crisis due to weakness of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr did support sabotage and a policy of general resistance in the occupied Ruhr. This resistance was fueled by printing more money which ultimately resulted in hyperinflation and the collapse of the German economy, as well as an abandonment of its’ resistance policies.

iv. Layne argues that this crisis further illustrates the inability of the democratic peace theory to predict outcomes. French policy toward Germany did not reflect any of the mutual respect that would be expected through shared norms and beliefs. In fact, France was only concerned with Germany’s latent military power and not its’ domestic structure.

IV. Theoretical Conclusions

a. Democratic peace theory implies that it is supported by a large number of cases (“N”) that is achieved by aggregating any number of possible democratic dyads (39). Layne gives three reasons why, in his estimation, the appearance of a large number of cases with little or no conflict is of little consequence in supporting democratic peace theory.

i. There are very few democracies in existence between 1815 and 1945.

ii. The possibility of any dyad, regardless of regime, becoming involved in war is small, because wars are a relatively rare occurrence. As David Spiro argues, if nations are unlikely to engage in war, the claim that democracies do not fight is relatively unimportant (39).

iii. Not all dyads are created equal.

1. There has to exist opportunity and reason to engage another state.

2. A dyad is only significant when it can meet these preconditions.

b. Democratic peace theory is then only supported by a small number (“n”) of cases that are historically difficult to define.

i. War of 1812?

ii. American Civil War?

iii. Wilhelmine Germany?

c. Layne suggests that the democratic peace theory has mistakenly “reversed” the “second image” resulting in a view that fails to take into account that a state’s internal structure is a product of its’ external relations. A states’ internal political structures are, in essence, formed in response to it national security concerns.

Owen, John M. 1994. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.” International Security 19: 87-125.

Article Purpose: An attempt to defend the democratic peace theory, arguing that liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, tending toward war with illiberal states.

The basis of Owen’s argument is that the argument can be determined, “by testing propositions from existing democratic peace theories on historical cases, then using the results to formulate a new theory (88).” (Using cases from 1790s through WWI)

I. Previous Attempts to Define Democratic Peace

a. Structural and normative theories

i. Structural accounts look to the actual structure of the democratic state to explain democratic peace. In other words, the process by which the state receives its mandate for waging war, from the people, constrains liberal democracies from waging war with one another.

ii. Normative accounts explain democratic peace through the actual ideals and norms held by democracies. Here it is assumed that liberal democracies will be more apt to share the same norms, and as such seek more just and cooperative ways in which to solve their problems.

b. Problems with these approaches

i. Democratic structures do not have any effect on a democracies propensity to war with another democracy (91).

ii. Normative approaches are found to not take perceptions into account; in studying two “democracies” at war with each other, they did not perceive each other as being “democratic” (91). In part these perceptions are a process of semantic differences (esp. 19th c.), e.g. republics and monarchies v. democracies and non-democracies.

c. The Realist approach

i. In using quantitative approaches, Realist variables such as “relative power, alliance status, and the presence of a hegemon…(92),” cannot render the effects of democracy ineffectual.

ii. Power politics has an effect in determining the foreign policies of liberal democracies, but it is in fact Liberalism that tends liberal democracies into war with each other and illiberal democracies. (92-3).

II. Liberalism as the Cause of Democratic Peace

a. Liberal ideas (a review)

i. Liberalism is universal and tolerant (93). This ideology stems from the philosophies of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant that in a state of nature all men are equal.

ii. Liberalism says that all individuals have an interest in self-preservation and material well-being (93-94). “True interests harmonize, the more people are free, the better off all are (94).”

iii. Liberalism is cosmopolitan, or every individual is free, not just those from one’s own state (94).

iv. There are two factors that belie freedom for liberals.

1. Individuals or states should be enlightened, insofar as their own interests and how they should be secured (94).

2. Individuals must, “live under enlightened political institutions which allow their true interests to shape politics (94).”

b. Liberal foreign policy ideology

i. Liberalism is concerned with assessing states by its regime type, whereas Neorealism is concerned with assessing states’ capabilities (95). As such, liberal democracies are more tolerant of their own kind.

ii. Liberalism holds to the idea of ceteris paribus, or that people are better off without war, however this belief is not extended to illiberal democracies, due to the fact that by definition illiberal democracies are viewed as prima facie, ‘unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous’ (95-96).

iii. Liberal democracies do not necessarily fight all illiberal democracies out of a need to spread democracy, usually because the cost is too high, and the illiberal democracy is too powerful, hence the imperatives of power politics (96).

1. The importance of perceptions: If a states peer states do not view it as a liberal democracy, it will not treat it as one (96-7).

2. Illiberal democracies: These states hold the view that all individuals “are not fundamentally the same, and that there are no harmony of interests between them (98-99).”

c. Democratic institutions

i. Democratic institutions are the governmental structures that, “actualize the harmony of interests among individuals by insuring that the freedom of each is compatible with the freedom of all (99).” This is accomplished through the citizens’ right to self-government, to give leverage to citizens over politicians, and regular, competitive elections, to allow citizens’ the ability to punish politicians who violate their rights (99).

1. “When those who govern hold the liberal ideology prohibiting war against fellow liberal democracies, then the role of democratic institutions is limited simply to putting these liberals in office (99).”

a) E.g. Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson (99).

b) Having a liberal democracy does not necessarily meant that the politicians will hold liberal ideals.

1) Political Realists – power is more important than freedom

2) Politicians that regard economic partnerships regardless of regime the most important factor in foreign policy.

3) When such politicians are in power they can lead liberal democracies into war with other liberal democracies, especially where the citizenry pays little attention to foreign affairs (99).

c) Ordinary citizens ignore foreign affairs due to the fact that, overall, foreign policy has very little effect on their individual lives. There for foreign policy is mainly the domain of elites and politicos (100).

1) Together elected representatives and the elites are characterized as opinion leaders.

2) Without the leverage provided by public opinion, special interests can trump the liberal elites, and thereby the liberal democracy can fall into a crisis with a fellow liberal democracy (100).

d) When war is threatened it is the interest of every citizen to pay attention, as the public must be mobilized, and public opinion must support the action (100-01). C.f. Figure 1 (102).

1) A liberal politician would never seek wage war against another liberal democracy.

2) Illiberal politicians in a liberal democracy may wish for a war against another liberal democracy, but to do so would be folly due to public outcry.

3) Liberal politicians was wish to wage war against an illiberal democracy, but may incur the ire of illiberal politicians (e.g. Spanish-American War) (101).

4) Recent studies demonstrate that public opinion precedes public policy, therefore the opinion leaders are key in forming opinion with regard to war (again, Figure 1) (101-2).

III. Hypothesis on Democratic Peace (102-4)

a. Liberals will trust states they consider liberal and mistrust those they consider illiberal.

b. When liberals observe a foreign state becoming liberal by their own standards, they will expect pacific relations with it.

c. Liberals will claim that fellow liberal democracies share their ends, and that illiberal states do not.

d. Liberals will not change their assessments of foreign states crises with those states unless those states change their institutions.

e. Liberal elites will agitate for their policies during war-threatening crises.

f. During crises, statesmen will be constrained to follow liberal policy.

IV. Four Cases

a. Franco-American Relations, 1796-98

i. With the US and France embroiled in the Quasi-War with France of 1798, liberal ideology, in the form of republican solidarity, prevented the Quasi-War from expanding to a full-scale war.

ii. The US of late 1790s qualifies as a liberal democracy by Owen’s estimation, although suffrage was limited to white, landed, males (105).

1. Elections were mandated by law.

2. Republican opposition to the Federalist government was lively. (Free debate)

3. Republicans held to liberal ideals, insofar as they viewed other republics (non-monarchies) as liberal states, therefore France was a “sister republic” (105).

iii. France of the late 1790s does not qualify as a liberal democracy, by Owen’s definition.

1. Elections were mandated by law (The Constitution of the Year III [1798])

2. The press was free.

3. The Directory, however, ordered coups d’état expelling those in the legislative and executive branches that opposed them (Sept. 1797 and March 1798), in effect “ending any institutional claim that France had to democracy (105).”

iv. Because the Republicans viewed France as a “sister republic” and Great Britain as a monarchy, there was great agitation to not go to war with France due to this Republican belief, and that the US and the French First Republic shared similar ideals. As a result the Republicans effectively agitated against war with France (106-8).

b. Anglo-American Relations, 1803-12

i. The Anglo-French war, starting in 1803, which ultimately embroiled the US in the war 1812, is often cited by critics of the democratic peace theory as an example of two democracies at war with each other. Owen, however, gives several reasons why, in his estimation, that Great Britain was not a democracy.

1. Anecdotally, very few Americans, and virtually no British, saw Great Britain as a democracy (108).

2. Some US Republicans saw Napoleon as a “republican Emperor,” and as a result saw France as less of threat than Great Britain.

3. Republicans believed that Great Britain did not share the US’s ends and was actively attempting “to wipe republicanism from the face of the earth (109).”

4. Republicans looked at Great Britain as a non-democratic regime both before and during the conflict, mostly as a result of historical reasons.

ii. Statesmen followed Republican ideology, that is, the national interest required war with Great Britain due to the fact that, ultimately, it was a monarchy (109-10).

c. Anglo-American Relations, 1861-63

i. During the early years of the American Civil War, Britain and the Union had an adversarial relationship. Americans still saw Great Britain as a monarchy, and therefore a country not to be trusted. In fact, Liberals on both sides had very weak feelings toward each other. Several key events ultimately kept an Anglo-American war at bay (110-11).

1. By Owen’s definition Britain in the 1860s was a liberal democracy, due in part to the 1832 Reform Act, which made for more equitable elections and place cabinet power in the stead of the Parliament as opposed to the Crown (111).

2. The Trent Affair ultimately became a non-event due to Lincoln’s apology and the US’s subsequent return of Britain’s emissaries.

a) A war with Britain was seen as imprudent from a cost-benefit approach.

b) A war with Britain would not further and liberal purpose in Lincoln and his cabinet’s estimation.

3. British Liberals trusted the Union during the 1860s, this trust was solidified following the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, as it demonstrated shared liberal ideals between the US and Great Britain.

4. British liberals actively agitated against intervention with support from evangelical Christian groups and other groups that supported an “anti-slavery sentiment.”

ii. What followed was a situation that made continuing support for the Confederacy, or intervention, by the British cabinet and Parliament untenable (112).

d. Anglo-American Relations, 1895-96

i. The US and Great Britain were again close to war, this time due to the American perception of a British violation of the Monroe Doctrine by trying to expand its territory in the New World. Owen argues that since the US and Great Britain were both liberal democracies, the situation was ultimately peacefully resolved.

1. After the Third Reform Act of 1884, Americans changed their views of Britain, shifting from that of a monarchy to a democracy. This was precipitated by a shift in Britain’s governing structure.

2. American views of Great Britain as a liberal democracy did not diminish during the crisis.

3. Liberals on both sides of the conflict actively agitated for peace.

ii. Resolution was reached by the creation of a joint commission to adjudicate the Venezuelan-British Guianan border dispute.

V. Democratic Peace and the Realist Challenge: The Liberal Response

a. Realists argue that there is no theoretically compelling causal mechanism that can fully explain the peace process (119).

i. Realists claim that if neither democratic structures nor norms alone can explain the democratic peace, then there is no democratic peace. Owen argues that structure and norms work in tandem.

ii. Realists claim that if there were a democratic peace, then liberal democracies would never threaten each other.

1. Owen claims that liberal democracies do not always perceive each other as such.

2. Illiberal leaders sometimes govern liberal democracies and they may be somewhat autonomous in creating foreign policy. However, due to democratic constraints they are unable to go to war, left merely to make threats.

iii. When power politics require war with another democracy, liberals will redefine that state as despotism; when power politics require peace with a non-democracy, they will redefine that state as a democracy (120). Owen argues that in his four cases he has demonstrated that liberals hold fact to their labels in the face of crisis.

iv. Realists claim that power politics are more significant to a state’s position in foreign affairs than liberal ideals. Owen recognizes the importance of power politics in foreign affairs, but argues that liberal ideology is a powerful force in liberal democracies and has the ability to trump power politics as a factor in waging war against another liberal democracy (121).

b. Owen argues for a Realist-Liberal synthesis.

i. Using Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory, power politics could incorporate states’ estimation of regime type (123).

ii. The use of idea postulated by Wendt, Lumsdaine, and others of their ilk, that international anarchy does not necessarily lead to power politics and self-help.

VI. Conclusion

a. Democratic peace does not necessarily lead to perpetual peace.

b. Liberalism and democratic peace is not the “end of History (125).”