Talk:Free will/Archive 20

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Metaphysical constraints?

The lede frames 'free will' in terms of constraints upon choices. The constraints mentioned are of two types:

(i) Right now the preponderance of the lede leans to the empirical 'constraints', mentioning "physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions)". These constraints have an everyday interpretation as factors interfering with an agent's ability to execute certain choices, as when being tied to a chair interferes with walking across a room, or addiction interferes with a desire to break a destructive pattern of activity.

(ii) The other type of constraints mentioned are "metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism)". If they are constraints at all, they are constraints upon language. In other words, we are talking about usage and definitions.

So, as an example, the article refers to "the constraint of dominant concern" as "determinism of some variety (such as logical, nomological, or theological)". What kind of constraint is this?? Regardless of the variety of determinism chosen, the relation of determinism to free will is not one of a 'constraint' in the empirical sense. Rather, as an example, if we use the old version of determinism mentioned by Stanislas Dehaene, the discussion is whether determinism defined more or less as "every event is determined by prior events" is logically consistent with 'free will', seen roughly as the idea that the "mind chooses its actions 'at will' ".Dehaene, two pages later on. Other discussions of the metaphysical constraint of determinism also are of this ilk: they argue about consistency and compatibility of various definitions.

These linguistic debates, which occupy about 3/4 of the article on free will, are 'constraints' only in a very different sense from the common-sense empirical constraints mentioned in the same breath in the lede. The idea of 'constraints' may seem a wonderful way to combine disparate ideas, but it really is just a way to confuse two completely different approaches to the subject, and then direct discussion into a huge distraction from the empirical constraints that are the common-sense focus of neuroscience and neurophilosophy.

The article seems to begin with a broad conception of its topic, but rapidly shrinks to a narrow focus on semantics that distorts the topic as a whole. What is more, the article repeatedly confuses these semantic matters with questions of fact and intuition, muddling the entire presentation. So for example, definitions seem to be invested with real empirical implications, matters that can be related to (possibly fallible) intuitions about free will, but which are far beyond any test of observation or experiment. Brews ohare (talk) 12:38, 3 April 2014 (UTC)

A proposal

I've suggested above that metaphysical constraints be clearly identified. How about some rewording? The lead paragraph can be split in two and the first one reworded as follows:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors.[1] Among these factors are some that are readily observed, for example, physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions). A different type of constraint is that of consistency among our beliefs, and consistency in language and definitions. These are metaphysical constraints, which examine logical constraints required for consistency among these beliefs, and how consistency might (or might not) be reached using various definitions of 'free will' and of the terms involved in its definition.

The principle of free will has religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications.[2] For example, in the religious realm, free will implies that individual will and choices can coexist with an omnipotent divinity. In the law, it affects considerations of punishment and rehabilitation. In ethics, it may hold implications for whether individuals can be held morally accountable for their actions. In science, neuroscientific findings regarding free will may suggest different ways of predicting human behavior.

The second paragraph is the same as the existing text. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 5 April 2014 (UTC)

I'm not sure that 'constraints' is the defining characteristic of free will so that the facts you select are appropriate. If you have a secondary source that supports this happy to look at it, but on the face if it I don't see as an improvement. Adding something on implications has more promise but is problematic. Your definition in the context of religion for example is dubious, and the phrase means very different things in different religions anyway. Again a secondary source would make a better case ----Snowded ^TALK 22:06, 5 April 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: The first two sentences of the present lede are:

"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism),[1] physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions)."

Are these the sentences (due to Pfhorrest) that you are objecting to? I have made no attempt to define 'free will' myself in any fashion, but have simply parroted what was already there. Brews ohare (talk) 03:52, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

It's your extension/elaboration which is the issue Brews. That said I have never been wild about constrain based definitions anyway but change needs secondary sourcing and the position there is not clear from the sources I have to hand. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:08, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

So, just to get this straight, contrary to your earlier statement, you did not mean to raise objection to Pfhorrest's unsourced definition of 'free will' in terms of 'constraints', but just that you are 'not wild about it'. But if it's unsourced mention of 'metaphysical constraints' is to be explained further, because that changes the original wording, that requires not just a reputable source, but a 'secondary' source, and that requirement is not simply your desire, but is a matter of some yet to be identified WP policy?

Apart from your shift to more rigorous standards to be applied only to changes in text, perhaps you could help out by actually identifying the 'sources you have in hand' and just why you think they disagree with the suggested meaning of 'metaphysical constraints' on free will? Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

To put things on a more useful basis, in the abstract the words 'metaphysical constraints' are extremely vague, and may simply mean 'constraints imposed by one's abstract ideas about reality'. However, in the present context it is evident from the later discussion that 'metaphysical constraints' refers to the subsequent extensive discussion of various stances likes 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism'. These positions are well-described by the wording you object to, but it is obvious that labeling these stands as 'metaphysical' is meant primarily to separate them from everyday observable constraints and to place them in an abstract realm inaccessible to verification by direct observation, unlike physical or medical constraints. There is no need for a source to permit the use of 'metaphysical constraints' in this way - it is not an usurpation of some technical term with specialized meaning. Indeed, the Stanford Encyclopedia article on 'metaphysics' suggests that term, even applied to that technical subdivision of philosophy, defies any easy meaning but, as here, is best understood from the context in which it occurs. Brews ohare (talk) 15:03, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

I'm trying to keep a new financial year (UK) resolution not to waste time on you. If other editors engage I will, or if pigs fly or you change the manner of your engagement (in ascending order of likelihood) ----Snowded ^TALK 09:59, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

A hackneyed expression of your usual personal attacks that substitute for useful activity on WP. Brews ohare (talk) 13:16, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

An oddity

I apologize if this has already been discussed before, but I couldn't help noticing why there isn't any mathematical perspective on free will. In mathematics it basically boils down to determinism vs randomness debate, which can be reconciled using the law of large numbers. (Manoguru (talk) 16:19, 21 July 2014 (UTC))

Neural antecedents of actions

Libet part of the discussion could do with inclusion of the recent study, 'Neural antecedents of self-initiated actions in secondary motor cortex', Nature Neuroscience, vol.17, No. 11, pp. 1574-82, November 2014, which throws some doubt on the Libet-based position.Persephone19 (talk) 18:28, 23 November 2014 (UTC)

A suggestion

I'd suggest that the first reference be changed to something that refers to constraints. An example is Stent, p. 126 on Constraints. The existing first reference relates to neuroscience, for which no basis has been laid in the lede. Brews ohare (talk) 14:39, 5 April 2014 (UTC)

I would also suggest some basic grammar corrections. There are some sentences that are confusing, either with excess punctuation marks or lack of. --Floresairam (talk) 21:00, 17 February 2015 (UTC)

Some sentences in here make little sense. or cause confusion. How can I edit them? --Floresairam (talk) 19:12, 19 February 2015 (UTC)

Attempted reorganization

Finding that the header levels and organization were in chaos, I did some reordering. I also found consolidation of scattered discussions under one heading would help the focus of this article. However, the necessary reorganization and consolidation of this article to improve its coherence is far from achieved. Brews ohare (talk) 19:43, 14 March 2015 (UTC)

Proposal for a briefer first statement

The present introductory two sentences read:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unimpeded by certain prevailing factors. Such prevailing factors that have been studied in the past have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism),[1] physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions).

The first sentence could be made briefer and more transparent as follows:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unimpeded. Impedances to choice that have been studied include: metaphysical constraints (such as logical ...

Admittedly, it is a minor improvement, but an improvement nonetheless. Brews ohare (talk) 13:46, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I have implemented this change. Brews ohare (talk) 15:49, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I am OK with this change.

I might suggest a further change to this same sentence that could shorten it further, going back to something more like the phrasing that used to be there a long while back: instead of "…that have been studied", something along the lines of "…of concern" seems more appropriate, because the point of this introductory sentence is to give a list of things that various sources have considered possible impediments to free will, and those possible impediments themselves may not have been the objects of study per se; rather, whether "free will" really means freedom from those things is what was studied. (E.g. even to those, like Hobbes, who considered free will just freedom from chains and imprisonment, they weren't studying chains, they were just studying the concept of free will). --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:45, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I'm OK with it as well, but not with just waiting 2 hours for comments before implementing it. The idea of engagement on the talk page first is to allow others to engage - I've just woken up in Dubai and this is the first change I have had to review. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:48, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

Objections to recent edits

I have several objections to Brews' recent edits that I don't have time to properly undo/fixed out of the many other things that he's been doing that I don't have strong opinions on yet.

Firstly, I object to removing physical and social constraints, and to the addition of material saying that those are not relevant to free will, because that is biased against several notable views on free will, namely those of Hobbes and Rousseau. I don't agree with Hobbes or Rousseau and I personally don't think they the thing they were calling "free will", identified as lack of physical or social constraint, really is the proper referent of the term, but nevertheless we have to be neutral about that in the article. As it is now, the article now allows for no views besides the freedom-from-causal-determination (incompatibilist) kind, and possibly modern Frankfurtian forms of compatibilism.

Secondly, I object to removing (again? We've been over this a billion times) what are now the first two paragraphs of the "Historical divisions" section from the lede. Those are intrinsically connected to the lede sentence. They were once part of the very same sentence, and only became separate sentences because other people insisted that they be filled with more and more disclaimers and qualifiers, and then other people still insisted that other information come before them. The lede absolutely needs to be clear that there are multiple different kinds of things (with a vague area of overlap of "freedom [from something] to choose [somehow]") that different notable sources mean by "free will", and give an overview of those different positions. To do otherwise will necessarily be either biased toward or against some views of free will, or else hopelessly vague and uninformative.

Brews, I ask you to please address these objections over the weekend yourself, as an alternative to me simply reverting everything and letting you re-implement the parts I don't object to separately, which is what I'm sorely tempted to do right now. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:34, 14 March 2015 (UTC)

Hi Phorrest: Let's take a look at this.

As an overall comment, these differences between us seem to me to be primarily a matter of how to present the material. My feeling is that launching immediately into a technical classification of constraints is premature for the unversed reader, who probably has an intuitive sense of what free will is and has to understand why that intuition has found objections. The approach you favor is to say that these objections arise because there are constraints upon free will (fine), but then away we go into academic classifications of constraints based on how they relate to determinism.

'Determinism' is unlikely to be in the mind of most readers, but constraints they will understand. They also will understand things like addiction, brain washing, mental disorders as things that could interfere with free will.

I think that building upon these obvious limitations is a better beginning than introducing the technical meaning of "determinism" and then launching into arcane discussions of a figure showing a Zwicky box of all possible attitudes towards determinism. This explanation is dry, confusing, tedious and just does not hit home with a reader. The typical reader will conclude very quickly that this is another of those 'philosophical' discussions in which philosophers enjoy debating among themselves over the right vocabulary just to see who has the more subtle mind, and anything beyond their amusement is not going to come out of it. Brews ohare (talk) 04:53, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

Here are some comments upon your comments with a view toward suggesting you may have been a bit harsh in your reactions:

First, part (a) You say: Firstly, I object to removing physical and social constraints. That did not happen. They were put into a paragraph of their own, still in the Intro, as follows:

"Physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment) and social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure) limit the ability to execute choices and, in some forms are relevant to free will, when they impact the ability to make (or even to imagine or to formulate) choices, as with undue influences like brainwashing or Pavlovian conditioning"

I don't imagine you object to this content, as far as it goes.

First, part (b) You say: the addition of material saying that those are not relevant to free will. The paragraph does not suggest irrelevance, but when they are relevant. It cites Rescher: "In practice freedom is a default position that obtains in the absence of determinable obstacles." "For free will to be absent, something on the order of posthypnotic suggestions, Pavlovian conditioning, drugging, or "brain washing" is called for: something that prevents the agent from being in control of his choice through the operation of his mind." You might be inclined that Rescher's is not a typical view. If so, I'd suggest simply adding more sources and veiws to this paragraph, rather than suggesting we go back to the old version.

First, part (c) You say: it is biased against several notable views on free will, namely those of Hobbes and Rousseau. Rouseau does not disagree - he says chains "cease to be unnatural restraints when...the chains are freely chosen". Hobbes "chains" that influence decisions are metaphysical, and like obedience to the will of God, sometimes do not curtail free will. In any event, given the rather involved context of their work, to say the plain words of this paragraph will bias a reader against these authors is a stretch. I'd say that if it were worth the struggle to present these authors for a modern reader, their views would not seem to be contradicted. But that requires an understanding of these authors' time and place, which is not the modern context.

Second, you say: I object to removing the "Historical divisions" section from the lede. Those are intrinsically connected to the lede sentence. The revised lede is a logical development of the subject, as "intrinsic" as any, if that means it is intelligible and carries the presentation forward. The previous scholarly discussion of the technical divisions of determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism now is moved under the main header "In Western philosophy" where it belongs. It is better placed there than in the lede where it resided as an indigestible gulp of jargon.

Anyway, it doesn't fit the structure of the article laid out by its headers. It belongs under the header "In Western philosophy" because it is not an overview of what goes on under the other main headers, like "In science", "In Eastern philosophy" and so forth.

Definitions of determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism, etc may classify constraints viz a viz determinism, but that is not a straightforward way to say what free will means before strapping it into this academic framework. Brews ohare (talk) 00:52, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

Brew's, you seem to have simply waited and then returned with a very similar set of edits to those you attempted before. That includes some clear errors such as your opening assertion that Free Will is not a scientific problem when for many it clearly is. You have a very partial view of this subject from a very particular perspective. Further we are getting the same mass changes that make it very difficult for other editors to engage. I'm going to review it, but my temptation at the moment is simply to revert the lot and ask you to propose changes one by one here, ideally not repeating changes that you know we have rejected before. As I say I will read them carefully first but you don't make life easy for people. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:49, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

I guess my "opening assertion" you refer to is my early Edit Summary to the effect that 'free will' is not a scientific concept like 'decision making' might be, but a metaphysical concept. This point has not arisen in the changes being discussed in this thread. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

It is important in looking at these changes to realize that, apart from the Intro, the intent is to rearrange the existing text to consolidate fragmented discussions of the same topic and remove redundancies. Brews ohare (talk) 16:09, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

Yes well that needs to be checked and its very difficult when you are spending a lot of time making large batches of edits over the article as a whole. It would be a lot easier if you made a proposal here before you made such major changes. As it is I see you are active again and I have limited time. So when you have finished say and it can be reviewed. If as you say you are just moving things around then it may not be difficult. If you are starting to reintroduce a particular perspective (and the edit with the 'science' edit summary did that, then its more problematic For the moment do not assume that non refusal means consent. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:45, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

OK I went through the changes

I agree with all of Pfhorrest's objections and I don't think you have answered them
The lede is not boring not is the diagram lacking in utility at that point
Adding 'relating decisions to brain activity' as a change makes a cartesian assumption about consciousness (a variety of your previous bias) and is not a valid reduction
Additional citations in generally are not necessary if there is already one
In the other moves there are multiple small changes which either (1) add nothing or (ii) alter the meaning
There seems to be a general assumption in the changes to contrast science with metaphysics (loosely construed) which looses meaning over the prior text

Overall I can see no substantive improvement so I have reverted en mass. Please propose any changes here first. You might want to consider separating moves from changes. That makes life a lot easier for other editors. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:34, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I see no point in arguing over organization with you. Added citations were not additional in your sense of adding nothing. Your understanding of metaphysics vs science is not supported by the references supplied. Granted, there are other views, perhaps ones you like better, but these are also published opinions, and necessary for a NPOV. Brews ohare (talk) 05:00, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

We use citations to support the text not as additional text. This has been explained to you many times in the past. You choose references to support the position you like and edit accordingly, We need to take a balanced view. But above all, you have to learn to work with other editors. Multiple editors over multiple articles have asked you to discuss things first, or do smaller changes over longer periods so they can engage. My request on references below also makes life easier for other people. Having to do multiple edits to redo references when content is in flux just makes life more difficult and makes mass reverts of your edits more likely. If you discussed organisation (no need to argue) first before making the changes that would be good. If you separated changes in content from re-organisation that would be even easier. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:55, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

You have identifIed one use for footnotes—supporting assertions. On WP especially, multiple supporting sources are helpful in demonstrating avoidance of cherry-picking an atypical source as pseudo support. However, both citations and footnotes (which can be separated, but usually are not on WP) also serve to guide a reader to supplementary discussion that can prove too distracting to dwell upon in the main text. This second purpose is found everywhere in scholarly literature and in WP. These points are completely obvious to most readers, though you don't see that.

Raising this issue here is not appropriate and serves (perhaps accidentally) as a red herring to distract from revision of this article. You might usefully address an important issue: the divergence of published opinion upon the adequacy of reductionist views to address the metaphysical topic of free will. Brews ohare (talk) 13:30, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

Text books use multiple footnotes as a way of making things more readable, but we are writing an encyclopaedia here and we use reliable third party sources to support the various positions, not primary sources strung together in edits and footnotes to make a point. As I remember it other editors have disagreed with you on this in the past so I suspect you assertion of what is "completely obvious' to other reasons is an assertion. I personally don't think reductionist views can support or deny free will per se so I am not sure what you are getting at there. ----Snowded ^TALK 13:36, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I have to say I think your idea that footnotes in WP cannot be used "as a way to make things more readable" as is done in every other form of writing, and that their only role is "to support the various positions" using only "reliable third party sources" is peculiar and impractical, and at variance with how most of WP is written and with WP policy. Although it is unfortunate, there is not much point in discussing it further, as no evolution of thought is in the works. Brews ohare (talk) 14:59, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

Reference Style

Brews you are going back to a reference style that makes it very difficult for other editors to contribute other than through mass reversal. Would you please leave references within the text UNTIL the changes are agreed, then move them ----Snowded ^TALK 17:55, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

The use of this standard WP reference approach gets citation info out of the text avoiding editing confusion. Your objections to it are simply your own preferences, probably applicable to Harvard style as well. They express your unwillingness to adapt. Brews ohare (talk) 05:27, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I'm more than willing to accept that style of referencing once an article is STABLE. I've made this point before but you either refuse to listen or simply fail to understand. In text references make editing by many contributors easy. Once agreement is reached, then there is a job to be done of extracting the citations into your preferred form, This is a both/and not an either/or position ----Snowded ^TALK 11:10, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

In my experience, no article has been revisited to reformat its citations after it reaches the mythical state of being STABLE. There is no such recommendation in WP guidelines. Brews ohare (talk) 13:34, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I've seen plenty of articles tidied up after a period of active editing. Either way the manual of style does not compel your preferred mode so expect reverts if you change without agreement. I suggested a compromise, its still up there if you want it. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:06, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

Recent changes

I'm happy with some of the recent batch of changes but not all. I won't have time until tomorrow to go through them in detail, but just to make it clear that silence should not be considered as assent. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:08, 20 March 2015 (UTC)

I likewise won't have time to really look at anything in much detail until after the weekend at least. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:54, 20 March 2015 (UTC)

Hobbes and free will

As a parallel to the thread on Hume and free will, what does the Stanford Encyclopedia article on Compatibilism say about bodily movement and Hobbes? Here we have the following:

"Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to one's will."

Obviously, to me, Hobbes mention of a "stop" is with regard to freedom, and is not about the freedom to make a decision but about the freedom to act upon a decision. The SEP article says:

"Classical compatibilism is often associated with the thesis that the word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent’s will."..."[Let] us characterize the moral freedom pertinent to classical compatibilism as freedom of will, keeping in mind that this notion is meant to be an especially deflationary one attributing nothing special to the will itself: Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants."

Now on this basis, being tied to a chair has some bearing upon the notion of "free will" because we have redefined "free will" to include actions involved both in deciding and in executing a decision. In my opinion this point of view combines separate things. The careful way to look upon this kind of thing is, as they say Schlick suggests, not to use the term free will in this way but, if that is the subject, to call it freedom of action. The combination of the two is probably useful in deciding moral responsibility, where conduct is a combination of freedoms or lack thereof, but it is confusing in a philosophical context.

On this basis, the Intro to the article 'free will' should begin in its first or second sentence by drawing a distinction between the terms free will and freedom of action and suggesting that some idiots (perhaps misreading Hume and Hobbes) use the first term to mean the second. Please do not think I am including yourself among these idiots: we are simply discussing idiocy. Brews ohare (talk) 17:02, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

The role of physical constraints

In the intro, among constraints upon free will are mentioned physical constraints:

"physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment)".

In my mind, being tied to a chair does not impede my free will, although it does impede my ability to execute my free will. There is a subsection on this topic. Aside from the fact that the sources in this subsection (Hobbes, Hume, and Voltaire) are very dated, framed in a mindset no longer widely accepted, the sources cited in support of this claim are largely misinterpreted, possibly on the underlying basis of "ability to do otherwise", which has much currency, or literal interpretation of the availability of "alternative possibilities".

Of course, literally speaking, a physical chain or imprisonment limits the ability to do otherwise and alternative choices, but no author dwells upon this kind of physical restraint. They are concerned with the role for a causal chain, like that proposed by nomological determinism, that means one's thoughts are not really one's own, or theological determinism concerned that God can control our thoughts, which Hobbes dwelt upon, or the issue of moral responsibility. None of these topics are seriously involved with physical restraint.

I haven't read a source that supports the view that mere physical restraints are important to arguments about 'free will'. They may be mentioned, but never are central. Brews ohare (talk) 14:20, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

The reference to chains and imprisonment might be considered an everyday example of more severe external influences like brainwashing and Pavlovian conditioning. However, these are singled out later in the same sentence of the Intro (as mental constraints), and as mentioned by Rescher, are legitimately held to be in a different category as actually influencing thought processes. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

It might be argued that imprisonment is intended to rehabilitate a criminal by "changing their thoughts", but rehabilitation is more complex than simple incarceration. See Pereboom. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

My recommendation is that chains and imprisonment be dropped from the lede, or that it be mentioned that their failure to influence mental processes militates against their having any importance in the debates about free will. Brews ohare (talk) 14:48, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

I personally agree that physical constraints have no bearing whatsoever on the question of free will, but that's my personal philosophy. There are plenty of notable sources that agree, of course, and those are some of my favorite philosophers, but we have to make room in the article for those who disagree. Because there are notable historical currents of thought (even though they are unpopular [deservingly so if you ask me] today), like those in the subsection you note, who do think that lack of physical restraint is all that's needed to have free will, I think we need to give them at least a token mention in the lede as we do now, as a part of summarizing the plurality of different views covered by the article as a whole.

NB that the list is of things which have been of concern to someone or another as possible impediments to free will, and not a list of things that you definitively must be free from in order to have free will. We're not defining free will there, but giving a list of things variously thought relevant to the definition of it by different sources. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:53, 16 March 2015 (UTC)

This rings true as far as it goes. My understanding of Hobbes, and Hume, and Voltaire isn't wonderful, but I entertain doubts that they thought real physical chains had anything to do with free will. Do you have some chapter and verse to cite on this connection? Thanks. Brews ohare (talk) 01:57, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

I've discovered a discussion of Hobbes by Kane. If I understand this discussion, Hobbes was a complete determinist and 'free will' in its modern sense was ridiculous. So all that was left for free will was whether one's desires were compatible with physical possibility. Of course, chains could affect physical possibility, but Hobbes was more concerned that what we wanted to do be compatible with the laws of nature and theology, and if they were, we had free will. Being constrained by the inevitable didn't interfere with freedom. This context is so remote from the modern concerns, whether the inevitable controls of nature also control free will, as to require rather extensive discussion in order to grasp it at all. Kane's discussion being an example. Brews ohare (talk) 02:29, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

Get rid of chains, leave physical? ----Snowded ^TALK 03:49, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

I'm not sure, but I think a fair example of Hobbes' thinking is that humans are free to take a left or a right turn if they are both available, but not to go straight ahead at a T-intersection. So we have free will so long as we don't attempt the impossible or expect to contravene our Maker's will. Pfhorrest, what have you found? Brews ohare (talk) 04:12, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

As for Hume, he is unconcerned with philosophically trivial constraints like chains or incarceration. Brews ohare (talk) 04:55, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

Both these thinkers accepted a causal universe to which we are not exempt.Their notion of 'free' will seems to be that we are free when what we want to do fits with what nature and God allows. They hold the view of transcending these conditions to be lunacy. Brews ohare (talk) 04:59, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

Hume and Hobbes have a view of free will like parents think about their kids: they are 'free' to do whatever they 'will' as long as they do what they are told (stay within parameters set). This viewpoint doesn't even see the question of reductionism vs antireductionism as entering into consideration: they simply adopt reductionism almost without recognition of its being an assumption.Hume Hobbes Neither of them is concerned with constraints like physical chains or incarceration. Brews ohare (talk) 12:04, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

This looks like a discussion of primary sources. Have we got a definition from one of the enclyopedia's of dictionaries we can use so we go to a third party source? I'm away from home until Friday so I can't check my reference books until then. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:39, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

The whole primary source thing is a red herring when its Hobbes and Hume. The real question here is not primary or secondary sources. It is whether Hume and Hobbes really discussed chains and incarceration as a serious aspect of 'free will'. Pfhorrest probably can find such a discussion if it exists, or a reference to it in the gazillions of books that analyze these two. If they really are focused on other aspects, as I have surmised, then there are no authors that actually consider physical constraints to be an important aspect of free will, unless you think of physical constraints as the causal laws of nature. Brews ohare (talk) 01:46, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

I'm sorry I'm not more involved in this conversation, right when I thought I finally had some time to do things like this again another real-life disaster is sucking me away.

There's a quote I think from Hobbes that I'm loosely remembering, something to the effect that "the only sense to be made of freedom of the will is the freedom granted to any man who is not a prisoner or in chains". Let me Google for that and see what I can find...

It looks like I was misattributing a Hume quote, not a Hobbes one. The Hume quote is:

"By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute."
— David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII, "Of Liberty and Necessity,"

Let me see if I can find something actually from Hobbes...

"when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and therefore are necessitated. ... I hold that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction and is nonsense; being as much as to say the cause may be sufficient, that is necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow."
— Thomas Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity, 1654,§ 30-32

Those are both great summaries of the early-modern kind of compatibilism which is meant to be not-excluded from the lede with the "physical constraints" clause; the kind of compatibilism that said "all this wanting to be free from determination stuff is nonsense; you're free if you can do what you want, not if you can somehow indeterministically determine to want what you want to want, which makes no sense".

Contemporary compatibilists like Frankfurt distinguish that kind of freedom from their sense of "free will", calling what Hume and Hobbes talk about "freedom of action" instead, and I personally agree with those contemporaries. But nevertheless Hobbes and Hume and such clearly thought that there was nothing more to freedom of will than this kind of freedom, and that "not a prisoner and in chains" quote is exactly the one I was thinking of when I wrote the almost-identical parenthetical example for the "physical constraints" clause, to include their point of view among the many glossed over as examples of different points of view. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:42, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

These quotes require examination. Perhaps that is best delayed for a while to be sure of your participation. The quote from Hume mentions "every one who is not a prisoner and in chains" as having the "hypothetical liberty" to act according to the determination of their will. He clearly thinks one can will even when unable to act, which ability seems to be questioned by modern philosophers. The quote from Hobbes ("a free agent, namely that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction and is nonsense") appears to express doubt that the will is at all free, but rather is always determined by prior causes, which would differentiate him sharply from Hume. The Hobbes quote does not seem to bear upon chains and incarceration, except that they are 'causes' acting upon the individual, as is gravity and natural law. Further clarification of their thoughts may develop. In any event, the idea of chains and imprisonment does not add a useful dimension to the idea of free will, nor does it capture the thrust of Hume's or Hobbes' perspectives. Brews ohare (talk) 13:39, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

About Hobbes: "man had to be seen as a determined tool" This source makes clear that Hobbes' main objective was to make peace with theology and God's omnipotence. It seems to me that whether a person was tied up or not, they didn't have control.

About Hume, we have to focus on the "liberty of spontaneity" which allows choice and moral responsibility. a power of acting or not acting, according on the determinations of the will. (Some sources quoting this have a comma, some do not, and that completely changes the meaning of the quote.) "The spontaneity argument seeks to establish...a different type of cause." a free action is not compelled by external forces. There appears to be a lot of confusion over this point. I am inclined to think Hume allows us choice whenever that choice is not contrary to natural or theological laws, which last do not cover every contingency, leaving us room to maneuver.

However, we can defer these deliberations to later. Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

I think I will harken to Snowded's suggestion above and appeal to a third party source: the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Compatibilism:

"According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom of the sort pertinent to moral evaluation is nothing more than an agent's ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom.

There's other good stuff in that article, I'd recommend giving it a read. --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:49, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I'll look it over. Brews ohare (talk) 05:30, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

This article is an armchair philosopher's dream come true—like mathematics, it addresses no matters of fact, but focuses entirely upon logical constructions and their relation to choices of definitions. Of course, a clear vocabulary is necessary to discussion. But with no appeal to what is the fact, most of this activity is a discussion of hypothetical board games without practical significance. In fact, its practical irrelevance may be an implicit objective of the entire exercise, eh? (According to G. H. Hardy, good mathematics has no application.) Not an exercise likely to capture those that don't find board games worth their attention.

In any event, if there is any pertinence to the role for incarceration or chains in this article, maybe you could point it out? Brews ohare (talk) 12:51, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

In this regard, pointing out that incarceration constitutes an impediment to action does not make this type of impediment an issue worth singling out. In fact, it trivializes the discussion. It is clear that the important impediments are not simple constraints of this kind, but constraints that actually may affect our thought processes, whether that be God's will, societal superstitions, or the inanimate workings of the "selfish gene". As you are aware, these deeper issues occupied Hume and Hobbes and many modern philosophers too. Brews ohare (talk) 13:28, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

I don't have time to respond to this in much detail now but on the surface a lot of it sounds like you're just unhappy with the way that philosophy is done and discussed again. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:55, 20 March 2015 (UTC)

It may be true that I am impatient with philosophers' tendency to wander off into debates over definitions that no-one will ever find a use for, but in this case there are real issues with real consequences that should be addressed, even if it means focusing for a change and leaving the fun for later. Brews ohare (talk) 19:54, 21 March 2015 (UTC)

Fun has nothing to do with it. We are discussing the definitional part of the lede here, the part where we give a quick sample of different issues considered definitional of free will. That SEP article shows that there is a notable published opinion considering freedom of the sort shared by everyone "not imprisoned and in chains" to be what constitutes freedom of will, and that's all that matters here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:29, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

With regard to the present thread, I understand the argument to be that incarceration or chains should be mentioned because it occurs in a quote from Hume even though it has played no part in his discussion of the will, but only in the liberty to pursue one's will, nor does it come up in any other contributor to 'free will'. All authors trace their concern over constraints upon free will to lie in the working of nature or theology, not in the caprice of one man's bondage by another, and Hume's mention of chains is as an example of a constraint upon liberty, and not upon the will itself.

This being so, and the main issue lying elsewhere entirely, bringing it up is distracting the reader from the main issues of how free will fits into the grand scheme of things. Brews ohare (talk) 05:09, 22 March 2015 (UTC)

Sorry for terseness and delay, still very short on time and energy.

The SEP article indicates that philosophers such as Hume and Hobbes considered what modern compatibilists would call "freedom of action" synonymous with freedom of will; there is actually a section of that article specifically addressing that what they are talking about, with regards to unimpeded bodily movement and so on, is taken by them to be specifically freedom of will and not some other kind of freedom irrelevant to the free will debate. Hume uses almost exactly the phrase "imprisonment or chains" in a discussion of that topic. That they also discussed issues with theological or nomological determinism elsewhere is irrelevant, as the bottom line is they end up dismissing those concerns as nonsense and saying that freedom e.g. from prison and chains is the only thing important to "free will". And so we have to be inclusive to that point of view, no matter how much we might disagree with it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:29, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I've changed the introduction to fit the SEP article on Compatibilism, particularly as discussed in the thread below on Hobbes. Brews ohare (talk) 17:34, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

On Hume and free will

Pfhorrest: You say about the Stanford article on Comptibilisim: "The SEP article indicates that philosophers such as Hume and Hobbes considered what modern compatibilists would call "freedom of action" synonymous with freedom of will; there is actually a section of that article specifically addressing that what they are talking about, with regards to unimpeded bodily movement and so on"

I would like you to point out that information

"The first stage (of compatibilism) involves the classical form defended in the modern era by the empiricists Hobbes and Hume..." so Hobbes and Hume are lumped together as defending the same sort of thing. "According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom of the sort pertinent to moral evaluation is nothing more than an agent's ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom" so Hobbes' statement about free will being nothing more than freedom of action is is an exemplary expression of that kind of thing that Hobbes and Hume are both on about. And from that same section as the last link, "Classical compatibilism is often associated with the thesis that the word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent’s will. For this reason, some writers advised burying the expression altogether and instead speaking only in terms of freedom of action (e.g., Schlick, 1939). For ease of expression, and to avoid cumbersome worries about different authors' formulations, lets us characterize the moral freedom pertinent to classical compatibilism as freedom of will, keeping in mind that this notion is meant to be an especially deflationary one attributing nothing special to the will itself." so the thing they're talking about is supposed to be freedom of will specifically. That the article doesn't explicitly say that Hume said that is immaterial. Hobbes would be enough anyway even if Hume didn't agree with him. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:19, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

as my search of the SEP article using "Hume" does not turn it up. It cites the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as determinism being compatible with free will on the basis that: Had things been different (a different past), something different would have occurred. The basic idea here is clear: the "freedom" to do something is contingent upon the laws of nature and/or theology allowing it to happen.

Just how this view is compatible with moral responsibility according to Hume is left unaddressed in the SEP article. As we know, Hume based moral responsibility upon character, molded by custom and education, and susceptible to change as one ages. Apparently society imposes moral responsibility upon its members (for example, on the grounds of public safety), and if a member's character, however acquired, warrants censure, society will censure. Thus is the issue of responsibility for one's character rendered moot viz a viz moral responsibility. According to Russell Hardin, Hume had little interest in the last issues, and was basically an anthropologist regarding moral responsibility. A person acts according to passion, filtered by character, which last is a product of personal and societal accident.

In any event, there is no mention of a role for impeding bodily movement in the Enquiry, and any connection of this idea to Hume appears to be missing from the SEP article.

In the SEP article, the commonly used phrase "could have done otherwise" is mentioned, especially with regards the "Garden of Forking Paths". There the issue arises that agent x has control over alternative a only if x has the ability to select among alternatives some of which would allow a to be done. Now, Pfhorrest, one might argue that if one is tied to a chair, the action of standing up is not within one's control and so enters into these ruminations over the Garden of Forking Paths. However, that idea is not discussed in the SEP article, and my interpretation of what is said there is that this notion is hardly an issue under discussion, which issue is actually whether the laws of nature preclude any control. Brews ohare (talk) 16:50, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Apparently you did not read my remarks in the thread under Hobbes which quotes exactly the same material you have repeated above. The subsequent remarks in the SEP article summarized in that thread make it clear that there are two interpretations of free will. To quote:

"Classical compatibilism is often associated with the thesis that the word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent’s will."..."[Let] us characterize the moral freedom pertinent to classical compatibilism as freedom of will, keeping in mind that this notion is meant to be an especially deflationary one attributing nothing special to the will itself: Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants." [bold font added]

"For this reason, some writers advised burying the expression altogether and instead speaking only in terms of freedom of action (e.g., Schlick, 1939)."

I don't think there is any doubt about their being two interpretations, and the SEP article even quotes Schlick to this effect. Brews ohare (talk) 23:02, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

In the material you reverted two positions are clearly stated and sourced, including support for the point of view that combines will and execution, and one that stresses will alone. I believe the position that free will deals only with action and not at all with the decision to act is not held by anyone. My interpretation is that your action was incompletely considered, probably because of your preoccupation with other matters. Brews ohare (talk) 23:02, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

On massive reversion

[Continuation of above thread]

I've sympathy with a the mass revert, I started to work through it on the big screen with the changes visible and gave up after 15 minutes, there was so much that needed changing. I think Brews it would be a lot better if you proposed one clear change at a time and got agreement here before editing the article directly. Maybe start with ones you consider uncontroversial. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:40, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

Hi Snowded: Pfhorrest has made a mass revert already. Maybe that is what you mean? Anyway, one question you could offer an opinion on is inclusion of the source Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron (2011). "Determinism tout court". In Judy Illes, Barbara J. Sahakian, eds (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 9780199570706. Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link), or at least the quote provided (without my addition of bold font).

Then there is the source Henrik Walter (2011). "Chapter 27: Contributions of neuroscience to the free will debate — The cognitive neuroscience of volition and intention". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 522 ff. ISBN 9780195399691. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) which also says "Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the ability to decide and act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own." "The criterion of an unimpeded will is the possibility for it to choose between different alternatives." (p. 155) and, it continues, "not due to some accidental circumstance. What could cause such an inability?" A discussion follows.

These sources make the division between free will as free conduct versus free will as free volition. These two possibilities are important and are not expressed in the present lead sentence.

They also show up in the SEP article cited by Pfhorrest in his Talk page discussion, but which is not part of the lede. ::They are part of the problem of definition, which is separate from and perhaps logically prior to the question of possible constraints.

Thoughts? Brews ohare (talk) 05:07, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

What is probably relevant is the quotation you give, but then a summary of the discussion. I'm always dubious about the Standard site as its more a series of essays ----Snowded ^TALK 14:29, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

Both sources are third party ones so we can use conclusions they draw without OR ----Snowded ^TALK 14:29, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

On moral responsibility

For no provided reason, the following material was deleted from the article:

"Philosophers largely agree that the practical importance of 'free will' lies in its connection to moral responsibility:

"Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action."¹

—Timothy O'Connor: Free Will in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct.²

—Michael McKenna & D Justin Coates: Compatibilism in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Sources

¹Timothy O'Connor (October 29, 2010). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Free Will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

²McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Compatibilism: §1.1 Free will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

This important topic has no separate subsection in the article, although the words "moral responsibility" do show up in a sentence or two under other topics. The treatment of moral responsibility is an essential element of all other discussions of free will, and deserves prominence in the introduction to this WP article. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

I recommend this deleted material be restored to the article. Brews ohare (talk) 14:53, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

Brews, there is a general problem here (and in the points below) that you are selecting quotes from (in the main) primary sources. We have almost identical discussions over a year ago on this article and wikipedia policy hasn't changed in that time. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:38, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The issue here is the importance of moral responsibility to the subject of free will. You can discount the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy simply because it's articles are only single or double authored, but 98% of encyclopedia articles since the beginning of time are just like that. You may suggest if you like that the authors contributing to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy have inadequate stature because the editors of this encyclopedia aren't selecting them well. However, I think that is a hard sell: are you really willing to debate the qualifications of these editors and these widely published article contributors? Where are our credentials to make this anything but hutzpah? And how on earth are we to argue that The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is not a reliable source? Brews ohare (talk) 04:08, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Don't over react Brews, the point is that it is a collection of essays. If you check the review process of the Oxford and Cambridge ones you will find a different review process. My point is that the Stanford material is closer to a primary than a third party source in consequence. You tend to like working with primary sources, and stringing to gather quotes from them which is what gives the rest of us problems. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:20, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

I am not the person claiming The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an unreliable source, different from others like the Oxford and Cambridge ones. According to you, The Stanford Encyclopedia is made up of 'essays' that are 'closer to primary' sources (personal opinion pieces, not to be confused with scholarly summaries), while the Oxford and Cambridge encyclopedias and 'companions' or 'handbooks' to this-or-that, which are also assemblies of single-author summary pieces also accepted by an editor, are truly 'secondary' sources worthy of citing. How is that? Brews ohare (talk) 14:13, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

In any event, there is no doubt whatsoever that concern about 'moral responsibility' is the common and practical origin of interest in 'free will', whatever survey you wish to adopt. The basic idea, as you know, is that regardless of one's views about what is moral and according to what authority, it is moot if one has no ability to implement these values. Argument over sources here is just a diversion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:25, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

I didn't call it an unreliable source Brews, I made a side comment about relying on it for the sort of statements you are trying to make and the degree of OR or SYNTH (on your part) that implies. I've explained the point and you either don't understand it or choose not to. The article currently covers moral responsibility. If you want to propose a change which does not involve stringing together quotes that you have found, and which uses third party sourcing then I'm very open to it ----Snowded ^TALK 14:40, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The statement I made and used two different articles from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to support is simply that the main interest in 'free will' stems from its connection to moral responsibility. There is no 'stringing together of quotes' involved, just reliable support. The present article does not 'cover' the importance of moral responsibility, it mentions 'moral responsibility' as an aside and does not present its importance. Brews ohare (talk) 14:52, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

My proposed change is provided at the outset of this thread: to state the importance of 'moral responsibility' to 'free will' in the Intro with supporting documentation. Documentation needed because some editors believe that the main importance of 'free will' is not this, but word play. Brews ohare (talk) 14:58, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Happy to look at any revised proposal but only if you pay attention to criticism without these silly sniping comments on other editors. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:06, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The proposal is in quotes at the top of the thread and is exactly what was reverted from the main article earlier. If you prefer, the quotes can be relegated to the citatations instead of being explicit in the text. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

in my opinion, a change in focus from word play to moral responsibility will make the word play take on significance by virtue of its importance in this context. The present focus is upon verbal distinctions, rather than practical consequences. Brews ohare (talk) 15:48, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

You seem to be ignoring the point that you are selecting primary sources. quotes or citations so what? You need a third party source which makes the point, then text which summarises that. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:52, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, if I understand you, although you might accept the thesis that a common interest in free will stems from the connection to moral responsibility, and although it is apparent in all philosophical discourse on the subject from the early Greek stoics to Hume and Hobbes and today to Robert Kane and Sam Harris, you will not accept incorporation into the main article solely because it's supported by two articles in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is a reliance upon 'primary' sources based upon your low opinion of editorial process at this encyclopedia? Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

For yet another essay about various authors on the importance of moral responsibility to free will, see David K. Chan (2008). "Note 7". Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 221. ISBN 9781402068720. Brews ohare (talk) 17:19, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

I barely have time to just skim this discussion right now but I want to note that the importance of "word play" as you call it Brews is in the first sentence or two of the lede, which define the subject of the article that is to follow ("Free will is ____"), and the fact that different notable sources disagree on how to define the subject. Their definitional disagreements do often call back to moral responsibility in their arguments (arguing that "free will" if taken to mean this or that would be irrelevant to moral responsibility, or insufficient for moral responsibility, etc), but they are still definitional disagreements and so we need to address them, briefly and succinctly, in the definitional part of the lede. (And then structure the rest of the article such that it's clear which sense of the term is being used when discussing substantive questions about the subject). At the same time note that we need to mind WP:REFERS and not talk just about the words "free will", which is mostly a matter of phrasing. --Pfhorrest (talk) 18:48, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Pfhorrest, we have no disagreement about the value of word play in analyzing the issue. The point of this thread is not that. It is to stress that the practical importance of clarifying the issues stems from moral responsibility. That is what the quotes and Chan's footnote 7 refer too. Brews ohare (talk) 20:33, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Replacement of lead sentence

Previously the following lead sentence was removed by Snowded:

Free will is taken by some to include both the ability to decide and to execute a decision unimpeded (freedom of conduct ),^1,² while others focus upon the ability to decide unimpeded (freedom of volition ),³ or only to act unimpeded (freedom of action ).⁴ Impedance to free will in the broader sense includes: metaphysical constraints [... the same wording as before this change follows...]

Sources

¹ Rudolf Steiner (2011). The Philosophy of Freedom (English translation of 1916 by Hoernlé reprint ed.). Lulu.com. p. 26. ISBN 9781257835126. the nature of human action presupposes that of the origin of thought

² Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron (2011). "Determinism tout court". In Judy Illes, Barbara J. Sahakian, eds (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 9780199570706. Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

³ Henrik Walter (2011). "Chapter 27: Contributions of neuroscience to the free will debate — The cognitive neuroscience of volition and intention". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 522 ff. ISBN 9780195399691. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

⁴ McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Compatibilism: §3.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). The word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent's will.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Snowded's objections to this sentence are summarized by him as: "The names of your sources indicate their orientation Brews. Find a third party source, if you are 'right' it should not be difficult. Then propose a new wording. And later on, following a response to his continued objection following this revision: "Propose a specific edit here Brews - if it is different from the one rejected above then I will happily look at it.".

A "third party source" according to WP:THIRDPARTY is defined as

"A third-party source is not affiliated with the event, not paid by the people who are involved, and not otherwise likely to have a conflict of interest or significant bias related to the material."

Apparently Snowded agrees with this description and considers The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics as unsuitable sources. Inasmuch as any encyclopedia article is written by an expert in the field (sometimes identified by name or by initials), and therefore is not written by an uninvolved nonparticipant, I am baffled as to how the assertion of two aspects to the term 'free will' can be sourced to meet Snowded's expectations. As a matter of WP policy, WP:SECONDARY does not require 'third-party' sources and says:

"Wikipedia articles usually rely on material from reliable secondary sources. Articles may make an analytic or evaluative claim only if that has been published by a reliable secondary source." Brews ohare (talk) 23:53, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

I believe that this lead sentence stands without any sourcing, in fact, as it is a feature of philosophical discourse since early Greek times, and there is no philosopher of free will that does not bring up the two aspects and deal with them according to their particular perspective. For example, Chrysippus deals with the conflict between individual choice and destiny or fate (which suggests there is no choice). Today we have whole books on this division.Dennett "One widespread tradition has it that we human beings are responsible agents, captains of our fate...[but many people think]..We really don't have ‘free will’ and nothing really matters.";Kane "The current preference is to talk about free action rather than free will.." Brews ohare (talk) 00:39, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

In the hope of meeting less resistance, I have added these ideas as a final paragraph in the Intro. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

On meanings for 'free will'

The material below concerning different author's definitions for 'free will' was deleted without Talk page comment:

"Free will is taken by some to mean the ability to decide and to execute a decision unimpeded (freedom of conduct),¹ while for others only the ability to decide unimpeded is meant (freedom of volition).^2,³ Impedances to free will in the broader sense include: metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), ...[ followed by the same material already present in the article ]"

Sources

¹Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron (2011). "Determinism tout court". In Judy Illes, Barbara J. Sahakian, eds (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 9780199570706. Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

² Henrik Walter (2011). "Chapter 27: Contributions of neuroscience to the free will debate — The cognitive neuroscience of volition and intention". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 522 ff. ISBN 9780195399691. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

³McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Compatibilism: §3.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

It may be noted that in the sub-subsection Free will as "moral imagination" a similar point is made and attributed to Rudolf Steiner in his The Philosophy of Freedom where, it is said "Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action." These terms do not appear in this translation of his work He does say "But the ideal content of an act of will, which is drawn from the conceptual system and which precedes the act of will, is determined only by the conceptual system itself." This remark does divide the act from the concept initiating the act.

This sub-subsection on moral imagination is an inadequate presentation of this very significant division that colors 'free will' from its early inception. The deleted material should be restored. Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

Proposal seeks to make a general definition based on a synthesis of sources which look at aspects of the field in the main. The Neuroscience perspective is one, but only one take. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:45, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

No. The two aspects have nothing to do with neuroscience, being simply a matter of terminology. The point is that, as noted by the sources, traditionally the term 'free will' has combined the decision with its implementation, but some authors have separated the two aspects. That is what the sources say. Steiner did that too. Neuroscience is not mentioned nor sourced. (Walter discusses neuroscience which focuses on decision, but his preamble points out the division under discussion.) The possibility of this division is simply a matter of fact, and the sources serve only to support the notion that this division has been deemed useful by some published sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The names of your sources indicate their orientation Brews. Find a third party source, if you are 'right' it should not be difficult. Then propose a new wording, the one you used has been rejected by two editors. Continuing to insist you are right rather than accommodating others concerns is problematic to say the least. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:29, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Are you saying that McKenna and Coates and Baertschi & Mauron are somehow known to have a biased view to the effect that the application of 'free will' involves both decision-making and decision-execution? Or that Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics and The Oxford Handbook of Free Will and The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy exercise no editorial control over their selection of articles and are unreliable sources? Or perhaps that reference to these two aspects, found throughout the philosophical literature over centuries or perhaps millennia, is somehow controversial? What is your problem here? If there is any controversy whatsoever, please produce a source that says these two aspects of 'free will' do not exist, or are only a minority view of what goes on. Brews ohare (talk) 13:45, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

You might notice the suggested material says that traditionally the term free will includes both aspects 1, but that some authors restrict the term to only one of them.2,3. That sounds like a WP:NPOV to me. Maybe you would like to tone this down further by saying that some authors include both aspects in the term 'free will', while some authors focus upon the initial aspect, volition? Such an assertion is proven by finding only one source that makes either claim, and there is absolutely no requirement for a general 'third party' source, which I doubt is an actually existent phenomenon. That is, according to WP:THIRDPARTY, no philosopher could be cited that had ever expressed an opinion on 'free will' before or after the cited instance. Brews ohare (talk) 13:55, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

I have inserted a toned down (and sourced) version of these remarks in the lede. Brews ohare (talk) 15:37, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

You don't have agreement Brews. Please get agreement HERE before making edits that have already been disputed. You also seem to be making a presumption that change is necessary: it isn't until you get consensus And please stop this nonsensical rephrasing of other editors comments. The idea of bias is not one I raised, my reasons are clearly stated and I've explained them twice. I'm not obliged to keep repeating a point you choose not to understand ----Snowded ^TALK 18:46, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: You have supplied no objection to the sentence you have reverted. Brews ohare (talk) 18:50, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

You made mass changes without agreement Brews. My objections to various aspects of your edits are clearly stated on this talk page ----Snowded ^TALK 18:53, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

The bulk of the changes you reverted were for links to other WP articles, and removing capital letters in headers that do not follow WP formatting. The first sentence, which probably precipitated your actions, namely:

"Free will is taken by some to include both the ability to decide and to execute a decision unimpeded (freedom of conduct),[1][2] while others focus upon the ability to decide unimpeded (freedom of volition),[3] or only to act unimpeded (freedom of action).[4]"

has received no critique from yourself or anyone else, so it hardly seems a consensus has been flouted. In fact, the sources provided for this assertion that 'free will' is seen to have two parts, are only indicative of a view so widespread and so long-standing in the philosophy literature as to defy its suppression and cast doubt upon its sanity. Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

You have Brews, you just don't agree with them or don't understand them. WP:BRD you know that if its disputed you either reach agreement, call an Rfc or edit war. If you carry on with the latter option then ANI is inevitable (again) ----Snowded ^TALK 19:20, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: There is no controversy in the literature regarding the two facets of 'free will', which goes back to Chryssipus if not before. There is, of course, debate over what weight to give to the two aspects and what they imply. So go ahead and reword the sentence or source it differently, but let us not pretend there is actual disagreement in the literature about the mere concept of two aspects of freedom. Brews ohare (talk) 19:28, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

Propose a specific edit here Brews - if it is different from the one rejected above then I will happily look at it. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:36, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

I have reintroduced the trivial changes you reverted earlier. I have not changed the lead sentence. Brews ohare (talk) 23:31, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

And the trivial ones are OK. However you have introduced a large amount of selective material from a particular perspective. Its going to take an hour at least to disintangle that from potentially useful edits and that might take some days before I can do it. I'm sorely tempted to follow Pforest and just revert the lot as you don't make it easy with mass edits. Also you are making a whole set of edits that are more or less the same as those rejected last time you tried to edit the article. However I will resist the temptation to revert for the moment and try to compromise, but for the moment your changes as such are not accepted so don't take silence to indicate consent, its just going to take time. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:47, 30 March 2015 (UTC)

Any other changes occur after the 27 March. If we focus on the lede there are two changes of possible importance to you or Pfhorrest. One is the added final paragraph in the lede which concerns breaking free will into the conception and the execution of a decision. The other is the insertion of "and/or" in the first sentence. Any other changes in the Intro are simply formatting and minor wording changes. Brews ohare (talk) 04:36, 30 March 2015 (UTC)

In the section on causal closure in the first section of Free_will#In_Western_philosophy I added a few sentences and sources. I don't know what your reaction to that will be. Brews ohare (talk) 04:39, 30 March 2015 (UTC)