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"Meta" and "ontology"

This is a note to the author of the article of Meta-ontology:

Dear Madam/Sir:

The prefix 'Meta' is associated with the word 'about', as can be seen on the Wikipedia page <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta>, but it is much more associated with the words 'beyond' and 'after' in the original Greek.

Now, if 'Ontology' is the 'talking about existence', then there can be nothing 'beyond' Ontology. Everything that exists is within the realm of 'Ontology'. Meta-ontolgy is therefore an oxymoron because both the term 'meta-ontolgy' along with its meaning exist. They both exist, and therefore, they are both within the realm of 'Ontology' by definition. The only things that are 'beyond' Ontology (or Meta-ontological) are things which do not exist. 'Things which do not exist' simply do not exist and therefore cannot be talked about by anybody or any branch of knowledge that has the suffix '-ology'.

I hope you understand and agree that the term 'meta-ontology' is an oxymoron regardless of who used it first and why, and I hope that you show that on your Wikipedia page for 'Metaontolgy'.

Thank you.

5509gh (talk) 15:32, 3 June 2011 (UTC) +George. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5509gh (talkcontribs) 00:03, 3 June 2011 (UTC)

Incorrect definition of topic?

As ontology is the coverage of " of the nature of being, existence, or reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations" it would seem to be a very broad area, not confined to metaphysics, which is about "the fundamental nature of being and the world" and (at least by scientists) is thought to consider abstract issues about the practice of science, such items as What are the criteria for a good theory and works such as Hawking & Mlodinow's The Grand Design and model-dependent realism. On this basis I'd say the lead sentence of this article:

"Metaontology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of ontology and ontological questions.

is inaccurate, seemingly restricting meta-ontology to a sub-field of metaphysics. We have this:

"Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed."

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy meta-ontology is described as follows:

"the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered."

Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

I removed the phrase " is the branch of metaphysics ". Brews ohare (talk) 16:32, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

Fixing this article

The subject of meta-ontology is recognized. It is discussed at length in Logic and Ontology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), has about 55,800 hits on Google Books and several books with this word in the title, for example: these.

The right thing to do here is to restructure the article to be better sourced, I think, not to delete everything in it.[1][2] Brews ohare (talk) 17:19, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

I've put the sources as in the original article in template form, found some more recent reprints, and put the footnotes in the text where they pertinent. Brews ohare (talk) 18:03, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

Ontology is extensively discussed in the Stanford reference; "meta-ontology" appears in 3.1 and is stated to be a part of Ontology and not a popular term so it does not establish the legitimacy of the term as a field. Do you have any third party references that do so? If not the material needs deleting and the article deleting. ----Snowded TALK 22:12, 20 March 2013 (UTC)
I find Hofweber on both sides of the issue. Here is what he says (my emphasis):
"Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology.
Sounds like the same problem as with meta-philosophy: some want it separate, some want it combined. Brews ohare (talk) 00:20, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
The book Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology has 17 essays by many different philosophers. Two of them have 'meta-ontology' in the title and many more discuss it. This link turns up some 2000 books discussing meta-ontology, of which we find at least these [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] have 'metaontology' in the title. Brews ohare (talk) 00:42, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
Original research again, you need a third part source which says it is an established field ----Snowded TALK 02:33, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
I am unsure of what a 'third-party source' signifies in this context. The essay Wikipedia:Third-party sources discussing third-party sources is aimed more at substantiating reporting of news events and the like. In any event, this essay is not a WP policy or guideline, and the WP requirements are listed as Wikipedia:Verifiability, Wikipedia:No original research, Wikipedia:Reliable sources and Wikipedia:Notability . There are books about meta-ontology, some are edited collections of essays by multiple authors, but you feel somehow they are all 'original research'. If reputable philosophers discuss the topic in books published by distinguished presses like Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press, that seems to me to be sufficient.
However, maybe something in this bibliography is suitable?
Bibliography on metaontology
There also is a scholarly literature: for example, The science of being Metaontological Minimalism The deflationary metaontology of Thamassons's ordinary objects Carnap’s Metaontology Meta-ontology and accidental unity A slew of other activity is found here. This stuff may not fit your bill as suitable sources, but they suffice to show a lot of work going on at universities and in philosophical journals related to meta-ontology. Just in case you really had personal doubts about that. Brews ohare (talk) 04:23, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
I am the term is used but you really need to get your mind around WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. You need a third party reliable source that says is a significant discipline within philosophy not just a word used from time to time. ----Snowded TALK 16:32, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: There is no need for a "third-party source" to establish we have a significant discipline. First of all, that is not a WP criterion: WP requires Wikipedia:Verifiability, Wikipedia:No original research, Wikipedia:Reliable sources and Wikipedia:Notability . These criteria are adequately met by the existence of multiple books written by established philosophers and published by reputable presses. Second, unless one takes the view that the scholarly journals are all nonsense until a "third party" blesses them with "significance", the various papers linked above show that there is significant activity. Meta-ontology itself provides very clear sourcing to the Carnap, Quine debate that is much discussed and traces the history back to the much quoted and reprinted article by Van Inwagen. Brews ohare (talk) 18:24, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
DId Carnap or Quine use the words? Sorry Brews the fact the word is around does not make it a philosophical discipline of note ----Snowded TALK 23:00, 21 March 2013 (UTC)
Carnap and Quine predate Inwagen who coined the term Metaontology. However, Inwagen refers to both Quine and Carnap in his paper Meta-ontology. Since then, this name has caught on. For example we have this: "The references on meta-ontology cited in Chapter 4 are also connected to the broader methodological disputes between Carapians, Quineans, and others that continue to be hotly debated on the contemporary scene." This book has a glossary in which it defines meta-ontology:

"a term that has recently become popular, referring to the philosophical theory concerning the nature and proper methodology for ontology, including the nature of existence claims. For example, a meta-ontological question might be whether there is a fact of the matter concerning various ontological claims such as whether there are numbers or arbitrary mereological sums."

— Cory Juhl, Eric Loomis, Analyticity (New Problems of Philosophy) p. 278
I can't claim to make much of this example, but this source is evidence that a field called 'meta-ontology' is extant and becoming more popular. Brews ohare (talk) 00:59, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
So they don't use the language and the only material is from a single book which discussed them. Please show me a source which says it is becoming more popular - and by that I do not mean your original research or opinion but a source. ----Snowded TALK 05:23, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
See emphasis added in above quote from a source, not my opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
Not enough, need a third party not an advocate ----Snowded TALK 15:24, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
Possibly to establish growing popularity we need some statistics. It isn't a big issue. The points that need to be established, and already are, are listed as Wikipedia:Verifiability, Wikipedia:No original research, Wikipedia:Reliable sources and Wikipedia:Notability . Brews ohare (talk) 15:31, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Only if the statistics are in a third party source, otherwise its OR ----Snowded TALK 15:41, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Sure; the focus should be on Wikipedia:Verifiability, Wikipedia:No original research, Wikipedia:Reliable sources and Wikipedia:Notability . Growing popularity is unnecessary. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
If you list the policies then you should follow them. ----Snowded TALK 15:48, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Other aspects of meta-ontology

It appears that some of the impetus toward meta-ontology comes from problems that originated in set theory. See this.

It also appears that 'meta-ontology' is an adopted technical term in computer and information science. See this. Brews ohare (talk) 03:51, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Ontology is used in computer and information sciences in radically different ways from Philosophy ----Snowded TALK 05:22, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
No contest; but maybe we need a disambiguation page? Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Origin of discussion of Quine and Carnap

The three paragraphs forming the body of this article refer to Carnap, to Quine and to van Inwagen. The question arises as to whether the presentation of Carnap and Quine in this section is due to van Inwagen, and whether it is accurately based upon the works by Carnap and Quine.

I believe the header "Inwagen's treatment of Carnap and Quine" suggests incorrectly that this treatment is a biased version from the viewpoint of van Inwagen. Any comment? Brews ohare (talk) 15:42, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Personally, my interest in Van Inwagen is slight. I don't find a discussion claiming that "numbers exist" and "people exist" use "exist" in the same sense to be either useful or accurate or descriptive of what is going on. Carnap was right on the money, and that is the end of it. Brews ohare (talk) 15:55, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Best to delete the whole thing. Neither author uses the term ----Snowded TALK 16:03, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I just don't understand that viewpoint. Van Inwagen introduced a name for a particular kind of discussion, and of course there is a history of this discussion before the name was coined. It makes no difference whether Quine or Carnap used the term if they engaged in this particular discussion and if their arguments remain central themes in what is now called by many 'meta-ontology'. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
I have broken this section up into paragraphs, and IMO the third paragraph is nonsense. Brews ohare (talk) 16:45, 22 March 2013 (UTC)
I've rewritten large sections of this article and removed what seemed to me unclear or nonsense. I am no expert in this area, but I have endeavored to understand the sources and to define technical terms where they appear. Brews ohare (talk) 05:04, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
It looks like you took the original stuff from van Inwagen and simply sourced it with some additions. I've stripped it back to something that I think is sustainable and supportable by the sources. This is by nature of a compromise. I actually think the whole paragraph should go ----Snowded TALK 13:55, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

Is meta-ontology part of ontology itself?

This question is common to all the meta-disciplines and is a source of debate among philosophers. WP editors tend to get involved in argument over which view is correct, and this problem is best avoided by simply confronting the issue directly. Hence, the quotes from Hofweber that state the matter very straightforwardly. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

This article (or any other for that matter) is not for you to express you views over arguments you are having with significant numbers of other editors. We don;t string together quotes and the material in them is already in the article. ----Snowded TALK 14:47, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: My views have nothing to do with it. The quotes are Hofweber's views, and they indicate that he thinks as follows: (i) Strictly construed, meta-ontology is a metatheory. and (ii) Nonetheless, ontology broadly construed contains its metatheory. Neither of these ideas is directly expressed in the article already, and by quoting Hofweber in this regard two things are accomplished: (i) a rather clear explanation is provided, and (ii) it is made clear that this is an authoritative opinion, and not (as you suggest above)my own opinion. Please try to avoid criticizing me instead of the content. Brews ohare (talk) 14:53, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
I was referencing your statement about other WP editors You seem to be convinced that because people don't agree with you they somehow need you to explain it more. I am open to altering the lede to include the idea of a metatheory if we can AGREE wording But not to two large quotations from one source is excessive and not what wikipedia is about. As to you complaining about people criticising you LOL ----Snowded TALK 15:07, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
A point well taken. Of course, at least sometimes, it is true that I need to explain it more. You have elsewhere suggested that my difficulties with other editors is that they can't figure out what I'm saying. Unfortunately, once that happens it is hard to make a second attempt work. Brews ohare (talk) 15:56, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

Backwards E notation

The statement "Quine held that there is a single meaning to ontological claims, and this is captured by the backwards-E existential quantifier of formal logic." seems obscure to me. Can this be rephrased? Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

Cut it to the first phrase only? ----Snowded TALK 14:48, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
I took out the whole paragraph, which sounded rather technical. If that kind of detail is interesting, maybe a technical subsection is a better place for it? Brews ohare (talk) 15:59, 23 March 2013 (UTC)
Deletion was a good move, not sure of the need for a technical sub-section. This is not a major subject ----Snowded TALK 00:24, 24 March 2013 (UTC)

Later developments

The article fails to go beyond the Carnap-Quine debate to look at later developments. Below is a beginning at trying to add something in this direction.

Later developments

The analytic/synthetic controversy of Carnap and Quine has continued to the present.[1] The basic issue is the connection between objects in a theory and those in the 'real' world. Quine blurs this distinction, suggesting we employ everything from immediate sensory reports to theoretical constructs based upon logic and science all combined in a web of belief. The organization of one’s own experience is a "semantic ascent" from talk about experiences to talk or thought about the representational contents of these experiences.[2][3] Pinker has described the connection with the use of language by children.[4] Although there are supporters of this view today, there are also critics who hold that although the distinction between 'theoretical' objects and 'real' objects is not sharp, it is still useful.[1]

Sources

  1. ^ a b An extensive discussion is found in Frank X Ryan (2004). "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic". In John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds (ed.). American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press. pp. 36–39. ISBN 020349279X. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  2. ^ William Van Orman Quine (1960). "§56 Semantic ascent". Word and Object (Paperback reprint ed.). MIT Press. pp. 270–276. ISBN 0262670011.
  3. ^ "Semantic ascent". Blackwell Reference Online. Retrieved 2013-03-23.
  4. ^ Steven Pinker (2007). "Chapter 4: Cleaving the air". The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window Into Human Nature. Penguin. p. 170. ISBN 0670063274.

Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 24 March 2013 (UTC)

Comments?

  • Snowded has raised the issue of whether this proposal is meta-ontology or ontology. I don't think that matter can be resolved definitively.

"Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is.However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology."[1]

— Thomas Hofweber, Logic and Ontology; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[1] Hofweber, Thomas (Aug 30, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Logic and Ontology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
Maybe we could ask what Inwagen referred to when he introduced the term meta-ontology? See this and this.
Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
This search could be helpful. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
It seems that the meta issue raised by Carnap is whether ontology exists at all, and Quine's contribution is to say that it does. Now it is hard to argue over this matter without going into what you think ontology is, so you are bound to cross into ontology itself in trying discuss things about it. Schaffer puts a different cast on things, which I'd say suggests we shouldn't be talking about what objects exist (ontology) but about which are the fundamental objects and how do they relate to more complicated objects; something along the lines of the hierarchy from matter to atoms to nucleons to leptons to strings to ----. This discussion is about the subject 'what the discussion should be about', but it requires specification of the objects to chose between, not just a focus on the process of choosing between them. Brews ohare (talk) 17:09, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
this article is specifically about a recently introduced term. When it strays over into material already covered in the ontology article it is going to far. This and the above section smack of original research, constructing material from Internet searches ----Snowded TALK 18:04, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: (i) What in this material is already covered in ontology? Quine and Carnap and analytic/synthetic and internal/external are not mentioned there. (ii) What do you think is original research here? (iii) How about helping out with "later developments"? Brews ohare (talk) 22:38, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
The article is about meta-ontology not ontology so it should not be a coatrack to create alternatives to the main article. You seem to be developing an editorial practice on multiple articles of finding quotations and stringing them together in a way that you find coherent. That is original research. On your third point I think this article should be a stub at best. The odd use of a word does not justify a whole article. ----Snowded TALK 22:46, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I glean the following. Regarding helping out here, your view is that the article is a stub and so isn't worth your time to expand, and indeed, you are inclined to counter any attempts that might expand the article to include later developments. Regarding your claims it 'strays over into material in the ontology article' your position is that although that apparently is not the case, any overlap with the subject of ontology is a 'WP:Coatrack', that is, such overlap ostensibly discusses meta-ontology, but in reality is a cover for a tangentially related and biased treatment of ontology. Finally, although you are unable to identify any specific examples of WP:OR in the above material, you suggest that any discussion that contains several quotations from original sources is ipso facto a stringing together of points in a narrative not supported by any of these sources, nor any others. Of course, the material being discussed here, in this thread, has exactly zero quotations, so this argument appears directed at some other instances that are irrelevant here. Have I got your position well-characterized? Brews ohare (talk) 23:36, 24 March 2013 (UTC)
Rather than such an unproductive squabble over aesthetic abstractions and differences of taste, I would like to see the two of us go through some of the later developments and assemble a reasonable update to meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 00:10, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
You are making judgements about my motivations again, and yet again you are getting it wrong. The article is about what it is about, it should not become a parallel article to ontology. Your stringing together of quotes is a pattern over many articles and its WP:OR. The later developments included material from non-philosophers and was again you stringing together the results of your google searches. Its not good enough. ----Snowded TALK 10:23, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I have nothing to say about your motivations. Only about your statements, which are becoming increasingly vague generalities without specifics and without any pertinence to what the thread is about. Brews ohare (talk) 13:19, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Further reading

These two books are pertinent to the section of the article Meta-ontology#Differences between Carnap and Quine.

This encyclopedia entry contains a very extended discussion of the Carnap-Quine debate and its later developments.

  • Jonathan Schaffer (2009). "On What Grounds What Metametaphysics". In Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, eds (ed.). Metametaphysics (PDF). Oxford University Press. pp. 347–83. ISBN 0199546045. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) Reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual 29, eds. Grim, Charlow, Gallow, and Herold; also reprinted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Kim, Korman, and Sosa (2011), 73-96: Blackwell.) Contains an analysis of Quine and proposes that questions of existence are not fundamental.

This article not only discusses the Quine-Carnap debate but extends the discussion of Meta-ontology to a contrast between Quine-Carnap and Aristotle.

There is no basis for removing these readings from Meta-ontology#Further reading. Brews ohare (talk) 13:28, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

What you have done here is to simply list articles or books that link to words in the article. Have you read any of these or are they just the result of a google search like so many of your edits? If the book relates to meta-ontology specifically then its rightly here. If is on ontological issues then the list could easily become near infinite, there have to be criteria and those are normally direct ≥treatment of the subject. As a compromise I will accept one of those - the American Philosophy one. Now you have added them BOLDLY, I have REVERTED for the stated reasons we now DISCUSS but until there is an agreement stop edit warring. ----Snowded TALK 14:10, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: Right back at you: you have not read the sources yourself and you have reverted without discussion. Yes, I have read Schaffer at length, and it discusses Carnap and Quine and Aristotle, as I have stated. This author uses the term 'metaphysics' to describe his discussion, but obviously the discussion is the same subject discussed by Carnap and by Quine dubbed 'meta-ontology' by Inwagen. While Carnap said there was no ontology, Quine said there was, and Schaffer, after reviewing this debate, says this debate emphasizes the wrong aspect.
The general works on Carnap and Quine (the Cambridge 'companions') have pertinent sections on the Quine-Carnap controversy. I've already pointed out that Ryan has a very long account that includes modern developments. Brews ohare (talk) 14:21, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
I've probably read a lot more on this subject than you Brews, its my degree and continuing interest. I don't insert recommended readings UNLESS I have read them, as you are doing the insertion the question stands. The Carnap/Quine debate needs a reference to the met-ontology aspect and that is there with the founder of the term. I've allowed one more as a compromise. The sheer number of books and articles on this particular subject is legion and wikipedia is not a place for long lists. Shaffer by your own admission is not about meta-ontology ----Snowded TALK 14:31, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I just don't understand your views on this matter. You contradict my assertions and explanations without counterargument, but on the basis that you are an 'expert'. Well, that is wonderful. Can you put those skills to work to help the reader of this article? Is removing titles from a reading list anything more than censorship in this case? You don't like this topic. You think it is silly. You are right, but philosophy is largely silly. What is next? Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
I realise you don't understand how anyone could possibly disagree with you but its something you are going to have to learn to live with. It's not wikipedia practice to list everything, only relevant stuff. So lets keep it like and tone down on the invective shall we. ----Snowded TALK 15:33, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: When will you get around to addressing the issue that all the listed sources are germane, and get away from personal judgments like "I realize you don't understand how anyone could possibly disagree with you but..." and "I've probably read a lot more on this subject than you Brews" . The underlying problem here is that you will not accept Van Inwagen's definition of meta-ontology in terms of the Carnap-Quine arguments over whether ontology is an empty subject. For some reason you feel that even when this is the topic, if the word meta-ontology is not explicitly stated, the subject is not what Van Inwagen was talking about. That is simply a misconception on your part, and for example, Schaffer's paper is all about these very issues, even though the word 'meta'-ontology does not arise, and he uses the much broader term metaphysics, mainly because he wants to emphasize the connections to Aristotle. By the way, Aristotle didn't use the words 'ontology' or 'meta-ontology' either. Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

A quote or two from Schaffer: "That is the ontology. The rest is ideology. The Quinean view deserves praise for providing an integrated conception of the discipline." ". Thus the Quinean view promises what Yablo calls ‘‘Ontology the progressive research program (not to be confused with ontology the swapping of hunches about what exists)’’ ‘‘What is empirically significant in an ontology is just its contribution of neutral nodes to the structure of the theory’’ ‘‘Here the exceptions prove the rule, in that those few who challenge Quine usually then champion Carnap.’’

Don't these quote indicate that Schaffer is talking about ontology? Isn't' that exactly what Inwagen defined meta-ontology to be? Brews ohare (talk) 16:18, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

See prior arguments and I humbly apologise for any irony that slipped into my comments. Schaffer is there now as a reference, given the text provides context so hopefully that will make you a little happier. ----Snowded TALK 23:24, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

RfC: Proposed subsection of meta-ontology concerning later developments

An addition to meta-ontology is presented here. The article meta-ontology as it stands at the moment is focused upon the Carnap-Quine debate over what ontology is about that took place in the 50's. More has happened since that time. Comments and suggestions for improvement are solicited. Brews ohare (talk) 01:08, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Further views

Four different views of ontology modeled after Schaffer. Top to bottom: 'flat, sorted, structured and multiply structured

The subject of meta-ontology is the study of what ontology is.[1] As such, the subject of meta-philosophy comes up oftentimes without specific mention of this term, for example, being subsumed under broader categories like metaphysics. One such area of discussion is that of separating analytic ("Elm street is a 'street'") from synthetic statements ("Elm Street is a 'dead-end'").[2] The Carnap-Quine debate over ontology revolved around this subject, with Carnap supporting a distinction and Quine refusing one. The bearing upon meta-ontology is that each view provides a different idea of how to approach ontology itself, but this discussion can be carried on without explicit mention of meta-ontology, even though such a discussion about ontology does belong in the domain of meta-ontology. The distinction between the subjects is not sharp, because the discussion wanders back and forth across this boundary between ontology proper and meta-ontology.

Van Inwagen was quite clear that he thought Quine engaged in meta-ontology.[3][4] The central message of Quine is the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.[5] Ryan describes the position of Quine as stating that a synthetic claim cannot be verified by appeal to some amalgam of empirical evidence, but depends upon its embedding in a theoretical context, and as such is not different from an analytic claim. According to Ryan, this view is supported by Nelson Goodman, Morton White, and Hilary Putnam. In contrast, again according to Ryan, H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, among others, suggest Quine has oversimplified matters by extending analyticity beyond mere logical tautology.[2] Again, wherever this discussion concerns how ontology should be conducted, for example, where it discusses the adequacy of the Quine methodology,[6] it belongs in the category of meta-ontology.

The Carnap-Quine debate has been generalized recently by Schaffer.[7] Schaffer suggests that the dichotomy exemplified by Quine and Carnap is not the whole issue regarding what ontology is, but there is a different question to discuss: the hierarchical connections between the objects in an ontology and which are the fundamental objects and which are derived. He describes three possible approaches to ontology, as shown in the figure. He calls them flat (top), that is an array of undifferentiated objects; sorted, that is an array of classified objects (center); and ordered (bottom), that is an array of inter-related objects. Again, viewed as a suggestion as to what ontology is about, these ideas are part of meta-ontology. Schaffer says Quine's ontology is flat, a mere listing of objects, while Aristotle's is ordered, with an emphasis upon identifying the most fundamental objects. Perhaps Carnap's ontology might fall into the "sorted" category with the sorting into two categories: 'analytic' and 'synthetic' objects, neither of which he felt was interesting enough for a significant ontology.

The philosophy of science

Ontology arises in the philosophy of science, and was a focus of Quine's philosophy.[8][9] There are a number of particular ontologies associated with science, for example, physicalism, the claim that everything is physically constituted, an example being the claim that all mental processes ultimately are reducible to neuroscience. However, the discussion here is not about particular ontologies, but how to arrive at ontologies, and their purpose, the subject of meta-ontology. To understand the meta-ontology of science, some background is needed.

A scientific theory consists of a formal apparatus (perhaps mathematical in nature) and a set of observations that support this apparatus.[10] A scientific theory therefore contains the concepts of its underlying formal structure (which Carnap would say contain its theoretical language; that is, the entities involved in the semantic rules and linguistic conventions of its formal apparatus)[11][12] and also specifies real-world tests in the form of observations (which involve what Carnap would call its observation language, describing objects of the 'real' world).[11] The ontology of a science therefore has two aspects: the ontology of its formal structure and the ontology of its observational structure.[13]

Quine expressed the view that the distinction between these two ontologies: the objects of the formal structure and those of the laboratory, is invalid.[14] The resulting back-and-forth is the famous Carnap-Quine debate that led Inwagen to coin the word meta-ontology to describe discussions about the nature of ontology.[3] According to Quine, one cannot isolate the objects in the conceptual structure of the theory from the objects involved in the observations that ground the theory. As pointed out by Schaffer, Quine's ontology is 'flat', there are no differentiations between objects.[7]

This point was raised again by Thomas Kuhn:

There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle. ...But I can see in their succession [that is, of various improvements in theory] no coherent direction of ontological development. On the contrary, in some important respects, though by no means all, Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either of them is to Newton's."[15]

— Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Postscript p. 206

In Kuhn's view, science arrives at its ontologies through "paradigms" (the collective opinion of scientists in a certain epoch) that adopt subjective criteria for what is a "good" theory. Discussion of these criteria that determine What is a 'good' theory? is a meta-ontological discussion that leads, upon making a selection, to the ontology of the theory selected.[15][16] The question arises as to what rational basis can be laid for accepting a paradigm and its related ontology.[17][18] The question also arises as to the ultimate purpose of a theory and how that influences its selection:

Science is widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly comprehensive, systematically organized, world view that is explanatory and predictive. It seems to me that the desiderata [which determine the goodness of a theory] may best be viewed as attempts to articulate this conception somewhat more fully and explicitly. And if the goals of pure scientific research are indicated by the desiderata, then it is obviously rational, in choosing between two competing theories, to opt for the one which satisfies the desiderata better...[These considerations] might be viewed as justifying in a near-trivial way the choosing of theories in accordance with whatever constraints are imposed by the desiderata."[19]

— Carl G. Hempel, Valuation and objectivity in science, pp. 73-100 as quoted by Kuhn

As another view, Duhem suggested the purpose of a theory was 'economy of thought', sort of a mnemonic device to compensate for our limited intellects.[20] These issues are not about particular ontologies, but about the selection of ontologies. They explore pragmatic considerations involved in adopting a framework that were dismissed earlier by Carnap as not being about factual claims.[21] They also involve perennial issues of philosophy regarding the role of human perception and the human mind, its limitations, and how they might affect our selection of a 'good' theory.

A related approach to selecting ontologies is proposed by model-dependent realism. Here, science is proposed to exhibit ontological pluralism.[22] Science is seen as a mosaic of overlapping theories, each with its own ontology, its own view of what is real, and its own formal structure, or model, with its own conceptualization, applicable to its own slice of reality with its own supporting observations.[23] In what seems to echo Quine's thesis that the analytic/synthetic distinction fails, the meta-ontological claim is made that: "There is no model-independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own."[23] However, unlike Quine's single undifferentiated ontology, there are now multiple overlapping ontologies, none of which separates its structural from its observational objects.

References

  1. ^ Hofweber, Thomas (Aug 30, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Logic and Ontology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition). The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts [of which one is] the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help).
  2. ^ a b Frank X Ryan (2004). "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic". In John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds (ed.). American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press. pp. 36–39. ISBN 020349279X. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  3. ^ a b Peter Van Inwagen (1998). "Meta-ontology" (PDF). Erkenntnis. 48: 233–250.
  4. ^ Peter van Inwagen (2008). "Chapter 6: Quine's 1946 lecture on nominalism". In Dean Zimmerman, ed (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 125 ff. ISBN 0191562319. Quine has endorsed several closely related theses that I have referred to, collectively, as his "meta-ontolgy". These are...those of his theses that pertain to the topic "ontological commitment" or "ontic commitment". {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  5. ^ A discussion of the Carnap-Quine debate is found in John P. Burgess (2008). "Chapter 3: Cats, dogs, and so on". In Dean Zimmerman, ed (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 63 ff. ISBN 0191562319. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  6. ^ Stephen Yablo and Andre Gallois (June 1998). "Does ontology rest on a mistake?" (PDF). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 72: 229–262. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00044.
  7. ^ a b Jonathan Schaffer (2009). "On What Grounds What Metametaphysics". In Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, eds (ed.). Metametaphysics (PDF). Oxford University Press. pp. 347–83. ISBN 0199546045. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) Reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual 29, eds. Grim, Charlow, Gallow, and Herold; also reprinted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Kim, Korman, and Sosa (2011), 73-96: Blackwell.) Contains an analysis of Quine and proposes that questions of existence are not fundamental.
  8. ^ Robert Sinclair (June 27, 2009). "Quine's philosophy of science: Ontology, explication and the regimentation of theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  9. ^ This discussion is an ongoing process. See for example, Roberto Poli (2011). "Analysis-synthesis". In Veselin Petrov, ed (ed.). Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos Verlag. pp. 19 ff. ISBN 3868381074. The misplaced faith in analytic, reductionist methods follows almost unavoidably from the lack of a correct ontology, and in particular from the lack of both a theory of wholes and their parts, and a theory of levels of reality. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  10. ^ Rudolf Carnap (Dec., 1955). "On some concepts of pragmatics" (PDF). Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 6 (6): 89–91. A postulate system in physics cannot have, as mathematical theories have, a splendid isolation from the world. Its axiomatic terms - "electron", "field", and so on - must be interpreted by correspondence rules that connect the terms with observable phenomena. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  11. ^ a b Rudolf Carnap (1956). "The methodological character of theoretical concepts" (PDF). Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. 1: 38–76.
  12. ^ The formal structure of a theory may be mathematical in nature, and the ontology of mathematics is a subject unto itself. For example, the thesis of mathematical structuralism is that mathematical objects (if there are such objects) simply have no intrinsic nature. See Stewart Shapiro (June 6, 2010). "Mathematical Structuralism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. ^ The meta-ontology of science, the discussion of what such an ontology should consist of, and how to arrive at such an ontology, often is subsumed under the umbrella of ontology itself. See for example, Larisa N Soldatova, Ross D King (Dec 22, 2006). "An ontology of scientific experiments". J R Soc Interface. 3 (11). Although no ontology exists that formalizes general experimental information, several ontologies exist for specialized experimental areas in biology...
  14. ^ Quine, W. V. (1951). "On Carnap's views on ontology". Philosophical Studies. 2: 65–72. If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence...Science is a unified structure, and in principle it is the structure as a whole, and not its component statements one by one, that experience confirms or shows to be imperfect. Reprinted in Willard Van Orman Quine (1976). "Chapter 9: On Carnap's views on ontology". The Ways of Paradox (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. pp. 203–211. ISBN 0674948378.
  15. ^ a b Thomas Kuhn formally stated this need for the "norms for rational theory choice". One of his discussions is reprinted in Thomas S Kuhn. "Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice". In James Conant, John Haugeland, eds (ed.). The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 208 ff. ISBN 0226457990. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  16. ^ Thomas S Kuhn (1966). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226458083.
  17. ^ Howard Sankey (2000). "Kuhn's ontological relativism". Science and Education. 9: 59–75.
  18. ^ John R Wettersten (November 2, 2007). "Karl Popper and Critical Rationalism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. ^ Carl G. Hempel (2000). "Chapter 20: Valuation and objectivity in science". In James H Fetzer, ed (ed.). The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 372 ff. ISBN 0195343875. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  20. ^ "Pierre Duhem". The New World Encyclopedia: Organizing knowledge for happiness, prosperity, and world peace. April 3, 2008.
  21. ^ Amie L Thomasson (2007). Ordinary Objects. Oxford University Press. p. 31. ISBN 019804318X.
  22. ^ Ontological pluralism suggests there are many ways the world is. One form of pluralism is that there is one independent real complex material world, and the plurality of world versions can be viewed as ‘many (fragmented, temporary) versions, one (enduring) world’. Zygmount Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence quoted by Gregor McLennan (1995). Pluralism. University of Minnesota Press. p. 73. ISBN 0816628157..
  23. ^ a b Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking (2010). "Chapter 8: The grand design". [[The Grand Design (book)|The Grand Design]]. p. 172. ISBN 0553805371. {{cite book}}: Text "Bantam Books" ignored (help); URL–wikilink conflict (help)

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "Carnap" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "Quine1" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "Rosenkrantz" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Comments

  • Snowded has reverted this section with the in-line editorial comments "repeats early material and/or provides an editors explanation of his earlier rejected edits" and "Its all still Quine/Carnap and that picture does not help".
Inasmuch as several new sources and an image have been added in this subsection, I don't think Snowded's comments are accurate. Of course, there is a lot more could be said by fleshing out the positions of Nelson Goodman, Morton White, and Hilary Putnam, H.P. Grice, and P.F. Strawson if that is deemed appropriate.
It should be born in mind that meta-ontology is variously considered to be either a part of ontology proper or as a metatheory of ontology. That ambiguity need not be settled here. It suffices that the discussion of meta-ontology is about ontology, regardless of whether it is part of ontology or is a metatheory. Brews ohare (talk) 01:08, 26 March 2013 (UTC)
  • I didn't revert it, I cut it down to avoid duplicating the previous text and to avoid this becoming a coatrack article for Ontology. The vast bulk referenced Quine anyway. I also got rid of a meaningless picture. New sources which added new material were retained. Your other RfC on Philosophy (which attracted no support) made similar silly accusations. The purpose of an RfC is also to present a defined problem, ideally in a neutral way to engage other editors by the way ----Snowded TALK 05:09, 26 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: Sorry, "reverted" was an exaggeration. Perhaps you can explain why you think the figure is irrelevant? Certainly Schaffer does not agree with you about the irrelevance of his figure. His work doesn't really fit under the single header Carnap and Quine, and a separate section with its own header for later work as proposed above works better. The introductory paragraph you removed describing the fuzzy boundary between ontology and 'meta'-ontology seemed necessary in view of your insistence above that 'meta'-ontology applied to a source or a discussion only when the word itself was mentioned explicitly. You have now backed off, but perhaps the very similar discussion at metaphilosophy about 'philosophy' viz à viz 'meta'philosophy suggests some words about this matter serve a purpose for some readers. Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 26 March 2013 (UTC)
Well if you are simply recreating a figure from a book then its a possible violation anyway. Aside from that it ends up dominating the section and emphasising one authors view in consequence. The explanation in text is really simple and if anything the diagram takes more time to interpret. A new section would be appropriate if there is new material from THIRD PARTY sources on the subject itself. The previous text was nearly all the Carnap/Quine reference again. Not sure why you are using 'backed off', maybe its just you have started to understand? You seemed to be writing material that in effect justified a stand you are taking on multiple talk pages. That is not appropriate. ----Snowded TALK 23:27, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: The figure is original, just the same idea. As you might have read somewhere, different people perceive things differently. Some are more visual some more word-oriented. Dyson said he couldn't understand Feynman diagrams until he found how to express them in algebra. Feynman said theory was all images in his mind. So the picture should stay. I've added more material from philosophy of science. So I'll try again. See what you think. Brews ohare (talk) 23:44, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Brews I am not even sure I think that material should be there, for it to dominate the section with a large illustration is not on. Otherwise I generally agree on visual/written but we have to choose where we apply that and we don;t have pictures for every paragraph. Otherwise be careful of the coatrack in additions ----Snowded TALK 23:48, 26 March 2013 (UTC)
You know, part of the problem here is that whole Quine/Carnap section. Its why I originally removed it as its a specific debate before the word was invented. It would be a lot better if the whole article was about subjects discussed by people who call it meta-onology (and yes will reference the past). The problem is to find third party material, most of it is primary or secondary at best. ----Snowded TALK 00:38, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: There are many ways to approach this topic. I have tried three or four. You don't like any of them. I don't think that will change with four or five more attempts. It takes time to compose text, make figures and find references and read them. You have it all too easy just sitting in your easy chair watching the screen and saying: 'uummm -- no, I don't think so..." Brews ohare (talk) 01:25, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
If you use third party sources, avoid excessive quotation and original research then there is no problem. How much time you spend on it is your own affair. I don;t see three or four attempts by the way they have all been minor variations on the same theme ----Snowded TALK 02:19, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Brews, you are writing personal essays again. Finding things you think fit and just putting them there. You have to find a third party source that supports the Khun paragraph. I was tempted to delete it as you seem not to understand this point, but tagged it as an alternative for 24 hours ----Snowded TALK 15:04, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: It would be helpful if you actually read the sources provided. There is no doubt that the references to Carnap say what he has said, and the sources are presented earlier in the article. Maybe you would like some of the quotations you detest added in? Likewise for Kuhn. More quotations? Finally, the Hawking discussion is cited, quoted, and is very obviously a discussion about ontology, that it is dictated by models, that is, these considerations are meta-ontology, about where the ontology originates. Brews ohare (talk) 15:12, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
You really don't get it do you. You are using primary sources to write an essay. It doesn't matter if the sources support what you say or not you need third party ones. And don't use a word like "detest" aside from being wrong its silly; another example of you missing the point about how wikipedia works. ----Snowded TALK 15:17, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
There is something interesting to discuss here, although it is metaWikipedian. If one wants to say what Carnap says, for instance, when is Carnap the best source, and when is a third party source needed? If you grant this question has some merit, it might be answered by an example: If we want to establish that Carnap said there was an analytic/synthetic distinction, I'd say a quote from Carnap is the best evidence. On the other hand, if one wants to say Carnap was right about this, you need a third party source. We know in fact that there is a lot of commotion here, not so much about the theoretical possibility of such a distinction, but about what such a distinction means. As the issue is not settled definitively, one can quote various parties as to their position: that is best evidence. On the other hand, if one wants to assess the status of the debate, you need an impartial observer. Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
It might be added that establishing the impartiality of the third party is not a no-brainer. You might find review articles that profess objectivity, but of course the parties adjudicated might not see it that way. As for the Carnap-Quine debate, although there are reviews assessing the differences, and the later developments, none of them so far thinks an authoritative pronouncement is possible, and they adopt a he-says she-says approach, for example Ryan. Brews ohare (talk) 17:38, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
A third-party source with a he-says she-says approach may not be as good evidence as original quotes from the sources themselves, because the best authority on what he-says is himself, and for she-says is herself, not a second-hand version that may misquote or misconstrue. The third-party account may be shorter or clearer than direct quotes, or not. Brews ohare (talk) 19:59, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
While it may be an interesting question its one that is resolved here, we use third party sources. This is important here where you are talking about a subject like meta ontology. In your recent edits you are not building on third party references that talk about recent developments but making your own choices about what to include. So its original research and/or synthesis and is not allowed ----Snowded TALK 21:47, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Carnap Quine debate

I felt that although the existing description outlined the assertions of Carnap and Quine, adding a quotation from each of these authors provided a useful insight into the reasoning behind their positions. Brews ohare (talk) 17:17, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Excessive quotation is discouraged as we are an encyclopaedia and meant to summarise the material. I was tempted to simply delete them but have reduced them in size by way of compromise ----Snowded TALK 23:23, 26 March 2013 (UTC)
'Excess' always is bad. However, you might have noticed that Wikipedia is a laugh-line in sitcoms:
Surprised question: Where did you get that from?
Laugh line: From Wikipedia!
Laugh track: ha ha ha.
A quotation serves several purposes: it often expresses an idea or viewpoint more lucidly than the Shakespeares of WP; and, it gives the reader some confidence that the view in the article actually is as stated, and not a perverse or inept distillation.
Of course, if pertinent sources are presented and if they are accessible and if the reader actually wants to take the time, they could pursue the original sources themselves, instead of hit and run. Yeah, right. Brews ohare (talk) 13:40, 27 March 2013 (UTC)
Few encyclopaedias have long quotations, that sort of style works better if you are writing an essay or paper. Its easy to loose track of the need to think "encyclopaedia" ----Snowded TALK 13:54, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded on third-party sources

While it may be an interesting question its one that is resolved here, we use third party sources. This is important here where you are talking about a subject like meta ontology. In your recent edits you are not building on third party references that talk about recent developments but making your own choices about what to include. So its original research and/or synthesis and is not allowed ----Snowded TALK 21:47, 27 March 2013 (UTC

Let's take a look at the material you quarrel over. Using the above rationale, you have changed the following:
Meta-ontology also arises in the philosophy of science.[1] A scientific theory consists of a formal apparatus (perhaps mathematical in nature) and a set of observations that support this apparatus.[2] A scientific theory therefore contains the concepts of its underlying formal structure (which Carnap would say contain its theoretical language; that is, the entities involved in the semantic rules and linguistic conventions of its formal apparatus)[3] and also specifies real-world tests in the form of observations (which involve what Carnap would call its observation language, describing objects of the 'real' world).[3] Like Quine,[4] Thomas Kuhn expressed the view that this simple distinction between the objects of the formal structure and those of the laboratory is not possible.
Sources
[1] This discussion is an ongoing process. See for example, Roberto Poli (2011). "Analysis-synthesis". In Veselin Petrov, ed (ed.). Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos Verlag. pp. 19 ff. ISBN 3868381074. The misplaced faith in analytic, reductionist methods follows almost unavoidably from the lack of a correct ontology, and in particular from the lack of both a theory of wholes and their parts, and a theory of levels of reality. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
[2] Rudolf Carnap (Dec., 1955). "On some concepts of pragmatics" (PDF). Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 6 (6): 89–91. A postulate system in physics cannot have, as mathematical theories have, a splendid isolation from the world. Its axiomatic terms - "electron", "field", and so on - must be interpreted by correspondence rules that connect the terms with observable phenomena. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
[3] Rudolf Carnap (1956). "The methodological character of theoretical concepts" (PDF). Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. 1: 38–76.
[4] Quine, W. V. (1951). "On Carnap's views on ontology". Philosophical Studies. 2: 65–72. If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence...Science is a unified structure, and in principle it is the structure as a whole, and not its component statements one by one, that experience confirms or shows to be imperfect. Reprinted in Willard Van Orman Quine (1976). "Chapter 9: On Carnap's views on ontology". The Ways of Paradox (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. pp. 203–211. ISBN 0674948378.
into the following:
Meta-ontology also arises in the philosophy of science. [citation needed] A scientific theory consists of a formal apparatus (perhaps mathematical in nature) and a set of observations that support this apparatus. A scientific theory therefore contains the concepts of its underlying formal structure (which Carnap would say contain its analytic objects)[citation needed] and also specifies real-world tests in the form of observations (which involve what Carnap would call its synthetic objects). Like Quine [citation needed], Thomas Kuhn expressed the view that this simple distinction between the objects of the formal structure and those of the laboratory is not possible.

The argument, I take it, is not the relevance of the sources, all of which you have replaced by [citation needed], but two other factors: (i) I have selected them, so they might reflect some omission on my part, and (ii) these sources are unsuitable because they are not "third-party" sources but (I suppose) some other unsatisfactory kind of source.

Before I embark on a defense of these sources as entirely appropriate for their purposes in this text, and meeting WP guidelines in every respect, I'd like to be sure I have your objections clearly in mind. Would you care to amplify your concerns? Brews ohare (talk) 00:12, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

I've said this so many times. If you were writing an essay on the subject then the sources and what you say would be fine. But wikipedia is not a collection of essays it is an Encyclopedia. That means you can't define a field unless you have a reliable third party source which says that is in the field (even if it self-evidently is). So for an article on meta-ontology you need sources that say this is a meta-ontological issue. You can't just pick things that you think (rightly or wrongly) are meta-ontological. Some of the material would be OK (with changes) in the ontology article as there are third party sources that would support that. So your factor (i) is not relevant and your factor (ii) is wrongly stated. Oh - I didn't change it, I left one paragraph with citation tags to see if you could create something. I was (as I said) sorely tempted just to delete it and will if third party sources are not included. And before you ask I did do some searches and it looks to me like meta-ontology is a narrow field with little or no third party sources. That would mean it stays as a short article ----Snowded TALK 00:29, 28 March 2013 (UTC)
To paraphrase, although it seemed you were objecting to the sources used to support the material here, your real objection is not that. Your real objection is that the subject discussed above, no matter how it is sourced, is not meta-ontology unless a source says verbatim that it is meta-ontology? So there is no point looking further into a source unless it explicitly contains the exact word meta-ontology, and not just a circumlocution of same? Would you make an exception for Carnap and Quine inasmuch as Inwagen has sourced their works as examples of meta-ontology, a word coined by Inwagen for this express purpose, and defined more generally by him as the subject of asking and answering questions about ontology? Brews ohare (talk) 01:02, 28 March 2013 (UTC)
Paraphrase is always dangerous but in essence the Carnap/Quine material is legitimate given Inwagen but that would justify only an article about Inwagen which might not be notable. There are other sources that also use the term, so their material can be summarised and that makes the article marginally notable. What you can't do is to expand on what they say using primary sources or generalised discussion of ontology. The Carnap/Quine section really needs trimming by the way. You can't assume that a reference to ontology is one about meta-ontology. ----Snowded TALK 01:09, 28 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I think your take on this is too narrow. If we adopt Inwagen's definition: what one asks when one asks What is?, or adopt the narrower of Hofweber's definitions the study of what ontology is, whichever definition one chooses, of course one can identify discussion that fits the definition, and of course it may not call itself meta-ontology. It even may call itself something else like 'metaphysics', or even 'ontology' (as Hofweber points out in his broader definition). There is no basis (in reason nor in WP guidelines) for restricting a WP article on a subject to use only those particular sources that employ this specific name for the subject, but one should accept any reliable source that is engaged in a discussion that fits the definition of meta-ontology. And if one's subject is 'zoology', individual animals will come up. A reference to zebras can show up in a zoological discussion.
A particular example is the discussion above of model-dependent realism which is devoted to comparing various ontologies as well as proposing a version of its own. Such discussion is clearly meta-ontology but it doesn't use the term. Likewise, the discussion of Kuhn is all about ontology in general, about choosing between them, and is not about specific ontologies except by way of examples for the broader meta-ontological discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 04:43, 28 March 2013 (UTC)
I can find plenty of third party sources for zebras and zoology. Is Inwagen's definition accepted by most philosophers? It's his take which is about the meat of jthis article.. I'm not being narrow he I am following Wikipedia policy. You make a series of statements above that are your opinion about meta ontology. If that is a val I'd you should should be able to find a third party source to back you. If not its OR and a coatracks. Not only that there is no point in replicating material that better belongs at the ontology article. Here we describe meta ontology and we link we don't replicate and we certainly don't write essays----Snowded TALK 06:06, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

Your stance is that when Hawking compares model-dependent realism to Plato, which is a comparison of two ideas about What is?, such a comparison is not meta-ontology until a 'third-party' source says: "The comparison of model-dependent realism to Plato by Hawking is meta-ontology." That clearly is too narrow a view. Such a comparison clearly falls under the definition of meta-ontology. That is my opinion, but also clearly within the definition of the subject, and not simply my opinion. If you are able to argue that comparisons between ontologies explaining, for example, why one ontology is better than another or, for example, explaining principles that might govern a selection between ontologies, is not meta-ontology, please do so. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

You might profess that whether you agree with me that such matters actually do fall within the definition of meta-ontology, from WP's standpoint that is not the issue, because whether we agree about the import of the definition has no standing on WP, which requires a third-part statement like: "The comparison of model-dependent realism to Plato by Hawking is meta-ontology." If that is your position, perhaps you might explain what on WP suggests this policy? The articles WP:Third-party sources and WP:Independent sources are not binding policy or guidelines, and anyway have no bearing on the question of whether a subject falls within a definition, or not. Their focus is upon avoiding bias in the exposition of a topic. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, it seems to me that what this boils down to is whether one wants to split off discussion of what ontology is for and what its questions mean from the article ontology and put it into meta-ontology, or not. Argument over what constitutes ontology or metaontology is just a practical decision about theory and its metatheory, and deciding what best goes where as a matter of exposition. It is not a fundamental issue. Brews ohare (talk) 20:30, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

Your interpretation Brews You are taking a series of statements then drawing conclusions not directly supported by sources. Even if one conceded your point in part the question of what you select to talk about is problematic. You seem to me to be on a meta-crusade here and while its a PoV it does not define the field. If this article needs to cover something it will be present in an article about meta-ontology. If not it belongs in the ontology article. It really is that simple. ----Snowded TALK 04:36, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
You have to keep in mind that this opinion of yours has no basis, or none you have supplied anyway. Brews ohare (talk) 05:00, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Another of your opinions. Its fairly clear if you read policy. We are not here to provide a vehicle for you to write essays ----Snowded TALK 05:01, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: Point out a policy that you think applies here. There is no 'essay'; an essay is personal opinion; there is none of that here: everything is documented. You refuse to recognize the definition of meta-ontology as splitting off a particular facet of ontology for discussion here.
I am trying to add substance to this article. Why not make some useful proposals? Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
No you are making a personal selection of material without proper third part sources to confirm it belongs to the subject matter. Policy is clear on this ----Snowded TALK 16:16, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Again, what is this 'policy'? The issue of third-party sources was presented at length above, and shows there is no 'third-party' requirement involved here. As for making a 'personal selection' of material, of course I selected the material, as every editor on WP does. What is objectionable about this selection? Be specific. Avoid vague assertions. Try to provide some specific changes that could guide revision other than complete censorship. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

OK let me try again - and please stop using emotive words like censorship and filibustering. This article is about meta-ontology. The first section contains properly referenced material and a possibly overlong discussion of Carnap and Quine based on those references. There is an argument for the article to be merged into Ontology as its all fairly minor but lets put that on one side for the moment. Wikipedia frowns on articles replicating material that is already covered elsewhere so a general discussion on Khun is better at Philosophy of Science (and could be linked) and/or Ontology itself. If there is specific material, that is considered to be about meta-ontology and referenced as such then it could belong here. Metaontology does not appear in the latest Oxford Companion which is a pity as that would give us some guidence - its a third party source. The fact that it does not appear casts doubt on the legitimacy of the subject by the way. What you do have is a small number of authors who use the term. So if it is legitimate to have an article then it can cover issues discussed by those authors, but cannot extend to a more general discussion using primary sources which is what you are doing. ----Snowded TALK 17:26, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
You're avoiding the subject once more by now attacking the notability of the topic, and suggesting merger. That can be tackled in the new thread you have introduced below.
Assuming the legitimacy of meta-ontology, you say it's OK to "cover issues discussed by those authors" meaning issues raised by the "small number of authors who use the term". Now, Hofweber raises the issue as follows:
"The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts [of which one is] the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.".
Consequently, this condition of discussing "only the issues raised" seems to be exactly what I have been trying to do. Brews ohare (talk) 19:10, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Please try and pay attention. I have proposed a general criteria for meta articles and made a separate proposal for merger. Here I answered you question the very opposite of avoiding the subject. Given that you constantly repeat the same arguments (as you did at the Philosophy article) I was being generous in restating again the argument. You seem to be arguing that the Hofweber quotes gives you license to provide words using primary sources on anything loosely covered by that phrase which is odd. Especially as Hofweber only really mentions the word in passing. What you have is some authors using the word, but it has not yet reached the stage where its considered a subject heading in the major third party sources.----Snowded TALK 19:15, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Your dismissal of articles discussing meta-ontology as only "using the word in passing" is (let's say) exaggerated. And what is the relevance to WP of meta-ontology's not having "reached the stage where it's considered a subject heading in the major third party sources". Isn't that a notability issue, which is under discussion in your new thread? It has no bearing whatsoever upon the material I am trying to add to bring the meta-ontology article into the 21st century. Brews ohare (talk) 20:01, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
I don't dismiss the articles I dispute the context of their use. Ah well I tried now we need other editors ----Snowded TALK 03:27, 30 March 2013 (UTC)

Reversion of section by Snowded

The following material has been removed by Snowded, and I have restored it to the article:

Further views

Meta-ontology also arises in the philosophy of science.[Ref 1][Ref 2] A scientific theory consists of a formal apparatus (perhaps mathematical in nature) and a set of observations that support this apparatus.[Ref 3] A scientific theory therefore contains the concepts of its underlying formal structure (which Carnap would say contain its theoretical language; that is, the entities involved in the semantic rules and linguistic conventions of its formal apparatus)[Ref 4] and also specifies real-world tests in the form of observations (which involve what Carnap would call its observation language, describing objects of the 'real' world).[Ref 4] Like Quine,[Ref 5] Thomas Kuhn expressed the view that this simple distinction between the objects of the formal structure and those of the laboratory is not possible. One cannot isolate the objects in the conceptual structure of the theory from the objects involved in the observations that ground the theory. In Kuhn's view, science depends upon "paradigms" (the collective opinion of scientists in a certain epoch) and upon subjective criteria for what is a "good" theory. Discussion of how a 'good' theory is selected is a meta-ontological discussion that leads, upon making a selection, to the ontology of the theory selected.[Ref 6][Ref 7]

Sources

  1. ^ The meta-ontology of science, the discussion of what such an ontology should consist of, and how to arrive at such an ontology, often is subsumed under the umbrella of ontology itself. See for example, Larisa N Soldatova, Ross D King (Dec 22, 2006). "An ontology of scientific experiments". J R Soc Interface. 3 (11). Although no ontology exists that formalizes general experimental information, several ontologies exist for specialized experimental areas in biology...
  2. ^ This discussion is an ongoing process. See for example, Roberto Poli (2011). "Analysis-synthesis". In Veselin Petrov, ed (ed.). Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos Verlag. pp. 19 ff. ISBN 3868381074. The misplaced faith in analytic, reductionist methods follows almost unavoidably from the lack of a correct ontology, and in particular from the lack of both a theory of wholes and their parts, and a theory of levels of reality. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  3. ^ Rudolf Carnap (Dec., 1955). "On some concepts of pragmatics" (PDF). Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 6 (6): 89–91. A postulate system in physics cannot have, as mathematical theories have, a splendid isolation from the world. Its axiomatic terms - "electron", "field", and so on - must be interpreted by correspondence rules that connect the terms with observable phenomena. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  4. ^ a b Rudolf Carnap (1956). "The methodological character of theoretical concepts" (PDF). Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. 1: 38–76.
  5. ^ Quine, W. V. (1951). "On Carnap's views on ontology". Philosophical Studies. 2: 65–72. If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence...Science is a unified structure, and in principle it is the structure as a whole, and not its component statements one by one, that experience confirms or shows to be imperfect. Reprinted in Willard Van Orman Quine (1976). "Chapter 9: On Carnap's views on ontology". The Ways of Paradox (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. pp. 203–211. ISBN 0674948378.
  6. ^ Thomas Kuhn formally stated this need for the "norms for rational theory choice". One of his discussions is reprinted in Thomas S Kuhn. "Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice". In James Conant, John Haugeland, eds (ed.). The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 208 ff. ISBN 0226457990. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  7. ^ Thomas S Kuhn (1966). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226458083.

Comments

I would like to have some real proposals for fixing this addition. Snowded has suggested that it is not meta-ontology but ontology, based upon a view of meta-ontology that contradicts its definition. He has disputed the sources based upon his view that no source is pertinent unless it specifically uses the word meta-ontology, a position he cannot or will not support. He has called this paragraph an essay and therefore inappropriate. He has not supported this description, which seems to imply some personal viewpoint of my own that is belied by the provided sources. Basically, Snowded has mounted a filibuster that has as its main aim the curtailing of the article Meta-ontology, an article he would like to keep as a stub because he thinks it is a non-subject. Brews ohare (talk) 15:01, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

You did not have agreement to include it. I left a draft there tagged for around two days to give you a chance to gain third part references and you failed. So its deleted. Its not a filibuster, you have to make a case to expand the material and you should not attempt to create a coatrack article. Most of your statements above are (as before) false ----Snowded TALK 16:11, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
The first of your references by the way is nothing to do with Philosophy - its always dangerous to rely on google searches ----Snowded TALK 16:20, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
References are provided. Your notion of philosophy is your own. Brews ohare (talk) 16:56, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Well I'm surprised your notion of ontology in philosophy includes an article which is really about taxonomy, but such is life. ----Snowded TALK 17:10, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I assume your refer to this which says "The first step in formalizing knowledge is to define an explicit ontology, i.e. to describe what exists." The paper describes a specific approach to setting up such an ontology in the context of experimental science, and my view is that a discussion about how to do ontology is meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 17:22, 29 March 2013 (UTC)
Find me a single paper in a philosophy journal that references that or anything like it and I might take you seriously ----Snowded TALK 17:27, 29 March 2013 (UTC)