Talk:Russo-Georgian War/Archive 29

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Reposting an Argument that wasn't addressed by Xeeron and company, and yet an argument they pretend they've addressed about Pavel Felgenhauer.

Going back to the original topic, of removing the disgrace that Felgenhauer is, a point that opposing editors don't want to debate, Xeeron and Kober would rather make Ad Hominems against me than actually engage in intelligent debate, here's an argument that discredits Felgenhauer's whole theory: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-151-12.cfm

"Pavel Felgenhauer’s conspiracy theory has several major wholes in it. First of all, it relies on the false assumption that contingency plans constitute decided actions. This is the same mistake made by those who supported the various conspiracy theories surrounding the August 1991 party-siloviki putsch against Gorbachev and Yeltsin. More or less normal contingency plans for instituting emergency rule and martial law were loosely interpreted as plans to implement them at a soon-to-be-determined time and place.

Second, the entire Russian ‘plan’ would have been undone, if Saakashvili had agreed to sign the agreement proposed by Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to reject the use of force to resolve Georgia’s self-made‘frozen conflicts.’ It was Saakashvili’s willingness to use force that allowed him, if he indeed was, to be sucked into using force. This means that he was as complicit as the Russians were in the frozen conflict’s thaw and devolution into violence. Both sides were spoiling for a fight and to one extent or another were doing their best to bait the other side into flagrantly breaking the ceasefire by way of a major incursion. In other words, it is unclear who entrapped whom. As usual a certain ilk of ‘analyst’ is willing to entertain this possibility in relation to the Russian side; for that ilk the Russians are always entirely to blame, and the West and whomever the present administration has designated an ally are not.

Felgenhauer mentions Russia's April tranfer of unarmed troops to Abkhazia to make repairs of the Abkhaz railroad for transport of Russian military equipment and the shooting down of the Israeli-suppled recon drones. He neglects to mention that if the railraod repairs were preparation for war, what were the recon flights for?

He mentions the Russian 58th army's maneuvers, but neglects the American-Georgian military excercies being conducted at the same time. One is seen as preparation for war, the other is ignored. Clearly both were intended as general preparation in the even of war. It is possible that niether or both were part of mobilization for an already planned attack. Felgenhauer neglects the fact that Georgian forces stepped up their activities and moved heavy artillery closer to Tskhinval during their maneuvers with U.S. forces. In RFERL writer Brian Whitmore's rehash of Felgenhauer's material he mentions that "(a)t center stage in the Russian maneuvers was...Russia's 58th Army, the very unit that would later play a key role in the incursion." This supposedly revealing 'coincdence' is intended to be further 'proof' that Russia had decidec on war. Omitted from Whitmore's piece is that any maneuvers in Russia's North Caucasus would include the 58th Army which is the nucleus of its military presence there and has been fighting Chechen separatists and Caucasus jihadists for years. American taxpayers might wonder why their hard-earned money is funding pro-Georgian propaganda by the "independent" organization "funded by the U.S. Congress"?!

Felgenhauer’s reliance on the conspiracy theories surrounding the Chechen jihadists’ long-planned invasion of Dagestan in 1999 further undermine his interpretation. The Russian did not need to goad jihadists like Shamil Basaev and global jihadist and al Qaeda operative Khattab to attack Dagestan. The Chechen and foreign jihadists had been conspiring with Dagestan jihadists’ for well over a year to establish an Islamic jamaat/caliphate in several Dagestani villages and months before their attack were declaring their intention to do so. The same conspiratorial approach surrounds that period’s Moscow and Volgadonsk apartment bombings, for which both Basaev and Khattab took responsibility by acknowledging that Dagestanis had carried it out.

These conspiracy theories are similar to those surrounding the Bush administration and Mossad and 9/11 and deserve about as much credence. That is why no semi-serious, no less serious analyst pays them much heed.

Dr. Gordon M. Hahn –Senior Researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group; and Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch, www.russiaotherpointsofview.com. Dr Hahn is author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), and numerous articles on Russian politics."

In other words, the only critique of Felgenhauer's "argument" has pointed out that it is a conspiracy theory, yet the pro-Georgian lobby want to present it as an actual statement by an analyst, because it fits their views. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:39, 4 September 2009 (UTC)

No need to type much myself here, since that discussion can be nicely seen on http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson. For those to lazy to read all of the following, let me summarize the following: Just like on this wiki talk page, the analysts disagree. Some back up Felgenhauer, some doubt him, some are in between. Just what you would expect from a controversial topic.

PS: Many more pieces on the link I only copied some. --Xeeron (talk) 16:11, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

A rebuttal to Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D. [re: Anna Politkovskaya, murders of journalists, Russo-Georgian War]

From Pavel Felgenhauer Ph.D. Defense analyst and columnist, Novaya Gazeta

I am not a party to the discussions between Gordon Hahn and Col. Hamilton. Mr. Hahn's arguments do not seem to be serious, say, like the passage from his #180 JRL contribution: "Col. Hamilton claims that in the New York Times September 16 article regarding tapes purporting to sound Ossetian and Russian soldiers around the Roki Tunnel on Aug 7 ushering Russian forces into South Ossetia, are described in the article as "credible by U.S. intelligence sources." If these are the same sources that gave us the pipes from Nigeria and Iran's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program, I would suggest that we NOT form our Russia and Georgian policies or our view of the Ossetian war based on this interpretation of these tapes."

Of course, there have been other multiple reports and interviews given by Russian solders, published in different Russian newspapers that report first-hand evidence that Russian troops began the invasion of Georgia on August 7^th and actually crossed the border before the Georgian troops attacked the Ossetian positions in the Tskhinvali region. Newsru.com published a good summery of such reports on September 11. But even if the New York Times tapes were not supported by other evidence, do "pipes from Nigeria and Iran's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program" in anyway discredit them? Did Mr. Hahn establish that the same people were involved with vetting the pipes, the program and the tapes?

Mr. Hahn stepped out of his way in his #180 JRL contribution to personally attack my murdered friend Anna Politkovskaya and the Novaya Gazeta in which she worked and I still do: "I would encourage those who can read Russian to read the Novaya Gazeta articles on the Georgian elections as well. Remember this "Russian newspaper" was Anna Politkovskaya's home, and there are many more Anna Politkovskayas at Novaya. On occasion they engage in something other than the kind of reporting that paints the worst possible picture of Russia that is so well received by people of Col. Hamilton's "mindset".....most of the time."

Anna Politkovskaya was murdered for her reporting. Novaya Gazeta is indeed a "Russian newspaper" that is not controlled by the Kremlin. This has put the journalists of Novaya Gazeta into mortal danger. I do hope that there are indeed "more Anna Politkovskayas at Novaya" and we do our best to resist censorship and political repression in Russia. We put our lives and well-being in constant jeopardy by trying to exercise free expression in a corrupt and repressive Russia. Mr. Hahn seems to be jeering cheerfully from the nice safety of his sunny California tenure, maybe awaiting that "more Anna Politkovskayas at Novaya" are murdered and the voice of independent journalism is finally squashed in Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Good Ad Hominem! Bravo! Now, where exactly is Hahn's claim even mentioned here? Felgenhauer is talking about tapes of August 7th. Hahn is talking about Felgenhauer's silly claim that the decision was made in April. Furthermore, Anna Politkovskaya was allegedly murdered for her work on Chechnya, not Georgia. But facts don't matter to Felgenhauer, he loves Ad Hominems instead. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:28, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Comment on the Felgenhauer article

[Russia-Georgia conflict, start of hostilities] Dale Herspring, a University Distinguished Professor at Kansas State University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a retired US diplomat and Navy captain.

Let me begin by stating the obvious. The jury is still out on who started this conflict. Having said that, I think the following are worthy of attention.

What do we know?

1. Based on conversations with the American trainers, it is clear that the Georgians were not ready for such a conflict. They were being trained, not for a conflict in South Ossetia, but for Iraq. They arrived at work on August 7, only to find that their troops (who they were supposed to train for three weeks), were sitting on their rucksacks singing folk songs. Obviously, something was up from the Georgian side.

2. It is not clear who provoked who. There are a number of sources claiming that the South Ossetians clearly provoked the Georgians, just as there are sources claiming the opposite. The bottom line is that this was a brutal, ethnic free-for-all and if one side didn't prokoke it the other side might have.

3. Based on what I have seen thus far, it appears relatively clear to me that Saakashvilli decided to retake control over South Ossetia, and in response to firing from the South Ossetian side (whether real or created) decided to "normalize" the situation.

4. This brings us to the Russian question -- was the Russian Army just waiting for an opportunity to attack the Georgians and liberate South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Felgenhauer asserts?

-- Again the material is unclear.

a. on the pro side.

-- the Russian Army had just finished Kavkaz 2008 in which it rehearhsed exactly this scenario. It is hard to convince any one with a military background that it was "just getting prepared for a future conflict as one person put it to me." The same troops, the same equipment, the same weapons? Six months later, perhaps, but a week later? Very supicious.

-- The Russian logistics network was already to go. Ships in Sevastapol were loaded (and that is something that cannot be done over night), and the same was reportedly true of the ground logistics capability. The same was true of the Railroad Troops fixing the rails in Abkhazia. Again, the argument can be made that it was just a case of being "prudent," but it is clearly very suspicious.

-- The Russian units involved were probably the only in the Russian Army at this point that could have been used effectively. The Naval Infantry at Sevastapol, the Airborne regiment at Pskov, and the 58th has experience in Chechnya.

-- It took the Russian military 12 hours to respond, although that might be fast given the sorry state the Russian military remains in at present.

b. on the con side.

-- If the Russian military had known this invasion was coming, it would have been saddled up waiting for the go sign. In fact, it wasn't at least insofar as the troops were concerned.

-- 12 hour response time suggests that the troops were relaxed. They may have expected a need to deploy forces, but could have been caught by surprise when it happened. The Georgians may have preempted.

-- based on comments from senior Russian military officials and commentators, the Russian military screwed up the operation, even to the point of getting planes shot down and its general wounded. Clearly, an intelligence failure, which I am told cost the commanding general his stars.

-- was the delay and were the screw-ups due to the incompetence of Russian troops or does it mean they really did not know the Georgian action was forthcoming? It is impossible for me to say.

4. The rest of Felgenhauer's commentary is possible, but who knows? I think we are going to have to wait until we get more data. I would advise against jumping to conclusions at this point. Although someone else may have conclusive data, I don't have it, nor does Felgenhauer -- even though I submit that his claims must be taken seriously, which has not happened in Moscow where they are dismissed with no counter evidence.

He doesn't mention anything about April's NATO summit. My point was that Felgenhauer's article on the "April Claim" - which this source doesn't even mention. If someone doesn't mention an article, here's a hint: they think it's insignificant. Furthermore he's saying that Moscow offered no counter-evidence. Yet Hahn's article offers counter-evidence, which hasn't been addressed. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:34, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Re: Felgenhauer [re: Russia-Georgia war, war planning] (Joera Mulders)

Currently, the biggest threat to a viable solution for the Georgian conflict is the blame game, consisting of theories trying to single out one party responsible for the provocations leading to Saakashvili's order to attack the city of Tskhinvali. Multiple parties have played negative roles in the runup to the night of the 7th of August, but now it is time to put the genie back into the bottle. A local conflict that caused a diplomatic row of almost global proportions should again be approached as a microconflict. The solution will be found in mediation between South Ossetian, Abkhazian and Georgian sides, with international help, but without drawing international partners into a conflict with each other.

In this light I would like make a few comments on Pavel Felgenhauer's elaborate attempt to convince his readers of a pervasive Russian intent behind the outburst of violence.

Of course Felgenhauer is right when he says that a Russian incursion into Georgia was planned in advance. It's called a contingency plan. Russia should have had such a plan from the moment it sent its peacekeepers into the region in the early nineties. Perhaps in those years such an operation would have been too much to ask from the Russian military.

This year the Russian military trained its contingency plan during the Kavkaz-2008 exercise. "One week before the war, Air Force, Navy, and Army forces completed their final readiness check in a locality close to the Georgian border", Felgenhauer writes. What he doesn't mention is that during the same period the Georgian military trained to liberate a city occupied by enemy combatants in a NATO "immediate response" exercise.

I doubt we should blame either military for being prepared. The timing of political decisions tells us much more. A short five hours after Saakashvili's eloquent 7:10 PM call for dialogue and peace, the Georgian Ministry of Defense declared that a military operation was underway to restore constitutional order in the breakaway republic of South Ossetia. In effect this meant the indiscriminate shelling of a city with thousands of civilians present.

Felgenhauer's colleague Aleksandr Golts concludes it took Russian forces 13 to 14 hours to reach the area of the fighting. On Wednesday the 21th it took the ICRC 7 hours drive from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali. How to explain the delay? Felgenhauer reports "monstrous jams" and "obsolete and decrepit Russian equipment breaking down". He is most likely right, but what about additional delay in decision-making?

At Russia's request, the Security Council held consultations at 11 pm followed by an open meeting at 1:15 am with Georgia attending. The Council members were unable to come to a consensus. Perhaps Russia did search for a diplomatic solution before deploying its troops. Medvedev was probably not surprised by the Georgian assault, but at that moment he still had different options on the table, one of which was asking the international community to restrain Tbilisi. Unlike in September 2006 when both EU representative Peter Semneby and his US counterpart Daniel Fried publicly reprimanded Georgia for its provocations, this time there was no timely international call for restraint.

In those first 13 to 14 hours, while the Russian army was stuck in "monstrous jams", it was the Ossetian militia and volunteers from the North Caucasus who fought off the Georgian army. It's not fully clear why Felgenhauer writes about "Saakashvili's unexpectedly powerful assault" and "the instantaneous routing of Ossetian formations". Army Capt. Jeff Barta, who helped train a Georgian brigade for peacekeeping service in Iraq, told AP that "The Georgians weren't ready for combat", although "they do not lack 'warrior spirit.'"

Such an assessment better fits the picture of the army's withdrawal after Russian troops secured Tskhinvali. Not only was military equipment left behind, so was the population. A vacuum took shape in which HRW had to ask the Russian military to provide security to the population. Of course the Russian army is not the ideal actor to fulfill such a function, but who else was there except the Ossetian militia and volunteers from the North Caucasus?

Let us now move our focus to the western part of Georgia, or if you wish the area in and around Abkhazia. Felgenhauer writes about "a long-planned operation to 'clear' the upper part of the Kodori Gorge". Again, such an operation must have been planned, but I suggest we have a short look at the interactive map on the UNOMIG website, where we may read that since 1994 one of the tasks of the UN mission has been to "monitor the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori valley to places beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia (Georgia)". Indiscriminate violence should have been avoided, but "clearing" the Kodori Valley has not been an entirely illegitimate operation.

UNOMIG's interactive map shows us more. The cities of Senaki and Poti are not deep in Georgia proper. Both border on the Restricted Weapons Zone agreed upon in 1994 in SC resolution 937. Yes, Russia's incursion into these cities violated the mentioned agreement, but how disproportionate is it to destroy heavy military equipment amassed on the border of the RWZ by a country that just broke a cease-fire agreement using multiple rocket launchers to assault a city with civilians present? I am not arguing that Russia's reaction has been proportionate. I am only saying that Felgenhauer's piece does not provide us with sufficient information to fairly asses that question.

Lastly, when Felgenhauer wrote his piece, published on the 14th by Novaya Gazeta, he could not have known that a week later the Financial Times would print an interview with Georgian deputy defense minister Batu Kutelia in which the latter stressed that "Georgia did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia and was completely unprepared for the counterattack". Perhaps Felgenhauer has better sources of information than Georgia's deputy defense minister; perhaps he is just guessing.

Let me end with a note of harmony. I fully agree with Felgenhauer that foreign peacekeeping contingents should be moved into Georgia as soon as possible. I also agree with him that these international peacekeeping forces should include a Russian contingent. The Ossetian population will simply not accept otherwise. A double ring of peacekeepers, with an international force commanded by a large European nation with strong economic ties with Russia on the Georgian side and the Russians on the Ossetian and Abkhazian sides, can do the job. As soon as the international community can decide upon such a mission, international peacekeepers may replace the Russian forces where they should not be, for example in Poti. The ball is now in our court.

But do we care enough about stability in the Caucasus to send our peacekeepers to that region? And how can we encourage such a decision? By uniting against Russia, or by cooperating with Russia?

I pretty much agree with analysis. Especially since it points out Felgenhauer's genius: "Perhaps Felgenhauer has better sources of information than Georgia's deputy defense minister; perhaps he is just guessing". Again, nothing about April is mentioned, or that the preparation began in April. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:41, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

How the war began (Stephen Shenfield)

Extensive war preparations like those Felgengauer describes do not prove that a definite decision has been taken in favor of war, only that the leadership wants to have the option of war available. The US has made extensive preparations for war with Iran ("preparing the battlefield"), but as yet there is no definite decision to go to war.

To be more precise, extensive preparations usually make available a range of more or less far-reaching military options. The option finally chosen can then be made dependent on circumstances as they evolve. Thus, for the Russian operation in Georgia a minimum option might have been confined to introducing forces into Abkhazia and South Ossetia to back up recognition of their "independence." A maximum option might have entailed occupying Tbilisi and enforcing regime change -- though not, I suspect, advancing south of Tbilisi because this would have threatened core Western interests (i.e., the oil and gas pipelines). What happened in the event was an option between these two.

I think that the two key aspects of the evolving situation that may have influenced the choice of option were:

(1) the Georgian reaction to the creeping annexation of South Ossetia in its various aspects (making more Ossets Russian citizens, expulsion of inhabitants of Georgian villages in SO, etc.)

(2) the reaction of the West.

Given a Western reaction restricted to rhetoric, I think that if there had been no significant Georgian reaction the operation would have been limited to the minimum option, as defined above. This would not have attracted so much world attention and would almost certainly have sufficed to block Georgia's accession to NATO, which is after all the main Russian goal. The political costs of going further under those circumstances would have exceeded the military benefits.

However, the Georgian attack on Tskhinval sharply changed this calculus in Russia's favor. It meant that even if a more ambitious option was selected world opinion would be confused and divided. Instead of Russia finding itself isolated internationally for clear-cut aggression, many people throughout the world (most importantly in Europe) sympathized with the Osset victims and adopted a position equidistant between the sides.

Nothing here also mentions that the preparations started in April. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:43, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

re Felgenhauer [Russia-Georgia war, war planning]

I found myself agreeing with Dale Herspring's comments to Felgenhauer's thesis about "Russian provocation". We cannot know yet who provoked who.

However, I do think that in a sense, all sides were ready for the war.

Saakashvili may - we don't really know - have been trapped by the Russians, or perhaps by the South Ossetians going it alone - but he was also trapped by his own words about reintegrating South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I think many of us have underestimated the dangers of ever-escalating rhetoric and ever more serious clashes each summer since 2004. It is dangerous to speak about peace with a soaring military budget in the background, especially when you have powerful neighbours with interests in your region. On this background, of course the Russians were prepared. And of course Saakashvili was easy to provoke, if that is what happened.

While the details are still unknown, I suspect this was a classic case of August 1914 - all parties being bound by their obligations and blinded by their own nationalism (Georgia) and the yearning to once again rule the Caucasus (Russia). Everybody simply played a dangerous game, and war in the end broke out, perhaps even to the surprise of quite a few of the actors.

But what happened afterwards with the Russians going deep into Georgia, destroying infrastructure and military bases, need not have been planned to the same extent as the invasion. Perhaps it was just too good an opportunity to let go, seen from the Kremlin?

So pre-planned from April - well, in a sense, perhaps, but in another sense, the last two years of long escalation between Georgia and Russia at least should have prepared everyone for war, and I think that is far more important.

Ingerid M Opdahl Research Fellow The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

www.ifs.mil.no

"So pre-planned from April - well, in a sense, perhaps, but in another sense, the last two years of long escalation between Georgia and Russia at least should have prepared everyone for war, and I think that is far more important". Again, Mr. Opdahl is saying that he's (she's?) unsure when the attack was planned. This isn't a confirmation argument. It simply states that there isn't enough information to decide. The words "in a sense" and "perhaps" are the equivalent of "maybe". HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:47, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Pavel Felgenhauer Response to Professor Herspring Posting on JRL

In regard to Professor Herspring’s recent posting on JRL on August 22 - the good Professor and former Navy captain does not, apparently understand the difference between the deployment into battle of a combined army task force, supported by air and Navy, and a limo or pizza delivery service that can be expected to turn up in an hour after receiving an order.

I have been since the unsuccessful coup in August 1991 following closely Russian/Soviet patterns of military readiness and deployment. If the Russian response would have been indeed only a reaction to a sudden Georgian attack, it would have taken at least a week to send a vanguard force into South Ossetia and a month to organize a full-scale invasion.

The 4,000 vanguard troops sent into Georgia with hundreds of pieces of armor that reached Tskhinvali within 15 hours of the Georgian offensive consisted of troops based from Moscow and Pskov that are thousands of kilometers from the battlefield. The nearest airstrip to Tskhinvali is Beslan - over 200 kilometers of narrow mountain road, a narrow 5 kilometer tunnel and they also had to break throw Georgian positions to reach Tskhinvali. The 20,000 plus Russian troops thousands of armor, naval ships and air forces from all over Russia were assembled and ready for the invasion of Georgia in August beforehand and began moving into the attack before the Georgians that much more roads of approach and less distance to cover.

In my most recent article published in EDM on August 25, I have quoted VPK - a military/intelligence establishment closely connected publication in Moscow - that states the same - the troops were propositioned for an invasion of Georgia and fully prepared for immediate attack action. In that article I wrote:

“A Moscow defense weekly connected to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's former KGB associates and published by the state corporation Rostekhnologiy has admitted that the invasion of Georgia was prepared well in advance. The troops that crossed the Georgian border on August 8 were concentrated in attack positions in full readiness for immediate action under the cover of military exercises Kavkaz-2008 that ended on August 2. Massive troop reinforcements were also ready to follow up the initial attack (VPK, August 20).”

Reports that the Russians were somewhat caught off guard on August 8 - are crude and false propaganda.

Sincerely, Pavel Felgenhauer.

"It would have taken at least a week to send a vanguard force into South Ossetia"? Oh wow. I gotta post this on the VDV website, so everyone can have a great laugh. "[A] month to organize a full-scale invasion"? Good one! I am rolling on the floor laughing! Does Pavel Felgenhauer know what contingency planning is?

"The 20,000 plus Russian troops thousands of armor, naval ships and air forces from all over Russia were assembled and ready for the invasion of Georgia in August beforehand and began moving into the attack before the Georgians that much more roads of approach and less distance to cover." - Umm, actually that's wrong. According to the MDB, most Georgian troops got their on August 7th, most Russian troops on August 10th.

"In regard to Professor Herspring’s recent posting on JRL on August 22 - the good Professor and former Navy captain does not, apparently understand the difference between the deployment into battle of a combined army task force, supported by air and Navy, and a limo or pizza delivery service that can be expected to turn up in an hour after receiving an order. " - yeah, Pavel Felgenhauer, who never fought, nor has any military degrees, is clearly more qualified to make such assessments, than a navy captain participating in amphibious operations.

"The 4,000 vanguard troops sent into Georgia with hundreds of pieces of armor that reached Tskhinvali within 15 hours of the Georgian offensive consisted of troops based from Moscow and Pskov that are thousands of kilometers from the battlefield." - and here Felgenhauer is praying that we don't pay attention to geography. "Distance from Moscow, Russia to Tbilisi, Georgia is 1020.7 Miles." http://www.happyzebra.com/m/distance-calculator/index.php?city=Moscow&city2=Tbilisi The cruise speed for an Antonov Transport airplane is 490 mph. The troops from Moscow and Pskov are paratroops. (For some reason Pavel Felgenhauer neglected to mention this.) The paratroops don't need an air strip. In other words, at cruising speed, the troops would have been parachuted in Tskhinval, which is closer to Moscow than Tbilisi, within two hours. This isn't original research, this is basic addition and division. Assuming that they needed to get to their base, and to parachute successfully, we'll give that another hour apiece, that's more than enough time. So in under four hours, not a week, Russia would have sent the paratroops from Moscow and Pskov.

"I have been since the unsuccessful coup in August 1991 following closely Russian/Soviet patterns of military readiness and deployment. If the Russian response would have been indeed only a reaction to a sudden Georgian attack, it would have taken at least a week to send a vanguard force into South Ossetia and a month to organize a full-scale invasion."

That's what the Kavkaz-2008 exercises were for, it's called a contingency plan. But were does it say that the Kavkaz-2008 exercises were planned in April? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:18, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Of Georgia, Jamtland and the Texas Solution

I.D.: Goltz is an adjunct professor of Political Science at Montana State University, Bozeman, and author among other books of Georgia Diary: A Chronicle of Political Chaos and War in the Post-Soviet Caucasus, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, soon to be re-issued in paperback with a new Epilogue

Tbilisi/Baku, August 28, 2008

Well, it seems to be over, surprise, surprise, unless it turns into WW III, which I hope it does not.

The Caucasus War of 8.8.8 that is, the two-week (or two day) hurly burly in the mountainous southwest corner of the defunct Soviet Union that was a national debacle for West-obsessed Georgia and a crushing victory for a resurgent Russia.

For those of you who chose to watch the Beijing Olympics instead, which seemed to be timed almost purposely to create maximum distraction from the seismic events happening in the place that gave rise to the legend of Pandora’s Box getting re-opened, geo-politically speaking, let me fill you in on a fistful of details.

On August 8, in a coordinated land, air and sea assault, the pre-positioned military of the Russian Federation attacked the Republic of Georgia, theoretically to defend its citizens of Ossetian ethnicity from what it described as a genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Georgians. Those citizens under siege happened to live in a tiny, mountainous region known as South Ossetia (within Georgia), but which just happens to abut on the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia (within the Russian Federation). South Ossetia, populated by around 60,000 Ossets and 40,000 Georgians, had enjoyed a fuzzy sort of independence since 1991, although efforts to peacefully re-integrate the territory back into Georgia have been going on for years. The reintegration process effectively ended when Moscow began distributing Russian passports to the Ossets living in the territory over the past year or two (but not the Georgians), thus making them Russian citizens on the spot, and deserving of Russian protection, even outside Russia’s borders. And so the war began.

By August 9 (and certainly the 10th), the one-sided contest was over for all intents and purposes, with the Russian side having thrown all American-trained Georgian military and police out of South Ossetia, taken over much of the rest of northern Georgia, and seemed poised to make an assault on the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, which was a mere 25 miles/40 kilometers away from the Russian front lines. Meanwhile, to the west, Russian tanks, troops and other gear were rushed to a second breakaway area of Georgia known as the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, lest the impetuous Georgians open a second front there, with the result that whatever Georgian military (and civilians) that remained in the territory were forced out, too, albeit with scarcely a shot getting fired.

By August 11, Georgia had in effect capitulated, and was begging for international diplomatic intervention. Russian tanks ruled the land, Russian aviation ruled the skies and Russian naval craft ruled the shores of the Black Sea. And Russian propaganda largely ruled the airwaves, too. That last victory might be summed up by the way the short war is usually represented even in the western media: namely, that the Russian counter-attack had been massively successful, and the man to blame for the mess was not Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (and certainly not Russian President Dmitry Medvedev) but the mercurial Georgian President, Mikheil (Misha) Saakashvili. Not.

A ‘counter attack’ assumes an initial attack, and the Georgians, while perhaps guilty of being lured into a trap, never attacked Russia. Rather, in the days prior to 8.8.8, Georgia had been responding to an escalating series of provocations inside South Ossetia and to a lesser extent in Abkhazia. That is how the war began, and how it should be remembered: it was and is a war of provocation followed by creeping annexation, and planned and executed with a surprising degree of efficiency, and complete audacity.

This was no where more in evidence than the decision by the Upper House of the Russian Duma on August 25th to recommend the recognition of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, IE, to tear these territories away from Georgia, and forever. The parliamentary decision was next passed by the Lower House and then signed by President Medvedev within 24 hours of its initial getting tabled, to the joy of the Ossetians and Abkhaz, the shock and anguish of Georgia and the baffled cries of ‘foul play!’ in western capitals. A bed-rock of the international system of relations between countries in place since 1945, namely, the inviolability of the territorial integrity of existing states, had just been removed, and Pandora’s Box opened.

In some cynical circles, we call this The Texas Solution, because it so resembles the series of US provocations of Mexico that started with the Alamo and ended with the storming of the Halls of Montezuma and the creation of the (temporary) Texas Republic of 1840 before its annexation as the Lone Star State into the United States in 1845.

For an alternative history of that war, I would recommend The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant. Although most of the book is devoted to Grant’s reduction of the Confederacy, it is the first part of the Memoirs that pertains to Russia’s creeping annexation of northern and western Georgia, namely, how a young Lt. Grant viewed President Polk’s Remember The Alamo! campaign against Mexico, starting with the sort of cross-border provocations that would force Mexico to retaliate, and young Grant’s participation in the entire campaign.

“The occupation, separation and annexation (of Texas by the US in 1845) were, from the inception of the movement until its consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the American Union,” he wrote.

And more.

“The Southern Rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican War.(and) Nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times.”

Grant declared himself bitterly opposed to the war, which he regarded as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.

What will the unintended consequences of Russia’s creeping annexation of the two Georgian autonomous territories be, when it has its own fair share of legally recognized sub-republics, such as Chechnya? Will a Russian lieutenant in the 58th Army in the war against Georgia of 8.8.8 one day write his memoirs about a distant, footnote in history?

I truly hope so, because the wash of propaganda coming out of Moscow right now needs correction, even fifty years hence.

As for the Georgian response to the disaster, only time will tell if Mr Saakashvili can survive; there is sufficient animosity growing against him both domestically and even in western capitals that would suggest that he cannot remain in power much longer, particularly after the ‘formal’ departure of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russians have made it absolutely clear that they will not tolerate any military adventures that Tbilisi might want to mount, and short of going into a stand-off that might lead us into WW III, no western power, however friendly to Georgia, is going to challenge Moscow on the matter with military might. Like ‘Old Mexico’ being forced to live with the reality of first an independent and then US state of Texas across the Rio Grande River, future generations of Georgians are apparently just have to get used to living without the chunks of their ancestral homeland once known as South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Other paradigms, all evoking the concept of the ‘phantom limb’ syndrome experienced by amputees, are the Kingdom of Jordan’s loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem through war with Israel in 1967, and then final renunciation of all Jordanian claims to that territory a decade later, or Syria’s now very passive, even plaintive whisper that the province of Iskenderoon, which became Turkey’s province of Hatay by quasi-rigged plebiscite in 1938, come home to the motherland some day.

Other observers of shifting frontiers will have their own favorite lost-limb stories, but mine concerns the Scandinavian regions known as Jamtland and Harjedalen, forcibly ceded by Norway to Sweden following the 1645 Peace of Bromsebro, a loss that was not even papered over by the union between those Nordic states during the friendlier period of 1814-1905. To this day, the King of Norway (and indeed all naval officers) keep two buttons unbuttoned on their dress togs remembering those two, obscure chunks of fjord and mountain, and hoping for their eventual return.

I shared that anecdote with Saakashvili at a late night meeting last week; he almost seemed to smile.

Ahh, the good old "Russia is oh so totally ebil" source. If the Georgians weren't the attackers, how come they had no rear guard? How come after the Battle of Tskhinvali, they were routed. Wouldn't it be smarter to fight on your De Facto soil if you are really defending? Oh yeah, the source still doesn't mention the April 2008 "claim". HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:23, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Theories Swirl About War's Beginning

By Nikolaus von Twickel / Staff Writer

In war, the saying goes, truth is the first casualty. In South Ossetia, it seems, truth has been battered so ruthlessly that it is virtually impossible to determine who fired the first shot.

It's even hard to figure out when it was fired.

Tbilisi and Moscow are accusing each other of planning the war well in advance of Aug. 8, when the Georgian army attacked the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. Georgia says it was forced to attack after its soldiers in the area came under heavy fire from separatists.

With information and misinformation flying in all directions, it might take some time before the real facts are known.

In the meantime, theories are swirling about how Russia managed to set 2,000 tanks and 20,000 servicemen in motion in just 48 hours and why, on the eve of the war, the South Ossetian government sent hundreds of children across the border to Russia and 48 Russian journalists were camped out in a Tskhinvali hotel.

"There is no question that Russia had planned its measures long before," Georgian Reintegration Minister Temur Iakobashvili said in a recent interview in Tbilisi.

Russia echoes the accusation, countering that Georgia had long-planned the military operation.

The country's top mediator in the conflict, ambassador-at-large Yury Popov, said in an interview Wednesday that he had witnessed Georgian forces mobilizing on Aug. 7, one day before he was to hold direct talks with Iakobashvili in Tskhinvali.

Popov said he was returning from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi late that evening when, near the village of Tkviavi -- a few kilometers south of Tskhinvali -- he encountered Georgian units moving heavy weaponry into the conflict zone.

"I saw artillery howitzers and rocket launchers," Popov said.

Meanwhile, one photojournalist said Russia, having brought dozens of journalists into the breakaway region several days before heavy fighting erupted, appeared well-aware that major violence was imminent.

Said Tsarnayev, a Chechen freelance photographer, said he and a colleague came to Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 for a nature shoot and was surprised to find the town teeming with reporters from Moscow.

"When we checked in to our hotel, there were 48 other journalists," Tsarnayev said by telephone from Grozny. "I did not expect such a number."

When he suggested to Mikhail Zheglov, his editor at state news agency RIA-Novosti, that he go to South Ossetia to take pictures two weeks earlier, Tsarnayev said the editor told him: "'You know Said, maybe it is too early. Wait a little.'"

A man who answered the phone Wednesday at RIA-Novosti said Zheglov was on vacation and could not be reached for comment Wednesday.

Journalists from national media outlets confirmed that they were in place in Tskhinvali when the fighting began but said Tsarnayev's suggestions of a conspiracy were ludicrous.

"This is not true," said Marina Perevozkina, a reporter with Nezavisimaya Gazeta who was staying at Tskhinvali's Hotel Alan at the same time as Tsarnayev.

Perevozkina said those following the events in Tskhinvali closely were aware of escalating tensions for some time and that it was by pure chance that she arrived a week earlier.

"I had asked back in July to go there but was not able to because our editor was traveling in the United States," Perevozkina said. "When [editor-in-chief Konstantin Remchukov] returned on Aug. 3, he immediately allowed me to travel. That is why I arrived just days before the war started."

Ruslan Gusarov, a North Caucasus correspondent for NTV television who covered events in Tskhinvali, also dismissed the suggestion that journalists knew anything in advance.

"We knew nothing," Gusarov said by telephone from the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala. "We decided to go to Tskhinvali as the situation heated up as any other professional news organization would. That is why I worked there a whole week before Aug 8."

Indeed, international media had noted a week earlier that the conflict was escalating. On Aug. 2, the South Ossetian government said sniper and mortar fire had killed six people in the region.

Some analysts said the simmering conflict received too little coverage in the West because the two sides trade gunfire almost every summer.

"The world only found out on Friday Aug. 8 [about the small arms attacks], while in Georgia it had been news for a week," said Mark Mullen, head of the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International Georgia.

This was convenient for Russia because Moscow could concentrate on, and even control, the "who started it" debate," Mullen said in an interview in Tbilisi.

"That debate is a 'he said/she said' between Tbilisi and Moscow, each of which can be casual with the truth," Mullen said.

Iakobashvili, the Georgian Reintegration Minister, said the South Ossetian authorities' decision to send hundreds of children to Russia the weekend before the war clearly showed that Moscow was planning a military campaign well in advance.

The South Ossetian leadership, however, said the decision was linked to the fatal shootings.

Statements by captured Russian soldiers also point to a premeditated Russian campaign, Iakobashvili said.

"The pilots we captured reported that they were mobilized days before Aug. 8," he said. "And you do not set 2,000 tanks and 20,000 men in motion within 48 hours. To launch an assault from sea, land and air -- as Russia did against Georgia -- requires serious preparation."

Tbilisi says it decided to attack after separatists opened fire on all Georgian checkpoints near Tskhinvali and after it received intelligence that 100 Russian armored vehicles and trucks were heading into South Ossetia through the Roksky Tunnel.

Popov, the lead Russian mediator, said the claim is false and that "absolutely no tanks" had passed through the tunnel by the time Georgia attacked. "I double checked it," he said.

Moscow, however, does not deny that it had amassed forces in the North Caucasus for military exercises in July.

Perevozkina said she saw these troops with her own eyes. In her article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Aug. 8 -- the day the war began -- she wrote that en route to Tskhinvali she saw columns of Russian military vehicles in North Ossetia moving along the road between the town of Alagir and the border post of Nizhny Zaramag.

"The military says it is continuing training exercises, but undoubtedly Russia is demonstrating its determination to protect its citizens in South Ossetia," Perevozkina wrote. "Even including an operation to enforce peace."

Stratfor, a private U.S.-based intelligence agency, has said Moscow was aware of a strong possibility that Georgian forces might attack. Russia responded by mobilizing equipment close to the border but refrained from crossing over so as not to jump the gun, Stratfor has said.

One might wonder why, if this were true, Russia would have abandoned its peacekeepers in Tskhinvali, where up to 20 of them were reportedly killed in the Georgian attack.

There is also confusion about last-ditch diplomatic efforts between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Iakobashvili has said he proposed talks with Popov in Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 but that the Russian mediator could not make it because of a flat tire.

Popov confirmed that a tire on his Chevrolet Suburban was punctured 10 kilometers outside of Gori as he was traveling to Tskhinvali that afternoon.

"It took 1 1/2 hours until a new car arrived, and I continued on only after 6 p.m.," Popov said.

Popov denied, however, that there had been an agreement to meet Iakobashvili that day. "We both went to Tskhinvali on separate schedules," he said.

Popov said three-way talks scheduled for Aug. 8 in Tskhinvali were canceled after Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced -- and subsequently broke -- a unilateral cease-fire.

"When I arrived [in Tbilisi] around midnight, the war had already started," Popov said.

Both sides have argued that the other consciously chose to escalate the conflict during the vacation season, when leaders for both countries were away.

The accusation cuts nicely both ways.

On Aug. 8, President Dmitry Medvedev was vacationing on the Volga, while Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was in Beijing for the opening of the summer Olympics.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has said he had planned to go to Italy and that Georgian Defense Minister David Kezerashvili was on vacation that day.

Events in the months leading up to the war, however, indicated both sides had embarked on a dangerous road long before August got hot.

Moscow had been stepping up political and military support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In April, Putin, then the president, ordered the government to establish closer trade, economic, social and scientific links with the two rebel regions.

The Kremlin also sent reinforcements to its peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and repaired a rail link to the Black Sea province, which Tbilisi says was used to transport military hardware in the breakaway region.

Georgia, meanwhile, sought to bolster its military with U.S. and Israeli aid and angered Moscow with its aspirations to join NATO.

It sent spy drones over the breakaway regions that were shot down by Russian jets.

Human rights activists have also accused Tbilisi of orchestrating an attack in May on two buses carrying Georgians from Abkhazia's Gali region. The busses were hit with grenades and gunfire in the village of Kurcha, and Georgia blamed Abkhaz separatists.

But members of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee said in a subsequent report that they had uncovered evidence that Georgia had staged the attack.

The writing was on the wall already in early May, when independent defense analyst Alexander Golts wrote in The Moscow Times: "Nobody wants war, but both sides are doing everything to spark a military conflict."

Citing the only thing relevant: "Moscow had been stepping up political and military support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In April, Putin, then the president, ordered the government to establish closer trade, economic, social and scientific links with the two rebel regions." - and? They increased their trade, does that mean they're going to invade? The US increased their trade with Kurdistan in 2003, does that mean that the US will invade Turkey? It does using Felgenhauer's logic! Merely increasing trade with a De Facto independent region, doesn't mean that you are going to invade the country next door. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:30, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Finally, no articles here, except Ad Hominems written by Pavel Felgenhauer, address my, and Gordon Hahn's initial point: that the "April 2008" claim by Felgenhauer is a conspiracy theory. No amount of irrelevant text that you post Xeeron, no amount of Ad Hominems that you quote, will change that fact. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:30, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Summing it up

I'd like to see the actual links to the ALR articles Xeeron, so that I can verify the dates. None of these comments, specifically address Pavel Felgenhauer's claim that "Russia started preparing for war after April, in order to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from entering NATO". When Hahn pointed out the silliness of Pavel Felgenhauer's argument, Pavel Felgenhauer turned into the Incredible Hulk and unleashed an Ad Hominem against Hahn involving Politkovskaya, and mocking Hahn for living in sunny California; and where does Pavel Felgenhauer report from? Is he a bold embedded reporter, giving us news from the frontline?

There are two sources here, that state that "Russia may have, or may not have started mobilizing" in April. That can be said about anything. "The Holocaust deniers may have, or may not have a claim." Furthermore, the articles seem to be published very early on, and express a general state of confusion. So in other words, the only article that directly addresses Pavel Felgenhauer's points is Hahn's, to which the only rebuttal is Felgenhauer's Ad Hominem, written in a manner unworthy of a peasant, much less a historian. Added with the rather sarcastic and untrustworthy tone towards Pavel Felgenhauer that is visible in most of the commentaries, and Pavel Felgenhauer's inability to respond with anything, other than a cheap Ad Hominem, I find that the deletion of Pavel Felgenhauer from this article benefits the article enourmously. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 03:33, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

As I said above, all are linked on the page you cited from already. Here is the exact link: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-2005-georgia.cfm --Xeeron (talk) 16:03, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

Here is what Pavel Felgenhauer is being quoted for: "Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian independent defense analyst with an academic degree in biology stated that "Russia's invasion of Georgia had been planned in advance, with the final political decision to complete the preparations and start war in August apparently having been made back in April."

Here is Hahn's brilliant rebuttal, especially this part: "Second, the entire Russian ‘plan’ would have been undone, if Saakashvili had agreed to sign the agreement proposed by Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to reject the use of force to resolve Georgia’s self-made‘frozen conflicts.’ It was Saakashvili’s willingness to use force that allowed him, if he indeed was, to be sucked into using force. This means that he was as complicit as the Russians were in the frozen conflict’s thaw and devolution into violence. Both sides were spoiling for a fight and to one extent or another were doing their best to bait the other side into flagrantly breaking the ceasefire by way of a major incursion. In other words, it is unclear who entrapped whom. As usual a certain ilk of ‘analyst’ is willing to entertain this possibility in relation to the Russian side; for that ilk the Russians are always entirely to blame, and the West and whomever the present administration has designated an ally are not."

In all of the arguments and counter-arguments that you posted I've seen three things: Reasonable discussion that's completely unrelated to the final decision being made in April, vague statements about April made in a sarcastic tone, and Felgenhauer showing his mastery of Ad Hominems and his complete disregard for facts. For instance, here is Felgenhauer's rebuttal to Hahn: "I am not a party to the discussions between Gordon Hahn and Col. Hamilton. Mr. Hahn's arguments do not seem to be serious, say, like the passage from his #180 JRL contribution: "Col. Hamilton claims that in the New York Times September 16 article regarding tapes purporting to sound Ossetian and Russian soldiers around the Roki Tunnel on Aug 7 ushering Russian forces into South Ossetia, are described in the article as "credible by U.S. intelligence sources." If these are the same sources that gave us the pipes from Nigeria and Iran's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program, I would suggest that we NOT form our Russia and Georgian policies or our view of the Ossetian war based on this interpretation of these tapes." In other words, Felgenhauer doesn't rebut Hahn's statement at all, but instead picks up another article from Hahn, that's used to discredit Hahn.

So why not use Felgenhauer's logic on Felgenhauer: if a previous article discredits you from being taken seriously, than how about Felgenhauer's article where Pavel Felgenhauer argues that "the 2008 South Ossetia War will be tough for Russia to win, during either winter or summer". Clearly we know that Russia did it with a fraction of their forces, did it in five to eight days, and took very few casualties. So according to Felgenhauer's logic of discrediting Hahn, Felgenhauer is himself discredited. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:40, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

T-80

Were they used in this war? The thing is, I was going over the ORBATs for both sides, in scrutinizing details, and I couldn't find a single T-80. Furthermore, the only article I found on the T-80, talked about "scores of low-slung T-80 tanks", but I'm damn certain no more than twenty, if any, were used, so that article cannot be accurate. (Scores means forty or more.) Are there any actual sources that the T-80 was used? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 07:56, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

Conclusive evidences

I propose to remove the following sentence from the Evening of 7 August section:

"However, no conclusive evidence has been presented by Georgia or its Western allies that Russia was invading the country before the Georgian attack (the Russians claim it was simply a routine logistics train or troop rotation, however the troop movement occured at night, which was prohibited by the agreements regulating the status of Russian peacekeepers) or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary, and the Georgian claim has received little support from Georgia's allies, the US and NATO."

The sentence adds nothing to the article, it is outdated and last but not least, it is false. There are currently 6 Russian and 1 Georgian sources cited after the previous sentence, confirming the move of Russian troops over the international Russian-Georgian border before the Georgian Army began its action in South Ossetia. Somebody can argue that the intercepted calls provided by Georgia aren't credible enough, but even Russia didn't put this evidence into question - Russia explained that the move was part of routine logistics or troop rotation, which of course wasn't supposed to happen during the night and just 2 months after the previous rotation took place (in May), as normally such rotations were agreed to happen every 6 months and in accordance with all sides (which didn't happen neither), etc.

As to the second part, you can refer to the last sentences of David J. Smith's chapter in The Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War in Georgia book (p.142):

"The bottom line is that Georgia reacted to Russia's escalation as any Western democracy would have done, using diplomatic means to lodge protests at every step. It sought the help of friends. It used international organizations. It became savvier about public relations. It put forward peace proposals for the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that should at least have been taken up as points of departure for negociations.

Really? What were these proposals? For Ossetians to pack up and leave? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

I guess that's what you learned from your credible Russian News in the U.S., but instead it is what the fascist Russian puppet Kokoity told to Georgians. Let me enlighten you a bit and show you what you've asked for - the Georgian proposals.

Here's one proposal of Saakashvili to Abkhazia, made on 28 March 2008:

• Free economic zone in Ochamchire and Gali;
• Abkhaz representation in all bodies of the Georgian central authorities;
• The position of vice-president of Georgia;
• The right to veto all those decisions by the central authorities which concern or will concern their constitutional status, as well as all important preconditions for saving and developing their culture, language and ethnicity.

Mind to tell me at least one autonomous entity in the world which has such privileges? Some of the Russian Republics probably?...

Here's another proposal of Misha made in a televised broadcast to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, on 29 April 2008:

"Today’s Georgia is offering you calm and protection, which you lack so much, Today’s Georgia is offering you life without gangs and criminal authorities; today’s Georgia is offering you life without corruption, wherein no one will ever be able to extort bribes from you, or shares from your businesses; today’s Georgia is offering you opportunities for free and legal business activities, wherein no one will be able to restrict your initiative; we are offering you much better healthcare and education systems; today’s Georgia is offering you real freedom of choice, wherein no one will force you to accept citizenship of this or that country and where you will not be arrested because you want to elect your country’s parliament and president; today’s Georgia is offering an open economy and borders, law and order."

There's an entire chapter in the book mentioned above called "The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War" by David Smith, which describes in detail what did Georgia before the war. Read it, you will learn interesting things you obviously don't know by now. Kouber (talk) 10:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Perhaps they just don't beleive Georgia anymore, or just detest it so much that they want not to hear anything about entering Georgia. Knowing some Abkhaz people, I'd say both statements are right. FeelSunny (talk) 12:57, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

The reality is that the August 2008 war was neither provoked nor a product of miscalculation. It was initiated and waged by Russia for well-articulated geopolitical reasons. Georgia behaved diplomatically - perhaps too long."

It wasn't a product of miscalculation? Oh boy. My turn to have fun: CNN, Newsweek, Washington Times, BBC, LA Times, Der Spiegel, Open Democracy, CFR, Haaretz, Reuters, Wired, CS Monitor, Japan Times, Telegraph, Times Online, CDI, Global Research, New York Times, Washington Post, antiwar.org, eurasianet.org, US News and World Report, http://www.google.com/#q=Saakashvili+miscalculation&hl=en&start=0&sa=N&fp=fd7d05ccb38cbf27 - I got tired after the first five pages, but they all say the same exact thing: "Saakasvhili miscalculated". Thank you for confirming that Svante Cornell is on crack. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

That is Smith's personal conclusion, yes, and since he made that conclusion based on well sourced evidences, that means that there are "conclusive evidences". Kouber (talk) 10:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Kouber, do you just skip arguments that you don't like? Look up. I've quoted several dozen sources, and I can quote more, to discredit Smith's personal conclusion. Seriously, you ignoring arguments that you don't like just won't fly here. Look up. Look at the two dozen sources saying that Smith was wrong. Even the UK said that Georgia miscalculated. Even CNN admitted it. That book is beyond dishonest journalism, it's just pure fiction! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 23:23, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

HW007, I am not skipping your arguments, but you need to face the fact that normally there is more than one point of view on some topics, and there are a lot of arguments standing behind those. LokiiT just raised the keyword here: "conclusive". How conclusive is something depends on the person making the conclusion, it is very relative term. For Smith, and dozens of professors, senators, and a big audience of ordinary people, there are conclusive evidences. Thus by stating that "no conclusive evidence has been presented", would mean that none of these people exist, which of course isn't true. That is one of the reasons behind my insistance to remove that sentence from our article. Kouber (talk) 14:34, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Conclusive evidence, is evidence that is widely accepted. Dozens of professors is not conclusive evidence. I can find dozens of professors who believe that the Earth is 6,000 years old. There are over a 1,000,000 professors. Dozens just doesn't cut it. As for Senators, again, maybe a fringe lobby group. There were also Senators congratulating Birthers or people believing that Obama wasn't born in the US. You're taking a miniscule sample of people, less then .1 percent, and arguing against the other 99.9% of the population. This isn't called "presenting another viewpoint". It's called "hiring a fringe group to promote one's political views that have been proven to be dead wrong". I mean come on, CNN and UK's government follow Russia's views on the war? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:45, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, would you please find me dozens of professors "who believe that the Earth is 6,000 years old"?... Or can you prove that 99.9% of the population believe the Russian version of events? Have you counted them? Was there an election held on the issue?... Oh I forgot, "Russia is a Great Power", so the rest of the population doesn't matter, it is important what the Russians think, right? But I'd agree even if you can find me 99.9% of the Russian population agreeing with your arguments. Have you seen this, for example? There it appears that 76% of the people who called, believe that Russia is responsible for the war, 82% - that there was no genocide, 81% - that Russia was the aggressor (and according to all international laws indeed Russia was the aggressor in this war)... It's good to back your words HW007, otherwise it would appear that you're loosing your time, my time and the time of many other wikipedians. Kouber (talk) 16:37, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Kouber - when you are arguing, always keep in mind what you are arguing about. The 99.9% argument was towards Saakasvhili committing a blunder. Yes, 99.9% of reports that I've read stated that Saakashvili committed a blunder. That's what the 99.9% number refers to. It's hilarious how you go all dramatic and forget what the actual argument was about. Try remembering next time. Even those who believe that Russia was the aggressor, also believe that Saakashvili committed a blunder. So indeed, if you change up the argument, my numbers to the changed argument won't work. CNN called Russia the aggressors and continues to do so. CNN is also still looking for WMDs in Iraq. However, even CNN confirmed that Saakashvili committed a blunder. Seriously, stop arguing. You're now changing my entire claim, and arguing that after you changed it, my claim won't work. Well duh! If you change the original claim, the changed claim won't work. Nor will it be my claim. And it's spelled losing, not loosing, as in Kouber is losing, so he must change what the actual argument was about, yet leave my numbers unchanged. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:19, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

HW007, the sentence in question isn't saying that "no conclusive evidence has been presented that Misha didn't commit a blunder", it is about "Russia invading the country" - we are discussing exactly that, so I guess you didn't get right my point. Kouber (talk) 09:00, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

That means that there is "conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country... and that the situation ... was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary", which means that the entire sentence is obsolete and thus useless. Kouber (talk) 17:12, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

My argument was that the source is extremely poor: "The reality is that the August 2008 war was neither provoked nor a product of miscalculation. It was initiated and waged by Russia for well-articulated geopolitical reasons. Georgia behaved diplomatically - perhaps too long." That's your source. I found conclusive evidence that the war was indeed a product of Saakashvili's miscalculation. Blunder = severe miscalculation. So that means that the entire sentence, the one that you are basing your arguments are, is obsolete, and thus, useless. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:30, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Here's a question: if Russia was so mean and evil, why didn't the Russians take Tbilisi? They had at the very least 4 to 1 odds. Aside from massive civilian casualties, I don't see anything stopping the Russians. Could it be, judging that Russia's attack destroyed 90% of Georgia's military infrastructure and under 5% of Georgia's civilian infrastructure, that Russia was merely responding to an attack and keeping civilian casualties low? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

The question is raised in the book too and it is well analysed, I am not going to copy/paste entire chapters for you. It is only $17, just get it. You can also refer to the sources, so you can judge for yourself whether to trust them or not. Kouber (talk) 10:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Already $17? Damn the price just keeps on dropping. FeelSunny - I told you it'd be 99 cents soon. Umm, Kouber - in America, we don't take John McCain seriously. Not after his statement of "100 years in Iraq". The book is crap, but it is currently setting a record, for a book that's rapidly dropping in price. It will be the fastest book to go from $70 to a buck, but I don't think that's a good thing. Anyways, if you have arguments, present them. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:45, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

I support removing the sentence. However, instead of sourcing this article with blatant propagandist fiction, such as the book you've mentioned, why don't wait for the EU commission to release their findings before we start implicating any one side? The report is due by the end of September, it isn't that long to wait.--98.232.98.144 (talk) 17:46, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Maybe get an actual username before making controversial edits? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Dear 98.232.98.144, please dont be scared away by HistoricWarrior. Seems he likes biting new editors, having a username is in no way a requirement for editing here. --Xeeron (talk) 10:04, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

No I have a habit of requiring people to actually debate controversial edits instead of placing them into the article. And having a username makes a debate that much easier. I do remember a certain user attacking a pro-Russian IP a few months ago, shall I get the link where you did so, Xeeron? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:24, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

I really don't see how "no conclusive evidence" would be obsolete info. It was confirmed by BBC again just a few weeks ago. And I'm not sure how that article in Cornell's book would have any effect on this. Speking of Cornell's book, it's interesting to take a look at the list of its writers. Illarionov, Felgenhauer, Paul Goble... Did Mr Cornell just order a chapter from each of the most fiercely anti-Russian authors out there? And to think of that this is the first and only book about the war that has come out yet. We must be seeing the anti-Russian lobby in action here. Offliner (talk) 18:31, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, our sentence says that "no conclusive evidence has been presented by Georgia or its Western allies". The point is that there are such evidences presented by both Georgia and by its Western allies. Cornell's book, for example, represents such a conclusive study. I.e. our article is raising the exceptional claim that something doesn't exist, while in reality it exists. I am not pretending whether it is right or wrong, good or bad, etc. but it exists. That's why I think the whole sentence needs removal.

The BBC article is about Georgian claims concerning Russian "premeditated" and "violent climax of policies pursued by Russia against Georgia over many years" and also the "large-scale Russian invasion". But we cite none of these claims in the article, hence the point that "the claim has received little support from Georgia's allies, the US and Nato" is a bit popped out of context. Our article says only that parts of 58th Russian Army moved to South Ossetia prior to the Georgian attack, which is not questioned even by Russia.

Btw, I've read the book that our dear Anonymous called "blatant propagandist fiction", and I'd recommend it to everybody. It contains well sourced information and analysis of why the war broke out, Russian-Georgian relations, Georgian history, European security in general, etc. and it isn't so biased, as you might probably think. Give it a try, before throwing it into one or another category. Kouber (talk) 19:37, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

The key word here is conclusive. There is no conclusive evidence. That is a fact not up for debate at this point. As far as this book cited goes, I don't think it deserves a chance when you consider who wrote it. It's not like these writers are unheard of. We know their opinions and their biases already. Why waist our time? That'd be like a libertarian recommending an Ayn Rand book to a socialist and saying "give it a chance, it's not as biased against socialism as you think!" Except this is even worse because it's about an ultimate truth (and the skewing thereof) rather than subjective philosophical and ideological differences.LokiiT (talk) 22:34, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, as I explained above, every fact in the book is sourced, so you can just check the source and judge it for yourself. The book is not introducing new facts, it is just gathering sourced evidences together. A conclusion is reached based on these evidences. Kouber (talk) 10:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Really? As poorly sourced as ISDP? Where it said "according to a well known Moscow military historian" but the historian was so well known that they didn't need to mention his name? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:24, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Hey, it's Kouber - how's your Army/Air Force doing? Same branch too right? I'm not anonymous, I have never signed off as anonymous. If you're going to call me out, have the guts to type my name. Also, Michael Moore has a bet going that if anyone can find a single incorrect fact in his movies, that person will get $10,000. That's $10,000 per fact. I wonder, is Mr. Svante Cornell up for the same deal? For every fact I find in that book, that any average person will admit is dead wrong, I get $10,000. If anyone is willing to take me up on that offer, I will throughoutly discredit the book. Any takers? Also, here's another funny thing: Georgians have outnumbered Russians in South Ossetia, yet in the ISDP paper Svante Cornell assures us all that the Russians are outnumbering Georgians two to one. Did Mr. Svante Cornell remove that fiction from the book? And in his analysis, did Mr. Svante Cornell discuss British Imperial Policy? Stalinization? Perhaps the 1920's Georgian-Ossetian War where there was actual genocide? Cause if he didn't, the book's a joke. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Here's another fun fact: Georgian History is intertwined with the history of the Caucasian Region much more so, than Georgia's history with Europe. And Georgia's a threat to European Security? No, no, wait, Russia's actions in Georgia is a threat to European Security, right? Because Russians are drinking Red Bull and getting wings, and doing a flank attack from Georgia to Europe, right? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Boys, discussions aside, I thought the sentence in question was from a reliable source? HW007 made 1001 example of other well reliable sources that say it was a miscalculation by the Georgian president. Do we have sources as reliable as those presented that say Russia attacked first and made Saakashvili start the defencive operation, as he claims? Kouber, do you have these sources? FeelSunny (talk) 07:29, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

The sentence is composed from reliable sources, yes, but it has nothing to do with the previous one, i.e. the sentence is denying that "Russia was invading the country", but the previous sentence isn't claiming that "Russia is invading the country", instead, it is just saying that "parts of 58th Army went to South Ossetia before the Georgian attack", which Russia didn't deny and which is confirmed by many non-Georgian sources! That is the point - the way it is now one can get easily confused. Furthermore, as I already explained, we use the part from the BBC article that "the Georgian claim has received little support". But which claim?... And why Georgian?... It seems completely out of context. It wouldn't be if we put a sentence descibing the Georgian claims before it, but I don't think we need to do that either. Kouber (talk) 10:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Previous sentence says just what Georgian president wants us to beleive, exactly this: According to Georgian intelligence[126] and several Russian sources, parts of 58th Russian Army moved to South Ossetian territory through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian attack. It is disproved by the next sentence, with sources. The logic is clear, and it follows sources' articles' logic. FeelSunny (talk) 12:51, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

That would mean that the Georgian president influenced a lot Russian medias, Russian soldiers and Sergey Bagapsh personally, which sounds ridiculous. Neither of the three sources used in the sentence do not disprove the move of parts of 58th Russian Army. That's the whole point - we do not present Georgian claims of "Russia invading the country", hence we don't need a sentence to disprove it. Why don't we put also a sentence saying that "no conslusive evidence has been presented that Russia used nuclear weapons" then?!... The sentence is trying to disprove something that is missing in our article, which can possibly confuse the readers.

Actually the Russian Media that claimed Parts of the 58th Army moved into South Ossetia turned out to be soldiers boasting and getting the date wrong. The exact quote was "the entire 58th Army moved into South Ossetia". Riiight. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:45, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Once again, even Russia didn't deny the move of its 58th Army. Russia explained that it is rotational move, and by doing so it confirmed that indeed the move occured. Kouber (talk) 14:12, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Umm, there's a difference between CIS approved Peacekeepers and Russian Infantry. The latter have those thingies called tanks. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:45, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

So, according to your logic, as long as the troops don't have tanks, they're considered peacekeepers? Nice logic HW007, but unfortunately you're (once again) wrong. The peacekeepers are agreed by international organisations and they're given a mandate, and last but not least their size is limited. The Sochi agreements specifically noted that each side (Russia, South Ossetia and Georgia) had the right of 500 peacekeepers present, but Kulakhmetov stated that "there're were 1700 peacekeepers present and they weren't enough". How many of the so called "peacekeepers without tanks" would be enough in your opinion HW007? Or just because "Russia is a great power" it wasn't expected to respect international agreements (and international borders)? Kouber (talk) 16:57, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Kouber, stop. Peacekeepers are those who have a legal mandate to be peacekeeping. For the retards who cannot tell peacekeepers apart from infantry, I have explained that infantry has tanks supporting, whereas peacekeepers do not. How anyone could have understood that differently, is beyond me, but you are clearly unique. Russia is expected to respect international agreements; any great power is expected to respect them. However being a small country doesn't give you the right to shell you citizens with Grads either. Also, newsflash: I'm not Kulakhmetov. Stop making stuff up about me. Stop telling others what my logic is, because you clearly don't get my logic. And stop going on your little neutralize HW007 mission. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:26, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

"Being a small country doesn't give you the right to shell you citizens with Grads", does that mean that "being a big country" grants you that right? Or does that deny the right to fight armed separatists on your territory?... It is strange how 50 000 civilians killed in Chechnya don't matter, but 162 killed (the majority of them being armed men) represent a legitimate reason to invade, occupy and cut to pieces another country... Kouber (talk) 09:00, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Umm, Kouber - if you actually read what I said earlier, "Russia is expected to respect international agreements" you wouldn't be asking those silly questions. Also, it was 350 killed, 162 civilians, the rest militia. And it's not just the 162 killed number. It's the fact that Saakashvili shelled Tskhinvali with Grads, and the casualties would have been much greater had Russia not intervened, the fact that Saakashvili attacked Russian peacekeepers without any provocation from the latter, and the fact that Saakashvili tried taking Roki Tunnel. Those facts are what gave Russia the right to launch a counter-attack. Your silly little claim Kouber of "I only murdered 162 men, women and children, but if I say most of them were military, even though that's not true, I can still go unpunished, right?" Reality doesn't work that way. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:29, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I don't know where you get this 350 killed number from. Bastrykin concluded that the total number of people killed is 162, but perhaps he's wrong, as Famous Wikipedian HistoricWarrior007 is better investigator than him.

350 was reported by the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 02:54, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Russia also shelled Tskhinvali with Grads, far more extensively than Georgia did, and performed aerial bombardments of the city for three consecutive days. Not to mention Iskander and Tochka-U. And yes, thanks to Russia's intervention 20000 people cannot return to their homes now and dozen of villages have been demolished... very humanitarian, bravo Russia.

That is so awesome! According to HRW, 15,000 civilians fled, as a result of Georgia's attack, but 20,000 cannot return. Bravo Russia - you just created 5,000 civilian refugees out of thin air! Interestingly enough, a UK report stated that 17,500 Georgians were in South Ossetia, and HRW stated that 15,000 fled. That leaves 2,500 Georgians in South Ossetia. I have no idea where you are getting the 20,000 number from. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 02:54, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

As to the Russian "innocent peacekeepers", you can refer to this. Oleg Galavanov corrected Ossetian artillery fire from his peacekeeping observation post for hours, before he was shot down. Russian peacekeepers were given orders to "not allow Georgians to enter the city", etc. etc. But you're right, there were no provocations at all, right!?... Kouber (talk) 09:10, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Not allowing Georgians to return is an issue that should be tried in courts, not decided by military force. There may have been provocations, but nothing came even close to a full scale attack that Saakashvili launched. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 02:54, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

There are Russian Sources confirming this? Oh right, that was the soldiers boasting that the entire 58th Army moved into South Ossetia. Too bad it doesn't adhere to reality. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:24, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, you can look at Vesti, for just an example. At 2:42 you can see Sergey Bagapsh explaining after the security council of Abkhazia (which took place on 7 August around 10 a.m.): "Я говорил с президентом Южной Осетии. Там сейчас более-менее стабилизировано. Туда вошел батальон Северо-Кавказского округа. Все вооруженные силы привести в боевую готовность". I guess you don't need a translation from Russian to understand it, do you? Kouber (talk) 14:12, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Was it a batallion of peacekeepers or regular army? According to Georgians, and this source, they saw peacekeepers: "Министерство иностранных дел Грузии обвиняет Россию, в "подстрекательстве сепаратистов" и предлагает убрать российских миротворцев." So Georgians saw peacekeepers, not army. Why do you beleive that "батальон Северо-Кавказского округа" Bagapsh spoke about were army, not peacekeepers? FeelSunny (talk) 17:47, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

No, Georgians didn't "saw peacekeepers", they were proposing (note the present continuous tense, please) to replace the Russian peacekeepers (or piecekeepers) with international ones for some time (from March), as they wanted to replace the JCC format with a more fair one. This sentence isn't related to Bagapsh' statement, but is representing the willing of Georgia concerning the format of the peacekeepers. Once again, Russia didn't deny its move, so my arguments still stay. Kouber (talk) 16:57, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Saying "our way or no way" doesn't exactly demonstrate Georgia's willingness. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:26, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

Even if what is published here is true, that was just a bravado talk. Just the talk of Bagapsh talking about talking to Kokoity. Statements of two civilians which were being heavily discredited by many people, including you Kober. Would you really buy that talk from the guys who said that 2000 Ossetians died in the first hours of the Georgian attack? Do you think that Russian military would keep these two highly corrupt officials in the loop? Are you claiming that Russian intelligence just let these guys spill sensitive information to the left and to the right? That is as far from being a conclusive evidence as you can get. In fact there is a term for such "evidence", in the courts it is called "hearsay".(Igny (talk) 19:26, 19 August 2009 (UTC))

To get back to the point: other than Kouber's peirsonal opinion, we have not been presented any reliable sources claiming there are proofs to the Georgian statements Russia was invading Georgia before Georgia invaded South Ossetia. But we have seen many reliable (international, respected, and to a large degree pro-Georgian, in general) sources, claiming Georgian president just went postal in August, 2008. That is actually the only result of all this discussion by now. The sentence in question has passed the test, I beleive. FeelSunny (talk) 20:36, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Once again (I guess I have to repeat it over and over again, until you finally pay some attention to it):

1. Russia didn't deny that information (that parts of 58th Army crossed the Roki tunnel early on the 7th) in any way, but instead confirmed them (indirectly), by stating that it is a routine logistics troop rotation.
2. None of the three sources ([1], [2], [3]) used to compose the sentence in question is denying this information in any way.
3. Nowhere in our article we don't state that Russia was invading the country. Then why should we put a sentence denying this, and not put a sentence denying Russian use of nuclear weapons for example, or any other non-existent claim?

Can you try to comment the points above, please? Thank you. Kouber (talk) 22:01, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

1. Russia did not deny the information Earth is flat, so what? Earth is flat or it's just Russia lies again, man? Seriously, how did Russia confirmed 58th army entering Georgia, Kouber? Where? Was it about peacekeepers rotation or army rotation? Can you give reliable sources that say parts of Russian 58th army were there and were undergoing any "routine rotation" on August 7th? Do you understand that what you say means that parts of 58th army were there for some time and nobody just saw them? Because you can only make rotation of an army which is already there?
2. None of three sources denies the information Earth is flat, so what? NYT claims: Newly available accounts by independent military observers of the beginning of the war between Georgia and Russia this summer call into question the longstanding Georgian assertion that it was acting defensively against separatist and Russian aggression. Etc., etc. This has nothing to do with what you call Russian 58th army invasion. They just say Georgia lies. And we just repeat they say Georgia lies, that simple. Do not start OR sessions on this, trying to dispute sources with your own words.
3. On Russia invading Georgia and why it is not there in the article: A year ago today, Russia's 58th Army crossed over Georgia's internationally recognised borders. Thus began what the evidence shows was a long-planned invasion aimed at toppling my government and increasing Moscow's control over our region. A year later, the results are not what the Kremlin expected. (published on 6 August, 2009) These words are not there just because nobody wants to kick this looser for fun once again here. But I may add this into the article, if it would make life easier for you. FeelSunny (talk) 07:55, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

I love how people are still pretending that Russia couldn't have taken Tbilisi if they wanted to. Or that Russia couldn't topple or take out Saakashvili. It's not like the Russians had four Iskander launchers in range of Saakashvili's exact location; oh wait, they did. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:31, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

1. As I already explained, peacekeepers rotations, according to the Sochi agreements, aren't expected to happen during the night, two months after the previous rotation took place and without informing everybody in advance. That means that those troops weren't legitimate peacekeepers, according to the signed agreements, which means that they weren't peacekeepers at all, if we agree on what the term peacekeepers mean.
2. These Georgian assertions have been put into question. That's all, we're still waiting for the EU investigation to give us more details. The thing is that those sources aren't denying the physical move of Russian troops, they're about responsibility issues and justifications of Georgian military actions.
3. I would be happier if our article becomes better and more consistent and there are no sentences composed by popping words out of their context. Either we have to add Georgian claims, and the sentence in question should follow as a denial, or we just have to remove the sentence. IMHO the latter would be better. After all we're trying to shorten the article, anyway. Kouber (talk) 09:00, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Peacekeeping rotations aren't expected to happen during the night? Source? Also, since the Georgian peacekeepers left, who were they supposed to inform? They saw Georgian peacekeepers leave, they saw Georgian civilians leaving, a rotation took place. And is there a limit on rotations in the Sochi Agreements? I.e. only one rotation every six months? And why didn't the OSCE report mention anything about Russia breaking the terms? Your claim sounds more like a conspiracy theory. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:29, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Once again, Russians peacekeepers do not have tanks supporting them. Russian infantry do. It's not that hard to tell the difference between the two. If Georgia felt that Russia was violating the peacekeeping terms, (although no western satellite data shows Russia violating said terms) then the proper response was to file a complaint with the United Nations, not launch a disastrous attack, get their butts kicked, and then make stuff up. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:29, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Can we remove sources that quote out of context too? Or editors that argue that ground troops really mean air force? This article isn't Saakashvili's mouthpiece. We don't add claims unless they're backed up by actual evidence. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:29, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I actually disagree, Kouber, with every of the three points you are trying to prove. But to save my time, may I just reply to the third one? I think we should add Micha's words then, if you want more consistent a paragraph. Because all this media war was, actually, about this Georgian president playing a little innocent girl for about a year now, crying about being invaded by a big bad bear. The result is that even his closest friends do not want to have much in common with the current Georgian government. So we may well insert all those hysteric statements of the first days after the blietzkrieg failed. And, yes, the NYT article in question is calling those Micha's accusations a bullshit. And, yes, it is a reliable source.FeelSunny (talk) 01:12, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

@HistoricWarrior007: You can refer to JCC Protocol #38, Annex #1 (8th page): "Peacekeepers rotations must happen not more frequently than once every 6 months (and once every 3 months for Georgian peacekeepers)... The rotation process must happen during 3 days, in the daylight, between 7 a.m. and 18 p.m... A rotation plan should be presented at least one month before it.". This planned rotation of Russian peacekeepers took place between 28 and 31 May 2008. Thus, the move of Russian troops at around 3:30 a.m. (during the night) on 7 August through an international border is illegal and cannot be considered a rotation, according to the agreement above. Georgian peacekeepers left the JPKF Headquarters at 2:42 p.m., or some 11 hours later, so Georgians were still present there when Russia moved its troops.

Also, there were many international reactions to Russian violations and provocative behaviour before the war, but Russia paid little attention to them.

Nobody's claiming that "ground troops really mean air force", so you can stop repeating it, thank you. The compound term "troops", however, could mean air forces. Kouber (talk) 15:26, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

I apologize Kouber, I will quote you as saying "troops could mean air forces" from now on. Also, that link is horrendous, it is edited in such a manner as to make Russia look like the bad guy. Oh wait, it's from the Georgian Government, that explains it. Also, illegal movements of peacekeepers still do not justify an invasion. You appeal that decision to the ICJ, you don't use your troops, then have said troops, and air forces, (since those are the same to you Kouber) whine about Russia being bad after you get your butts handed to you in combat. Did I get your "troops and air forces" quote correctly this time? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 05:25, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

What invasion are you talking about? South Ossetia is (and on 7 August 2008 was indisputably) part of Georgia. Georgia had the right to move its troops around its own territory, just like Russia had the right to do so. Do you call the massing of Russian troops in North Ossetia an invasion? No. Simply because North Ossetia is part of Russia. South Ossetia, however, isn't part of Russia, thus Russia hadn't the legitimate right to move its troops there. There's no such thing as "illegal movements of peacekeepers" - either the move is legal and the troops represent legitimate peacekeeprs, either it is illegal and these aren't peacekeepers.

Concerning the documents, the JCC protocols are scanned from the originals, with their signatures, etc. Here's a list with other peace format documents, in case you're interested. As to the document with international reactions, I can find you a dozen more if you like. There were a lot of diplomatic efforts made by the Georgian government and there were also international reactions to Russian provocations and military buildup. None of these, however, had any influence on Russia. Kouber (talk) 11:15, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

So you are saying that if people are part of your country De Jure, despite their De Facto independence, it's ok to shell them with missiles? Newsflash - reality's different. And those documents that are "scanned" from the originals, are heavily edited. I've read the original OSCE Report - it came out as pro-Russian. However after it was "scanned" by the Georgian government, as a result of said Pravda-style "scanning" it "magically" became pro-Georgian. I guess it must be Saakashvili's "magic scanner". HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:39, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

@FeelSunny: I don't see how inserting "hysteric statements" (such as "2000 being killed", "Georgia committing a genocide", "Tskhinvali not existing as a city no more", etc.) can improve the article. Neither I understand why do we need denial of statements that doesn't exist. However, if we put a denial of something we need to put that thing as well, otherwise it wouldn't make any sense and could possibly lead to confusion. Kouber (talk) 15:45, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

2000 being killed also came from CNN, as in "Russia invades Georgia. 2000 civilian casualties result". That's not just a Russian quote. And Tskhinvali was pounded during the war; keep in mind that the civilian population of Tskhinvali was most likely, under 10,000 when the Georgian attack came, so killing 1.64% (164 people) is still pretty damn bad. That's similar to what happened during the Siege of Leningrad and Nazi attacks. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 05:25, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Of course it is bad when poeple are dying. As to CNN, it was simply citing the lies of Churkin, which probably listened to the lies of Vyacheslav Kovalenko. The latter stated on 9 August 2008 that there're "at least 2000 killed" and that "the city of Tskhinvali doesn't exist no more" - "Города Цхинвали больше не существует. Его просто нет. Он уничтожен грузинскими военными". WTF?... You can refer to UNOSAT satellite pictures to see that the damage caused on surrounding Georgian villages is much bigger than the one caused on Tskhinvali, which once again puts the humanitarian justification of Russia into question. Kouber (talk) 11:15, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

CNN was simply citing the lies of Churkin? CNN is a pro-Russian source?! Kouber - how do you expect anyone to take you seriously after that comment? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 21:39, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

HistoricWarrior007, normally when Russian Ambassador makes a statement in the UN, especially when his country is invading another country, member of the UN, his statements are cited by the medias. CNN just cited Churkin: "Russia said at least 2,000 people have been killed in South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali". This lie didn't came from CNN, as CNN made it perfectly clear who made the claim - Russia.

That citation was made on August 11th, the one I quoted was made three days earlier, on August 8th. Either way, I expect journalists to actually do research, and realize, that if there are only 10,000 people in Tskhinvali, and the city wasn't captured, 20% of the civilian population cannot be killed off by an invading army, in a city that has fortifications, as that has never happened in history of warfare. I apologize for requiring journalists to actually do research, instead of blindly quoting Georgian/Russian sources. I will strive to become a mindless robot that cites Illarionov, Felgenhauer and Svante Cornell from now on. I am also known to be sarcastic. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 22:18, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Back on the topic. As you all guys insist on keeping the denial of a claim, I would feel free to insert the claim itself, in order to make the article consistent and not to confuse our readers, although I still believe that we need to reduce such claims-denials to a minimum. Thank you. Kouber (talk) 09:10, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Yes, we deny the inclusion of fiction in this article. We actually want valid facts, not fringe theories. This article is already a mouthpiece for parts of the fringe theories, such as Borisov's quote, which actually breaks WP:Fringe, or Svante Cornell's views. Your sources either come from Neocon or Neocon sponsored groups, or people who hate Putin and/or Russia. Our sources come from the rest of Planet Earth. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 22:18, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Wow, Putin must read your words HistoricWarrior007, I bet he doesn't know that the entire Planet Earth admires him (except some veeery bad neocon guys, of course). And, no, the fictitious claims made in this war indeed came primarily from his administration, not to mention that the Georgian-Ossetian relations started to worsen exactly after he came to power. A coincidence?... Yeah, right. Also, based on your continuous citing of Svante Cornell, which you desperately tried to disprove so poorly in the past, I believe you listened to my advice - to learn how to use dictionaries. Oh, let me guess - your new favourite word is "fringe", isn't it? Kouber (talk) 12:20, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

I never said "everybody loves Putin". My argument was that Neocon Propaganda, such as that written by Svante Cornell and Company is a fringe view. I have quoted, in earlier statements, many people who disagreed with Putin. For instance I've quoted the US Ambassador as saying "Russia had to respond but they went too far". I quoted Nicolas Sarkozy as speaking out against Putin "holding Saakashvili by the balls". That would've been a difficult task, hard to hold someone by such tiny handles. I've pointed out, or I think I might have, when MSNBC disagreed with Putin. I have accepted the fact that 150 million in property damage of civilian homes wasn't vital to victory, another anti-Putin fact.

What I disagree with are quotes of sheer stupidity. For instance Svante Cornell's claim that Russia won due to sheer numbers, whereas in reality Georgian forces in South Ossetia outnumber Russian forces, until the former were routed. With Svante Cornell's statement of how Russians have continuosly taken out Georgian homes, via continuos firing, which never took place. With Pavel Felgenhauer's statement that the war was planned in April, and no evidence offered. When I asked to see a pro-Russian source on Siegel's quote, I was told to "trust in the wisdom of the New York Times" - the newspaper that raised panic in the US via claiming that there are WMDs in Iraq and Saddam has ties to Al Qaeda. I repeatedly kept on asking for a primary source, and an edit-war ensued instead.

And than there's Svante Cornell's fiction, with the book's premise being that Saakashvili acted "too diplomatically for his own good" and statements that he "didn't commit a blunder". Riiight. Attacking a well prepared Russian Peacekeeping Force on De Facto Russian soil, with high quality Russian Army units standing on alert a few miles away, without leaving a single unit in reserve, is not a blunder? Or wait, I get it, that's a diplomatic action. It's called "agressive negotiations". When Georgia shoots civilians it's "to preserve territorrial integrity", when Russia shoots the military that's shooting said civilians, that's called "violation of international law".

Those are the sources I'm fed up with. It's bad for America, because now there's no superior pressure that the US can apply against Russia; the US Media that so many Russians trusted, has taken that trust and dumped it. Over what? What was the gain? It's sucks for the average Russian, because now, where does he/she go for news, to get another perspective? Not CNN, not Fox News, not Sky News, that's for sure. It sucks for the average American too, because we also lost trust in the media, at least regarding Russia. And the media knows it, that's why now Russia is only mentioned in passing, very briefly, and usually, negatively. It sucks for Obama, the man I voted for, (granted it wasn't a tough choice after McCain's 10,000 year in Iraq quote and Palin as a pick), but it sucks for Obama, because he needs Russia's support in Afghanistan, and it's waning. The US War in Afghanistan isn't "the boy who cried wolf" like the US War in Iraq is, but Russia might lose trust altogether. Not to mention that Medvedev is as good as it gets for the US, because any other leader, or a person who can take the presidency in Russia, is more Anti-US than Medvedev. BTW, his name is Medvedev, not Med, just an FYI for the ignorant ones.

But to Neocon media outlets, none of that matters. The media is the Neocons' last weapon. They need the Americans to be scared, so they'll be inventing new ways for Americans to be scared, and what better country to play bogeyman, than Russia, the ebil Empire that's coming back *insert evil music here*? It's the exact same scare propagated by the Neocons in terms of the War in Iraq, it's identical! With scared Americans you can invade other countries, neglect vital infrastructure, deregulate loans, and turn one's fellow countrymen into wage slaves. The thing that annoys me the most, is that the exact same outlets that mislead Americans to believe that WMDs are in Iraq, are doing it again, turning Russia into a ebil bogeyman. If you don't believe me, here's the peice by Felgenhauer about Iraq that I cited earlier, where the summary is: "If you don't invade Iraq or support the invasion, you are appeasing Hitler!" http://www.cdi.org/russia/244-4.cfm And in a similar manner, Svante Cornell uses scare tactics to goad the US into a Cold War with Russia: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/17/russia-georgia-obama Except Svante Cornell isn't so subtle about his scare tactics, he likes to hit it right on: "The [Russian] move served to kill the last remaining international organisation...stage provocations against its small neighbour with impunity...[Russia sought] to undermine western interests in Europe and Eurasia...The August war generated fear and horror across much of Europe, and pledges of aid and support to Georgia were swift to follow...Many scholars have now shown that Russia's invasion of Georgia was long in the planning (just like the many "intelligence reports" that showed WMDs in Iraq, the many "scholars" are not named)...there is little doubt Moscow provoked the conflict to bully its neighbours into submission...Simply put, Moscow has not finished its job. (A brazen lie, culminating fear provocations, so typical of Neocon tactics. Russia wants a stable Caucasian Region, not a destablized one, they're happy with the status quo and want to keep it. Considering the job of pacifying the Caucasian Region was accomplished, it's kinda hard to pretened that the job, that was accomplished, wasn't finished, but Neocons are Neocons.) Kill, stage provocations, undermine, fear and horror.

Those are wonderful adjectives to use. Let me try: "Svante Cornell wants to kill the relationship between the Russian and American armies in Afghanistan. With his anti-Russian articles, he calls on President Barack Obama to stage provacations against Russia, and to undermine the joint efforts against Al Qaeda. Svante Cornell's articles are written to spread a false sense of fear and horror against Russia, for fear that Russia might deprive his oil company of business, and horror that he might actually have to work for a living like the rest of us". How did I do? At least I was honest. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:14, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

I think we went too far off the topic. My initial proposal was to remove useless claim denials, not to include new things. That proposal, however, wasn't accepted so far.

Nevertheless, I propose you read the last book of Cornell. The words you're questioning concerning miscalculation are part of a conclusion of an entire chapter (by David J. Smith). The meaning of that sentence was not to deny Saakashvili's possible wrong decisions, but to point out the main reason for the war - Russian political decisions taken long before the war erupted. In another chapter (by another author) of the same book, for example, Saakashvili's actions are described as possibly foolish, but definitely not criminal, etc. The book is rich in different analysises and points of view.

I'd skip your de facto Russian soil and other fictitious fantasies without any comment. Kouber (talk) 14:08, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

It's not a fictitious comment. South Ossetia was always De Facto Russian soil, or at least parts of the country were. No one denies that, except you and a few others of similar analytical capabilities. As to the book, I'm reminded of a quote by Stephen Colbert: "Fox news always gives you two sides, the President's (George Bush's) and the Vice President's (Dick Cheney's)". It's similar to Cornell's book which gives similar analysis, ranging from Saakashvili's to Yushenko's. Shelling your own civilians with BM-21 Grad missiles is not criminal?! So if I'm the government of whereever it is that you live, I get to shell your house with rockets all day? And get away with it, as long as I brand you a rebel and have strong support? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 02:59, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Dear Colchicum

You claim that there is no way that Venezuela's recognition comes as a result of the war. I differ. When Russians recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Independent Republics, Medvedev was crystal clear that the main reason was Saakashvili's attack. So tell me Colchicum, do you honestly believe that had Russia not recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, miraculously Venezuela would? Venezuela's recognition stems from Russia's recognition, which is a direct result of the war. Had there been no war, there would be no Russian recognition. Had there been no Russian recognition, there would be no Venezuelan recognition. There's a clear and direct chain of events here, where one can say that, had there been no war, there would be no Venezuelan recognition. Hence Venezuelan recognition is a direct result, via a chain of direct events, that were all started by Saakashvili's failed attack on August 7, 2008. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:00, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

This may be Very Interesting, but your source doesn't support your claim and I am not interested in sharing our beliefs. Colchicum (talk) 08:36, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

Colchicum, please don't make us prove the obvious: unless Saakashvili started the war on August, 7, 2008, noone would have recognized SO and A by now. Please see the source that links the two. FeelSunny (talk) 09:25, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

It is as obvious that if not for August 1914, the history would be vastly different, so what? Is that a reason to pollute infoboxes with garbage? By the way, the source you guys use doesn't support your claim at all. Have you seen the edit you are defending? Well, let the facts speak for themselves. Also beware of looking ridiculous in advance with that "started the war" story, for the report is forthcoming. Colchicum (talk) 10:50, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

As to Xinhua, it doesn't link the two either. Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy on your part, not Xinhua's. Colchicum (talk) 10:57, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

Where are you going with the 1914 story? If you have 6 Empires, all wanting land, you are going to have a World War between them, sooner or later. I have stated two direct facts. Let's try this again: Fact #1: Russia recognized South Ossetia as a result of the 2008 South Ossetia War. Fact #2: Venezuela would not have recognized South Ossetia, had Russia not recognized South Ossetia. Legal inference: Venezuela recognized South Ossetia, as a result of Russia's actions. Why is this so complicated to follow? I mean you are asking me to prove that 2 + 2 = 2 * 2. Here, I'll do a timeline that's been accepted by everyone:

August 7, 2008: Saakashvili moves his troops into South Ossetia; August 16, 2008: 2008 South Ossetia War ends in a major victory for Russia; August 26, 2008: Russia recognizes South Ossetia's Independence; September 5, 2008: Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetia; September 10, 2009: Venezuela recognizes South Ossetia.

Now that timeline is accepted by everyone. Your claim Colchicum, states that the latter event in the timeline is unrelated to the two preceding events. Common sense argues otherwise. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 11:16, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

I must add that this direct chain of events seems completely logical to me and this source backs it up. Therefore, I agree with HistoricWarrior and FeelSunny. Colchicum, just re-examine this source and think about it, and you'll utimately come to the same logical conclusion. My regards, Laurinavicius (talk) 15:55, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

So if any other country recognizes South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in future they will be all piled up there? You can build up massive chain of events with that logic but infobox is not really a proper place to explain whole aftermath of conflict to every last detail. I dont see Kosovo's declaration of independence and 63 states that have recognized it in infobox of Kosovo War, although we could build very realistic chain of events there too.--Staberinde (talk) 12:54, 14 September 2009 (UTC)

Yes! I get to argue with 100% of the facts on my side! This never happened before! Will I win? Kosovo wasn't recognized as a result of the Kosovo War. It was recognized as a result of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, and recognized incorrectly, but I'll let the ICJ tackle that matter. If you'd actually bother to read the article on the Kosovo War, you'd notice that it ended on July 11th, 1999. The first recognition of Kosovo came from Afghanistan, a country deeply interested in the affairs of Europe, and under no influence from the Bush Administration, on February 18th, 2008. In addition there is no direct link between Kosovo War and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. South Ossetia declared independence in relation to the 1991-1992 South Ossetia War, but this call was ignored by the International Community, that deeply cared about the Caucasian Region and wasn't more interested in stealing Russian oil reserves, or those belonging to the five CIS Stans. Just as in the Kosovo War, there is no direct link between the 1991-1992 South Ossetia War, and the international recognition of South Ossetia. (The parts in italic are written in an extremely sarcastic tone.)

Now going back to the 2008 South Ossetia War; the result of the war was Russia's Recognition. Unlike the Kosovo War, or the 1991-1992 South Ossetia War, the result here was direct. Russia clearly stated that the recognition came as a result of Saakashvili's actions on August 7th and throughout the war. Venezuela stated that they are recognizing South Ossetia "jointly [with Russia and Nicaragua]". When you recognize a country jointly, that means you agree with the others' actions and reasoning, but you needed a bit more time to study the issue. A year isn't that much when it come to International Recognition; Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are still working out their differences over the Benes Decrees. Russia recognized South Ossetia as a result of the 2008 South Ossetia War. Venezuela agrees with Russia's reasoning. Thus Venezuela recognized South Ossetia as a result of the 2008 South Ossetia War. Ergo, the Kosovo War example fails, as there is no direct link. First you have the Kosovo War, then there's an attempt at compromise, with Thaci doing everything to kill that attempt, then, as a result of no compromise, Kosovo declares independence. In our case, independence was already declared. A war has already been fought, yet no International Recognition came. Then there was a war. Right after the war, as a direct result, there was International Recognition. Come on guys, this isn't rocket science! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:11, 14 September 2009 (UTC)

This is amusing. Well, I knew that using Kosovo as example may bring some ramble that mostly ignores my main point, but this even surpasses my expectations. My previous comment here consisted of 3 sentences, you gave 2 paragraph reply to last and least importnant one, while ignoring first 2 ones.--Staberinde (talk) 14:24, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

Umm, your first one was very silly. If 63 countries recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I'm sure we can have some form of regional grouping, or cite the most important ones, and link the rest to a newly created article. Your first point deals with technicalities; we are able to handle technical edits as Wikipedia editors. It's a lot easier to do Wiki-Programming, especially under the Wiki-Templates, than it is to come to an NPOV conclusion. Furthermore, I have clearly stated that the placement of the recognitions was valid, via a single direct link. There is no mass chain of events. Georgia moves troops into South Ossetia and loses, Russia recognizes South Ossetia as a result of the war and the war's victory, Venezuela recognizes South Ossetia as a result of South Ossetia's victory in the war and Russia's recognition.

The reason that you are able to produce no more than two-three sentences, is because 100% of the facts are on my side, which leaves you scrambling to find an irrelevant fact, question simple technical issues, and make comments without logic. Of course my comments will be longer, as it's very, very easy to write long comments, with 100% of the facts on your side. In addition, at this point, people are e-mailing me that they're reading the section for sheer amusement purposes, so I do put in a bit of, shall we say, fun. I mean you're linking an irrelevant war, a technical issue and a non existent, indirect chain of events. A direct chain of events is where, as a result of a single event, nothing but a supernatural act or that of supreme human error, could interrupt the chain. An indirect chain is where events can go either way. There's a huge difference of ten day recognition after the war, and ten year recognition after the war. There are such things as "joint recognition" - i.e. a recognition as a result of the initial recognition's justification that are directly linked, and "simple recognition" - where countries make the call, not for the same reason as the initial recognizing country, but for their own purposes.

Sure you could construct a chain of the Kosovo War, but had Howard Dean won the Democratic nomination, Kosovo would've gotten didly squat, whoopsie, there goes your chain. In our case, the link is direct. Once August 7th through August 16th occurred, the way they occurred, there is virtually nothing, save a supernatural event or a supreme and grave human error, (Bush launching nukes) that would prevent Russia from recognizing South Ossetia. Furthermore, had Russia not recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, no other country would. So yes, there's a single, direct link, which qualifies as the reason for the future recognitions being a direct result of the 2008 South Ossetia War, provided that recognition is done "jointly" with Russia's recognition, as Venezuela's was, and we have Chavez's quote on that! Sorry about the three paragraphs, that took me a whopping ten minutes to type. Straberinde, arguments are simple: first get more than zero percent of the facts on your side, then argue. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 03:50, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Adding onto what HistoricWarrior said, if that was your main point, Staberinde, it just goes to show how few facts and technical details support your argument. It just seems logical to arrange things in this sort of manner. Remember, resistance to logic is futile... My regards, Laurinavicius (talk) 21:17, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Reneem, Please Discuss Your Edits

First, Georgia didn't have 17,000 men. They had up to 17,000 men. The number is 12,000 to 16,000 men in South Ossetia and 1,000 men in Abkhazia. Second, titles are capitalized. Third, we do not talk about bombing runs in the Order of Battle. As I've argued earlier, the total number was up to 10,000 soldiers, and as such cannot be 11,700 soldiers. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 03:52, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

If you refuse to discuss your edits they will be undone. Also, we don't cite Wikipedia as proof. The Georgian soldiers were up to 16,000 in South Ossetia. The Russian soldiers were up to 10,000. The Ossetian soldiers were up to 3,000. We don't know the exact composition of the troops, because neither country has published that. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:23, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

Please bring sources for your edits

Re: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2008_South_Ossetia_war&diff=314480417&oldid=313933401

A ton of unsourced additions. Please add sources. --Xeeron (talk) 15:52, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

I think the information he is adding seems correct. The sources he seems to be using are elsewhere in the article. Looks like this user just doesn't know how to use inline citations. Offliner (talk) 19:31, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Well, it might be correct, or it might be taken from some unrelable webblog. The problem is that Reneem has been adding unsourced content for over a year now and he seems unable or unwilling to change. I hate undoing edits that could be legit, but if these edits stay and are forgotten, it becomes even harder to check whether they are legit. --Xeeron (talk) 20:34, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Reneem has been warned repeatedly. His edits aren't against NPOV, but they're unsourced, and that is his only problem. So at this point, I think anyone can remove them. Speaking of sources, September is almost up, what do we do with the EU-Commission? Bump it back again? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_South_Ossetia_war#EU_investigation_commission HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 23:16, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Guys, I'm not kidding. Once September expires, I'm deleting that section. I don't want the article to have outdated sources. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 10:04, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

What's the deal with this report? Is it coming out or not? Any news? LokiiT (talk) 19:05, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

It comes out on the last day of September. Offliner (talk) 19:16, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

I see, thanks for the quick response. LokiiT (talk) 19:19, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

=Before Placing Pictures, make sure they are ok to use!

Like Totally! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 01:16, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Reneem

Yes, I know there were 600 peacekeepers. There were also an addition 500 peacekeepers from the South Ossetian Force, making their number 3,000 total. But this information belongs in the Order of Battle, not in the infobox. And also 300 men from Battalions Vostok and Zapad fought. And 200 men from the 104th. And 1700 total from the 135th. But that information doesn't belong in the infobox. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 20:45, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

Permanent edit-warring

Guys, I've watched this as an uninvolved administrator from a distance now for several weeks. The editing situation in this article is absolutely unacceptable. For as long as I've been able to follow, more or less throughout this whole year, there has been hardly a single day where the same small group of editors has not been revert-warring against each other on this article. I strongly suggest you agree on something like an editing moratorium for a while and instead sit down together to work out why it is that this toxic situation persists, and what to do against it. If this doesn't soon improve radically, I am thinking to remove the lot of you from this article for good, on both sides of the issue. Fut.Perf. ☼ 09:02, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

As an uninvolved administrator watching the article, you may be interested in the discussion about the group of users, some of whom seem to be active in editwarring in this article. The case is now being investigated by the arbcom. possibly the discussion would help you to understand why the heat level in the article is quite high.FeelSunny (talk) 11:42, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

I am aware of that case, obviously. Fut.Perf. ☼ 11:45, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Yes, I recall your time here as an "uninvolved editor", trying to take away parts of the MDB from the analysis, using mysterious Wikipedia Policies, that later turned out not to exist. "Surprisingly", the parts you were trying to take away, just happened to be pro-Russian. Also, the current "edit-warring" in this article, compared to what it used to be, is laughable at best. In terms of Reneem, most of his edits get reverted, because he doesn't follow Wikipedia's etiquette, doesn't cite sources for the most part, and places what should be in the ORBAT only, in the general infobox. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 15:32, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, Fut.Perf., do I understand it right you're going to substitute Biophys et al. here while the arbcom is considering it's decision?FeelSunny (talk) 15:40, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Of course if that's the case, the irony here is quite superb! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 15:46, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

(ec) No, FeelSunny, I will not take up the role of Biophys et al. Unlike them, I have no intention of editing this article, and will work in a purely administrative capacity. Also, I am as neutral about this conflict as any you'll find on this project. My one brief moment of involvement here, several months ago, concerned a mere technical detail of formatting; that does not bar me from acting as an uninvolved administrator. However, that little episode did play its small role in forming my opinion about the overall toxic nature of the situation here, and the reaction of you two guys just now has done little to change this opinion. Frankly, I believe this article will only be able to breathe once the whole cast of its regular editors is removed from it. Do something to convince me of the opposite, because otherwise that's exactly what's going to happen quite soon. Fut.Perf. ☼ 16:05, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Judging by your previous edits, you cannot possibly be neutral on this issue. I have to get going, RL stuff, but I will get these edits later on. Suffice it to say, you thought that the Moscow Defense Brief offered was pro-Russian POV. So don't even bother making the "I'm neutral, here to stop the edit-wars" argument here. Also, there are no edit-wars at the moment, and the only possible one I see, is when the EU report comes out. Don't worry, I'll ensure that it's quoted verbatim. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 16:45, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Do I understand it right your last message means you intend to block me from editing this article together with a "whole cast of its regular editors" unless I convince you this article can breath with me editing it? If so, you can proceed with your administrator duties and rights and block me right away, if this is your intent. Please take into account that whatever decision you make, you make it on your own discretion, of course, and this message is in no way an expression of my wish to be blocked. Thanks, FeelSunny (talk) 16:22, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but I don't think threatening editors is the correct answer here. Many of us have been working hard to improve the article. Offliner (talk) 16:08, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

User:Nixeagle tried full-protecting the article once, but it didn't help. The reason for most of the edit warring has been that there are many different versions of truth, about who is to blame for the war, etc. The different version and the editors supporting them have been fighting each other in the article. On 31 September a major EU investigation about the controversial aspects of the war will be released, which I hope will stop most of this, since I think most of the editors here will accept its results. Offliner (talk) 16:03, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

• Comment: first off, there is no edit-war going on. Reverting Reneem is one thing that Xeeron and I agree upon. This isn't new, nor does this Constitute edit-warring. Reneem's edits aren't POVed, they are just done improperly, i.e. not per Wikipedia's rules; for instance placing information under the overall heading, vs. the subsection heading. Reneem isn't an experienced Wiki User; sometimes he vandalizes articles, but those are the result of Reneem's newbie mistakes, not his will to edit-war, or to vandalize Wikipedia. As an appropriate punishment, I have undone his edits, but haven't taken it up for further punishment, as that is unnecessary in my opinion. An edit-war usually result when a POV is in dispute, and two editors, or groups of editors, are going at it. The only thing here, is that instead of creating proper subsections, instead of using proper subsections, Reneem places it in the general infobox. That's not a blatant POV edit-war. In fact, there's no edit-war here. If anyone has actually been paying attention, the only thing that's "in dispute", is whether or not to include pictures of dead soldiers, a "dispute" that was decided earlier! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 18:17, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

• Comment: what I do find interesting, is that right after FeelSunny started commenting on the Eastern European Discussion group, an admin, who is part of said group, shows up here, and threatens FeelSunny in the interest of preventing a non-existent edit war. Said person never even edited the article, except to show his "breadth of knowledge" by claiming that Moscow Defense Brief is a pro-Russian POV. Said person also, miraculously happens to be on that list: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case/Eastern_European_mailing_list#Involved_parties. This looks like someone from a group, despite being busted, still hasn't learn their lesson, and continues with the cabal-like tactics, to drive editors, who dare to comment on what they perceive as injustice, from that discussion and from this article. I find this unacceptable. If this continues, another appeal to ArbCom is guaranteed. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 18:17, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

And this admin basically warns us all to leave his internets, or he would block everybody around. Cool.FeelSunny (talk) 20:16, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Stay away from my Internets! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfga4bFIUoc HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 01:56, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

If you think I was part of that e-mail list, you are mistaken: I am only listed as a party to that case because I incidentally helped bust the list. Fut.Perf. ☼ 06:59, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

So how does it change the nature of your threats on this page? Frankly, I do not understand your reasons behind this post about "removing" established editors in "casts" from the article. Unwelcoming attitude towards an admin that is on the mailing list, and still comes to this very controversial article (which has come to a very fragile peace in the last several months) and starts talking about some "situation in the article" that is being "unacceptable" (what is unacceptable? for whom? why? have you consulted the history page? have you compared it to the current "unacceptable" situation? what do you want to acheive by starting such a discussion?) - this unwelcoming attitude can hardly be a reason for threatening anyone. Not to say such threats would most probably not frighten anyone, and messages of such nature would most probably not make anyone more cooperative.FeelSunny (talk) 09:10, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

Are you still repeating that untruth about me being on that mailing list? I just told you I wasn't. And what is unacceptable about the situation here is the level of edit-warring, quite simple. I'm still in the process of trying to work out who bears the largest share of responsibility for it, but I note that the very editor who was so loudly claiming there was no edit-war here was busy continuing the same type of edit-war against the same opponents just on the neighbouring article only yesterday. Fut.Perf. ☼ 09:19, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

Ok, sorry, my bad English, I intended to say "a party in the mailing list case". On the "neighbouring article" - perhaps we can alter the wording and call the "neighbouring article" a "POV fork" instead? And perhaps removal of this POV fork was denied by the coordinated actions of the group of users in mailing list, which you are not in? Have you asked yourself these questions? Why do you not want to wait for the arbcom's decision on the group's activity before coming to a (possibly) affected article proposing strong measures? Yet one question - why do you need to come to this article with accusations, when the problem turns out to be in the "neighbouring" one? Again, is there an editwarring going on here right now? Please could you give recent examples? For you have come to the talkpage of the 2008 South Ossetia war, not the Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in South Ossetia. Your logic completely evades me, Future Perfect at Sunrise.FeelSunny (talk) 09:34, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

I want to emphasise Offliner's point above: The previous full block of the article did not help at all. And despite the high occurance of reverts, this article has been constantly and considerably improved over the last months. Most contentious points that were heavily reverted have since settled down in a version acceptable to both sides (let me point to [4], where the lastest "edit war" occured, which now seems to have found a stable version). Furthermore, if you compare the edits of "regular" editors with those of "non-regular" editors at this page, you will find that those by non-regular editors are as bad or at times worse in terms of NPOV. The main issue at hand is improving the civility of the talk page discussions such that the talk page becomes an avenue of improving the article again. --Xeeron (talk) 14:03, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

If I'm thinking of the same "small group of editors" that you're referring to, Future Perfect at Sunrise, I belive that you're sadly mistaken. Although disagreements do break out, as they usually do on such a controversial and fairly recent topic, this "small group of editors" has done a superb job of revamping this article over the past several months. There is little revert-warring occurring, and the only reason for the high revert count is due to the fact that Reenem's edits are often reverted, as they are done improperly and violate WIkipedia rules, as HistoricWarrior said earlier. And Xeeron is correct, in my opinion. "The main issue at hand is improving the civility of the talk page discussions such that the talk page becomes an avenue of improving the article again." Full page protections, blocking editors, etc. are unnecessary as there is little evidence that either revert- or edit-warring is occurring. My regards, Laurinavicius (talk) 21:19, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

I agree in part, and disagree in part. User:NixEagle was correct to block this page, twice, as it enabled a cool down period and better editing. However, I agree with Laurinavicius, that, unless people are part of a secret cabal or are being paid to edit Wikipedia, in groups, via certain special interests, there is no point in blocking users prior to going to ADR. As per civility, you have to realize that this is a heated article, where mistakes and harsh edits will be made, that's the nature of writing about a recent war that was improperly portrayed by the mass media, Russian as well as Western, although CNN, New York Times and Rupert Murdoch owned media get the gold by far, in that department. And the dumbest awards go out to Svante Cornell and Pavluysha Felgenhauer, who predicted that the war will be a tough one for Russia. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 06:13, 24 September 2009 (UTC)

I need to take back the part about the latest edit war I linked above, seems the direct quote is not the stable version yet. --Xeeron (talk) 01:48, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

The direct quote is an interpretation, that is being used, because you are pretending that Russia recognized South Ossetia, nor as a result of Georgia's attacked, but as a result of South Ossetia's inquiry to be recognized. When I asked you why the earlier inquiries were rejected, instead of answering the question, you hid behind a direct quote from a source that you like; however the source was an interpretation, not the original. You seriously think that, had there been no war, Russia would've still recognized South Ossetia? Because that's the argument you are making, hiding behind a quote. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 01:38, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

So let me get this straight. An administrator is threatening to block a group of users who are almost entirely responsible for the article in its current form, simply because of the unavoidable fact that the topic is controversial and there are parties on both sides who are adamant that the article stay neutral from their view? So what would you rather, one person or one group with coinciding views to edit it to their liking with no disruptions? Your logic is incomprehensible to me. There's no such thing as a neutral editor. It's important that there are disputes and arguments, as that's the only way neutral articles on controversial subjects can exist on wikipedia - compromise by both opposing sides.

The worst articles on wikipedia are those of controversial subjects in which like-minded editors have free reign. Have you actually taken a look at some of the articles the people on that mailing list edited that didn't get any opposition?LokiiT (talk) 15:40, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

Perhaps another "stellar" quote for Felgenhauer, the very person who Future Perfect's actions can bring into this article again, is in order: Now, the Russians are back in Afghanistan in force. "We never left," said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based military analyst. "Officially, Russia is not involved. Unofficially, it is". So perhaps someone can show me proof of Russia being in Afghanistan in 1997? 1996? 1995? Also, if Russia was involved in Afghanistan, even unofficially, it would be all over the press. Russia is just providing logistical support to US forces in Afghanistan, a fact that was all over the press. There may have been some arguments that Russian Special Forces might be in Afghanistan; but then again, I can make an argument that Russian Special Forces are in any country. Felgenhauer has not a centilla of evidence to back up his conspiracy theory.

Another quote, from Hahn, lest we forget: Felgenhauer’s reliance on the conspiracy theories surrounding the Chechen jihadists’ long-planned invasion of Dagestan in 1999 further undermine his interpretation. The Russian did not need to goad jihadists like Shamil Basaev and global jihadist and al Qaeda operative Khattab to attack Dagestan. The Chechen and foreign jihadists had been conspiring with Dagestan jihadists’ for well over a year to establish an Islamic jamaat/caliphate in several Dagestani villages and months before their attack were declaring their intention to do so. The same conspiratorial approach surrounds that period’s Moscow and Volgadonsk apartment bombings, for which both Basaev and Khattab took responsibility by acknowledging that Dagestanis had carried it out.

The Dagestan War was the trigger for the Second Chechen War. In order to pull the trigger, you actually need a gun, unless you're Pavel Felgenhauer. He can read Putin's mind and know that Putin will attack. The above-mentioned conspiracy theory was orchestrated by Boris Berezovsky, a notorious anti-Russia hack. Knowing full well that he cannot win an honest election in Russia, Berezovski suggested a Revolution, to bring his majesty to power. It is said that, in contrast to Russian entrepreneurs such as Vladimir Gusinsky, Berezovsky did not enrich any of the enterprises with which he became involved or took over (e.g. Sibneft, ORT, the car dealership Avtovaz, Omsk Oil Refinery, National Sports Fund, and aluminum smelters Bratsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Novokuznetsk), but instead drained them of cash. http://www.scribd.com/doc/13835442/The-Russian-Kleptocracy-and-Rise-of-International-Organized-Crime-by-Johanna-Granville

Clearly, users who use the talkpage to discredit such pests, must be banned from the article, so that the Moscow Defense Brief quotes get shortened, and the Felgenhauers are edited into the article. If you cannot beat them at honest debates on the talkpage, ban them. Good tactics, user:Future Perfect at Sunrise. But the rest of us would prefer to edit this page without interference, and if we need help, we will go to ADR first, that's been the consensus here, for over a year. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:33, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

Interesting link

Now that Xeeron was kind enough to offer us all the Jamestown Organization's side of the story, let's get the story of the actual people being present there, and not those critiquing form afar: http://cominf.org/en/archive/all/2008/8/8. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 01:40, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

Note on Roy Allison

I think it's interesting how he calls Russia's Operation "Coerce Georgia to Peace" whereas the real name was "Force Georgia to Peace". Interesting, and totally "NPOV" verb change there. And Roy Allison publishes books with a certain Svante Cornell. Also, he's the same guy who said something about Russia and US not cooperating on Afghanistan, and I've yet to find Reality backing up that assertion. Thoughts? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 19:21, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

No special thoughts, really. This thing is called variation of language, more precise - a lexical variation.

You can have a "charged" question, charged with a certain presupposition, like "Have you quit smoking so much when you're high on crack?" (double charged question here,I know:)).

There are also charged words. Another language level, same sh*t, basically:) You can say "separatists", or "insurgents", or "freedom fighters", or "extremist fanatics", or "mujaheddin". And every word will depict one and the same group. And each word here would have different presuppositions. Anyone would support "freedom fighters", but who would like to send Stingers to "extremist fanatics"? Guess when would the Western press cease calling mujaheddin "freedom fighters"?:) Right:))

There is enough information on how media use variation on Wikipedia. For example, one may start here, here, here, or here. FeelSunny (talk) 20:41, 30 September 2009 (UTC)

Shortening the intro

I propose we cut this from the intro:

The 1991–1992 South Ossetia War between Georgians and Ossetians had left most of South Ossetia under de-facto control of a Russian-backed internationally unrecognised regional government.[43][44] Some ethnic Georgian-inhabited parts remained under the control of Georgia. This mirrored the situation in Abkhazia after the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993). Already increasing tensions escalated during the summer months of 2008.

This is actually not about the 2008 SO war, and the intro is too large as it is. Plus, we have this information in the "prelude" section in the beginning of the article.FeelSunny (talk) 15:03, 30 September 2009 (UTC)

We need to summarize the background material in the lead as well. Maybe there is a shorter way to write all this, but for now I would leave that paragraph be. I don't think the intro itself is too large yet. But some parts of it are clumsy (especially the quoted paragraph) and should be rewritten eventually. Offliner (talk) 15:11, 30 September 2009 (UTC)