User:AlexandreAssatiani/sandbox

Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War
Part of 2006-2008 Georgia-Russia diplomatic crisis
Map of Georgia and its conflict zones prior to the Russo-Georgian war
Date March 6, 2008 (2008-03-06) - August 7, 2008 (2008-08-07) Location Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Result Russian invasion of Georgia
Belligerents
Georgia	Russia Abkhazia South Ossetia
Commanders and leaders
Mikheil Saakashvili Vano Merabishvili Davit Kezerashvili Davit Bakradze Eka Tkeshelashvili	Vladimir Putin Dmitry Medvedev Sergey Lavrov Anatoly Serdyukov Sergey Bagapsh Mirab Kishmaria Eduard Kokoity Vasily Lunev

• Abkhazia was the first point of tensions, before moving to SO suddenly in late July
• In the wake of Kosovo's independence and the Bucharest summit, preparations were made to invade by bringing in military infrastructure that would facilitate an invasion (Asmus)
• Events from June to August characterized as low-intensity war by some analysts per the IIFFMCG

Background

Russo-Georgian diplomatic tensions

• On 12 June 2008, American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski said that Russia was trying to gain control of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline by destabilizing the situation in Georgia.

GALLEOTI

• Plans to get handle the Saakashvili problem were drawn up as early as 2006 (125)
• From 2006, the North Caucasus Military District began staging increasingly elaborate and sizeable military exercises that it would turn out were both wargaming invasion and also a cover for the eventual troop build-up (125)

• Relations seriously deteriorated after the Russian embargo and the espionage controversy (Stent, 161)
• Putin later admitted that he ordered his General Staff to plan an invasion of Georgia following the 2006 spy scandal (Gachechiladze, 540)

BLUASHVILI

• Russia's reasons to start a war with Georgia (396)
  • Full control of South Ossetia by removing Georgian enclaves
  • Full control of Abkhazia, including full control of Gali and invasion of Kodori
  • Establishment of a "security zone" near Zugdidi, pushing the conflict line deeper into Georgian territory
  • Forcing Georgia into a Treaty of Non-Use of Force
  • Weakening of Saakashvili's presidency and strengthening of his domestic opposition by putting him under constant internal pressure
  • Ending Georgia's NATO integration dreams
• Georgia's reasons to start a war in South Ossetia (397)
  • Inspiration from the Palm Revolution
  • Inspiration from the Croatian Operation Whirlwind
    • The Croatian President told that to Saakashvili during the Bucharest Summit (Asmus, 143)
  • Forcing the world to pay attention to the South Caucasus conflicts
  • Conviction that Russia would not directly intervene, out of shift of focus or weakness
  • Realization that the next US administration would be less keen on supporting Georgia
  • Boosting Saakashvili's popularity

IIFFMCG I

• Under Putin's presidency, Russia became "more adamant in imposing its influence upon its 'near abroad'" (14)
• Despite noted attempts to have close relations, Putin and Saakashvili's relations became tense soon after the Rose Revolution, with the political climate deteriorating rapidly (14)
• "The strong pro-Western orientation of Georgia's foreign policy and President Saakashvili's energetic drive for Georgia to become a member of NATO added to Moscow's concerns" (15)
• "Saakashvili sought to find like-minded allies such as Kiev after the Orange Revolution, and to support together with them pro-Western orientation elsewhere in the extended string of countries ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black and Caspian Seas. As might have been expected, however, all this did not go down well with Russia and its new assertiveness in post-Soviet space." (15)
• There were reportedly 100 US military advisers in the Georgian armed forces when the war began and even more in the power structures and administration (15)
• Besides the strong pro-US orientation of the Saakashvili administration, there was also an increasing level of EU-Georgia cooperation, with Georgia seeking to become part of the EU and being included in the ENP in 2004 (16)

ASMUS

• The bilateral relations were described as "years of de facto cold war between Moscow and Tbilisi" by Asmus (37)
• One of the point of contentions between Russia and Georgia was Saakashvili's attempts to transform the South Caucasus into an independent energy corridor bringing Azeri and Central Asian energy resources to the West bypassing Russia (57)
• During the Saakashvili years, American money, advisers, and friends poured into Georgia to assist in his attempt to remake the country and Georgia became a major beneficiary of US aid and economic assistance (58)
• When the war began, a senior Russian official sat down with a former Clinton official about the goals of the war: (108)

IIFFMCG II

• Under Putin and Saakashvili, bilateral ties became 'the most precarious ever between the Russian Federation and a neighbouring state formerly belonging to the USSR (7)
• The divide over the separatist conflicts between Moscow and Tbilisi was so large that experts believed bilateral improvements could only be expected in other fields. (8)
  • Saakashvili's prioritization of the conflicts in his domestic agenda made improvements almost impossible (8)
• In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, Moscow's conditions for normalization were "renunciation of US and NATO orientation, recognition of Russia's special interest in Abkhazia and SO, allow Russian military intervention in Pankisi" (9)
• Tbilisi was seeking to replace the CIS with GUAM, including in peacekeeping (16)
• Spy scandal: On September 27, 2006, Georgia arrested four Tussian military officers accusing them of being members of an espionage network who's email goal was to prevent Georgia's integration into NATO (19-20)
  • This triggered an exchange of mutual accusations and marked a new low point in bilateral relations (20)
  • Led to trade and financial sanctions against Georgia and recall of its diplomats from TBilisi (20)
  • Instead of being expelled, the men were released and transferred to the custody of OSCE officials in theatrical circumstances (20)
  • Russia described the circumstances as "State terrorism accompanied by hostage-taking" (20)
• The expelling of Georgian diaspora members in cargo planes damaged Russia's international image, as it was seen that public officials were promoting xenophobia. (21)
• Xenophobia was met with public support for Georgia in Russia, with thousands of demonstrators gathering in Moscow to protest Russia's actions (21)
• On October 3, 2006, Russia cut air, land, sea, postak, and banking communications with Georgia (21)
  • Already in early 2006, it had banned wine, fruit, vegetables, and mineral water, causing significant damage to Georgia's economy (21-22)
• The Spy Affair ended when the Russian Ambassador returned to Tbilisi in January 2007, along with the lifting of some sanctions (22)
• Georgian authorities continuously accused Russia's long arm of reaching into domestic affairs and supporting opposition forces in the political crisis (22-23)
• In March 2007, Russian Mi-24 helicopters bombed the Kodori and Chkhalta Valleys and the Chuberi pass, denied by Russia. (24)
• In August 2007, there was an airstrike on Tsitelubani near SO (24)
• When reinaugurated, Saakashvili extended his "hand of partnership and cooperation to Russia" and invited Putin to visit Georgia. He said that the main regret of his first term was spoiled relations with Moscow (29)
  • Lavrov was sent to the inauguration despite expectations of a boycott (29)
  • Saakashvili and Putin met at the Novo-ogaryovo presidential residence and agreed to re-establish direct civilian air links, and talks for a joint control of borders on the Psou river and at the Roki Tunnel (29)
• Most experts believed that Georgia would not go to war for several reasons: NATO MAP required stability, the Georgian economy would not be able to sustain a protracted military operation, risk of losing support of the Western world (31)

Separatist conflicts

• On 26 February 2008, Belgium and Germany asked at NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan summit if Georgia was acting in "conciliatory" manner towards the separatists in contrast to Eastern Europe's full support for granting Membership Action Plan to Georgia.

• In 2006, Russia built a 2,500-man strong military base near Tskhinvali (Asatiani, 478)
• GACHECHILADZE believes that Russia was looking by 2008 for an opportunity to reassert its military dominance in the world and saw Saakashvili as a perfect excuse (Gachechiladze, 537)

GALLEOTTI

• Eduard Kokoity was fiercly anti-Georgian (125)
• A failed attempt to retake the region in 2004 left a legacy of bitterness and mutual suspicion (125)

BLUASHVILI

• Saakashvili was emboldened by the Palm Revolution and believed another show of force could bring South Ossetia into the fold (392)
• In September 2006, Vano Merabishvili told Rustavi 2 that Russia was "weaker than ever before" (392)
• Bluashvili believes that Saakashvili had been inspired by Croatia's 1991 Operation Whirlwind (393)
• Saakashvili announced already after the Palm Revolution that the South Ossetian issue would be solved like Adjara (393)
• Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili had several comments about military intervention in Tskhinvali, talked about plans, and said they would happen whether the West agreed or not (393-394)
• 17 July 2006: Parliament adopts non-binding resolution rejecting Russia as a peacekeeper (394)
• 28 November 2007: Saakashvili Tells IDPs they would spend the next winter in Abkhazia (394-395)
• The continuous militaristic statements from the Georgian leadership created distrust in the separatist leaderships (395)
• The defense budget of Georgia reached 1,3 billion in 2007 (395)
• For Russia, South Ossetia was strategically very important, as it was in the core of Georgia, just 40 km from Tbilisi (395-396)

IIFFMCG I

• The Sochi Agreement between Russia and Georgia of June 1992, signed by Shevardnadze and Yeltsin, established the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) for South Ossetia, made of one battalion of up to 500 officers each from Georgia, Russia, and Ossetia, to be commanded by a Russian officer. (14)
  • An OSCE mission was set up in December 1993 to assist conflicting parties reach a political settlement (14)
• The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement of May 1994 between Georgia and Abkhazia, later endorsed by the UNSC, created a CIS Peacekeeping Force (CIS PKF) made of up to 3,000 servicemen, although only Russia provided troops. (14)
• UNOMIG was set up in August 1993 to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreements for Abkhazia (14)
  • The UN SG's Special Representative was tasked with promoting a Georgian-Abkhaz peace process (14)
• In all of these cases, these structures were "largely under the influence of Russia, if not more directly, then at least by means of a vetoing position." (14)
• Military spending increased from 1 to 8% of the GDP in 2004-2008, and there were "few who did not see this as a message" (14-15)
• The Friends of the UN Secretary General (also known as the Group of Friends of Georgia) was made of the US, Russia, the UK, France, and Germany and was meant to provide political cooperation on the Abkhaz issue (16)
• Since 2001, the EU Commission became an observer of economic meetings in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in charge of implementing the Sochi Agreement (16)
• An EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus tasked with assisting with the settlement of conflicts was appointed in 2003 (16)
• The passportization policy of Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia violated international law and ran "against the principles of good neighborliness", constituting an "open challenge to Georgian sovereignty" (18)

ASMUS

• The Ugardanta military base outside of Java was supposed to have been disbanded after the end of the original conflict, but Russia renovated it completely in 2007, making it capable of holding and staging much larger forces too (23)
• Shootings between South Ossetians and Georgians were frequent in past years (25)
• At the end of the Abkhazia War, a security zone was established along the Enguri River, 12 km on both sides, added by another 12 km zone with where heavy weapons were also restricted (62)
• South Ossetia had become a safe haven for contraband coming through the Roki Tunnel (63-64)
• The UN and the OSCE (the West) agreed to let Russia be the only peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in agreements renewed every year until the war (65)
  • This was done mostly because of a lack of Western focus on the region
  • This was a heavily disandvantageous situation for Georgia (65)
• The Baden Plan of 2000 almost reached a peace deal between Georgia and South Ossetia, but the rise to power of strong separatist Kokoity in 2001 and his immediate dismissal of the Baden Plan put an end to settlement hopes (73)
• Both in Abkhazia and SO, entire ministries were handed over to Russian nationals (73)
• The massive expansion of passportization started in 2002 in both regions (73)
• Saakashvili made deep autonomy offers, almost semi-independence deals to the regions (76)
• Saakashvili sought to increase the UN and add the EU presence in the regions for peacekeeping (76-77)
• As soon as MS came to power and after Adjara, the two regions leaders increased their integration into Russia (78)
• Western powers were not too excited to support MS's initiatives for peace, including the internationalization of peacekeeping (79)
• Military plans to retake South Ossetia were abandoned by 2006, to instead focus on Abkhazia (80-81)
• Project Sanakoyev, including Georgian-controlled villages he administered (82-83)
• In June 2007, Bezhuashvili presented to Lavrov a peace plan for SO, including making Moscow a guarantor of peace, abandoning efforts to internationalize the peacekeeping mission, creating a special travel regime for S and N Ossetians, and major economic incentives. NATO integration was not discussed directly but "Gerogia could be open-minded" (83-84)
  • It was a comparison with the Treaty of Kars, granting Turkey a say in the administrative structure of Georgia (84)
    • The plan was killed soon after being leaked to Russian press and being immediately shot down by Kokoity (84)
• The red lines for Georgia over Abkhazia and armed conflict were: Russian recognition, large-scale ethnic cleansing of Georgians living in the conflict zone, systematic Russian military buildup that essentially amounted to annexation and rendered a negotiated and peaceful resolution impossible (146)

IIFFMCG II

• Since the passportization policy, there was an overwhelming feeling in Russia that locals with anti-georgian feelings had to be protected against Georgia (8)
• Though Russia's role was that of a peacekeeper and facilitator, and a member of the Group of Freidns, it had a clear bias in favor of the separatists. Tbilisi described Russia as "not peacekeeping, but keeping in pieces." (8)
• Shortly after the Rose Rev, Tbilisi sought to enforce more control over the conflict line, where a lot of smuggling was coming from. Tbilisi closed down the Ergneti Market, but also promised to reestablish South Ossetian autonomy, the first for a Georgian leader (13)
• Summer 2004 became a flash point. Turkish and Russian ships were banned from docking in Abkhazia, while armed confrontations took place near Tskhinvali. (13)
  • The August 2004 clash in Tskhinvali was the gravest conflict there since the end of the war in 1992 (13)
• In July 2005, Saakashvili proposed a new peace plan for SO: Substantial autonomy, three-stage settlement consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and political settlement. (14-15)
• In November 2006, as tensions began, South Ossetia held an independence referendum (15)
• In November 2006, South Ossetian elections reelected Kokoity but parallel elections elected Sanakoyev (15)
• In 2007, Tbilisi appointed Sanajoyev as Head of the provisional administration in Soth Ossetia based in Kurta (15)
  • Tbilisi sought to include Sanakoyev into international negotiating format, under the 2+2+2 format (Tbilisi-Moscow, EU-OSCE, Sanakoyev-Kokoity) (15)
• During the South Ossetian crisis in 2004, the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution rejecting Russia's role as a peacekeeper in the conflict, but rather as a party to the conflict (16)
• In October 2007, the Ganmukhuri incident involved a Russian unit trying to take control of a Georgian patriotic youth camp near Abkhazia (17)
  • As a result of that incident, the NSC authorized the MFA to double efforts to internationalize the peacekeeping efforts (17)
• The ICG characterized the EU's involvement in the region prior to 2008 as "working around the conflict", not "working on the conflict" (18)
• Russia promoted "progressive annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia" by integrating them into its economic, legal, and security space, though recent military conflict in Chechnya and avoiding confrontation with the West prevented Moscow from directly annexing (18-19)
• Passportization: In 2007, Russia paid Abkhazian residents 590 million rubles in the form of pensions and another 100 million in South Ossetia (19)
• First peace agreement in Abkhazia after the war was the Declaration of Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict of 4 April 1994 (78)
  • Followed by the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow under Russian and UN Mediatation on 14 May 1994. That agreement provided for the CIS PKF, the establishment of Security Zones and Restricted Weapons Zones on both sides of the ceasefire line, and defined the ceasefire line as the Inguri River, or ABL (78)
  • The Russian-controlled CIS PKF was deployed in the conflict zone in June 1994 and endorsed post factum by the UNSC (78)
  • In July 1994, the already existing UNOMIG was expanded to include 136 military observers and civilian staff following an agreement between Boutros Boutros Ghali and Boris Yeltsin (79)
  • Ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia: 300,000 IDPs and refugees, with an overwhelming majority staying in Georgia (79)
  • Russian support for Abkhazia prevented the establishment of friendly relations between Moscow and Tbilisi (80)
  • The Group of Friends was created in December 1993 (80)
  • The Bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Commission for Practical Issues was set up in August 1997 as a tool to address direct contacts and needs (80)
    • Abkhazia withdrew from the talks in January 2001 (88)
  • One of the main points of contentions in conflict resolution was the issue of IDPs, which the parties sought to address with the Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees (82)
  • But the lack of political will prevented any return of IDPs (82)
  • The position of UNSG Special Representative for Georgia was created in 1997 with a changed focus: instead of political settlement, focus on the return of IDPs, improvement of security conditions on the ground, and economic rehabilitation (84)
  • The CIS Council of Heads of State adopted a document introducing restrictions on contacts and cooperation between the CIS Member States and Abkhazia in January 1996, plunging Abkhazia into deeper economic crisis (85-86)
  • In May 1998, a new conflict in Gali forced another 30-40,000 IDPs to leave Abkhazia and though most returned by 1999, hopes for a rapid settlement ended (86)
  • The Boden paper (named after the new SRSG) was adopted by the Group of Friends in 2001 and was known as the Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. It was endorsed by the UNSC. It treated Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within the State of Georgia, while rejecting its right to secession and ruled out the possibility of unilateral changes to a future federal agreement. But in anticipation of the Paper, Abkhazia redeclared its independence in 1999 (87-88)
  • The 1999 Abkhazia declaration of independence, the 2001 withdrawal by Sokhumi of the BGACCPI, and its rejection of the Boden paper led to a deterioration of the situation on the ground and, eventually, the October 2001 conflict in Kodori, which killed nine UNOMIG staff (88)
  • To boost security, the UN implemented a Security Assessment Mission for the Galo region that helped to improve the overall security situation. That included international, Western-funded training of local police, international police force, confidence-building measures, and UNOMIG transportation to help individuals cross the ceasefire line (88)
  • The Second Geneva Process was launched in February 2003 with the guidance of the GoF (88)
    • In May 2006, the BGACCPI resumed its operations. (89)
  • In March 2003, the Sochi Process was launched by Shevardnadze and Putin to discuss the rehabilitation of the railway, to interconnect the South Caucasus through Abkhazia (89)
  • It seems that the return of the Kodori Valley into Georgian hands and the installation of the Abkhaz government in exile there caused a hard pause in all peace talks (89-90)
    • That would soon be followed by a demand by Georgia to remove the CIS PKF and tensions with Russia (90)
• The 24 June 1992 Sochi Agreement on Principles of a Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict provided for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of armed formations from the So conflict zone and the establishment of a Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) under the supervision of a Joint Control Commission made of NO, Russia, SO, and Georgia (93)
  • The agreement provided for the future return of IDPs and the free movement of people and goods (93-94)
  • The JPKF modus operandi was defined in June 1994, included Georgian, Russian, and NO battalions, and made Russia the commanding force (94)
  • The Joint Control Commission was created on October 31, 1994 to impelement the Sochi Agreement, and was to address different aspects of the conflict: political, military, economic, humanitarianm and others (94-95)
  • The four sides and the OSCE created an Experts Groups in a number of areas, including on the political issue, at a Vladikavkaz meeting on October 30, 1995 (95)
    • The first meeting of the Experts Group working on comprehensive settlement met in Vladikavkaz in February 1999. Ten further meetings would take place until 2003, including in Baden in 2000 (96)
  • The Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence Between the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict was adopted under the aegis of the OSCE on May 16, 1996 and required the sides to renounce the ise of force or political and economic pressure, granted amnesty to those who fought in the 1989-1992 war byt committed no war crimes, agreed to an investigation on war crimes, and envisaged punishment for those found guilty, agreed to the step by step removal of checkpoints and a reduction in the number of peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, and agreed to support civil society initiatives (95)
  • Three meetings took place between 1996-98 between Shevardnadze and chibirov (95)
  • It seems that the Kokoity election is what derailed hopes for peace talks (97)
  • The OSCE Mission to Georgia was approved by the CSCE Council of Senior Officials in November 1992, approved by Georgia in January 1993, and Tskhinvali in March 1993 (99)
  • In July 1999, the JCC agreed to let the European Commission attend JCC meetings on economic issues as an observer, giving the EC a seat around the negotiating table. Eventually, a Steering Committee on economic issues with EC as a full member was created (101)
  • In 2002, the EC and OSCE made a joint proposal to set up a Georgian-Ossetian Trade Control Centre at Didi Gupta but was never considered (101)
  • Though the Ergneti Market was widely viewed as a "confidence-building measures", it was also a prime point of smuggling, blossoming into a spontaneous quasi-free economic zone (103-104)
    • But Ergneti May have only prevented conflict resolution: some local officials making money from the status quo had a vested interest in avoiding settlement, prevented real discussions on the political status of the conflict by making the focus on the police's role, weakened international resolute for conflict settlement (104)
  • Georgia closed down the market in June 2004, which was viewed negatively by SO (104-105)
  • 31 May 2004: Tbilisi sets up police road blocks around Tskhinvali to prevent smuggling, prompting the Commander of the JPKF to demand their removal and Moscow to call it a provocative step (106)
  • Tbilisi engaged in a double-sided approach: increasing pressure and isolation on the separatist government in Tskhinvali while seeking to win favors in the civilian population through subsidy programs, pensions, health care, and television programs (107)
  • There was a militaristic rhetoric to Saakashvili over Tskhinvali (107-108)
  • The July-August 2004 tensions were ended with a ceasefire agreed by the JCC on August 13, 2004, signed by Zhvania and Kokoity (108)
  • 21 September 2004: MS presents "stage by stage settlement plan" for the SO conflict from the UNGA. Three steps to speed resolutions: confidence-building and the return of IDPs, demilitarization of the conflict aread, and offering the regions the broadest form of autonomy with international guarantees (109)
    • Negotiations were launched between Zhvania and Kokoity in Sochi under the mediation of Russia, NO and the OSCE (109)
  • Early 2005: New peace plan by MS during his PACE speech on January 26: broader autonomy than what NO is given by Russia, role in Georgia's central parliamentary, judicial, and government structures, establishment of free economic zones, special rights in education and culture, special law on property restitution for the victims of the 90-92 conflict, special commission to deal with unresoolved property disputes, special commission to deal with allegations of crimes against the population, implemented within a transitional 3 year conflict resolution period with international assistance and guarantees (109-110)
    • Though it was initially rejected by Tskhinvali, it was later endorsed by Russia and Tskhinvali in October 2005, just as Tbilisi started campaigning for a change in the peacekeeping format (111)
  • 10 July 2005: First Batumi International Conference, meant as a donors conference for SO. MS proposes to Tskhinvali "everything except independence". Tskhinvali rejected everything and refused to attend Batumi (110)
  • 11 October 2005: Parliament passed resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from SO if the performance of the peacekeeping forces did not improve before February 2006 (110)
  • 27 October 2005: PM Noghaideli presents an Action Plan on the next 15 months at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, welcomed by the US and EU, envisioning radical changes to the conflict resolution and management mechanism, including the JCC format, proposing a new framewhrok with the participation of the OSCE, EU, US, and Russia. It was dismissed immediately (110-111)
  • 12 December 2005: Kokoity presents his own peace plan, including also three stages: demilitarization, confidence-building and security guarantees; social and economic rehabilitation; political settlement. But the plan was meant to span over years or decades and was just a prolonged reiteration of the Saakashvili 2005 plan (112)
  • Result of ethnic cleansing in 90-92: 60,000 ethnic Ossetians forced to leave, 10,000 Georgians forced to leave. (113)
  • In May 2006, Georgian Parliament passed a bill envisioning an 18-member tripartite commission to hear the appeals submitted by victims of the conflict, with 6 seats to international organizations, 6 from Georgia, and 6 from SO. Rejected by Tskhinvali as a PR move (113)
  • In the summer of 2006, a series of explosions terrorized Tskhinvali, and the Georgian Parliament once again called for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers (114)
  • The Salvation Union of Ossetians, which organized the parallel elections of 2006, "clearly had the backing of Tbilisi" (115)
  • Tbilisi legitimized the Sanakoev administration by giving him control of all the former SO territories under Tbilisi's control (115)
  • Sanakoyev addressed the Georgian Parliament in Ossetian, stating that the Ossetian people's future was only in a democratic and stable Georgia, while Kokoity responded by threatening military action against Sanakoyev, resulting in a war of words between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi (116)
• The international legal option is for constitutional reform and political negotiations, not armed conflict (119)
• Ultimately, Georgia's efforts to weaken Russia's role in the conflict was because of clear bias toward the separatists (122)
• Tbilisi's own efforts like Sanakoyev and Kodori May have prevented conflict settlement (120-123)
  • So did Kosovo independence and the "virtually passive and non-innovative approach to the peace process adopted by the international community present in the area, in particular the UN" (124)

Kosovo independence

• On 14 February 2008, President of Russia Vladimir Putin declared that Russia had "homework" prepared in case of Kosovo's declaration of independence and would respond accordingly.
• Chairman of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov declared during a meeting with the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in February 2008 that Russia should "reshape its relations with self-proclaimed republics".
  • A session was called by Russia's Duma for 13 March to discuss the issue of recognition of the unrecognized republics in the former Soviet Union.

• "It was not simply that Saakashvili was personally committed to restoring Tbilisi's control over the rebel republics; it was also that there was a sense that the time to do so might be running out. The West's recognition of Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia in February 2008 infuriated the Russians, who regarded it as a dangerous precedent but also a naked bit of favouritism, given that Serbia was a Russian ally. In response, they began making noises to the effect that if the West could treat secessionist regions as real countries, then so could they. There was a sense that a formal recognition of Abkhazia and Sourh Ossetia - and with it, security guarantees - was just a matter of time. (Galeotti, 124-125)
• Putin's comments after Kosovo's independence: "This is a harmful and dangerous precedent... You can't observe one set of rules for Kosovo and another for Abkhazia and South Ossetia." (Stent, 124)

BLUASHVILI

• Back in 2006, NATO SecGen Javier Solana had warned the West that a recognition of Kosovo's independence could lead to unintended consequences for Georgia (390)
• At a CIS summit after the Kosovo recognition, Putin told Saakashvili, "You understand, I cannot leave the West without a response after Kosovo, and I'm sorry but you are understood as part of this response (390)
  • Saakashvili responded by warning that an Abkhazia/SO recognition could lead to stronger independence movements in the North Caucasus (390-391)
  • Saakashvili added that Georgia could be an excellent neighbor for Russia, all it took was political will by Moscow, to which Putin responded that all bilateral relations could be restored, but the territorial issues were a separate geopolitical problem related to Kosovo (391)
• Bluashvili believes that Western powers continuously told MS not to worry about Kosovo-Abkhazia parallels (391)

• GACHECHILADZE 2017
• At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin announced he would not allow Russia to lose any more of its periphery (537)
• The US and EU kept saying that Kosovo was a unique case, not a precedent (537)
  • Russia warned that it would lead to an assymetric response (537)

ASMUS

• The recognition of Kosovo "inadvertently contributed to the summer's slide to war in Georgia." The West "supported Kosovo's independence without any coordinated effort to contain any spillover from that step into the frozen conflicts in Georgia." (87)
• There was no preventive strategy under consideration, let alone in place on the ground or in the diplomatic corridors of the West, to shield Tbilisi from or to mitigate such consequences - except for weak diplomatic talking Points." (89)
• Asmus believes that one thing the US and EU should have done to mitigate the consequences was pushed for an expansion of the UN and OSCE missions on the ground to help control dynamics (89)
• Saakashvili was aiming for a final settlement of the Kosovo crisis with a mutual agreement of partition, something he would then use as a precedent to solve the Abkhazia conflict (100)
• The worse outcome for Georgia was a forced unilateral declaration of Tbilisi, which would lead to Tbilisi completely exposed to Russia's wrath and retaliation. That's what happened (104)
• Saakashvili wrote Bush and other Western leaders to keep Georgia and its vulnerabilities in mind as they worked for a solution on Kosovo (104)
• At the February 17, 2008 summit, Putin detailed how Russia would lift CIS Sanctions on Abkhazia and expand political and legal contacts with the two provinces, which launched the crisis (106)
• The Kosovo independence was followed by the Feb 17 summit and then on March 4 by the South Ossetian parliament's call on Russia to recognize its independence, followed by that of Abkhazia. (107-108)
• In private conversations, Putin threatened to transform Abkhazia into North Cyprus (142)

IIFFMCG II

• Those that recognized Kosovo argued a case of sui generis, which was rejected by some EU member states and Russia itself (26)
• Russia saw recognition as a precedent for unresolved frozen secessionist conflicts in the CIS space (26)
• Although Russia pressed the precedent on Georgia, not Moldova or Azerbaijan (26)
• When Montenegro already found independence in 2006, Russia's statement was: "Moscow respects the principle of territorial integrity, but it points out that South Ossetia’s right to self-determination is an equally respected principle in the world community" (27)
• The fact that Russia used the Kosovo precedent only related to Georgia and not other republics showed that it was part of a coercive pressure against Georgia (28)
• At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia strongly opposed separatism and assessed it with China as one of the "evil forces" challenging global security. (28)

Initial tensions (March-May)

Russian departure from Abkhazia Sanctions Treaty

• On 26 February 2008, the Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a note to Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russian ambassador to Georgia, because the 2008 Russian presidential election would be held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without Georgia's consent.
  • The Russian presidential election was held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in February 2008, long before the elections in Russia would be held, and the polling stations were opened in almost all settlements of South Ossetia.
  • According to Shota Malashkhia, the member of the Georgian parliament, ethnic Georgian population in Abkhazia's Gali District was coerced to vote in the Russian elections.
• On 6 March 2008, Russia cancelled Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sanctions imposed on Abkhazia in 1996, and declared them outdated.
  • Georgia's central government in Tbilisi protested the Russian decision.
  • The other CIS countries did not embrace cancellation of sanctions.
  • Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Georgian Labour Party, warned this Russian action would lead to the loss of Abkhazia for Georgia.
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia Dimitrij Rupel said foreign ministers of the European Union were concerned by this development, while Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that Russian economic ties with Abkhazia could lead to de facto annexation which was alarming.
  • European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner said that there was "a growing preoccupation and anxiety that Russia may be paving the way for recognition of Abkhazia," and declared the EU's support for Georgia's territorial integrity.
  • On 10 March 2008, first deputy head of the Committee on International Affairs of the Russian State Duma Leonid Slutsky said that Abkhazia "must be encouraged, including by the lifting of restrictions" for the fulfillment of obligations for solving the conflict.
  • On 11 March 2008, Georgian MPs were considering to demand 20 billion United States dollar from Moscow for the damages in Abkhazia.

• 29 February - 5 March: Abkahzia conducts military exercises involving tanks, small arms and mortar firings, including in the Ochamichira area close to the ceasefire line (IIFFMCG II, 201)

IIFFMCG III

• The withdrawal from the sanctions treaty is viewed by Georgia as the begining of the prelude to the conflict (18)

NATO Bucharest Summit

• On 1 April 2008, during his visit to Kiev, American president George W. Bush expressed his support for Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO.
  • Bush planned to meet Russian president Putin on 6 April in Sochi.
  • On 3 April 2008, the heads of state of Abkhazia and South Ossetia received a letter from Russian president Putin at the same time when the NATO summit was being held in Bucharest.
  • The letter called separatist leaders "presidents" and assured them of "practical, not declaratory" assistance from Russia.
  • On 8 April, the Russian Ministry of Justice informed its Georgian colleagues in a letter that Russian links with the two breakaway regions would be bolstered.
  • Journalist Petru Bogatu later wrote that after the Bucharest summit announced that the membership would be considered in December 2008, Russian diplomats and journalists attending the summit suggested that the war in the Caucasus before December was inevitable.[26]
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Russia would "do everything" to prevent Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership.
  • Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky said on 11 April that Russia would carry out "steps of a different nature" in addition to military action to block NATO membership of former Soviet republics.
  • Baluyevsky's statement was not seen as accidental by Russian media because he had never been known for making unsanctioned statements.
  • Members of the Georgian parliament saw Baluyevsky's statement as a threat of Russian military incursion into Georgia.
  • Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ODKB) Nikolay Bordyuzha said that ODKB would respond to NATO's enlargement.
  • First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergei Ivanov suggested that Russian industrial enterprises and the economy of Russia could be refocused on the needs of the war.
  • On 15 May, Yuri Baluyevsky urged the NATO at a session of NATO–Russia Council to stop arming Georgia. He said: "I do not exclude the possibility of a military conflict in Georgia."
• Georgian foreign minister Davit Bakradze said that NATO's promise to consider Georgia's possible accession in December 2008 contributed to Russia's aggressiveness: "this is the window of opportunity: to blow up Georgia in order not to make MAP in December possible.
• US Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar wrote that NATO's attempt to appease Russia by denying MAP to Georgia and Ukraine failed because in several days Moscow began to establish close ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to sabotage Saakashvili's peace plan on Abkhazia.
• On 3 May 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that "plans to pull Georgia into NATO" were to blame for Georgia's "inability to negotiate" on Abkhazia with Russia. He expressed hope that Georgia and "those capitals, which are pulling Georgia in the North Atlantic alliance" would not make "artificial problems in this very sensitive region."
• On 21 July 2008, Russian Newsweek published an article where a source with close links with the Kremlin was quoted as saying that the territorial problems of Georgia could be settled if pro-Russian government came to power in Georgia.
  • Russia viewed the tensions with Georgia as a part of Russia-America confrontation. Sources told Newsweek that the Russian overflight over South Ossetia in early July was sanctioned by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev after consultation with Vladimir Putin.
  • There were indications that Georgia would receive the status of NATO associate member in December 2008, and Russia understood that it was forced to settle the Georgian problem quickly.

BUSH

• Bush supported granting Ukraine and Georgia the MAP, but Sarkozy and Merkel opposed (430)
• Bush believed granting the MAP would protect Georgia from the Russian threat, but the Europeans believed it would draw NATO into a war with Russia (431)

GALLEOTI

• Tbilisi's eagerness [to join NATO] angered Moscow (124)
• Baluyevsky warned that Moscow would take steps to prevent Georgia from joining the alliance (124)
• Despite Secretary Rice's private warning, Georgia was convinced that in case of war, the US would assist Georgia (124)

STENT

• Within the US administration, both Gates and Rice were against granting Ukraine and Georgia the MAP, fearing Russian countermeasures (130)
• Bush and Cheney were hugely proponents of expanding NATO to the color revolution states (130)
• The Bucharest Summit was characterized as "the most contentious and dramatic NATO meeting ever" (130)
• Merkel was the one to propose a compromise that rejected the MAP but called for future membership in the communique (130)
  • This was analyzed as "the worst of both worlds" (130)

• The Russian information war was filled with propaganda against Georgia joining NATO (Panfilov, 76)

GACHECHILADZE 2017

• Though the US was strongly in favor of Georgia's NATO integration at the summit, France and Germany were the biggest opponents and did not want to risk relations with Russia (538)
• Putin went to Bucharest to express his strong disapproval of the summit's declaration (538)
• On April 4, Sarkozy and Merkel did a joint press conference talking about Georgia [see text on p. 538)
• There were some interpretations that not giving the MAP to Georgia was even "better" because it only sped up Georgia's integration (538)
• Gachechiladze believes that MAP or not, it did not change the situation because Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not apply to candidate countries (538)
• According to Gachechiladze, Russia started making direct plans for its invasion after Bucharest as it saw a moment of division and weakness in the West (538)

ASMUS

• The decision not to grant the MAP but to pledge future membership was a compromise (89-90)
• What looked good in theory and satisfied the divergent political needs of key NATO members elicited a very different reaction in Moscow. (90)
  • Putin saw a need to act soon to stop Georgia before the process gained momentum (90)
  • Like Kosovo, Bucharest helped trigger a series of Russian steps that led to war the following August (90)
• The February 17 summit between MS and Putin involved a big speech by Putin about why he feared Georgia's accession to NATO. Read full script (107)
• It was the division within the Alliance that Russia built on (112)
• Despite existing conflicts, Georgia was aiming for a MAP as a guarantee for stability, much like the Albania precedent in 1999 during the Kosovo War (117)
• Support for Georgia: US, UK, Canada, new members from Central and Eastern Europe, Denmark, a few smaller Western European states. Opponents were Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux (117-118)
• The US-Germany/France relations had been strained since the Iraq War (118)
• High-level US diplomats were also at odds with Bush himself over MAP for Georgia after the November 2007 crisis (124)
• In Februry 2008, in DC, Rice, Gates, and de Hoop Scheffer agreed privately that MAP was a bridge too far (124)
• Ultimately, it was Bush's side and uncompromising decision that won the Washington debate (125)
  • Bush saw in Ukraine and Georgia courage in being able to confront Russia to join the Western bloc and they should be rewarded for that (125)
• The Alliance's 27 members were evenly divided (125)
  • But many Eastern and Central European leaders continuously lobbied Bush for the MAP for Georgia (125)
• Bush had opened a back channel for negotiations over the MAP with Sarkozy and Merkel before the Summit through his NSC (126)
  • But ultimately, the SPD (inc. FM Steinmeier) forced Merkel to back out of any deal she could have reached with Bush (126)
• In March, Merkel publicly announced her opposition to the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia in Moscow (126)
• Bucharest became "the most dramatic NATO summit since the Madrid meeting in 1997, when the Alliance had debated enlargement's first round" (130)
• Critics say Washington never launched an all-out campaign to support the MAP (131)
• Opponents of the MAP: Germany (leader), Belgium, Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, and Turkey (131)
• Bush was closely backed by Poland and Romania (131)
• Lithuania, Romania, and Poland leaders were particularly disappointed with the compromise draft (132)
  • The three rejected the original compromise deal, which included MAP as "ultimate goal" (132-133)
  • It was their uncompromising attitude that forced Germany to agree to a new compromise that included promise for future membership (133-134)
• The summit was attended by Alexander Grushko, deputy FM of Russia, who did not attend the NAC where everything was decided (134)
• The next day when Putin arrived, he congratulated the SecGen for "standing up to the Americans" by not granting the MAP (135)
• The Bucharest outcome might have not only failed to deter Moscow, it might have emboldened it (138)
• The real issue, according to Asmus, was not the MAP or lackthereof. it was that the Bucharest Summit forced the Alliance to show publicly its cracks, which is what empowered Russia to then attack Georgia (138-139)
• Saakashvili was asked by Bush to put a positive spin on the summit (141)
• Merkel's primary objection to Georgia's MAP was the state of Georgian democracy, but Steinmeier was more concerned with Russia (141)

Russia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia diplomatic ties

• On 1 March 2008, Russian General Vasily Lunev, former Deputy Commander of Siberian Military District, was appointed as defence minister of South Ossetia.
  • After the August war, he suggested in an interview that he, as a military serviceman, obeyed the initiative of his superior to become the commander of the South Ossetian army.
• Abkhazia and South Ossetia both submitted formal requests for recognition of their independence to Russia, and international community by 7 March 2008. Both cited the precedent of the recognition of Kosovo
• Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, threatened that a move by Georgia to accede to NATO could increase the support for the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, arguing that exclusion of the separatist-controlled territories from the NATO referendum held in Georgia showed Georgia's intention to join NATO without them.
  • Vice-speaker of Russian parliament Leonid Slutsky said that "no decisions will be taken" in the parliament hearings on 13 March 2008, since Russia supported Georgia's territorial integrity and "will not suddenly change its position and announce the opposite."
  • Rogozin also said that Ukraine would also lose the eastern territories if it continued the pursuit of NATO membership.
  • Vladimir Socor observed: "At worst, no MAP decision could tempt Russia into testing whether Georgia had become fair game."
• On 13 March 2008, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of South Ossetia Tarzan Kokoity declared that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would become independent in 2008.
  • He stressed that Russia had already unofficially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia since long.
  • On 13 March, the Duma Committee for CIS, following a hearing on the unrecognized republics, recommended on a deepening of links with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.
  • Other recommendations included the establishment of diplomatic missions in the regions (with the foreign ministry to choose whether they would be consulates or another type of mission), a removal of import duties on goods created by businesses with Russian co-owners in the regions, and increased humanitarian and economic aid for the residents owning Russian passports.
  • The Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily described the hearing as "the launch of a procedure of recognition."
• On 21 March 2008, Russian State Duma adopted a resolution, in which it called on the President of Russia and the government to consider the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Alexey Ostrovsky, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, said that NATO could not accept Georgia until Georgia settled its territorial disputes.
  • Ostrovsky suggested in April that the Russian government had the right to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia's NATO membership was "forced".

• Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on 14 April that soon-to-be announced steps against NATO expansion included the establishment of direct official contacts with separatist authorities and a presidential decree had been prepared to this effect.
  • Konstantin Zatulin, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Russian Compatriots, said that the recognition should be postponed to December 2008 to avoid the sharp escalation with the West in the beginning of the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev.
  • However, he also said, "Now our steps towards the unrecognized republics will meet with understanding in the world as a response to the US recognition of Kosovo. If we do not solve the problem now, then it will remind of itself closer to the Olympics."
  • Russian expert on the Caucasus was concerned by the possible failure of the Georgian opposition: "If the decree is issued before the parliamentary elections in Georgia, this will have an extremely negative impact on the chances of the opposition to win."
  • Anonymous Russian diplomat, who had worked in Georgia, said that direct Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would prevent Georgia's NATO membership.
  • An anonymous Russian diplomat's words were interpreted as suggesting that de facto annexation was intended by the draft decree.
• On 15 April 2008, the embassy of South Ossetia was opened in Sukhumi, Abkhazia

• On 16 April 2008, Vladimir Putin announced that some separatist-authored documents would be accepted by Russia.
  • He said there would be partnership between Russia and separatists in some areas, also ordering his government to recognise entities registered under Abkhaz and South Ossetian laws.
  • The possibility of consular assistance for the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be considered.
  • This decision was linked to the push for Georgia to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan and, indirectly, the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.
  • United States Department of State official Sean McCormack said the US were studying Putin's order and the statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
  • Minister for Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was very close to the recognition.
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Ossetia Murat Jioev commented: "This is the actual implementation of all methods that the President of the Russian Federation mentioned, saying that they would not repeat the Kosovo option, and Russia has its own preparations."
  • Russian ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko said that there was no conflict between Georgia and Russia regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[36]
  • President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity approved Putin's decision, saying that it was "the only right solution to save the lives of Russian citizens."[37]
  • Rallies were held in Abkhazia on 6 May to thank Vladimir Putin for his support for Abkhazia.[38]
• Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia David Bakradze said Russian decree to establish ties with the separatis regions was a "legalisation of the de facto annexation process" and Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged Russia to annul the move.[33]
  • Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt said: "Georgia's territorial integrity contributes to the stability of the wider Caucasus region."
  • He also noted that Putin's decree followed Georgian's announcement of a new peace plan on Abkhazia.[39]
  • 25 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a declaration stating that Russian peacekeepers were "not neutral but are a party to the conflicts" and the United Nations forces should be deployed in their stead.[40][41]
  • The European Union issued a statement expressing concern and calling on Russia "not to implement" the decision to establish ties with the breakaway regions.
  • On 18 April 2008, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed her concerns over Putin's decree with her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov during their phone talk held at her initiative.[42][43]
  • US presidential candidate John McCain said that Russia's aim was "de facto annexation".[44]
  • Ukraine,[45] President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, Chairman of the OSCE Alexander Stubb, US envoy to the OSCE Julie Finley, Special Representative of the United Kingdom Brian Fall and members of the European Parliament also condemned the Russian move.[46]
  • Direct contacts between Russia and Abkhazia on the relocation of Russian citizens from Abkhaz jails raised concern from Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis since the dealings were done without seeking the permission of the Georgian government.[47]
• On 22 April 2008, Vadim Gustov, member of the Federation Council of Russia, said that the Federation Council would not adopt a resolution recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia because the Russian peacekeeping mandate would be terminated.[48]
  • The next day, the Federation Council postponed the consideration of the recognition.[49]
• Robert Parsons suggested on 13 May that Russia was provoking Georgia "into hasty action." He concluded, "a war between Georgia and Russia would be a disaster. Yet it is a measure of Russia's ambition, and of western diffidence, that such an outcome is becoming conceivable."
• Russia's state-owned Gazprom was reported to be planning oil and gas survey in Abkhazia beginning 1 July 2008.
• In addition, Abkhazia said international airline flights from Russia could use Sukhumi airport though the International Civil Aviation Organization had said such flights would be inadmissible.[54]
• Officials from Gazprom said Gazprom did not plan oil exploration in Abkhazia, but did say there was a proposal being considered to build a gas pipeline to Abkhazia.[55]
• Responding to Russian media reports that sea links between Sochi in Russia and Gagra in Abkhazia would be resumed, Georgia threatened to complain to international marine organizations over the use of "illegal" routes.
• On 26 June 2008, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev officially received Sergei Bagapsh as president of Abkhazia in Moscow.[132][133] Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze expressed his concern over the meeting, saying that such actions were contrary to the resolutions of the UN Security Council.[134] The Russian Foreign Ministry said they were surprised at the Georgian reaction.
• Carl Bildt, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Russia's 16 April decision was the culmination of annexation of Abkhazia.

• April 16 decree a "flagrant violation of Georgia's sovereignty" (Asatiani, 478)

ASMUS

• All security decisions in South Ossetia were decided by Russian officers (27)
• A dozen key members of the separatist government were Russians (27)
  • Including the PM, the MOD, and the MIA, and the Head of the NSC (27)
  • The Kremlin had a "direct line" with Kokoity's office (27)
  • "The only question was who in Russia was actually calling the shots" (27)
• On March 13, the Russian Duma met in a closed session to discuss a report on Abkhaz and SO independence (108)
• On March 21, it adopted a special resolution endorsing their requests for independence. (108)
• On April 14, an anonymous Russian diplomat told the Nezvasimaya Gazeta that Moscow should recognize the independence of Abkhazia and SO in case of war (108)
• Moscow's response to Kosovo started on March 6, followed by March 21, April 3 (146)

IIFFMCG II

• On top of the passportization and creeping annexation policies, the separatist governments and security forces were largely manned by Russian officials. Including former civilian and military leaders in key posts in both regions, especially South Ossetia. Included Abkhaz MOD Sultan Sosnaliev, South Ossetian MOD Anatoly Barankevoch, Abkhaz General Staff Chief Gennadi Zaystev. (19)
• Julia Latynina, a Russian journalist, described the power elite in So as a joint business venture between KGB generals and Ossetian entrepreneurs using money allocated by Moscow for the fight against Georgia (19)
• Shamba statement following the April 16 decree: "We can see the ribbon at the finish line on the road to our recognition. And we’ll cut that ribbon. We’re not afraid of any backlash from Tbilisi. We’re prepared for the fact that the situation in the conflict zone will heat up; Georgia may instigate that" (28)

IIFFMCG III

• 21 March: Duma passes declaration calling upon the Russian government to actively defend the rights of Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to discuss the recognition of the independence of these breakaway territories. This is viewed by Georgia as an early step in the prelude to the war (18)
• 3 April: Putin sends a letter to Baghapsh and Kokoity mentioning Georgia's integration into NATO would have negative implications and henceforth Russia's support of Abkhazia and SO would bear a substantive and not a declarative character (18)
• 16 April: Putin issues a decree instructing the Russian government to establish direct relations with the Abkhaz and SO authorities (18)

Georgian drone program

• The intensification of air activities over the conflict zone, including by UAVs and fighter jets was one of the first start of tensions that looked like it could lead to an open conflict (IIFFMCG I, 18-19)

IIFFMCG II

• UNOMIG noted five Georgian UAVs and two Su-25 military fighter jets over Abkhazian territory from March 18 to May 12, in violation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement (200)
  • Georgia argued that the drones were necessary to monitor Russian military reinforcements in Abkhazia. Sokhumi argued the drone flights were done in preparation of a Georgian military operation (200)
  • Both Tbilisi and Moscow violated the ceasefire agreement (200)
  • The Russian air force involvement was not part of the CIS PKF (200)
  • Drones were also flown over the Kodori Valley (both sides of the river, therefore under both sides' control), but no side admitted to flying them (200-201)
  • In mid-April, Abkhazia complained about the buildup of Georgian forces along the ceasefire line, although a UNOMIG investigation denied any such build-up (201)
• The air surveillance, in addition to the participation in exchanges of fire in SO later, and the comprehensive military build up with the assistance of third parties such as the US, including the acquisition of modern weaponry, have been described as a threat of force (233)
• The report established that the exercises, Russia's warnings of permanent loss of the territories for NATO membership, warnings that Moscow was prepared to use military force, warplanes flying over Abkhazia and SO, the shooting down of the drone, the increase of the troop level in Abkhazia and the dispatching of railway troops, also constituted a threat of force illegal (234)

Russian military buildup in Abkhazia

• On 17 April 2008, President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh warned that Abkhazia would deploy its armed forces in Gali District, Abkhazia and the Kodori Valley if Georgia did not withdraw its armed forces from Zugdidi Municipality and the upper Kodori Valley.
• On 26 April 2008, Valery Kenyaikin, Special Representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the development of relations with the CIS countries, said that the conflict between Georgia and Russia could escalate into a military confrontation because Russia was ready to defend the interests of the Russian citizens in the breakaway regions.
  • High-ranking European source told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Russian escalation could force some European countries to change their position and support Georgia's accelerated membership of NATO.
  • In response to Kenyaikin's statement, Georgian foreign minister David Bakradze was planning to appeal to NATO for help. Russian foreign ministry official said that Russian peacekeepers would not leave Abkhazia without Abkhazia's consent and they would only leave Georgia proper on the other side of Enguri river
• On 29 April, the Russian government said that Georgia was assembling 1,500 military troops and police in the upper Kodori Gorge area and was planning to attack Abkhazia
  • President Saakashvili, in his televised address, pledged to pursue only a peaceful line in the conflict areas and called upon the Abkhaz and Ossetians to unite with Georgia in defying attempts by "outrageous and irresponsible" external actor to provoke bloodshed
  • Russia announced it would boost its military in the region and Russian foreign minister Lavrov threatened to "retaliate" militarily against Georgia
  • Prime Minister of Georgia Lado Gurgenidze said Georgia would treat any additional troops in Abkhazia as aggressors.
  • The European Union called on Russia to refrain from taking rash measures
  • Carl Bildt commented on the developments in Abkhazia that Russia was provoking the war in Georgia.[80]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated on 30 April that Russian armored vehicles, heavy artillery and additional military force had crossed the state border on the Psou River without Georgia's consent.[81]
  • NATO official James Appathurai said Russia "increased tensions and undermined Georgia's territorial integrity."[82]

• On 29 April 2008, residents of Moscow noticed that new Russian tanks marched on Leningradsky Avenue and one of the tanks had the inscription "On Tbilisi".
  • Russian blogger commented: "The war between Russia and Georgia is more real than ever."[83][84]
  • Russian Cossacks and North Caucasian volunteers declared their readiness to fight Georgia in the case of a renewed confrontation in Abkhazia.[85]
  • Ataman of Don Cossacks Viktor Vodolatsky declared on 30 April that Cossacks were ready to defend the population of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea.[86]
  • Movladi Udugov stated on 3 May that Emir of the Imarat Kavkaz Dokka Umarov had authorized the establishment of the special group for monitoring the Russo-Georgian tensions and the Russian military deployments in the North Caucasus and gathering of intelligence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 2 months ago.[87]

• In early May, anonymous Russian official stated that Georgia had prepared a plan of the war against Abkhazia with help from foreign advisors and the foreign embassies were preparing to evacuate from Tbilisi.
  • The Georgian foreign ministry ridiculed this assertion.[88]
  • Minister for Defence of Abkhazia said, "If they [Georgians] invade us, we need two days to defend ourselves, and after two days we will reach Kutaisi (West Georgia) ourselves, we have enough troops and equipment."[89]
  • On 6 May 2008, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili said Georgia was on the verge of war with Russia.[90]
  • Iakobashvili also said, "We know what the signals are when you see propaganda waged against Georgia."
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was ready to grant military control of the territory between the Psou and the Enguri rivers to Russia.[91]
  • Alexey Ostrovsky, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, responded to Shamba's statement that Russia would not consider building the military bases in Abkhazia until the settlement of Abkhazia's status.[92]
  • The United States Department of State spokesman said that Russia's recent actions "have significantly and unnecessarily heightened tensions in the region, and run counter to Russia's status as a facilitator of the U.N. Friends process on Abkhazia."[93]
  • The United States Department of State demanded from Russia "to reconsider" "some provocative steps".[94]
  • Georgian media was reporting in early May that Russia would aid its citizens in Abkhazia.
  • Newspaper Rezonansi reported that Russia and Abkhaz separatists would launch an offensive against the Kodori Gorge.

• According to the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense issued on 8 May, the number of Russian peacekeepers deployed in Abkhazia was boosted to 2,542.
  • But Russian troop levels remained under the cap of 3,000 troops imposed by a 1994 decision of CIS heads of state.[96]
  • UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) said that its monitors had not detected any buildup either at the administrative border of Abkhazia or in Kodori Gorge.
  • Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the chief UN observer "agreed that actions by the Russian side do not contradict basic agreements on the conduct of the peacekeeping operation".
  • But the mission later countered that it "has no authority to pronounce on the conformity between the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and CIS rules."[97]
  • Sources in the Staff of the Russian Airborne Forces stated that a regular non-peacekeeping battalion of 400 heavily armed troops was sent to Abkhazia without Georgia's consent.[98]
  • On 12 May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza, during his visit to Tbilisi, criticized Russian military deployment to Abkhazia: "In my entire career, I have never heard of artillery being used to keep the peace."[99]
  • On 18 May, Georgia demonstrated video footage captured by a drone to the BBC allegedly proving that Russian forces used heavy weaponry in Abkhazia and were combat troops, rather than peacekeepers; Russia denied the accusations.
• On 11 May 2008, the pro-Georgian government of Abkhazia in-exile said that a detachment of paratroopers had arrived in Tkvarcheli in preparation for the storm of the Kodori Gorge and that they were commanded by the former chief of the staff of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces.
  • Georgian media reported that high-ranking Russian officers arrived in Sukhumi to "coordinate the actions of the Russian military in Abkhazia."[101]
  • It emerged on the internet that the Abkhaz forces and Russian generals had created a plan of the war with Georgia codenamed "Double Dbar - Double Attack", which intended not only the capture of the Kodori Gorge, but annexation of parts of western Georgia including Kutaisi. Russian forces would kill the Georgian residents of Gali district. However, if Georgia did not respond to this provocation militarily, then the Abkhaz post would be attacked by a group wearing NATO uniforms. This attack would be blamed on Georgia and Abkhazia would be recognized by Russia.[67]
• Russian military expert Alexander Golts wrote in early May 2008, "Nobody wants war, but both sides are doing everything to spark a military conflict."[102]
• Georgian president Saakashvili said, "we were close to an armed conflict a few days ago, but now the tension has released a bit".
  • Saakashvili asserted that he had been told by many Russian officials that it "has been decided not give up Abkhazia".
  • Later, Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that Sergei Shamba's statement on the plan to carve out a "buffer zone" from Georgia probably suggested that Abkhazia intended to deport the residents of this area. According to Felgenhauer, although Georgia was being accused of preparing for the war, "there are no signs of combat arrangements in Georgia."[98]
• Separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh said he was in favor of Russia establishing a military base in Abkhazia and called for the signing of a military treaty with Russia similar to the Taiwan Relations Act.[103]
  • Alexander Zelin, commander of the Russian Air Forces, said if such a decision was made it would "promote the implementation of air defense tasks" and observed Russia had similar cooperation with Armenia.[104]
  • On 16 May 2008, Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff denied Russia had any plans to build a military base in Abkhazia.[105]
• On 15 May 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry published the information on military armaments given to Georgia by the West and claimed that "strengthening [Georgia’s] military capabilities serves as destabilizing role in military-political situation in the South Caucasus region."
  • Georgian authorities said the information on the military equipment was "outdated".[106]
• On 1 May 2008, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that increase in Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia was unnecessary

• Russian illegal armed units in Abkhazia included paratroopers, assault units, and heavy military equipment (Asatiani, 478)
• The "peacekeeping" troop build up included two companies of Spetsnaz and paratroopers from the 7th Air Assault Division (Galeotti, 125)

ASMUS

• April 18: Sokhumi claims Georgia is reinforcing troops in the Kodori Gorge (148)
  • UNOMIG investigated but could not find any evidence of that
  • Valery Kenyakin declared that Moscow was prepared to act through military means if Tbilisi made a military move in Abkhazia (148)
  • In response to the Kodori claim, on April 21, Moscow announced it was deploying 400 additional paratroopers from the Novorossiysk Airborne Division to reinforce its peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, without prenotifiying Georgia and setting up checkpoints along the ENguri river (148)
    • That deployment was interpreted by MS as the beginning of war (149)
• In early May, Russia increased its peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia to close to 2,500, but Georgian intelligence estimated the number closer to 4,000 (148)
• Military analysts argued that Georgia could not invade Abkhazia from the Kodori Gorge because of the huge mountain range (148)
• In late spring, Georgia claimed having observed at least 26 large containers of Russian military equipment brought into Abkhazia. They included a large number of BMP/BTR armored vehicles, D-30 type howitzers, SA-11 BUK antiaircraft systems, BM-21 GRAD rocket systems, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka anti-aircraft systems. Similar weapons were also brought into South Ossetia and placed in Java (166)

IIFFMCG II

• At the end of April, referring to a possible deterioration in the conflict, Russia reinforced its CIS PKF battalionn with a 525-strong airborne battalion deployed in the Restricted Weapons Zone, though keeping it under the legal limit of 3000 men (201)
  • The new battalion was equipped inter alia with 10 pieces of artillery, which do not traditionally belong to the inventory of a peacekeeping force (201)
  • A UNOMIG attempt to monitor the camp of the new contingent were obstructed by Abkhaz law enforcement agencies for a certain period (201)
  • Tbilisi argued the move was in violation of a number of CIS regulations governing peacekeeping Operations, especially as it lacked advance notification (202)

IIFFMCG III

• 17 April: Several Ural type trucks carrying 300 Russian contract soldiers enter the military base in Ochamchire seaport, according to Georgian intelligence data (18)
• 29 April: Russia starts to increase its peacekeeping contingent deployed in the Abkhaz conflict zone (18)
  • An echelon of 30 train cars crossed the Psou border by railway carrying 26 units of camouflaged armor vehicles, including BMDs, D-30 type howitzers, etc. Included 4 additional passenger cars, carrying soldiers from the Novorossiysk military base. The cargo was unloaded in Sokhumi railway station and from there the soldiers and armament were distributed to Maiak military base in Skhumi, to Tsebelda military site (towards Kodori), to Ochamchire seaport, as well as to Tkvarcheli and Gali districts (18)
• 1 May: Checkpoints opened on every strategically important road in Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli, including the villages of Narghali, Arasadzihi, and Akamara (18)
• 3 May: Five units of 120 mm artillery systems and several anti-aircraft defense systems BUK-M1 were located at the military base in Ochamchire seaport (Georgian intelligence) (18)
• 6 May: Russian deployment of additional airborne battalion of at least 400 soldiers of the Novorossiysk and Pskov Airborne Divisions into Abkhazia that had started on April 29 is completed, confirmed my various Russian media reports (18-19)

IIFFMCG III

• From April to June, Russia reinforced the military bases in Sokhumi (Maiak), Bombora (Gudauta), Ochamchire and Okhurei with 3 BUK air defense systems, 40 D-30 type howitzers, 10 BM-21 Grad systems, 20 Shilka, ZU-23-2, ZU-23-4 AA guns, 120 anti-tank missiles, 2 MI-24 helicopters, 50 aviation specialists, 30 military experts, 100 communication and anti-aircraft defense experts (19)
• 6 June: Several SU-25 and SU-27 type fighter planes in armed condition were detected at the Bombora military base in Gudauta (Georgian intelligence) (19)

Georgian spy accusation

• On 16 May 2008, it was reported that Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed to have captured a Chechen spy.
  • The spy had been operating in Georgia's interests and was aiding rebels in Southern Russia.
  • The alleged agent was identified as Ramzan Turkoshvili, a Georgian-born Russian citizen.
  • According to the unnamed FSB official, Georgian intelligence working with Zelimkhan Khangoshvili were responsible for drafting Turkoshvili.
  • The detention was cast as proof that confirmed that Georgia was "participating in disruptive terrorist activities in the North Caucasus."
  • The accusations were dismissed by Shota Utiashvili, the spokesman for Georgian Interior Ministry. Utiashvili labeled the claims as "a continuation of Russia's policy of provocation toward Georgia, which has taken a particularly acute form recently."

Dispatching of Russian Railway Troops

• On 31 May 2008, Russia deployed railroad troops to repair a rail line in Abkhazia.
  • According to the Russian defence ministry, railroad troops were not armed.
  • Georgia stated that the development was an "aggressive" act.
  • Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze said, "Nobody needs to bring Railway Forces to the territory of another country, if a military intervention is not being prepared."
  • The US Department of State also said that the Russian move "dismayed" them.
  • Temur Mzhavia, chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in exile, said that Russia planned to recognize Abkhazia on 27 September, an "independence day" of Abkhazia, but Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russian ambassador to Georgia, dismissed such claims as "fabrications"
• The new Russian troops' arrival in Abkhazia preceded by a few days a planned meeting between the presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Dmitry Medvedev of Russia during a CIS summit in Saint Petersburg scheduled on 6–7 June.
  • It was reported that Saakashvili would speak about this issue with Medvedev on 3 June by phone.
  • On 3 June, NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that Russia violated sovereignty of Georgia and called for the removal of railway troops.
• On 7 June 2008, the Russian defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov said the railway troops would withdraw after they would have finished work on the railroad in two months.
  • Russia claimed to have found an anti-tank mine on 13 June on the railway section which was being rehabilitated.
  • Russia claimed that a "subversive-terrorist act" was attempted against the Russian Railway Forces.
• On 18 June 2008, a Russian military official announced two explosions on the railroad near Sukhumi caused the security to be increased and Abkhaz police suspected the Russian railway forces were intended target of the bombings.
  • Malkhaz Akishbaya, chairman of the Georgian-backed Abkhaz government in exile, claimed the explosion was a provocation to discredit Georgia and also aimed at legitimizing the presence of Russian railway troops.
• On 23 June 2008, Sergei Bagapsh said construction material for a sports complex to be used in the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, would be moved by the railroad rehabilitated by the Russian railway troops.
• In early July 2008, Georgian political expert Mamuka Areshidze noted that the line between Sochi and Sukhumi was operational and the repair works mainly centered on the line leading to Ochamchira, where the former Soviet border base, very well-suited for the movement of troops into the Kodori Gorge, was located.
  • Areshidze suggested that Abkhazia closed the border with Georgia to cover up the military preparations.
  • On 21 July 2008, it was reported that repair of the 54 km (34 mi) railroad line between Sukhumi and Ochamchira had been finished
  • Earlier, Russian military official had said that the repair job was planned to be finished on August 6.
• On 24 July 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry said renovation of the Abkhaz railway had been almost completed and there would be an opening ceremony at the end of July.
  • After participating in the ceremony, the railway forces would return to Russia in early August.
  • Russian railroad troops attended the inauguration ceremony of the railroad on 30 July 2008.
  • Russian railroad forces began withdrawal from Abkhazia on 30 July 2008.[
  • Historically, when the Soviet Union was planning a new military offensive, ralway troops were deployed to the future combat area in advance.
  • Previous instance of the deployment of the railway troops was in Chechnya in 1999.
  • The fixed railroad (Sukhumi-Ochamchira line) was used to transport military equipment by at least a part of the 9,000 Russian soldiers who entered Georgia from Abkhazia during the invasion in August 2008.
• Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili said in Riga that the deployment of additional Russian troops into Georgia would be viewed as "direct aggression" and would automatically transform Russian peacekeepers into occupiers.

On 14 July 2008, Georgian deputy defense minister Batu Kutelia said more than 15 percent increase of Georgian army to 37,000 troops was intended to protect Georgian airspace and the Black Sea coast against the Russian aggression.

• Russian political elite called the dispatching of railway troops "a humanitarian action" (Asatiani, 478)
• The fixed railway was the Sokhumi-Sochi line and was then used to transport military hardware deeper into Abkhazia (Kavadze, 76)

PANFILOV

• NATO SecGen condemned the dispatching of Russian Railway Troops as a violation of Georgia's national sovereignty (73)
  • The Georgian MFA called on Western partners to increase assistance to Georgia, as it was facing Russia's annexation of Abkhazia (73)

GACHECHILADZE 2017

• The railway being fixed had been damaged for at least 20 years (538)
  • It was the Ochamchire-Enguri section of the railway (538)
  • Georgia's international protests fell mostly on deaf ears (538)

ASMUS

• Vashadze said "no one needs to bring Railway forces to the territory of another country unless a military intervention is being prepared" (150)
• The renovation of the railway ended in early August (150)
• The refurbished railways and roads would help move Russian forces and supplies when Russia later invaded from Abkhazia (150)
• Tbilisi sought to purchase Stinger missiles from the US to prevent a Russian airborne assault but was denied (151)

IIFFMCG II

• NATO SecGen demanded Russia to withdraw its railway troops and urged both sides to engage quickly in a high-level and open dialogue to deescalate tensions (31)
• The railway battalion was 400-man strong (201)
  • The line was Sokhumi-Ochamchira (201)
  • The unit was withdrawn at the end of July after the work was accomplished (201)
  • Georgia saw the deployment as aggressive in nature and demanded an immediate withdrawal (201-202)
  • Tbilisi saw them as preparations for an armed intervention in Georgia (202)
  • The US administration and NATO assessed it as a violation of Georgia's territorial integrity (202)

IIFFMCG III

• The Russian troops are from the Volgograd's 76th Unit of Railway Forces in Abkhazia (19)

Escalations (May-July)

Tensions in South Ossetia

• Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili said on 15 May 2008 that deployment of additional Russian peacekeepers to South Ossetia would be seen by Georgia as a "gross encroachment on Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity".[139]
  • In late May 2008, there were about 1,000 Russian peacekeepers present in South Ossetia.[140]
• Three blasts were reported to have occurred in South Ossetia.
  • In one of the blasts, there was a bomb explosion near Georgian police vehicle and one serviceman was wounded. The South Ossetian authorities were accused by Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia of resorting to "tactics of terrorism."[141]
• On 20 May 2008, foreign ambassadors were asked by Taymuraz Mamsurov, president of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia, to help North Ossetia to unite with South Ossetia.
  • Georgian Ambassador Erosi Kitsmarishvili said that international law would be violated by such merger.[142]
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity approved Mamsurov's proposal, saying "South Ossetia's main goal is unification with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation."
  • Kokoity and Dmitry Medoyev suggested an interim period where South Ossetia would be recognized as independent and then formally integrated into Russia through a referendum.[143]

• Russia seemed to neglect South Ossetia compared to Abkhazia during the tension build-up because when it did strike, it wanted to have some pretext and it knew both that Georgia was actively preparing its own offensive to try to retake the region, and that Saakashvili was a hothead (Galeotti, 125)
• Saakashvili believed that the conflicts would start in Abkhazia (Glucksmann, 18)

IIFFMCG III

• 16 May: Georgian police car explodes on a road near Ditsi in the Little Liakhvi Valley on a mine placed by SO irregular forces, injuring officer David Korashvili (19)

Khurcha incident

• On 18 May 2008, five Russian peacekeepers were arrested along the administrative border with Abkhazia; however, they were later freed.
  • According to Georgia, their armoured personnel carrier hit a Georgian car in the town of Zugdidi; however, Alexander Diordiev, a Russian peacekeeping official, said there was no crash and instead that Georgians provoked the peacekeepers in an attempt to discredit the Russians.[107]
  • According to Diordiev, on the night of 17–18 May, the road near the village of Urta was closed for the peacekeepers who were moving hardware and then an already damaged car arrived.
  • The Georgian police blamed car damage on the Russian peacekeepers and used the force against them.[108]
  • Diordiev stated that the Georgians knew in advance about the redeployment of the hardware.
  • A statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, issued on 19 May 2008, said the Georgians' actions were of "true street bandits", saying the Georgians used "crude physical force" against the peacekeepers.
  • The Russian peacekeepers were freed due to the efforts of the Collective Forces for the Support of Peace command and the UN mission.[109]

• Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on 19 May that Russian peacekeepers had recently been allowed to undertake military actions independently if necessary and Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said this report was "credible."[110][111]

• On 21 May 2008, heavy gunfire was reported near the Abkhaz administrative border, with a Georgian interior ministry official saying two buses of passengers going to vote in the Georgian elections were attacked.[112]
  • Some reports said the bridge, connecting Abkhazia and Georgian region of Mingrelia, was closed by Abkhaz separatists during the elections in Georgia.[113][114]
  • Georgian officials accused Abkhazia of the attacks and preventing Georgians from voting in the legislative elections.
  • Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh denied these allegations, instead saying that the attack occurred on the Georgian territory and Georgians living in Abkhazia were not interested in voting.
  • According to Abkhazia, in order to avert tensions, Russian peacekeepers were deployed along the border.[115]
• The Georgian Foreign Ministry wrote a protest note to the CIS secretariat on May 21.
  • Georgia requested illegal Russian troops and weaponry to be removed from Abkhazia, saying that the recent deployment of troops and military hardware (an airborne battalion, 50 BMD-2 airborne combat vehicles, and two artillery batteries) contradicted a 1995 resolution adopted by the CIS presidents' council.

• A U.N. report issued on 23 July 2008, describing the period between April and July 2008, noted discrepancies with the Georgian account of a shooting in Khurcha on the day of Georgian elections.
  • In particular the report noted "the fact that the incident was filmed in such a way as to suggest that events were anticipated."
  • The report said Georgian reconnaissance flights violated the ceasefire, but the shooting down of those fights also constituted a breach of the ceasefire.
  • Concerning a military buildup in Abkhazia by Georgia, the UN report said it found no evidence of a buildup, but noted observers were denied access to certain areas, including the Kvabchara Valley.
• On 31 July 2008, South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev admitted to building military fortifications in the conflict zone which violated previous agreements.
  • Mindzaev claimed it was in response to similar actions by Georgia.[292]
  • Mindzaev accused Georgia of "creeping annexation".
  • Vladimir Ivanov, Assistant Commander of the JPKF, reported that South Ossetian servicemen hindered the monitoring mission by the JPKF and OSCE observers.[294]

Skirmishes with Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia

• On 9 June 2008, Georgian interior minister Vano Merabishvili commented on the statement of the Abkhaz authorities on the Kodori Gorge: "We do not want war, we are putting things in order on our territory."
  • He explained that the Kodori Gorge was a criminal haven and Georgian authorities were forced to reestablish the control.
  • He also said that Russia was ready to start the war in Abkhazia to prevent Georgia's NATO membership.
• On 15 June 2008, media reports said that a Russian military base had been established near the village of Agubedia in Abkhazia's Ochamchira District.
  • According to reports, heavy weaponry had been sent there. The reports were denied by the Russian Defense Ministry.
  • The Georgian-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile said on 17 June that Russia refused to allow UN monitors in the area.
• On 17 June 2008, four Russian peacekeepers and a military truck were captured near the border between Georgia proper and Abkhazia.
  • Georgia's Interior Ministry said that the peacekeepers were moving 35 crates of ammunition, thus violating the existing agreements, while the Russian Defense Ministry said the detention was "in violation of all regulatory norms in the buffer zone."
  • According to the Georgian police, after nine hours of interrogation, the peacekeepers were released.
  • Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told Georgian President Saakashvili by phone on 18 June that Russia would not tolerate "provocations" against Russian peacekeepers.
  • Georgian Deputy Interior Minister Eka Zguladze said that seized armaments would not be returned to the peacekeepers since they "didn't present any legal documents related to the weapons, and the Georgian side wasn't informed about this."
  • Lieutenant General Alexander Burutin, a deputy head of the Russian General Staff, compared the arrest to "a bandit attack" on 19 June, saying Russian peacekeepers had every right to use their weapons.
  • Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on June 21 that Russia would not tolerate such actions against peacekeepers.
• A Russian military expert, Pavel Felgenhauer, commenting on the situation in the conflict zone on 19 June, predicted the war between Georgia and Abkhazia.
  • Felgenhauer said on 20 June that Vladimir Putin had already decided to start a war against Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia supposedly in late August 2008.
  • Provocations against Georgia would begin in Upper Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then the war would spread to the rest of Georgia.
• On 23 June 2008, Sergei Bagapsh said that he was going to close off the sea for Georgia.
• On 24 June 2008, Russian peacekeepers established a curfew in the Gali district of Abkhazia and were in complete control of the car roads. Russian and Abkhaz forces were conducting a joint exercise near the Kodori Gorge.

• On June 15, the Abkhaz exile government accused Russia of establishing a new military base in the village of Agubedia in Ochamchire, equipped with tanks and howitzers, and Soviet-era air defense systems (Panfilov, 72-73)

IIFFMCG II

• In June, UNOMIG noted that the Georgian side had increased the number of trainees and training areas as well as the frequency of training conducted for its law enforcement agencies (in the Security Zone) and its military (in the Restricted Weapons Zone). (203)

June 14 South Ossetia clashes

• On the night of 14–15 June 2008, mortar fire and an exchange of fire broke out between South Ossetian and Georgian forces.
  • One person was killed and four injured in the clashes, and several Georgian houses were reportedly damaged.
  • South Ossetia's interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev claimed that their forces were responding to mortar fire launched from Georgian-controlled villages.
  • He said that the crossfire lasted for about four hours while the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces said that it lasted for about an hour and a half.
  • Georgia refuted acting first and said that the Georgian-controlled villages of Ergneti, Nikozi and Prisi had been attacked by South Ossetia.
  • A land mine wounded 14-year-old boy near Ergneti in another incident; he later died.[144]
  • According to South Ossetia, five people were injured during the violence and one of them died later.
• The area of the clashes was visited by Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian peacekeepers and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observers.
  • They came under fire near Ergneti, with no injuries.
  • The fire exchange began on the night of 15 June at 11:38 PM and lasted for half an hour.
  • Automatic firearms and grenade launchers were used.

IIFFMCG II

• Tension in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone started to rise in mid-June 2008 with explosions and mine incidents close to the Georgian-administrated villages of Kekhvi, Ergneti and Tamarasheni and the de facto South Ossetian militia post in Kokhati as well as with the exchange of fire between the Georgian-administered villages of Sveri and Prisi and the South Ossetian-administered villages of Andzisi and Zemo Prisi respectively. (204)
• Prolonged exchange of fire also took place in the southern environs of Tskhinvali and nearby Georgian villages. These incidents were a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement, resulted in a number of dead and wounded and caused collateral damage to houses on both sides. (204)

IIFFMCG III

• June 14: 14-year-old Karlo Inauri of Ergneti explodes on a mine placed by SO irregular forces near the ABL. He died of severe injuries (19)
• 16 June: 8 Ural type trucks loaded with anti-tank rocjets and landmines enter Tskhinvali (Georgian intelligence) (19)
• 25 June: General Aleksei Maslov, Commander of the Russian Land Forces, visits Tskhinvali and meets with both Russian peacekeepers and SO officials (19)

Bombings across Abkhazia

• On 29 June, there were two blasts in Gagra and six people were wounded.
  • Abkhaz president Bagapsh accused Georgia of pursuing "a policy of state terrorism."[136]
  • According to the source of Gruziya Online, one Russian vacationer from Ural was killed in Gagra, but this was being covered up.
  • On 30 June, there were two blasts in Sukhumi which wounded 6 people.
  • Abkhaz authorities declared that similar explosive devices had been used in both Gagra and Sukhumi.
  • Abkhaz president visited the location of the blasts in Sukhumi and announced closing of the border with Georgia.
• On 6 July 2008, Georgian interior ministry reported that there were explosions near the villages of Rukhi and Ganmukhuri near the Abkhaz border.[206]
  • A bomb in Gali in Abkhazia killed four people and wounded six.
  • Abkhaz authorities claimed that Georgian "state terrorism" was responsible for the blasts and severed all communication with Georgia in response to the bombing.
  • The travel documents of the Georgian citizens, who had the right to enter Gali, were seized and they could not leave Abkhazia.[207]
  • Georgia decried the bombings and blamed them on Russia, claiming the attacks were being done for a continued Russian military deployment in Georgia.[208]
• The French Foreign Ministry called to resume negotiations in a statement. Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis expressed his concern over the recent blasts in Abkhazia and said that "the situation may spin out of control."
• Source in Sukhumi told Gruziya-Online that the investigation of the Gagra bomb blast was almost finished and 4 suspects were arrested in Abkhazia.
  • 3 of suspects were ethnic Abkhaz and 1 was ethnic Armenian. Two of the suspects were participants of the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia and were recipients of the Abkhaz awards.

GLUCKSMANN

• Saakashvili talks of "strange explosions" and remembers the Chechen scenario: a series of blasts used to justify the Russian invasion (21)
• Another blast occurred in Sochi (21)
• Georgian authorities willingly did not react, to avoid provocations (21)

• In summer 2008, there were bombings of public places in Abkhazia and roadside explosions on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line (IIFFMCG I, 19)

IIFFMCG II

• From the end of June until mid-July 2008, a series of bomb blasts occurred in public places on the Abkhaz side of the ceasefire line as well as roadside explosions on the Georgian side.19 The bombings resulted in four fatalities, including the head of the Gali branch of the Abkhaz de facto security service, and left 18 people injured, mostly civilians. (203)
• Referring to security considerations, as of 1 July the Abkhaz authorities closed the Inguri bridge, a main communication link over the ceasefire line for the local, mainly Georgian, population. (203)

Achamkhara incident

• On 1 July 2008, the maritime traffic between Sochi and Gagra resumed.[171]
• On 2 July 2008, Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia claimed that a car came up to the Russian checkpoint on the border with Georgia and threw an unidentified object which detonated, then the car turned back to Georgia and Georgian servicemen did not detain the car.[172]
  • There was a blast between the Georgian interior ministry post and the Russian peacekeeping post in South Ossetia at 20:00 MSK.
• On 9 July 2008, an incident took place in the buffer zone between Abkhaz-controlled area and the Georgian-controlled Kodori Gorge, which left 3 Georgian policemen injured. Georgian Interior Ministry said that the UN monitors were denied access to the area by the Abkhaz side.
  • Abkhaz authorities claimed that 2 Abkhaz militiamen were wounded on Mount Achamkhara after an attack by 10 Georgian saboteurs.
  • According to the Georgian Ministry, a separate incident took place near Abkhazia-Georgia proper border when Georgian police post was attacked.
  • Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili and state minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili accused Russia of orchestrating provocations and sabotaging peace process.
  • Abkhaz State Security Service accused Georgia of staging the incident in the Zugdidi District ahead of Condoleezza Rices' visit.
  • According to the source of Gruziya Online, the incident in Kodori was a preparatory action carried out by the Russian paratroopers before the capture of the Georgian-controlled Kodori gorge and they were wearing the uniforms of the Abkhaz forces for camouflaging.
• Gruziya Online reported that Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh visited Moscow to finalize plans of attack on Upper Abkhazia. Russia reportedly was preparing to deploy 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov to Abkhazia and Russian airborne brigades were already present in Abkhazia in violation of the existing agreements without the consent of Tbilisi.
  • According to anonymous source, 45 wagons of Russian armament had arrived during the past week.
  • According to another anonymous source, Russian military was redeploying in South Ossetia and a Russian military plan to wage war against Georgia in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia did exist.
  • Another news report by abkhazeti.ru alleged that according to the source, the Russian special services were sending over a hundred Chechens from Vostok Battaliion, loyal to the GRU, to Abkhazia.
  • It was alleged that the Chechens would stage an attack on the Russian peacekeepers and after casualties would happen, the attack would be blamed on Georgia and a full-scale offensive to occupy the Kodori Gorge, Zugdidi and Kutaisi would be launched.[248][249]
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba declared that Bagapsh planned to negotiate the opening of the office of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Abkhazia.

IIFFMCG II

• On 20 June 2008, Abkhaz de facto Vice-President Raul Khajimba publicly stated that the use of force might be needed in order to seize control of the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Valley. (203)
• On 9 July, there was a clash between Abkhaz and Georgian forces on the Achamkhara heights in the lower Kodori Valley, resulting in several personnel being injured on both sides. (203)
  • Tensions rose further after allegations by the Georgian side of mortar firing into the Kvabchara Valley, an area in the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Valley, on 26 July. (203)
  • UNOMIG began conducting independent investigations into the incidents, but had to suspend them because of the August hostilities. (203-204)

Prelude to the war (July-August)

Tensions in Abkhazia

• Gruziya Online reported on 7 July that Bagapsh, the leader of the breakaway Abkhazia, planned to attack Upper Abkhazia, with the start of operation being scheduled for August 11-12 and Bagapsh reportedly planned to visit Moscow for the final consent for this operation.
• According to media reports, Abkhaz militias attacked a Georgian police post using grenades on 19 July 2008; one Abkhaz militiaman died from an accidental explosion of a grenade.[267]
  • Abkhaz officials denied the attack.[268]
• Georgian media reported on 19 July that a battalion of Russian troops had moved into the lower Kodori Gorge.[269]
  • Source in the Abkhaz armed structure of Gali District, Abkhazia said that Russian troops in the lower Kodori gorge, coordinated by Emzar Kvitsiani, were preparing to launch an attack on the Georgian-controlled part of the gorge.[270]
  • Commenting on alleged Russian deployment to the Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia's Foreign Minister said no new troops entered Abkhazia over the quota.
• On 27 July, blast killed one man in Gali District, Abkhazia.
• On 28 July 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern over the escalation in Abkhazia, which could have "unpredictable consequences for a fragile peace process", and increasing hostility between Russia and Georgia.
• On 29 July 2008, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia would never agree to the deployment of the international police force to Abkhazia.

GLUCKSMANN

• End of July, Saakashvili is on vacation in Italy. 200 Russian tanks enter Abkhazia. Georgia willingly does not react, to avoid provocations (21)
• According to MS, some in the Abkhaz leadership warned Tbilisi that Russia was encouraging skirmishes with Georgia (21)
• Overall, tensions were concentrated in Abkhazia until late summer, when there was a sudden shift of skirmishes in South Ossetia, originally interpreted as local criminal organizations (21)

• In the summer, Russia's navy in Sevastopol and Novorosik were set on full preparedness and were sent closer to Georgia's costs (Gachechiladze, 539)
• The conflict escalation on the ground shifted from Abkhazia to South Ossetia (IIFFMCG II, 31)

IIFFMCG III

• 8 July: Additional Russia soldiers, 4 BTR-70 and 4 BDRM type military vehicles and several anti-aircraft systems are deployed at the Okhurei military base in Tkvarcheli District (20)
• 15 July: Several hundred Russian soldiers and 44 military vehicles were observed at the Bombora milirary base by Georgian intelligence (20)

Clashes in South Ossetia

• The Eurasian Youth Union held a session in Tskhinvali on 30 June. The assembly adopted a resolution promising to send thousands of armed volunteers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to defend the local population from genocide. The resolution supported the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their accession to the Russian Federation.
• On 30 June 2008, South Ossetian authorities accused Georgia of kidnapping a Russian citizen from Tskhinvali, who had arrived from Vladikavkaz to visit his relatives.
• On 3 July 2008, bombing killed a South Ossetian police official Nodar Bibilov in the village Dmenisi in the early morning.
  • After several hours, a remote bomb targeted the car of Dmitry Sanakoyev, the leader of the pro-Georgian South Ossetian government.
  • After the blast, fire was opened from the villages of Sarabuki and Kokhati and Sanakoev's bodyguards responded.
  • Three bodyguards were wounded.
  • Deputy defense minister of South Ossetia Ibrahim Gazseev claimed that the Georgian interior ministry units had taken the 300 meter height near the village Sarabuki.
  • Around 20:10, the South Ossetian post in the village of Kokhati was fired upon.
  • South Ossetia reported that interior ministry post near the village Ubiat was attacked from the Georgian-controlled Nuli.
  • The attack killed one South Ossetian militiaman and wounded another.
  • South Ossetia reported that Georgia started shelling Tskhinvali at around 23:40.
  • Shelling of Tskhinvali resulted in the death of one man and the wounding of seven.
  • By the morning of 4 July, the South Ossetians reported that Georgia's special military operation had resulted in the death of 3 people and wounding of 11.
  • Georgian authorities said that South Ossetians were shelling Georgian-controlled villages Tamarasheni and Nikozi for 6 hours and this forced the Georgians to respond.[175]
  • Georgian chief of peacekeepers Mamuka Kurashvili said that at 6:00 in the morning of 4 July, South Ossetian separatists attempted to attack the Georgian post on the bypass road between Little Liakhvi and Great Liakhvi valleys.
  • South Ossetian military were mobilized in the morning of 4 July and peacekeeping forces were put on alert.[185]
  • South Ossetia warned its heavy weaponry would enter the conflict zone if attacks did not cease.[186]
  • Russian peacekeepers declared that 7 unidentified planes overflew Tskhinvali during the night.[187]
  • The chief of the Russian peacekeepers was quoted as saying that additional forces could be sent to South Ossetia in case of further deterioration.[188]
  • The Abkhazian Armed Forces were put on combat alert.
    • Abkhaz leader Bagapsh threatened if Georgia did not stop attacking Tskhinvali, Abkhazia would not abandon South Ossetia in time of need and the war would spill to the entire Caucasus region.[189]
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity called on the President of Russia to deploy the Russian forces to South Ossetia to defend the citizens of Russia.[190]
  • Kokoity said that Georgian peacekeepers were equal to the aggressors.[191]
  • Russia's NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin declared that Russia could not contain the volunteers from the North Caucasus from participation in the war against Georgia.[192]
  • By late afternoon, Kokoity canceled total mobilization.[193]
  • The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the assault on "the pro-Georgian puppet" Sanakoev was "obviously staged" and accused Georgia of "open act of aggression" against South Ossetia.
  • Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin arrived in Tbilisi.[194]
  • Kommersant confirmed that Georgians had taken control of the Sarabuki height after the attack on Sanakoev and observed, "Since the loss of a key height for Tskhinvali is unacceptable, large-scale hostilities may begin around the village of Sarabuk."[195]
• Igor Smirnov, president of self-proclaimed Transnistria, arrived in Tskhinvali on July 3.[196]
  • One South Ossetian politician, commenting on the shelling of Tskhinvali during this visit, said on July 4 that Georgians were the "accidental people" in the Caucasus because their disrespect of the guest from Transnistria contradicted the customs of the Caucasus region.
• According to South Ossetian authorities, the Georgian side began firing on the South Ossetian post in Ubiat at 23:20 on July 5 with automatic firearms and then began using grenade launchers.
  • During the night of 6 July, the Georgians opened fire on the posts near Tskhinvali and wounded one man.
  • South Ossetians said that they didn't return fire.[203]
  • Later, Georgian authorities reported that fire was opened on the Georgian villages of Nuli and Kekhvi, but the Georgian forces did not return fire.[204]
  • South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev accused Georgia of a military build-up near South Ossetia's borders.[205]
• South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity blamed the "provocations" on Georgia, and said, "Therefore, we must exercise wisdom, calmness, restraint, thus we will aid fastest collapse of the regime of Saakashvili."
• The Ministry of Defense of Georgia said on 7 July that when the Georgian side spotted about ten militants trying to sabotage a Georgian-controlled by-pass road in South Ossetia, the Georgians fired upon the group and the Ossetians withdrew to the nearest village.
• On 8 July 2008, South Ossetia reported that four Georgian Defense Ministry spies were arrested near to the village of Okona in the Znauri district the night before.[213]
• Georgian peacekeeping commander Mamuka Kurashvili said that four Georgian soldiers were kidnapped on the previous night from the Georgian territory near Kareli, Georgia outside of the South Ossetian conflict zone.[214][215]
• South Ossetia accused Georgian secret services of kidnapping a 14-year old resident of Tskhinvali.[216]
• The Georgian law enforcement was ordered by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to arrange the liberation of soldiers.[217]
• South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev ruled out the release of Georgian soldiers until Georgia returned 14-year old boy.
• Later, it became known that the soldiers were released after Saakashvili's order to carry out a police operation.[218]
• On 8 July 2008, South Ossetian envoy Dmitry Medoev accused Georgia of preparations for the war and claimed that the Georgian military had evacuated around 300 children from Georgian enclaves in Tamarasheni, Nuli, Eredvi and Kurta since July 5.
  • Medoyev said: "we are not opening fire yet, as there was an order."[219]
• Russian military jets had an overflight over South Ossetia on 8 July 2008.[220]
• On 9 July, Colonel Zurab Pochkhua, the deputy commander of Georgian Air Force, said that 4 Russian jets were flying for nearly 40 minutes close to Tskhinvali, while Russia accused Georgia of committing "a serious breach" by flying two Georgian Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets over South Ossetia.[221]
• On 10 July, the Russian authorities acknowledged the flight. Russia said in an official statement the fighters were sent to "let hot heads in Tbilisi cool down."[220][222]
• Four captured Georgian servicemen had already been released by the time of the overflight.
• The overflight violated the 2002 resolution of the Joint Control Commission requiring pre-approval for the overflights over the conflict zones.[223]
• Georgian authorities acknowledged that they knew about the release of the Georgian officers by midday and special operation in South Ossetia was no longer being considered by 20:10 when the overflight began.
• This was the first time in the 2000s that Russia had confessed to an overflight of Georgian territory.[225]
• A scheduled visit of Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, to Georgia on the next day nearly coincided with the timing of the flight.[226]
• In response, Georgia summoned back its ambassador to Russia "for consultations", stating that it was "outraged by Russia's aggressive policies."[227]
• Saakashvili noted the close proximity of the Russian overflight to Tbilisi and commented, "Maybe that's how they welcomed Condoleezza Rice."[228]
• The Georgian foreign ministry called the overflights open "military aggression" by Russia.
• On 10 July 2008, Colonel General Sergey Makarov, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District (SKVO), said SKVO had to help both the peacekeeping forces and civilian residents in the separatist regions.[238]
• Dmitry Medoyev, South Ossetian presidential envoy to Russia, declared on 11 July that South Ossetia "has all the necessary forces and means to repel" Georgia without resorting to Russia's aid, adding that more Russian peacekeepers should be deployed to the conflict zone.[239][240]
• That day a statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense said that they had "to increase the combat readiness" of the Russian peacekeepers present in Abkhazia, adding that security had been increased at the military installations, and "additional training" had been given "to explain regulations governing the use of firearms while on duty."[241][242]
• Nika Rurua, Deputy Head of the Georgian Parliament's Security and Defense Committee, warned Georgia would shoot down Russia's military aircraft should they appear in its airspace again.
• The proposal was discussed to this effect, but Georgian lawmakers decided instead to appeal to the international community on the matter.
• In response to Georgian organization of a special UNSC meeting, the sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Russia would reveal the details of a planned Georgian military operation in South Ossetia to release the Georgian officers.
• On 12 July 2008, Javier Solana, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, condemned the Russian overflights and stated that the EU would closely follow the developments.
• On 25 July 2008, bombing killed one person in Tskhinvali.
• * Former Prime Minister of South Ossetia Oleg Teziev said that South Ossetia refrained from cleansing the Georgian enclaves in the past and now they were "headache", further stating: "South Ossetia set a precedent in the international practice of resolving ethnic conflicts by ending the war without expelling the national minority that participated in the conflict from the opposite side."
  • He claimed that Georgian advance in the previous war was stopped by the South Ossetian threat to detonate the portable nuclear devices in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi.[256]
• On 20 July 2008, South Ossetian official media concluded its news report by saying, "But the fact that events in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone continue to be one of the most interesting topics for discussion even at the international level, is a good sign that allows us to hope for a positive solution of the issue of freedom and independence of the Republic of South Ossetia in the near future."[272]
• On 28 July 2008, the Georgian flag was hoisted on the strategic Sarabuki height by the Georgian Defense Ministry.
  • Later, the Russian command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) said peacekeepers and OSCE monitors had been barred by South Ossetians from entering the village of Cholibauri which was close to where Georgia said South Ossetia was building fortifications.[281]
  • South Ossetian armed militias fired at the peacekeepers and OSCE observers.[282]
  • Georgian media reported that Georgian posts on the Sarabuki heights were assaulted by South Ossetian forces overnight and early on 29 July, with no woundings reported.[281][283]
  • The Georgian village of Sveri was shelled with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades by the South Ossetians on the morning of 29 July.[284]
  • South Ossetian official accused Georgia of opening fire first.[285]
  • The peacekeepers and OSCE observers visited the area near Sveri to investigate an exchange of fire; however, they were fired upon at 10:00.[286]
  • On the late evening of the same day, South Ossetia said due to South Ossetian positions being fortified on the frontier of the conflict zone, two South Ossetian villages had been fired on by Georgian forces in the morning.[287]
  • Georgia reported that Ossetians fired on the Sarabuki height at around 22:00.[288]
  • The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported one man as wounded as a result from Georgian attack from Sarabuki height.[289]
• On 29 July 2008, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity declared that the Army of Nagorno-Karabakh was stronger than the Georgian Army. He said that although the South Ossetian army was not equipped according to NATO standards, it was still a force to be reckoned with for the Georgians.

GLUCKSMANN

• Sudden increase in tensions in SO happened after Kokoity's visit to Moscow to sign a cultural cooperation agreement with Moscow (21-22)
• Though in previous cases, Georgian police responses to shootouts was enough to calm down the situations, the same was not true anymore after Kokoity's return (22)

• The overflights incident was the first overflights officially recognized by Russia, although Georgia had reported others before and Russia claiming Georgia was bombing itself (Panfilov, 76)

GACHECHILADZE 2017

• The overflight was not denied by Russia, unlike previous such incidents, meaning Russia wanted the world to heed its warning (539)
• The overflight happened on the day of Rice's arrival to Georgia (539)
• In the summer, Georgia pushed heavy artillery closer to the SO conflict zone and troop movement became more and more obvious (539)

IIFFMCG I

• The main focus of tension shifted from Abkhazia to South Ossetia in the summer of 2008 (19)
  • It was triggered by subversive attacks as well as by intensified exchanges of fire between Georgian and SO sides, including mortar and heavy artillery fire. (19)
• In early July, the Russian military build-up started with deployment of troops, tents, armoured vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and artillery guns (20)

ASMUS

• The July 4 attack on Dimitri Sanakoev came a day fter Russia rejected officially the soft partition plan (161)
• Sanakoev's attack was with an IED (161)
• There was also an attack on a Georgian school bus and a police car (161-162)
• Those were signals that the time to talk had passed (162)

IIFFMCG II

• The July 9 overflights were the first ones to be admitted openly by Russia, which claimed they were meant to prevent a Georgian military attack in the conflict zone (24)
• The overflights led to Georgia recalling its Ambassador to Russia (30)
• Gleb Pavlovsky, a political scientist with Kremlin connections, interpreted this as “a possible pre-war state of affairs in Russian-Georgian relations”. (30)
• July 3: Sanakoyev convoy attacked, killing three Georgian policemen (117)
• July: Georgian forces occupy the Sarabuki Heights, overlooking Georgian and Ossetian bypass roads and controlling access to and from Tskhinvali. Several attempts to dislodge Georgians by Ossetians failed, with Georgian snipers reportedly shooting and killing several Ossetian fighters (117)
• The overall precarious security situation in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict dramatically deteriorated in early July 2008. On 3 July, explosions in the Ossetian administered village of Dmenisi killed Nodar Bibilov, leader of the de facto South Ossetian militia. (204)
  • A few hours later on the same day, another device was reportedly targeted against the pro-Georgian leader of the Temporary Administrative Unit of South Ossetia, Dimitri Sanakoyev (while he was travelling on the by-pass road linking the Small and Big Liakhvi Georgian enclaves), causing injuries to three Georgian special forces policemen.(204)
• An extensive exchange of light arms fire and mortar shelling occurred in Tskhinvali and its southern environs during the night of 3-4 July, causing several casualties and property damage. (204)
  • In a public statement, the South Ossetian leadership blamed the Georgian side for initiating the fire exchange and qualified it as an act of aggression against South Ossetia. (204-205)
  • In an official statement, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs blamed the South Ossetian side for firing against Georgian villages and claimed that the Georgian side returned fire in order to protect the civilian population in the area. (205)
• The shelling on 3-4 July was followed by an exchange of fire between the South Ossetian administered village of Ubiati and the Georgian-administered village of Nuli. (205)
  • Another exchange of fire erupted between the newly established Georgian and Ossetian peacekeeping posts on the strategically important Sarabuki heights, overlooking both the South Ossetian Geri by-pass road as well as the Eredvi-Kheiti by-pass road, the only functional road linking the Georgian enclave north of Tskhinvali, with a population of about 10 000, with the rest of Georgia. (205)
• In the night of 7-8 July, four Georgian armed forces servicemen were detained by the South Ossetian de-facto authorities. In the evening of 8 July they were released with the assistance of the OSCE Mission to Georgia. (205)
  • On the same day, four Russian military aircraft entered into Georgian airspace around the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. (205)
  • These events took place at the time of a visit to Georgia by representatives of the Permanent Missions of the OSCE member-states from Vienna (6-10 July) and on the eve of a visit to Georgia by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (9 July). (205)
  • In a statement on 9 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia qualified the incident as an “open aggression directed against the country and a brutal and undisguised attempt to infringe on its sovereignty and territorial integrity”. (205)
  • In statements on 10 and 14 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation explained the violation of Georgian airspace as a “forced extreme” measure aimed at preventing an “armed attack” on South Ossetia and an alleged attempt by Tbilisi to liberate its detained servicemen. (205-206)
  • On 10 July, Georgia presented an appeal to the UN to probe the violation of its airspace by convening an extraordinary session of the UN Security Council.38 Also at Georgian request, a special meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council was convened in Vienna on 14 July to discuss the situation. These two events may serve as an additional indication of the seriousness of the situation in the region at that time. (206)
• In early July, the South Ossetian authorities introduced restrictions on the freedom of movement of vehicles and people to and from the Georgian side. The OSCE observers encountered difficulties with visiting South Ossetian positions. (207)

IIFFMCG III

• 3 July: At 1000, SO irregular forces attempt to assassinate Sanakoyev with an explosive device placed on the Eredvi-Kheiti by-pass road near the Tdverikhao Mountain, set off when Sanakoyev's motorcade passed by it. Five police officers accompanying the motorcade are wounded. In response, a Georgian peacekeeping point is opened on Sarabuki Heights (19-20)
• 3 July: At 2330, SO irregular forces open fire from automatic rifles and grenade launchers in the direction of the central government controlled villages Nikozi, Ergneti, Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Vanati, Tamarasheni, and Avnevi. At 2340, Georgian police responds with fire (20)
• 4 July: 6 artillery guns were transported from Java District to Dmenisi and ganded over to local unit of SO irregular forces (intelligence) (20)
• 4-6 July: 10 armored vehicles enter SO from Roki Tunnel (Georgian intelligence) (20)

Information about incoming war

• The Kavkaz Center reported on 4 July that Chechen separatists had intelligence data that Russia was preparing a military operation against Georgia in August-September 2008 which mainly aimed to expel Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge; this would be followed by the expulsion of Georgian units and population from South Ossetia.
  • The decision to attack Georgia had been made by Putin before Medvedev became president and the preparations had been ongoing for the several months.
  • Provocations would antecede the start of the war.
• On 5 July 2008, the article was published by the Russian online paper Forum.msk.ru with the headline "Russia is on the verge of a great Caucasian war", stating that the war with Georgia had never been so close.
  • The chief editor of the paper, Anatoly Baranov, just returning from the North Caucasus where he had spoken with Russian officers stationed in Rostov-on-Don, stated that "the army wants to fight" as the officers were seeing the war as the only solution to Russia's internal problems.[201]
• Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh claimed that Abkhaz military counterintelligence became aware of the Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia in April-May 2008.[202]
• Aleksandr Dugin, who was known for his strong ties with the Russian military and intelligence, visited South Ossetia in late June 2008.[12] On 30 June, he said at a press conference:

"Russia has practically decided to recognize [Abkhazia and South Ossetia], and you have perfectly prepared everything for this. [...] The last formal hook of opponents of the recognition of South Ossetia is, perhaps, the lack of a project for the integration of Georgian enclaves inside South Ossetia. This card will be played many times, pressurizing and attacking Putin and Medvedev, that the unresolvedness of problem is a fundamental obstacle to the recognition of South Ossetia. [...] this is a pretext that can not be ignored. [...] If Russia recognizes independence of South Ossetia and deploys there not peacemaking but Russian border troops, the issue of Georgia joining NATO either will be removed from the agenda for a long time, or this will mean direct conflict with the United States. [...] So, we must recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia before December."[147]

• On 11 July 2008, Aleksandr Khramchikhin wrote for Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Georgia's only chance at winning the war was "swift decapitating blow" to neutralize the separatist leadership, which required complete surprise, "so it should be carried out not during the next aggravation of the situation, but, on the contrary, when tension is minimal."
  • Saakashvili knew well that Georgia would finally lose the territories if the war with separatists was lost for the second time.[254]
• On 14 July 2008, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) reported that NG had gained a possession of the secret report which was read at a closed session of the State Duma's security committee in the Spring of 2008 and contained an analysis of the situation in Georgia.
  • The report stated that Russia had several options, among them to "passively wait as the process of aggravation of the situation takes place, and to take decisive action by intervening at the stage of armed conflict."[259]
  • Russian political scientist Sergey Markedonov wrote that several journalists had called specific dates of alleged hostilities between Russia and Georgia.[260]
• Head of the Government of South Ossetia Yury Morozov told Komsomolskaya Pravda that "we have an excellent aviation" against Georgians, adding that he meant "our, Russian planes".
  • The journalist observed that columns of the Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks were deployed near the Russo-Georgian border, from which march Towards Tskhinvali required half a day.[261]
• On 15 July, a spokesman for the Union of Russia and Belarus said Abkhazia and South Ossetia had talked about joining the Union, but that they would need to be recognized as independent and become observers before they could join the Union as members.[262]
• On 18 July, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that the construction of the gas pipeline from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali would be completed by the year's end and Georgia was finally losing Tskhinvali.[263]
• Russian journalist Maxim Kalashnikov wrote that Georgian military attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead to Russia losing the North Caucasus and the only solution to this problem was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Kalashnikov stated that Russia's 1991 borders "do not correspond to the interests of security and development of the Russian civilization" and Russia had to begin "reformatting" of the post-Soviet space by solving of the "Georgian question" first.
  • Kalashnikov admitted that Russia was involved in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
  • Kalashnikov wrote that after the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had to aid the self-determination of Mingrelians and Adjarians.
  • He noted that pro-western Ossetian activists had emerged who were seeking to separate North Ossetia from Russia and Russia had to act quickly
• Georgian Defense Ministry claimed Russian troops occupied strategic passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge and were battle-ready.
• On 27 July 2008, US presidential candidate John McCain said that Vladimir Putin still ruled Russia and Russia was "putting enormous pressure on Georgia in many ways".
• Georgian president Saakashvili told The Times, "situation is precarious and the things they [Russia] are doing are outrageous. Unfortunately, they are not opposed by the Europeans and other players." When asked about the possibility of war, Saakashvili responded: "The point is that every day we are waking up with some surprises and when sometimes I think it can’t get any worse, then it does get worse."
  • Ronald Asmus wrote that Russia was trying "to provoke Tbilisi into actions that could lead to further Russian military intervention." He also wrote, "In the short term, we need to prevent a conflict from starting this summer." Asmus suggested that Russia would then focus on Crimea.
• Russian human rights activists began collecting signatures against the escalation of the Russian-Georgian tensions. They were of the opinion that the conflict was looming to transform into war between the two countries.

ASATIANI

• Russian State television were ctive in creating an image of a bloodthirsty Georgian enemy (478)
• Sociological queries showed Georgia as the number one enemy (478)

• At the Yalta Summit in July, Saakashvili attended and he said he was greeted "like a death convict" (Glucksmann, 20)

PANFILOV

• In the weeks leading up to the war, there was a proliferation of blog posts in favor of South Ossetia and posting about alleged war crimes by Georgian forces, though all IP addresses linked back to Russia (47)
• On 5 August, Izvestia published an article with the title "Georgian snipers are killing Ossetian children". After the war, the article disappeared from Izvestia's website. (51)
  • The article asked readers to take part in an online poll: "Why is Georgia promoting conflict in South Ossetia?", with a majority of respondents blaming the war on the Georgia-US relations (51-52)
• The information warfare spread by Russian state-controlled media in the days leading up to the war was meant to justify Russia's "intervention" to stop Georgia's "aggression" against South Ossetia (53)
• "when seeking to find who wanted a war between Russia and Georgia, what we need to do is look at the information war that preceded the military action, and we see that Russia was hungry for war." (69)
• On 20 June 2008, Gruzia Online published an article called "Will Vladimir Putin start a war with Georgia in August?" with Russian military expert Pavel Felgengauer stating that Putin had already decided about a war in "late August" (70-71)
• In June 2008, Russian platform iamik.ru was describing how the conflict could degenerate into a war that Russia would "have to intervene" in (71-72)
• In the days prior to the war, Russian media exponentially increased its criticism of the NATO-Georgia relations, posing it as a threat to Russia's national security and justifying the Kavkaz exercises (76-77)
• On August 3, the State Duma's CIS Relations Committee Chair Vadim Gustaev wrote an op-ed to Gazeta.ru in which he said Georgia was seeking war against South Ossetia to show the need for NATO intervention before the Alliance makes its decision in December (77)
• On August 5, Moscow Duma MP Mikhail Moskvyn-Tarkhanov wrote on Gudok that Russia was intending to annex South Ossetia (77-78)
• Countless Russian media outlets and articles were used to promote the ideas that Georgia was seeking war and Russia would have to intervene from June to August (78-101)

• The Plengengauer prediction was about a "special military operation" against Georgia (Bluashvili, 392)

ASMUS

• Kremlin pundits hinted on television about assassinating him (24)
• At the onset of the war, the country's leadership still did not expect any war. Kezerashvili was out of the country, his two key deputies were getting ready to go on vacation, the armed forces were at their lowest level of readiness became commanders had been allowed to grant units leave after months of mobilization (28)
  • Saakashvili was at a spa in Italy with his family and was planning to go to Beijing (28)
  • It was only in early August that Saakashvili returned to Georgia after Russian media coverage intensified (28)
• During a Yalta conference, MEP Elmar Brok recalled how Russian EU Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov reacted to his plans to visit Georgia in September, telling him to "go earlier, September May be too late" (164)

IIFFMCG II

• Apart from the “Kavkaz-2008” exercise, there were a number of signals from the Russian side that it would intervene in case of a Georgian military operation in South Ossetia. (207)
• On July 20, Saakashvili's website was shut down for 24 hours (218)
• On August 7, several Georgian servers and the Internet traffic were seized and placed under external control (218)

IIFFMCG III

• 11 July: Squadron of SU-27 fighters moved from the Leningrad Military District to the North Caucasus Military District (Georgian intelligence) (20)
• 13-14 July: 13 T-72 type tanks are reported move from Alagir in NO towards Roki Tunnel, as well as 6 Ural type trucks loaded with soldiers were driving from Zaramag (NO) towards Roki (intelligence) (20)
• 23 July: 120 Russian medica dispatched to Tskhinvali hospital (Georgian intelligence) (21)

Military exercises

Kavkaz 2008

• Anatoly Barankevich, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the Russian exercises in the North Caucasus were connected with the situation in the Caucasus.
  • He accused Georgia of financing the Chechen insurgents and of waging an undeclared war against Russia
• On 3 July, the Russian Federal Security Service border troops staged an exercise near the Georgian border in North Ossetia in which they repelled an armed attack on the Nizhny Zaramag border crossing.
  • Russian Defense and Interior Ministry troops also participated in the simulation.
  • This kind of training was staged for the first time since the 90s
• On 5 July 2008, the Russians began military training, named Caucasus Frontier 2008, in the North Caucasus
• In early July 2008, OSInform Information Agency published several articles where the participation of the Russian army in the future "peace enforcement" operation in Georgia was discussed.
  • One of the articles said that the planned Russian exercises were not accidental and this suggested a military operation on the foreign soil
• On 15 July, the United States and Russia began two parallel military trainings in the Caucasus, though Russia denied that the identical timing was intentional.
  • The Russian exercise was named Caucasus 2008 and units of the North Caucasus Military District, including the 58th Army, took part.
  • The exercise included training to aid peacekeeping forces stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
  • The Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla also participated in the exercises
  • A Russian military spokesman Igor Konashenkov said that the exercise would use around 700 military hardware.
  • He also said, "In connection with the aggravated situation of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts... we will also work on participation in special operations to bring peace to zones of armed conflicts."[303][304]
  • The paratroopers from 76th Airborne Division arrived in the North Caucasus on 16 July.[301]
  • Russian Airborne Troops emphasized the fact that the paratroopers were not sent to Abkhazia.[305]
  • Russian Airborne troop detachments arrived in the area near the Roki pass.
  • Posts of logistical and medical supplies were established along the routes of the deployment.
  • The participants in the exercises had an air support.[306]
  • Georgia called the exercises a demonstration of Russian aggression against it.[301]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement: "Not a single document on conflict resolution authorises Russian armed forces to carry out any kind of activity on the territory of Georgia."[307]
• On 18 July, the Roki and Mamisoni Passes on the border with Georgia were taken by 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov and 7th Guards Airborne Division from Novorossiysk.[308]
  • According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the fact that the exercises were spread across 11 regions of Russia was an evidence that the number of participating troops were higher than officially declared number.
  • Russian General Yuri Netkachev said that the number of participating soldiers in the Russian exercises was "officially underestimated" to avoid attention of international monitors.[309]
  • The second stage of the Russian exercises, which were a response to US-Georgian exercises, began on 22 July.
  • The Russian fleet would also participate in the exercises.[310]
  • Igor Konashenkov, assistant commander of the North Caucasus Military District, said on 23 July that the exercises gave the Mechanized infantry regiment of the Vladikavkaz division the task of securing the state border near the Roki Pass and all units of the division were deployed to the designated area and replaced the Air Assault battalion of the Pskov division.[311]
  • During exercises, a pamphlet named "Soldier! Know your probable enemy!" was circulated among the Russian soldiers.
  • The pamphlet described the Georgian Armed Forces.[312]
  • The Russian exercises ended on 2 August.[313]
  • Russian troops stayed near the border with Georgia after the end of their exercise on 2 August, instead of going back to their barracks.[314]
  • Later, Dale Herspring, an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University, described the Russian exercise as "exactly what they executed in Georgia just a few weeks later [...] a complete dress rehearsal."[315]

ASATIANI

• The military exercises were a demonstration of Russia's power (478)
• They involved 8,000 soldiers and 700 pieces of military equipmeent (478)
• Aim was to prepare for "special operations to establish peace by force" in Abkhazia and SO (478)
• Though the trainings ended on August 2, they never went back home (478)

GALLEOTI

• They left behind two reinforced battalions of the 19th Motor Rifle Division just 30 km from the border, or 1,500 troops (126)
  • They were supported by 14 T-72B tanks, 16 2S3 152 mm self-propelled guns and an additional battery of nine BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launch systems that could deploy into SO within hours (127)
• Other units, including paratroopers, were on 24-hour readiness (127)
• Plans for air attacks on Georgian strategic targets had already been made and distributed (127)

• Russian troops stationed in the Shali and Khankala bases of Chechnya had been regrouped in North Ossetia on 5-6 August (Glucksmann, 13)
• When the military games ended on August 2, the 58th Army stayed on the north side of the Roki Tunnel, a fact attested by Russian media (Gachechiladze, 538)

IIFFMCG I

• The exercises took place from July 5 to August 2 (19)
• They were held in the North Caucasus Military District, including close to the border and on the Black Sea (19)

ASMUS

• The purpose of the exercise was "detecting, blocking, and eliminating of terrorist groups in the local mountainous terrain" (21)
• It involved 700 combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, and part of the Black Sea Fleet (21)
  • This led to questions about how it was linked with terrorist groups (21)
• The exercise scenario involved Russian forces having to intervene in a fictitious breakaway former Soviet republic to protect Russian peacekeepers and citizens (21)
• "It was a de facto war game to invade Georgia" (21)
• The briefing materials given to soldiers said "Soldier, know your potential enemy!", which was identified as Georgia (21)
• Troop gathering by the border started as soon as the games ended. By the end of August 5, close to 12,000 soldiers were amassed at the border, ready to strike Georgia (21)
• On August 2, as the games ended, Nikolai Pankov, the deputy chief of intelligence and commendaer in chief of the 58th Army, visited So to meet with local leaders and the commander of the Russian and NO peacekeeping forces, finalizing the plan of action for these units (21)
• In mid-July, Georgian intelligence received reports of Russian fighter aircraft being moved to North Ossetia (23)
• Either on August 4 or 5, Moscow pre-deployed additional military aircraft from the Ivanovo base outside of Moscow to the Mozdok air base in North Ossetia (23)
  • That included the war place A-50, capable of directing an air war against Georgia (23)
• Parts of the Black See Fleet based in Sevastopol had left port several days before August 7 and was preparing for a major operation. (23)

• From 15 July to 2 August 2008, Russian troops carried out large-scale training exercises known as “Kavkaz-2008” (Caucasus-2008) in the North Caucasus Military District, near the Russian Georgian border and on the Black Sea. The Russian exercise officially involved approximately 8 000 Russian troops. [Some analysts believe that the number of troops involved “may have been intentionally understated”]. (IIFFMCG II, 207)

IIFFMCG III

• 15 July-2 August: Kavkaz 2008 exercises. 8000 soldiers and 700 armored vehicles mainly from the North Caucasus Military District participate in these trainings, including airborne units, air force units, it defense units, Black Sea and Caspian Sea fleets, federal security service and interior troops. Airborne units fromm Pskov and Novorossiysk (that later took part in the invasion) practiced at the Roki and mamisoni passes connecting Russia with Georgia. (20)
  • Leaflet called Know Your Enenmy distributed to the soldiers participating in the training, listing the composition and armaments of the Georgian Army as their main target (20)
  • Most of the troops participating in the exercises did not redeploy after the end (20)
  • Deputy Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, General Viacheslav Borisov, who was put in charge of the Russian armed forces grouping operating on the SO and Central Georgian directions in August 2008 also confirmed that just one week earlier the units under his command had undergone military trainings in those areas where the actual hostilities took place and hence Russian airborne troops carried out a March on Tskhinvali much better than other units of the Russian army (20)
• By the end of July, large tens were set up on the new Russian military base in the northwestern part of Tskhinvali for 1500-2000 people, allegedly for the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade from Botlikh (Daghestan) (Georgian intelligence) (21)

Immediate Response 2008

• The US exercises were called "Immediate Response 2008" and included servicemen from the United States, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
  • According to the officials, the exercises had been planned months in advance.
  • The exercises were held at the former Russian military base in Vaziani.
  • 127 American participating troops served as trainers in the exercises.
  • Counter-insurgency action was the focal point of the joint exercise.
  • The Georgian brigade was trained to serve in Iraq.
  • A total of 1,630 servicemen, including 1,000 American troops, took part in the exercise, which concluded on 31 July.
  • American troops had already left Georgia when the Russian invasion of Georgia began in August 2008.

IIFFMCG I

• Immediate Response was an annual exercise (19)
• It took place at the Vaziani base (19)
• It involved around 2000 soldiers from Georgia, the US, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine (19)

ASMUS

• In an early May NATO-Russia consultation, Russian Defense chief General Yury Baluyevsky warned that there could be a war in Georgia in the summer and asked NATO to cancel the exercises or risk having soldiers caught in the crossfire (149)

IIFFMCG II

• Tskhinvali: "In late July a joint US-Georgian military exercise entitled “Immediate Response” was held in the territory of Georgia. The exercise was designed to test the tactics of running a military operation against South Ossetia. The Georgian army units that took part in the exercise were redeployed towards the South Ossetia border following the completion of the exercise. At the same time the Georgian Government continued to evacuate ethnic Georgian population on a massive scale from the future area of hostilities." (195)
• In mid-July, a yearly U.S.-led military exercise called “Immediate Response” took place at the Vaziani base outside Tbilisi, involving approximately 2 000 troops from Georgia, the United States, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. (207)

Shelling of Georgian villages near Tskhinvali

AUGUST 1

• A Georgian police car was blown up at 08:05 on the Eredvi-Kheiti road.
  • Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) commander's media assistant Captain Vladimir Ivanov reported that JPKF military observers from all three sides and OSCE representatives investigated a bomb attack.
  • The explosion, which had been probably engineered by South Ossetian separatists, injured five Georgian policemen.
  • 122 mm artillery shells had been used to make the bombs, according to Russian peacekeepers.
• According to the Russian peacekeepers, a Georgian sniper from near to the village of Prisi killed one South Ossetian militia member at about 18:17.
  • South Ossetian de facto leader Eduard Kokoity claimed late that day that a "sniper war" was being conducted by Georgia and accused Ukraine and the United States of being responsible for this.[28]
• Ossetian separatists began shelling Georgian villages on 1 August at the earliest, with a sporadic response from Georgian peacekeepers and other troops in the region
  • During the night of 1/2 August, the worst outbreak of violence in the past four years happened.
  • South Ossetia accused Georgia of firing first.
  • South Ossetian authorities reported that the number of killed Ossetians was six (including one North Ossetian peacekeeper), and the number of injured was fifteen.
  • Georgian Interior Ministry stated that the Georgian villages of Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli and Ergneti were shelled.
  • The Georgian casualties were six injured civilians and one injured policeman.
  • Georgian defense ministry official Mamuka Kurashvili said that the Georgians only responded to the South Ossetian shelling and suspected that Russian peacekeepers were also involved in the shelling of the Georgian villages.[28]
• In the evening, Georgian forces kill 6 SO militiamen, including four via sniper (Asmus, 26)

3 AUGUST

• On 3 August, the Russian government said that the situation was becoming more and more dangerous.
• The South Ossetians began evacuation from probable war into Russia, which resulted in twenty bus-loads of refugees leaving the region on the first day.[29]
  • According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1,100 refugees arrived in North Ossetia by bus in early August.[30]
  • According to the former secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia, Anatoly Barankevich, about 35,000 people were evacuated from South Ossetia.[31]
• It was reported on 3 August that five battalions of the Russian 58th Army were moved to the vicinity of Roki Tunnel in North Ossetia.[32]
• South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity said on 4 August that about 300 volunteers had arrived from North Ossetia to help fight the Georgians, and thousands more were expected from the North Caucasus.[citation needed]
• Georgian minister Temur Iakobashvili travelled to South Ossetia to propose direct talks.
  • He was not let into Tskhinvali and the separatists refused to meet him.
  • Iakobashvili met with the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Marat Kulakhmetov and Georgian commander Mamuka Qurashvili at the Ergneti checkpoint.
  • Iakobashvili earlier had told a Georgian newspaper that the Georgian government would begin direct talks with the South Ossetian separatists "without any conditions", but would only agree to "a solution founded upon respect for Georgia's territorial integrity."
• SO authorities organized a massive evacuation of civilians in front of 50 Russian journalists (Glucksmann, 23)
• The evacuation was done under the guise of "vacationing in North Ossetia" (Gachechiladze 2017, 540)

4 AUGUST

• OSCE spot report notes that the fighting since August 1 had been the most serious since 2004 (Asmus, 26)
• Deputy FM Grigol Vashadze sneaks into destroyed village of Nuli and proposes taking the diplomatic corps there to let them see the destruction (Asmus, 27)
  • EU Special Representative Peter Semneby attested back to Brussels that there was evidence of mortar fire by South Ossetia against Georgian positions (Asmus, 27)
  • In his report, he added "at this stage, it does not look like the sides are interested in a large-scale military conflict but a small local conflict with fatilities Is highly likely." (Asmus, 27)
• The OSCE was much more distressing, warning that the situation on the ground was becoming dangerous (Asmus, 27)
  • The world's attention was on the Beijings Olympics. (Asmus, 27)

5 AUGUST

• On 5 August, Georgian authorities had organised a tour for journalists and diplomats to demonstrate the separatist-caused damage.
  • Russian ambassador-at-large Yuri Popov declared that Russia would intervene on the side of South Ossetia.
  • South Ossetian president Kokoity blamed Georgia of "attempting to spark a full-scale war".[33]
  • The South Ossetian presidential envoy to Moscow, Dmitry Medoyev, declared that volunteers were already arriving, primarily from North Ossetia, to South Ossetia. He said that the regions of North Caucasus and the Cossacks were ready to help South Ossetia. He claimed that Tskhinvali relied mostly on its own forces.[34]
• On 5 August, Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia agreed to hold negotiations on 7 August, with Georgian minister Temur Iakobashvili attending talks in Tskhinvali.
  • However, Georgia still opposed to the format of the Joint Control Commission.[32]
  • The Georgian state minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili said that a meeting between him and Boris Chochiev was decided and chief Russian negotiator over South Ossetia, Yuri Popov, would be attending.
  • However, later the South Ossetians denied any agreement for such meeting.[35]

6 AUGUST

• On 6 August, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that Boris Chochiev said that the South Ossetians had agreed to "a consultative meeting" in Tskhinvali on 7 August.
• However, later the South Ossetians refused to participate in bilateral talks, demanding a JCC session.[35]
• On 6 August, it was reported that the South Ossetian claim of having killed twenty-nine Georgian servicemen in the clashes in the past week was not proven.[32]
• Kokoity made a televised address in military uniform, warning the Georgian government to leave all of South Ossetian territory or face attack (Asatiani, 479)
• Kokoity's address calls for the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages (Glucksmann, 24)
• For the first time since the 1990s, Russians take over control of the Georgian side of the Roki Tunnel (Glucksmann, 24)

ASATIANI

• In shelling Georgia villages, Ossetian forces used artillery among others (478-479)
• In the first days of August, hundreds of Kazak and North Caucasian paramilitary fighters were broght in SO from Russia, shown Russian TV as heroes going to fight for their Ossetian brothers (479)
• Meanwhile, Tskhinvali was evacuated of women and children, a move that looked somehow inadequate at the moment (479)

GALLEOTI

• South Ossetia started shelling Georgian villages on August 1 (125)
• The aim was to provoke Saakashvili into some kind of action that would force a Russian invasion (125)

• The blowing up of the police car on July 31 (August 1?) was what started the conflict that degenerated into a full-blown war (Panfilov, 74)

BLUASHVILI

• From July 29 to August 7, 6 Georgian policemen, 11 Georgian peacekeepers and 14 civilians were injured in the shellings (398)
• On August 6-7, Saakashvili sought to call Medvedev several times, but failed (399)

ASMUS

• By August 7, according to Andrei Illiaronov, there were some 1,200 Russian soldiers, medical and communication units already stationed in South Ossetia illegally by August 7 (22)
  • Another 12,000 troops were stationed on the other side of the border "ready to immediately cross the border to provide assistance to the peacekeepers of South ossetia", as one Russian official put it, since the end of the military games (22)
• Sources, including Russian media ones, talked about the presence of elements of the 135th and 693rd Regiments of the 58th Atmy and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade and several tank units, moving into SO between August 2 and 7 (22)
  • These were in addition to the North Ossetian, Chechen, and Cossak volunteers officially mobilized by Moscow and registered by Russian military authorities before being sent across the border where a number of them were assigned to the NO peacekeeping battalion on August 3 (22)
    • Many of these volunteers would be the very ones to implement the ethnic cleansing later during and after the war (22)
• "When South Ossetian paramilitary forces opened fire on Georgian positions and villages on July 29, those barrages were more systemic and lethan in previous summers" (26)
  • They included 100 mm and 120mm artillery, heavier weaponry officially banned in the conflict zone and never before used there, indicating their Russian origin (26)
• On August 4, Kulakhmetov confirmed the use of banned weapons against Georgian villages (26)
• Intercepted phone calls between Russian and NO peacekeepers showed them collaborating with South Ossetian militia to target Georgians and hide evidence (26)
• Six Georgian policemen, 11 peacekeepers, and 14 civilians had been wounded (26)
  • 2 Georgians were KIA and two more died later
  • Georgian villages were shut down, cut off, and destroyed (26)
• Controversial use of "human shields" by the South Ossetian militia, although using peacekeepers (26-27)

IIFFMCG II

• From 24 to 28 July, several explosions occurred in the southern environs of Tskhinvali and in the Georgian-administered village of Avnevi, close to the post of the Georgian Peacekeeping Force (PKF) battalion. (206)
• From 29 to 31 July, exchanges of fire were reported between the Georgian-administered village of Sveri and the South Ossetian-administered village of Andzisi in the Sarabuki area, where the Georgian and Ossetian JPKF battalions established their posts after the events of 3 July. (206)
  • On the same day, exchanges of fire also took place in the area of Khetagurovo between the South Ossetian militia post and the Georgian police post on the Georgian Avnevi-Zemo Nikozi by-pass road. (206)
• On 29 July, a Joint Monitoring Team of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) came under fire, but neither side admitted responsibility for the incident. (206)
• In the meantime, both sides started to strengthen their positions and to build new fortifications in various strategic locations in the conflict zone, including in the villages of Tliakana, Khetagurovo, Zemo Prisi, Didi Gromi, Kverneti, Kusireti, Chorbauli and the Tsunarishba reservoir on the Ossetian side and, on the Georgian side, in the village of Prisi and close to the Georgian by-pass road running from Avnevi to Zemo Nikozi. (206-207)
  • Also reported were the completion of construction by a Russian company of a military base (Ugardanta) in the Java district and a so-called military rehabilitation centre in the north-western part of Tskhinvali. (207)
• On 1 August, an improvised explosive device that went off on the Georgian Eredvi-Kheiti road by-passing Tskhinvali left five Georgian policemen injured. (207)
  • During the evening and night of 1 2 August, a series of intense and extensive exchanges of fire including sniper fire and mortar shelling occurred in the conflict zone, causing fatalities and casualties. (207-208)
  • The events on 1-2 August were assessed by the OSCE Mission to Georgia as the most serious outbreak of fire since the 2004 conflict. Exchanges of fire continued in the nights of 2-3 and 3-4 August. (208)
• Beginning in the afternoon of 6 August fire was exchanged along virtually the whole line of contact between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides, with particular hotspots in the Avnevi Nuli-Khetagurovo area (west of Tskhinvali) and the Dmenisi-Prisi area (east of Tskhinvali). (208)

IIFFMCG III

• 29 July, 0500: Two tank platoons of SO irregular forces placed close to village of Andzisi per Georgian intelligence (21)
  • 1000: SO irregular forces open fire at members of the KPKF and an OSCE observer group moving near Andzisi (21)
  • 1600: SO irregular forces shell the GE-controlled Big Liakhvi villages for 40 minutes with mortars and grenade launchers
  • 2200: SO irregular forces shell the Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint on Sarabuki heights with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery. This big caliber used for the first time since the end of the hostilities in the 1990s (21)
• 1 August, 0805 and 0812: Toyota pickup truck carrying six police officers of the Georgian MIA hit by two remote control explosive devices on the Eredvi-Kheiti bypass road, severely injuring five police officers. The road is closed for civilian use, isolating the Georgian villages in SO (21)
  • 2130- : SO irregular forces shell Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikoxzi, Avnevi, Ergneti, Eredvi and Zemo Prisi with mortars and cannons. Shelling goes on all night and stops in the morning of Aug 2. August 4 report of the JPKF confirms the incident. Six civilians and one policeman are injured (21)
• 2 August, 1223: SO announces evacuation of civilian population from Tskhvinvali and villages. Evacuation continues till Aug. 6 (22)
• 3 August, 0630: SO irregular forces deployed in Velebi, Znauri district open fire towards Georgian police checkpoint near Dvani in Kareli district (22)
  • SO MIA Mikhail Mindzaev threatens to bomb tGori and Kareli (22)
  • Georgian intelligence reports units of the reconnaissance battalion of the 19th Motor Rifle Division of the 58th Russian Army to have been deployed in Java District through Roki Tunnel (22)
• 4 August (22)
  • Early hours: 10 units of armor (BTR/BMP vehicles) are brought into SO from Russia and distributed among the irregular forces. 2 vehicles were handed over to the irregular units in Dmenisi
  • 0730: SO forces based in Dmenisi opened fire towards Georgian peacekeeping checkoing in Sarabuki Heights. Exchange of fire for 30 minutes
  • Kokoity tells Caucasian Knot that 300 volunteers from NO arrived in SO and their number would increase to 2,000
  • At 1840, Kokoity receives a telegram from Viktor Vodolatsky, Comamnder of Don Cossack Forces and member of the Duma, promising himmilitary support. Nikolai Kozitsin, Commander of the Second Don Cossack Forces, announces being able to send 10,000-15,000 volunteers to SO (22)
• 5 August: 0015: SO irregular forces shoot 3 grenades from Ubiati (Znauri) towards Georgian police station in Nuli (Frone Valley), with two hitting the building (23)
  • 0130: SO forces fire at Georgian peacekeepers located at Sarabuki heights until 0630. Two Georgian peacekeepers are wounded (23)
  • 0901: Georgian MIA intercepts phone call with SO's Mindzaev ordering a massive attack and the elimination of the Georgian villages of Dvani (23)
  • 1000-1700: MIA organizes tour of Ergneti, Nikozi, Avnevi and Nuli for international media and foreign missions (inc. Russian Ambassador) to witness firsthand the damage. Tour include visit to all peacekeeping and police checkpoints. No build up is observed contrary to Russian claims (23)
  • 1510: 150 North Caucasus volunteers arrive in Tskhinvali.
  • 1805: Vladimir Voronin, Deputy Commander of DOn Cossack Forces, announces in an interview that volunteer battalions had been formed in Southern Russia and were ready to be deployed in SO, while Dmitry Medoev (representative of SO in Moscow) declared that the first squads of volunteers from Russia had already reached SO (23)
  • Throughout the day, 40 units of self-propelled artillery and a reconnaissance battalion of the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade from Botlikh are deployed in SO through the RT, in addition to that 30 artillery guns are brought into the Java district. Some units of the 58th Army are reportedly mobilized near the RT in NO, including the 135th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment from Prokhladniy and the 693rd Motor Rifle Regiment from Zaramag (Georgian intelligence) (23)
  • In the evening, several tanks and military trucks with armed soldiers are detected by Georgian intelligence moving towards the Georgian villages of Avnevi (24)
• August 6: In the early hours, several units of armor including BTR and BMP vehicles and self-propelled artillery systems are brought into SO from Russia and deployed near the southern entrance of the RT per Georgian Intelligence (24)
  • In the morning, Russian military base employees in Tskhinvali are furloughed and all local shops are closed (24)
  • 1600: SO forces open mortar fire from Prinevi, Ubiati, and Khetagurovo against the GE villages of Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli. Georian police and peacekeeping checkpoints in Nuli are targeted by armored vehicle and machine gun fire. Attack lasts three hours. (24)
  • 1800: SO forces attack Sarabuki heights where Georgian peacekeepers were stationed woulding 3 members of the Georgian battalion of the JPKF (24)
  • 2000: Artillery attacks from Khetagurovo on Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli until 0600 of next day
  • JPKF ends monitoring in the conflict zone, despite request by Georgian battalion (24)

Georgian response and Russian invasion

• Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) reported that events in South Ossetia could only be assessed as war.
• Starting with the night of 6–7 August, there was continuous fire.
• At 6 AM on the morning of 7 August, firing resumed.
• A reporter concluded that assault rifles, heavy artillery and grenade launchers were used.
• Tskhinvali hospital had been receiving the wounded all night.
• According to the Tskhinvali hospital, they received 14 wounded people.
• Anatoly Barankevich, the secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia, claimed that the clashes began when the Georgians unsuccessfully attempted to seize a key height near the village Nuli on 6 August.
  • According to Barankevich, Georgian special troops from the ministry of defense attempted to capture the Prisi Heights on the morning of 7 August.
• The hotel administrator in Tskhinvali refused to accept payment from a NG reporter, saying, "Maybe, here something will happen, that you will have to leave prematurely. So the bank won't work, and we won't be able to refund your money."
• JPKF commander's assistant Vladimir Ivanov told NG that the peacekeepers had documented five illegal overflights of the Georgian Su-25 jets from the Gori district towards Java and three drones during the night of 6–7 August.
• Nezavisimaya Gazeta also reported that Russian troops were being pulled towards the Georgian border, however Russian military claimed that they continued their exercises.
• According to the phone calls intercepted by the Georgian intelligence, regular (non-peacekeeping) Russian military entered South Ossetia in the early hours of 7 August through the Roki Tunnel.
• Later that day, even the state-controlled Russian TV showed Abkhazia's de facto president Sergei Bagapsh, who said at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council: "I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area."[38]
• Although South Ossetian separatists initially said in the morning that six people were wounded after fire exchange during the night and morning, later they said that the casualties were increased to eighteen.
• The Georgian Interior Ministry said the Georgian villages of Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani and Nuli were shelled on late 6 August and two Georgian peacekeepers were wounded.
  • The South Ossetians claimed that fire recommenced at about 10.[39]
  • According to Russia Today, after Russian peacekeepers intervened in the conflict, fire exchange stopped for 40 minutes.
  • South Ossetian de facto president Kokoity said that "South Ossetia stopped shooting for 40 minutes".
• Around 14:00, the South Ossetians renewed their shelling and killed two Georgian peacekeepers in Avnevi.
  • According to Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze, these were the first Georgian deaths in South Ossetia since the nineties.[40]
• At about 14:30, Georgian tanks, 122 mm howitzers and 203 mm self-propelled artillery began heading towards South Ossetia to dissuade separatists from additional attacks.[41]
• According to The Washington Post, Georgian infantry left their bases in late afternoon and began moving toward South Ossetia.
• During the afternoon, OSCE monitors recorded Georgian military traffic, including artillery, on roads near Gori.[40]
• In the afternoon, Georgian personnel left the Joint Peacekeeping Force headquarters in Tskhinvali.[42][43]
• Georgian official said that South Ossetian militia blew up an APC by a rocket propelled grenade and three Georgian peacekeepers were wounded.[44][45]
• Temur Iakobashvili had refused any talks in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) format, since the commission "is responsible for what is happening in the region," adding if Russian "puppets" would not be forced to negotiate then Russia's status as a mediator would be "in doubt."
• A Russian co-chairman of the JCC, Yury Popov, said in Tbilisi he was going to visit Tskhinvali with Iakobashvili: "We have not yet arranged a trip to Tskhinvali...The negotiations will be held if the situation allows it."
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity had earlier warned Popov that his visit to Tskhinvali would be "dangerous".
  • Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling on Russia to force the separatists to stop the systematic shelling and saying, "Responsibility for the latest events lies with Russia."
  • The Georgian diplomats said that mercenaries and military hardware were moving to South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel.
• In the afternoon South Ossetia claimed that lots of Georgian troops were advancing towards them.
• Abkhaz Defense Minister Mirab Kishmaria had said earlier: "The Abkhazian Security Council held a meeting [earlier] today, where our republic's Commander-in-Chief Sergei Bagapsh gave me instructions to put our troops on combat readiness."[46]
• At 16:00, Temur Iakobashvili arrived in Tskhinvali for a previously-arranged meeting with South Ossetians and Russian diplomat Yuri Popov;[41] however, Russia's special envoy, who blamed a flat tire, did not appear;[5] and neither did the Ossetians.[42]
  • Temur Iakobashvili met with General Marat Kulakhmetov (the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force), who said that Russian peacekeepers could not stop Ossetian attacks and Georgia should implement a ceasefire.[41] "Nobody was in the streets – no cars, no people," Iakobashvili told journalists several days later.[40]
• According to Russia Today, by the evening four people were reported to have been killed and more than two dozen wounded.
  • Later it was reported that about 12 people were killed and more than 20 injured on 7 August.[47]
• At 18:10, Russian peacekeepers told the OSCE monitors that Georgian artillery was fired on Khetagurovo.
  • But independent verification of this report was impossible.[48]
• At around 19:00, Georgian President Saakashvili, ordered a unilateral ceasefire and no-response order.[49]
  • "A sniper war is ongoing against residents of villages [in the South Ossetian conflict zone] and as I speak now intense fire is ongoing from artillery, from tanks, from self-propelled artillery systems – which have been brought into the conflict zone illegally – and from other types of weaponry, including from mortars and grenade launchers," Saakashvili said in a live TV address at 19:10.
  • Saakashvili called for negotiations "in any type of format," reaffirmed the offer of "unrestricted autonomy" for South Ossetia, proposed that Russia should become the guarantor of that solution, offered a general amnesty, and pleaded for international help to stop the hostilities.[49]
  • Ceasefire was announced after a skirmish that had killed up to ten Georgian peacekeepers and civilians, according to the Georgian authorities.[50]
• Russia regarded the ceasefire as an attempt to buy time to deploy Georgian forces for an offensive.[40]
  • The separatists shelled Tamarasheni and Prisi after Saakashvili's ceasefire.
  • They destroyed Avnevi and a police station in Kurta (seat of the Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia).
  • The escalated attacks forced civilians to flee the Georgian villages.[3][5]
  • Georgian Interior Ministry official later told the Russian newspaper Kommersant (on 8 August) that after this, "it became clear" that South Ossetians wouldn't stop firing and the Georgian casualties were 10 killed and 50 wounded.[51]
• Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili called the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, Daniel Fried.
  • She told him that Russian tanks were moving towards South Ossetia, but Fried replied that war must be avoided.[1]
• Georgian forces returned fire after the separatist shelling.[3]
  • Mamuka Kurashvili, head of the Georgian peacekeeping operations, told journalists late on August 7 that the South Ossetian violation of a unilateral ceasefire forced Georgia "to restore constitutional order".[52]
  • Georgia said the operation against the separatists would establish a "durable peace". South Ossetian envoy to Moscow, Dmitry Medoyev called the ceasefire that was announced on 7 August a "smokescreen".[53]
• The United Nations Security Council meeting was organized on 7 August at 23:00 (US EST time) upon Russias's request. Georgia participated in a follow-up open meeting held at 01:15 (US EST time) on 8 August. A discussion for a press statement calling for an end to hostilities did not reach a consensus.[54]

ASATIANI

• Georgian intelligence confirmed that Russian military with heavy equipment and artillery crossed the border, starting the Russian invasion (479)
• Saakashvili only then ordered Georgia's advance into Tskhinvali (479)

GALLEOTI

• The original Georgian plan (which was provoked by Russia) was to seize Tskhinvali and block the Roki Tunnel and the Transcaucasian Military Highway to prevent the arrival of reinforcements (126)
• Tbilisi hoped to have seize the main settlements in the region within four days, such that they could install a new friendly local administration and turn policing and mop-up duties to a force of reservist soldiers and police (126)
• The 4th Georgian Brigade was to seize Khetagurovi (West of Tskhinvali), while the 3rd Brigade was to take the Prisi Heights (East of Tskhinvali), meeting at Gupti to the north and encircling entirely Tskhinvali (126)
• The plan was to then race along the S10 highway to capture Java and close off the Roki Tunnel (126)
  • The responsibility for taking Tskhinvali was given to the MIA (126)
• Just before midnight on 7 August, Georgian started to bimbard Tskhinvali with more than 100 mortars and artillery pieces and 30 MRLs (127)
• The goal was to target strategic locations, but the reality was messier. Some civilian targets were hit (127)
• Among the collateral damage was the compound of the Russian peacekeepers under Lt. Colonel Konstantin Timerman, which Tbilisi wanted to avoid (127)
• This was called an illegal act of aggression by Moscow (127)
  • But Russian troops had already been on the move when that happened (127)
    • They were given orders around 0100 on August 8 to move into Georgia (127)
    • Around 0200, a battalion from the 693rd Motor Rifle Regiment crossed the border, followed by another from the 135th Motor Rifle Regiment (127)
    • Their mission was to secure the Roki Tunnel and the S10 highway for further Russian troops (127)

GLUCKSMANN

• "The goal in itslf was not to take Tskhinvali but to neutralize the enemy positions that had been bombing for days our lines and villages under our control and to block the advance of Russian troops that had entered the Georgian territory via the Roki Tunnel 20 hours before" (11)
• Saakashvili claims having recordings of South Ossetian border guards via cell phone describing the entry of Russian forces via Roki at 0352 on August 7 (12)
• The NYT did an investigation that confirmed the recordings (13)
• Saakashvili described the assault on Tskhinvali as a "simple invasion of a sovereign country by the army of Moscow, followed by a Georgian counter-attack (13)
• Russia alleged that the 7 August troops were peacekeepers, although Georgia rejected this claim, on the ground that all peacekeeping rotations must have a preciding notice (14)
• Saakashvili was in his office with Iakobashvili and faced the choice of either looking like the victim and not reacting to the Russian troops, or risk losing face and prevent a full-blown invasion by giving the world time to react (15)
• Saakashvili then gave the order to blow up the Roki Tunnel, with avoiding civilian deaths at all costs. (16)
• What Saakashvili predicts would have happened without his reaction would have been a direct annexation of South Ossetia and claimed lands (17)
• Saakashvili refused to bring to the SO front the Western troops, which were meant to keep stability in the Abkhaz conflict zone. He also rejected proposals to bring home troops in Iraq on August 7 (24)
• Shelling was coming from the Russian peacekeepers base (25)
• In the afternoon of August 7, General Kulakhmetov, head of Russian peacekeepers, told Georgian authorities that the Ossetians had become "uncontrollable" (25)
• Iakobashvili arrived for last minute talks in Tskhinvali around 1500 (25)
  • Iakobashvili was told by Russian peacekeepers that they were not planning to intervene in the Ossetians' shelling (25-26)
  • Yuri Popov, head negotiator of the Russian side, refused meeting with Iakobashvili (26)
• At 1800, Iakobashvili was ordered back to Tbilisi to announce a unilateral ceasefire (27)
• Tbilisi was told by Russia that the Russian troops' arrival was only meant to keep calm between Ossetians and Georgians (27)
• After hours of unilateral ceasefire and continuous shelling, Saakashvili gave three orders: neutralize shelling targets in the north of Tskhinvali, stop the Russians South of Roki, avoid the shelling of civilian neighborhoods (27)
• Saakashvili on how he knew the Russian forces' arrival into SO was not for peacekeeping purposes: "The massive character of the troops' entry, of tanks and armored vehicles, the unusually violent and continuous shelling of our positions around Tskhinvali, the crazy declarations of Kokoity on Georgian villages to recuperate and cleanse, the obvious refusal to start any serious negotiation with us, the mass hysteria on Rssian television" (28)
• At 2030, Saakashvili Tells Kezerashvili: "Even if our soldiers die, do not open fire" (28)
• His military advisers said that a barrage of fire was necessary to help evacuations on the ground (28)

• Batu Kutelia said later that Georgian forces had received the "green light" from Russian forces to neutralize Ossetian militias (Zourabichvili, 317)

BLUASHVILI

• On August 7, two Georgian soldiers were killed and another two would later die from injuries (398)
• Kulakhmetov admitted on August 7 that Ossetians were shelling Georgian positions from bases near the Russian peacekeeper base, but "they could not be controlled" (398)
• At 19:00, Saakashvili gave a unilateral ceasefire order and a "no-response order" (399)
  • At 2030, Merabishvili called Saakashvili and briefed that the shelling of villages was continuing, to which Saakashvili refused to lift the ceasefire order (399)
  • At 2230, Kezerashvili briefed Saakashvili that heavy artillery bombing of Georgian positions made the evacuation of injured soldiers and civilians impossible, to which MS still refused to break the ceasefire (399)
• Russian troop reinforcements had already entered South Ossetia on August 7 at 1530 (403)

• Georgian forces started shelling with heavy fire Tskhinvali at 23:55 (Gachechiladze, 541)

IIFFMCG I

• "The shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents." (11)
• The beginning of the war is considered by the IIFFMCG to be the Georgian military operation launched against Tskhinvali with a massive artillery attack (19)
  • Mamuka Kurashvili originally called it "restoring constitutional order in the territory of South Ossetia" (19)
• The order was given at 2335 on August 7 by President Saakashvili to launch a defensive operation "to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the security of Georgia's citizens" (19)
  • The order asked for the protection of civilians in South Ossetia, the neutralization of firing positions firing against civilian Georgian targets, and halting the movement of regular Russian units through the Roki Tunnel (19-20)
• The IIFFMCG found that the Georgian allegations of a Russian invasion were supported inter alia by claims of illegal entry into South Ossetia of a large number of Russian troops and armour before the launch of the Georgian operation (20)
• Russia claims that its forces entered Georgian (SO) territory at 1430 on August 8, along with a Russian air force and artillery campaign (20)
• The IIFFMCG confirms that there were Russian forces in South Ossetia other than the peacekeeping battalion before 1430 on Aug 8 (20)
  • Air bombing campaigns by Russia started already in the morning of August 8, before 1430 (20)

ASMUS

• Besides the Russians entering through the Roki Tunnel, the 2335 order included the Russian column coming from Java (19)
• The orders were given by phone to his command (19)
• In the morning of August 7, at 0400, South Ossetian border guards were discussing in an intercepted phone call the entry of Russian troops and the takeover of the Roki Tunnel by Russian border guards (19-20)
  • Georgian intelligence estimated as many as 150 pieces of armor to be transported through the tunnel (20)
  • The intercepts talked about the arrival of the 693rd Regiment of the 19th Division of the 58th Army, not authorized in Georgia, as well as elements of the 135th Regiment (20)
  • Georgian intelligence estimated as many as 550 men to have entered through the Roki Tunnel that night (20)
  • Also on that 6-7 Agust night, Georgian peacekeepers noted the movement of Russian heavy artillery from Java to Tskhinvali and when Tbilisi asked Marat Kulakhmetov for explanations, the latter never gave any (20)
  • Georgian intelligence believed that more Russian forces would enter through the Roki Tunnel on 7-8 August night unless stopped (20)
  • ASMUS calls "the final straw" the Russian artillery column going from Java to Tskhinvali (20-21)
• Asmus calls the claim that Russia entered Georgia at 1400 on August 8 "simply not credible", though the exact moment of Russia's entry remains passionately disputed (21-22)
  • This is because the Roki Tunnel was entirely controlled by Russia and there was no chance for international monitors to back Russia's claims (22)
• Krasnaya Zvezda published an article after the war featuring an interview with a wounded Russian captain from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment admitting that his battalion was already in SO on August 7 (22)
  • That article was eventually retracted and the captain disappeared from the public view (22)
• Throughout the day on August 7, Georgian intelligence reported Russian units gathering both north of the Roki Tnnel and around the Ugardanta military base outside of Java, thought to have been disbanded years ago (23)
• Throughout the day, Saakashvili sought to call Medvedev but failed (23)
• Despite US warnings, Saakashvili's main fears were as follows: (24)
  • Shelling of Georgian villages in the Didi Liakhvi Valley that Tbilisi had pledged to protect
  • Loss of Kurta, key to Georgia's soft power towards Ossetians
  • Expectation that a Russian intervention would not be limited to South Ossetia and would aim to topple him (24)
• At 1300, Saakashvili convenes a NSC meeting with Merabishvili, Kezerashvili, Adeishvili (at the time chief of staff), Ugulava, and Lomaia. (31)
  • Absent and out of the country were Bakradze, Rurua, Bokeria, Tkeshelashvili, and Bezhuashvili (31)
  • Held at Presidential Guest House in Tserovani (31)
  • When asked, every member of the NSC agreed that Russia had crossed a red line with all the recent developments, including entering through the Roki Tunnel (31)
  • It was during that meeting that another Georgian peacekeepers was killed (31-32)
    • Saakashvili gave the order to deploy Georgian troops to the edge of the conflict zone in case they were needed and at 1430, the MOD gave the public mobilization order (32)
    • At 1800, those forces were deployed to the edge of SO (32)
• On August 7, the MOD ordered the Fourth Infantry Brigade was ordered to end its US-led pre-deployment training for Iraq and to move to Gori to prepare to fight the Russians (32-33)
• Besides Popov's inability to meet, South Ossetian representatives had refused to meet with Yakobashvili on Aug 7 (33)
• Yakobashvili met with Kulakhmetov in the Nizhniy Gorodok, the HQ of the Russian command of the peacekeeping mission (34)
• Yakobashvili's announcement for a ceasefire was at 1840 and it was done on TV because it was the only way to reach SO (35)
  • Georgian forces were deploying to the conflict zone in the meantime (35)
• At 2030, Merabishvili told MS that the shelling had refused (35-36)
• At 2230, Kezerashvili told MS that the shelling had intensified and more villages were being shelled (36)
• Third report of increased shelling at 2330, in addition to scout reports of a Russian military column heading from Java to Tskhinvali (36)
• The order to stop the Russian columns and suppress Ossetian shelling and minimize civilian casualties was given to Zaza Gogava at 2335 (36)
• According to Georgian intelligence reports, the first units of the 58th Army were in Tskhinvali by 0144 on Aug 8 (36)
• Prior to launching the Tskhinvali assault, Kurashvili phoned Kulakhmetov to let him know that Russian peacekeeping positions would not be targeted as long as they remained neutral (43)
  • Peacekeepers were stationed at 14 differnt stations in the region (43)
• The first Russian peacekeepers were killed when exchanges took place on the ground around 0600 on August 8, when Russians fired from the Verkhniy Gorodok base, where some members of the SO leadership had sought refuge (43-44)

IIFFMCG II

• The Georgian view of the events: "On August 7th 2008, the Russian Federation launched a large-scale invasion on Georgia’s sovereign territory. This use of force was illegal and unjustified under international law. It constituted an egregious breach of Georgia’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It violated also the key principle of non-intervention in international law and relations, and its magnitude and scale made it an act of aggression." (186)
  • None of the existing (collective authorization, self-defence, consent) or purported (humanitarian intervention, protection of nationals, protection of peacekeepers, force in support of a legitimate self-determination claim) exceptions to this general prohibition justify or render lawful the Russian invasion. (186)
  • "The first military clash between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian forces occurred at about 6 a.m. on August 8, while the large scale military deployment of the Russian troops started in the early morning of August 7." (187)
  • Moreover, the Russian peacekeeping base attacked by Georgian forces was directly participating in the hostilities and they no longer enjoyed the protection normally accorded to them under international law. It must once again be noted that only those peacekeeping regiments and infrastructure have been attacked by the Georgian forces, which directly participated in hostilities, whereas other Russian peacekeeping posts continued to function throughout the hostilities and have never been subject to attack. (187-188)
  • It needs to be noted that the first casualties in the peacekeeping contingents were incurred from the side of Georgian peacekeepers. Two Georgian peacekeepers Shalva Trapaidze and Vitali Takadze were killed and five wounded on August 7 at around 14:00 as a Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint was shelled with 100 and 120mm artillery from the proxy regime-controlled village Khetagurovo. A proxy militant reported to superiors the fact of killing Georgian peacekeepers in a telephone conversation also intercepted by the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs on 07.08.2008. (188)
  • "Finally, the Georgian response to the Russian armed attack was confined entirely to its own

sovereign territory, was reluctantly undertaken, and was a proportionate, necessary and wholly justified exercise of its customary and Charter right to use force in self-defence. " (188)

• Russian View: Does not address details of what time it entered Georgian territory. Claims its intervention was done to stop Georgia's attack against South Ossetia (188-190)
• After a short break in the morning, firing, involving mortars and artillery, continued on 7 August, reportedly causing human casualties and fatalities. The same day, international observers could see significant movements of Georgian troops and equipment towards Gori from the east and west. Other troops and equipment were observed stationary north of Gori, just outside the zone of conflict. (208)
  • Diplomatic efforts were undertaken on 7 August, involving the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration, Temuri Yakobashvili, the Russian Special Envoy for the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Ambassador Yuri Popov and the Commander of the JPKF, Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov. They aimed to arrange for high-level Georgian-South Ossetian peace talks but did not bring any positive results. (208)
  • In the afternoon of 7 August, Georgian representatives left the JPKF Headquarters in Tskhinvali. (208)
• At 19.00 hours (Tbilisi time) on 7 August, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated in a televised address that he had just ordered Georgian troops to unilaterally cease fire. He called on the South Ossetian and Russian sides to stop the bloodshed and to meet at the negotiating table in either bilateral or multilateral format. (208)
  • For some hours, the ceasefire seemed to be stable and was also observed by the South Ossetian side, until firing was reportedly resumed again at around 22.00 hours. (208-209)
• 2335: Georgian artillery units begin firing smoke bombs (209)
• 2350: Georgian artillery opens fire on both fixed and moving targets of the enemy forces on South Ossetian territory (209)
  • The interval between 2335 and 2350 was to allow the civilian population enough time to leave dangerous zones or to find protection/shelter (209)
• In the early morning of 8 August, Georgian troops launched a ground attack against Tskhinvali as well as operations on the left flank of the city and on the right flank. The flank operations seemed to aim at occupying important heights surrounding Tskhinvali and then at moving further northwards to take control of the stratetically important Gupta bridge and the roads, including the Ossetian-controlled Dzara bypass road, leading from the Roki Tunnel to Tskhinvali to block movements of the Russian troops from the North. (209)

IIFFMCG III

• Here are the developments of August 7 as viewed by Georgia
  • 0015-1000: SO forces attack Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, and Vanati with artillery including mortars and grenade launchers (24)
  • 0325: Georgian MIA obtains communication according to which a Russian military unit including tanks and military trucks loaded with soldiers entered the RT (24)
  • 0341: Large number of armored vehicles, tanks, and military trucks of the Russian regular army stream into the RT and are deployed in the Java District as confirmed by two mobile telephone conversations intercepted by the Georgian MIA. (24)
    • Multiple Russian media sources confirm that parts of the 693rd and 135th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 58th Army entered SO prior to August 8 (24)
    • SO authorities report that in the early night hours of August 7, Kokoity traveled to Java to meet with "representatives of the Russian MOD" (24-25)
  • 1042: In an interview to Russian TV, Kokoity threatens to "wipe out" Georgian forces (25)
  • 1100: SO forces resume shelling of Nuli and Avnevi from Khetagurovo (Znauri). Georgian police returns fire. (25)
  • 1200: Baghapsh announced putting the Abkhaz armed forces on alert to provide military assistance to SO and confirmed that a battalion of the NC Military District had already entered SO (25)
  • 1230: Saakashvili calls on Russia to recall its officials serving in the proxy regimes from the military hospital in Gori (25)
  • 1400: Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint in Avnevi is heavily shelled with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery by SO forces from Khetagurovo. Two Georgian peacekeepers (Shalva Trapaidze and Vitali Takadze) are killed and their armored vehicle is destroyed. Georgian police and peacekeepers return fire. A latter intercepted phone call confirms the use of a cannon to blow up the vehicle. The shelling lasts for two hours. (25)
  • Russian troops that stayed behind after Kavkaz 2008 are put on high alert in the afternoon and are given orders to prepare to move towards the Georgian border (25)
  • 1430: Georgian MOD declares mobilization of its forces, including armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery towards SO (25-26)
  • 1500-1700: Yakobashvili visits conflict zone to seek meetings with SO officials, who refused, after which he meets with Kulakhmetov, who states that he could not reach Kokoity and that the peacekeepers could not stop the attacks by SO forces. (26)
  • 1700: Kulakhemtov refuses to give additional security guarantees to the Georgian peacekeeping battalion in Tskhinvali. Kurashvili orders his officers to leave the JPKF HQ (26)
  • 1710: Georgian police and peacekeepers unilaterally cease fire to defuse tensions. (26)
  • 1910: Saakashvili announces unilateral ceasefire on television and calls on Russia and de facto regimes to negotiate (26)
  • 1955: Georgian MIA intercepts phone call of SO forces planning an artillery attack on Georgian villages (26)
  • 2030: SO forces resume the shelling of Georgian peacekeeping and police officers in Avnevi from Khetagurovo. OSCE MMOs confirm the breaking of the ceasefire. (26)
  • 2230: SO forces fire at Zemo Prisi and Tamarasheni from Tskhinvali and the Tliakana Mountain (26)
  • 2330: SO forces intensify artillery fire on all positions of Georgian police and peacekeepers in Avnevi, Nuli, Tamarasheni, and Kurta (Big Liakhvi, Little Liakhvi, and Frone Valleys). Police station in Kurta is destroyed (26)
  • 2335: Saakashvili issues three orders to the Joint Staff of the MOD: (27)
    • Protect civilians in SO
    • Neutralize firing positions from the fire against civilians and units originates
    • Halt movement of regular Russian units through Roki Tunnel and inside SO
    • This begins the militaryy action (27)
  • Also at 2335: Georgian Armed Forces artillery units start firing smoke bombs and at 2350, open fire at both fixed and moving targets of enemy forces in SO (27)

Diplomatic negotiations

Saakashvili's 2008 Abkhazia Peace Plan

• On 28 March 2008, the Office of the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration summmoned an international conference "The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Processes of Reintegration in Georgia".
  • The conference was attended by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili.
  • Saakashvili announced new initiatives on the Abkhaz conflict, which were a joint free economic zone, Abkhaz representation in the central government and an Abkhaz vice-president, the right to veto all Abkhaz-related decisions, limitless autonomy and various security guarantees.[324][325][326]
  • However, the initiatives were dismissed by Abkhaz separatists.
• On 17 April 2008, Georgian minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Giorgi Baramidze said if Abkhazia allowed the return of refugees, then Georgia would sign the treaty on non-use of force.[329]
• On 1 May 2008, Georgian Finance Minister Nika Gilauri announced that $150 million from the sale of Georgian-issued Eurobonds would be transferred to the Fund of Future Generations, which was intended to finance the development of the former breakaway regions after the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.
• Georgian and Abkhaz sides were talking about deescalation of tensions in early May. However, each side had different vision, with Georgians focusing on recent peace plan proposed by Saakashvili and the Abkhaz demanding the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge and abolition of Georgian sanctions.
• On 12 May 2008, Georgia's UN envoy Irakli Alasania visited Sukhumi to discuss peace plan with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh.
  • The peace plan included proposals on the Georgian commitment not to use force and Abkhaz commitment to allow the return of Georgian refugees.
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba commented that Abkhazia was not completely against this plan.
  • Bagapsh planned to visit Moscow on 19 May to get approval for the Abkhaz-Georgian peace plan.
• On 15 May 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution underlining the right of return of all refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in addition to their property rights.[343]
  • Russia voted against the Georgian-sponsored resolution.[344]
  • The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Georgian proposal was "a counterproductive step".[345]
• On 16 May 2008, Georgian minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili arrived in Moscow and proposed to hold an international conference on the settlement of the conflicts.
  • Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that the US and the EU involvement indicated that Georgia did not want the real solution to the conflicts.[346]
• On 23 May 2008, Temur Iakobashvili said after his visit to Moscow for the discussion of Saakashvili's peace plan that Georgia wanted to revise peacekeeping formats not because "we are expelling the Russians."
  • He added that "Russia should be one of the parties to the settlement, and not have the exclusive right to peacekeeping."
  • He said that additional Russian troops in Abkhazia were not peacekeepers, but "illegal armed formations."
  • Sources in the administration of the Russian president said that Russian peacekeepers would not leave Abkhazia even if Georgia demanded their withdrawal; instead Russian troops would remain as allied forces per future military agreement with Abkhazia.[347]
• In late May 2008, Vladimir Putin said that Saakashvili's peace plan regarding Abkhazia was acceptable.[348]
  • Putin said the plan was "correct", but it needed an approval of Sukhumi.
  • Putin stated that Russia had asked the Abkhaz authorities to allow the return of 55 thousand Georgian refugees.[349]
• The Russian Foreign Ministry source said that Irakli Alasania negotiated the meeting between Georgian and Abkhaz presidents in May 2008; however, the interested parties organized the blasts in Abkhazia, which caused this meeting to be cancelled

• Saakashvili admitted later having written to Putin to propose a Cypriot model, where Abkhazia would be divided and Georgia would receive the southern section, while rejecting NATO (Zourabichvili, 312-313)
• During the 6-7 July CIS Summit in Astana, Saakashvili sought at several times to speak alone with Medvedev to talk about the brewing conflict, which Medvedev refused (Bluashvili, 398)

ASMUS

• For Saakashvili, the key to solving the Abkhazia issue was in Moscow, but Russia was not interested in making any deals (142)
• Saakashvili was disheartened by the fact that the EU was not aiming to solve the Abkhazia conflict (142)
  • Meanwhile, Saakashvili received various signals from Washington in terms of armed solution (143-144)
• Saakashvili was convinced that Putin was preparing for war since his February post-Kosovo meeting (144)
• Saakashvili hoped that Medvedev would be more willing to talk than Putin ever was (159)
• Saakashvili and Medvedev talked on the phone on June 2 (159)
• They met in St Petersburg on the sidelines of a CIS summit on June 6 (159)
  • during the meeting, Saakashvili sought to find common ground, talk about reforms in both countries. But Medvedev directly raised the issue of conflicts himself (159-160)
  • The meeting lasted 45 minutes and Medvedev ended it shortly, though opening to the idea of a future meeting. Saakashvili proposed a bilateral summit before the end of summer (160)
• June 21: Saakashvili writes secretly to Medvedev about a bold peace plan. Proposes an interim solution to split Abkhazia into two spheres of influence, with Georgia controlling Gali and Ochamchira as a FEZ jointly administered by a mixed Georgian_Abkhaz or an international administration that would allow the Abkhaz to trade with the outside world (160)
  • Tbilisi also proposed mixed law enforcement agencies with international involvement and supervision to deal with local organized crime (160-161)
  • In return, Tbilisi would unilaterally sign a non use of force pledge, abandon efforts to end the CIS Peacekeeping mission, and accept the presence of a redeployed and strengthened Russian peacekeeping presence, while wirj with Moscow to make the Sochi Olympics a success (161)
  • It was meant as an interim solution (161)
  • It was termed as "soft partition" (161)
• The plan was hand-delivered in Moscow on June 23 without the usual diplomatic channels (161)
• July 3: Karasin hand delivers Moscow's official response to Vashadze in Tbilisi. The letter rejected any hope for a soft partition. Instead, it set new preconditions for further talks (161)
• Tensions immediately started on July 4 (161-162)
• July 6: Saakashvili in Astana and hopes for meeting with Medvedev but the latter refuses despite persistent attempts. At one point, Saakashvili caught Medvedev at dinner and pushed him over bilateral summit, which Medvedev rejected. Saakashvili said the situation could hardly get worse. Medvedev said "it can get much worse" and walked away (162)

IIFFMCG II

• Saakashvili presented a peace plan on March 28: unlimited autonomy and wide federalism, supported by international guarantees, broad Abkhaz political representation in the official

structures of Georgia, including a new post of Vice-President to be occupied by an Abkhaz; the Abkhaz right to veto legislation and decisions related to the constitutional status of Abkhazia, and to issues related to Abkhaz culture, language and ethnicity; the establishment of jointly controlled free economic zones in the Gali and Ochamchira districts; and the gradual merger of law enforcement and customs services. (90)

• • It was rejected by Abkhazia (90)
• Another peace plan was proposed by MS in May 2008 (90)
• High-level bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz talks were held in May 2008 (Sokhumi) and June (Stockholm) (90)
• June 23: Saakashvili sends a letter to Medvedev with concrete proposals. At the first stage, the following:
  • Free economic zone in Gali and Ochamichira, a joint Georgian-Abkhaz administration and joint law enforcement agencies there, and the return of IDPs to these two districts
  • Withdrawal of the CIS PKF and its redeployment along the Kodori River
  • Reopening of the Moscow-Tbilisi-Yerevan railway
  • Reopening of sea communications between Sokhumi and Trabzon and other communication lines
  • International guarantors including Russia
  • Agreement on the non use of force and the return of IDPs to other parts to be concluded later (91)
• July 1: Medevedev rejects the peace plan, instead calls on Tbilisi to negotiate directly with Sokhimi, to sign a non-use of force agreement, and to withdraw from Kodori (92)

Steinmeier Solution

• Members of the Abkhaz parliament adopted a declaration to halt peace negotiations with the US, the UK, France and Germany because the "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" was biased towards Georgia. In early May, Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was disappointed in the West and approved the parliament's stance.
• On 23 June 2008, Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze visited Moscow in order to organize a meeting between Georgian and Russian presidents.
  • The Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Davit Bakradze said that Georgian president would discuss the situation in Abkhazia.
  • Bakradze hoped that the situation would improve.[354]
  • Vashadze met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and talked about the situation in Abkhazia.[355]
  • On 27 June 2008, Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Georgia had proposed Russia to divide Abkhazia into Georgian and Russian spheres of influence.
  • Georgian refugees would return to Gali and Ochamchira District and the line of contact would be moved from Enguri river to Kodori river in the north.
  • Russia would win by Georgia's cancelation of bid for the NATO membership.
  • When Abkhazia's leader Sergei Bagapsh arrived in Moscow on June 26, he also met with Grigory Karasin to discuss this plan.[356]
  • Abkhaz authorities rejected the proposal on Abkhazia's division.
  • Abkhaz official Ruslan Kishmaria suggested that Abkhazia might demand the return of Abkhazia's historical medieval capital Kutaisi.[357]
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied that Russia was considering the plan to divide Abkhazia.
  • However, an anonymous source in the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed the existence of such plan.
  • Later, the Ministry called the report as "deliberate leak of information."[358][359]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry denied the report on proposed spheres of influence in Abkhazia.

• On 25 June 2008, Saakashvili met with high-ranking German officials in Berlin to discuss a new peace plan.[361]
  • Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel met with Saakashvili.
  • She said that Georgia would become a member of the NATO, but NATO membership depended on the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.
  • She said that "the Russian peacekeeping mission should continue until new variants can be found in talks" and Germany would also be involved in the peace process.[362]
  • Saakashvili was planning to visit a summit of the leaders of the member parties of the International Democrat Union in Paris.[363]

• Patricia Flor, German ambassador to Georgia, was planning to meet with Sergei Bagapsh and other high-ranking officials in Sukhumi on June 27.[364]

• On 28 June 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE supported Georgia's territorial integrity, with OSCE PA President Göran Lennmarker saying: "We want to find a compromise and a peaceful resolution of this issue."[365]
  • On 30 June, American representative said that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly urged Russia to respect Georgia's sovereignty by refraining from relations with the governments of the separatist territories.[366]

• On 30 June 2008, U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends discussed the Abkhaz conflict in Berlin.[367]
  • A three-part peace plan was announced by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, according to which a trust-building and the repatriation of around 250,000 refugees to Abkhazia would be followed first by the rebuilding of the infrastructure and then by a settlement of the conflict.
  • Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, along with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, endorsed the German plan.
  • Georgian president Saakashvili also accepted the plan.[368]

• On 14 July 2008, Sergei Bagapsh met with special envoy of the German Foreign Ministry for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Hans-Dieter Lucas. Peace plan was discussed.[377]
  • On the same day EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Sukhumi.
  • Bagapsh said that he studied a draft plan on the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict that was worked out by the U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends, but he suggested that it was unacceptable for Abkhazia in its current form.
  • Bagapsh stressed that the main condition for resuming the dialogue with Georgia was "the withdrawal of all armed units from the Kodori gorge and the signing of an agreement on non-use of force".
  • He also said that he was "not going to discuss Abkhazia’s status with anyone" because Abkhazia was "an independent, democratic state."
  • Peter Semneby also met with Prime Minister of Abkhazia Alexander Ankvab and foreign minister Sergei Shamba.[378]
  • Sergei Shamba said that "more preparation" was required.[379]

• German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon.
  • Then Steinmeier had a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who said Russia wanted both Georgia and Abkhazia "to accept obligations not to use force," and the withdrawal of the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.

• On 16 July 2008, Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said that "polishing" of the new German plan was still needed despite of "positive elements" being present there.
  • Lomaia also said that the return of IDPs could not start until the Russian peacekeeping force was pulled out.[385]
  • David Bakradze said that if a German plan for resolving the conflict did not get large support, Georgia would be forced to "unilaterally bring an influence to bear on the deployment of armed forces in Abkhazia."

• On 17 July 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the repatriation of refugees to Abkhazia was "entirely unrealistic at this stage", adding "the situation first needs to be improved and trust restored."[389][390]
  • German Foreign Minister Steinmeier met with his Georgian counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili in Tbilisi.[391]
  • Steinmeier said in Tbilisi that due to recent multiple incidents, the international community had "growing anxiety" and there were no more "frozen conflicts."[392]
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Georgia first had to withdraw its troops from Kodori Gorge before Abkhazia would begin negotiations.[393]
  • On the evening of the same day, Saakashvili said at a briefing that there were no plans in Tbilisi to use force to restore control over Abkhazia.[394]
  • Saakashvili called Lavrov's statement on the refugees "shameful" and said that blocking the return of refugees would be "inhumane and barbaric decision."[395]
  • Steinmeier met with Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in Batumi.[394]
  • Saakashvili said at a joint briefing that the conflicts of the 20th century must be solved with "modern European methods".
  • Steinmeier said that Germany viewed Abkhazia to be Georgia's inalienable part.[396]
  • Steinmeier said that he wanted "a peaceful resolution based on the territorial integrity of Georgia".
  • Sources from the German delegation called the talks with Saakashvili "difficult".[397]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated on 18 July that Russia was seeking to legalize the results of the Russian-sponsored ethnic cleansing.[398]

• On 18 July, Steinmeier met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Gali.[399]
  • After his meeting with Steinmeier, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia still would not consider German peace proposal and he intended to present his own plan.[394]
  • Chairman of Georgian Parliament Davit Bakradze called the Abkhaz refusal "just a political game" and said that the Russian position would be "decisive".[400]
  • On the same day, Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov suggested an international "road map" on Abkhazia, however, he resisted the German plan since Georgian refugees would return to Abkhazia at the beginning of conflict resolution.
  • Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also received Steinmeier.[401]
  • Medvedev insisted that Georgia must withdraw its forces from the Kodori Gorge otherwise there would be no peace between Georgia and Abkhazia.[402]
  • According to the source of the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Lavrov admitted to Steinmeier that the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge was less likely in the near future.[403]
  • American diplomat Matthew Bryza said that Russian and Abkhaz rejection of the German peace plan was alarming.
• On 30 July 2008, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman said that efforts were made by Germany to organize a meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz officials.
  • Abkhaz separatists had earlier rejected to attend talks in Berlin scheduled on July 30–31.[430]
• On 31 July 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said there would be a separate meeting between Abkhazia and the Group of UN Secretary General's Friends on Georgia (the U.K., Germany, Russia, U.S. and France).
  • Bagapsh said that Georgia would hold a separate meeting with the Group.
  • Bagapsh also said, "The meeting was initially planned for July 28–29.
  • However, this didn't suit us. We have settled on August 15–20 for the meeting."
• By 22 July 2008, Georgian intelligence had given the West some proof of Russian military build-up in Abkhazia.
  • The Georgian government stated on 22 July that "the German plan in its present form does not address the proximate cause of the recent, dangerous escalation in the conflict zones: the role and actions of Russia, a central player in degrading security in Georgia."
  • On 24 July, analyst Vladimir Socor criticized the German plan and stated that Germany was more sympathetic towards Russia's position on Georgia's territorial integrity.

ASMUS

• Germany was the leading power in Europe articulating and shaping policy to the east (155)
• Close ties and economic partnership with Msocow, but historical ties with Georgia (155)
• Chairman of the Group of Friends (155)
• Feared that a conflict would force Germany to pick sides (155)
• The Steinmeier Plan involved three steps: Georgia issues a non-use of force pledge up front in return for a general agreement on the principle of refugee return and a mutual withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge, cnfidence-building measures between the Abkhaz and the Georgians in the economic real to be backed up by an international donors conference to finance specific practical projects, and a settlement of Abkhazia's political status with the help of international mediation (155)
  • Washington had some misgivings but ended up endorsing it (155)
  • Washington wanted to see Germany take the lead on the conflict (155)
• Tbilisi did not trust Germany and vice versa (155-156)
  • Tbilisi believed that Berlin was naive about Russian intentions and was too willing to accept Moscow's claim to a special sphere of influence in the Caucasus, and still were bitter over Bucharest (156)
  • Tbilisi also believed the plan was skewered against Georgia, with Georgia asked to make the first major steps with too little in return (156)
• A criticism was that Berlin negotiated the plan with the Group of Friends before Tbilisi, and the GoF included Russia, making the plan automatically disfavorable to Georgia (156)
• Tbilisi nevertheless agreed initially to the plan, hoping details would evolve once Steinmeier saw the situation on the ground (156)
• Reasons for failure:
  • Lack of Western unity over the plan and how to approach it towards Tbilisi, especially between both sides of the Atlantic (156)
    • Europe wanted Washington to be stricter towards Georgia and force it into submission, which Washington believed would only anger Tbilisi more and make it more prone to violence (156-157)
  • The second reason was Russia, who continuously sought to undermine the deal along the way (157-158)
• On July 9, Rice and Saakashvili renegotiated the Steinmeier Plan, which Rice got the endorsement of Berlin for (162-163)
  • Berlin was really not OK with the negotiated plan but could not complain that Washingto got Tbilisi to agree to fold (163-164)
  • Steinmeier traveled thento Sokhumi to meet with Baghapsh and then met with Russian leaders in Moscow. He got the sides to agree to meet at the end of July in Berlin (164)

IIFFMCG II

• Three-stage plan developed within the framework of the Group of Friends (31)
  • First stage: measures to rebuild trust between the conflict sides to lead to their signing of an agreement on the non use of force and the initiation of a process to bring Georgian IDPs/refugees back to Abkhazia
  • Second stage: Reconstruction work financed by donor states
  • Third stage: Tackle Abkhazia's political status, meant to be at the end
• Baghapsh rejected the plan, instead setting conditions for talks with Georgia: Withdrawal from the Kodori Valley and signing of an agreement on not resuming military operations (31)
• There was a Group of Friends meeting in Berlin in June 2008 that was aimed at addressing crisis settlement (91)
• The UN SG appointed a former high ranking UN official to undertake an assessment of the peace process and to explore the possibility of reviving it, but it proved to be "too late" in the summer of 2008 (92)

IIFFMCG III

• 18 July: Abkhazia and Russia reject the plan and refuse to attend end-of-month peace talks scheduled in Berlin (21)

Peacekeeping proposals

• On 17 June 2008, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that Georgian attempt to revise the peacekeeping operation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone could "unfreeze" the conflict. According to him, due to this, the situation could "slip out of control" in the wider region.[121]
• On 5 March 2008, Georgia left the Joint Control Commission for Georgian–Ossetian Conflict Resolution and suggested a new negotiation scheme which would include the EU, OSCE and the Sanakoyev government.
• On 24 April 2008, Georgian president Saakashvili announced that Georgia would discuss with allies how to revise the peacekeeping format and increased involvement of other countries in the peace process because "the presence of the Russian [peacekeeping] contingent there [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia], as well as [Russia’s] recent actions, is a risk factor in the conflict zone."
• On 30 April 2008, Member of the European Parliament Marie Anne Isler Béguin said that Russian peacekeepers were ineffective and the peacekeeping format should be changed.[334]
  • The EU was asked by Georgia to consider the deployment of European peacekeepers to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.
• Georgian president Saakashvili and President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko issued a joint statement criticizing recent Russian actions.
  • Ukraine announced willingness to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Georgia and approved Saakashvili's new peace plan on Abkhazia.
• On 8 July 2008, David Bakradze, chairman of Georgia's parliament, said that he raised the issue of changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia with UN envoy Bertrand Ramcharan. He added that if the peacekeeping format did not change, then Georgia would make a unilateral decision regarding the Russian peacekeepers.[373]
  • Ramcharan arrived in Abkhazia on 11 July to negotiate resumption of Abkhaz-Georgian talks.[374]
• On 9 July 2008, European diplomats stated 2 criteria for the European Union to become involved in the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. These criteria were: security for the foreign personnel and mutual consent from the conflict sides.[375]
• On 11 July 2008, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the international community to back Georgian peace proposals.
  • The resolution said, "Otherwise, the Georgian side will be forced to undertake appropriate legal measures in the nearest future for the de-legitimization and for the prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the conflict zones."
  • The Western officials earlier had told Georgian authorities to pause the demand for the removal of the Russian peacekeepers.
• On 21 July 2008, REGNUM News Agency reported that the western mediators were proposing to replace Georgian troops in the Kodori gorge with international police force. This force would exclude Russia.[406] Matthew Bryza said that currently there was no need to deploy international force in Abkhazia and the United States was working to establish direct dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz sides.[407] Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that the replacement of Georgian troops with international force was his initiative.

IIFFMCG II

• According to Tskhinvali, Geogria withdrew from the OSCE-brokered quadrilateral negotiations set up under the 1992 Dagomys Agreement on March 4, 2008 (194)
  • Tskhinvali saw that as an attempt to denounce the DA and ti eliminate the legal basis for the peacekeeping operation (194)
• After the Russian reinforcement to the Abkhazia peacekeeping force and the deployment of railway troops in May, Tbilisi argued that the Russian Federation was a party to the conflicts and could not longer serve in either a mediating or a peacekeeping capacity. (202)
  • Tbilisi intensified thereafter its calls for a change in the format and the replacement of the existing peace operation with a joint Georgian-Abhaz police force under EU and OSCE supervision and training, without excluding the possibility that Russia might play a role (202)
  • Tbilisi threatened that if substantial change in the format did not happen, it was ready to make a formal requests for the withdrawal of the CIS PKF (202)
• Sokhumi argued that the CIS PKF was strengthened in response to Georgian plans to carry out a military action, opposing any change in the format and warning that a withdrawal from the CIS PKF would lead to a resumption of hostilities. (202)
  • Sokhumi also threatened that it would propose a military cooperation agreement with Russia if Georgia withdrew its consent from the CIS PKF (202-203)

US efforts

• The 110th United States Congress passed a resolution on 6 May that said the recent Russian actions were "provocative" and Russia "impedes reconciliation between those regions and the government of the Republic of Georgia".
• On 8 May 2008, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried stated at the Congress: "While we have urged restraint on Georgia, there is a difference between a very small vulnerable country and a very large country that we have to keep in mind."[51]
• In May 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza said that Russia’s "provocative actions" was seen "as working against cause of peaceful settlement" of the Georgian-Abkhaz issue.
  • On 12 May, the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced Bryza's statement.
• President of the United States George W. Bush discussed Georgia with his Russian counterpart Medvedev at the 34th G8 summit.[211]
• On 8 July 2008, the statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts would be settled by Georgian NATO Membership Action Plan.
  • The statement caused a negative outcry in Moscow: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded, during his meeting with the de facto Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh, that Georgia's accession to NATO "may undermine the conflict resolution".[230]
  • Rice arrived in Georgia on 9 July.
  • She put the blame for the escalation on Russian inflammatory actions over the past months and said that Georgia "has to be treated like" an independent country.[231]
  • Rice stated on July 10 in Tbilisi that Russia "needs to be a part of resolving the problem and solving the problems and not contributing to it."[232][233] Saakashvili said at a joint conference that Georgia and Russia should work together to ensure the safety of the Sochi Olympics.[234]
• On 11 July 2008, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called for an immediate UN Security Council session on the conflict zones.[251] A closed meeting was held on 21 July by the U.N. Security Council to review the overflights; however, no resolution was adopted. The "pro-Georgian bias" of some Security Council members was condemned by Russian representative Vitaliy Churkin.[252][253]
• On 11 July 2008, the Kremlin dismissed the US offer to help in deescalating the Russo-Georgian crisis.[255]
• On 29 July 2008, RBK Daily reported that Russia toughened its rhetoric against the United States and a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry threatened that Russia would halt negotiations on "substantial issues of interest to the American side."
  • The source said that Russia was sick of the US "telling us how to behave, with whom to be friends, with whom to fight."
  • American support of Georgia's push to restore its territorial integrity and NATO membership of the former Soviet states were quoted as major reasons behind Russia's escalation.
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza declared at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: "Nobody wants such a development of the situation, when Georgian and Russian soldiers will face each other."
  • He said that he did not have an "impression that Georgia is 100 percent right" and added: "Leaders of Georgia also need to work a lot more on peace proposals so that Abkhazians stop feeling fears."[330]
  • Bryza also said that the existing peace formats for Georgia's breakaway regions no longer worked and "we need to rejuvenate [friends'] process."
• On 10 May 2008, Matthew Bryza and the US ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft met with the Abkhaz leadership. According to Bryza, Georgian drone overflights over Abkhazia were justified.
• On 7 July 2008, the United States Department of State called on the central Georgian government and the Abkhaz de facto authorities to resume negotiations.
  • The Department of State also called on Russia to stop "provocative" actions and proposed the deployment of International Police Force to Abkhazia.[369]
  • However, Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh denied the possibility of removal of the Russian peacekeepers.
  • The State Department spokesman also said that Condoleezza Rice would visit Georgia to support a peaceful settlement to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.
• On 14 July, the U.S. Department of State said in a statement it was "deeply troubled" by Russia’s acknowledgement that Russian military plane flew over South Ossetia because "Such actions raise questions about Russia's role as peacekeeper and facilitator of the negotiations and threaten stability throughout the entire region."[380]
  • That day, a special session was held by the OSCE Permanent Council.
  • The need for the resumption of talks regarding peace between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities was hightlighted.[381] On 15 July 2008, NATO said it was concerned by Russian military flights. Russia's peacekeeping and mediating duty was questioned.[225]
• On 23 July, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, stressed that Georgia’s territorial integrity and the return of refugees to Abkhazia were the key principles, and promised that the removal of Russian peacekeepers would be discussed.[409][410] Russian foreign minister Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice that the return of the refugees to Abkhazia must be postponed to the later phase of the peace settlement.
• On 23 July 2008, the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, after hearing German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's report on Abkhazia, recognized that Russia was a party to the conflict in Georgia.[411]
• On 24 July 2008, Matthew Bryza said that Russia "has taken steps that are deeply provocative and have led to some people in Georgia calculating that their only way forward is through escalation, and that is a path that cannot succeed."[412] Bryza arrived in Georgia on July 25 and was planning to visit Sukhumi together with Patricia Flor, German Ambassador to Georgia.
• On 25 July, the Abkhaz separatists met with Matthew Bryza. Bryza declared in Sukhumi that Russia was "more or less" in favor of the German plan approved by the Group of the Friends of the UN Secretary General.[416]
  • Lack of progress in peace settlement alarmed Bryza.
  • Abkhaz officials suggested that the German project was irrelevant to Abkhazia regardless of which country supported it.[417]
  • Bryza tried to persuade the Abkhaz authorities to unanimously agree to talks in Berlin the following week, but Abkhaz officials refused.[418]
  • Later that day, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh hinted that the Abkhaz could meet with the Group of Friends in Berlin.
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba also said that the Abkhaz "in principle" did not oppose talks in Berlin.
  • However, according to Shamba, Abkhazia would not resume direct negotiations with Georgia's central government.[419]
  • Russian ambassador to UN Vitaly Churkin said that Russia objected to urgent meeting of the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends on Georgia.[420]
  • According to the Jamestown Foundation, the Western involvement "may help steer the process away from the Russian-controlled formats. This is why Moscow encouraged Sukhumi to thwart the German-proposed consultations."[421]
  • Russian editorial opined that the Western initiatives contradicted Russia's interests and the placement of American bases in Abkhazia could lead to the loss of the North Caucasus for Russia.[422][423]
• On 26 July, Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, left Sukhumi and arrived in Tbilisi. He said that Georgian and Abkhaz separatist officials must start direct unconditional talks.[424]
  • Georgian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said after meeting with Bryza that the United States proposed a new peace plan combining elements from Saakashvili, Steinmeier and Rice plans.[425][426]
  • Bryza denied media reports that he had demanded the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge.
• On 23 July, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, stressed that Georgia’s territorial integrity and the return of refugees to Abkhazia were the key principles, and promised that the removal of Russian peacekeepers would be discussed.[409][410] Russian foreign minister Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice that the return of the refugees to Abkhazia must be postponed to the later phase of the peace settlement.

• On June 18, US Deputy State Secretary Fried accused Russia of increasing political and military pressure against Georgia during a Senate hearing, questioning Russia's role as a peacekeeper (Panfilov, 73-74)

BLUASHVILI

• Dan Fried told a Georgian delegation that "if you invade Abkhazia, you might win the first battle, and you might win the second battle. But that will be your last victory. Russia will absolutely intervene and will finish the entire job by singing and dancing" (399-400)

GACHECHILADZE 2017

• Condolezza Rice quote about Saakashvili and provocations (539)
• Saakashvili confirmed later Rice's statements (540)

ASMUS

• Though the US continuously warned Georgia against responding to provocations, Tbilisi stated it had its own red lines that Moscow could not cross without a Georgian response (28-29)
• Following the April developments, NSA Stephen Hadley started a diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict from devolving into war in Abkhazia (152)
• Hadley saw the problem was to portray the image to Georgia as a lose-lose situation where Tbilisi either acquiesced or lost a military conflict (152)
  • Hadley's aim was to show that Russia would lose diplomatically any conflict it starts by becoming isolated, while giving Tbilisi guarantees of a light at the end of the tunnel for good begavio (152)
    • This was done in three elements: encourage MS to formulate his own peace plan endorsed by the West, increase European and international elements in the peacekeeping force while Georgia signs a non-use-of-force agreement in exchange for the return of IDPs, and increased the level of negotiating format for Abkhazia (153)
      • It was part of that third element that Bryza went to Abkhazia in mid-Nay (153-154)
  • But critics say that what missed from the plan was showing Russia it would suffer consequences (154)
• The US and EU convinced Georgia not to cancel the peacekeeping mandate in Abkhazia, which Tbilisi wanted to do to declare the Russian troops as occupying by international law (158)
• In June, Georgian and Abkhaz leaders met in Sweden under NGO auspices to discuss the Bryza-Alasania plan developed earlier (159)
  • The plan involved a free economic zone allowing Abkhazia to establish external economic ties, a pull back of security forces from the demarcation line, an international civilian police presence in several ethnic Georgian districts in Abkhazia along the border to deal with organized crime and a non-use-of-firce pledge by Tbilisi (159)
    • Sokhumi told EU diplomats they welcomed greated European engagement on the ground (159)
• 9 July: Rice lands in Tbilisi, with four Russian fighter aircraft violating Georgian airspace (162)
  • By then, MS had lost faith in a Western-brokered solution (162)
  • Rice told MS to unilaterally agree to a non use of force pledge, which Saakashvili was open to as part of a brokered package. That same night, the US and Georgian delegations sought to draft a package deal that resulted in a modified Steinmeier Plan (162-163)

EU support for Georgia

• On 12 May 2008, the Foreign Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia visited Georgia.
  • Saakashvili spoke alongside the ministers and presented a Russian leaflet promoting the Sochi Olympics as a proof of Russia's design on Abkhazia.
  • Saakashvili said that Russia's escalation was "a prelude to the act of annexation and act of occupation".
  • Saakashvili said that when Georgia was occupied in 1921, Russia then attacked other European countries; Saakashvili expressed hope that "Europe will never again makes the similar mistake".
• On 12 May 2008, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus issued a joint statement supporting the territorial integrity of states, including Georgia.
• On 5 June 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which condemned the deployment of Russian forces to Abkhazia and endorsed Georgia's territorial integrity.
  • The resolution called on Russia to pull out those additional forces and stated that the peacekeeping structure should be changed because Russia was no longer an unbiased player.
  • A "deeper European involvement in these frozen conflicts in order to move the peace processes forward" was advised.
  • Russian officials did not comment on the resolution.
• On 7 June 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said after meeting with EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Javier Solana that Abkhazia would never consider the replacement of the Russian peacekeepers because "there is no alternative" and Abkhazia would insist on the continued presence of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia.
  • Solana said that Russia had a significant role and there would be no conflict resolution without Russia.
  • A two-day visit to Abkhazia by fifteen EU ambassadors was finished that day.[352]
  • Giorgi Baramidze, the Georgian deputy prime minister and minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, said: "Georgia is ready to sign a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia if it is guaranteed by the European Union."
  • Baramidze said that the loss of Gagra, Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia for Georgia was caused by absence of an effective guarantor of earlier agreements.
  • He added, "We want to carry out our peace plan."[352]
• Pro-Russian authorities of South Ossetia announced to have expelled 12 European ambassadors from South Ossetia due to their meeting with pro-Georgian government of South Ossetia on June 22.
• The visit of OSCE ambassadors and the Danish foreign minister to Georgia began on 7 July, which would last until 9 July and separatists would also be visited.[372]
• On 17 July 2008, the Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that France supported the active involvement of the EU in the process of peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Georgia.
• On 25 July 2008, the South Ossetian separatists rejected proposal by the OSCE chairman-in-office Alexander Stubb to hold Georgia-South Ossetia meeting in Helsinki.
  • The separatists had previously refused to participate in talks in Brussels arranged by the EU on 22 July.[414]
    • According to Kommersant, the South Ossetian decision to refuse participation in Brussels talks was coordinated with Moscow.
• On 23 July 2008, the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, after hearing German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's report on Abkhazia, recognized that Russia was a party to the conflict in Georgia.

• Saakashvili continuously warned European partners of the risk of war, of his fear of Putin, of evidence of an incoming invasion. He was met with calls to calm down (Glucksmann, 14-15)

ASMUS

• European Council meets in May and decides to launch a parallel diplomacy campaign to the US (154)
  • Javier Solana travels to the region in early June to offer more EU role, welcomed by all sides (154)
  • Following weeks, the EU offered a series of confidence-building measures, including holding conferences in Sokhumi and Brussels and sending a border support team and offering to host additional meetings in Brussels to bring the conflicting parties together (q54-155)
    • But internal divisions prevented the EU from taking bolder steps (155)
    • And Tskhinvali and Sokhumi backed out at the last minute (155)

IIFFMCG II

• On May 6, 2008, Yakobashvili said in Brussels that "We literally have to avert war", which raised alarm of the situation on the ground in the international community (30)
  • In the next few days, the French FM sought to prevent an armed conflict (30)
  • The EU announced a group of Fms that would go to Tbilisi to explore ways of halting the hostile actions and rhetoric that marked the Russia-Georgia relations (30)
  • The EU was supportive of Tbilisi, aspored to a peacekeeping role, and was unwilling to commit to any actions that would set it in opposition to Moscow (30)
• In June 2008, the EU Parliament passed a resolution stating that the Russian troops could not longer be considered neutral and impartial peacekeepers and that the peacekeeping format should therefore be revised (202)

IIFFMCG III

• 22-24 July: EU seeks to mediate talks between SO and Georgia with the participation of Russia. SO originally refuses to attend Brussels because of Yakobashvili's title as "Minister of Reintegration". Tbilisi changes his title to Special Envoy to Conflict Resolution, but Tskhinvali rejects anyways (21)
• Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, in his capacity as OSCE Chairman in Office proposes peace talks in Helsinki between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali for early August but SO refuses (21)

Russia WTO bid

• Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was suspended by Georgia on April 29.

IIFFMCG II

• Georgia's veto power was the only equivalent means for an adequate response to Russia's pressure (8-9)

Effect on Georgia's domestic politics

• Saakashvili aimed to position the parliamentary elections as a choice between old Soviet days and him (Asmus, 142)

IIFFMMCG II

• All political parties completely supported the president's approach towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia (8)

References

• War report III
• Civil Georgia
• Independent searches