User:DancingDoggo14/Fyodor Alexeyevich Golovin sandbox

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Background:[edit]

Bust of F. A. Golovin

Fyodor Alexeyevich Golovin was norn in Russia in the year 1650, and, died in Russia, July 30th, 1706[1]. He served prominently under the reign of Peter I. Originally, he was promoted by Sophia Alekseyeva (Peter I’s half-sister) to the rank of court official [titled: Okolnichi]. Though soon after Peter the Great became tsar he grew more important. Starting out as a diplomat for Peter, he was sent to discuss diplomatic relations with the Chinese, the Qing Dynasty, in the Amur Region[2]. This resulted in the Treaty of Nurchinsk (that was later ratified in 1689)—his delegations were rewarded and earned him the rank of Boyar by Peter I[3]. He secured Russia’s southern frontier by concluding the peace Treaty of Constantinople with the Ottoman-Turks (1700)[4]. He directed negotiations with the Polish King Augustus II until Peter I death. Golovin made himself indispensable as his services were extremely helpful to Peter up until his death in 1706[5].

The Great Embassy and Political Influence:[edit]

Peter and the 'Great Embassy' in Holland
Image of Peter I and his 'Great Embassy' to the left.


Peter I, come to power enabled him to name numerous people, Noblemen, Boyars, and friends to his ‘company’—Golovin was appointed, “head of the Ambassadorial Office (department of foreign relations) in Moscow and the first knight of Peter’s new Order of St. Andrew”.[6] Golovin also recognized diplomatic/strategically/governing talent in Pavel Iaguzhinsky, recommending the Polish-Lithuanian to become enrolled in Peter’s Preobrazhensky regiment who then became one of Peter’s favorites within his ‘company’.[7]

Polish-Ukrainian Jew, Peter Shafirov, came to Moscow and converted to Russian Orthodoxy to work as government translator. Began working in the Ambassadorial Office in which his talents within the delegation of trade and foreign affairs came to Golovin’s notice.[8] Golovin referred to his promotion which led to Peter making Shafirov a member in the Grand Embassy in 1697-98.[9] Shafirov became the personal secretary of Golovin in 1703, to teach him the responsibilities of the ambassador, however, he was not the successor[10]. Golovin was a gifted individual within his fields; however, he also enabled the promotion of other gifted individuals that were beneficial to Peter I and the Russian governing infrastructure.[11] In conclusion, Fyodor Alexyevich Golovin was extremely important to Peter and was responsible for hiring numerous talented individuals to be a part of his 'Grand Embassy'.

Delegating: The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1688-1689):[edit]

As both the Russians and the Qing were powerful agrarian states, both also set to expand towards Northern Manchuria as well as areas of Siberia for furs and natural resources. Having said that, they both housed fortresses along the Amur River to claim their spot, which then followed conflict.[12] Troops from both armies soon moved in and in contention the Russian fortress of Albazin was destroyed in 1685.[13] After the Chinese cemented their claim to both Albazin and Nerchinsk along the Amur River, Peter I sent Golovin to the seek delegate and reach a treaty with the Qing, arriving at Nerchinsk, August 18, 1688.[14] Russian interest in diplomatic relations revolved around prior conflict with the Qing state in 1640, as the Russian were infatuated with the fertile grounds within the Amur Region–fruitful landscape, water sources and fishing ports, and other natural resources.[15]


The Russians built the fortresses of Nerchinsk and Albazin on the Amur River in 1650, they did so by paying tribute to the Qing; the Qing grew discontent with Russian inhabitants, invaded, and destroyed the new fortress in 1658. In the end, the Russians grew apart from the region after recognizing that the resources of the region didn’t promess an abundance of riches.  Moscow then diverted their expansion eastward into Siberia and Alaska.[16] Golovin met the few Qing who arrived alongside their army; however, Golovin was intrigued that the Qing brought roughly 1000 soldiers instead of the agreed upon 800.  It is referenced that the Chinese leaders had misunderstood the agreement as they lacked the diplomatic knowledge, though Golovin reassured himself to trust his counterparts.[17] Golovin and other members of Peter I’s Grand Embassy sat beside the Chinese Jesuits discussing the issues at hand, the Qing believed the region belonged to them, claimed the Russians killed the local inhabitants, and built on Qing territory. Golovin reiterated the desires of Peter I, that the local-people had been loyal servants of the Tsar but were also willing to negotiate for the sake of achieving peace.[18] Golovin then suggested the Amur River provided the most convenient and fair border, which the Chinese quickly rejected.[19] Golovin indicated he could not give up the Albazin and Nerchinsk fortresses, also recognizing that the Jesuits claimed both sides of the Amur region and responded to their strong stance sarcastically, deeply upsetting their envoy–they fled and prepared for war.[20] Persisting war was avoided and to protect their claim on Albazin, Golovin and the embassy sent the Qing a letter requesting their terms for a treaty. Golovin grew close to coming to an agreement with the Qing. Peter and Golovin sought to protect the outposts of Albazin and Nerchinsk, the Qing modified their own demands, and September 6, 1689, Golovin finally accepted and a treaty was officially signed in Latin, Mongolia, Chinese, Manchu, and Russian.[21]Golovin, the lead diplomat on behalf of Russia during the negotiations with the Qing, conversed with Chinese diplomat Songotu and agreed to the demilitarization.[22] This was not formally listed in the treaty but outlined in its preface by forcing the withdrawal of Russian and Manchu forces who had been dispatched in the Amur basin.[23]

Amur River : Divided Russia and China

Golovin negotiated on behalf of the Russian Tsarist autocracy but stayed in close contact with Peter to make sure that the Tsar’s needs were satisfied. In pursuit to do so, the agreement to demilitarize the specific region was in part agreed upon to delay the delineation of each country's borders.[24] Golovin's records shows that in these preliminary discussions prior to the ratification of the agreement in 1689, the complicated matter surprisingly was conducted in a professional and swift manner, in comparison to other Russian attempts at diplomacy.[25] In between delegates and after the mutual agreement of demilitarization both parties grew frustrated and waged small scale physical and verbal threats/attacks throughout the region in (through 1670s). As military threats grew common, the governing bodies grew weary of each other's powers and not willing to wage war the Manchu diplomats applied undue pressure on the Russians to meet and discuss terms for a treaty.[26] The negotiations commenced soon after in Nerchinsk starting in 1688-1689, only lasting a year's time. The Russians were weary of the Manchu’s military ability and wanted to nullify any future conflicts before they arose. On the contrary, the Chinese were more focused towards establishing a border to keep Russians out of their land.[27] Golovin, who led delegation, advocated for the idea of returning former vassals (that excluded some specific native clans in the Amur region) and also suggested that there should be a monetary exchange that would compensate for each, the Russian and Manchu, deserters that fled during conflict. Golovin’s ideas proved to be too much to agree upon as the Chinese did not find middle ground immediately. But, in article IV of the Treaty a clause that states: “both sides agreed to keep their pre-1689 fugitives but vowed to reject deserters in the future” emphasizing the influence of his ideas while also showing his ability to benefit the Russian state.[28] Golovin's discussions, meetings, and thoroughness are noted to be, “well-calculated diplomatic move, aimed at benefiting Russian as well as Chinese interests in the region.”.[29] His duty as a diplomat during the negotiations of the treaty highlight Golovin’s intellectual ability and show him as an authoritative figure whom the Russian Tsarist autocracy trusted to make peace with the Qing.[30]

European Tour: (1697-1698)[edit]

His job on tour was to seek/hire officials for service within the newly established Russian Navy and 'Grand Embassy'[31]. In 1699, he was made admiral of the Navy, placed in charge of the entire Naval department, and named the head of Foreign Diplomacy in Russia (all mandated by Peter I).  Additionally, his time in Europe was also focused towards delegating and negotiate a treaty with the Ottoman-Turks to find and to the Turkish War. Subsequently, he and the Russian Embassy came to an agreement after two years of negotiation, ending the war. He also participated as general in Peter’s Azov negotiation and other war campaigns against the Ottoman-Turks (1695 & 1696) and in 1697-98 accompanied Peter I on almost every venture[32]. In the instance where Golovin was not with Peter physically, they remained in contact over letter. He engaged in extensive diplomatic activity for Peter I and in preparation of the Great Northern War[33].

After 'touring' Europe with Peter 1, Golovin was deemed to be one of Peter's favorite and most trusted members. Coming from an old boyar family, he was well educated with the ability to speak Latin. Furthermore, his ability to speak Latin enabled him to communicate with Jesuits at court and converse with Europeans as well.

The Russian Navy and the Azov Fleet:[edit]

Emblem of the Russian Navy
Imperial Russian Ships designed by the Dutch Ship-Builders


The impact of Peter’s Grand Embassy was instrumental regarding the creation of the Russian Navy. Peter and Golovin were in close communication during the European tours and often talked about which nations' ships were more efficient[34]. Peter sent letters to Golovin consistently informing him that the Dutch ships that were in construction by the Russians weren’t of proper proportions, but he and Golovin were unable to restart construction as it was too far along in the building process[35]. Though, both knew it was more important to establish a functioning fleet than to worry about precise construction[36].  

Through the summer and fall of 1698, the Great Ambassador and the rest of the Grand Embassy hired numerous officers and sailors to serve in the newly established Russian Navy, later arriving in Moscow during that time. Peter then assigned the collective, new group of militaries, to be represented by the Chancery for Naval Affairs which was led by Golovin, from the name General-Admiral[37]. Over-saw all the Naval related affairs in the late 1690s. Golovin also recruited the Captain of the Dutch Republic’s navy and the third crew chief (equipagemeister) to serve as an official member in the Russian Navy (he agreed to serve after two months of negotiation and hired for 3-4 years). This was also the reason Dutch naval influences remained in the Russian militaries infrastructure until 1620.

During the peace negotiations with the Turks, Peter and Golovin were in close contact, sending letters, Golovin was the one to inform Peter of the truce that was ended in February of 1699. The truce enabled the Russians to flaunt their new Azov fleet which would gloriously define their militaristic push[38].  Golovin also informed Peter of Lefort, another member of the Grand Embassy, of his illness on February 26th of 1699, though, four days later he passed. The first goal of the newly established Azov Fleet was to gather the Russian-built ships and from the Azov Sea, sail to Kerch[39]. Golovin manned one of the four flagships, named the Fortress (Krepost). The eventually reached and sailed through the Kerch Straight two hours before dawn on August 18th. Golovin then met with an amalgamation of Turkish officials, including the governor and a Kerch Admiral[40]. The display of naval strength intimidated the Turks and worked to help reach a peaceful agreement through Golovin’s negotiations to which soon after the Fortress and the other ships set sail for the Black sea and Constantinople[41]. It led to successes in the Azov and Caspian Sea as well as assistance that led to victory in the Great Northern War from 1700 to 1721.[42] The creation of the Fleet, led to an massive increase in military expenditures but Golovin, Peter I, and other trusted cabinet members, decided that this project provided a justifiable reason.[43]

References:[edit]

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.

Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).

Anderson, M. S. Peter the Great (New York, Longman Publishing, 1995) vol. 2. 

Sumner, B. H. Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, Blackwell Press, 1949). 

Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003). 

Bushkovitch, Paul. A Concise History of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 

Perdue, Peter C. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 341–56. 

Lystsova, Anastasiya. “Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia.” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726.

Keenan, Paul. “Mavens, Mavericks, and Managers: Educational Projecting and Politicking in Petrine and Post-Petrine Russia.” Edited by Robert Collis and Ernest Zitser. ВИВЛIОθИКА: E-Journal of Eighteenth-Century Russian Studies 9 (January 21, 2021): 184–89. https://doi.org/10.21900/j.vivliofika.v9.905.
  1. ^ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.
  2. ^ Bushkovitch, Paul. A Concise History of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
  3. ^ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.
  4. ^ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.
  5. ^ Sumner, B. H. Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, Blackwell Press, 1949).
  6. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  7. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  8. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  9. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  10. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  11. ^ Cracraft, James. The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003).
  12. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 345.
  13. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 347.
  14. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 347.
  15. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 344.
  16. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 344.
  17. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 347.
  18. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 348.
  19. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 348.
  20. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 350.
  21. ^ Peter C Purdue. “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 351
  22. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 336.
  23. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 336.
  24. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 336.
  25. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 336.
  26. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 334-336.
  27. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 349.
  28. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 349.
  29. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 350.
  30. ^ Anastasiya Lystsova, “Review of Igor Fedyukin, the Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia,” Review of Igor Fedyukin, The Enterprisers: The Politics of School in Early Modern Russia, Oxford University Press, European History Quarterly Volume 50, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 724-726, 2020, October 28, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/89423640/Review_of_Igor_Fedyukin_The_Enterprisers_The_Politics_of_School_in_Early_Modern_Russia, 356.
  31. ^ Bushkovitch, Paul. A Concise History of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
  32. ^ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.
  33. ^ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Fyodor Alekseyevich, Count Golovin." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fyodor-Alekseyevich-Graf-Golovin.
  34. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  35. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  36. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  37. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  38. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  39. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  40. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  41. ^ Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Press, 1995).
  42. ^ Edward J. Phillips. The Founding of Russia’s Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995), preface.
  43. ^ Edward J. Phillips. The Founding of Russia’s Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet 1688-1714 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995), 132-158.
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