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Defence Strategic Review 2023
Presented24 April 2023
Commissioned by3 Aug 2022
SubjectDefence
PurposeStrategic force review
Official website
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review
Authors

The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) (formally, the National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023) is a formal review of the force posture and force structure of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) following the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. The review was commissioned by the Albanese government on 3 August 2022 and released on 24 April 2023. The government chose Professor the Hon Stephen Smith and former Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston, AK, AFC (retired) to conduct the review.[1] The review included considerable number of recommendations for the government to undertake to best meet the security and geopolitical challenges of the Asia-Pacific, and south-China sea;

The DSR followed the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, with a number of recommendations made in relation to AUKUS pillars.

https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review

Background[edit]

The Review[edit]

The review covered a number of specific areas and broad recommendations including

  • Australia's Strategic Circumstances
  • Defence partnerships
  • Force design and structure
  • Preparedness
  • Workforce
  • Capability acquisition, risk and accountability

The defence strategic environment for the ADF and the review's first listed recommendation is that the area of primary military interest for Australia's National Defence is the Indo-Pacific, that being an area reaching from the north-eastern Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia, and an area encompassing the northern approaches to Australia.

The DSR reviewed Australia's Force Structure and Posture, indicating that Australia needed to move to a n

To help inform the establishment of a methodical and comprehensive process to enable long term, sustainable implementation the Albanese government accepted the recommendation to for an inaugural National Defence Strategy in 2024, to be updated biennially with a view to provide a comprehensive outline of Defence policy, planning, capabilities and resourcing, including reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program, to align with the intent and recommendations of the Review.

Major Recommendations[edit]

Surface Fleet Review[edit]

As part of the DSR, a major maritime domain recommendation that was agreed to by the government was to conduct an independent analysis of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability in Q3 2023. The major goals of the Surface Fleet Review was to assess the:

  • Structure and size of the combatant fleet, and ensure it complements the capabilities provided by the forthcoming AUKUS attack-submarine program.
  • The capability requirements of Australia's current strategic circumstances outlined in the DSR.
  • Cost, schedule, risks and the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option.

Infrastructure[edit]

Infrastructure development should commence immediately at the Osborne shipyard to enable the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway. Agreed

Infrastructure development should commence immediately at HMAS Stirling to enable the support and maintenance of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine operations. Agreed

Accelerated and Expanded Programs[edit]

The DSR outlined a number of current and future acquisition programs that should be accelerated and/or expanded in size in order to meet the circumstances outlined within review.

Littoral Capability[edit]

Land Fires[edit]

The government agreed to the DSR's recommendation that the the Long-Range Fires (HIMARS) (LAND 8113 Ph 2-4) and the Land-Based Maritime Strike (LAND 4100 Ph 2) should be accelerated and expanded

Reduced or Cancelled Programs[edit]

Infantry Fighting Vehicles1[edit]

LAND 400 Ph 3 - Land Combat Vehicle System, the program to acquire Hanwha Defence Australia’s AS21 Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicle to be reduced to provide only one mechanised battalion with 129 vehicles.

Self propelled Artillery[edit]

LAND 8116 Ph 2 - Protected Mobile Fires, the program to acquire and stand up a second self propelled artillery regiment of AS9 Huntsmans and AS10 AARVs.

Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO)[edit]

The review found the current management of guided weapons and explosive ordnance (GWEO) unable to support the the future structure of the ADF, as well as ensuring that domestic manufacturing can be managed be a suitably senior organisation. The government recommended that a senior officer or official (in this case a 3 Star Staff Officer of the ADF) should be appointed to solely lead the GWEO Enterprise with an appropriate organisational structure. With this the government commenced the creation of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Group (GWEOG) to be stood up, with the transfer of Explosive Material Branch from CASG to with GWEOG, underneath another division.

Other Recommendations[edit]

The a number of other miscellaneous or general recommendations were made, and are included below

Review Area Chap. Recommendation Government

Response

Maritime/Infrastructure Henderson shipyard industry consolidation options should be looked at as a matter of urgency Agreed
Land Domain Landing craft, long-range fires, and IFVs delivery should be synchronised Agreed

The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should be prioritised as part of AUKUS Pillar I. Agreed

The Government should confirm its commitment to continuous naval shipbuilding through an updated National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise Strategy and updated supporting Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan. Agreed


Industry consolidation options for the Henderson shipyard should be examined as a matter of urgency. Agreed

National Defence Strategy[edit]

One of the major recommendations to come out of the DSR was to establish a biennial National Defence Strategy in order to comprehensively track the actions of the DSR and Australia's force posture and design.

Response[edit]

International Response[edit]

China[edit]

Upon the release of the Defence Strategic Review, China accused the Australian Government of ­hyping up the Chinese “threat narrative” while asserting it doesn’t pose a risk to any country.[2] The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the Australian Government was using Beijing as a scapegoat to boost its military power after a declassified version of the review was released, warning of the Asian superpower’s growing threat to regional stability.

“China pursues a defensive national defence policy and stays committed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the wider world,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said. “We do not pose a challenge to any country. We hope certain countries will not use China as an excuse for military build-up and will refrain from hyping up the China threat narrative.”[2]

Following the release of the inaugural National Defence Strategy on 17 April 2024 the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian stated that

"China is committed to peaceful development and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. We stay committed to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the wider world, and pose no threat to any country. The security risks in the region mainly come from some major countries outside the region. They have been forming exclusive groupings, stoking bloc confrontation, and in particular, muddying the waters in the South China Sea, as if the world needed any more instability. China firmly opposes it. We hope Australia will correctly view China’s development and strategic intentions, abandon the Cold-War mentality, do more things to keep the region peaceful and stable, and stop buzzing about China."[3]

France[edit]

United Kingdom[edit]

United States[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ "Defence Strategic Review | Prime Minister of Australia". www.pm.gov.au. Archived from the original on 23 March 2024. Retrieved 28 April 2024.
  2. ^ a b "China claims it does not 'pose a challenge to any country'". The West Australian. 25 April 2023. Retrieved 6 May 2024.
  3. ^ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian's Regular Press Conference on April 17, 2024". www.fmprc.gov.cn. Retrieved 6 May 2024.