User:Langchri/sandbox/Evaluative diversity
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Evaluative diversity (also known as moral diversity) is the degree to which different decision-makers in a population exhibit preferences for different forms of evaluation. Unlike race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, evaluative diversity does not yet enjoy legal protected status.[1]
"Evalutive diversity" vs. "moral diversity"[edit]
The term "evaluative diversity" is attributed to a 1961 paper by P. F. Strawson.[2][3] Antonio Cua referred to Strawson's concept of evaluative diversity as "the region of conflicting ideal images of man, the region of moral diversity."[4] Evaluative diversity includes differences of moral sensibility[5]--as an example, Richard Brandt observed that the Hopi people did not share his moral qualms about killing birds by tying them to strings and playing rough with them[6]--yet one may prefer the term "evaluative diversity" over "moral diversity" because different philosophers disagree about which kinds of values qualify as moral. [7]
Research[edit]
Studies comparing different kinds of diversity find that moral diversity is even more socially divisive than ethnic diversity.[8][9] Other studies indicate that such value differences correlate with biological differences including genes and brain-activation patterns.[10]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ Wallick, Scott Allan. "Evaluative Orientation". Discrimination: Harvard Law School. The Berkman Center for Internet & Society and Harvard Law School. Retrieved October 21, 2014.
{{cite web}}: Check|url=value (help) - ^ Nelson, Paul. Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry. Penn State Press (2010) pp 40-41
- ^ :*Tierney, Nathan L. Imagination and ethical ideals: Prospects for a unified philosophical and psychological understanding. SUNY Press (1994) pp 18-19
- ^ A. S. Cua, "Toward an Ethics of Moral Agents", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, volume 28, number 2 (1967) pp. 163-174
- ^ Gerald Gaus, “Evaluative Diversity and the Problem of Indeterminacy”, in The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, Cambridge University Press (2010) p. 42
- ^ Doris, John M., and Alexandra Plakias. "How to argue about disagreement: Evaluative diversity and moral realism." In W. Sinnot-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (2008). p 314
- ^ Santos-Lang, Christopher Charles. "Moral Ecology Approaches to Machine Ethics." In Machine Medical Ethics. Springer International Publishing (2015) p.112
- ^ Du Bois, Inke, Nina Smidt, and Sivan Spitzer Shohat. Cultural diversity and the empowerment of minorities. Eds. Majid Al Haj, and Rosemarie Mielke. Berghahn Books (2007) page 35
- ^ Skitka, L. J., and C. W. Bauman. "Is morality always an organizational good? A review of morality in the context of organizational justice theory and research." In Gilliland, Stephen, Daniel Skarlicki, and Dirk Douglas Steiner, eds. Justice, morality, and social responsibility. IAP, (2008) p. 17
- ^ Hibbing, John R., Kevin B. Smith, Johnathan C. Peterson, and Balazs Feher. "The deeper sources of political conflict: evidence from the psychological, cognitive, and neuro-sciences." Trends in cognitive sciences 18, no. 3 (2014) p. 113.