User:LouisAragon/sandbox/RPW26-28
- Behrooz, Maziar (2013). "Revisiting the Second Russo-Iranian War (1826–28): Causes and Perceptions". Iranian Studies. 46 (3): 359–381. doi:10.1080/00210862.2012.758502.
| Russo-Persian War (1826–28) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Russo-Persian Wars and Russian conquest of the Caucasus | |||||||||
 The Battle of Elisabethpol on 13 September 1826 | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Russian Empire |
 Persia | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Aleksey Yermolov Valerian Madatov Ivan Paskevich |
Fath 'Ali Shah Abbas Mirza Hossein Khan Sardar Hasan Khan Qajar | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 15,000 (at Ganja, 1826) | 30,000 (at Ganja, 1826) | ||||||||
The Russo-Persian War of 1826–28 was the last major military conflict between the Russian Empire and Iran.
Background[edit]
In accordance to the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), the Russians annexed vast tracts of Iranian territory in the Caucasus, comprising present-day Eastern Georgia, southern Dagestan, northern Armenia, and most of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The appointment of Aleksey Yermolov in late 1816 as Russian commander-in-chief in the Caucasus and ambassador to Iran, further detoriorated the situation for the Iranians.[1] A staunch Russian imperialist, Yermolov was convinced that the entire Caucasus should become part of the Russian Empire.[1] He also felt that, in order to maintain Russian interests and security in the area, the last remaining Iranian khanates in the area (the Erivan and Nakhchivan Khanates) had to be conquered, and the border between the two should be formed at the Aras River.[1]
Thus, during his mission in Iran in 1817, Yermolov tried his very best to provoke a new war with Iran.[1] He insulted his hosts, and especially crown prince Abbas Mirza.[1] Yermolov's unacceptable manners, behaviour and demands, failed to resolve the border disputes that had been formed by Gulistan treaty, and in fact worsened the relations between Russia and Iran.[1]
The next steps Yermolov undertook in fulfilling his mission, was annexing the autonomous khanates of Shaki, Shirvan and Karabagh.[2] Though the Russians had made several separate agreements with the khans of the entities, which gave them the Russian approval to stay in power, under Russian suzerainty, Yermolov simply proceeded to fully annex them, in 1819, 1820, and 1822 respectively.[2]
Though the central government in St. Petersburg directed Yermolov to take a calmer approach, Yermolov ignored the calls, and continued to send inflammatory messages to the Iranians by sending Russian military into territories that were considered to be disputed.[2] The khans who had fled to mainland Iran in order to escape from the Russians, adressed their complaints Russian about mistreatment of the local Muslims; this sparked an outrage amongst the Shia religious hierachy.[3]
In May 1826, the Russians occupied Mirak in Iran's Erivan Khanate, in violation of the Gulistan Treaty (1813).[4] Though apparantly it was done against the wishes of Czar Nicholas I.[4] In response, the Persian government sent Mirza Mohammad Sadeq to St. Petersburg in an attempt to discuss the issue. However, Caucasus General Governor Aleksey Yermolov had Sadeq detained at Tiflis.[4] These events were the casus belli.
1826: Iranian reconquest and Russian response[edit]
Without a declaration of war, on 19 July 1826 (all dates old style, so add 12 days for the Western calendar) a 35000-strong army led by Abbas Mirza invaded Karabakh and Talysh, and did a good deal of damage. Noticing the approach of the Iranian army, many of the locals that had recently come under formal Russian jurisdiction, quickly switched sides.
Bombak and Shuragel {near Gyumri} were overrun from Yerevan. Gyumri was blockaded, but the garrison managed to escape, while 1000 men surrendered at Ak-Kara-Chay {location?}. Shusha, the capital of Karabakh, was besieged, Lenkoran and Elisabethpol (formerly Ganja) abandoned,[5] and Baku besieged. Yermolov remained strangely inactive, partly because he had only 35000 men. He asked for more, and Nicholas sent one division and 6 regiments of Don Cossack cavalry, telling Yermolov to invade the Yerevan Khanate. Yermolov replied that this was impossible and Nicholas replied by sending out Ivan Paskevich. This roused Yermolov, who sent Valerian Madatov south with instructions not to risk a major battle. Madatov disobeyed and on 2 September he and 2000 men defeated 10000 Persians and relieved the siege of Shusha. The Russians reentered Elisabethpol. The reinforcements arrived, as did Paskevich who took command of the army from Yermolov. On 14 September he routed an estimated 60000 Persians on the Akstafa River 18 miles west of Elisabethpol.
1827: Russian counter-invasion and victory[edit]
 | This section needs additional citations for verification. (September 2015) |
X=Russian, Blue=Persian, Yellow=Turkish
Yermolov’s position was now untenable and on 28 March 1827 he turned over all his powers to Paskevich. In April 1827 {or earlier?} Benckendorff occupied without resistance the monastery of Echmiadzin, the Armenian ‘Rome’, and then invested Yerevan. Paskevich joined him on 15 June. Finding Benckendorf’s men exhausted he replaced them with fresh troops under Krasovsky and set off south for Nakhichivan, the capital of that khanate. His purpose was to threaten Abbas Mirza’s capital of Tabriz and block any relief of Yerevan from that direction. He entered Nakhichivan unopposed on 26 June and the khanate became a Russian province. Sickness broke out and the supply convoys were late, so Paskevich did not push on to Tabriz.
Meanwhile, on 21 June, Krasovsky was forced to raise the siege of Yerevan due to the condition of his troops. He left one regiment at Echmiadzin and retired further north. At this point Abbas Mirza struck. His plan was to bypass Paskevich on the west and take Echmiadzin and Gyumri, devastate Tiflis and return through Karabakh. Krasovsky was forced to return south to relieve Echmiadzin (16 August). He had 1800 infantry, 500 cavalry and 12 guns. The distance was only 33 kilometers but the terrain was difficult, the heat was terrible and 30000 Persians blocked the way. At the battle of Ashtarak the Russians cut their way through and relieved Echmiadzin at the cost of half their number. The Persians withdrew south with a loss of only 400 men. It is said that if Krasovksy had not garrisoned the monastery he could have met Abbas Mirza on ground of his own choosing, but the thing was done and it worked.
When word reached Paskevich he abandoned any plans to move south and returned to Echmiadzin (5 September). Moving east he captured the fort of Serdar-Abad and on 23 September appeared before the walls of Yerevan. Much of the siege work was directed by Pushchin, a former engineer officer who had been reduced to the ranks for involvement with the Decembrists. When the place fell he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. Yerevan fell on 2 October. 4000 prisoners and 49 guns were taken and the Yerevan Khanate became a Russian province.
When Pashkevich left Nakhichivan he entrusted the area to Prince Eristov, a Georgian, with Muravyov as his lieutenant. He gave them strict instructions to merely guard the province and make no aggressive move. Abbas Mirza did the obvious thing. Crossing the Aras unopposed he found himself facing Eristov with 4000 men and 26 guns, far more than he expected. Abbas withdrew, Eristov chased him for a while and returned to Nakhichivan. So far they were within their orders. When they heard that the Persian army was in a state of complete demoralization the temptation was too great. Setting off on 30 September they reached a place called Maraud, Abbas got behind them, but when news of the fall of Yerevan reached them the Persian army was seized with panic and dispersed. Muravyov now chose to be bold, or foolish. Concealing his plans from everyone including Eristov he left Marand on 11 October and headed south. By 13 October they were a few miles from Tabriz. The garrison fled, driven out, it is said, by the inhabitants. The gates were opened and the ancient and wealthy city of 60,000 inhabitants was occupied without opposition. Peace negotiations began immediately, but dragged on. Fighting resumed in January but the Persian army was too demoralized to fight. Urmia was occupied and Ardebil opened its gates. The Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed on 10 February 1828 giving the two Azerbaijani khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan to Russia. On 20 March 1828 Paskevich learned that Russia was now at war with Turkey.
Aftermath[edit]
Historians from Russia glorified the conquest by labeling it as a "liberation of the region from tyranny and backwardness", it being the "start of its cultural transformation under the guidance of the enlightened Russian people".[3] Nevertheless, ironically, the Russians increased the burden on the locals of the South Caucasus (a region which they viewed as a "colony"), during the next five decades.[6]
In the words of professor Bournoutian;[7]
"Except for a short-lived period of independence (1918-1921), most of the territory south of the Caucasus Mountains then became part of the Soviet Union. Russian and local historians were directed to ignore the more than three centuries of Iranian cultural and linguistic heritage and to focus instead on the "national formation" and "the historical friendship" of the local Georgians, Armenians and Turkish-speaking Muslims (called Azeris after 1918). After the fall of the USSR in 1911, the three independent republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia had to face the realities of past differences and conflicts, which unfortunately continue to plague the region to this day."
By the Turkmenchay treaty, Russia completed the conquering of all Caucasian territories from Iran, having previously gained Georgia, Dagestan, and most of contemporary Azerbaijan through the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan. According to the terms of this treaty, the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan passed to Russia, encompassing modern day Armenia, and the remaining part of the contemporary Azerbaijan Republic that still remained in Iranian hands, as well as a small part of Eastern Anatolia, namely Iğdır (nowadays part of Turkey). The Shah promised to pay an indemnity of 20,000,000 silver roubles and allowed his Armenian subjects to migrate to Russian territory without any hindrance. This were to cause significant demographic shifts in the Caucasus as well as within the newly established borders of Iran, especially as the effects were combined with the Treaty of Adrianople of a year later. More importantly, the Shah granted the Russians the exclusive right to maintain a navy in the Caspian and agreed that Russian merchants were free to trade anywhere they wanted in Persia.
In the short term, the treaty undermined the dominant position of the British Empire in Persia and marked a new stage in the Great Game between the empires. In the long term, the treaty ensured the dependence of the Caucasus on Russia, thus making possible the eventual emergence of the modern states of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the territories conquered from Iran during the war, as well as the direct reason in combination with the 1813 Gulistan treaty for the decisive partition of the Azerbaijani and Talysh people between nowadays Iran and Azerbaijan.[8]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- Inline
- ^ a b c d e f Bournoutian 2016, p. 5.
- ^ a b c Bournoutian 2016, pp. 5–6.
- ^ a b Bournoutian 2016, p. 6.
- ^ a b c Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921, F. Kazemzadeh, The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol.7, ed. Peter Avery, G. R. G. Hambly and C. Melville, (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 337.
- ^ A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, (ABC-CLIO, 2010), 1148.
- ^ Bournoutian 2016, p. 212.
- ^ Bournoutian 2016, p. 7.
- ^ Swietochowski, Tadeusz. Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2003 Taylor and Francis, 2003. ISBN 1857431375 p 104
- General
- N. Dubrovin. История войны и владычества русских на Кавказе, volumes 4-6. SPb, 1886-88.
- Gen. V.A. Potto. Кавказская война..., volumes 1-5. SPb, 1885–86, reprinted in 2006. ISBN 5-9524-2107-5.