User:Shapeyness/sandbox/Transparency argument

The transparency argument, also known as the argument from transparency or the argument from diaphanousness, is an argument in the philosophy of mind for intentionalism. According to the argument, introspection is unable to reveal the intrinsic aspects of experience, which are claimed to be "transparent", and can only access the intentional or representational aspects of experience. The argument draws the conclusion from this thesis that intentionality is fundamental to the mental and that the phenomenal aspect of experience is reducible to or at least supervenient upon its intentional content. A result of this conclusion is that there are no purely phenomenal aspects of experience, or qualia, because all phenomenal experiences have an intentional content.

Background

Traditionally, philosophers have identified two separate aspects of experience: a representational aspect and a sensational aspect. The representational aspect, which is called intentionality, is an experience's ability to represent or to be directed towards objects, events or states of affairs. The sensational aspect, also called the phenomenal character of the experience, is the way that the experience subjectively feels. Throughout much of the twentieth century, philosophers classified intentionality and phenomenal character as thoroughly distinct aspects of experience. However, beginning in the 1980s, philosophers such as John Searle and Fred Dretske began to argue that such a strict separation between the two was mistaken, and that intentionality and phenomenal character were deeply connected mental phenomena. Searle argued that phenomenal consciousness was the fundamental aspect of mental phenomena, whilst intentionalists such as Dretske argued that intentionality was fundamental, underlying phenomenal character.

One of the motivations for intentionalists such as Dretske came from the idea that the phenomenal character of experiences is introspectively transparent, or in other words, we "see right through" the phenomenal properties of perceptions directly to the properties of represented objects. According to Amy Kind, this idea dates back at least to early modern philosophers such as Thomas Reid, later being influentially raised by G. E. Moore in his 1903 paper "The Refutation of Idealism" in which he said "The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous." However, this transparency thesis was not utilized to argue for intentionalism until Gilbert Harman's 1990 paper "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience". Primarily defending functionalism in the paper, Harman used the transparency of experience to argue for the intentionalist conclusion that "two perceptual experiences with the same intentional content must be psychologically the same."

[transparency argument and intentionalism vs qualia realism]

Counterarguments

Proposed counterexamples, inverted spectrum thought experiments

References

Sources

• Bayne, Tim (2022). Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-66984-9.
• Byrne, Alex (2001). "Intentionalism Defended". The Philosophical Review. 110 (2): 199. doi:10.2307/2693675. ISSN 0031-8108.
• Kind, Amy. "Qualia". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Kind, Amy (2010). "Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness". Philosophy Compass. 5 (10): 902–913. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00328.x. ISSN 1747-9991.
• Lycan, William (2019). "Representational Theories of Consciousness". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.