User:TShilo12/Interrogatives

In Which I Ramble on Drunkenly about Who Knows What... The following is a rough draft of a treatise on the rôle of interrogatives on our [humanity's] understanding of our physical universe, and a question about the extent to which that understanding is limited by "normal questions humans ask" as well as a consideration for how to expand our collective understanding by abandoning such limitations on a linguistic and cultural level.

• What? [requires a concept of substance]
  • From what? [requires a concept of cause -> effect]
    • By what => How? [agency]
    • With what => How? To what? [co-agency]
  • To what? [also requires cause->effect conceptualization]
    • For what => Why? [presupposes the concept of purpose]

• Who? [requires a concept of person]
  • From whom? [simple causation or origination]
  • By whom? [ergativity or agency]
  • To whom? [purpose or objectivity]
  • For whom? [definitive purpose]

• When? [requires a concept of time; linear, cyclical or chaotic]
  • From when? [requires conception of time as either linear or cyclical]
  • To when? [requires conception of time as either linear or cyclical]

• Where? [requires a concept of place]
  • From where => Whence? [requires "HERE" as a determinant in perspective; presupposes place as independent of time and causality]
  • To where => Whither? [requires "HERE" as a determinant in perspective; presupposes place as independent of time and causality]

• How? [requires a concept of ergativity/causality]
• Why? [requires a concept of purpose]
  • From why? [requires "causality"]
  • To why? [requires "purpose"]

• Which?, while normally presented as a distinct category of interrogative, is actually little more than a determinant among indistinct divisions of the above. "Which person?" is a finite expression of "Who/m?" "Which time?" is a finite interrogative equivalent to "when [specifically]?" or "which incident?", both pinpointing-forms of "when?"; "Which place?" is clearly a form of "where?", etc.

What this analysis boils down to is that human perceptions are categorizable into classifications, no matter how uneasily the lines between them might be drawn, as matters of "what" [substance], "who" [personage], "where" [location] and "when" [time]. The "who" interrogative can be further reduced to "which person?", which is a particularizing/specificationizing subset of "what?", leaving the field of genuine interrogatives at "substance", "location" and "time".

A further reduction seems self-evident at this juncture, specifically, "what [thing]?", "what place = where" and "what time = when", seeming to make the core principle interrogative "what", but this is deceptive, as it combines "substance", "location" and "chronology" differentiated by a single interrogative. What this does, under deeper analysis, however, is reveal that these three concepts, while intricately interwoven, are, in point of fact, unique. That these three seem to be ideological and substantive interrelated ideas is, as it happens, a trick of linguistics. This "trick" has a lot to do, in this author's humble estimation, with a fundamental unspoken human desire to enforce order on a universe where our species' feeble intellect has a daunting task: imposing order compatible with our understanding upon a[n undoubtedly ordered] universe, the evidence of which indicates anything but understandable order. This linguistically-based limitation, tied to our pre-scientific-method understanding of "things as we see them", is, in my humble estimation, among the primary limitations on the expansion of our knowledge into areas in which we are, as a species, "inexperienced". The core weakness of the "what *" approach is the failure to realize that, in such instances, "what" is a stand-in for "which", which, as discussed earlier, is nothing more than a qualifier "among similars", not "among disparates".

If we return then, to the core fields of "substance, location and time", a cursory study of modern physics brings us smack dab into a confrontation between linguistics and such things as quantum physics and the uncertainty principle; not exactly the place where either field, linguistics or modern physics, expect to find common ground... That said, however, the dissection of language can offer interesting fields of study for the pursuits of modern physics: specifically, "What is the relationship between substance, location and time?" Clearly, modern physics teaches that "substance" is significantly "less-than-immutable", and on the quantum level especially, significantly "less-than-stable". As for the "location and time" aspects of such an inspection, anyone with half a noggin can't help but be reminded of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.

This entire discussion is academic, on a philosophical level. The foremost question that philosophers obsess about is not encompassed in any of these. That question, of course, is "Why?", which I have dismissed above as "for what?", presupposing purpose. Among mundane interrogatives, "Why?" has no place, and perhaps it is this singular word that separates humanity from the so-called "lower creation". When animals die, even the majestic elephants whose memories are legendary, there is no indication that they ever wonder "Why?" Why do elephants die? Why do elephants live? That is the question that plagues human philosophy, and which human religion in its many hues seeks to answer. "Why?", when removed from the mundane "for what purpose" or "by what cause" (almost "how?") ('i.e.', "Why is white flame hotter than blue?"), suddenly becomes a quest for meaning, rather than a simple desire to understand fundamental forces of nature. In that respect, "Why?" comes closest to indicating the reason for this entire treatise. "Why?" pushes the boundaries of our understanding, and stands alone among interrogatives in demanding explanations beyond those immediately within our grasp and indeed, beyond explanations necessarily within our immediate capacity to understand.

Questions for thought

• To what extent has language played a rôle in our understanding of our physical universe?
• [different wording] To what extent does our use of language shape our understanding of the physical universe rather than reflect it?
• How can/should language be "forcibly" altered in order to ensure that science rules the use of terminology for the purpose of forwarding a realistic understanding of modern scientific knowledge, rather than to promote an understanding of our universe according to traditional misinterpretations, which may [or may not] be presently stifled by linguistic factors?
  • In this vein, rather than using a word like "sunrise", a more accurate descriptor would be something along the lines of "sunsight".