User:Ttocserp/Limitation of the Vend

The Limitation of the Vend was a cartel of coal mine owners of north east England. Its purpose was to fix prices and restrict sales. It controlled the shipment of coals from Newcastle and adjacent ports, a coastal trade proverbial in the English language. The immediate buyers in this market were ships' captains who aimed to resell in other parts of England; but above all in London which, by becoming the planet's first mineral-fuelled city, had escaped a natural constraint on the growth of urban areas, and was a voracious consumer. Often dated 1771-1845, the Limitation of the Vend can be traced back much earlier.

Usually, the combination operated openly and without concealment, being supervised by a well-organised secretariat, who could detect significant cheating. Apparently, members thought their behaviour was illegal, but morally justified. Never successfully prosecuted by the law, they were investigated at least five times by Parliament, twice at their own instigation.

The cartel's coals, despite their enhanced prices, captured nearly the whole of the lucrative London market. Coals mined in other parts of Great Britain, though geographically closer, could seldom compete. Members of the cartel kept up their competitive advantage by heavy investment in transportation and deep mining technology. The region has been described as the Silicon Valley of its day.

The Limitation of the Vend has left meticulous records, enabling scholars to study the behaviour of a real cartel in cliometric detail. Unlike most price-fixing business combinations, which soon collapse e.g. because members start cheating, the Limitation maintained itself for an exceptionally long time, albeit with occasional outbreaks of cut throat competition, being perhaps the most durable cartel that has ever existed. It has been described as one one of the most fascinating problems in economic history.

Names[edit]

The Limitation of the Vend was also known as the Limitation of the Vends, the Regulation of the Vend(s), the Joint Durham and Northumberland Coal Owners Association, and the Newcastle Vend.

The combination: preliminary outline[edit]

The Limitation of the Vend was an association of coal mine owners of County Durham and Northumberland. At yearly intervals its members negotiated an agreement. It laid down each member's share of the market and the minimum prices it was allowed charge. These depended on its productive capacity and the qualities of its coals.^[1]

A committee kept its eye on the London coal market and decided the total sale ("issue") allowed for the next month (later, fortnight). No mine was to load ships in excess of its allocation or sell below its list price. However, because the cartel was an agreement in restraint of trade it is most improbable that its rules would have been enforced in a court of law. Obedience was voluntary.

An efficient secretariat kept accounts and could usually tell if there was significant cheating. Members who exceeded their allocations, or who sold at less than the prescribed price, could be "fined". The fine was calculated by a method laid down in the agreement; the money was paid over for the benefit of members who had sold less than their quotas.

Coals sold to local consumers, or for export to foreign countries, were free of the cartel, and cheap. The agreement applied to coals sold to ships in the coastwise trade only. Most of those vessels, which were moored in the rivers Tyne or Wear, or later, the Tees, were bound for London. Such was the volume of the London trade that a modest tax on it paid for the rebuilding of the city after the 1666 Great Fire, including St Paul's Cathedral and the 51 Wren churches.^[2]

There was nothing to stop members from resigning and offering their coals to ships at keener prices in any amount. Moreover, mines had conflicting aims and interests. The most productive mines wanted large quotas and vends, and lenient fines for those who exceeded them. The least productive mines wanted higher prices, smaller vends for everybody, and tougher fines.^[3] Thus, possibly no mine was happy with the terms and conditions eventually agreed. Despite all this, the members did usually keep to the agreement, and negotiate next year's. This went on for nearly 75 years; arguably, for much longer. It may have been the most durable cartel that has existed.^[4]

Since most cartels, even stable cartels, last only a small fraction of that time — most commonly, about 4 years — then collapse e.g. through cheating,^[5] the problem in economics is to explain the length and stability of the Limitation of the Vend. In 1941 Austin Robinson called it one of the most fascinating unsolved problems in economic history.^[6]

The north east coalfield and its geographical advantage[edit]

Histories of the coal industry tend to concentrate on mining, but much of it had to do with transport. "The remarkable point [is] that it became economically feasible to move such large amounts of a heavy and bulky material over comparatively long distances. In this respect the coasting trade is of the utmost significance".^[7]

Sea transport[edit]

There were rich coal deposits in several parts of Great Britain, some much nearer to London, but the north east coalfield of County Durham and Northumberland — often simply called the Great Northern Coalfield — had a competitive advantage. The advantage was the low cost of sea transport to the London consumer.^[8]

Until modern road surfaces were developed it was much cheaper to send bulky cargoes by water.^[9] According to various estimates, the price of coal if taken by the roads of the era^[10] doubled within five^[11] or ten^[12] miles of the pit-head, hence soon became unaffordable. But the north east coalfield was intersected by navigable rivers that flowed into the North Sea, only 300 miles away from London's river Thames.

The north east coalfield's geographical advantage

Coalfields of Great Britain (Ordnance Survey: National Library of Scotland) ↙ north east coalfield

The north east coalfield c. 1750

A recent estimate is that in 1750 it would have been about 65 times cheaper to send coal to London by sea than by road.^[13] Sea-sale collieries were near enough to the tideway (tidal rivers) to do so; landsale collieries had to be content with the local market.^[14]

Other coalfields did send coal to London by sea, but the voyages were longer. Already in the 17th century small amounts of Pembrokeshire culm (good for hothouses) and Scotch great coal (for warming noblemen's mansions) were burnt in the neighbourhood of London, though they were expensive.^[15]

The coastal shipping trade[edit]

To London[edit]

In general,^[16] the north east mines did not ship their coals to London themselves.^[17]^[18]^[19] They sold them to colliers — typically small sailing brigs — that loaded in the north east rivers and resold their cargoes in the river Thames or other ports. This coastwise trade, in itself, was highly competitive, because participants were numerous and ships were easily switched into and out of the business.^[20] East coast colliers have been described as "among the very best sailing vessels in operation anywhere".^[21]

By 1800, there were 600 colliers in the London trade alone, shipping an annual 1.35 million tons.^[22] They caused severe congestion in the Pool of London and in 1829 it was decided that no more than 250 should be allowed there at the same time.^[23] In 1820 the Limehouse Basin was dug for colliers to transship their cargoes to the new Regent's Canal, which conveniently skirted the built up area.

This coastal trade was the largest branch of the British shipping industry by volume;^[24] and it had some political leverage. The North Sea voyages were hazardous (in one extreme case, 200 ships were lost at the same time),^[25] especially on voyages to supply the winter coal market.^[26]^[27] In wartime, enemy privateers tried to seize them;^[28] hence they were armed,^[29] or painted with fake gun-ports.^[30] It was believed the trade bred tougher and more skilful seamen;^[31] it was called a "nursery"^[32]^[33] for the Royal Navy^[24] and was even said to account for England's naval supremacy.^[34]

Other destinations[edit]

Although most ships in the coastwise trade sailed for London,^[35] a substantial proportion, particularly if departing from Sunderland,^[36] delivered to other places. Colliers were strongly built with flat bottoms,^[37] and small ones could trade from beaches for example.^[38]

Turn-around[edit]

A collier's profitability depended on how many voyages a year she could achieve — eight was considered not bad — and was affected by her turn-around time in the ports.^[39] Explained Simon Ville:

Colliers arriving in the Tyne would drop anchor at Shields. The master travelled across land to Newcastle to order a cargo of coal. Coal was transported from the pit head to the river side and loaded into small keel boats. The keelmen sailed to Shields and discharged the cargo into the waiting ship. This process would be repeated using several keel boats until the vessel was fully loaded. This was expensive and time-consuming ...^[40]

If the master wanted the best grades of coals e.g. Wallsend (which sold better in London, but were harder to procure) the delay was greater.^[41] This could happen because the best mines had used up their monthly quotas. "No more could be supplied till the commencement of the ensuing month; and detentions of this kind, as your Committee have reason to believe, frequently occurred", Parliament was told.^[42] It was hard for the master to make the right buying decision not least because prices in London fluctuated tremendously.^[43]

Since ships lost money by being kept waiting — which might happen on purpose if they had offended the cartel — in 1811 the shipping industry procured an Act of Parliament (the Turn Act)^[44] by which colliers in the Tyne waiting for a load had to be served strictly in turn, no ship being allowed to jump the queue. Thus, refusing to sell a ship coal was a breach of the law. The cartel admitted they evaded the law by demanding steep prices instead of refusing point blank.^[45]^[46]

Sea versus rail[edit]

The London and Birmingham Railway, which connected London to the much nearer Midland coalfield (1833), was strongly opposed by the Limitation of the Vend, who regarded it as unfair competition,^[47] which in one sense it was.^[48] As it turned out, however, very little coal came to London by rail during the cartel's lifetime. Even in 1845 it carried a minuscule 8,377 tons.^[49]^[50] In that year coastal shipping conveyed 3,177,321 tons from the north east, and 163,994 tons from Scotland, Yorkshire or Wales. Even canals carried 60,310 tons.^[50]

Textbooks on 19th-century national transport history devote little attention to coastal shipping; overwhelmingly, they concentrate on railways. Yet, until about 1910, more ton-miles of British goods were moved by coastal shipping than by all the public railways combined. A long-distance railway required heavy investment in infrastructure; a coasting business, practically none. Steamships were much faster than freight trains, which averaged 2 miles in an hour, if that.^[51] Sailers, even if at the mercy of the winds, were usefully conveyed by the tides,^[52] and consumed no fuel. There was even a type that could be crewed by two men and a boy.^[53]

Potential competitors[edit]

Despite its advantage, the north east coalfield was exposed to potential competition. Though other coalfields did not send very much coal to the capital before 1860,^[54] that was partly because the cartel was careful not to push its prices too high.

For example, tramways and canals were built, eventually, that connected the South Wales coalfield to the sea;^[55] it was still sending coal to London by sea in the 1950s. So were the Scottish ports of Leith and Methil, as were Yorkshire's Goole and Hull.^[56] The Grand Junction Canal (1800)^[57] connected the midlands coalfield to London. That the Limitation opposed such canals shows they were a credible threat to its business.^[54]^[58] "Easy access to navigable water was an immense economic asset, and one fiercely defended".^[59]

The north east mine owners knew that, if they set their cartel prices too high, it would stimulate competition from other regions,^[60] and they behaved accordingly. Their chairman admitted it to the House of Lords in 1830:

Q. The Price as now fixed at Newcastle is a high a Price as can be supported, without letting into the Market other Coals which compete with them? A. I feel perfectly confident of that.^[61]

In 1828 they had made the mistake of fixing the prices too high, and as a result "we found a great Influx of Coals from other Parts of the Kingdom, from Wales, from Scotland, from Yorkshire and Stockton..."^[62] (At that time Stockton was not in the cartel.) "We endeavour to keep the Prices at a Point a little below what the Consumer can get the same Article for elsewhere".^[63]

Elaine S. Tan found that these potential competitors, just by existing, set a cap on the prices the Limitation could safely impose.^[64] Many "fringe" mines in these regions, being near the surface, required very little investment, and could be exploited opportunistically. There were rural workers who mined coal on a casual basis. Small traders in those regions — grocers and drapers — invested the small sums required.^[65]

The consumers[edit]

The north east coal industry was exporting to a market unprecedented in world history, with which it had developed in symbiosis:^[66] a large urban area that had escaped the Malthusian trap imposed by the growth constraints of organic fuel.

Organic fuel, and its limits[edit]

Grain crops and firewood were two basic necessities of life for early modern European cities.^[67] Fuel scarcity was a critical constraint upon their growth,^[68] because firewood and grains competed for the same basic resource: land. "More land devoted to the production of timber ... meant less land available to produce food".^[69]^[70]

The demographer Tony Wrigley and Dutch scholars estimated that, for a town of only 10,000 inhabitants,

each day an average of thirty to forty horse-drawn carts would pass through the city's gates laden with firewood, along with a further ten carts laden with bread grain.

To produce such quantities, sustainably, needed a large^[71] reserve of well-managed woodlands, plus at least as much land again for the bread grains.^[72] As the town's population grew so would the cultivation area. A limit would be reached eventually. (It has been estimated that by 1860 England's domestic fuel requirements, supposing they had had to be satisfied by firewood, would have required nearly all English farmlands to be turned into woodlands.)^[73] Besides, wood was bulky, so much of its final town price was represented by the cost of transporting it to market.

Hence there was a practical geographical limit^[74] — the "accessible hinterland" — in which wood might usefully be cultivated,^[75] or, in other words, a cap on the town's population growth.^[76] It might be possible to bring more marginal land into production but this was subject to a law of diminishing returns.^[77]

Though woodlands in south and east England were carefully managed as renewable resources, they could not keep up with the demand. Already by 1300 firewood prices were rising sharply,^[78] and this in a region that contained some of the most wooded parts of medieval England.^[79] Prices continued to rise in ensuing centuries and there may have been a fuel crisis.^[80] By the 17th century sea coal (i.e. from Newcastle) had become the general fuel in London.^[81]

By pioneering the substitution of mineral coal for organic wood, London managed to escape the law of diminishing returns altogether.^[82] No longer was the town limited to the quantity of fuel that could be produced by the annual cycle of plant photosynthesis. With coal, although "the energy source continued to be plant photosynthesis, [it had been] accumulated over a geological age. *** The problem that haunted the classical economists in their discussion of growth possibilities" was avoided. However, the city was now living off capital not income, because the stock of energy built up over a geological era, though vast, was not a renewable resource.^[83]

London, the first mineral-fuelled city[edit]

In c. 1500, London was not even among the ten largest cities in Europe; by 1700, it was the largest, with half a million inhabitants.^[84] Around 1800 it had a million,^[85] about then overtaking Beijing, and thereafter underwent unparalleled growth.^[86] It was unique for its inward migration. Apprenticeship records show that, of young men who became citizens, only 17% were born in the town. The rest came from all parts of England.^[87] The planet's first coal-fuelled city, its urban, economic and demographic growth was unprecedented. So was its smoke pollution.^[88]

London was able to grow from a town to a metropolis only by switching from firewood to coal. Wrote Wrigley:

When London's population passed the half million mark towards the end of the seventeenth century, it would have needed the annual timber growth from an area of approximately 3,200 square kilometres of woodland (c. 1,250 square miles) to meet its fuel needs on the assumptions set out above,^[89]

so that already by 1700, without coal, a land area roughly equal to the county of Kent would have had to be devoted just to growing firewood.

Industry[edit]

London started importing coal from Newcastle upon Tyne in the middle ages,^[90] there being a Sea-coal Lane near the River Fleet by 1228.^[91] It was too acrid a fuel for warming the houses of the era, and was objected to as a noxious pollutant,^[92] but it gradually substituted for the firewood consumed in the town's industries: brewing, which already in 1578 burnt 20,000 waggon loads (≈ 10,000 trees),^[93] brick making,^[94] lime burning, blacksmithing,^[95] soap, sugar,^[96] salt^[97] and shipbuilding (since planks had to be heated to bend them).^[98]

Building materials[edit]

Though rarely publicised, the bricks of traditional London houses contain the ashes of coals carried from Newcastle by sailing ship.

London's expansion would have been impossible without making hundreds of millions of bricks annually, which probably^[99] could not have been done without coal.^[88] Bricks were normally made by baking clay forms in kilns, in which coal substituted for firewood. One estimate was that, using that conventional process, the brick industry of mid-Victorian London would have consumed an annual 100,000 tons of coal.^[100] However, by 1800 Londoners had discovered a cheaper method: mixing brickearth (a local mineral) with cinders and coal ash;^[101] the latter was imperfectly burnt coal, available as household waste, and could be made to burn again at high temperatures. Placed in a brick clamp and initially heated, the bricks ignited and fired themselves.^[102] Contractors paid for the privilege of removing household rubbish with its valuable dust,^[103] hence the expression dustmen.

The town rapidly expanded in the Georgian and Victorian era and was built in London stock brick. "At night a 'ring of fire' and pungent smoke encircled the City". It was a zone of outlying fields that were being turned into streets of new houses. The required bricks were manufactured on the spot, brickearth being dug up in the fields, and firing them in brick clamps.^[104] A gang of 6-8 men could make a million bricks in a season, enough to build about 30-35 fourth-rate houses (three-storey artisan's dwellings). Firing these took 6-8 weeks.^[105] Thus, coal not only directly substituted for wood as a fuel, but indirectly as a construction material, since it was used for firing brick, the prime building material of the new age.^[106]

Lime (burnt with coal) was needed for the mortar, and glass for the windows, which with coal could be made at much lower cost. "English travellers on the continent in the eighteenth century were struck by the rarity of window glass in the villages and towns that they visited".^[84]

London, built in coal-fired brick

1. Brick, the prime building material

2. Brick Lane

3. A Georgian terrace of artisans' houses.

Building in brick was always an option; after the Great Fire it became the norm. (St James's Palace and Pall Mall, English school, c.1750, Lady Lever Art Gallery.)
Brick Lane is named for a 15th-century district where bricks were fired, well outside the City of London's walls. By then Newcastle coal was in use for making bricks.
Large parts of London are built in brick. A million bricks would build a modest street of fourth-rate houses, so-called for the tax band. (In this example: Sekforde Street, Clerkenwell.) To fire them, household waste (mainly coal ash, which was increasingly plentiful), was mixed with brickearth.

Building innovations: domestic heating[edit]

As wood became expensive Londoners evolved a new style of house. It could be heated by burning coal without choking the place with fumes. Instead of burning firewood in a central, ground-floor hearth, as hitherto, houses were planned around a central chimney with back-to-back fireplaces on the ground and first floors; grates of appropriate design allowed air to circulate around the burning coals.^[107] That coal was burned inside houses astonished foreign visitors.^[108]

After the Great Fire of London (1666) the town's houses were rebuilt in brick and mortar so there was a huge demand for quicklime, the burning of which required more coal. London's building boom encouraged builders to experiment, innovate, and learn from each other.^[107] Robert C. Allen has argued that it was this collective innovation that first stimulated the expansion of the north east coal industry.^[109]

The capital imported more coal than any other port in the world,^[24] and from the Elizabethan era^[110] a proverbial coastal trade developed from the port of Newcastle.^[111] By the 17th century^[112] London's households were warmed, and its industries were fuelled,^[113] almost entirely by coal.^[111]

In the Victorian era there were worries that coal would not last for ever and the London-type fireplace was criticised as wasteful. In his 1863 presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir William Armstrong said:

In warming houses we consume in our open fires about five times as much coal as will produce the same heating effect when burnt in a close and properly constructed stove.

The money wasted, which effectively went up the chimney, exceeded the annual income tax.^[114] The Society of Arts offered prizes for improved stoves; but after testing 107 specimens, rewarded none. The reason was this, said an author: the English people had an irrational prejudice for visibly cheery fires. "We, in England, like to see our fires, and the consequence is that we are never able to feel them". The method was fundamentally wrong: the updraft in the chimney inevitably drew into the room an equal volume of cold air, which was felt as draughts.^[115]

The products[edit]

Coal is not a homogenous product.^[116] Coals suitable for different uses were mined in the north east and each was available in various qualities, with prices to match. Coals were quoted by the name of the mine, and many produced two or three grades.

Some of the main types exported to London were:

Household coal[edit]

The most expensive in the London market was known as best Wallsend, because originally it came from Wallsend colliery, though later the name was applied generically. The ideal household coal, it was long-burning; the very best grades left absolutely no ash. They were also hard, an attractive feature, since coal tended to break in handling, forming small lumps that burned too quickly.^[117] Some mines in other parts of the north east coalfield e.g. around the river Wear were capable of producing coal just as good, or even better, than Wallsend; but since their owners mixed their excellent coals with inferior grades, they failed to acquire the same outstanding reputation. A time came when the real best Wallsend coal was exhausted, and these mines decided to go for quality.^[118]

Gas coal[edit]

After dark, European towns were illuminated — if at all — by burning whale oil, tallow candles and other animal products; these were unsatisfactory and expensive.^[119] In early 19th century London a different concept was promoted by Anglo-German pioneer Frederick Albert Winsor: lighting towns by coal gas. A few factories had already been illuminated with gas made on the premises, but it was his vision that whole districts would be supplied with gas centrally made and piped under the streets — "as London is now supplied with water". His wildly optimistic financial forecasts set off a speculative bubble, but it did attract the needed investment capital; and in 1812 the London and Westminster Chartered Gas Light and Coke Company was incorporated as the world's first gaslighting company. Soon the streets of Westminster were lighted by gas, as were shops, pubs and theatres, and the concept was imitated in other towns.^[120]

Now there was a demand for coal suitable for making gas. The ideal gas coal would be cheap, sulphur-free and productive. The best kind came from the Hutton coal seam north of the river Wear. It easily broke into fragments, making it inferior as household coal, but for gas making that was no objection.^[121] By mid-19th century the north east was exporting two million tons annually.^[122]

Steam coal[edit]

The new steamboats demanded yet another type of coal. It should ignite and burn rapidly — ships might need to get up steam in a hurry — without leaving too many clinkers, since these obstructed the firebars.^[122]^[123]

The best kind in the north east came from seams found in the north of the coalfield:^[124] Hartley, Seaton Sluice and the River Blyth (see below).^[122]^[125]

Railway coal (coke)[edit]

Early railway locomotives were prohibited from burning coal because of the smoke nuisance, and were required to use coke instead. For manufacturing coke, the best coals in the northeast came from deep beds in various places, including Auckland.^[126]

Miscellaneous[edit]

Yet other grades of coals were used in various industries, such as glassmaking, ironwork, and so forth.

The coal industry as a business investment[edit]

Mining[edit]

Spectacular cases[edit]

Some families made large fortunes in the north east coalfield: for example the Londonderrys who, unlike most owners of coal-bearing lands, were in the mining business themselves.^[127] The headstrong Charles Vane, 3rd Marquess of Londonderry, unable to touch his wife's vast capital without the consent of her trustees,^[128] borrowed riskily^[129] and founded Seaham Harbour, the coalfield's first sea port. After his death she, Frances Vane, Marchioness of Londonderry, managed the business herself. According to Benjamin Disraeli, she had been a society hostess who, having brains, sought excitement. She found it on the shores of the North Sea, "surrounded by her collieries and her blast furnaces and her railroads and the unceasing telegraphs, with a port hewn out of the solid rock, screw steamers and four thousand pitmen under her control". Disraeli said she had a regular office "and here she transacts, with innumerable agents, immense business".^[130]

Perhaps the most spectacular example, however, was William Russell who, by leasing the prodigious Wallsend Colliery, made at least £50 million in present-day money and bought himself Brancepeth Castle ^[131] and a parliamentary pocket borough.

The prosaic norm[edit]

However, to invest in the industry was not necessarily a wise decision, or even a rational one. Chicago economic historian John U. Nef, in his The Rise of the British Coal Industry, said the business was, in Adam Smith's words, "a lottery, in which the prizes do not compensate the blanks". It could become a ruinous addiction, like treasure hunting.

History seems to show that coal mining almost invariably attracts more capital than can be profitably invested, and that this capital remains in the industry, in apparent defiance of the rules laid down by the classical economists, even when the return on it is lower than that received by adventurers in other industries. * * * Experience shows that mine owners continue to work their pits, even at a loss, when the market is already glutted with coal.^[132]^[133]

Reliable quantitative accounts are not available before about 1850, when it appears the net return on capital in coal mining in Britain was about 5%, little more than could have been got by lending the money safely in mortgages.^[134] Yet the industry was so risky that it was not possible to obtain fire insurance.^[135]

The town clerk of Newcastle told the House of Commons (1800) that although Wallsend colliery made "outrageous profit", and two or three others made "large" profits, on the whole it was not a sound investment.

I have lived my whole life in a Coal Mine country. I have possessed the means, and have had frequent opportunities offered me, of adventuring in speculations of that nature; I have ever declined doing so upon this principle, that the average profits resulting from those adventures were inadequate to the employment of so much capital as they required, and to the risk attending them.^[136]

To like effect wrote economist William Stanley Jevons: "That in some cases prodigious profits are made, as in the case of the original Wallsend mine, is well known. But this cannot usually be the case, otherwise the wide areas of land yet known to contain untouched seams of coal of the finest qualities, would at once be broken up by speculators, who are never wanting. That deep mines are so deliberately opened is a sufficient proof that the highest prices obtained are, taking all mining risks and charges into account, only an average equivalent for the capital invested."^[137]

Mineral leasing[edit]

In Britain, unlike other Western European countries, mineral deposits^[138] belonged, not to the State, but to the owner of the soil.^[139] With time, owners of coal-bearing land, instead of mining it themselves, tended to lease the mineral rights to entrepreneurs. These landowners — in County Durham the Church was the largest ^[140] — were content to receive a fixed rent plus royalties on the tonnage.^[141]^[142] They avoided the risks, but got what was a modest return for the exploitation of a wasting asset. Clark and Jacks from a sample of 203 coal leases found that the average royalty on a ton of coal was only 10% of the pithead price.^[143]

In contrast, in the modern world the mineral rent paid for some oil reserves in the Middle East is close to the whole of the wellhead price. That is why there were so few coal millionaires in eighteenth and nineteenth century England, in contrast to the oil billionaires of today.^[144]

North east coalfield: investment in technology[edit]

The coalfield kept up its competitive advantage even after its easily accessible deposits had been exhausted. The industry was created, not "by landowners, but by a Newcastle merchant oligarchy that lacked neither capital nor ability".^[145] By the eighteenth century the Northumberland and Durham coalfield was the largest and most technically advanced in the world.^[146] It has been said that Newcastle was "the Florence of the Industrial Revolution";^[147] "the north-east was the Silicon Valley of its day".^[148]

Deep mining[edit]

Already maybe by 1600 (but at the latest, 1700)^[149] not only had the surface outcrops of coal been worked out, but so had the shallower underground seams where a mine could be drained easily by opening an adit and letting the water run further downhill.^[150] Deep mining became necessary, which brought a host of problems. "In 1700 the deepest mines were already about 300 feet [100 m]. By the 1750s they reached 600 feet. By the 1820s some pits reached nearly 900 feet underground". In 1828 two thirds of the mines were more than 300 foot deep, one third more than 600.^[151]

Depth and winning[edit]

Winning coal is making it accessible for extraction, and in this district it required heavy investment with no guarantee of a return.^[152] In The Coal-Mines of the North of England (1846) David T. Ansted, professor of geology at King's College London, wrote:

The depth of the sinkings is enormous, being rarely less than 150 fathoms [275 m], and sometimes upwards of 300. The competition amongst the various proprietors is very great, and the expense of sinking such deep shafts, often through untried ground and with a vast body of water pouring from quicksands, is so enormous, that there seems no hope of adding very considerably to the number of shafts in each mine

which made for severe ventilation problems.^[153]

If the shaft-sinking struck water-bearing sands it could become a serious emergency. In sinking the shaft for Murton Colliery (1838) a torrent of nearly 10,000 gallons (45 tons) of water a minute rushed in, and had to be pumped up 540 feet (165 metres) to the surface, requiring the combined power of 39 steam-engine boilers, before workmen could safely tub off the shaft with cast iron.^[154]

Pumping and lifting[edit]

The main problem was seepage water in the mines, however. In deep mines it was necessary to pump it up, which required a source of power. A common misunderstanding is that mines were pumped by horse power until steam engines were invented. They sometimes were, but hydraulic power was more effective than either.^[155]^[156] For this to work, though, a large catchment area was needed to collect enough run-off water to drive the wheels (called coal mills); the necessity favoured large landholdings.^[157] By 1800 mine ownership in the north east was much more concentrated than in other parts of England.^[158] Even so, the region was one of the first to adopt the Newcomen steam engine, and it installed many,^[159]^[160] some for pumping water to waterwheels.^[161]

Prime movers

1. Animal power

2. Water power

3. Steam

4. Hybrid

Horse-driven cog and rung winding machine. Early machines could be built by local millwrights. "In the Walker colliery in 1765, the deepest mine at that point at 600 feet, coal was lifted from the mine by a gin powered by 8 horses".^[162] At that depth the rope weighed more than the load of coal.^[163]
Coal mill. For driving mine pumps, these water-powered prime movers were more effective than early steam engines and much more so than horses (Beamish Colliery: T.H. Hair, 1844, Views of the Collieries of Northumberland and Durham ).
Pumping engine at Friar's Goose Colliery, Gateshead (Hair, Views). Deep mining required heavy investment.
John Smeaton's water gin, Long Benton Colliery, 1777. Early steam engines were too jerky to drive the winding gear, so they pumped water to overshot wheels, which turned it smoothly. (Wellcome Collection: J. Farey, eng. Lowry)

Ventilation[edit]

The mines being deep and the coal bituminous, explosive gas became a serious problem, and until 1815 had to be dealt with by improved ventilation alone since miners had no practical^[164] way of illuminating their work except by the light of a naked flame. The method of getting coal in this district was pillar and stall mining,^[165] in which the mineral is extracted by cutting a grid of intersecting passageways, leaving thick pillars of coal to support the roof. Besides yielding coal, those passageways were essential for ventilation because, if they were obstructed — even in abandoned sidings — explosive pockets of gas might accumulate and endanger the whole mine; this was appreciated by 1760. Thus, until safety lamps were introduced (see below), a third if not one half of the coal could not be extracted, but had to be left as part of the mine's structure.^[166]

Ventilation was achieved by heating air in a furnace and letting it rise in the upcast shaft, thus creating a strong vertical current. A system of closing doors, called coursing, directed the airflow in a sinuous path through all parts of the mine; but since the pathway might easily be 30 miles long, the current was sluggish, and became dangerously contaminated.^[167] An important breakthrough was to divide the air into many parallel currents.^[168]^[169] Called splitting, it was devised by John Buddle at the Hebburn colliery, and it greatly improved the air's freshness and intensity.^[170] A dumb drift allowed potentially explosive air to escape without dangerously feeding the furnace fire.

Illumination[edit]

The north east was responsible for introducing the first practical safety lamps. Following the Felling mine disaster of 1812, the Society in Sunderland for Preventing Accidents in Coal Mines, in which John Buddle was influential, encouraged investigators to tackle the problem of explosions. Three of these, William Reid Clanny, George Stephenson and Humphry Davy, independently came up with safety lamps, converging on a solution where the flame was shielded by a gauze. They were in use by 1816. The term "safety" was relative, since the lamps were dangerous if incautiously used.^[171]

Nevertheless they produced "an entire revolution" in mining.

It was now no longer necessary [said Nicholas Wood] to preserve the ventilation so as to render all parts of the workings safe with naked lights. Pillars could be removed to any extent so far as ventilation was concerned... Collieries which had been partially worked and abandoned for years as unworkable to any further extent, and in which about one third of the coal was left, were then reopened, and the entire pillars removed.

Millions of tons of 'lost' coal were recovered.^[172]

Other[edit]

The new methods brought new challenges. Removing some coal pillars put extra stress on the rest, which were gradually crushed by the weight of the roof; or the floor buckled. A condition called creep or crush developed, which slowly spread as a chain reaction through the district, damaging the coal and, once started, very difficult to stop. John Buddle solved the problem by inventing panel working, which is still used. The district is divided into panels, isolated by barrier pillars which are wide enough to support the roof and prevent creep.^[176]^[177] Interior pillars may then be robbed out.

Rail transport technology[edit]

The north east has been described as the native land of railways.^[178] "From about 1620 to 1820 the northern coal-field was the theatre of experiments which culminated in the formation of the Stockton and Darlington Railway".^[179] Even George Stephenson's standard gauge, now used from America to China, originated from the rail separation used at his employer the Killingworth Colliery, Northumberland.^[180]^[181] These early railways were used for carrying coal from mine to tideway, and most were less than five miles long.^[182] By 1800 there were perhaps 150 miles of line in Tyneside alone.^[183] They originated as follows.

As mines were sunk further and further from the rivers, they confronted the problem of getting their coals from the pithead to the tideway without incurring ruinous expense. A horse can pull much more on a very even surface.^[184] Mines invested in waggonways, at first nothing more than parallel wooden rails on sleepers upon which horses could draw trucks. Metal wheels, internally flanged as now, were in use by 1774. Rails were surfaced with iron strips to reduce wear, then cast solid; laid on edge instead of flat; then made of malleable iron. Brakes were improved, hence waggons could be run together as trains. Sometimes gravity was substituted for horse power (self-acting inclined planes: the downward force of the loaded waggons pulled the "empties" up the hill again). Where need be, stationary steam engines pulled cables (1808). Eventually steam engines moved themselves. North-easterners discovered that locomotives could get enough traction from their friction against the rails. Not the world's first public railway, but the first commercially successful one, the 25-mile Stockton and Darlington, carried coals to a hitherto inaccessible river: the Tees.^[185]^[186]

Waggonways

1. Flanged wheels by 1774

2. A train with a dandy-waggon

3. Self-acting inclined plane

4. First railway arch, 1726

5. Coal drop

A 1774 drawing by Gabriel Jars of the French Academy of Sciences shows that early Newcastle waggonways had many of the characteristics of modern railways, including metal wheels with internal flanges, rails laid across sleepers, braking, twin tracks and even turntables.^[187]^[188] (Detail: Notice unequal wheels to counter downhill tipping.^[189]) By 1795 improvements in braking allowed multiple waggons to be taken downhill as a set — or train.^[190]
Horse-traction was quite adequate for most of these waggonways, which on the outward journey ran chiefly downhill under gravity. The dandy waggon, an 1826 George Stephenson invention, rested and fed the horse during the gravity runs. The horse knew to trot after the train and jump aboard, which it did avidly. Horse railways continued until 1907.^[191]
Coal waggons (right, in distance) descend an inclined plane by gravity to waiting keelboats on the River Wear. An endless cable (not visible) returns the empties. Left foreground, Pemberton Main Colliery, Sunderland.
The world's oldest railway arch: Causey Arch, 1726. The Tanfield Railway, originally a horse-drawn waggonway, used this bridge on its way to a staith on the river Tyne; it was still supporting coal traffic in 1964.
A coal waggon is lowered directly onto a Tyne collier, Wallsend. The invention cut out the keelboats while saving breakage of coal, which reduced its value. Underneath, an inclined spout shows the older system. To this staith waggons were sent from Wallsend Colliery down a half-mile inclined plane. (Illustration from Hair, 1844.)

Locomotives

1. John Blenkinsop, 1811

2. George Stephenson, 1814

3. 'Locomotion', 1825

Blenkinsop's^[192] rack and pinion engine, described as the first actually useful^[193] locomotive.
Early locomotives with their weight and vibrations soon broke the rails. Stephenson realised that locomotive and track design had to be integrated. In one model his steam-filled cylinders were arranged to act as shock absorbers ("steam springs").^[194]^[195] Notice the "fish belly" rail pattern.
Stockton and Darlington Railway Locomotive No.1, 'Locomotion' (R. Wake, 1883, oil on canvas, National Railway Museum/Science & Society Picture Library)

Although steam locomotives revolutionised transportation everywhere, they originated in efforts to carry coal cheaply from mine to first customer.

The cartel: justifications and criticisms[edit]

Rationale[edit]

For many Londoners the Limitation of Vend was "an infamous combination for extorting exorbitant prices".^[196]^[197]

The mine owners did not see it that way. They conducted the Limitation openly and without concealment,^[198] were never successfully prosecuted by the law,^[199]^[198] and seem to have thought they were only defending themselves against an evil peculiar to their industry,^[200]^[201] namely irrational price slumps as will now be described. They told Parliament they were combining to keep up the price of their product like workmen combined to keep up the price of their labour, and were as justified.^[202]

Paradoxically, in a heavily invested mining industry under free competition, a slackening in the demand for coal can cause production to rise instead of falling. American economist Francis Walker, describing the origins of the coal mining cartels of Imperial Germany (where cartels, far from being illegal, were upheld by the law),^[203] explained it thus:

The prosperous years attract new investments of capital when profits are tempting, owing to decreasing costs and advancing prices, and when the lean years come, and prices fall, the hard times instead leading to a reduction of a output (which would increase costs) lead to an increase of production which, of course, only aggravates the fall in prices and the general difficulty.

The reason is that under a system of free competition no one mine can afford to limit its output — it would simply be playing into the hands of its rivals. Production must go on in order to pay some (even if an inadequate) return on the capital which is invested and which can not be withdrawn. Hence each mine tries to produce the greatest possible amount, hoping to gain something by increased cheapness of production,

knowing it will depress the price further, but accepting it as the lesser evil.^[204]

The resulting glut may instigate cutthroat competition ruinous to all.^[205]

The northeast coal mine owners themselves, asked why they did not compete, answered that coal-owners (unlike other industrial producers) could not be relied upon to stop producing when prices fell below the remunerative point.

Generally speaking, mines after they are once won must either continue to be wrought and kept a current-going colliery, or they must be forever abandoned. It is a work of the greatest difficulty, in many cases amounting to impossibility, to recover mines which have been abandoned.^[136]

If there had been shallow seams of coal, they could have been accessed or left alone according to the demand. The problem was the deep measures. A decision had to be made whether to incur the cost of sinking deep shafts and installing pumping equipment, steam engines, etc. Once incurred, however, it was a sunk investment.

Having the capacity, each producer naturally wishes to make use of it every month in the year; and it requires a high degree of self-denial or a very close agreement to insure forbearance.^[206]

Alternatives[edit]

An alternative to "close agreement" might have been to allow free competition and let the weaker members go out business. The 18th century intellectual Elizabeth Montagu, a shrewd businesswoman who owned mines in the north east and was herself a member of the Limitation of the Vend, described a situation in which the cartel was threatening to break down:

The coal trade is at present in great confusion, some of the rich want to ruin the poor ones and so pull the price of coal so low that many will lose and where they have not a capital must give up after a while.

She disapproved of such "cunning devices" even though she was one of the rich members who would have survived.^[201]

Confronted by slackening demand, cartel members like Elizabeth Montagu wanted to share the pain equally. The "cunning" members wanted to drive the weakest pits out of business.^[207].

Possibly, however, those that survived might have ended up with even greater market power, or so the Limitation's representatives told Parliament in 1830:

If, from the above-mentioned Causes, the inferior Collieries were ruined, and expelled from the Trade, the Supply would then be entirely in the Command of a few large Capitalists, who would be able to enhance the Price, and controul the Market, to an infinitely greater Extent than can now be accomplished^[208]

in which case "the natural effect would have been, that those Collieries that survived the shock would have raised the price to have remunerated themselves for the loss they sustained."^[209]

A hundred years later, when Parliament regulated the privately owned British coal industry of the 1930s — with its surplus capacity and threatening unemployment — it introduced a cartel scheme with minimum prices and quotas. It has been argued that it kept the less efficient collieries open.^[210] Had the mines been in social ownership e.g. had they been nationalised under a National Coal Board, as they eventually were, conceivably it might still have made sense to limit production across the board while the downturn lasted, instead of closing the least efficient pits.^[211]

Today, cartels have "a very bad reputation" and, since 1945 under U.S. influence, have been banned in principle in many countries. They were even represented as a Nazi instrument for world domination. Attitudes were not always so. "Before 1945 most decision-makers in the West believed that cartels were generally beneficial".^[212] Before World War II cartels were the norm in the European coal mining industry. In imperial Germany, coal extraction in the Ruhr was almost completely cartelised; one study found it did not affect productive efficiency.^[213] The Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), a forerunner of the European Union, though it forbade cartels by Article 65.1, in effect tolerated them by Article 65.2 if they were deemed to improve efficiency — which in practice meant that "the High Authority gradually accepted cartels as temporary devices, authorized in times of penury".^[214]

Even in the U.S., where competition law hardly ever tolerates price fixing arrangements, the American Supreme Court in one case allowed a scheme in which 107 Appalachian coal mines sold all their output to a joint agency (which set the prices). The scheme, which took place during the Great Depression, and was preceded by a history of exceptional coalfield violence, was said to be justified by better efficiency.^[215]

Mergers[edit]

In 1847 the London Northumberland and Durham Coal Company proposed to buy up the north east collieries: existing owners would become shareholders in the new company in proportion to the value of their properties. Thus, instead of a cartel between multiple owners, there would have been a single owner or monopoly. The proposal was strongly opposed by Lord Londonderry and fell through. ^[216] (In economic terms, the scheme would have reversed an accident of history: the coalfield going into multiple ownership during the English Reformation.)

Modern competition law has had to develop rules about mergers since they can achieve the same anti-competitive effects as a cartel. The dangers were virtually unconsidered in 18th and 19th century England, which like other countries at that time lacked a comprehensive competition law. In the event, something like that did happen, because — by marriage, inheritance or otherwise — two of the mine-owning families (the Londonderries and the Durhams, see below) acquired so much property that they could afford to defy the cartel.

Other[edit]

In 1800 a British Parliamentary committee thought the Limitation of the Vend should be done away with. It "might at any time enable [the coal industry] to enhance the price of an article of such necessity, to the oppression and danger of the public".^[217]. By the 1830s, however, Parliament thought the best solution was to encourage competition from other coalfields: see above.

Free trade criticisms[edit]

A trenchant critic of the cartel was George Richardson Porter, staunch free trader, chief statistician at the Board of Trade, and brother-in-law of economist David Ricardo. For Porter (The Progress of the Nation, 1843), the Limitation amounted to a virtual tax on the coal-consuming public, one that no government would have dared to impose, and more harmful than a real tax, for two reasons.

First, the cartel misallocated resources by creating artificially large collieries which were then underused. Investors sank more pits, erected more steam engines, built more miners' cottages, and committed to pay mineral royalties on much more land than was really required. They did it to qualify for larger quotas. Thus (he claimed),^[218] in order to get a colliery that was allowed to sell 25,000 waggon loads to the British market, they built one that could produce 100,000.

Secondly, in order to make some use of this spare capacity, they exported as much coal to foreign countries as possible at whatever price they could get, since the cartel did not apply to these. "By this means the finest kinds of coal which are used in London, at a cost to the consumer of about 30s. per ton, may be had in the distant market of St. Petersburg for 15s. to 16s., or little more than half the London price". Nut coal, perfectly good for steam engines, was practically given away,^[219] so that in effect the British manufacturer was subsidising his foreign competitors.^[220]

Criticisms by modern economists are mentioned below.

Jevons and his paradox[edit]

Some held that cheaper coal was not necessarily in the public interest. In The Coal Question (1865) the economist William Stanley Jevons argued that, although perhaps the Limitation of the Vend had increased the price of some grades of the product,^[221]^[222] the real problem was not expensive coal, but its prodigious use — in short, resource depletion.

His contention, now called Jevons' Paradox, was that cheaper coals (or, their more efficient use) meant greater demand for the fuel, and thus, quicker exhaustion of Britain's coal reserves.^[223] "To disperse so lavishly the cream of our mineral wealth is to be spendthrifts of our capital — to part with that which will never come back", he said.^[224]

Among other considerations, Jevons wrote of obligations owed to future generations and of "compensating posterity for our present lavish use of cheap coal".^[225]

The cartel: antecedents, origins and expansion[edit]

The Limitation of the Vend is often dated between 1771 and 1845,^[226]^[227] but the coal mine owners of the region had long been accustomed to act collectively to regulate output and prices.

The Hostmen of Newcastle[edit]

The Hostmen of Newcastle upon Tyne was a fraternity that claimed the legal monopoly of exporting coals from the river Tyne to any town in England. The monopoly existed in 1600 and probably much earlier, and continued to be asserted until nearly 1740.

The Hostmen began in medieval Newcastle as a small group of householders whose function was to entertain visiting merchants, and see they behaved themselves. As a fringe benefit, the Hostmen acquired the customary right of selling them coal and grindstones, two Newcastle commodities no other trading company had yet appropriated.

In the Tudor era, however, circumstances combined to transform their modest privilege. The Church lands confiscated in the English Reformation included some coal-rich fields in the north east, which passed into private hands. The export trade to London burgeoned. The government of Elizabeth I — which, like many early modern governments, struggled to raise revenues — routinely sold monopolies.^[228] The government saw the advantage of imposing^[229] a tax on the Newcastle coal export trade, the problem being to collect it.

The government solved the problem by granting the Hostmen the exclusive right to supply coal to other towns; in exchange for this, the Hostmen were made responsible for seeing the tax was paid. The Hostmen were incorporated as a company or guild by royal charter in 1600.

The Hostmen's monopoly was effective for a long time. In 1662 the town authorised them to seize coals (apparently, without a court order) vended by non-members and laid aboard ship, which they often did, even as late as 1720. It is known they used their monopoly powers to fix prices, despite complaints.^[230]^[231]

The legality of monopolies was strongly debated in England and as a concession Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies 1623 which declared them void. However it contained exceptions and one concerned the Hostmen. The wording (reproduced in this^[232] note) was open to interpretation so that, although the Hostmen continued to exercise the monopoly well into the 18th century, they gradually gave up trying to, abandoning all pretence by 1740.^[233]

The Hostmen's Company still exists as a formal institution, and its records were published as a book in 1901. In the list of members, wrote the editor, were "the leading men in north of England mercantile life for the last three hundred years". It included

the Jenisons, afterwards Counts Jenison-Walworth in Germany; the Vanes and the Tempests; the Liddells, now represented by the Earl of Ravensworth; the Grays and Ellisons, now represented by Lord Northbourne; the Whites and Ridleys, now represented by Viscount Ridley; and the Scotts, now represented by the Earl of Eldon.^[234]

The Grand Alliance, and its downfall[edit]

After them came the Grand Allies (1726), "the most powerful partnership that the coal trade has known"^[235] which apportioned quantities to be worked; "but more important, from the point of view of maintaining the monopoly, they joined to prevent the opening of new collieries by buying up of land, royalties and wayleaves. Any coal property which they could not directly get hold of they proposed to block off from an outlet to the river".^[236] There is evidence that the powerful mine owners had a "contract" (really, a gentlemen's agreement) to limit production and fix minimum prices.^[237] Their most visible achievement was the Tanfield Railway (above) by which they cooperatively got access to the relatively distant river Tyne.^[238]^[239]

However, their market power eventually collapsed because of rising competition from coal mines near the river Wear^[236] and new Tyneside mines below bridge. Also, technological advance and the development of a banking system made it easier for new mines to enter the business. The Grand Allies continued to exist, however.^[240]

The Tyne and the Wear combine[edit]

The Limitation of the Vend is often dated from 1771 when the mine owners of both the Tyne and the Wear combined. It differed from previous versions in that it did not even pretend to have legal powers to keep out competitors, whether by town regulations, government grants, or the ownership of strategic lands.^[241]^[242] "No longer was it possible to erect substantial barriers to the entry of new competition". The system depended on widespread consensus.^[243]

It seems there was no regulation at all between about 1750 to 1770, possibly because sales were expanding and prices were rising. But it appears to have led to over-investment, and excess capacity.^[244] The regulation was resumed around 1771.^[245]

Hermann Levy^[246] thought the new cartel originated in bitter competition between newly discovered mines and the old ones. Typically the old mines were located near the river Tyne, above bridge, where seagoing ships could not go.^[247]^[183] Their owners — the Ravensworth, Strathmore and Wortley families i.e. the Grand Allies^[248] — had secured all the best lands, or so they had thought. To their dismay they found they had burdened themselves with "long and costly leases", for better mines were found elsewhere.

Deep mining technology won new, rich seams of best coal; furthermore, in locations favourable for transport.^[249] They were below bridge on the Tyne, and so could load coal directly onto the ships;^[41] or they were on the river Wear, whose keelboats used an early form of containerisation.^[250]

To compete with the new mines on quality, the old mines resorted to a "blameable" practice. They screened their coals through a grid, selling the large, valuable lumps and rejecting the small coals, which had to be burned as waste, (It can be seen in the Fiery mine at night illustration, on the right.)

The waste was so enormous that the labourers were directed from time to time to set fire to the heaps accumulated ... After lasting some years, both parties became weary; they found it prudentially wise to unite in interest, to equalise the price, to regulate the transmission from each colliery.

"Hence their union became a direct monopoly; it was agreed that the market should be fed, and not glutted".^[251]

The natural Wear was shallow, and inferior as a coal-shipping river, but its harbour commission was a progressive authority, willing to invest in improvements, unlike its Tyne counterpart, which was apathetic. By 1770 the Wear navigation had been much improved, it could take bigger ships, and the tonnage shipped coastwise had risen from 40% to 60% of the Tyne's.^[252]

Thus the Limitation of the Vend, to work, needed the cooperation of the owners of the mines adjacent both rivers, and this was obtained by assigning quotas: at first Tyneside got 60%, Wearside 40%.^[253] Later, the rivers wrangled over their shares: it was to prove a source of instability.

Nineteenth century expansion[edit]

The river Tees and its ports[edit]

Unlike its northern sisters, the river Tees was not on the coalfield. The nearest mines were in the Auckland district of south Durham, and were rudimentary land-sale collieries, sending their produce to local consumers by road, even pack-mule.^[254] The cost of a ton of coal doubled between Bishop Auckland and Darlington, and trebled by Stockton-on-Tees,^[255] where it might be better to import it by sea.^[256] The Stockton and Darlington Railway was promoted (1818) to carry this local coal traffic more efficiently and make a modest profit. Since Stockton was an unsatisfactory port — the navigation from river to sea was poor — the railway's Quaker promoters thought an export trade was a distant dream.^[257]^[258] The Limitation of the Vend did not even bother to oppose the railway effectively in Parliament.^[259] They were to regret it.^[260]

Christopher Tennant, a Stockton merchant, had a different vision. He appreciated that, if a good deep water port could be made, it should be possible to supply it by rail, hence tap the lucrative London market.^[261] He promoted the rival Clarence Railway for the purpose. Powerful members of the Limitation of the Vend strongly opposed it in Parliament on environmental grounds, at first successfully, saying the locomotives would be a public nuisance (May 1825).^[262] Shortly afterwards, the Stockton and Darlington realised they could have a profitable coal export trade after all. It was so successful that the directors decided to build a suspension bridge across the Tees to Middlesbrough (pop. 150), where a better port could be made.^[263] The cartel tried to deny the railway the necessary parliamentary sanction and bitterly opposed the scheme in the House of Lords.

The coal-owners of the Tyne and Wear, who had been caught napping in 1821, were now wide awake to the danger of the Tees competition, and they banded their forces together to prevent the continuation of the railway to deep water. Having themselves to pay heavy wayleave rents, they contended that the legislature, in sanctioning a public railroad for the conveyance of coals, was virtually giving a bonus to their rivals in trade by relieving them from the difficulty of bargaining with the landowners for a right of passage through their property and by rendering unnecessary the investment of capital in waggonways.

**Hartlepool**, showing medieval town wall with Victoria docks in background

Nevertheless, the scheme passed.^[259] This was "the real break-through".^[264] New mines, attracted by the export trade, adopted modern technology, found a seam of excellent household coal, and the area boomed;^[265]^[266] population grew.^[267] The Tees competed with the Tyne and Wear. Later, a still better port was constructed at Hartlepool and served by the Clarence and a third railway.

In 1834, by which time the Tees' coastwise exports were overtaking the Wear's, the Limitation of the Vend persuaded the mines of south Durham to join the cartel.^[268]^[269]^[270]

Coastwise exports (tons/year, average)^[271]
	Tyne	Wear	Tees
1810-14	1,659,000	917,000
1815-19	1,729,000	962,000
1820-24	1,870,000	1,161,000
1825-29	1,922,000	1,391,000
1830-34	2,004,000	1,064,000	See text^*
1835-39	2,306,000	939,000	1,148,000
1840-44	2,264,000	874,000	1,436,000
1845-49	2,422,000	1,734,000	1,407,000

^*Complete statistics are not available, but in 1830-31 some 281,960 tons of coal were carried over the bridge to the staithes.^[272]

There were also large amounts produced for local consumption e.g. by the iron and steel industry or (after the export tax was reduced) for export to foreign countries.

Northumbrian coal ports join[edit]

Mines in the River Blyth area were the first to build waggonways for the sea-sale of coal — in 1605 — but shipments were always comparatively low. The river was not a good natural port. "At low Water the Sea, at the opening of the Creek, may be safely passed on horseback" wrote Daniel Defoe (1769). In 1814 it was still shallow, with a hard bed and dangerous rocks at the entrance. Improvements were considered, but rarely carried out; a proper harbour was not constructed until 1854.^[273] Even so, the Blyth shipped enough coal coastwise to be invited to join the cartel in 1834.^[274]

In contrast the modest Seaton Burn ("dry at Low-water Mark", according to Defoe), attracted investment from the Delaval family, Seaton Sluice being the first gated dock in the region. When the sluice was opened at low tide twice daily, water rushed out and "scoured the Bed of the Haven clean" (1676). In 1758 a new colliery was opened at the nearby village of Hartley and a 900 foot (300 m) long harbour entrance was cut through solid rock ("looked upon as one of the greatest engineering feats of the day"),^[275] providing a navigable depth of 11-14 feet, and enabling ships to leave the harbour fully laden. Coal could be laden directly aboard through spouts. So rapid was the turnaround that vessels could make 10 London sailings a year.^[23] In 1777 the little harbour exported 81,300 tons of coal,^[276] even though its produce was unsuitable for household use, being sold for industrial purposes.^[124] Despite this, its mines (like those of the Blyth and Tees) were invited to joint the cartel in 1834.^[274]

Seaham Harbour[edit]

In 1821 Lord Londonderry,^[277] who was being advised by John Buddle, bought 2,000 acres of cheap farmland at Seaham,^[278] then a small settlement on the rocky coast a few miles south of Sunderland.^[279] The two men were informed that here was an opportunity to create a private sea port, much better for shipping coals than the river Wear. It would operate in all weathers (the Wear and the Tyne could freeze up, or be shut in by easterly winds); it would be less congested; and it would avoid the Wear keelboats and their exorbitant charges.^[280]

A 5.8 mile railway, driven by stationary and locomotive steam engines, was built simultaneously. It conveyed coals from Rainton to Seaham.^[281] To build the port a conical pinnacle of rock weighing thousands of tons had to be blasted into the air.^[282] Londonderry persisted for years while running heavily into debt,^[283] but eventually the port began to ship coal in 1831, catering not only for the Londonderry mines but for other new pits sunk through the Magnesian Limestone at Monkwearmouth, Seaton and Murton.^[284]

Lord Londonderry was now so powerful a member of the cartel that, were he to oppose it, it would collapse; but that was much later. In 1838 a ship's captain told the House of Commons what happened to him at Seaham for flouting the Limitation's rules:

I had been a good customer at Seaham, and I went over to Seaham; and Mr Spence, the agent to the Marquis, held out his hand before I got to him; he said, "It is no use your coming here, Mr Young; we will not load you; you may compel them to load you in Newcastle by the turn, but we will not load you here".^[285]

The changes summarised[edit]

The Limitation of the Vend, therefore, from 1771 to 1845 was obliged to adapt itself to those technical and spatial changes, and a background of events such as the American war, the wars with France ("the major features of which were the fear of invasion, the threat of privateers, the adoption of the convoy system, the depredations of the press-gangs and the restriction of markets for coal"),^[286] the coming of the railway age and the Reform Act 1832.

Coastwise shipments (tons)^[287]
	1799	1856
Newcastle	1,186,720	1,978,682
Sutherland	791,213	1,337,538
Blyth^*		96,479
Hartlepool		1,074,189
Seaham		652,625
Middlesbro'		142,438
Stockton		11,004
Amble		21,228

^*Prob. including Hartley and Seaton Sluice.

In relative terms the London export trade became of less importance as time went by, because increasing quantities were consumed by local industry. Thus by 1867 Tees-side alone produced about a million tons of pig iron, equal to the entire output of the U.S.A.^[288]

Functioning of the cartel[edit]

Governance[edit]

**Chester-le-Street**, meeting town of the cartel's Wear committee (The Queen's Head in 2010)

Each river had its own governance and administration; their systems were not the same and, except for the Tyne, details are rather sketchy. The Tyne had many mine owners, so it was not practical to have frequent general meetings. General policy was decided at an annual meeting where prices were fixed and colliery proportions ("the Basis") agreed; each colliery had one vote. It was specified that the agreement did not enter into force unless and until every mine owner signed up.^[242] A printed set of detailed rules for 1835 was put before Parliament.^[289]

The owners appointed representatives, who elected a committee; it administered the system on a day to day basis. On the Wear, mines were larger, owners few; this small group constituted the Wear committee without need for delegation. The Tyne committee met at Newcastle, the Wear committee at Chester-le-Street, the Tees committee apparently at Stockton.

The committees also met jointly and were called the United Committee. The main business was to decide the issue or quantities of coals to be supplied to the coastwise trade next month. (As explained the object was to keep London prices high but not so high as to provoke competition from other coalfields.) Thus, the monthly vend, allowed to each individual mine, was arrived at on the Basis already agreed. Later, it was fixed fortnightly instead of monthly.^[290]

If there were disputes between the rivers the United Committee tried to resolve them by consensus, failing which the system broke down and there might be a "fighting trade", which everybody dreaded. In 1829 the Tyne and the Wear agreed to resolve their disputes by a system of arbitration and in 1834 the Tees, Hartley and Blyth joined in.^[291]

Summarised Elaine S. Tan:

It had a centralized and professional monitoring infrastructure made up of about 30 to 40 representatives, with a common office and a secretary. These met to determine ... quotas for each mine and inspected monthly output, the amount of which had to be sworn before a magistrate. They also forfeited deposits and imposed fines on collieries that exceed their quotas. Transacted prices for each mine were available to all cartel members; together with limited points of shipment, and verification of output levels with data from customs houses and sale points, opportunities to cheat were reduced further.^[198]

Records[edit]

Anti-trust scholar John M. Connor wrote: "This so-called Newcastle Vend kept meticulous price archives and became among the first cartels to be studied by modern scholars who were interested in applying quantitative methods to price-fixing conduct. The availability of detailed purchase records has permitted sophisticated econometric modeling of the London coal cartels". ^[292]

Quotas[edit]

Quotas were the main point of argument since each mine wanted a better share of the vend. At first quotas were settled by discussion and consensus, each mine trying to persuade the meeting that it could produce more and better coal and should be allowed to do so. After 1829 more objective criteria were adopted and inspectors looked at factors such as royalties payable, number of pits, their depths, shaft widths, inclination of seam, distance to water, and so on.^[293]

Prices[edit]

There was much less contention over prices since, once quotas had been fixed, and the producers of the best coals had named their prices for the coming year, the others could estimate how much to discount their inferior varieties. Since a mine wanted to sell all of its quota, but not too cheaply, there was no point in fixing its price too high or too low.

Prices were listed and could not be changed until next year; however, a mine that had made a genuine miscalculation and found it could not sell its quota was usually allowed an adjustment by the committee.^[294]

It should be noted that the prices charged to ships in the northeast, being fixed for the year, did not fluctuate seasonally,^[274] whereas prices in London could fluctuate a great deal, even day by day,^[295] since they depended on demand, supply and the weather.

Legality[edit]

The north east coal cartel existed over a period of history when societal and legal attitudes to restraints on trade were fluctuating. The courts never pronounced on the Limitation of the Vend's legality. In particular it was never explicitly decided that it — or any specific cartel, for that matter — was a criminal conspiracy at common law attracting a prison sentence,^[296] although there was certainly a strand of legal opinion to that effect.^[297] The common law as understood in England and America shared much the same uncertainty until the 1890s, when they diverged; in America, the Sherman Act presaged an aggressive pursuit of cartels, but in England the courts established that, although a cartel is a void contract that will not be enforced, it is not a tort or a crime at common law.^[298]^[299]

However in 1710 Parliament passed "An act to dissolve the present, and prevent the future combination of coal-owners, lightermen, masters of ships, and others, to advance [raise] the price of coals, in prejudice of the navigation, trade, and manufactures of this kingdom, and for the further encouragement of the coal-trade". The Act prescribed substantial fines for violations,^[300] though not jail sentences.^[33] In that era an Act of Parliament was only half the story since, unless a jury felt conduct was wrongful, it was unlikely to convict.

In 1795 one Errington, who had inherited a share in a mine in North Shields,^[301] but discovered its produce was selling poorly, for which he blamed the cartel, deposed witnesses and launched a prosecution against six individuals who (he said) were the Tyne Committee. They were indicted, not for breaching the 1710 Act, but as a criminal conspiracy; presumably, so they might receive a jail sentence. The proceedings were transferred from Newcastle to York for jury prejudice. The case never came on for trial.^[302] As was common at that time, it was a private^[303] prosecution; the prosecutor told Parliament he had lost enthusiasm.^[304]

It seems the cartel was believed to be illegal in the locality itself, though morally justified. The town clerk of Newcastle told Parliament:

I saw a body of men, highly respectable in situation, and highly responsible in character, entering into a measure, without attempt of disguise or concealment, which, in my humble judgement, was not strictly legal.^[305]

From their conduct it would seem the Limitation thought they ran little danger of a being convicted by a jury, but knew it was no use going to law to enforce their cartel's rules.

Enforcement[edit]

It was to the interest of each mine to be seen to be complying with the cartel's regulations, since it encouraged the others to behave likewise. Mutual compliance was more likely if mine owners believed significant cheating was difficult or impossible.^[306]^[307]

As to that, explained William J. Hausman:

Enforcement mechanisms (crucial for success) varied in their particulars over the years, but by far the most important component of enforcement was the availability of information. The points of shipment were few enough that it was impossible for any large-scale cheating to go undetected, although chiseling and overmeasure were always possible.^[308]

Through points of shipment[edit]

The points of shipment were staiths, similar to waterside piers; from thence coals were transferred to keels (sailing barges), which carried them downriver to waiting colliers. A keel was marked with nails to denote government-certified loadlines; thus loaded, it carried a definite weight of coal;^[309]^[310]; further weighing was unnecessary. Later, and increasingly, staiths were located below bridge and loaded the seagoing ships directly through spouts.^[311]

A class of businessmen called fitters was responsible for getting the coal from staith to ship and seeing everybody got paid. When a ship's master wanted to buy coal he approached a fitter, who was an agent representing one or more mines. Fitters owned the keels^[312] and paid the keelmen for their services. The fitter personally guaranteed^[313] that the shipowners were reliable payers and that the promised coal was up to the specified quality. Furthermore the fitter cleared the shipments through Customs and saw to the paperwork, without which the cargoes could not be imported into London. When business was complete he presented his bill to the ship's master.^[314]

The reason coal had to be cleared through Customs was that, until 1831, there was a heavy internal tariff on coal exported coastwise from the northeast.^[315] Indeed the fitters were the successors of the medieval Hostmen: the men who were given trading privileges in exchange for seeing that the government tax was paid. After 1831 coal still had to be customs cleared since (until 1850) there were duties to pay on its export to foreign countries.^[316]

To gather intelligence the Committee sent agents round to the "staithmen" and required them to deliver accounts; they had to appear before a magistrate and swear to their truth. The Customs figures were supplied to the Committee, who also received reports of sales from their agents in London.^[317]

Through shipping[edit]

In 1827 the Tyne Committee resolved to charge an extra 10 shillings per chaldron — a punitive rate — to any ship found to be dealing with blacklisted mines. It seems this scheme did not work very well, however.^[318]

Through the coal factors of London[edit]

Factors were a class of London businessmen who acted as agents for the ships and negotiated the sale of their cargoes on the Coal Exchange, London. They handled the paperwork to clear the coals through customs,^[319] without which they could not be unloaded in the Thames.

Although the evidence is unclear it appears that from 1834 the Limitation of the Vend

^[320]

Sanctions[edit]

Mines that exceeded their sales quotas were not necessarily cheating, if they did it openly and accepted the consequences. A system of fines was instituted, the monies to be paid over for the benefit of the mines who undersold their quotas. When the fines were found to be too low — i.e. that it was worth breaching the quota and paying the fine — it was decided to increase them steeply in future, and to deduct the oversale from the mine's next monthly quota.^[321]

The cartel's chairman told Parliament the fines were rarely collected in practice, since conciliation prevailed. According to Paul M. Sweezy a stronger deterrent than fining was peer disapproval.^[322]

Cheating[edit]

An obvious way to sell under list price was to give a ship a hidden discount, either as a secret cash payment to her owners, or as a kickback to the captain. It is unlikely this kind of cheating was very widespread. Generally, the purpose of price cutting is to increase sales, but there is little point if sales volumes are capped anyway, as they were. Members who could not sell all of their quota owing to a genuine mistake in fixing their annual price were given sympathetic treatment, see above, and had no need to cheat.

Another obvious dodge was to give ships extra weight. However as explained above the loading of ships was usually done in plain sight of everyone. Even when it was not (as where coals were delivered directly on board through spouts), there were the Customs authorities to think of. Until 1831 the coastwise coal trade was taxed quite heavily and ships could not clear the harbour without making a customs declaration and getting the required paperwork. Customs officials were entitled to inspect the loading. The paperwork had to be produced to the Customs authorities in London. In any case the quantities unloaded in London were officially measured or weighed and published on the Coal Exchange, though corruption was certainly possible.

Still another way to cheat might be to sell coals to a ship bound for foreign parts - this trade was free of the cartel, of course — which would then divert to London or other English port. But until 1831 coal exports to other countries were heavily, indeed prohibitively, taxed.^[323] After that, it would have required outright smuggling to sell in London coals cleared for foreign ports.

On occasions cooperation ceased and a "fighting trade" broke out in the industry. It was not because of cheating, but because powerful members stopped cooperating.^[324]^[325]

Disruptive personalities[edit]

Two colourful personalities, Lord Londonderry and Lord Durham, were powerful members of the cartel. They were social and political rivals^[326] and mutually jealous, which made common action on Wearside difficult.^[327]

Autocratic and abrasive — they are described in this^[328] note — both men were major public figures in their own right. Heads of major coal mining families on Wearside,^[329] "they alone possessed the power to bludgeon the trade into submission by forcing a period of free, or 'fighting' trade".^[330] They were less interested in the long-term future of the cartel than in securing larger quotas for themselves, and keeping out interlopers.^[331] Cashflow problems afflicted both,^[332] encouraging short-term thinking.

About 1825 a third major player emerged: the Hetton Coal Company. Formed of a partnership of numerous investors, it was more like a modern joint stock company than a traditional mine owner. It had the resources to withstand Lords Londonderry and Durham, if not to equal them, and the animus to do it.

Rivals

1. Lord Londonderry

2. Hetton Colliery

3. Lord Durham

Charles Stewart, 3rd Marquess of Londonderry, right-wing Tory; "the bravest soldier in the British army", notorious womaniser, "arch villain of the north-east coal trade" (Thomas Phillips, 1812: National Portrait Gallery, London)
Colliery of the Hetton Coal Company, one of the first to be capitalised on modern lines, willing and able to take huge risks — whose management hated Lord Londonderry
John Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham, left-wing politician ("Radical Jack"), "haughty and disdainful", insomniac, opium addict, liable to mood swings (Thomas Phillips, 1819: National Portrait Gallery)

The Hetton Coal Company's adviser was an attorney called Arthur Mowbray who had cause to dislike Lord Londonderry.^[333] Mowbray got together the syndicate of investors who became the Hetton Coal Company. They were regarded as upstarts and outsiders (one of them was a famous prizefighter looking to invest his winnings). In an immensely risky enterprise, the Hetton Company bought a large landholding in a part of the east Durham coalfield where geologists — of the calibre of Adam Sedgwick and William Buckland^[334] — had doubted good coal would ever be found. They sank a 900 foot (300 m) shaft through quicksands and struck rich seams of the very best coal.^[335] They had their own railway connecting to the river Wear, the first in the world to be designed for steam power alone.

The Hetton Coal Company now demanded a quota to equal Durham's and Londonderry's, which the two men bitterly resisted. John Buddle writing to Lord Londonderry said about the interlopers:

I consider the Hetton Co. just now, as a pack of madmen, with swords in their hands slashing about them on all sides ... A[rthu]r [Mowbray] ... will never stop until he involves the whole Coal mining interest of this country in one general ruin.^[336]

Lord Durham was heard to say "There was no sacrifice he was not prepared to make" to ruin the Hetton Company if they tried to force a bigger quota.^[331] It led to the "fighting trade" of 1829 (below). Another consequence was that, inspired by the Hetton Coal Company's success, fifteen other major collieries were opened in the same area, each wanting a share of the issue. There were "more pigs than teats in the trade", wrote Buddle.^[337]

The "fighting trade": outbreaks of free competition[edit]

The cartel broke down and did not operate for a period in 1800; possibly in 1812 and 1814;^[338] February 1819 to February 1821; September 1824 to July 1825, January 1828 to August 1829; and November 1832 to March 1834.^[339]. Sweezy wrote about two periods particularly:

1829[edit]

In 1828 there were disputes between the Tyne and the Wear over quotas; they featured Lords Londonderry and Durham. Unable to resolve them, the United Committee declared the trade open on January 24, 1829.^[340] During the ensuing fighting trade the price of best coals in London fell from 40 to 30 shillings per unit. The dispute dragged on until 31 August when the regulation was renewed. To reduce disputes in future an arbitration system was instituted, with appeals. ^[341]

1833-34[edit]

A miner's strike disrupted the regulation, hitting the Tyne harder than the Wear; hence the Wear greatly exceeded its quota. Also the the strike-bound mines were meant to be supported by those in work, but there was disagreement over the details. Lord Londonderry, who had refused to sign the agreement for 1832, refused to chip in on the strike fund. His behaviour was resented. The Hetton Coal Company refused to sign the agreement until it was sorted out. The London price of best Wallsend fell from 21s. 9d. per unit to 15s. 6d., the lowest ever. The Tees mines, not part of the cartel, were doing well. Eventually the long fighting trade disposed everyone to find a solution. The Limitation was resumed on March 1, 1834. The revived cartel now included the Tees.^[342]

Abuses in London[edit]

In reality the prices Londoners paid for their coals were affected by two cartels, the Limitation of the Vend in the north east, the other a buyer's cartel in London itself. Each cartel had an incentive to deflect blame by casting it on the other.

The London coal trade by 1830 has been described as "a veritable Augean stable of fraud and abuse".^[343] Few branches were free of corruption, generally tending to increase the price to consumers.

The London buyers' cartel[edit]

Principle[edit]

While the vendors' cartel in the north east was accused of overcharging its customers, the buyers' cartel in London was accused of undercharging its suppliers. Although this form of market abuse gets less publicity, the economic theory, according to John M. Connor, is well established:

If buyers are small enough in number and sufficiently cooperative, they may be able to form oligopsonies that can force down the prices of common inputs below the prices that would have reigned in a more competitive procurement market. In other words, powerful buyers can undercharge their input suppliers.

When the savings are not passed on to consumers this conduct may be harmful, just as overcharging would be, because "industry output contracts from the level that would be seen in purely competitive or noncooperative oligopsonistic procurement markets and allocative inefficiency is created"^[344] Put otherwise, the more the London cartel forced down the price of coal aboard ships in the Thames, the less attractive it was to sink new coal mines in the northeast and keep existing mines open.

Perpetration[edit]

When a collier arrived in the river Thames it looked for a mooring, which took time because the port was highly congested. A fleet of river barges, known as lighters, relieved it of its cargo.^[23] The owners of these lighters were wholesale coal merchants who bought the coals direct from the ships. At times, they were few enough in number to be able to manipulate the prices paid. "The mine owners themselves were in the position of having to pay premiums, 'kickbacks', to the London dealers in order to assure that ships would be unloaded expeditiously".^[345] High coal prices paid by London consumers might have to do with the lightermen's cartel.^[346]

Coal-whippers[edit]

Coal whippers referred to gangs of men who unloaded the colliers waiting in the Thames, typically in Wapping, into barges. Usually a gang consisted of nine men. Four, who worked down in the ship's hold, filled a basket. Four men on deck climbed a ladder and threw their weight onto a rope that went round a pulley; this jerked or whipped the basket from hold to deck. The foreman swung the basket into a chute, which delivered it to an adjoining barge. The work was demanding: on a busy day a gang would raise 98 tons of coal, the rope men climbing a cumulative distance of 1+1⁄2 vertical miles.

Until 1843, when Parliament stopped the abuse, the gangs were kept by publicans who contracted the labour to ship's captains. The men's chances of getting employment depended on how much they drank at the pub. According to Henry Mayhew, when it came to collecting their pay they sometimes found they were actually in debt. Also according to him, the publicans were often related to the shipowners; the leading coal merchants were shipowners who kept their ships back to keep up the price of coals.^[347]

Metage[edit]

**Coal landed in Thames** by lighter. In background, a Newcastle collier fills the next one. Fruchard, a Huguenot, told Parliament (1730) the London coal trade was in the grip of the lightermen. (Trade-card, British Museum)

The abuses did not stop there. In London, until 1831, instead of coal being sold by weight it was sold by volume. The unit of volume was the London chaldron which was a heaped measure and so lent itself to interpretation. There was also an incentive to break coal into smaller pieces to increase the volume.

In an effort to prevent cheating, all measurements were performed by public officials, called sea-meters if they measured from ship to barge, or land-meters if they measured standard quantities into sacks on the quayside. The sea meters were paid by the ship's masters, so had an incentive to collude by exaggerating the measure. In the illustration of coal-whippers, the official by the chute is a sea-meter, though by that date they had gone over to measuring by weight. The land meters were paid fixed wages by the City of London but could (and did) hold down other jobs — many kept pubs or shops — and there were complaints of absenteeism, drunkenness, carelessness and irregular measurements. It appears that by bending the rules a merchant could deliver a fourth less than expected.^[348]

Parliamentary enquiries[edit]

Six times a parliamentary Select Committee held an rnquiry into the Limitation of the Vend, receiving evidence and documentation. Two of the enquiries — 1829 and 1830 — were instigated by the mine owners themselves, probably to draw attention to the inefficient and fraudulent conduct of the London end of the trade.^[349]


Year	Summary of recommendations	Report and evidence
1800 (June)	Detailed investigation, ran out of parliamentary time, but should be investigated further and dealt with.^[350]	House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, pp. 538–639
1800 (December)	That stringent measures to be taken to put down the combination.^[351]	House of Commons (December 1800) 1803b, pp. 640–650
1829	The Committee did not report, wrongly believing the cartel had collapsed permanently.^[352]	Evidence summarised in Dunn 1844, pp. 71–8
1830	“The trade had better be left to the control of that competition [i.e. from the inland coal trade]^[353] which appears already to have affected it".^[354]	House of Lords 1830
1836	“That every means of promoting a new supply [i.e. from other coalfields] be encouraged, as furnishing the most effectual means of counteracting the combinations of the coal owners and factors".^[355]	House of Commons 1836
1838	No relevant change in the law recommended.^[356]	House of Commons 1838

The end of the cartel[edit]

Scholarly appraisal: how successful was the cartel?[edit]

Gustav Cohn[edit]

xxx

Hermann Levy[edit]

xxx

John Ulric Nef[edit]

xxx

Paul M. Sweezy[edit]

Paul Sweezy was the only author to write a full-length book on the north east coal cartel. His 1938 Monopoly and Competition in the English Coal Trade 1550-1860 was derived from his Harvard PhD thesis. A Marxist, Sweezy said his interest "was first aroused by a study of Marx's brilliant investigations imto 'the law of motion of the capitalist system'".

William J. Hausman[edit]

Elaine S. Tan[edit]

Aftermath[edit]

References and notes[edit]

^ This section is only a summary; further sources are cited later throughout this article.
^ Dunn 1844, p. 18.
^ Cromar 1977, pp. 86–7.
^ In a dataset of 532 historical markets, Connor found the Limitation of the Vend was the most durable cartel: Connor 2014, pp. 269, 277.
^ Levenstein & Suslow 2006, pp. 43, 44, 52.
^ Robinson 1941, p. 102.
^ Ville 1984b, p. 638.
^ Smailes 1935, pp. 203–4.
^ Bogart 2013, pp. 4, 6.
^ Where carts could move in dry weather only: Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 12
^ Wrigley 1962, p. 6.
^ Turnbull 1987, p. 547.
^ Bogart 2013, pp. 7, 15, 17, 18.
^ Pollard 1980, p. 220-1.
^ Nef 1932a, pp. 110–111, 115, 117–121.
^ Some ships were operated by the mine owners themselves, particularly during the French wars of 1793-1815 when shipping was scarce (Ville 1980, pp. 37, 33) or during one of the occasional outbreaks of free competition (Hausman 1984a, p. 383n), but this was not preferred. Sunderland may have been different but it supplied only 8% of the London market: Ville 1990, pp. 37–8. Some mine owners owned a minority shareholding in a ship: Finch 1973, p. 49.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 50 n18.
^ Hausman 1984a, p. 383 n1.
^ House of Commons 1836, p. xvi.
^ Hausman 1977a, pp. 461–2.
^ Evans 1988, p. 382.
^ Ville 1986, pp. 359, 362, 366.
^ ^a ^b ^c Ville 1986, p. 364.
^ ^a ^b ^c Ville 1986, p. 357.
^ Hausman 1977b, pp. 470, 472.
^ Nef 1932a, p. 396.
^ Ville 1986, pp. 361.
^ Ville 1984a, pp. 115, 116.
^ Finch 1973, pp. 88.
^ Finch 1973, p. 176.
^ House of Commons (December 1800) 1803b, p. 643.
^ Finch 1973, p. 41.
^ ^a ^b 9 Anne c.28 1710, p. 273.
^ Nef 1932a, p. 238.
^ Ville 1986, p. 359.
^ House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 614 (App. No. 43).
^ Hausman 1977b, pp. 461n–462n.
^ Finch 1973, pp. 32, 68–9.
^ Ville 1984a, p. 358.
^ Ville 1984a, p. 362.
^ ^a ^b Ville 1984a, pp. 109–110.
^ House of Commons (December 1800) 1803b, p. 641.
^ Ville 1984a, p. 110.
^ 50 Geo. III c.91; renewed as 57 Geo. III c. 30; as 8 Geo. IV c.72; and as 8 & 9 Vict. c93 1845, (see preamble).
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 76.
^ House of Commons 1836, p. xiii.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 91.
^ Mine owners in the North had to negotiate wayleaves to pass over intermediate landholdings on their way to the river: these were expensive. The mine owners complained that, in authorising the Birmingham railway, Parliament was expropriating the wayleave rights without compensation, giving users an unfair advantage.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 92.
^ ^a ^b Scott 1869, p. 25.
^ Goods trains were frequently shunted into sidings to make way for passenger trains, and did not move by night.
^ Evans 1988, pp. 369, 371.
^ Armstrong 1997, pp. 242–6.
^ ^a ^b Tan 2009, p. 353.
^ Turnbull 1987, pp. 548–9.
^ Estall 1958, p. 83.
^ Turnbull 1897, p. 541.
^ Rennison 2004, p. 272: "In 1768 the towns of Newcastle and Sunderland petitioned against the formation of a canal between Oxford and Coventry, a scheme ‘so hurtful to our maritime power [. . .] and destructive to this populous part of the island.’"
^ Turnbull 1987, p. 538.
^ Hausman 1984b, p. 383 n10.
^ House of Lords 1830, p. 215.
^ House of Lords 1830, p. 214.
^ House of Lords 1830, p. 223.
^ Tan 2009, pp. 350, 351, 353–4, 355, 363.
^ Tan 2009, pp. 358, 359, 360, 361.
^ MacLeod 2011, p. 168.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 91, 99.
^ Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, p. 447.
^ Wrigley 1962, p. 2.
^ See also Evans 1988, pp. 364–5.
^ Perhaps 50-80 km².
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 97.
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 66.
^ Evans 1988, p. 365.
^ Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, pp. 447, 448.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 88, 90.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 108–9.
^ Evans 1988, p. 397.
^ Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, p. 449.
^ Evans 1988, p. 393.
^ Smith 1961, p. 5.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 82, 90, 97–9, 103.
^ Wrigley 2013, pp. 1, 4, 6.
^ ^a ^b Wrigley 2013, p. 7.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 81, 82, 86.
^ Xu, van Leeuwen & van Zanden 2018, p. 348.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 83–4.
^ ^a ^b Bierig 2023.
^ Wrigley 2014, pp. 98–9.
^ Smailes 1935, p. 203.
^ Smith 1961, p. 2.
^ Smith 1961, p. 3.
^ Nef 1932a, pp. 192–3.
^ Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, pp. 447–8.
^ Allen 2013, p. 12.
^ By 1650: Nef 1932a, p. 212
^ Ville 1986, p. 358.
^ Nef 1932a, pp. 191–2.
^ Clark and Jacks have argued that, even if Britain had had no coal, the industrial revolution would have gone on just the same, by importing firewood from the Baltic: Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 66.
^ Chamberlain 1856, p. 522.
^ Chamberlain 1856, pp. 516, 517, 519, 522; the proportion was 70:30.
^ Dobson & Tomlinson 1868, pp. 119–161, esp. 119, 122, 140, 144–9, 152–3.
^ Dobson & Tomlinson 1868, pp. 159–60.
^ Bull 1956, p. 28.
^ Cox 1997, pp. 57, 62.
^ Wrigley 1962, p. 5.
^ ^a ^b Allen 2013, pp. 13–15.
^ Nef 1932a, p. 199.
^ MacLeod 2011, pp. 1689.
^ McLean 1997, p. 2.
^ ^a ^b Hausman 1977a, p. 461.
^ Evans 1988, p. 398.
^ Ville 1986, p. 258.
^ Armstrong 1863, p. 9.
^ Carrington 1875, pp. v–vi, 9–13, 17.
^ Turnbull 1987, p. 546.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 185, 186.
^ Wood et al. 1863, pp. 23–6.
^ Falkus 1982, pp. 218–9.
^ Falkus 1982, pp. 219, 223–4, 225, 226, 228, 231, 232.
^ Wood et al. 1863, pp. 24, 25.
^ ^a ^b ^c Wood 1858, p. 186.
^ Wood et al. 1863, p. 24.
^ ^a ^b Craster 1907, p. 29.
^ Wood et al. 1863, p. 25.
^ Wood et al. 1863, pp. 24, 25–6.
^ Spring 1960, p. 75.
^ Sturgess 1975, pp. 8, 78.
^ Sturgess 1975, pp. 44–5, 49–51, 63, 77–8, 83, 86.
^ Reynolds 2004.
^ Daunton 1985, p. 638; Bank of England Inflation Calculator.
^ Nef 1932b, pp. 71–74.
^ See also Taylor 1953, p. 25: "the prizes were for the few".
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, pp. 59–60.
^ Hair & Ross 1844, p. 6.
^ ^a ^b House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 544.
^ Jevons 1866, p. 83.
^ Except gold and silver.
^ Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 1.
^ Hiskey 1978, p. 33.
^ Hiskey 1978, p. 30.
^ Sill 1984, p. 149.
^ Although it did vary, depending on how easy it was to extract.
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, pp. 48, 49.
^ Clavering 1995, p. 213.
^ Turnbull 2018, p. 657.
^ Smailes 1935, p. 201.
^ Barke & Taylor 2015, p. 44.
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 41.
^ Clavering 1995, p. 214.
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 44-5.
^ Smailes 1935, p. 208.
^ Ansted 1846, p. 3.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 213–4.
^ Clavering showed it would have required a stable of 80 horses to drain a 300-400 acre colliery, which was rarely practical. Water wheels, called coal mills, were preferred, a treble-wheel system being common practice.
^ Tann 1992, pp. 56–8.
^ Clavering 1995, pp. 211, 213–5, 228.
^ Tan 2009, p. 356.
^ Kanefsky & Robey 1980, pp. 169–70, 176, 179.
^ Tann 1992, p. 54.
^ Kanfesky & Robey 1980, p. 166.
^ Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 45.
^ Tann 1992, p. 56.
^ Spedding's steel mill, which generated a shower of relatively cool sparks, could be used for exploring workings but was too cumbersome for routine hewing.
^ Long wall mining, used in e.g. Yorkshire, in which all the coal is taken at once, the roof being collapsed, was thought unsuitable in this coalfield of gaseous, fiery mines: Dunn 1844, p. 40.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 198–9.
^ Dunn 1844, p. 48.
^ Ansted 1846, p. 5.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 202–7.
^ Wood 1858, p. 234. Per Matthias Dunn, himself an eminent mining engineer.
^ Hardwick & O'Shea 1916, pp. 640–2.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 199–200, 211.
^ Spring 1960, p. 76.
^ Bowman 1997, p. 249.
^ Hiskey 1978, p. 5.
^ Wood 1858, pp. 200–2.
^ Dunn 1844, p. 60.
^ Tomlinson 1915, p. 4.
^ Tomlinson 1915, p. 5.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 81–2.
^ Killingworth used 4' 8" (1,422 mm), as did the Stockton and Darlington Railway. For the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Stephenson increased it to 4' 8 1/2" (1,435 mm} to improve the flange tolerance, and this became the international standard. But his extra half inch made little practical difference at the time, and some trains ran on both gauges daily without it attracting attention.
^ Smailes 1935, pp. 204 and Map 2.
^ ^a ^b Rennison 2004, p. 253.
^ Jaffe 1989, p. 241.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 4–31.
^ Kirby 1993, pp. 11–12, 18–19, 22.
^ Jars 1774, pp. 200–205.
^ See also Tomlinson 1915, p. 14.
^ Craster 1907, p. 21.
^ Tomlinson 1915, p. 11.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 153–8.
^ Blenkinsop was a north-easterner. Although he introduced his engine at a colliery near Leeds, it was also used on waggonways near Newcastle: Tomlinson 1915, pp. 21, 22.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 21–4.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 28–9.
^ Kirby 1993, p. 20.
^ Cohn 1895, p. 559.
^ Tan 2009, p. 350.
^ ^a ^b ^c Tan 2009, p. 351.
^ Hausman 1984, p. 321.
^ Taylor 1953, p. 25.
^ ^a ^b Beckett 1986, pp. 155–6.
^ House of Commons 1836, p. viii.
^ Walker 1904, pp. 304–5.
^ Walker 1904, p. 41.
^ Jaffe 1989, p. 237.
^ Virtue 1896, pp. 318, 319.
^ Storing surplus coal in hope of a market upturn was too expensive an option.Virtue 1896, p. 319
^ Argument of the Limitation of the Vend before the House of Lords Select Committee on the Coal Trade: House of Lords 1830, p. xii.
^ House of Commons 1836, p. vii.
^ Kirby 1973, pp. 273, 274, 276, 277.
^ Munby 1959, pp. 246, 254.
^ Barjot & Schröter 2013, pp. 957, 958, 959.
^ Burhop & Lübbers 2009, pp. 500, 503–4, 521.
^ Schmitt 1964, pp. 102, 103–4, 105, 106, 109–10, 111, 112–3.
^ Kimmel 2011, pp. 245, 246, 248, 251–4, 258–60, 269.
^ Taylor 1953, pp. 27–8.
^ Cohn 1895, p. 558.
^ Sweezy thought this was perhaps an exaggeration: Sweezy 1938, p. 63.
^ "Nor is this the worst effect of the system. In working a colliery a great proportion of small coal is raised. The cost to the home consumer being exaggerated, and the freight and charges being equally great upon this article as upon round coal, very little small coal finds a market within the kingdom, except on the spot where it is raised; and as the expense of raising it must be incurred, the coal-owners must of course seek elsewhere for a market at any price that will exceed the mere cost of putting it on board ship. By this means 'nut coal', which consists of small pieces, free from dust, which have passed through a screen, the bars of which are five-eighths of an inch apart, are sold for shipment to foreign countries at the low price of 3s. per ton. The intrinsic quality of this coal is quite as good as that of the round coal from the same pits; it is equally suitable for generating steam, and for general manufacturing purposes; and thus the manufacturers of Denmark, Germany, Russia, &c., obtain the fuel they require, and without which they cannot carry on their operations, at a price not only below that paid by English manufacturers, but for much less than the cost at which it can be raised. The coal-owner might, it is true, sell this small coal at home at a better price than he obtains from his foreign customer, but every ton so sold would take the place of an equal quantity of large coal, upon which his profit is made, and by such home sale he would by no means lessen his sacrifice, but the reverse."
^ Porter 1843, pp. 97–103.
^ Hausman 1984a, p. 385n..
^ Jevons 1866, p. 80.
^ Jevons 1866, pp. x–xi, 8, 122–136, 241, and passim.
^ Jevons 1866, p. 371.
^ Jevons 1866, pp. xxii–xxiii, 345–6, 369.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 37.
^ Hausman 1984a, p. 383.
^ Hill 1993, pp. 77–8.
^ More precisely, hiking. An existing tax of 4d. per chaldron was increased to 1 s. (A chaldron, broadly, was a waggonload.)
^ Dendy 1901, pp. xiii–xv, xix–xx, xxviii–xxxi, xxxv, xxxvi, xliii, xlv.
^ The Hostmen's combination is also discussed in Nef 1932b, pp. 110–115 and Sweezy 1938, pp. 3–21.
^ "Any use, custom, prescription franchise, freedom, jurisdiction, immunity, liberty, or privilege, heretofore claimed, used, or enjoyed by the governors and stewards and brethren of the fellowship of the hoast-men of the town of Newcastle upon Tine, or by the antient fellowship, guild, or fraternity commonly called hoastmen, for or concerning the selling, carrying, lading, disposing, shipping, venting, or trading of or for any sea-coals, stone-coals, or pit-coals, forth or out of the haven and river of Tine; or to any grant made by the said governor and stewards and brethren of the fellowship of the said hoast-men, to the late Queen Elizabeth, of any duty or sum of money to be paid for or in respect of any such coals as aforesaid": Dendy 1901, p. 28.
^ Dendy 1901, p. xxxiii.
^ Dendy 1901, p. liv.
^ Lee 1945, p. 147. "It was designed 'to join some of their collieries and to enter into a friendship and partnership for the purchasing or taking other collieries, and for winning and working of coals thereout, and to exchange benefits and kindnesses with each other, upon a lasting foundation'. This agreement gave the one powerful group a virtual monopoly of the most valuable mineral district in the north of England."
^ ^a ^b Robinson 1941, p. 103.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 30.
^ Smailes 1935, pp. 205 and Map 2.
^ Cromar 1977, p. 80, Fig 1.
^ Cromar 1977, pp. 79, 84, Fig 5.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 135.
^ ^a ^b Cromar 1977, p. 86.
^ Cromar 1977, pp. 79, 86.
^ Dunn 1844, p. 50.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 32–6.
^ Levy was a professor at the University of Heidelberg.
^ Ville 1986, p. 362.
^ Craster 1907, p. 28.
^ Smailes 1938, p. 221.
^ Ville 1986, pp. 362–3.
^ Levy 1911, pp. 107–110.
^ Rennison 2004, pp. 258, 259–261, 263, 265, 273.
^ Cohn 1895, p. 557.
^ Kirby 1993, p. 21.
^ McCord & Rowe 1977, p. 34.
^ Nef 1932a, p. 102.
^ Kirby 1993, pp. 2, 27, 30, 32.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 42, 46, 52–56.
^ ^a ^b Tomlinson 1915, p. 172.
^ Tomlinson 1915, p. 69. "If he [Lord Lambton] had thought any export would ever have taken place by the Darlington Railway they should never have had an Act".
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 42, 87.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 101–2.
^ Tomlinson 1915, pp. 120, 121, 136, 165–7.
^ McCord & Rowe 1977, p. 35.
^ Smailes 1935, pp. 206–7.
^ Kirby 1993, pp. 86–7, 121–2.
^ Smailes 1938, p. 222.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 105–8.
^ Hausman 1984a, p. 394.
^ Levy 1911, p. 121.
^ Ville 1990, p. 39.
^ Edwards 1930, p. 657.
^ Rennison 2004, pp. 265–8.
^ ^a ^b ^c Sweezy 1938, p. 59.
^ Craster 1907, p. 203.
^ Rennison 2004, pp. 267–273.
^ Then known as Lord Stewart.
^ Sturgess 1975, pp. 42–3.
^ Bowman 1997, p. 250.
^ Jaffe 1989, pp. 239–240.
^ Bowman 1997, pp. 250, 256, 259.
^ Hall 1854, p. 118.
^ Jaffe 1989, pp. 240, 244, 252.
^ Smailes 1935, p. 206.
^ House of Commons 1838, p. 42.
^ Rennison & 2004 272.
^ Wood 1858, p. 193.
^ Edwards 1930, p. 658.
^ Reproduced in Sweezy 1938, pp. 166–170,
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 61.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 56–9.
^ Connor 2021, p. 3.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 62–4.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 59–60.
^ Ville 1984a, p. 310.
^ Dewey 1955, p. 768-770.
^ "By one popular view, often incorporated into dicta in both English and American opinions, contracts in restraint of trade — that is, all agreements wherein the parties pledge themselves not to compete with one another — were originally unlawful in the sense of being unenforceable. Moreover, 'conspiracy to monopolize' constituted an indictable offense". Dewey 1866, pp. 759–60.
^ Dewey 1955, p. 761.
^ Letwin 2013, pp. 355–385.
^ A mine owner could be fined £100 per offence.
^ High Flatworth Colliery.
^ House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, pp. 604-611 (App. 41).
^ Cohn 1895, p. 558 misunderstood the English legal system, thinking that since the prosecutor's lawyer was a king's counsel, it must be an official prosecution.
^ House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, pp. 563–4.
^ Coal Trade Committee 1803, p. 544.
^ Sweezy, 1938 & pp64-5.
^ Cf. Levinstein & Suslow 2006, p. 67 ("Firms' expectations about their compedtitors' propensity to cooperate can have a significant impact on the success of collusion".)
^ Hausman 1984b, p. 325.
^ Velkar 2008, p. 305.
^ House of Lords 1830, pp. 199, 208, 209.
^ Finch 1973, pp. 22–30.
^ Finch 1973, p. 22.
^ I.e. he was a del credere agent,
^ Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 195.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 49, 55.
^ Thomas 1903, pp. 444–5.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 66.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 86-7.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 50.
^ Smith 1961, pp. 160–2.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 67–8.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 68, 66.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 50, 55.
^ Hausman 1984a, p. 395.
^ Jaffe 1989, p. 248.
^ Orde 2013, p. xvi.
^ Hausman 1984b, p. p=325.
^ Charles Stewart, 3rd Marquess of Londonderry, famous for his impetuous cavalry charges, was described by The Times as the bravest soldier in the British army. Badly wounded several times, he had fought two duels. Entering the diplomatic service, he had represented his country in Berlin and Vienna (where he was a notorious womaniser); the Duke of Wellington, who distrusted him, allowed that he had been a good ambassador. Londonderry opposed the Coal Mines Act 1842, holding that child labour had educative value; hence "popular mythology ... unjustly cast him as the arch villain of the north-east coal trade": Lloyd & Heesom 2011. If Londonderry was a right-wing Tory, John Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham was so far to the left that he was known as Radical Jack. An insomniac who suffered from mood swings, he eloped with his first wife and married her in Gretna Green. A seasoned politician, Durham was instrumental in bringing in the Reform Act 1832, was British ambassador to Russia, and a Governor-General of Canada, where he played a significant role in Canadian history. He suffered a series of bereavements, losing his son, his mother and three daughters in one year, and took to laudanum. "Haughty and disdainful", probably personally insecure, it was said men were afraid of him: Martin 2004.
^ Jaffe 1991.
^ Jaffe 1991, pp. 55–6, 43–6.
^ ^a ^b Jaffe 1989, p. 243.
^ Hausman, 1984a & 395n.
^ Before Londonderry's marriage to Frances Anne (the Vane-Tempest coal heiress), she had been a ward of court; Mowbray had been appointed to manage her affairs. Londonderry had got rid of Mowbray for incompetence, employing John Buddle instead; for this Mowbray was aggrieved: Orde 2013, p. xiv.
^ Sill 1982, pp. 53–4.
^ Sill 1984, p. 146.
^ Buddle 2013, pp. 124–5, 5 June 1825
^ Taylor 1953, p. 26.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 40–41.
^ Jaffe 1989, p. 254.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 88–90.
^ Sweezy 1838, pp. 94–5.
^ Sweezy 1938, pp. 101–6.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 38.
^ Connor 2021, p. 1.
^ Hausman 1977a, p. 253.
^ Connor 2021, pp. 2–3.
^ Mayhew, pp. 233–241.
^ Velkar 2008, pp. 282, 289–294, 295.
^ Sweezy 1938, p. 53.
^ House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 538.
^ Dunn 1844, pp. 68–71.
^ Dunn 1844, pp. 71–78.
^ Cohn 1895, p. 560.
^ Dunn 1844, pp. 78–84.
^ Dunn 1844, pp. 84–93.
^ House of Commons 1838, p. v.

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Smailes, Arthur E. (1935). "The development of the Northumberland and Durham coalfield". Scottish Geographical Magazine. 51 (4): 201–214, . doi:10.1080/14702543508554344.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

Smailes, Arthur E. (1938). "Population Changes in the Colliery Districts of Northumberland and Durham". The Geographical Journal. 91 (3): 220–229. JSTOR 1787541.

Smith, Raymond (1961). Sea Coal for London: History of the Coal Factors in the London Market. London: Longmans, Green.

Spring, David (1960). "Review: The Life and Times of Frances Anne Marchioness of Londonderry and Her Husband Charles Third Marquess of Londonderry by Edith, Marchioness of Londonderry". The Journal of Modern History. 32 (1): 75–76. JSTOR 1871869.

Sturgess, R.W. (1975). An Aristocrat in Business: the Third Marquess of Londonderry as Coalowner and Portbuilder. Durham: Durham County Local History Society. ISBN 0 902958 02 X.

Sweezy, Paul M. (1938). Monopoly and Competition in the English Coal Trade 1550-1850. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tan, Elaine S. (2009). "Market Structure and the Coal Cartel in Early Nineteenth-Century England". The Economic History Review. 62 N.S. (2): 350–365. JSTOR 20542915.

Tann, Jennifer (1992). "The Steam Engine on Tyneside in the Industrial Revolution". Transactions of the Newcomen Society. 64 (1): 53–75. doi:10.1179/tns.1992.004.

Taylor, A.J. (1953). "Combination in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Coal Industry". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 3: 23–39. JSTOR 3678707.

Thomas, D.A. (1903). "The Growth and Direction of Our Foreign Trade in Coal During the Last Half Century". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 66 (3): 439–533. doi:10.2307/2339411. JSTOR 2339411.

Thompson, Lloyd (1939). "Review: Monopoly and Competition in the English Coal Trade, 1550-1850 by Paul M. Sweezy". Science & Society: 258–261. JSTOR 40399243.

Tomlinson, Wiliam Weaver (1915). The North Eastern Railway: Its Rise and Development. Newcastle-upon-Tyne; London: Andrew Reid; Longmans, Green. Retrieved 20 March 2023.

Turnbull, Gerard (1987). "Canals, Coal and Regional Growth during the Industrial Revolution". The Economic History Review. 40 (4): 537–560. JSTOR 2596392.

Turnbull, Les (2018). "Elizabeth Montagu". Huntington Library Quarterly. 81 (4, "The Commerce of Life": Elizabeth Montagu (1718–1800)): 657–686. JSTOR 10.2307/26661609.

Velkar, Aashish (2008). "Caveat Emptor: Abolishing Public Measurements, Standardizing Quantities, and Enhancing Market Transparency in the London Coal Trade c1830". Enterprise & Society. 9 (2): 281–313. JSTOR 23701369.

Ville, Simon (1984a). "Note: Size and Profitability of English Colliers in the Eighteenth Century: A Reappraisal". The Business History Review. 58 (1, Transportation): 103–120. JSTOR 3114530.

Ville, Simon (1984b). "Review:The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 2. 1700-1830: The Industrial Revolution by Michael W. Flinn and David Stoker". The Business History Review. 58 (4): 637–638. JSTOR 3114195.

Ville, Simon (1986). "Total Factor Productivity in the English Shipping Industry: The North-East Coal Trade, 1700-1850". The Economic History Review. 39 (3): 355–370. doi:10.2307/2596345. JSTOR 2596345.

Ville, Simon (1990). "Shipping in the Port of Sunderland 1815–45: A Counter-Cyclical Trend". Business History. 32 (1): 32–51. doi:10.1080/00076799000000003.

Virtue, G. O. (1896). "The Anthracite Combinations". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 10 (3): 296–323. JSTOR 1882587.

Walker, Francis (1904). "Monopolistic Combinations in the German Coal Industry". Publications of the American Economic Association, Third Series. 5 (3): 5-334 (461-790). JSTOR 2999957.

Wood, Nicholas (1858). "On the improvements and progress in the working and ventilation of coal mines in the Newcastle-on-Tyne district within the last fifty years". Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers: 177–236. Retrieved 31 March 2023.

Wood, Nicholas; Taylor, John; Marley, John; Pease, J.W. (1863). "On Coal, Coke and Coal Mining". A History of the Trade and Manufactures of the Tyne, Wear, and Tees: comprising papers read at the British Association for the Advancement of Science (2nd ed.). Newcastle-on-Tyne/London: Lambert/Spon. pp. 18–46. Retrieved 15 May 2023.

Wrigley, E.A. (1962). "The Supply of Raw Materials in the Industrial Revolution". The Economic History Review. XV (1, 2nd ser.): 1–16. JSTOR 2593286.

Wrigley, E.A. (2013). "Energy and the English Industrial Revolution". Phil Trans R Soc A. 371 (20110568): 1–10. doi:10.1098/rsta.2011.0568.

Wrigley, E.A. (2014). "Urban Growth in Early Modern England: Food, Fuel and Transport". Past & Present (225): 79–112. JSTOR 24545164.

Xu, Yi; van Leeuwen, Bas; van Zanden, Jan Luiten (2018). "Urbanization in China, ca. 1100–1900" (PDF). Frontiers of Economics in China. 13 (3): 322–368. doi:10.3868/s060-007-018-0018-9. Retrieved 20 August 2023.

Parliamentary reports[edit]

House of Commons (June 1800) (1803a). "Report from the Committee appointed to consider of the Coal Trade of this Kingdom". Reports from Committees of the House of Commons: Re-printed by Order of the House. Vol. X (Miscellaneous Subjects 1785-1801. House of Commons. Retrieved 15 February 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)

House of Commons (December 1800) (1803b). "Report from the Committee appointed to consider of the Coal Trade of this Kingdom". Reports from Committees of the House of Commons: Re-printed by Order of the House. Vol. X (Miscellaneous Subjects 1785-1801. House of Commons. Retrieved 8 October 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)

House of Lords (1830). Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to take into consideration the state of the coal trade in the United Kingdom, with the minutes of evidence, appendix and index. London: House of Lords. Retrieved 14 February 2023.

House of Commons (1836). Report from the Select Committee on the state of the coal trade together with the minutes of evidence and appendix. London: House of Commons. Retrieved 21 February 2023.

House of Commons (1838). Report from Select Committee on the Coal Trade (Port of London) Bill with the minutes of evidence, appendix and index. London: House of Commons. Retrieved 13 February 2023.

Legislation[edit]

An act to dissolve the present, and prevent the future combination of coal-owners, lightermen, masters of ships, and others, to advance the price of coals, in prejudice of the navigation, trade, and manufactures of this kingdom, and for the further encouragement of the coal-trade (Public General Act 9 Anne c.28). Parliament of the United Kingdom. 1710. Retrieved 31 July 2023.

Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Coal Turn Act (Local Act 8 & 9 Vict. c.93). Parliament of the United Kingdom. 1845. Retrieved 4 July 2023.

Tools[edit]

Bank of England. "Inflation Calculator". Retrieved 4 October 2023.

[1] This section is only a summary; further sources are cited later throughout this article.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184418-2] Dunn 1844, p. 18.

[FOOTNOTECromar197786–7-3] Cromar 1977, pp. 86–7.

[4] In a dataset of 532 historical markets, Connor found the Limitation of the Vend was the most durable cartel: Connor 2014, pp. 269, 277.

[FOOTNOTELevensteinSuslow200643,_44,_52-5] Levenstein & Suslow 2006, pp. 43, 44, 52.

[FOOTNOTERobinson1941102-6] Robinson 1941, p. 102.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984b638-7] Ville 1984b, p. 638.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935203–4-8] Smailes 1935, pp. 203–4.

[FOOTNOTEBogart20134,_6-9] Bogart 2013, pp. 4, 6.

[10] Where carts could move in dry weather only: Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 12

[FOOTNOTEWrigley19626-11] Wrigley 1962, p. 6.

[FOOTNOTETurnbull1987547-12] Turnbull 1987, p. 547.

[FOOTNOTEBogart20137,_15,_17,_18-13] Bogart 2013, pp. 7, 15, 17, 18.

[FOOTNOTEPollard1980220-1-14] Pollard 1980, p. 220-1.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a110–111,_115,_117–121-15] Nef 1932a, pp. 110–111, 115, 117–121.

[16] Some ships were operated by the mine owners themselves, particularly during the French wars of 1793-1815 when shipping was scarce (Ville 1980, pp. 37, 33) or during one of the occasional outbreaks of free competition (Hausman 1984a, p. 383n), but this was not preferred. Sunderland may have been different but it supplied only 8% of the London market: Ville 1990, pp. 37–8. Some mine owners owned a minority shareholding in a ship: Finch 1973, p. 49.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193850_n18-17] Sweezy 1938, p. 50 n18.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a383_n1-18] Hausman 1984a, p. 383 n1.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons1836xvi-19] House of Commons 1836, p. xvi.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1977a461–2-20] Hausman 1977a, pp. 461–2.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988382-21] Evans 1988, p. 382.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986359,_362,_366-22] Ville 1986, pp. 359, 362, 366.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986364-23] Ville 1986, p. 364.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986357-24] Ville 1986, p. 357.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1977b470,_472-25] Hausman 1977b, pp. 470, 472.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a396-26] Nef 1932a, p. 396.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986361-27] Ville 1986, pp. 361.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a115,_116-28] Ville 1984a, pp. 115, 116.

[FOOTNOTEFinch197388-29] Finch 1973, pp. 88.

[FOOTNOTEFinch1973176-30] Finch 1973, p. 176.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(December_1800)1803b643-31] House of Commons (December 1800) 1803b, p. 643.

[FOOTNOTEFinch197341-32] Finch 1973, p. 41.

[FOOTNOTE9_Anne_c.281710273-33] 9 Anne c.28 1710, p. 273.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a238-34] Nef 1932a, p. 238.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986359-35] Ville 1986, p. 359.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(June_1800)1803a614_(App._No._43)-36] House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 614 (App. No. 43).

[FOOTNOTEHausman1977b461n–462n-37] Hausman 1977b, pp. 461n–462n.

[FOOTNOTEFinch197332,_68–9-38] Finch 1973, pp. 32, 68–9.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a358-39] Ville 1984a, p. 358.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a362-40] Ville 1984a, p. 362.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a109–110-41] Ville 1984a, pp. 109–110.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(December_1800)1803b641-42] House of Commons (December 1800) 1803b, p. 641.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a110-43] Ville 1984a, p. 110.

[44] 50 Geo. III c.91; renewed as 57 Geo. III c. 30; as 8 Geo. IV c.72; and as 8 & 9 Vict. c93 1845, (see preamble).

[FOOTNOTESweezy193876-45] Sweezy 1938, p. 76.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons1836xiii-46] House of Commons 1836, p. xiii.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193891-47] Sweezy 1938, p. 91.

[48] Mine owners in the North had to negotiate wayleaves to pass over intermediate landholdings on their way to the river: these were expensive. The mine owners complained that, in authorising the Birmingham railway, Parliament was expropriating the wayleave rights without compensation, giving users an unfair advantage.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193892-49] Sweezy 1938, p. 92.

[FOOTNOTEScott186925-50] Scott 1869, p. 25.

[51] Goods trains were frequently shunted into sidings to make way for passenger trains, and did not move by night.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988369,_371-52] Evans 1988, pp. 369, 371.

[FOOTNOTEArmstrong1997242–6-53] Armstrong 1997, pp. 242–6.

[FOOTNOTETan2009353-54] Tan 2009, p. 353.

[FOOTNOTETurnbull1987548–9-55] Turnbull 1987, pp. 548–9.

[FOOTNOTEEstall195883-56] Estall 1958, p. 83.

[FOOTNOTETurnbull1897541-57] Turnbull 1897, p. 541.

[58] Rennison 2004, p. 272: "In 1768 the towns of Newcastle and Sunderland petitioned against the formation of a canal between Oxford and Coventry, a scheme ‘so hurtful to our maritime power [. . .] and destructive to this populous part of the island.’"

[FOOTNOTETurnbull1987538-59] Turnbull 1987, p. 538.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984b383_n10-60] Hausman 1984b, p. 383 n10.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Lords1830215-61] House of Lords 1830, p. 215.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Lords1830214-62] House of Lords 1830, p. 214.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Lords1830223-63] House of Lords 1830, p. 223.

[FOOTNOTETan2009350,_351,_353–4,_355,_363-64] Tan 2009, pp. 350, 351, 353–4, 355, 363.

[FOOTNOTETan2009358,_359,_360,_361-65] Tan 2009, pp. 358, 359, 360, 361.

[FOOTNOTEMacLeod2011168-66] MacLeod 2011, p. 168.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201491,_99-67] Wrigley 2014, pp. 91, 99.

[FOOTNOTEGallowayKeeneMurphy1996447-68] Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, p. 447.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley19622-69] Wrigley 1962, p. 2.

[70] See also Evans 1988, pp. 364–5.

[71] Perhaps 50-80 km².

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201497-72] Wrigley 2014, pp. 97.

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200766-73] Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 66.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988365-74] Evans 1988, p. 365.

[FOOTNOTEGallowayKeeneMurphy1996447,_448-75] Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, pp. 447, 448.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201488,_90-76] Wrigley 2014, pp. 88, 90.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley2014108–9-77] Wrigley 2014, pp. 108–9.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988397-78] Evans 1988, p. 397.

[FOOTNOTEGallowayKeeneMurphy1996449-79] Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, p. 449.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988393-80] Evans 1988, p. 393.

[FOOTNOTESmith19615-81] Smith 1961, p. 5.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201482,_90,_97–9,_103-82] Wrigley 2014, pp. 82, 90, 97–9, 103.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley20131,_4,_6-83] Wrigley 2013, pp. 1, 4, 6.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley20137-84] Wrigley 2013, p. 7.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201481,_82,_86-85] Wrigley 2014, pp. 81, 82, 86.

[FOOTNOTEXuvan_Leeuwenvan_Zanden2018348-86] Xu, van Leeuwen & van Zanden 2018, p. 348.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201483–4-87] Wrigley 2014, pp. 83–4.

[FOOTNOTEBierig2023-88] Bierig 2023.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley201498–9-89] Wrigley 2014, pp. 98–9.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935203-90] Smailes 1935, p. 203.

[FOOTNOTESmith19612-91] Smith 1961, p. 2.

[FOOTNOTESmith19613-92] Smith 1961, p. 3.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a192–3-93] Nef 1932a, pp. 192–3.

[FOOTNOTEGallowayKeeneMurphy1996447–8-94] Galloway, Keene & Murphy 1996, pp. 447–8.

[FOOTNOTEAllen201312-95] Allen 2013, p. 12.

[96] By 1650: Nef 1932a, p. 212

[FOOTNOTEVille1986358-97] Ville 1986, p. 358.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a191–2-98] Nef 1932a, pp. 191–2.

[99] Clark and Jacks have argued that, even if Britain had had no coal, the industrial revolution would have gone on just the same, by importing firewood from the Baltic: Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 66.

[FOOTNOTEChamberlain1856522-100] Chamberlain 1856, p. 522.

[101] Chamberlain 1856, pp. 516, 517, 519, 522; the proportion was 70:30.

[FOOTNOTEDobsonTomlinson1868119–161,_esp._119,_122,_140,_144–9,_152–3-102] Dobson & Tomlinson 1868, pp. 119–161, esp. 119, 122, 140, 144–9, 152–3.

[FOOTNOTEDobsonTomlinson1868159–60-103] Dobson & Tomlinson 1868, pp. 159–60.

[FOOTNOTEBull195628-104] Bull 1956, p. 28.

[FOOTNOTECox199757,_62-105] Cox 1997, pp. 57, 62.

[FOOTNOTEWrigley19625-106] Wrigley 1962, p. 5.

[FOOTNOTEAllen201313–15-107] Allen 2013, pp. 13–15.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a199-108] Nef 1932a, p. 199.

[FOOTNOTEMacLeod20111689-109] MacLeod 2011, pp. 1689.

[FOOTNOTEMcLean19972-110] McLean 1997, p. 2.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1977a461-111] Hausman 1977a, p. 461.

[FOOTNOTEEvans1988398-112] Evans 1988, p. 398.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986258-113] Ville 1986, p. 258.

[FOOTNOTEArmstrong18639-114] Armstrong 1863, p. 9.

[FOOTNOTECarrington1875v–vi,_9–13,_17-115] Carrington 1875, pp. v–vi, 9–13, 17.

[FOOTNOTETurnbull1987546-116] Turnbull 1987, p. 546.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858185,_186-117] Wood 1858, pp. 185, 186.

[FOOTNOTEWoodTaylorMarleyPease186323–6-118] Wood et al. 1863, pp. 23–6.

[FOOTNOTEFalkus1982218–9-119] Falkus 1982, pp. 218–9.

[FOOTNOTEFalkus1982219,_223–4,_225,_226,_228,_231,_232-120] Falkus 1982, pp. 219, 223–4, 225, 226, 228, 231, 232.

[FOOTNOTEWoodTaylorMarleyPease186324,_25-121] Wood et al. 1863, pp. 24, 25.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858186-122] Wood 1858, p. 186.

[FOOTNOTEWoodTaylorMarleyPease186324-123] Wood et al. 1863, p. 24.

[FOOTNOTECraster190729-124] Craster 1907, p. 29.

[FOOTNOTEWoodTaylorMarleyPease186325-125] Wood et al. 1863, p. 25.

[FOOTNOTEWoodTaylorMarleyPease186324,_25–6-126] Wood et al. 1863, pp. 24, 25–6.

[FOOTNOTESpring196075-127] Spring 1960, p. 75.

[FOOTNOTESturgess19758,_78-128] Sturgess 1975, pp. 8, 78.

[FOOTNOTESturgess197544–5,_49–51,_63,_77–8,_83,_86-129] Sturgess 1975, pp. 44–5, 49–51, 63, 77–8, 83, 86.

[FOOTNOTEReynolds2004-130] Reynolds 2004.

[131] Daunton 1985, p. 638; Bank of England Inflation Calculator.

[FOOTNOTENef1932b71–74-132] Nef 1932b, pp. 71–74.

[133] See also Taylor 1953, p. 25: "the prizes were for the few".

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200759–60-134] Clark & Jacks 2007, pp. 59–60.

[FOOTNOTEHairRoss18446-135] Hair & Ross 1844, p. 6.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(June_1800)1803a544-136] House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 544.

[FOOTNOTEJevons186683-137] Jevons 1866, p. 83.

[138] Except gold and silver.

[FOOTNOTEAshtonSykes19291-139] Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 1.

[FOOTNOTEHiskey197833-140] Hiskey 1978, p. 33.

[FOOTNOTEHiskey197830-141] Hiskey 1978, p. 30.

[FOOTNOTESill1984149-142] Sill 1984, p. 149.

[143] Although it did vary, depending on how easy it was to extract.

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200748,_49-144] Clark & Jacks 2007, pp. 48, 49.

[FOOTNOTEClavering1995213-145] Clavering 1995, p. 213.

[FOOTNOTETurnbull2018657-146] Turnbull 2018, p. 657.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935201-147] Smailes 1935, p. 201.

[FOOTNOTEBarkeTaylor201544-148] Barke & Taylor 2015, p. 44.

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200741-149] Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 41.

[FOOTNOTEClavering1995214-150] Clavering 1995, p. 214.

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200744-5-151] Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 44-5.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935208-152] Smailes 1935, p. 208.

[FOOTNOTEAnsted18463-153] Ansted 1846, p. 3.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858213–4-154] Wood 1858, pp. 213–4.

[155] Clavering showed it would have required a stable of 80 horses to drain a 300-400 acre colliery, which was rarely practical. Water wheels, called coal mills, were preferred, a treble-wheel system being common practice.

[FOOTNOTETann199256–8-156] Tann 1992, pp. 56–8.

[FOOTNOTEClavering1995211,_213–5,_228-157] Clavering 1995, pp. 211, 213–5, 228.

[FOOTNOTETan2009356-158] Tan 2009, p. 356.

[FOOTNOTEKanefskyRobey1980169–70,_176,_179-159] Kanefsky & Robey 1980, pp. 169–70, 176, 179.

[FOOTNOTETann199254-160] Tann 1992, p. 54.

[FOOTNOTEKanfeskyRobey1980166-161] Kanfesky & Robey 1980, p. 166.

[FOOTNOTEClarkJacks200745-162] Clark & Jacks 2007, p. 45.

[FOOTNOTETann199256-163] Tann 1992, p. 56.

[164] Spedding's steel mill, which generated a shower of relatively cool sparks, could be used for exploring workings but was too cumbersome for routine hewing.

[165] Long wall mining, used in e.g. Yorkshire, in which all the coal is taken at once, the roof being collapsed, was thought unsuitable in this coalfield of gaseous, fiery mines: Dunn 1844, p. 40.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858198–9-166] Wood 1858, pp. 198–9.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184448-167] Dunn 1844, p. 48.

[FOOTNOTEAnsted18465-168] Ansted 1846, p. 5.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858202–7-169] Wood 1858, pp. 202–7.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858234-170] Wood 1858, p. 234. Per Matthias Dunn, himself an eminent mining engineer.

[FOOTNOTEHardwickO'Shea1916640–2-171] Hardwick & O'Shea 1916, pp. 640–2.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858199–200,_211-172] Wood 1858, pp. 199–200, 211.

[FOOTNOTESpring196076-173] Spring 1960, p. 76.

[FOOTNOTEBowman1997249-174] Bowman 1997, p. 249.

[FOOTNOTEHiskey19785-175] Hiskey 1978, p. 5.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858200–2-176] Wood 1858, pp. 200–2.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184460-177] Dunn 1844, p. 60.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson19154-178] Tomlinson 1915, p. 4.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson19155-179] Tomlinson 1915, p. 5.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191581–2-180] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 81–2.

[181] Killingworth used 4' 8" (1,422 mm), as did the Stockton and Darlington Railway. For the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Stephenson increased it to 4' 8 1/2" (1,435 mm} to improve the flange tolerance, and this became the international standard. But his extra half inch made little practical difference at the time, and some trains ran on both gauges daily without it attracting attention.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935204_and_Map_2-182] Smailes 1935, pp. 204 and Map 2.

[FOOTNOTERennison2004253-183] Rennison 2004, p. 253.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989241-184] Jaffe 1989, p. 241.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson19154–31-185] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 4–31.

[FOOTNOTEKirby199311–12,_18–19,_22-186] Kirby 1993, pp. 11–12, 18–19, 22.

[FOOTNOTEJars1774200–205-187] Jars 1774, pp. 200–205.

[188] See also Tomlinson 1915, p. 14.

[FOOTNOTECraster190721-189] Craster 1907, p. 21.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191511-190] Tomlinson 1915, p. 11.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson1915153–8-191] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 153–8.

[192] Blenkinsop was a north-easterner. Although he introduced his engine at a colliery near Leeds, it was also used on waggonways near Newcastle: Tomlinson 1915, pp. 21, 22.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191521–4-193] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 21–4.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191528–9-194] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 28–9.

[FOOTNOTEKirby199320-195] Kirby 1993, p. 20.

[FOOTNOTECohn1895559-196] Cohn 1895, p. 559.

[FOOTNOTETan2009350-197] Tan 2009, p. 350.

[FOOTNOTETan2009351-198] Tan 2009, p. 351.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984321-199] Hausman 1984, p. 321.

[FOOTNOTETaylor195325-200] Taylor 1953, p. 25.

[FOOTNOTEBeckett1986155–6-201] Beckett 1986, pp. 155–6.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons1836viii-202] House of Commons 1836, p. viii.

[FOOTNOTEWalker1904304–5-203] Walker 1904, pp. 304–5.

[FOOTNOTEWalker190441-204] Walker 1904, p. 41.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989237-205] Jaffe 1989, p. 237.

[FOOTNOTEVirtue1896318,_319-206] Virtue 1896, pp. 318, 319.

[207] Storing surplus coal in hope of a market upturn was too expensive an option.Virtue 1896, p. 319

[208] Argument of the Limitation of the Vend before the House of Lords Select Committee on the Coal Trade: House of Lords 1830, p. xii.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons1836vii-209] House of Commons 1836, p. vii.

[FOOTNOTEKirby1973273,_274,_276,_277-210] Kirby 1973, pp. 273, 274, 276, 277.

[FOOTNOTEMunby1959246,_254-211] Munby 1959, pp. 246, 254.

[FOOTNOTEBarjotSchröter2013957,_958,_959-212] Barjot & Schröter 2013, pp. 957, 958, 959.

[FOOTNOTEBurhopLübbers2009500,_503–4,_521-213] Burhop & Lübbers 2009, pp. 500, 503–4, 521.

[FOOTNOTESchmitt1964102,_103–4,_105,_106,_109–10,_111,_112–3-214] Schmitt 1964, pp. 102, 103–4, 105, 106, 109–10, 111, 112–3.

[FOOTNOTEKimmel2011245,_246,_248,_251–4,_258–60,_269-215] Kimmel 2011, pp. 245, 246, 248, 251–4, 258–60, 269.

[FOOTNOTETaylor195327–8-216] Taylor 1953, pp. 27–8.

[FOOTNOTECohn1895558-217] Cohn 1895, p. 558.

[218] Sweezy thought this was perhaps an exaggeration: Sweezy 1938, p. 63.

[219] "Nor is this the worst effect of the system. In working a colliery a great proportion of small coal is raised. The cost to the home consumer being exaggerated, and the freight and charges being equally great upon this article as upon round coal, very little small coal finds a market within the kingdom, except on the spot where it is raised; and as the expense of raising it must be incurred, the coal-owners must of course seek elsewhere for a market at any price that will exceed the mere cost of putting it on board ship. By this means 'nut coal', which consists of small pieces, free from dust, which have passed through a screen, the bars of which are five-eighths of an inch apart, are sold for shipment to foreign countries at the low price of 3s. per ton. The intrinsic quality of this coal is quite as good as that of the round coal from the same pits; it is equally suitable for generating steam, and for general manufacturing purposes; and thus the manufacturers of Denmark, Germany, Russia, &c., obtain the fuel they require, and without which they cannot carry on their operations, at a price not only below that paid by English manufacturers, but for much less than the cost at which it can be raised. The coal-owner might, it is true, sell this small coal at home at a better price than he obtains from his foreign customer, but every ton so sold would take the place of an equal quantity of large coal, upon which his profit is made, and by such home sale he would by no means lessen his sacrifice, but the reverse."

[FOOTNOTEPorter184397–103-220] Porter 1843, pp. 97–103.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a385n.-221] Hausman 1984a, p. 385n..

[FOOTNOTEJevons186680-222] Jevons 1866, p. 80.

[FOOTNOTEJevons1866x–xi,_8,_122–136,_241,_and_passim-223] Jevons 1866, pp. x–xi, 8, 122–136, 241, and passim.

[FOOTNOTEJevons1866371-224] Jevons 1866, p. 371.

[FOOTNOTEJevons1866xxii–xxiii,_345–6,_369-225] Jevons 1866, pp. xxii–xxiii, 345–6, 369.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193837-226] Sweezy 1938, p. 37.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a383-227] Hausman 1984a, p. 383.

[FOOTNOTEHill199377–8-228] Hill 1993, pp. 77–8.

[229] More precisely, hiking. An existing tax of 4d. per chaldron was increased to 1 s. (A chaldron, broadly, was a waggonload.)

[FOOTNOTEDendy1901xiii–xv,_xix–xx,_xxviii–xxxi,_xxxv,_xxxvi,_xliii,_xlv-230] Dendy 1901, pp. xiii–xv, xix–xx, xxviii–xxxi, xxxv, xxxvi, xliii, xlv.

[231] The Hostmen's combination is also discussed in Nef 1932b, pp. 110–115 and Sweezy 1938, pp. 3–21.

[232] "Any use, custom, prescription franchise, freedom, jurisdiction, immunity, liberty, or privilege, heretofore claimed, used, or enjoyed by the governors and stewards and brethren of the fellowship of the hoast-men of the town of Newcastle upon Tine, or by the antient fellowship, guild, or fraternity commonly called hoastmen, for or concerning the selling, carrying, lading, disposing, shipping, venting, or trading of or for any sea-coals, stone-coals, or pit-coals, forth or out of the haven and river of Tine; or to any grant made by the said governor and stewards and brethren of the fellowship of the said hoast-men, to the late Queen Elizabeth, of any duty or sum of money to be paid for or in respect of any such coals as aforesaid": Dendy 1901, p. 28.

[FOOTNOTEDendy1901xxxiii-233] Dendy 1901, p. xxxiii.

[FOOTNOTEDendy1901liv-234] Dendy 1901, p. liv.

[FOOTNOTELee1945147-235] Lee 1945, p. 147. "It was designed 'to join some of their collieries and to enter into a friendship and partnership for the purchasing or taking other collieries, and for winning and working of coals thereout, and to exchange benefits and kindnesses with each other, upon a lasting foundation'. This agreement gave the one powerful group a virtual monopoly of the most valuable mineral district in the north of England."

[FOOTNOTERobinson1941103-236] Robinson 1941, p. 103.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193830-237] Sweezy 1938, p. 30.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935205_and_Map_2-238] Smailes 1935, pp. 205 and Map 2.

[FOOTNOTECromar197780,_Fig_1-239] Cromar 1977, p. 80, Fig 1.

[FOOTNOTECromar197779,_84,_Fig_5-240] Cromar 1977, pp. 79, 84, Fig 5.

[FOOTNOTESweezy1938135-241] Sweezy 1938, p. 135.

[FOOTNOTECromar197786-242] Cromar 1977, p. 86.

[FOOTNOTECromar197779,_86-243] Cromar 1977, pp. 79, 86.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184450-244] Dunn 1844, p. 50.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193832–6-245] Sweezy 1938, pp. 32–6.

[246] Levy was a professor at the University of Heidelberg.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986362-247] Ville 1986, p. 362.

[FOOTNOTECraster190728-248] Craster 1907, p. 28.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1938221-249] Smailes 1938, p. 221.

[FOOTNOTEVille1986362–3-250] Ville 1986, pp. 362–3.

[FOOTNOTELevy1911107–110-251] Levy 1911, pp. 107–110.

[FOOTNOTERennison2004258,_259–261,_263,_265,_273-252] Rennison 2004, pp. 258, 259–261, 263, 265, 273.

[FOOTNOTECohn1895557-253] Cohn 1895, p. 557.

[FOOTNOTEKirby199321-254] Kirby 1993, p. 21.

[FOOTNOTEMcCordRowe197734-255] McCord & Rowe 1977, p. 34.

[FOOTNOTENef1932a102-256] Nef 1932a, p. 102.

[FOOTNOTEKirby19932,_27,_30,_32-257] Kirby 1993, pp. 2, 27, 30, 32.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191542,_46,_52–56-258] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 42, 46, 52–56.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson1915172-259] Tomlinson 1915, p. 172.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191569-260] Tomlinson 1915, p. 69. "If he [Lord Lambton] had thought any export would ever have taken place by the Darlington Railway they should never have had an Act".

[FOOTNOTETomlinson191542,_87-261] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 42, 87.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson1915101–2-262] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 101–2.

[FOOTNOTETomlinson1915120,_121,_136,_165–7-263] Tomlinson 1915, pp. 120, 121, 136, 165–7.

[FOOTNOTEMcCordRowe197735-264] McCord & Rowe 1977, p. 35.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935206–7-265] Smailes 1935, pp. 206–7.

[FOOTNOTEKirby199386–7,_121–2-266] Kirby 1993, pp. 86–7, 121–2.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1938222-267] Smailes 1938, p. 222.

[FOOTNOTESweezy1938105–8-268] Sweezy 1938, pp. 105–8.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a394-269] Hausman 1984a, p. 394.

[FOOTNOTELevy1911121-270] Levy 1911, p. 121.

[FOOTNOTEVille199039-271] Ville 1990, p. 39.

[FOOTNOTEEdwards1930657-272] Edwards 1930, p. 657.

[FOOTNOTERennison2004265–8-273] Rennison 2004, pp. 265–8.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193859-274] Sweezy 1938, p. 59.

[FOOTNOTECraster1907203-275] Craster 1907, p. 203.

[FOOTNOTERennison2004267–273-276] Rennison 2004, pp. 267–273.

[277] Then known as Lord Stewart.

[FOOTNOTESturgess197542–3-278] Sturgess 1975, pp. 42–3.

[FOOTNOTEBowman1997250-279] Bowman 1997, p. 250.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989239–240-280] Jaffe 1989, pp. 239–240.

[FOOTNOTEBowman1997250,_256,_259-281] Bowman 1997, pp. 250, 256, 259.

[FOOTNOTEHall1854118-282] Hall 1854, p. 118.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989240,_244,_252-283] Jaffe 1989, pp. 240, 244, 252.

[FOOTNOTESmailes1935206-284] Smailes 1935, p. 206.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons183842-285] House of Commons 1838, p. 42.

[FOOTNOTERennison2004272-286] Rennison & 2004 272.

[FOOTNOTEWood1858193-287] Wood 1858, p. 193.

[FOOTNOTEEdwards1930658-288] Edwards 1930, p. 658.

[289] Reproduced in Sweezy 1938, pp. 166–170,

[FOOTNOTESweezy193861-290] Sweezy 1938, p. 61.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193856–9-291] Sweezy 1938, pp. 56–9.

[FOOTNOTEConnor20213-292] Connor 2021, p. 3.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193862–4-293] Sweezy 1938, pp. 62–4.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193859–60-294] Sweezy 1938, pp. 59–60.

[FOOTNOTEVille1984a310-295] Ville 1984a, p. 310.

[FOOTNOTEDewey1955768-770-296] Dewey 1955, p. 768-770.

[297] "By one popular view, often incorporated into dicta in both English and American opinions, contracts in restraint of trade — that is, all agreements wherein the parties pledge themselves not to compete with one another — were originally unlawful in the sense of being unenforceable. Moreover, 'conspiracy to monopolize' constituted an indictable offense". Dewey 1866, pp. 759–60.

[FOOTNOTEDewey1955761-298] Dewey 1955, p. 761.

[FOOTNOTELetwin2013355–385-299] Letwin 2013, pp. 355–385.

[300] A mine owner could be fined £100 per offence.

[301] High Flatworth Colliery.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(June_1800)1803a604-611_(App._41)-302] House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, pp. 604-611 (App. 41).

[303] Cohn 1895, p. 558 misunderstood the English legal system, thinking that since the prosecutor's lawyer was a king's counsel, it must be an official prosecution.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(June_1800)1803a563–4-304] House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, pp. 563–4.

[FOOTNOTECoal_Trade_Committee1803544-305] Coal Trade Committee 1803, p. 544.

[FOOTNOTESweezy1938pp64-5-306] Sweezy, 1938 & pp64-5.

[307] Cf. Levinstein & Suslow 2006, p. 67 ("Firms' expectations about their compedtitors' propensity to cooperate can have a significant impact on the success of collusion".)

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984b325-308] Hausman 1984b, p. 325.

[FOOTNOTEVelkar2008305-309] Velkar 2008, p. 305.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Lords1830199,_208,_209-310] House of Lords 1830, pp. 199, 208, 209.

[FOOTNOTEFinch197322–30-311] Finch 1973, pp. 22–30.

[FOOTNOTEFinch197322-312] Finch 1973, p. 22.

[313] I.e. he was a del credere agent,

[FOOTNOTEAshtonSykes1929195-314] Ashton & Sykes 1929, p. 195.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193849,_55-315] Sweezy 1938, pp. 49, 55.

[FOOTNOTEThomas1903444–5-316] Thomas 1903, pp. 444–5.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193866-317] Sweezy 1938, p. 66.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193886-7-318] Sweezy 1938, p. 86-7.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193850-319] Sweezy 1938, p. 50.

[FOOTNOTESmith1961160–2-320] Smith 1961, pp. 160–2.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193867–8-321] Sweezy 1938, pp. 67–8.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193868,_66-322] Sweezy 1938, pp. 68, 66.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193850,_55-323] Sweezy 1938, pp. 50, 55.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a395-324] Hausman 1984a, p. 395.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989248-325] Jaffe 1989, p. 248.

[FOOTNOTEOrde2013xvi-326] Orde 2013, p. xvi.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984bp=325-327] Hausman 1984b, p. p=325.

[328] Charles Stewart, 3rd Marquess of Londonderry, famous for his impetuous cavalry charges, was described by The Times as the bravest soldier in the British army. Badly wounded several times, he had fought two duels. Entering the diplomatic service, he had represented his country in Berlin and Vienna (where he was a notorious womaniser); the Duke of Wellington, who distrusted him, allowed that he had been a good ambassador. Londonderry opposed the Coal Mines Act 1842, holding that child labour had educative value; hence "popular mythology ... unjustly cast him as the arch villain of the north-east coal trade": Lloyd & Heesom 2011. If Londonderry was a right-wing Tory, John Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham was so far to the left that he was known as Radical Jack. An insomniac who suffered from mood swings, he eloped with his first wife and married her in Gretna Green. A seasoned politician, Durham was instrumental in bringing in the Reform Act 1832, was British ambassador to Russia, and a Governor-General of Canada, where he played a significant role in Canadian history. He suffered a series of bereavements, losing his son, his mother and three daughters in one year, and took to laudanum. "Haughty and disdainful", probably personally insecure, it was said men were afraid of him: Martin 2004.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1991-329] Jaffe 1991.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe199155–6,_43–6-330] Jaffe 1991, pp. 55–6, 43–6.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989243-331] Jaffe 1989, p. 243.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1984a395n.-332] Hausman, 1984a & 395n.

[333] Before Londonderry's marriage to Frances Anne (the Vane-Tempest coal heiress), she had been a ward of court; Mowbray had been appointed to manage her affairs. Londonderry had got rid of Mowbray for incompetence, employing John Buddle instead; for this Mowbray was aggrieved: Orde 2013, p. xiv.

[FOOTNOTESill198253–4-334] Sill 1982, pp. 53–4.

[FOOTNOTESill1984146-335] Sill 1984, p. 146.

[FOOTNOTEBuddle2013124–5-336] Buddle 2013, pp. 124–5, 5 June 1825

[FOOTNOTETaylor195326-337] Taylor 1953, p. 26.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193840–41-338] Sweezy 1938, pp. 40–41.

[FOOTNOTEJaffe1989254-339] Jaffe 1989, p. 254.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193888–90-340] Sweezy 1938, pp. 88–90.

[FOOTNOTESweezy183894–5-341] Sweezy 1838, pp. 94–5.

[FOOTNOTESweezy1938101–6-342] Sweezy 1938, pp. 101–6.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193838-343] Sweezy 1938, p. 38.

[FOOTNOTEConnor20211-344] Connor 2021, p. 1.

[FOOTNOTEHausman1977a253-345] Hausman 1977a, p. 253.

[FOOTNOTEConnor20212–3-346] Connor 2021, pp. 2–3.

[FOOTNOTEMayhew233–241-347] Mayhew, pp. 233–241.

[FOOTNOTEVelkar2008282,_289–294,_295-348] Velkar 2008, pp. 282, 289–294, 295.

[FOOTNOTESweezy193853-349] Sweezy 1938, p. 53.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons_(June_1800)1803a538-350] House of Commons (June 1800) 1803a, p. 538.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184468–71-351] Dunn 1844, pp. 68–71.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184471–78-352] Dunn 1844, pp. 71–78.

[FOOTNOTECohn1895560-353] Cohn 1895, p. 560.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184478–84-354] Dunn 1844, pp. 78–84.

[FOOTNOTEDunn184484–93-355] Dunn 1844, pp. 84–93.

[FOOTNOTEHouse_of_Commons1838v-356] House of Commons 1838, p. v.

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