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Chinese Friendship Farms in Africa[edit]


Chinese Friendship Farms are part of the agricultural cooperation of the People's Republic of China with many African states. Some of the numerous projects started as development aid, other (and later) engagements lost this aspect. [1]

"China’s 'Friendship Farms' in various African countries are formally owned by a Chinese parastatal organisation, but are mostly medium scale, usually below 1000 hectares." [2] While the intended and more often cited farm sizes are reported in the thousands, actual sizes are much smaller or the engagement never became operational. [1] In the context of large-scale land acquisitions they are, therefore, among smaller engagements [3].

Many of the plantations indeed carry the name "Friendship Farm". In projects oriented towards production this implies a "political requests by the host government". Farmers on both sides consider the activities as a political task as well, where they equate political with building friendships. In the context of Mozambique this means to concentrate on crops that improve local food security. This, however, does not exclude an economic and profit-maximizing interest. In Mozambique a project initialized as an aid project is now open to invest in cash crops such as soybeans, rapeseed, tobacco for the Chinese market or organic vegetables for the Europe.

Originally this farm was set up in the context of China–Africa Friendship Cooperation. There was not so much economic interest involved … [yet] although Lianfeng was established for a specific state purpose, we are still an enterprise.’

— A Chinese farm team-leader accd. to Brautigam, 2012 [4]

Official Chinese government information from 2006 claims that through agricultural cooperation between China and Africa 40 countries could establish "agro technology pilot or demonstration farms and promotion stations under nearly 200 cooperation programs and carried out 23 fishery cooperation projects with 13 African countries." Exchange of technical staff is also an important part of the cooperation (more than 10 000 Chinese specialists sent to Africa). [5] Academic findings from 2009, claim that 14 such agro-technical demonstration stations had been started by China. [6]


The employment mix between Chinese and local African workers varies between projects, yet many projects have a significant positive employment effect in their regions. [1] [7]

Chinese agricultural investment has to be analysed in the global context. It has received (mostly unfairly) exceptional international media coverage. [8] [3]



Examples[edit]

The list of projects is long, yet here are a few illustrative examples

  • Wanbao Rice Farm, Mozambique, rice [4]
  • China-Zambia Friendship Farm, 630 ha, renewable 99 years lease[9]
  • Hanhe Farm, Uganda, mushrooms and others, 160 ha [10]
  • Hubei-Gaza Friendship Farm, Rwanda, rice, [11]
  • Anié Sugar Complex, Togo, sugar cane, 1 300 ha [1]

A comprehensive list of investments can be found in the book 'Will Africa feed China?'[1]


See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e Brautigam, Deborah (2015). Will Africa feed China?. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199396863.
  2. ^ Cotula, Lorenzo; Vermeulen, Sonja; Leonard, Rebeca; Keeley, James (2009). Land grab or development opportunity? : agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. IIED. ISBN 978-1-84369-741-1.
  3. ^ a b "Land Matrix". landmatrix.org.
  4. ^ a b Brautigam, D.; Ekman, S.-M. S. (28 May 2012). "Briefing Rumours and realities of Chinese agricultural engagement in Mozambique". African Affairs. 111 (444): 483–492. doi:10.1093/afraf/ads030.
  5. ^ "Agricultural cooperation". www.fmprc.gov.cn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.
  6. ^ Bräutigam, Deborah A.; Xiaoyang, Tang (2009). "China's Engagement in African Agriculture: "Down to the Countryside"". The China Quarterly. 199 (199): 686–706. doi:10.1017/S0305741009990166. ISSN 0305-7410. JSTOR 27756497.
  7. ^ "Chinese Farmers toil in Africa". youtube. New China TV. Retrieved 30 March 2020.
  8. ^ Swanson, Ana. "An incredible image shows how powerful countries are buying up much of the world's land". Washington Post.
  9. ^ Chatelard, Solange Guo; Chu, Jessica M. (2015). "Chinese Agricultural Engagements in Zambia: A Grassroots Analysis" (PDF). The China Africa Research Initiative by the John's Hopkins University (4). Retrieved 31 March 2020.
  10. ^ Maiyo, Joshua. "The Political Ecology of Chinese Investment in Uganda: the Case of Hanhe Farm" (PDF). China-Africa Research Initiative at John's Hopkins Universite - Policy Brief.
  11. ^ "China's hybrid rice sows hope for Africa". The New Times | Rwanda. 6 September 2019.

External links[edit]

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Inti-Plasma Farming[edit]

Inti-Plasma refers to a farming system for oil palm practised in Indonesia. Inti, the Bahasa word for nucleus, is the part of such a plantation that is under concession of the company, while plasma is operated on land owned by the smallholders but planted by the company. Plasma farming is a particular form of contract farming.

Smallholders work on the plasma farm usually organized in farmers' cooperatives and by contract have to sell to the oil palm company for a price set by the government.

The motivation for this kind of organizational and contractual arrangement is mainly that the initial investments to establish an oil palm plantation are considerable. Clearing land, building roads, and planting trees on sizeable areas requires not only elevated economic power but also technological skills. This part, therefore, is in the company's responsibility while the costs are later deducted from the payments made to the farmers.

Smallholders can benefit from the arrangement through technological transfers. Not only in the establishment of the farm does the company play an important role. Also during operations, the company usually provides inputs such as fertilizer to the plasma-farmers. Often smallholders have a non-plasma oil palm farm in addition to the plasma farm where they can apply their newly acquired skills. [1]

The scheme was established in the course of the transmigration program for those resettling.[2] This form of inti-plasma is called PIR TRANS which stands for Perkebunan Inti Rakyat Transmigrasi, i.e. Nucleus Estate Smallholders Project for Transmigrants. Construction of health treatment facilities and public facilities such as roads, schools, houses of worship, clinics, and other projects are included in the PIR scheme.[3] The other, more recent form of the system, started in the 1990s and is called KKPA. It stands for Kredit Koperasi Primer Anggota, i.e. Credit for Cooperative Primary Members and is not attached to the transmigration program. [1]

A significant difference in how transmigrants and indigenous populations were treated is in how their own land was considered. Part of the transmigration program was to give resettled families two to four hectares of land for their own cultivation. However, indigenous populations willing to participate in such a scheme, had to give away parts of their land to become both inti and plasma oil palm farms. Such arrangements depend on the individual negotiation between village communities and oil palm companies and most commonly result in deals wherein 80% of the land becomes core plantation (inti) and 20% plasma. [4] [5] [6]

In 2013, smallholders (not only plasma!) were farming around 3.5 million ha of oil palm plantations or 39.5 percent of the plantation areas at that time. [7]




See also[edit]

Palm oil production in Indonesia


References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Cahyadi, Eko Ruddy; Waibel, Hermann (2013). "Is Contract Farming in the Indonesian Oil Palm Industry Pro-poor?". Journal of Southeast Asian Economies. 30 (1): 62–76. doi:10.1355/ae30-1d. ISSN 2339-5095. JSTOR 43264660.
  2. ^ "Indonesia's Plasma Farmer Scheme Explained". www.asianagri.com. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  3. ^ Mangoensoekarjo, S. dan Semangun, H. (2008). Manajemen Agrobisnis Kelapa Sawit (in Indonesian). Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press. ISBN 978-979-420-523-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ Gatto, Marcel; Wollni, Meike; Asnawi, Rosyani; Qaim, Matin (July 2017). "Oil Palm Boom, Contract Farming, and Rural Economic Development: Village-Level Evidence from Indonesia". World Development. 95: 127–140. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.013.
  5. ^ Feintrenie, Laurène; Chong, Wan Kian; Levang, Patrice (1 July 2010). "Why do Farmers Prefer Oil Palm? Lessons Learnt from Bungo District, Indonesia". Small-scale Forestry. 9 (3): 379–396. doi:10.1007/s11842-010-9122-2.
  6. ^ Rist, Lucy; Feintrenie, Laurène; Levang, Patrice (3 March 2010). "The livelihood impacts of oil palm: smallholders in Indonesia". Biodiversity and Conservation. 19 (4): 1009–1024. doi:10.1007/s10531-010-9815-z.
  7. ^ Ngadi, Ngadi (2013). "The Employment Aspect of Palm Oil Plantation in Indonesia : Challenges and Prospects". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

External links[edit]

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Maher Massacre[edit]

The Maher Massacre took place during the (Second) Liberian Civil War in Maher, Bomi County, on July 18, 2002. Details on the massacre differ across sources, but between 150 and "several hundred" people were killed and their bodies thrown into the Maher river.[1][2][3] Amnesty International reports that 175 people were killed in what they call the "Maher Bridge incident". According to this report the perpetrators were government troops suspected to be LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, a rebel group active between 1999 and 2003) supporters. The frightened population of Tubmanburg was lured onto pick-up trucks which ought to bring them to Monrovia, 100km away, into safety and where food was available. Instead, the trucks stopped along the road after just 10km, killed them and threw them into the river. [1]

I just want the truth to come out – I want people to know what happened. I want them to know what happened on 18 July 2002. People need to know the truth because of the huge numbers of people who were killed at the Maher bridge. We are not talking about two or three people. People from the different parts of Liberia may not know about this but may have relatives who have died and they just don't know. Because in the war – people are scattered everywhere and those that are living in different areas won't know about this.

— M, survivor of the Maher Bridge [1]

A number of witnesses to the massacre gave testimonies to the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC reacted with a recommendation for compensating the survivors but nothing was paid out as of October 2018. [2]

Maher Massacre Monument, photo from November 2019

A memorial next to the town North of the river reminds of the atrocities. Three sides of the monument depict the course of the events. The first scene shows a village of a few huts with an insinuated forest in the back- and a road in the foreground. On the road a camouflaged pickup is carrying many people; four perpetrators are attacking the villagers, two with machine guns, one with a machete. The second scene shows the Maher bridge where the attackers shoot at fleeing people and others are throwing them into the waters below. The third scene shows the river with five victims floating downstream.

This is one of 155 massacre and mass grave sites identified by the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR). [4]

The movie "Maher - Black Rain in Bomi" is based on the events.[5]

Map


References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Amnesty International. "Liberia: Truth, Justice, Reparation for Liberia's Victims". Refworld. Retrieved 2019-11-16.
  2. ^ a b "Family Calls for Justice and Reparations over Maher Massacre". FrontPageAfrica. 19 October 2018. Retrieved 2019-11-10.
  3. ^ "Survivors tell how Taylor's forces massacred hundreds in Bomi County". The New Humanitarian. 2004-02-27. Retrieved 2019-11-16.
  4. ^ Wiakanty, Simeon S. (27 January 2020). "INCHR to Start Builiding Massacre Memorials Across Liberia". Liberian Observer.
  5. ^ "Liberian Movie on Maher Massacre Screens at London Festival". FrontPageAfrica. 3 December 2018. Retrieved 2019-11-10.

External Links[edit]

Trailer of the movie on Youtube


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Category:Bomi County Category:Civil wars Category:Massacres in Liberia

Badan Permusyawaratan Desa[edit]

The Village Consultative Body (Indonesian: Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD) is a democratic institution in Indonesian village governance. The BPD can be considered the "parliament" of the village. BPD is a relatively new village institution which came into existence in the course of decentralization efforts since around 2000. According to the 2019 report by the Ministry of Home Affairs, there are 8,488 urban villages and 74,953 rural villages in Indonesia.[1]

BPD members are representatives of the residents of a village based on regional representation determined by deliberation and consensus. The members of the BPD consist of the Rukun Warga (~citizens' association) head, traditional (adat) stakeholders, professional groups, religious leaders and other community leaders. The term of office for BPD members is six years. Members can be reappointed/re-proposed for one additional term. BPD leaders and members are not allowed to hold concurrent positions as Village Heads or in the village apparatus.

The inauguration of BPD members is determined by the Decree of the Regent/Mayor, before taking an oath/promise together in front of the community and guided by the Regent/Mayor.

The chairman of the BPD is elected from and by the members of the BPD directly in a BPD meeting that is held for this purpose. The function of the BPD is to establish Village Regulations with the Village Head, to accommodate and channel the aspirations of the community.

The BPD's powers include:

  • Discuss the draft village regulations with the Village Head
  • Carry out supervision of the implementation of Village Regulations and Village Head Regulations
  • Propose the appointment and dismissal of the Village Head
  • Form a village head election committee
  • Explore, accommodate, collect, formulate and channel the aspirations of the community

The use of the name/term of BPD does not have to be uniform in all villages in Indonesia, and can be referred to by another name.

BPD has the right:

  1. Request information from the Village Government;
  2. Express opinion.

BPD members have the right:

  1. Submit a draft Village Regulation;
  2. Ask question;
  3. Submit suggestions and opinions;
  4. Choose and be chosen; and
  5. Get allowances.

Membership

  1. BPD members are representatives of the residents of a village based on regional representation determined by way of deliberation and consensus;
  2. BPD members consist of the head of the RT/RW, professional groups, religious leaders and community leaders or leaders;
  3. The number of BPD members in each Village is odd with the number in accordance with the applicable provisions;


External links[edit]

The main duties of the BPD (in Indonesian)

References[edit]

  1. ^ "Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 72 Tahun 2019 tentang Perubahan atas Permendagri nomor 137 Tahun 2017 tentang Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan" (PDF). Ministry of Home Affairs. Retrieved 15 January 2020.
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