User:Ykantor/Sandbox/Israel1956- Suez war causes

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Leaders[edit]

Israeli leaders[edit]

In August 1953 Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “Contrary to Moshe Sharetts opinion ... reprisals are imperative. There is no relying for our security on UN observers and foreign states. If we do not put an end to these murders by infiltrators] now, the situation will get worse....(Morris, victims. p. 280)

...(According to the moderates. i.e Sharett) We must restrain our responses to Arab attacks.(Morris, victims. p. 280)

Sharett himself acknowledged that to some degree activism reduced terrorist infiltration, for a time in a given area....(Morris, victims. p. 280)

But paradoxically, while he ( Sharett) was prime minister (On 1954 and beginning of 1955), the reprisals increased in magnitude and in the number of casualties inflicted on the Arabs. This was due to the shift from civilian to military targets, and to the growing incidence of terrorism some state-directed from the Gaza Strip” (Morris, victims. p. 281)

On April 13 (1956) Ben-Gurion proposed a strike against a fedayeen base in Gaza, which in the circumstances would probably have provoked wide-ranging hostilities. But the cabinet made its approval of the plan contingent upon a renewal of fedayeen attacks. Sharett, though depressed, had again won the day (Morris, victims. p. 287)


A number of politicians and generals, including Dayan, repeatedly voiced the hope that an opportunity would arise in which Israel could complete its historic mission and round out its borders (as well as expel its own, inconvenient Arab minority). Indeed, they toyed repeatedly with the idea of provoking a second round” and in 1955-56 they at last managed to do so. Morris2011p261 [1]

Israels leaders believed and continued to believe that the Arab states primarily Egypt—posed a threat to the existence of their country.(Morris, victims. p. 298)

President Nasser[edit]

"During its first two years in power the RCC showed little interest in Israel. In their public utterances, the juntas leaders continued to toe the rejectionist Arab line, though there was an appreciable reduction of incidents along the Gaza Strip border. Israeli peace feelers were politely ignored. In early 1953 Egypt secretly informed Israel that it preferred to maintain the no war, no peace" status quo" Morris2011p266 [2]

"in 1955...The U.S offered to finance the High Dam on the Nile river...in exchange for Egypt's help to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully...But Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West in the Cold War.... was the quasi alliance with the soviets more important than solving the Palestinian issue peacefully?...since the alternative to a negotiated settlement was a war with unpredictable price, Nasser's refusal to accept the Negotiation offer was irrational. " El-Hasan2010p156 [3]

Nasser said at 31.8.1955 that "There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death." On October 14, Nasser said: "I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Caraccilo2011p113[4]

Other Arab leaders[edit]

During the years before the 1956 Suez crisis, Egyptian leaders talked openly about destruction of Israel. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, said early in 1954: "The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East" [5].

"Arab leaders and media spoke obliquely or explicitly of the need for or possibility of a redeeming “second round,” of wiping out the traces of Zionist aggression” or “righting Palestinian wrongs.” Before 1955 the Arabs did nothing to occasion or prepare for it, but many Israelis feared that such an attack was in fact being planned, and believed that Israel should strike first, before the Arabs were ready and while they were off guard". Morris2011p261 [1]

Peace initiative[edit]

"During its first two years in power the RCC showed little interest in Israel. In their public utterances, the juntas leaders continued to toe the rejectionist Arab line, though there was an appreciable reduction of incidents along the Gaza Strip border. Israeli peace feelers were politely ignored. In early 1953 Egypt secretly informed Israel that it preferred to maintain the no war, no peace" status quo" Morris2011p266 [2]

Anderson peace initiative. p. 166 : Egyptian territorial contiguity with Jordan...(Nasser) said that "the line should run from Dhahirya ...to Gaza. Alteras1993p166 [6]

"in 1955...The U.S offered to finance the High Dam on the Nile river...in exchange for Egypt's help to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully...But Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West in the Cold War.... was the quasi alliance with the soviets more important than solving the Palestinian issue peacefully?...since the alternative to a negotiated settlement was a war with unpredictable price, Nasser's refusal to accept the Negotiation offer was irrational. " El-Hasan2010p156 [3]

The war reasons[edit]

summary[edit]

In late 1956, the bellicosity of recent Arab statements prompted Israel to remove the threat of the concentrated Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and Israel invaded the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956. Other Israeli aims were elimination of the Fedayeen incursions into Israel that made life unbearable for its southern population, and opening the blockaded Straits of Tiran for Israeli ships.[7][8][4][9][10][11]

The Arab statements bellicosity[edit]

During the years before the 1956 Suez crisis, Egyptian leaders talked openly about destruction of Israel. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, said early in 1954: "The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East" [5].

Nasser said at 31.8.1955 that "There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death." On October 14, Nasser said: "I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Caraccilo2011p113[4]

"Arab leaders and media spoke obliquely or explicitly of the need for or possibility of a redeeming “second round,” of wiping out the traces of Zionist aggression” or “righting Palestinian wrongs.” Before 1955 the Arabs did nothing to occasion or prepare for it, but many Israelis feared that such an attack was in fact being planned, and believed that Israel should strike first, before the Arabs were ready and while they were off guard". Morris2011p261 [1]


Tiran straits block[edit]

Egypt blocked the Suez canal for shipping and refused to comply with the 1951 Security Council order that Egypt should open the Canal to Israeli shipping. On 12 Sept 1955 Egypt tightened the Tiran straits block for an Israeli shipping, and closed the airspace for Israeli flights over the Gulf of Acaba.

Fedayeen, Borders armed clashes[edit]

"the Israelis would have to accept a certain degree of friction in their relations with Egypt, and understand that such acts as the blockade and armed infiltration were political necessities for Egypt and not representative of any truly belligerent intention." Oren2013p120[12]

"During its first two years in power the RCC showed little interest in Israel. In their public utterances, the juntas leaders continued to toe the rejectionist Arab line, though there was an appreciable reduction of incidents along the Gaza Strip border. Israeli peace feelers were politely ignored. In early 1953 Egypt secretly informed Israel that it preferred to maintain the no war, no peace" status quo." Morris2011p266 [2]

(Israeli casualty statistics show that 7 or 8 Israelis were killed by infiltrators on the Gaza border annually from 195I to I954, with a dramatic rise to 48 in I955. (Morris, victims. p. 281)

", it is quite clear that regardless of any other possible motives, the direct incentive, goal and purpose was the struggle against the infiltration, and more accurately, against its lethal aspects. Not every assassination was followed by a reprisal attack, but every reprisal attack came after a murderous infiltration incursion. mith2013tal-p140Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page). [13] [14] [12] [1] [2] [15] [16] [17] [18] [8] [19] [10] [9] [4] [6] [7] [11] [5] [20] [21] [22] [23] [3] [24] }}

  1. ^ a b c d Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 261. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. Arab leaders and media spoke obliquely or explicitly of the need for or possibility of a redeeming "second round," of wiping out the traces of Zionist aggression" or "righting Palestinian wrongs." Before 1955 the Arabs did nothing to occasion or prepare for it, but many Israelis feared that such an attack was in fact being planned, and believed that Israel should strike first, before the Arabs were ready and while they were off guard...A number of politicians and generals, including Dayan, repeatedly voiced the hope that an opportunity would arise in which Israel could complete its historic mission and round out its borders (as well as expel its own, inconvenient Arab minority). Indeed, they toyed repeatedly with the idea of provoking a second round" and in 1955-56 they at last managed to do so.
  2. ^ a b c d Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 266. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. During its first two years in power the RCC showed little interest in Israel. In their public utterances, the juntas leaders continued to toe the rejectionist Arab line, though there was an appreciable reduction of incidents along the Gaza Strip border. Israeli peace feelers were politely ignored. In early 1953 Egypt secretly informed Israel that it preferred to maintain the no war, no peace" status quo
  3. ^ a b c Hasan Afif El-Hasan (1 January 2010). Israel Or Palestine? Is the Two-state Solution Already Dead?: A Political and Military History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Algora Publishing. p. 156. ISBN 978-0-87586-794-6. in 1955...The U.S offered to finance the High Dam on the Nile river...in exchange for Egypt's help to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully...But Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West in the Cold War.... was the quasi alliance with the soviets more important than solving the Palestinian issue peacefully?...since the alternative to a negotiated settlement was a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser's refusal to accept the Negotiation offer was irrational.
  4. ^ a b c d Dominic Joseph Caraccilo (January 2011). Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy. ABC-CLIO. pp. 113–. ISBN 978-0-313-39149-1. The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent:"I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three armies. The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956.
  5. ^ a b c Matthew C. Price (2008). The Advancement of Liberty: How American Democratic Principles Transformed the Twentieth Century. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 122–. ISBN 978-0-313-34618-7. In early 1954 the Egyptian Foreign Minister declared that the Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East
  6. ^ a b Isaac Alteras (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. University Press of Florida. pp. 166, 167. ISBN 978-0-8130-1205-6. p. 166 Egyptian territorial contiguity with Jordan...(Nasser) said that "the line should run from Dhahirya ...to Gaza
  7. ^ a b Moshe Shemesh; Selwyn Illan Troen (5 October 2005). The Suez-Sinai Crisis: A Retrospective and Reappraisal. Routledge. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-135-77863-7. The aims were to be threefold: to remove the threat, wholly or partially, of the Egyptian rmy in the Sinai, to destroy the framework of the fedaiyun, and to secure the freedom of navigation through the straits of Tiran.
  8. ^ a b Isaac Alteras (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. University Press of Florida. pp. 192–. ISBN 978-0-8130-1205-6. the removal of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The blockade closed Israel's sea lane to East Africa and the Far East, hindering the development of Israel's southern port of Eilat and its hinterland, the Negev. Another important objective of the Israeli war plan was the elimination of the terrorist bases in the Gaza Strip, from which daily fedayeen incursions into Israel made life unbearable for its southern population. And last but not least, the concentration of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, armed with the newly acquired weapons from the Soviet bloc, prepared for an attack on Israel. Here, Ben-Gurion believed, was a time bomb that had to be defused before it was too late. Reaching the Suez Canal did not figure at all in Israel's war objectives.
  9. ^ a b "The Jewish Virtual Library, The Sinai-Suez Campaign: Background & Overview". In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt's war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955: Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death. These "heroes" were Arab terrorists, or fedayeen, trained and equipped by Egyptian Intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder.
  10. ^ a b Alan Dowty (20 June 2005). Israel/Palestine. Polity. pp. 102–. ISBN 978-0-7456-3202-5. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who declared in one speech that "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death."...The level of violence against Israelis, soldiers and civilians alike, seemed to be rising inexorably.
  11. ^ a b Ian J. Bickerton (15 September 2009). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. Reaktion Books. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-86189-527-1. (p. 101) To them the murderous fedayeen raids and constant harassment were just another form of Arab warfare against Israel...(p. 102) Israel's aims were to capture the Sinai peninsula in order to open the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and to seize the Gaza strip to end fedayeen attacks.
  12. ^ a b Michael B. Oren (11 October 2013). The Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-56. Routledge. p. 120. ISBN 978-1-135-18942-6. the Israelis would have to accept a certain degree of friction in their relations with Egypt, and understand that such acts as the blockade and armed infiltration were political necessities for Egypt and not representative of any truly belligerent intention.
  13. ^ Hazem Kandil (13 November 2012). Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt. Verso Books. p. 47. ISBN 978-1-84467-962-1. (Israel) "was alarmed by the Czech arms deal, and believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to cripple Cairo's drive for military parity".
  14. ^ Guy Laron (February 2007). "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal". wilsoncenter.org. p. 16. Egyptian representatives were able to sign a new commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which included a secret clause stating that "the government of Czechoslovakia will provide the Egyptian government with arms and ammunition - to be selected by Egyptian experts - worth about 600 million Egyptian pounds, to be paid in Egyptian cotton." The Egyptian experts requested 200 tanks, 200 armored vehicles, 60 to 100 MIG-15 planes, 2,000 trucks, 1,000 jeeps, and other items…. Czechoslovakia would not be able to supply weapons to Egypt in 1952. And each year, from then until 1955, Prague kept finding new reasons to delay the shipments
  15. ^ Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 271. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. In July 1954 the head of Egyptian military intelligence in the Gaza Strip wrote: "The main objective of the military presence along the armistice line is to prevent infiltration, but the Palestinian troops encourage the movement of infiltrators and carry out attacks along the line.
  16. ^ Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 287. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. During December 1955 February I956 the Egyptians appear to have clamped down on civilian infiltration, but their troops fired across the line at Israeli patrols almost every day
  17. ^ Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. pp. 300, 301. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. (p. 300) In exchange (for Israeli withdrawal) the United states had indirectly promised to guarantee Israel's right of passage through the straits (to the Red sea) and its right to self defense if the Egyptian closed them....(p 301) The 1956 war resulted in significant reduction of...Israeli border tension. Egypt refrain from reactivating the Fedaeen, and...Egypt and Jordan made great effort to curb infiltration
  18. ^ Fred John Khouri (1 January 1985). The Arab-Israeli Dilemma. Syracuse University Press. p. 204. ISBN 978-0-8156-2340-3. by late April (1956), Hammarskjold was able to bring about a cease-fire...The resulting calm along the demarcation lines proved only temporary. The situation deteriorated again for a few weeks in July and then improved for several months
  19. ^ Hazem Kandil (13 November 2012). Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt. Verso Books. p. 50. ISBN 978-1-84467-962-1. "meeting on November 15 (1956) ... Amer also lashed out at Nasser, accusing him of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result."
  20. ^ Prof Dr Simon C Smith (28 June 2013). Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. pp. 101–. ISBN 978-1-4094-8013-6. On 18 March 1956, the Israeli Prime Minister had warned that 'war within a few months could not be avoided unless Israel obtained the arms needed to counter Egypt's weapons'
  21. ^ Avner Falk (17 February 2005). Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoanalytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Terrace Books. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-299-20253-8. In early March 1955, after a series of murderous fedayeen attacks on Israeli civilians, Sharon sent 149 of his paratroopers to raid the Egyptian forces in the Gaza
  22. ^ Derek Varble (2009). The Suez Crisis. The Rosen Publishing Group. p. 17. ISBN 978-1-4358-7497-8. "On the eve of 1956 Sinai campaign...16 Mystere...22 Ouragan fighters
  23. ^ Hasan Afif El-Hasan (1 January 2010). Israel Or Palestine? Is the Two-state Solution Already Dead?: A Political and Military History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Algora Publishing. p. 118. ISBN 978-0-87586-794-6. Israel was looking for war to pre-empt the potential threat of Egypt's arms purchase and to thwart Nasser's support for the Palestinian guerrillas. It found one by aligning himself with the french and the British
  24. ^ Hasan Afif El-Hasan (1 January 2010). Israel Or Palestine? Is the Two-state Solution Already Dead?: A Political and Military History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Algora Publishing. pp. 154–. ISBN 978-0-87586-794-6. The (1956) war was waged by Israel, the French and the British. As stated before, Israel wanted to pre-emp the potential threat of the arms purchase, The French wanted to retaliate for Nasser's support to the Algerian Liberation movement and the British wanted to prevent Nasser from Nationalizing the Suez Canal....He (Nasser) promoted Arab nationalism and claimed himself the defender of the Palestinian cause...but his (Nasser) anti Israel warlike rhetoric that was broadcast in public speeches and publicized in local press did not help the Palestinians. On the contrary, it convinced large section of the Israeli population to oppose reconciliation with the Palestinians
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