User:Ykantor/Sandbox/Israel1972-before the 1973 war
Before the 1973 war[edit]
"This is why he (Sadat) cooled on the idea of an interim settlement at that point, for he feared it would be ascribed to weakness and not statesmanship" Kissinger2013p2324[1]
"It was in France on May 20, 1973,... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this “diluted sovereignty,” but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him." Kissinger2011p254[2]
THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT from 1967 to 1973. UN-report1973 [3]
The Israeli cabinet publicly rejected the plan in communiques issued on December 10 and 22, calling it “an attempt to appease [the Arabs] at the expense of Israel.” ...But it was Egypt and the USSR who in fact definitively shot down the plan. The Soviets dismissed it as “one-sided” and “pro-Israeli.” Nasser rejected a separate deal with Israel (even if he recovered all of Sinai) as well as demilitarization of the peninsula after Israeli withdrawal, freedom of maritime passage for Israeli vessels, and various security arrangements—all stipulated in the Rogers Plan as part of the quid pro quo. Morris2011p354[4]
"She (Golda Meir) would be prepared to have me (Kissinger) continue to explore in private with Hafiz Ismail (the Egyptian delegate) some general principles of an overall settlement" This hint is compatible with Rabin's description of Golda readiness for recognizing Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. Kissinger2011p252 [5]
In February 1973, Kissinger held talks with Sadat's National Security Advisor, Hafez Ismail. ... memoirs that Kissinger told him that, on the basis of his conversations with Hafez Ismail, Egypt might be ready to start negotiating if Israel acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over all of Sinai. Rabin consulted with Prime Minister Golda Meir and told Kissinger that Israel authorized him to explore this approach." Kumaraswamy2013p105 [6]
Dinits evidence. Parker2001p64 [7]
based on Rabin. Spiegel1986p237[8]
Notes[edit]
- ^ Henry Kissinger (24 September 2013). Henry Kissinger The Complete Memoirs E-book Boxed Set: White House Years, Years of Upheaval, Years of Renewal. Simon and Schuster. pp. 2324–. ISBN 978-1-4767-6080-3.
This is why he (Sadat) cooled on the idea of an interim settlement at that point, for he feared it would be ascribed to weakness and not statesmanship
- ^ Henry Kissinger (1 September 2011). Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster. pp. 254–. ISBN 978-0-85720-718-0.
It was in France on May 20, 1973,... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this "diluted sovereignty," but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him.
- ^ "REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 331 (1973) OF 20 APRIL 1973". UNITED NATIONS, Security Council. 18 May 1973.
THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT from 1967 to date
- ^ Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 354. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4.
The Israeli cabinet publicly rejected the plan in communiques issued on December 10 and 22, calling it "an attempt to appease [the Arabs] at the expense of Israel." ...But it was Egypt and the USSR who in fact definitively shot down the plan. The Soviets dismissed it as "one-sided" and "pro-Israeli." Nasser rejected a separate deal with Israel (even if he recovered all of Sinai) as well as demilitarization of the peninsula after Israeli withdrawal, freedom of maritime passage for Israeli vessels, and various security arrangements—all stipulated in the Rogers Plan as part of the quid pro quo.
- ^ Henry Kissinger (24 May 2011). Years of Upheaval. Simon and Schuster. pp. 252–. ISBN 978-1-4516-3647-5.
"She (Golda Meir) would be prepared to have me (Kissinger) continue to explore in private with Hafiz Ismail (the Egyptian delegate) some general principles of an overall settlement" this hint is compatible with Rabin description of Golda readiness for recognizing Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai
- ^ P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. pp. 105–. ISBN 978-1-136-32888-6.
In February 1973, Kissinger held talks with Sadat's National Security Advisor, Hafez Ismail. ... memoirs that Kissinger told him that, on the basis of his conversations with Hafez Ismail, Egypt might be ready to start negotiating if Israel acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over all of Sinai. Rabin consulted with Prime Minister Golda Meir and told Kissinger that Israel authorized him to explore this approach.
- ^ Richard Bordeaux Parker (2001). The October War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida. pp. 64–. ISBN 978-0-8130-1853-9.
Dinits evidence
- ^ Steven L. Spiegel (15 October 1986). The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan. University of Chicago Press. pp. 237–. ISBN 978-0-226-76962-2.
based on Rabin