Before[edit]

kissinger, hafez ismail, rabin, golda; humaraswamy2013p105 ^[1]

On 28 February 1973, during a visit in Washington, Golda agreed with Henry Kissinger's peace proposal based on "security versus sovereignty" : Israel would accept Egyptian sovereignty over all Sinai, while Egypt would accept Israeli presence in some of Sinai strategic positions.; The Rabin Memoirs ^[2]

"It was in France on May 20 1973,... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this “diluted sovereignty,” but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him. (Kissinger) ^[3]

kissinger, ismail. Kissinger2011^[4]

Goals[edit]

"Sadat's goals were the` return of Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal...to reengage the U.S in middle east diplomacy" SullivanJones2008p9^[5]

Sadat and Assad "sought to regain the territories lost in 1967. Neither aimed to destroy Israel, though during the opening hours of the conflict, its leaders could not be sure of it.". Morris2011p396 ^[6]

victory[edit]

(p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory- militarily as well as politically...The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt....(p. 11) Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as "the earthquake" or "the blunder" Siniver2013p6 ^[7]

"the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel-in 1956, 1967, and 1973" Bickerton2012p128 ^[8]

"(p. 184)Yom kipur war...its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory...(p. 185) in October 1973, that despite Israels military victory" Kumaraswamy2013p184 ^[9]

Soviets[edit]

(Nov 4 1973) "Brezhnev: We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn’t have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, “Save me!” He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them." Chernyaev1973p69 ^[10]

notes[edit]

^ P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. pp. 105–. ISBN 978-1-136-32895-4.
^ Yitzhak Rabin (1996). The Rabin Memoirs. University of California Press. p. 215. ISBN 978-0-520-20766-0. security versus sovereignty"...Israel would have to accept Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, while Egypt ,in turn, would have to accept Israeli military presence in certain [Sinai] strategic positions.
^ Henry Kissinger (1 September 2011). Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster. pp. 254–. ISBN 978-0-85720-718-0. It was in France on May 20 1973,... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this "diluted sovereignty," but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him.
^ Henry Kissinger (1 September 2011). Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-85720-718-0.
^ Denis Joseph Sullivan; Kimberly Jones (2008). Global Security Watch--Egypt: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. pp. 9–. ISBN 978-0-275-99482-2. Sadat's goals were the` return of Sinai andd the reopening of the Suez Canal...to reengage the U.S in middle east diplomacy
^ Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 396. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. "Sadat and Assad "sought to regain the territories lost in 1967. Neither aimed to destroy Israel, though during the opening hours of the conflict, its leaders could not be sure of it.".
^ Asaf Siniver (2013). The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford University Press. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-19-933481-0. (p. 6) For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory- militarily as well as politically...The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt....(p 11) Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as "the earthquake" or "the blunder"
^ Ian Bickerton (2 February 2012). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed. A&C Black. p. 128. ISBN 978-1-4411-2872-0. the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel-in 1956, 1967, and 1973
^ P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. p. 184. ISBN 978-1-136-32888-6. (p. 184)Yom kipur war...its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory...(p. 185) in October 1973, that despite Israels military victory
^ Anatoly Chernyaev. "Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973" (PDF). National Security Archive. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430. p. 69. (Nov 4 1973) "Brezhnev: We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them." {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)

[Kumaraswamy2013p105-1] P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. pp. 105–. ISBN 978-1-136-32895-4.

[Rabin1996p215-2] Yitzhak Rabin (1996). The Rabin Memoirs. University of California Press. p. 215. ISBN 978-0-520-20766-0. security versus sovereignty"...Israel would have to accept Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, while Egypt ,in turn, would have to accept Israeli military presence in certain [Sinai] strategic positions.

[Kissinger2011p254-3] Henry Kissinger (1 September 2011). Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster. pp. 254–. ISBN 978-0-85720-718-0. It was in France on May 20 1973,... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this "diluted sovereignty," but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him.

[Kissinger2011-4] Henry Kissinger (1 September 2011). Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-85720-718-0.

[SullivanJones2008p9-5] Denis Joseph Sullivan; Kimberly Jones (2008). Global Security Watch--Egypt: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. pp. 9–. ISBN 978-0-275-99482-2. Sadat's goals were the` return of Sinai andd the reopening of the Suez Canal...to reengage the U.S in middle east diplomacy

[Morris2011p396-6] Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 396. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. "Sadat and Assad "sought to regain the territories lost in 1967. Neither aimed to destroy Israel, though during the opening hours of the conflict, its leaders could not be sure of it.".

[Siniver2013p6-7] Asaf Siniver (2013). The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford University Press. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-19-933481-0. (p. 6) For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory- militarily as well as politically...The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt....(p 11) Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as "the earthquake" or "the blunder"

[Bickerton2012p128-8] Ian Bickerton (2 February 2012). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed. A&C Black. p. 128. ISBN 978-1-4411-2872-0. the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel-in 1956, 1967, and 1973

[Kumaraswamy2013p184-9] P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. p. 184. ISBN 978-1-136-32888-6. (p. 184)Yom kipur war...its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory...(p. 185) in October 1973, that despite Israels military victory

[Chernyaev1973p69-10] Anatoly Chernyaev. "Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973" (PDF). National Security Archive. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430. p. 69. (Nov 4 1973) "Brezhnev: We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them." {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)

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