User:Ykantor/Sandbox/Palestine1948- April,May Truce proposals

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 43, adopted on April 1, 1948. It called on both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to immediately cease all acts of violence, and to arrange for a truce.

  - United Nations Security Council Resolution 44 at 1 Apr 1948 requested the Secretary-General convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine. The Arabs demanded immediate independence and sovereignty over all of Palestine, not a prolongation of international rule, as embodied in an open-ended trusteeship. the Zionists insisted on declaring statehood on the termination of the Mandate, according to the November 1947 partition resolution.

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 46, adopted on April 17, 1948. It called on both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to immediately cease all acts of violence, to stop outside combatants from entering the territory, stop importing weapons. It called both sides and the neighboring countries to cooperate in any way they could, particularly enforcing the movement of fighters or arms into the territory. The AHC representative Jamal al-Husayni rejected the decision. The Yishuv accepted the military terms of the Resolution, but rejected its political terms. Nneither side respected the truce.

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 48, adopted on April 23, 1948, called on all concerned parties to comply with Resolution 46, and to establish a Truce Commission for Palestine. The United Nations tried to negotiate a truce throughout Palestine or at least in the holy city, but to no avail, despite official Jewish and Arab agreement to many of the proposed clauses.

• On 16 April the General Assembly convened in special session. There, during the next four weeks, the trusteeship proposal as well as separate proposals for a a general truce or in Jerusalem were debated On 4 May 1948 the general assembly voted for truce. The Arabs accepted only if the The Yishuv would give up the Partition. The Yishuv accepted conditionally

  -The Assembly adopted resolution 185 (S-2) of 26 April 1948, asking the Trusteeship Council to study measures for the protection of Jerusalem, .

  -United Nations General Assembly Resolution 187, 6 May 1948 - PROTECTION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND ITS INHABITANTS: APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER. United Nations representatives tried to negotiate a truce throughout Palestine or at least in Jerusalem, but did not succeeded, despite Jewish and Arab agreement to many of the proposed clauses. The truce proposals included a cessation of fighting, prohibition of entry of foreign troops into Palestine, and a limitation of Jewish immigration.

  - General Assembly Resolution 186 on May 14, 1948 called for an appointment a Mediator in order to secure a ceasefire in Palestine;

• The Americans drafted truce proposals, which included a military and political standstill that required the Jews to curb immigration severely, and to defer establishing of a Jewish state. Israel consistently rejected the linkage and the deferment of statehood.

From the last week of April… The consensus in the US government departments was that the Arab states would attack the Jewish state and persist in a guerrilla war for as long as it took…” Without “diplomatic and military support” from at least one Great Power, the Jewish state would go under within “two years,” they believed. Their advice against American intervention in support of a Jewish state was unequivocal (5 may 1948) (Morris 2008 p. 174)

Ben-Gurion consistently opposed any postponement. He bluntly vetoed several provisions in the truce proposals (such as the limitation on Aliya) (Morris 2008 p. 174)

By late April, the U.S. State department, concerned to avoid a foreseeable conflagration after the British withdrawal, proposed a truce, managing to get the Arab states, that wished to avoid war, to accept . This is based on Shlaim, quoting General Marshall. It does not show other State Department considerations. e.g. Marshall may have had in mind the CIA report of August 1947, which predicted that if war broke out between a newborn Jewish state and the Arab states, the Arabs would win. The prognosis had been “coordinated” with the intelligence arms of the departments of State, the army and navy, and the US Air Force. At most, the Jews could hold out for “two years,” the report concluded. (The report added that the eruption of such a war would unleash a wave of anti-Zionist, and perhaps anti-Western, jihadist “religious fanaticism.”)(Morris 2008 p. 175)

the CIA report of August 1947, which predicted that if war broke out between a newborn Jewish state and the Arab states, the Arabs would win. The prognosis had been “coordinated” with the intelligence arms of the departments of State, the army and navy, and the US Air Force. At most, the Jews could hold out for “two years,” the report concluded (Morris 2008 p. 175)

On 12 May, the situation appeared far from rosy.... Yadin concluded cautiously that “at this minute, I would say that the chances are very even .... But to be more candid, I would say that they have a big advantage, if all this force is deployed against us.” Ben-Gurion was more optimistic: “We can withstand [an invasion] and defeat it, [but] not without serious losses and shocks.” (Morris 2008 p. 175)

April,May 1948: Truce proposals

How Israel was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, By Baylis Thomas. A list of Baylis lies and misleading text:

• Baylis: (Ben Gurion) "he was confident by April 1948 of having both U.S. support … in the event of any international war. P. 68

  -notes: Misleading. President Trumann helped Israel a lot, but the state Dpt was against Israel. The U.S banned arms supply to the Mid east, as early as Dec 1947, which hurt the Haganah, but not the Arabs Armies whose arms was supplied by the U.K and France.

• Baylis: he was confident by April 1948 of having both … and Jewish military superiority in the event of any international war. P. 68 (41)

  -notes: A lie. Ben Gurion was not confident. His military advisers told him that the winning chance was 50:50. He himself said that if Israel will succeed to hold on for the first 3-4 weeks, then there will be a good chance of survival . "the proposals— against the backdrop of intense fighting in Palestine and Arab threats to invade— triggered a painful debate in the Zionist leadership about whether to postpone statehood" Morris 2008 p. 174  ; "the Yishuv genuinely perceived the invasion as a threat to its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arab armies’ true lack of military efficiency, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally and prepared for the worst. … in the first month after the invasion the Arab armies enjoyed a considerable superiority in the air, artillery and light armor" Gelber

• Baylis: UN military experts shared his appraisal. P. 68 (41)

  -notes: A lie. The U.S thought otherwise. "Without “diplomatic and military support” from at least one Great Power, the Jewish state would go under within “two years,” they believed. Their advice against American intervention in support of a Jewish state was unequivocal . Morris 2008 p. 174 .  ; Marshall may have had in mind the CIA report of August 1947, which predicted that if war broke out between a newborn Jewish state and the Arab states, the Arabs would win. The prognosis had been “coordinated” with the intelligence arms of the departments of State, the army and navy, and the US Air Force. Morris 2008 p. 175

• Baylis: the Arab countries] still preferred a solution which would make it unnecessary for them to be drawn into war. They wished to avoid an armed conflict and thereby deny Abdullah the opportunity to pursue his expansionist aims p. 68. the Arab nations sought to avoid war in Palestine p. 69

  -notes: Misleading. He omits the unacceptable conditions e.g. no arms supply " The truce proposals included a cessation of fighting, prohibition of entry of foreign troops into Palestine, and a limitation of Jewish immigration …… During the period of the truce, no steps shall be taken by Arab or Jewish authorities to proclaim a sovereign state in a part or all of Palestine.”335 Israel consistently rejected the linkage and the deferment of statehood. Morris 2008 P. 174

• Baylis: when the UN Security Council voted for a truce in the civil conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews on April 17, 1948 (one month before the end of the British mandate), Egypt voted in favor and Syria was prepared to agree p. 68

  -notes: Misleading. Egypt could not vote, since it was not a member. Syria agreed conditionally. The AHC rejected it. "Jamal al-Husayni rejected the decision...Shertok accepted the military terms of the Resolution, but rejected its political term… neither side respected the truce

• Baylis: they [the Arab countries] still preferred a solution which would make it unnecessary for them to be drawn into war. They wished to avoid an armed conflict and thereby deny Abdullah the opportunity to pursue his expansionist aims p. 68 CONTRADICTS:  ; The Arabs …. Might even accept de facto partition through acquiescence to march of Abdullah’s troops to Jewish-Arab frontier p. 69

  -notes: Contradicts itself

• Baylis: The State Department persuaded the Arab nations to accept, off the record, a Jewish immigration of 48,000 per year, a prior sticking point and condition demanded by Ben-Gurion….. By now accepting these conditions that Ben-Gurion had previously insisted on, the Arab nations sought to avoid war in Palestine. But the Jews turned down the U.S. proposal p. 69

  -notes: A lie. Ben Gurion have not accepted the 48000 limit. "But Ben-Gurion …. He bluntly vetoed several provisions in the truce proposals (such as the limitation on aliya)". Morris 2008 P. 174

• Baylis: The United States also considered pledging assistance to the Jews if, after the truce, the Arabs were to invade p. 69

  -notes: A lie?????. " the Americans were unwilling to commit troops to enforce a truce." Morris 2008 P. 173

• Baylis: But the Jews turned down the U.S. proposal,. P. 69

  -notes: Misleading. Both Yishuv and Arabs states, accepted parts of the proposal, but not the full one. "United Nations … UN Security Council resolution of 24 April 1948) working in Jerusalem tried to negotiate a truce throughout Palestine or at least in the holy city, but to no avail, despite official Jewish and Arab agreement to many of the proposed clauses. Morris 2008 P. 174

On 4 May 1948 the general assembly voted for truce. The Arabs accepted only if the The Yishuv would give up the Partition. The Yishuv accepted conditionally

see Truce calls during April 1948.

• Baylis: But the Jews turned down the U.S. proposal, knowing that the local Palestinians and Syrian irregulars were demoralized. P. 69

  -notes: Misleading. The expected enemies were the Arab states armies and not the Palestinians

• Baylis: But the Jews turned down the U.S. proposal, knowing that …. Weapons from Czechoslovakia and France were coming in past the British troops who were now concerned only with leaving Palestine without casualties. p. 69

  -notes: A lie. The British navy strictly enforced the Arms embargo to the last Mandate day. As an exception, 2 arms ships managed to infiltrate to Tel Aviv port during April.  ; " Since April 1948, small deliveries arrived by air and sea from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere and the large influx began after the end of the British mandate." Gelber  ; During the same period, Arab armed forces freely moved across the borders from / to the neighboring Arab states, and the U.K continued to supply the Arabs states armies with weapons and ammunition, until couple of days before the invasion.

• Baylis: The Jews stood firm since a truce would have forced them to accept the UN- drawn boundaries for a Jewish state. P. 70

  -notes: A lie. At that point, the Jews were worried and generally accepted the UN- drawn boundaries for a Jewish state. Later, " By July 1948, Israeli restraint from crossing the UN partition line faded " Gelber

• Baylis: Jewish public sentiment in Palestine was also against a truce, even though it would have prevented an expected outside Arab invasion. The Jews clearly dominated the fighting and were excited about their defeat of local Palestinian and volunteer fighting groups. Spectacular victories in Galilee, the surrender of Arabs in Jaffa and the flight of Arabs from Haifa, all created an atmosphere of enthusiasm and confidence along with much anti-Arab ultranationalistic propaganda. P. 70

  -notes: A lie. the expected Arab Invasion caused the Yishuv to worry. "the Yishuv genuinely perceived the invasion as a threat to its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arab armies’ true lack of military efficiency, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally and prepared for the worst. … in the first month after the invasion the Arab armies enjoyed a considerable superiority in the air, artillery and light armor" Gelber

• notes: Baylis refer to the truce as the main issue, which is misleading. The proposed deferment of a Jewish declaration of statehood, was the main issue for the state dpt. And for the Yishuv.  ; "From the last week of April, the State Department focused on obtaining a deferment of a Jewish declaration of statehood, arguing that the declaration would precipitate an invasion". Morris 2008 p. 174
• Baylis: The United States also considered pledging assistance to the Jews if, after the truce, the Arabs were to invade p. 69
  -notes: A lie. " the Americans were unwilling to commit troops to enforce a truce." Morris 2008 P. 173