User talk:Werchovsky/Archive 1

Causes of WW1

thanks for your work on the article - if you have time don't forget to include inline citations to show us which book/books you are using, the article is in general much lacking in these at the moment, kind regards, sbandrews (t) 22:19, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

Ping! --ROGER DAVIES ^TALK 21:11, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

Assassination of Franz-Ferdinand

Could you take a look at the article "Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand" and determine if it falls into the military history category? The basis for including the "Causes of World War I" as military history may also apply to it. I think you will find this article much better footnoted. Werchovsky 19:12, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

Done. Not quite B-class. --ROGER DAVIES ^talk 19:53, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

I'm going to make some style changes now to this article. Please avoid editing it until I remove the {{inuse}} temp[late. This will take an hour or so. Thanks, --ROGER DAVIES ^talk 08:07, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

I did not see your "in use" notice until I had saved.Werchovsky (talk) 08:32, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

No problems. I'll carry on. --ROGER DAVIES ^talk 08:34, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

I have been trying to keep out links like the newly added "February 3" or "October 12" links which link to pages that shed absoluately no light on the assassination. Is there any reason I should not keep removing them when they pop up? Werchovsky (talk) 08:42, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

Yes, you must leave them in. They make the date appear correctly for people who have Day/Month instead of Month/Day set in "My Preferences". All day/month dates need to be wikilinked like that.--ROGER DAVIES ^talk 09:36, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

Assassination of Franz-Ferdinand Edit

Hello, you asked me why I changed "train" by "motion" in the article about The Assassination of Franz-Ferdinand. In my opinion, "set in motion" is the correct way to mean in english "getting something started" or "giving an impulse to something". In fact, it is almost a "fixed expression", while "set in train" does not convey the idea that the assassination was the begining of something(although, many historians now believe, as tragic as it was, that is was more a pretext than a cause to WW I, but that is beside the point) [Note I will also post this answer on my own page] Boris Crépeau (talk) 07:30, 7 January 2008 (UTC)

"Set in train" is an ocasional British usage for this concept, but it seems to me to be largely out of favor these days. I agree that "set in motion" is the more appropriate usage now.Loren.wilton (talk) 03:39, 10 February 2008 (UTC)

Since I have often heard the expression "Set in train" in my hometown here in America, I think this is not strictly British usage. Since the article has largely a high school or college level audience I did not want to dumb down the language to middleschool, but so be it.Werchovsky (talk) 01:45, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

Causes of WW1

I have read your message to me, and I will read your "moribund" comments. By the way, you edited my comments on the Kaiser's hurried return from his cruise of the North Sea, and you stated that this was caused by the gathering of the British fleet at Scapa Flow. Was this the reason? I thought it was due to the presentation of the Austrian Ultimatum. User:Italus 15 Nov. 2007 —Preceding comment was added at 05:03, 16 November 2007 (UTC)

Transferring Images

Werchovsky, I would appreciate it if you could tell me how images from other wikipedias can be saved on the English version? Italus 02:59, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

I am new at this too. I went to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Upload and filled out the form and it worked fine. I have only uploaded one image. I don't know how to move from one wikipedia to another, but I expect you could save the image on your computer and then upload it onto the english Wikipedia. If that does not sound good then you better ask someone more experienced.Werchovsky 03:17, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

WW1 French Fortressess

You are correct, they would have been asked to surrender them 'as an act of good faith' so to speak, but as they rejected to pledge neutrality, it was not put to them. I had misread the source. In 'The Struggle for Mastery of Europe' (p524) Taylor does correctly state that the 'demand' would have been a subsequent one. Given the small scope of the article where I made those edits, there's not much point re-adding that information in its correct form.

In an expanded section on the diplomacy, ultimatums and declarations of war in July and August 1914 I think that the Germans designs on Toul and Verdun would offer a more complete view of the choice France had to make in accepting Germany's offer of neutrality, that is the acquiescence to German supremacy in Europe and her abdication as a Great Power, by threats of German aggression. Whilst not quite naked aggression, the German offer of neutrality was not a benevolent or real choice for a France that wished to preserve her status.

Sonnybillyboys (talk) 05:47, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

what was wrong with this?

[1] I remember when this bit was put in, the wording is not great but its an important explanation of how the serbians were given no choice is it not? Which bit is questionable? sbandrews (t) 14:35, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

As I mentioned in the edit title, it was out of sequence. That is to say, the paragraph below it took place about two weeks after the material inserted on the Austrian note of demands. The next problem is that subsequent paragraphs covered the same ground but without the same pro-Serb tilt. Finally, Serbia accepted point #10, now almost meaningless, but in regard to the other enumerated demands and demands in the preamble there were deficiencies in the Serbia response as covered in the Wikipedia article on the July Ultimatum, so it is a commone inaccuracy to say that Serbia acquiesced to all but two of the demands.Werchovsky (talk) 18:11, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

anon

That seems a little unfair. The anon is a POV pusher who has no idea what he's talking about and doesn't listen to anything anyone says, but I don't think particularly it's our place to judge that he's mentally ill and needs professional help. I am getting rather sick of arguing with him, though, as he doesn't seem to listen to anything I say. This latest stuff about Belgium is particularly annoying. My personal preference would be to let him figure out if he needs professional help by himself, but to get him barred from editing wikipedia articles on WWI. john k (talk) 01:32, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Lovette is driving me insane. Talk page discussion is not going to get anywhere as long as he's ranting for pages on end about international law. What is to be done, do you think? john k (talk) 23:11, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

Well, I do have to thank Mr. Warchovsky for his endless patience. Someone prior alluded to John K's "profanity". Fortunately I have not yet driven him to that extreme yet. I have presented my "international law question" to Wikepedia's article "public international law". AKA "law among nations". But still no response on the discussion page. I'll let you know what they say, if they respond at all. It is not exactly a "timely" question for them to addresse. John Kenney is absolutely wrong about me being a POV pusher. I am absolutely nuetral. I explained my background from the beginning. I merely wanted to find the truth. John K can get somewhat personal with his comments (hope I have not).EdwardLovette (talk) 05:23, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Werchovsky, I was curious, you are not by chance related to Russian Minister of War, Werchovsky, are you?EdwardLovette (talk) 07:20, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

Hello, Mr. Werchovsky. I have been reading your comments on my talkpage. Some areas of concern that "jump out" to me are your comments about Belgium. "there would be no way to properly blockade Germany if Belgium remained neutral". And yet Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden somehow managed to remain neutral. They managed to survive the "inconveniences" of the British blockade. Clearly Belgium likewise, could and would have also remained completely neutral as she had done in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The British navy had a complex formula regarding how much food to allow into each neutral country. And this formula was completely legal by the laws of war in effect at the time. In other words, it was completely fair play for Britain to take advantage of the fact that her navy was far superior to the German navy and use it to her advantage. Just as it was fair play for Germany to use to her advantage the fact that she had the most powerful land force on the continent.

Regarding your other Belgium related allegations, which of these allegations actually "violated" the terms of the 1839 Belgian Neutrality Treaty". Have you read that treaty?

Your second point about the Serbian March 1909 commitment. Any good attorney will tell you that any contract signed under "duress" is null and void.

Your Third point about the French arsonist. If you go into a store and shoplift, the store will "wait" until you have left their property. They do not act "prematurely".

Wikepedia "laws of war" legal experts are going to review your claims in further detail. I will post their responses on the "origins of world war one" discussion for all to see.EdwardLovette (talk) 09:34, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Werchovsky, I will keep our discussion on Internation Law off of the "orgins of World war one" discussions pages so as not to "clutter" up the page if you so desire.

I did a search on the archive.org page under "Hague" and found quite a gold mine. Here is a list of books I plan on reading shortly as time permits;

1. The first Hague convention (1912)

2. The Hague Rules (1921)

3. Arbitration and the Hague Court (1904)

4. The International Union of the Hague Conference (1918), vol one and two.

5. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907, Vol one and two.

6. The two hague conferences and their contributions to international law.(1908)

7. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference; Tranlations of the official texts(1920)

8. The Hague Peace Conferences and other International conferences concerning the laws and usages of war: texts of conventions with commentaries (1909)

I did an Amazon.com search. There was not that much available on this subject. A lot of the times, the books at Amazon.com are just the same books as available at Archive.org except they are not free. So, you see Mr. Werchovsky often, if you really want to learn something in detail you have to go back to primary sources available at the time because there are scant modern alternatives, which may be a by-product of book publishing economics and marketing. In other words, in 1920 people were interested in the Hague Conferences, whereas in 2008 very few people are still interested in the Hague Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907. So John K and Loje are possibly limiting themselves pooh poohing these old books.

I do know that the Russian Czar is the leader that proposed these conferences. I also know that most or all of the attendees to these two conferences (including the U.S.A.) were supportive of both A. Disarmament and B. Use of Mediation/Arbitration to resolve disputes. There was one country opposed to disarmament and mediation/arbitration, Germany.

Germany opposed mediation/arbitration agreements because it viewed it as a "time buying measure" for any future opponents. In some ways I can understand Germany's thinking on this item. Germany opposed disarmament measures because?EdwardLovette (talk) 02:27, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Rather than pooh pooh your sources I have decided to spend a half hour making a minimal effort to find SECONDARY sources in English that might be worth reading (not everything with an unexpired copyright is junk). Enjoy.

The United States and the first Hague Peace Conference. Ithaca, N.Y., Published for the American Historical Association [by] Cornell University Press [1962]

The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference : American diplomacy and international organization, 1899-1914 / Calvin DeArmond Davis. Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1975, c1976.

Arbitration or war? Contemporary reactions to the Hague Peace Conference of 1899. With a new introd. for the Garland ed., by Sandi E. Cooper. : New York, Garland, 1972.

International adjudications : ancient and modern history and documents together with mediatorial reports, advisory opinions, and the decisions of domestic commissions, on international claims : modern series / edited by John Bassett Moore. Buffalo, N.Y. : W.S. Hein, 1996.

Documents relating to the program of the First Hague Peace Conference : laid before the conference by the Netherland government translation. Buffalo, N.Y. : W.S. Hein, 2000.

The United States and the Origins of the World Court David S. Patterson Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 2. (Summer, 1976), pp. 279-295.

Symposium: The Hague Peace Conferences War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference David D. Caron The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 4-30.

Symposium: The Hague Peace Conferences The Laws of War on Land George H. Aldrich The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 42-63.

--Loje (talk) 03:43, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Werchovsky I did a preliminary search based on Mr.Loje's list of 8 books. Here are my results;

1. Available used at Amazon.com for $45.00. Not at my local library. Not at archives.org.

2. 1976 copy at amazon.com for $40.00. Not at my local library. not at archives.org

3. Not at Amazon.com . Not at archive.org

4. 1906 series available at Amazon.com for $15.00

5. at amazon.com used for $18.00. not at archive.org or at my local library.

6. not at amazon.com. Not at archive.org and not at my local library.

7. not at amazon.com not at archive.org. Not at my local library

8. Not at amazon.com Not at archive.org. Not at my local library.

This list of books submitted by Mr. Loje are either not readily available or (heaveen forbid!!) are not that recent. All in all it is a very "obscure" list of books. Whereas the list of books I submitted are readily available and FREE!! Kindly submit your sources as to where to buy these books and I will "enjoy" them.EdwardLovette (talk) 04:48, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry that you only find it convenient to visit a local library without many books, but that isn't the same as their being non-existent or impossible to find. And for the record, the three articles were from JSTOR. --Loje (talk) 16:21, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Hello Mr. Werchovsky,

thanks for the comments on 'Bright-line'. I have never heard that term before. But I can learn much from you!.

Not to beat a dead horse, but I find this WW1 stuff really fascinating and I sincerely want to know. I will definately read eAlbertini. Archive.org does not have it and Amazon.com only has Volume2 or volume 3. I think that book comes in at 2000 pages? But since you have such a high opinion of it and I do have to really thank you for taking the time to read Beck's 'Evidence in the Case'.

I would like to explore this whole 'British evasiveness' with you. I have read a lot of books on this WW1 topic. I think it was Haldane, Asquith or it might have been Sir Grey's speech to parliament, where they explained the evasiveness. They were apparently afraid that if they openly supported France and Russia, that then France and Russia would be unnecessarily 'emboldened' in their demands. If they openly supported Germany, then Germany and Austria would likewise be unnecessarily 'emboldened' in their demands. On the surface this makes sense to me. It also kind of reminds me of the U.S. government's notorious avoidance of foreign committments. With all various dynasties and rivalries in Europe, the U.S. government never wanted to really get involved in Europe. And some people suggested at the time that the U.S. was a signatory to the Hague Convention which I believe declared treaties to be 'inviolable', and that perhaps the U.S. should have declared war on Germany upon it invading Belgium.75.84.227.196 (talk) 01:40, 14 August 2008 (UTC)EdwardLovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 01:40, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

I am reading 'violation of the Neutrality of Belgium' by Hymans. Sometime back in the talk pages, I believe you made a comment that all or most of the Belgian fortresses faced Germany. Well on page 15 of this book from 1915, he is talking about a British military attache named Colonel Barnardiston who toured Belgium in 1906 and visited Belgian General Ducarne . Quoting from page 15 it says 'He still pressed the question wether we were ready to resist a German invasion. The General replied that WE WERE READY TO DEFEND LIEGE AGAINST GERMANY, NAMUR AGAINST FRANCE, AND ANTWERP AGAINST ENGLAND.' So Mr. W it would appear to me that the fortresses were not all along the German border and that they were prepared to resist ANY invader, as the Neutrality Treaty required. My preliminary research is indicating that the signatories did in fact have an obligation to not only refrain from invading Belgium but ALSO to defend Belgium against any and all invaders. My next book to read is 'England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxembourg' (1915) by C.P. Sanger(barrister) and Norton(historian). This book looks like a gold mine of information. So if that be the case, England merely followed her obligations under the treaty. And technically so did France. Here's a bizarre scenario for you Mr. W. As a signatory to the Belgian Neutrality Treaty, Austria had a duty to declare war on Germany!! There I go again, talking like an attorney. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.84.227.196 (talk) 20:22, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Lovette, you have made so many terrible errors blindly accepting anything you read that fits with your pre-conceived notion of the extreme war guilt of Germany and the clean hands of the so-called "Entente". Here you have made two more small errors 1) I am not the one who wrote all the Belgian fortresses were facing the Germans and 2) by not consulting a book of maps or the map in the Avalon Hill game I recommended to you "1914". Liege and Namur are bottlenecks for the German advance into the flat plains of Belgium, Brussels and Northern France. They are part of a natural defensive line behind the River Meuse. More importantly, they are rail hubs, which, Germany would have to capture to supply its advance into France and Brussels. Namur would not impede the French; if the Belgians resisted the French, the door to Brussels was wide open. I don't know much about the purpose of the Antwerp fortifications. In the context of WWI they seem almost pointless. By treaty Holland was to close naval passage in time of war. England attacking Belgium and Holland without the support of France is not plausible and if they attacked together with France then the British would likely come from the west (Ostende and Bruges), so I guess the fortifications were just there because Antwerp had been a fortified city for over 100 years (or perhaps Holland was not completely trusted), not because it was the right spot to defend against the British in the 1900s.Werchovsky (talk) 05:17, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

There was a 'string of fortresses' along the Belgian and French border at Menin, Tornai, Mons, Charleroi, and Phillipville but the French insisted that this 'line' be removed as it was a constant reminder of the Peace of Vienna of 1815. So the decision was made that Belgium would have some strategic fortresses but that they would not form a definate barrier against one particular invader(like the Maginot line). So this is why Belgium had no particular line of defense. It did not want to offend any neighbor.75.84.227.196 (talk) 04:45, 19 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 04:45, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Hello Mr.W. One thing I forgot to mention. You questioned the purpose of fortifying Antwerp. The Germans side-stepped Antwerp and headed south having occupied Brussels. However, the Antwerp fortresse drew forces away from the German attack upon the Paris area(because the Belgians attacked the Germans rear) as did the Russian attack upon East Prussia. And this actually greatly hurt the Germans. Read Von Kluge's 'The march on Paris' (1920)75.84.227.196 (talk) 05:21, 19 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 05:21, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

We are in complete agreement with regards to the actual affect of the Antwerp fortifications; they provided a kind of safe haven from which Belgian forces could launch raids and thus tie down several German reserve divisions until Germany brought up its siege artillery. This weakened Germany's right hook into France. (Still, you know, most military planners would look for a way to defend their nation's capitol. If I was in charge, I would put all my forts in concentric rings arround Brussels, not Antwerp and Namur and perhaps not Liege. If one rips up the railroad tracks as one retreats [frankly, I would start ripping them up as soon as I got the German ultimatum] toward Brussels, it will take time to bring up enough siege artillery and most of the Belgian field Army will still be intact. With luck, allies will arrive before Brussels falls.) But with regards to the other fortresses, doesn't dismantling all the forts between France and Brussels while retaining the fortresses defending against the German advance across the Meuse sound like an imbalanced neutrality. Taken together with the secret military preparations discussions the Belgians had with Britain makes clear that Belgium was no Switzerland, though of course, Belgium did not deserve to be invaded for this.Werchovsky (talk) 18:11, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Mr. W. I was looking at the 'Origins of WW1' today. I noticed the line about german demands to 'make port in Belgium' is still there. I was not awaare of this 'alleged demand' but I will investigate it. Why were you not able to get it 'exercised' from the article?75.84.227.196 (talk) 02:51, 23 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 02:51, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Hm. That's weird. It looks like I forgot to fix that one. If you find anything supporting the statement let me know, but it does not really make sense for the Germans to make such a demand as Britain would take offense and Britain had not yet declared itself.Werchovsky (talk) 15:46, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Hi Mr. W. I just got Albertini's volume 3 today. Looks like a good book. I am currently reading 'Who was Responsible for the war?' by Italian Senator Tommaso Tittoni(1918). He was former Italian Foreign Minister and former Italian ambassador to France. Of course this is a book written by an 'Entente' ally but I also read books written at the time by the Central Powers. Regarding Beck's claims about each country's right to mobilize, here is what Tittoni says on page 47, 'We could answer that mobilization ordered by one power, may give the other powers the right to mobilize in their turn, but that war does not necessarily follow; indeed examples are not wanting in which mobilization has not interrupted diplomatic negotiations, and in which the latter have been followed by peaceful solutions.'

On page 48, he says 'It may be that Austria had for a long time considered mobilization a normal precaution. She mobilized her army in 1908 and in 1909 during the whole of the Bosnia-Hercegovina crisis; she mobilized in 1913 during the balkan and Albanian crisis, but the other powers neither lost their "sang-froid" nor looked upon WAR AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF MOBILIZAITON.

This would seem to corroborate Mr. James M. Beck's assertion regarding Russian mobilization.75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:22, 27 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:22, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Bye the way, 'Sang-froid' means 'coolness of mind; calmness, composure'75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:50, 27 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:50, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

" but the other powers neither lost their "sang-froid" nor looked upon WAR AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF MOBILIZAITON. "

An intriguing claim Mr. Lovette, on that subject this might interest you:

"In 1892, the French military asked Alexander III if Mobilize meant war and he responded that this was how he understood it. More strikingly in 1912, the Russian government order for mobilization was considered to be the command to open hostilities, and this was only countermanded in Nov. 1912 to require a separate order. That means that until less than two years before the war the Russian government considered the two equivalent. "

"The Russian Mobilization in 1914", L. C. F. Turner, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Jan., 1968), pp. 66. --Loje (talk) 19:43, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

The quotes Loje has brought up, I, myself, have quoted before (but based on other authors). I went one step further. In late July we do not know what the Russian and French attitude was regarding whether mobilization was a tacit declaration of war. This is because the governments of France and Russia have never released any notes from the Franco-Russian summit of July 1914. Serbia was on the agenda, but what was said remains unpublished except for Paléologue, who in his memoirs speaks of table decorations and lighting in detail, but as for substance only speaks in the greatest generalities regarding his President's firmness and the King of Montnegro and his coded telegram to his daughter Anastasia saying it is really war this time (this is just before the Austro-Hungarian Demarche known as the ultimatum). The text of the Secret Treaty of 1892 certainly make it sound as though once France and Russia complete their mobilizations they would proceed immediately to action. The agreement makes no mention of formally declaring war.

Its not really possible to let Tittoni's memoirs serve as a basis for concluding what international law or practice was. He is an interested party justifying his part in stabbing his allies in the back in return for promises of territorial engrandizement at the expense of Austria-Hungary (and of course, he got much less than he was promised, so he doubly needs to argue he stood on principal). The history of the time doesn't really justify his remarks. Where is the example of two opposing Great Powers executing Full Mobilization and not going to war? It is nonsense that Austria-Hungary was mobilized through-out the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-9. Look at the Wikipedia article on the subject or read Albertini. Austria-Hungary mobilized on the last day of the crisis.Werchovsky (talk) 21:00, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

On the 'Origins of WWI' is a map of the world with most of the world in green for the allies or their supporters and with a distinct minority of the world in gold representing the central powers and their allies. Why is most of the world 'green'? Could it have something to do with world opinion at the time overwhelmingly on the side of the entente? And if this is true, why was world opinion overwhelmingly on the side of the entente, even after all the various white, grey, orange, blue, yellow, and red books had been published? 76.94.18.217 (talk) 23:46, 4 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 23:46, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

you've run out of arguments so you're going to point at a map and say that the size of French, British and Russian empires means they must have been right?--Loje (talk) 01:00, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

Well, as Mr. James M Beck would point out, there is such a thing as a 'Supreme Court of the World'. 76.94.18.217 (talk) 02:54, 5 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 02:54, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

The U.S.A. was certainly not a colony of any entente power, and rather included a rather large proportion of her population with Irish and German populations that were mostly simpathethetic to the Central Powers. The head of 'Goldman SAchs' was simpathetic to Germany and he was Jewish. Yes, the U.S. sold weapons and ammunition to the Entente, but under the Hague convention of 1899 and 1907 this was allowed, and indeed Germany sold weapons and ammunition to both the Boers in 1899 and the Russians in 1907. 76.94.18.217 (talk) 03:31, 5 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 03:31, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

The U.S. is only one country power, and a rather late entry at that. Is that really the basis for your beliefs? that any side on which the U.S. fought cannot possess a share of war guilt?--Loje (talk) 04:53, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

I am sorry Mr. Loje I ever gave you that impression. I've always been rather critical of the American government. It may be that the U.S. government being a democracy with ying and yang and Republicans and Democrats actually took the middle road and circumnavigated foreign affairs in such a way that it did indeed in many cases end up on the right side. The side of right vs. might. Americans are in no way innocent of brutality and arrogance. Look at slavery. A horrible blight on their conscience. Not quite on the scale of the Holocaust, but close.76.94.18.217 (talk) 08:57, 5 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 08:57, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

Oh, Mr. W, regarding Italy 'stabbing her allies in the back' he indicates that Austria betrayed Italy by not keeping Italy fully informed of Austria's intentions as regards the ultimatum to Serbia. He states that Austria was secretive in prior diplomatic endeavors and was not fully communicative with Italy as an ally should be. He clearly felt that Austria had betrayed the tenants of the 'Triple Alliance' and had acted in bad faith.76.94.18.217 (talk) 09:55, 5 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 09:55, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

Italy's behavior prohibited the kind of perfect communication that Tittoni pretends is a necessary condition (without which stabbing your ally in the back is warranted). As I am sure you are aware, Italy leaked what it new about the "Ultimatum" to the Entente. That is why, in St. Petersburg, you have talk of coded telegrams from the King of Montenegro saying "This time, it is war." This is why Russia was so well prepared with its firm response (immediately selling German assets, declaring a state prepratory to war, instructing Serbia how to respond to the "Ultimatum". France was not quite as organized in its response, mostly because Poincare and Viviani was at sea, but clearly Poincare had urged and promised an absolutely firm response to the "Ultimatum" before it was ever delivered. If the Italian wanted to be fully informed he needed to inspire more confidence in Italy as an ally, rather than saying things like he did in 1909 "The Triple Alliance is worth no more than a scrap of paper." To remain neutral in 1914 was understandable, to sit arround and do nothing at all to assist its ally when its ally is attacked by state sponsored terrorism was embarrassing, to demand a piece of Austro-Hungarian land as its price for joining the war on the side of Austria-Hungary was completely mercenary, to attack its ally in 1915 when promised Austro-Hungarian lands by the Entente was criminal.Werchovsky (talk) 18:27, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

Mr. W. I am currently going thru Albertini's volume 1. In Enigma Books version...in the introduction...at the top of page 4. he says 'His more favorable view of Kaiser Wilhelm II's role in the crisis matches that of recent studies, while his castigation of Bethmann and the imperious military German leaders also echo newer findings.

At one time, I would have agreed with that statement. But this is what gives me pause. The fact that Wilhelm II dismissed a powerful and somewhat popular Chancellor such as Bismarck and what really gives me pause is Wilhelm's sometimes patronizing margin notes where he referred to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg as a 'Civilian'. If you read Wilhelm's margin notes in detail he does not come off as some shrinking violet.76.94.18.217 (talk) 05:23, 12 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 05:23, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Albertini's introduction, page 4 near the bottom, Russia...'The decision on July 24 to move to PARTIAL MOBILIZATION, even though there was no such plan and even though Sazonov had no idea of what it might entail, set the pattern. Then, in a step as fateful as the precipitate Habsburg declaration of war on July 28, came Russia's decision of July 30 for GENERAL MOBILIZATION. On the other hand, he also faulted berlin for not understanding that Russian mobilization DID NOT IMMEDIATELELY MEAN WAR, a view that numerous historians ever since have repeated.

James M Beck, is hereby fully vindicated by your own scribe Mr. W.!!!...and so is the British military attache to Russia...who claimed they did indeed have such a thing as 'partial mobilization'. Do you really think that a collosal country the size of the Russian Empire could perform a 'partial mobilization' withouth actually having some sort of plan in which to perform it?. In any case, Mr Loje, is shown to be completely wrong!!. Albertini clearly states that Russian mobilization did not immediately mean war. And apparently 'numerous historians ever since have repeated' that view.76.94.18.217 (talk) 07:14, 12 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 07:14, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Beck says that Russian mobilization does not mean war, Albertini you have quoted as saying that it did not immediatly mean war. I don't think anyone disputes that Germany could have sacrificed its military position in favor of Russia to delay war by a few weeks. Perhaps the Russian foreign minister put it best speaking of Russia's situation:

"....it was necessary to put away any fears that our warlike preparations would bring about war and to continue these preparations carefully, rather than by reason of such fears to be taken unawares by war."

He also notes (during the July crisis) that:

"In Russia, unlike in western European states mobilization is far from being war"

Russia did not complete a partial mobilization, it switched to general mobilization very soon after it was ordered, the position of the Russian generals was that if the partial mobilization were not switched to general mobilization within a certain time frame (I don't recall the exact day specified) it would not be possible to do so (thus leading to military disaster if Germany supported Austria). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Loje (talk • contribs) 23:07, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Mr Lovette: The forward to the edition you are reading of "Origins of the War..." is by Williams, not Albertini. The Kaiser, of course, was full of bluster, in his internal communications. But this was not his external policy. Until August 1914, the German Empire had never known war. Austria-Hungary and Germany are alone amongst the Great Powers during that period in refraining from war. You need to rid yourself of the Entente propagandistic view that the Kaiser and the Germanies were war mongers. On the contrary, Germany and Austria-Hungary were satisfied powers, aiming at maintaining the static status-quo while Germany developed its industry and Austria-Hungary tried to develop its political structure. This is quite different from Russia which wanted to maintain the "dynamic status-quo", i.e., its continued advance into the Balkans and eventually Constantinople, and different than Poincare who saw no reason for his generation living other than taking Alsace-Lorraine from Germany and adding it to France. Poincare and Russia through war hoped to overturn the Treaties of Frankfurt and Berlin and expand their territories.Werchovsky (talk) 19:47, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

The 'Preface' is by WilliamSON, Jr... It is an excellent book. I am only on page 31 and I have learned a lot from it. I have to thank you for bringing it to my attention.

'But this was not his external policy'. Hmm. What about the famous speech to the troops heading off to China during the Boxer Rebellion in which he extolled them to 'give no quarter to the enemy. Behave like Attila the hun...make it so that no Chinaman in a thousand years ever again looks askance at a German'. Is that 'internal communications'? Especially when it is published in all the world's newspapers. What about the famous 'Daily Telegraph' interview of 1908? What about the telegram of support to the boers?

What about his threats to the monarchs of Holland and Belgium? What about his statement that he could have his troops in Paris within 'two weeks'?. What about his warlike statements to Churchill in 1908 during army manuevers? What about German plans relating to the Panama Canal and South America?. German involvement in Mexico at a time when Mexico and the U.S. were having border difficulties? What about the German admiral who tried to interfere with Admiral Dewey in the Phillipines in 1898? What about his provocative appearance at Tangiers?

Regarding Alsace-Lorraine and Bismarck, this is what Albertini has to say on page 7...'Only by coming to understandings with both Austria and Russia could he hope to escape the conseqeunces of his GROSS BLUNDER, the annexation of alsace-lorraine, which by mutilating France filled her with an overpowering thirst for revanche, While Bismarck remained in power, his acts were always inspired by the need to keep France isolated, a need resulting from this BLUNDER.'

Even Beck(a man of Swiss-German background)in a speech in 1895 in Pennsylavania (available at archive.org) hypothesized that the German Empire had spent far more on defending Alsace-Lorraine than they were ever economically worth.76.94.18.217 (talk) 09:21, 17 September 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 09:21, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

Hi. I added some replies to your replies, and made several of the edits in I think the way you had suggested. I would appreciate it if you would look them over and add any additional replies in a couple of the threads that may be needed. Loren.wilton (talk) 01:30, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Hello Mr. Werchovsky,

I am currently reading Prince Von Bulow's memoirs(1932), a fascinating analysis of the world at that time. I was curious if know where I could find a map of the ethnic makeup of the German Empire. Something like the picture you have on the Austro-Hungarian Empire's ethnic makeup on the Origins of WWI article page.75.84.230.67 (talk) 19:53, 26 February 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.230.67 (talk) 19:53, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, I have never run across an ethnic map of Germany circa 1914. Werchovsky (talk) 16:58, 27 February 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Werchovsky, On page 236. of Prince Von Bulow's memoirs, he says "We Germans had given our assent, without reserve or hesitation, to the whole demarche against Serbia, leaving allies free to choose their method. This made them perfectly sure of our support, and they felt in no way bound to consider us. With our blank cheque signed they proceeded to sit down to the gaming table and lose our money with their own. Had we not, after all, from the OUTSET, given them leave to go to any lengths with Serbia---even to war, with ALL ITS CONSEQUENCES?

It truly makes me sad for Germany when I read this stuff. This is a man who knew intimately the Kaiser and the German foreign office. Such a shame. These stupid errors inaugerated 31 years of pure hell for Germany.75.84.230.67 (talk) 08:04, 29 February 2008 (UTC)Edwardlovette75.84.230.67 (talk) 08:04, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

Mr. Werchovsky,

I was recently reading the Origins of World War One Wikepedia article, and I have to thank you very much for some of the edits.75.84.225.75 (talk) 04:11, 26 May 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.225.75 (talk) 04:11, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

Archives I've moved them. —Justin (koavf)❤T☮C☺M☯ 03:00, 7 August 2008 (UTC)