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February 15[edit]

Is there a cardinal voting system where there is no incentive to lie about your preferences?[edit]

For example, for all the systems mentioned in Cardinal voting, if there are just 2 parties you should always give the less preferred party 0, and even if there's 3 it's often worth giving the least 2 preferred parties 0. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 45.80.90.69 (talk) 14:06, 15 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

EDIT: Looks like it's impossible after all: Gibbard's theorem — Preceding unsigned comment added by 45.80.90.69 (talk) 14:23, 15 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Unfortunately, strategic voting may lead to an outcome that is sub-optimal for most voters if they do not correctly estimate both the actual preferences and the strategic voting of other voters. You get the Yogi Berra kind of paradox of "Nobody goes there anymore. It's too crowded." I had expected to see a version of score voting in our article on Cardinal voting in which the voter may assign both positive and negative scores, such that the sum of their absolute values does not exceed a prespecified limit. Is anybody aware of this having been described in reliable sources? --Lambiam 15:13, 15 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Sadly no - though I'm a bit partial to range/score voting as at least strategic voting under the system makes sense, unlike in systems like ranked-choice. Elliot321 (talk | contribs) 19:52, 17 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]