2008 Georgian drone shootdowns

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2008 Georgian drone shootdowns
Part of Prelude to the Russian invasion of Georgia
Elbit Hermes 450, the model of the drones shot down over Abkhazia
Location
Gali and Ochamchire districts (Abkhazia)
ObjectiveNeutralization of Georgia's aerial reconnaissance operations over Abkhazia
DateMarch 18, 2008 (2008-03-18) - May 12, 2008 (2008-05-12)
Executed byAbkhazian Air Force
Russian Air Force
OutcomeShootdown of three to seven Georgian reconnaissance UAVs, end of Georgian drone use over Abkhazia

The 2008 Georgian drone shootdowns refer to a series of military incidents involving Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles brought down over the breakaway republic of Abkhazia between March and May 2008. The skirmishes were part of a larger context of tensions between Georgia and Russia, eventually leading up to the Russo-Georgian War.

Georgia's drone program was developed in 2007 when the Georgian government purchased dozens of unmanned aircraft from the Israeli Elbit Systems, using the drones to fly over Abkhazia and document Russian military movements in the region. In February and March 2008, as Moscow increased its ties with the separatist region, Georgia intensified its drone surveillance program. The first drone shootdown took place allegedly on March 18 over the Gali district.

According to Abkhaz claims, as many as seven Georgian drones were shot down in five different operations between the Gali and Ochamchire districts of Abkhazia. Georgia only admitted to three incidents, including the April 20 shootdown over the village of Gagida. The latter triggered an investigation by the United Nations that revealed the drone was brought down by a Russian military jet.

The UN accused both Georgia and Russia of violating the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement that had put an end to the Abkhazia War, Georgia by using drones over the conflict zone and Russia by shooting them down, although Tbilisi argued its surveillance program was justified to observe Russia's own militarization of the region. On May 30, Georgia announced an end to its drone program, but that failed to bring down tensions in the subsequent months.

Background[edit]

Georgian-Abkhazian conflict[edit]

Map of Abkhazia, including the Kodori Gorge.

Though originating in the late 1980s, the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway region of Abkhazia seemingly devolved following the 2006 Kodori Crisis, when the Georgian central government reestablished its control over the warlord-held Kodori Gorge in northeastern Abkhazia, leading to accusations by separatist Abkhaz forces of a Georgian militarization of the region. Tensions escalated in September 2007 with the Bokhundjara incident, when a clash between Abkhaz troops and Georgian police caused the death of two Russian military advisers working with the separatists.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the staunchly pro-Western President of Georgia in office since the 2003 Rose Revolution, is inaugurated for a second term on January 20, 2008, promising during his inauguration speech the "peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia,"[1] a pledge that comes after a campaign promise to return to Abkhazia Georgian IDPs displaced during the 1993 ethnic cleansing.[2] In response, Russia, which had been providing de facto support to Abkhaz separatists, called on Tbilisi to sign a Treaty of Non-Use of Force with Abkhazia, even though the Saakashvili administration refused to sign any treaty with separatist forces.

On February 26, a breakthrough was announced by President Saakashvili, who claimed having reached a deal with Russia to open a joint checkpoint on the Psou river, at the Abkhaz section of the Georgian-Russian border.[3] However, Russia rapidly denied having reached a deal[4] and tensions increased thereafter. The same day, Abkhazia announced military exercises,[5] while a Georgian journalist was arrested by Abkhaz forces on the ceasefire line, before being tortured in Sokhumi.[6] On February 29, Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Baghapsh announced a partial mobilization of his troops.[7] And on March 6, Russia formally withdrew from a 1996 Abkhazia embargo treaty.[8] At a Georgian National Security Council meeting held in response, Mikheil Saakashvili stated that Georgia would have a "zero tolerance policy" towards the militarization of Abkhazia.[9]

In later analytical documents, the Georgian government would describe the March 6 decision by Russia to be the start of the prelude of the Russia-Georgia War,[10] while both Tbilisi and the Bush Administration in the United States warned at the time that the lifting of sanctions on Abkhazia was an excuse by Russia to deliver military hardware to the region.[11] Russian officials at the time linked the Kremlin's policy towards Abkhazia to a response of Georgia's attempt to join NATO. On March 14, Abkhaz officials announced it would reject any attempted negotiations with the Georgian government as long as its troops remained stationed in the Kodori Gorge.[12] Days later, President Saakashvili travelled to New York to present a new peace plan to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon,[13] before announcing a proposal to create a joint Abkhaz-Georgian police force in the ethnically-Georgian district of Gali in Abkhazia.[14]

Sergei Baghapsh and Vladimir Putin at a press conference (2009).

On April 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order legalizing relations between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia.[15] A day later, Georgian intelligence noted the arrival of 300 Russian soldiers at a military base in Ochamchire, which Western powers called an "escalation".[16] According to Abkhaz reports provided to the European Union's Fact-Finding Mission following the Russia-Georgia War (IIFFMCG), this decision by Putin provided an excuse for Georgian intelligence activities to increase in southern Abkhazia, especially in the Gali and Tkvarcheli regions, where Tbilisi looked for possible troops deployment routes, fording sites across the Enguri river, and preparedness levels. Part of that intelligence activity included drone flights to "methodically collect intelligence data, monitor key strategic facilities, and obtain information pertaining to the deployment of the Abkhaz Armed Forces."[17] Saakashvili later told The New York Times that Russia had secretly expanded military aid to Abkhazia, staging aircraft inside the region and assigning trainers to Abkhaz ground units.[18]

Rising Russo-Georgian tensions[edit]

Tensions between Georgia and the Russian Federation had existed ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pro-Western orientation of the Saakashvili administration following the Rose Revolution heightened those tensions, while Tbilisi and Moscow navigated through several diplomatic crises, most notably the 2006 espionage scandal. In 2007, Russia was accused by Tbilisi of two airborne attacks on Georgian positions in Abkhazia, leading to Georgia calling for an internationalization of the Russian peacekeeping force in the conflict zone.[18]

The issue of Kosovo's independence contributed to a worsening of ties, with the Kremlin declaring in early 2008 that the recognition of Kosovo by Western powers would "set an international precedent", hinting at Russia's own relations with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[19] On the eve of Kosovo's declaration of independence, President Saakashvili called on Russian President Vladimir Putin "not to play with fire".[20] Despite a war of words, a summit of Saakashvili and Putin was held in Moscow on February 21 and tentative deals were announced to lower tensions.[21] A potential détente was however prevented by Russia's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the CIS embargo on Abkhazia on March 6, as well as Georgia's commitment to seek NATO membership at the April Bucharest Summit. On May 3, Saakashvili used the term "occupation" for the first time to describe Russia's military presence in Abkhazia.[22]

Georgian drone program[edit]

An Elbit Hermes 450, operated by the US Customs and Border Protection.

Georgia incorporated the use of unmanned aerial vehicles within its internal security apparatus since at least 2007, when the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a contract with the Israeli military manufacturer Elbit Systems[23] (although Abkhaz authorities alleged the manufacturing of the drones started in 2006[24]). Though the details of the contract were never confirmed, reports from the shot drones revealed them to be Elbit Hermes 450 models. The deployment of the UAVs by Georgia's Defense and Interior Ministries dates back to August 2007, though they were first mentioned in October during a press conference by Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Baghapsh, who threatened to shoot down any drone flying over the region. In November, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili confirmed Georgia's acquisition of Israeli-made drones during an interview with The Jamestown Foundation, although President Saakashvili refused to comment on his minister's comments.[25] The Georgian Ministry of Defense first confirmed its possession of drones when denying the March 18 shoot-down.[26]

On April 22, two days after a Georgian drone was shot down by a Russian military jet, Mikheil Saakashvili discussed the extent of Georgia's drone program in an interview with The New York Times, confirming the purchase of 40 Israeli-made UAVs.[18] Reports by Sokhumi claimed those drones carried optical infrared and laser sensors, and data transfer systems capable of transmitting images in real time to command and control centers on the ground, were designed to carry out surveillance, patrolling, reconnaissance, and fire adjustment missions, and were capable of detecting any movement from a distance of 25 km, reading registration plates, transmitting photographs of passengers, and identifying weapons.[27] Abkhazian authorities noted at least 16 cases of UAV flights over the region between August 2007 and March 2008.

Georgian reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia reportedly increased following Russia's withdrawal from the CIS embargo treaty and its subsequent opening of diplomatic ties with the separatist republics in March 2008. Georgian military experts believed that the key task of the Georgian drones was to confirm the deployment of Buk missile systems in Abkhazia,[28] while Tbilisi stated its use of drones was to engage in reconnaissance of Russian and Abkhaz military movements.[29] Georgian Interior Ministry spokesperson Shota Utiashvili confirmed in May that the drones were "conducting reconnaissance of the Abkhaz territory to identify where the Russian and Abkhaz armed forces and military hardware are concentrated." Drone footage released on May 12 by the MIA showed what Tbilisi claimed to be movement and deployment of Russian troops and military equipment within the region. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) reported several drone flights over the Kodori Gorge, but could not confirm if those UAVs were of Russian or Georgian origin.[30] Sokhumi continuously condemned drone flights over Abkhazia, claiming they were used to draw up maps for a potential Georgian attack scenario. A UNOMIG investigation found the Georgian drone flights to be in violation of the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement that banned military hardware, including for reconnaissance purposes, from the region. Even though the same investigation confirmed that illegal Russian military aid to Abkhaz separatists,[31] Georgia suspended its drone flights over Abkhazia on May 30.[32]

Several reports of Georgian drone flights over Abkhazia were made by separatist authorities in 2009, although Tbilisi vehemently denied them and independent reports could not confirm those allegations.[33]

Georgian-made SWAN III drone.

Journalist Nicholas Clayton later called the Russia-Georgia war "the world's first two-sided drone war", with Georgia's UAV capabilities surpassing Russia's outdated, Soviet-era fleet, with its Elbit Hermes 450 fleet inspired by the US-made General Atomics MQ-1 Predator.[34] Georgia's advantage ended in 2009 when Israel started manufacturing drones for Russia.[34]

Emails by the intelligence corporation Stratfor leaked by WikiLeaks revealed that Georgia believed Israel had provided Moscow with the data link codes for its drone fleet, allowing Russia to hack them and force crash them in exchange for Russian intelligence on the Tor-M1 missile systems it had sold Iran. Shortly before the Russia-Georgia War, Russia hinted it would sell advanced weapons to Iran if Israel did not stop its military cooperation with Georgia, which it would later do days before the war.[34] Elbit Systems would later sue the Georgian government for its refusal to pay for previously-purchased hardware, and Georgia was made to settle for 35 million dollars.[34] By 2012, Georgia started manufacturing its own line of drones with the assistance of Estonian military development company ELI.[34] The SWAN III, developed jointly by ELI and the Georgian-based STC Delta, became operational in 2012 and Saakashvili admitted for the first time the reasons why his government ended military cooperation with Israel during a speech in 2013. After the defeat of Saakashvili's party in the 2012 parliamentary elections, the new Georgian government led by Bidzina Ivanishvili restored commercial ties with Elbit Systems.

Incidents[edit]

Full timeline[edit]

  • 6 March: Russia withdraws from the 1996 CIS Treaty on Abkhazia Sanctions, triggering condemnations by Georgia and concerns about illegal military trade between Moscow and Sokhumi.
Mikheil Saakashvili walking with top US and Georgian military leaderships.
  • 14 March: Abkhazian separatist authorities reject any conflict resolution negotiation with Tbilisi and demands the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge.
  • 18 March: Abkhazian separatists claim shooting down a Georgian UAV over the village of Primorskoe, near the Georgian-populated region of Gali. Tbilisi denies the drone's shootdown but confirms its reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia. Moscow condemns what it calls a violation of the 1994 Ceasefire Agreement.
  • 20 March: The People's Assembly of Abkhazia issues a statement condemning "systematic flights of Georgian aircraft over Abkhaz airspace for reconnaissance purposes" as proof that Tbilisi is "taking a course towards preparation for another military invasion of the Republic of Abkhazia."
  • 21 March: The State Duma passes a resolution calling on the Kremlin "to consider the expediency of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia" and to review the feasibility of increasing the Russian peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.[35]
  • 26 March: PACE Co-Rapporters on Georgia Matyas Erosi and Kastriot Islami visit Georgia among other things to discuss "recent developments in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia."[36]
  • 28 March: Mikheil Saakashvili unveils a new peace plan for Abkhazia, including a joint Georgian-Abkhaz Free Economic Zone in Ochamchire and Gali, the creation of the post of Vice-President of Georgia to be allocated to a representative of Abkhazia with the right to veto all decisions by the central government on its constitutional status, specific security guarantees, and "unlimited autonomy." The proposal is immediately rejected by Sokhumi.[37]
  • 3 April: In a letter to Abkhazia's Sergei Baghapsh and South Ossetia's Eduard Kokoity, Vladimir Putin writes that "Russia can not ignore Tbilisi’s line directed towards destabilization of the situation, including through use of intimidation and force – including through appealing to non-regional states."[38]
  • 4 April: NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, pledging the future NATO accession of Georgia and Ukraine, but refusing to grant either a Membership Action Plan.
  • 15 April: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1808, extending UNOMIG's mandate till October and calling for the return of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia.[39]
  • 17 April: Putin signs an executive order establishing direct diplomatic ties between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The decree leads to widespread condemnation by Georgia and its international partners.[40]
  • 20 April: Georgian UAV is shot down over the village of Gagida in the Gali district. Tbilisi acknowledges the loss of a drone and blames Russia, releasing footage showing a Russian aircraft shooting an air-to-air missiles at the UAV. Both Russia and Abkhazia deny Moscow's involvement, instead alleging the drone was brought down by the Abkhaz Armed Forces. A later UN investigation confirms Georgia's accusation against Russia, while Russia accuses Georgia of violating the 1994 Ceasefire Agreement.
Meeting of Condolezza Rice and Sergei Lavrov.
  • 21 April: Mikheil Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin hold a phone conversation described as "not easy". During the discussion, Saakashvili calls on Russia to "stop attacks on Georgia", while Putin "expressed bewilderment" over the UAV flights.
  • 22 April: U.S. State Secretary Condolezza Rice and her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov meet in Kuwait and talk about the drone shoot down in Abkhazia.
  • 23 April: UN Security Council session is held at the request of Georgia to discuss the drone downing. The US, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany issue a joint call expressing their concern over Russia's move to establish ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[41]
  • 24 April: In a televised national address, President Saakashvili announces seeking to replace Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia with an international mission. The number of Russian forces stationed in Abkhazia increases from 2,000 to 2,540. The Kremlin uses the Georgian drone flights to justify the need for more peacekeepers.[42]
  • 29 April: Moscow announces an increase in Russian peacekeeping troops after accusing Georgia of increasing its own military presence in the Kodori Gorge.
  • 30 April:
    • Separatist leaders Sergei Baghapsh and Eduard Kokoity reject the Georgian proposal to form a confederacy with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[43]
    • The OSCE Permanent Council holds an emergency session over the April 20 drone incidents. A special Forum for Security Cooperation is called by the Finnish Presidency, which endorses the UN-led investigative effort.[44]
    • The NATO and Russian Ambassadors meet in Brussels over the Abkhazia crisis.[45]
    • The People's Assembly of Abkhazia calls on the Abkhaz separatists leadership to withdraw from the Geneva Process, a format of negotiations between Tbilisi and Sokhumi mediated by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the US.[46]
    • Secretary General Terry Davis of the Council of Europe call on Georgia and Russia to "do everything in their power to prevent any further deterioration of the situation with negative consequences for the local population and stability in the region."[47]
  • 3 May: Saakashvili used the term "occupation" to describe Russia's military presence in Abkhazia for the first time.
  • 4 May: Abkhaz separatists allege shooting down another two Georgian drones flying over the Gali district. Georgia denies the claim, but Russia backs Sokhumi's allegations. Instead, Tbilisi recognizes the extent of its drone program and pledges to continue flying UAVs over Abkhazia.
  • 5 May:
    • Sokhumi claims detecting another Georgian UAV flying over the Ochamchire district, but claims having willingly not shot it down.
    • Georgia withdraws from the 1995 Agreement on the Creation of the Integrated Air Defense System of CIS Member States, urging the United Nations to investigate the presence and use of air defense systems by separatist authorities in Abkhazia.[42]
  • 6 May: The White House formally backs Georgia in its claim that Russia downed the Georgian UAV on April 20.
  • 8 May: Abkhazia claims having shot down a fifth Georgian UAV, a claim denied again by Tbilisi. According to Sokhumi, the drone carried an air-to-air missiles, though Georgian military equipment did not include missile-carrying drones.
  • 12 May:
    • Abkhazia announces having shot down an additional two Georgian drones, one of which is confirmed by Tbilisi. These are the last drone shootdown allegations made by Abkhazia before the launch of the Russia-Georgia War.
    • George W. Bush speaks to his new Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in their first phone conversation after the latter's inauguration. They speak extensively about the Abkhazia crisis.
    • Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania visits Sokhumi and meets with separatist officials to seek a negotiated conflict settlement.[48]
    • Tbilisi releases drone footage claiming to prove Russian troop and military hardware deployment in Abkhazia.
    • President Saakashvili calls on the European Union to launch a formal investigation on the Russian use of force to down Georgian drones over Georgian recognized airspace.
  • 15 May: The UN General Assembly votes in favor of a Georgia-sponsored resolution calling for the return of IDPs to Abkhazia.[49]
  • 26 May: The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia publishes its final investigative report on the April 20 drone shootdown, confirming Georgia's accusations that a Russian military jet downed the aircraft. Georgia demands an official apology and compensation from the Russian Federation.
  • 30 May: Georgia announces the suspension of its done flights over Abkhazia during a UN Security Council meeting.
  • 31 May: In an interview with Le Monde, Vladimir Putin hints that Georgia's use of reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia is meant to prepare for an invasion of the separatist region.
  • 1 June: In a note of protest sent by the Georgian delegation at the OSCE to its Russian counterpart, Tbilisi recognizes having lost a total of three drones during the crisis, including with the use of Buk anti-missile systems.[50]
Meeting of Mikheil Saakashvili and Dmitry Medvedev.
  • 1 July: Using the Georgian UAV flights over Abkhazia as a reason, Russia proposes the installation of radar stations in South Ossetia.[51]

18 March Primorskoe shootdown[edit]

On March 18, 2008, Stanislav Lakoba, Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Abkhazia, announced to local press that a reconnaissance aircraft had been shot down at 12:05[27] over the village of Primorskoe, near the administrative boundary between the Ochamchire and Gali districts. Abkhaz officials claimed having shot down the UAV with an Aero L-39 Albatros, while a later analysis of radar records by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia confirmed a drone was shot down at an altitude of 4,500 m.[52] The drone, identified by separatist military officials as an Elbit Hermes 450 (Serial Number 551), allegedly fell into the Black Sea, while debris was said to have been recuperated by the evening. Said debris was exhibited to local journalists in Sokhumi.[53]

The Georgian Ministry of Defense immediately denied the incident,[52] while admitting nonetheless the conduct of reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia to track Russian military movements in the region. A latter UNOMIG investigation confirmed nonetheless the downing of a drone, with eyewitnesses in the Gali village of Nabakevi talking about hearing an explosion,[27] while it estimated that the aircraft's maximum range was "consistent with Georgian ownership".[52] Abkhaz de facto Deputy Defense Minister Gari Kupalba alleged that the downed drone had been performing reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia since the summer of 2007. UNOMIG called the flying of Georgian reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia a violation of the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement, leading Abkhaz President Sergei Baghapsh to warn the central Georgian government about the "inadmissibility of reconnaissance activities."[54]

On March 20, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia issued a declaration warning about Tbilisi's course "towards preparation for another military invasion of the Republic of Abkhazia," calling the UAV flights a "provocative action", and calling on Russia, the United Nations Secretary General, and the Group of Friends of Georgia (made of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States) to "take appropriate measures to prevent a new war in the Caucasus."[55] On April 14, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Ministry of Defense of Russia issued a note of concern to the Security Council of Russia about Georgian alleged violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement with the drone flights.[52] On April 15, Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin talked about the "new phenomenon of overflight jets in the security zone" and criticized the "build-up of the Georgian military" as evidenced by a "recently shot-down drone in the airspace of the security zone."[56]

20 April Gagida shootdown[edit]

Location of Gagida in Abkhazia.

At 09:57 on April 20, an Elbit Hermes 450 UAV[52] (Serial Number 553) belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia[57] was shot down over the village of Gagida in the Gali district of Abkhazia, while at an altitude of 6,000 m. Eyewitnesses described two loud explosions, an object departing from an aircraft, ignition in the air, and debris parachuting into the Black Sea, around 250 m from the Abkhaz shoreline, before the same aircraft gained height and flew north.[58] Locals in the Abkhaz village of Dikhagudzba described having noticed a southbound aircraft traveling over the Black Sea at some point between 09:30 and 10:00.[58] CIS peacekeepers reported having identified the drone at an altitude of 3,000 m over the towns of Anaklia and Pichori, before witnessing its explosion about 1 km northwest of Pichori.[58]

The first to report on the drone shootdown was Georgian news network Mze TV, which reported that the events had been confirmed by State Reintegration Minister Temur Iakobashvili. Other Georgian news agencies reported eyewitness accounts from the Abkhaz village of Primorskoe (where the first drone was allegedly shot down) of a military jet and an airborne explosion. The Georgian Ministry of Defense immediately denied having lost a UAV over Abkhazia, while Iakobashvili retracted his earlier comments and claimed it was impossible to confirm the eyewitness accounts since Tbilisi could not dispatch a recovery team on site in Abkhazia. Hours after the shootdown, Georgian operational command sent a notification to the UN Observer Mission about the drone flight, post-dated April 19.[52] On April 21, Abkhaz Deputy Defense Minister Gari Kupalba announced the recovery of drone debris and claimed that an Abkhaz-owned L-39 jet had brought shot the UAV down with an air-to-air missile as it was conducting a reconnaissance flight over the Gali and Ochamchire districts.[52]

Later that same day, Colonel Davit Nairashvili, commander of the Georgian Air Force, retracted Tbilisi's earlier denial and confirmed during an interview with Reuters that a Georgian UAV had indeed been shot down in Abkhazia after observing troop buildups in Gali.[18] Georgian officials adamantly denied the claim that an Abkhaz L-39 had the capacity to shoot down a drone and Nairashvili affirmed to foreign press that the spy plane had been downed by a Russian Mikoyan MiG-29 that had taken off from a supposedly abandoned military base in Gudauta.[18] The Georgian Ministry of Defense published the entire footage recorded by the drone, a total of 2h27, including the moment when a military jet fires a missile in the direction of its camera.[58] Tbilisi summoned Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to hand over a note of protest and shared the drone footage with every foreign embassy based in Tbilisi.[18] Russia categorically denied any involvement in the shootdown, claiming that all of its military pilots were "resting" on April 20, a Sunday.[18] President Saakashvili called the incident an "unprovoked aggression against the sovereign territory of Georgia" and asked Vladimir Putin during an April 21 phone call to "immediately repeal the establishment of official ties with the breakaway regions and to stop attacks on Georgia."[18] At that moment, Saakashvili stated Tbilisi's response would be "only to offer more peace initiatives" for conflict resolution.[59]

L-39 aircraft.

Moscow consistently supported Abkhazia's version of events, namely that the drone had been shot down by an L-39 that Abkhazia acquired from Ichkeria in the early 1990s.[25] In his conversation with Saakashvili, Putin expressed "bewilderment" at the idea of Georgian UAVs flying over Abkhazia in violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreement. In response to the drone footage released by Georgia, later authenticated by the UNOMIG investigation, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it "does not warrant trust and raises many question marks," noting alleged discrepancies with Tbilisi's version and the alleged pilot's maneuvers, the missile pylons' location on the plane, and several details later discredited by the UN.[60] Georgian military experts believe that it took the military plane two shots to hit its target, for the Elbit Hermes 450 has an engine small enough to make it a difficult target for heat-seeking missiles,[18] hence the eyewitness accounts of "two explosion sounds". Moreover, experts also believe that the technological capacities of the L-39 would have made its successful interception of a small drone in the skies "not a plausible story".[25]

The Georgian Ministry of Defense invited groups of experts from the Baltic states and the United States to conduct investigations into the April 20 incident. On May 12, Saakashvili called for an EU investigation in addition to the UNOMIG ongoing one, which the EU did not do. Eventually, the UNSC-endorsed investigation confirmed Tbilisi's claim of a Russian plane having shot down its drone using a Vympel R-73 missile[61] from a distance of 44.26 km,[62] although it could not confirm if the plane was an MiG-29 or a Sukhoi Su-27.[63]

On April 22nd, then-US Ambassador to Russia William J. Burns sought to raise the issue of the drone's shootdown with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which refused to open talks with Washington on the issue, insisting it only sought direct contacts on the matter with Georgia. According to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, Aleksey Pavlovskiy, the CIS Fourth Department Deputy Director at the Russian MFA, told American diplomats that he questioned the reasoning behind the drone's shootdown, given that Russia "did not need" this kind of altercations with Georgia at the moment. On April 23, the U.S. Department of State issued an official statement expressing "deep concern" over the "shooting down of an unarmed Georgian UAV, by a presumably Russian MiG-29," adding criticism for "the presence of a MiG-29 aircraft in Georgian airspace without Georgian authorization, and the use of weapons from this aircraft."[64] The same day, at Georgia's request, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency session to discuss the drone incident, during which Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin rejected the authenticity of the drone footage, while Georgian Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze affirmed that the incident substantially damaged Russia's role as a neutral mediator in the peace process.[41] On April 30, a Forum for Security Cooperation was organized by the OSCE in Vienna to encourage discussions between Tbilisi and Moscow, mediated by the Finnish Presidency of the OSCE. On May 6, White House spokeswoman Dana Perino directly accused Russia of shooting down the drone, become the first international figure to do so.

May 4 spy plane shootdowns[edit]

On May 4, both Abkhazian and Russian authorities claimed that Abkhazian air defence had shot down two more Georgian spy planes that day. According to Abkhazia, both spy planes had been shot down over the Gali district, the first at 4:06 pm local time over the village of Dikhazurga and the second at 4:51 pm local time over the village of Bargebi.[65] The Abkhazian Ministry of Defence later also reported to have shown debris of both downed spy planes to local journalists.[66]

Russian reactions[edit]

According to a statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two Georgian spy planes had been conducting “unauthorized flights” over Abkhazia, describing the fact that the Abkhazians would shoot them down as “natural”. Furthermore, according to the Ministry, the latest incidents demonstrated that Tbilisi had “ignored our warnings” about the danger of violating the provisions of the 1994 Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces.

“Resorting to adventures with unmanned reconnaissance planes and speeding up military preparations in the conflict zone, the authorities in Tbilisi have taken the path of deliberately escalating tension in the region.”

Georgian reactions[edit]

Georgian authorities denied that any of its spy planes had been shot down. Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that

“the information is yet another Russian provocation aimed at information-propagandistic support of Russia’s military intervention.”

The Ministry further denounced the fact that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had described the alleged shootdowns as “natural”:

“This indicates clearly that the Russian Federation’s so-called peacekeeping operation, carried out under cover of the CIS, has in fact turned into fiction and now represents nothing more than open military aggression against Georgia with the aim of annexing part of our territory.”

The Ministry added that Georgian spy planes would not stop flying over Abkhazia:

“[They] were flying, are flying and will continue flying over sovereign Georgian airspace to gather full information about the Russian military intervention.”[65]

On May 5 the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Russia that it withdrew from its air defence cooperation treaty with Russia, originally signed in 1995.[67]

May 5 spy plane overflight[edit]

On May 5, Abkhazian authorities claimed that early on that day they had again observed a Georgian spy plane fly over its territory, but that it had deliberately not been shot down. According to Abkhazian Minister of Defence, Merab Kishmaria:

“Despite the fact that we shot down two drones yesterday, today our radars observed again a spy plane over the Ochamchira district, which came from the direction of Georgia. At this time we did not shoot it down.”[66]

May 8 spy plane shootdown[edit]

On May 8, Abkhazian authorities claimed to have shot down a further spy plane. According to Deputy Minister of Defence Kupalba, the Georgian spy plane was shot down over the Ochamchira district at 5:10pm local time by Abkhazian anti-aircraft systems.

On May 9, Kupalba claimed that the Georgian spy plane allegedly downed May 8 had carried an air-to-air missile.

“The ammunition it was carrying represented danger for both civilians and peacekeeping troops.”[68]

Georgian reactions[edit]

Georgia once again denied that any shootdown had taken place, with the head of the Ministry of the interior's information and analytical department Shota Utiashvili saying “That is a lie” and president Saakashvili declaring that “nothing has been shot down”.[69]

On May 12, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs released footage shot by its unmanned reconnaissance drone showing, what it said was, movement and deployment of the Russian troops and their military hardware in Abkhazia.

According to Utiashvili:

“Our drones are conducting reconnaissance of the Abkhaz territory to identify where the Russian and Abkhaz armed forces and military hardware are concentrated.”

Utiashvili claimed that the footage had been recorded on May 8 and he pointed out the fact that Abkhazia claimed to have shot down a spy plane on that day:

“But as you see the drone has returned and brought very valuable information. We have not lost any drone since April 20, when our unmanned aerial vehicle was shot down by the Russian jet. The Abkhaz side simply does not possess capability that could pose a threat to our unmanned aerial vehicle.”[70]

May 12 spy plane shootdowns[edit]

On May 12, Abkhazia claimed that it had shot down yet two more spy planes over Ochamchira district. It said that the first shootdown happened around 14:16 pm local time over the village of Shesheleti and the second about an hour later over the village of Achigwara, and that debris of one of the two shootdowns had been found. According to Deputy Defence Minister Kupalba these spy planes too were Hermes 450 produced by Elbit Systems.

Officials in Tbilisi denied the report.[71]

Russian reactions[edit]

On May 12, acting spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Boris Malakhov criticised United States diplomat Mathew Bryza for having defended the use of Georgian spy planes over Abkhazia.

“At the same time, besides the reconnaissance activities and fire correction, the unmanned aerial vehicle can carry an air-to-air missile. [...] The statements of the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State made in Tbilisi and Sukhumi are in the line of the U.S. Administration’s efforts to cover up and to shield from criticism those, whom they are actively dragging into NATO.”[72]

On May 20, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, speaking at a hearing at the Russian State Duma said

“Practical actions of the Georgian leadership, which are accompanied by provocations, [...] do not back Georgia’s claim about its readiness to build a dialogue between the conflicting sides. Georgia [...] continues flights [over the conflict zone in Abkhazia]. In particular, within past month the Abkhazian side downed seven Georgian [unmanned reconnaissance] drones,”[73]

UNOMIG Fact-Finding Team[edit]

Findings[edit]

On May 26, the conclusions were publicised of an investigation into the spy plane downings conducted by a fact-finding team of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). It found that the fighter plane that shot down a spy plane on April 20 had indeed been Russian. The fact-finding team judged that both Georgian air radar data and the video footage were authentic. Based on the fighter jet's twin-tail marking and the location of the air intakes, it concluded that the aircraft seen on the video was either a MiG-29 or a Su-27. Given this, and given the fact that after the shootdown, the radar record showed the aircraft heading north towards Maykop/Krasnodar into Russian airspace, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the fact-finding team concluded that the aircraft belonged to the Russian air force.

The fact finding mission was unable to determine whether, as Georgia claimed, the aircraft had taken off from the Bombora military airfield near Gudauta. It said that this was possible, but that another scenario was that the jet aircraft had come in at low altitude from somewhere else and then ascended in the vicinity of Gudauta.

The fact-finding mission further judged that

“a reconnaissance mission by a military aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, constituted “military action” and therefore contravened the Moscow Agreement.”[citation needed] “However legitimate this purpose may seem to the Georgian side, it stands to reason that this kind of military intelligence-gathering is bound to be interpreted by the Abkhaz side as a precursor to a military operation, particularly in a period of tense relations between the sides.”[citation needed]

UNOMIG's fact-finding commission confirmed that debris from the March 18 and May 12 shootdowns also originated from Hermes 450 aircraft.

Georgian reactions[edit]

In reaction to the fact-finding team's report, Georgian President Saakashvili welcomed its conclusions:

“The UN issued a conclusion, which directly accuses the Russian Federation of an act of aggression against Georgia and confirms that Russian jet has bombed the Georgian territory. This is the first case when an international organization and especially UN, without general phrases, has directly pointed its finger at Russia.”[74]

On May 27, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Georgia

“categorically demands from the Russian Federation to make an official apology for the act of aggression directed against Georgia, ensure appropriate compensation for the material loss.”

The Ministry also renewed demands for an international inspection of the Gudauta military base (Bombora airfield), from which it claimed the fighter jet took off on April 20.[75]

On May 29, Georgia's Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania labelled the April 20 shootdown “an aggressive military act” that had further undermined Russia's role of mediator and facilitator. He also stated that Georgia did not consider overflights of unmanned, unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over the conflict zone violation of the Moscow agreement, since it was Georgia's "sovereign right" to observe and monitor its territory and “illegal movement” of Abkhazian and Russian forces.[76]

Russian reactions[edit]

On May 26, Russia again denied being responsible for the April 20 shootdown. According to Russian air force spokesman Alexander Drobishevsky:

“It is even pointless to speak about violation of the Georgian state border and especially about downing of the Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle.”[77]

According to Russian ambassador in Georgia Kovalenko

“In any story one should look for a root cause. When we know a root cause, the consequence becomes very clear. In my opinion, in this particular case the root cause is that the drone should not have flown there. It is a very troublesome zone for now.”[78]

In a statement on May 27, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the evidence on which the fact-finding mission's conclusions are based "questionable":

“We do not mean to question competence of specialists from the UNOMIG. It is about partiality of evidence on which the entire investigation [by UNOMIG] was built – video footage and data from certain radars.”

It further claimed that the Georgian air radar data did "not coincide with those available for us”. The Ministry also stressed the fact-finding team's judgment that Georgia's reconnaissance flights constituted military action and therefore contravened the Moscow agreement:

“This very flight [of the drone on April 20] was a root cause of the incident [downing] itself.” “Unfortunately, the Georgian side instead of stopping provocations involving flights of UAV, increased the number of [UAV’s flights]. These flights took a systematic nature, which only increase tensions in the conflict zone… It is important that UNOMIG continues investigation of the root cause of the problem.”[79]

Security Council meeting[edit]

On May 30, the Security Council of the United Nations met to discuss the April 20 downing of Georgia's spy plane and the findings of the UNOMIG fact-finding team. The meeting had been requested by Georgia on May 29.[80]

Absence of the Abkhazian side[edit]

Russia had originally wanted the Abkhazian side to be present at the Security Council meeting, but Georgia was strongly opposed to this. Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations Alasania said that this would be “fundamentally infringing existing arrangements under the UN-led Geneva peace process”:

“I can hardly imagine this institution allowing the representatives of the separatist insurgents, who are implicated and who are perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing to be present at this international forum. Frankly I also think that it is not in the best interests of the Russia to set this kind of precedent, because then the questions arise why can’t other representatives of the separatist movements be allowed at the UN forums.” “So I think it is really time for the Russian Federation’s delegation in the UN to drop using this leverage at the Security Council and sabotaging the Security Council meeting because of this reason.”[76]

Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said that Russia had given up its demand in the end because it did not want to block all discussion of the incident.

“We expressed our disappointment that there is no possibility to discuss the Abkhazian side. Without their participation it cannot be objective, full, comprehensive and serious.”[81]

On May 30, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov said that it would be “senseless” to discuss the April 20 spy plane downing at the Security Council without participation of the Abkhazian side:

“The fact that they have been refused to participate in this discussion indicates that there is something dirty in this initiative.” “[The] essence of the crisis is that the Georgian side is roughly violating its commitments. It [the April 20 incident] was not the single case; seven drones have been shot down and even more were overflying the conflict zone, which in accordance to the UN Security Council decision should not be the zone for military actions.”

Lavrov reiterated Russia's position that Georgian spy plane overflights were the root of the problem:

“This should be dealt with first; the disease itself should be cured and not its symptoms.”[82]

American reactions[edit]

United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff said that it was not clear from the 1994 Moscow agreement whether the spy plane overflights constituted a violation:

“We believe the ceasefire agreement of 1994, the Moscow agreement, at best is unclear on this issue. It's an interpretation as to whether a UAV reconnaissance craft that cannot be armed constitutes military action.” “We have a separate issue, which is a conclusion now reached by the UNOMIG independent investigators that the Russian aircraft flying from Russia, flew into the Georgian territory and shot down [Georgia’s] UAVs and that is very dangerous development, highly provocative and clearly is a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Georgian reactions[edit]

During the Security Council Meeting, Georgian Ambassador Alasania said that following the UNOMIG Fact-Finding Team's judgment that its spy plane flights over Abkhazia violated the 1994 Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces it had ceased them, but that they would be resumed in the event of threat.

“I openly said [at the meeting of the UN Security Council session] that since the [UNOMIG] report was issued, the Georgian side stopped overflights to honor the words of the current report. It doesn't mean that we will not use these military capabilities if the threat will occur in the region… But at this point since the report came out we’ve stopped these overflights.”

According to Alasania, the Russian explanation of the April 20 spy plane shootdown which it provided during the Security Council meeting was “not comprehensible”, nor “viable”. He further said that the Russian side had not strongly denied its involvement in the April 20 spy plane shootdown, but instead tried to shift emphasis onto the spy plane overflights.

“The largest part of the members reiterated their strong condemnation of the act of aggression against the Georgian sovereignty by the Russian military aircraft.”

Russian reactions[edit]

Russia's Ambassador to the United Nations Churkin responded to Alasania's remarks by saying:

“Ambassador Alasania chose again to put into the mouth of Security Council members the words that they have not actually used, like ‘aggression’ and stuff like that; but you know our Georgian friends are very temperamental so they tend to do that time to time.”

He also said that he regretted Alasania's remarks that Georgia reserved for itself the right to resume spy plane overflights.

“We emphasized [at the UN Security Council meeting] that one thing is clear is that flight of drone is violation and provocation that triggered the incident.”

According to Churkin, during the Security Council meeting he had pointed out “technical inconsistencies” in the Fact-Finding Team's findings, noting that nothing in the report indicated that the fighter jet had crossed into Abkhazia from the Russian Federation.

“There also was no conversation between the pilot and ground control. Experts tell me that it is virtually impossible to shoot down a drone from a fighter jet without communication between the pilot and ground control. So something is missing in the entire puzzle.”

Churkin also reiterated Russia's position that the footage used as evidence was fabricated. He added that Russia was prepared to conduct a “thorough investigation” also involving foreign experts.

Churkin repeated Russia's stance that discussions of this type at the UN are not objective without participation of the Abkhazian side, although he claimed that awareness amongst Security Council members of the need to include the Abkhazian side had increased, and he expressed hope that next time indeed the Abkhazian side would be invited.[80]

In a statement on May 31 Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that during the Security Council meeting, Georgia had failed to put the blame for the April 20 spy plane downing on Russia. It added:

“We have expressed our readiness to carry out a serious investigation with the involvement of foreign experts, instead of unilateral and hasty one [that was conducted by UNOMIG]. Only in this case we will believe that the truth about the April 20 incident is found.”[83]

Abkhazian military hardware used in the spy plane shootdowns[edit]

Both Abkhazia and Russia claim that the April 20 spy plane was downed by an Abkhazian L-39 aircraft.

On May 6, Abkhazian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Shamba declared that a Buk ground-to-air air defence system had been used in the downing of the Georgian spy planes. This was the first time that Abkhazian authorities officially acknowledged that Abkhazia military possessed this advanced anti-aircraft system.

According to Shamba, the Buk system was a leftover from the 1992-1993 war with Georgia.

Georgian authorities had claimed earlier that Buk systems had been transferred from Russia to Abkhazia in 2007 as part of a larger package of military support.

In response to Shamba's statement Georgian officials declared that the fact that Abkhazia possessed Buk systems constituted a violation of existing agreements. In a statement the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on UNOMIG “to urgently launch probing into the presence of anti-aircraft defense systems and their use in Abkhazia and to immediately acquaint the international community with the results of this probe.”[84]

Works cited[edit]

  • Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (PDF) (Report). Vol. II. September 21, 2009. Retrieved April 27, 2024.
  • Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (PDF) (Report). Vol. III. September 21, 2009. Retrieved April 27, 2024.
  • Report of UNOMIG on the Incident of 20 April Involving the Downing of a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle over the Zone of Conflict (PDF) (Report). UN Security Council. May 26, 2008. Retrieved April 29, 2024.

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