Battle of the Palo River

Battle of the Palo River
Part of Colombian War of Independence
Battle of the Palo River by José María Espinosa
Date July 5, 1815 Location near Caloto, Cauca Result Patriot victory
Belligerents
New Granada	Kingdom of Spain
Commanders and leaders
José María Cabal Carlos de Montúfar Manuel Roergas Serviez Liborio Mejía José María Córdova	Aparicio Vidaurrázaga Francisco Soriano † Joaquín de Paz †
Strength
1,200	2,100
Casualties and losses
49 dead 121 wounded	315 dead 500 captured

The Battle of the Palo River (Spanish: Batalla del río Palo) fought on July 5, 1815 was a battle of the Colombian War of Independence. It was fought between the army of the south of the United Provinces of New Granada and the Spanish Royalist army of Quito.

After the failure of Nariño’s southern campaign in 1814, the remnants of the Patriot army withdrew to Popayán which was by then under the command of colonel Jose Maria Cabal. The victorious Royalists, now under Lieutenant Colonel Aparicio Vidaurrázaga, went on a counter offensive in late December of 1814 and captured the city of Popayán on December 29, 1814. They looked to invade the Cauca Valley where the patriots had retreated, and if successful reconquer the rest of New Granada. Cabal, brigadier general by then, placed his forces on the north bank of the Palo River where he had led his enemy to. This happened after a series of retreating skirmishes by his vanguard.

The battle was a decisive victory and one of the most important battles of the Colombian war of independence. The victory at Palo River allowed the patriots to recapture Popayán and push the royalists back to Pasto. For the next year the Cauca province was free of royalist presence until June 1816 when the royalists conducted an offensive in tandem with Pablo Morillo’s expeditionary army from Spain coming from the north.

Prelude

With the failure of Nariño’s southern campaign in 1814, the remnants of the patriot army who were at the gates of Pasto, we forced to retreat towards Popayán, and shortly after, fell back towards the Cauca Valley. With the patriots in retreat, and the return of King Ferdinand VII to the throne in Spain the situation seemed favorable for a royalist offensive, thus Toribio Montes, Captain general of Quito, began plans for an offensive to reconquer the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Montes’s first decision would be the removal of Field Marshall Aymerich from his post as commander of the army and governor of Popayán, as their relationship had become strained during Nariño’s campaign. Montes replaced him with Lieutenant Colonel Aparicio de Vidaurrazaga, on December 6, 1816, Vidaurrazaga departed with the army from Pasto and captured Popayán on December 29 with 550 men. Upon arrival at Popayán, he requested more troops from Montes and dispatched units to the north of Popayán.

Meanwhile the patriot army, the army of the south, had retreated north to the Cauca Valley, during the next months the army would undergo an intense reorganization process as well as training troops with an emphasis on physical fitness which consisted of long marches at double time for 2 hours each day from 5 am in the morning. Cabal also decided to do away with Spanish manual of armsand adopted the French one which was translated by Captain Liborio Mejia. The republican government approved of these methods and as such promoted the commander of the army José María Cabal from colonel to brigadier general, however despite these efforts’ problems such as desertion remained a serious problem for the patriots. By 1815 Cabal’s army had some 1,200 troops composed of 5 infantry battalions:

·      Cundinamarca Battalion

·      Socorro Battalion

·      Cauca Battalion

·      Antioquia Battalion

·      Popayan Battalion

160 troops were cavalry, composed of the Veteran squadron and the Buga volunteer’s squadron. The army also had at its disposition two 4 pounder cannons and two falconet light cannons. The republican government also dispatched 3 distinguished officers to assist Cabal, those being the Quiteño Colonel Carlos de Montúfar and French Colonel Manuel Roergas de Serviez and French cavalry captain Honorato Dufour. The arrival of Dofour was a welcome addition, as he was considered the best cavalry officer in the army, meanwhile Serviez's arrival was less so, although Cabal recognized that he was an extremely competent and disciplined officer, he was hard to work with and arrogant.

Battle

Vidaurrázaga wanting to continue his offensive requested permission from Montes in Quito and received his approval, prior to setting out in a letter received from Montes the Captain General instructed him to "give no quarter to the enemy."

He then deployed his vanguard, under the command of Captain Mariano Cucalón, who had with him 616 troops along with two artillery pieces. The vanguard soon occupied the town Piendamó and its surroundings to the north, and then took the town of Tunia, eventually reaching the vicinity of Ovejas, where there was an advanced position of Patriot troops. The rearguard, composed of 400 men, with two 4 pounder cannons, began their march on June 21 with Vidaurrázaga leaving Popayán on the 24th.

Brigadier General José María Cabal, commander of the army of the south.

The Royalist plan was to march to the Cauca Valley, while Lieutenant Colonel Delgado and the Lieutenant Governors of Iscuandé and Micay, Illera and Valverde, marched on the patriot troops of Dagua to take the rest of the province, and attract the attention of the Army of the South and thus make rapid progress in their offensive.

At Ovejas the patriots had placed an advance force composed of troops of the Socorro battalion, there they engaged the royalists but eventually withdrew. Cabal had devised a plan if the royalists attacked Ovejas , it consisted of consecutive defensive lines that were meant to slow down his enemy and cause as much damage as possible and then lead them to a fortified position near the Palo River north of the town of Caloto. Vidaurrázaga upon seeing the patriots retreat and not knowing their defense plan, thought their retreat meant he had defeated them and he pressed his advance.

The patriot forces had organized their position on the battlefield as follows: Advanced units were placed on the right bank of the river, then, at a short distance, a line of fortifications defended by troops and further back the battlefield, a plain, in which they had to form the battalions to face the enemy.

The Popayán battalion defended with 83 troops the most western steps, called Pilamus. On the day of the battle, the outposts were made up of the battalions, Popayán, on the left and Cazadores del Cauca, on the right, which were supported by 80 cavalry. Probably, outside of the artillery that participated in the battle, there were some other pieces in the fortifications because at midnight between the nights of July 4 to 5 a 4 pounder cannon arrived at the Palo field.

Possibly the camp was organized in the same order in which the patriots had been training for combat, with the Cundinamarca battalion on the left, Socorro in the center, and Antioquía on the right flank.

The royalists arrived near the Patriot positions on July 4th and camped on the left bank of the Palo river, they then conducted a detailed reconnaissance survey of the Patriot positions. Vidaurrázaga then sent 2 scouts down river to look for a crossing where the entire army could cross and attack the Patriots while also avoiding their fortifications, they reported back to their commander that they had found one near a trail called Platanal which traversed through a small mountain, led to a ford of the river that allowed for a crossing with very little risk.

With this information Vidaurrázaga covened a meeting with his officers on the night of July 4th to plan their strategy. This strategy would consist of the placing the 4th company of Patía in front of the enemy to grab their attention while the royalist vanguard and rearguard divisions would conduct a left flanking movement.

As the royalists were planning so too were their patriot counterparts, Cabal covened a meeting with all of his officers. Colonel Serviez suggested moving the troops more towards the west, however Cabal disregarded this suggestion considering that the current area was favorable to the Patriot army with most of the other officers in agreement.

The Royalists began their attack around 5 am on July 5th, and began combat with the Patriot outpost unit who subsequently withdrew to the main defense line allowing the royalists to cross the river. The rest of the patriot force, who had been waiting for the attack upon knowing where the main attack would occur took formation through drum commands. The royalists launched their attacks in a disorderly fashion while the patriots fought back while withdrawing in an orderly and disciplined fashion. The advanced patriot units positioned in trenches maintained heavy fire over the royalists allowing for more units time to form up, the Spanish continued advancing up until they reached musket range. At that moment a Patriot cavalry squadron under the command of Captain Solís attacked them and the charge was valiant but Solís was killed near a Spanish cannon.

General Cabal directly commanded the battle. Cabal considered more favorable for the result, that the right wing retreat to the height, where the supply barracks were located, he ordered his assistant to communicate this instruction to the Quarter master. And as he saw that Serviez had arranged for Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Monsalve to advance to the left of the right wing with 50 men from the Cauca battalion, added to his battalion, for the withdrawal of the advanced posts, in such a way that the unit was between the enemy fires and those of his own artillery, ordered the immediate withdrawal of this battalion, The Royalist Commander, who was misinformed about the character of the enemy troops, was surprised when he saw the patriot units movements and discipline of their formations. He even praised them, writing that: “The opponents wait, make their fires and withdraw from ours, at the time I observed that five enemy columns were formed that made up greater forces than had been considered at all times”

In view of the opposing situation of organization and discipline of his army compared to that of the patriots, and appreciating from a distance the units that were going to disrupt his disorganized attack on a position prepared for defense, Vidaurrázaga hurriedly sent his aid-de-camp José Jaramillo, to inform the divisional commanders who stopped the movement, formed in battle, with the four pieces of artillery at the front, and appreciated the intentions of the enemy. But seeing that his order was not fulfilled, and rather, the disorganization was growing greater and that the voices of the commanders were only of advancement, without taking adequate training, or provisions conducive to success, he sent another of his assistants, Miguel Puente, to gather about the fulfillment of the order.

Meanwhile, Vidaurrázaga, personally ordered the attack of the fourth company of Patía from the front, in the sector of the bridge, where the main passage of the river lay. The attack of the Patians, under the orders of Captain Commander Joaquín de Paz, was faced by the Popayán battalion, which, located on an outpost on the bank of the river, withdrew in an orderly fashion.

The patriot forces, through an extraordinary cavalry attack, managed to ward off the royalist attack on their right flank. Colonel Montúfar, who commanded the entire sector to the right of the artillery, attacked with the Antioquia battalion, the most distinguished unit in the action, and in a heroic gesture snatched the flag of the Cundinamarca battalion from its standard-bearer, as the Cundinamarca Battalion charged the enemy.

The battle of the Palo River was ultimately decided by a simultaneous bayonet attack of the patriot divisions that under the command of Cabal, on the left wing, Serviez, in the center, and Montúfar, from the right, gave a mortal blow to the royalists, this attack was also supported by the accurate artillery fire that wreaked havoc on the royalists. José María Espinosa, a standard bearer and grenadier who served in the Cundinamarca Battalion, wrote that: "The hour had arrived to do battle with the enemy army. To the beat of the drums we advanced divided into 3 columns....the sound of musket fire was so lively and loud it was deafening, added to it was the incessant playing of war bands and drums. Since there was no wind the mass cloud of smoke blinded the view all around us." When the bayonet charge occurred he noted “It was such the impetus with which our people and the spirit and ardor with which they fought, that in a short time the royalist battalions were run over and undone, an operation that came to complete the cavalry very opportunely, to the Command of the Frenchman Dufaure." Colonel Serviez had his horse shot out from under him and when the bayonet charge was ordered, he personally led it on foot.

At half past eight in the morning, the Spanish army declared itself in defeat and in most of their units there was intense panic. However, some companies began their withdrawal in an orderly fashion until they were reached by the Republican troops who were in their pursuit.

Aftermath

General Cabal, at half past eleven in the morning, on the Alto de Cascabel, sent a letter to the governor of the province, Francisco Cabal, informing him of the victory writing

"The arms of the republic have triumphed, Today at 5 in the morning, the enemy presented himself with much ferocity and crossed the river. Our officers and soldiers have behaved like good republicans"

The battle was a decisive victory for the patriots, allowing them to recapture Popayán and pacifying the Cauca Province for one year.

José María Caballero wrote in his diary that the news of General Cabal's victory at the Palo River reached Santa Fe on July 18, his diary entry also mentioned that "they took 600 rifles, 400 prisoners, with 300 dead. Wow! This is good."