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  • Comment: Please fix the red errors in references 9 and 56. Thanks! GoingBatty (talk) 16:29, 1 September 2024 (UTC)
Emperor Hadrian on the Lex Cornelia and preterintentional killing
Utopian attempt to reconcile praeter intentionem crime with the principle of subjective responsibility: possible only by concealing the doctrine of illicit versa in re through presumed guilt

The term "Praeter intentionem" etymologically means "beyond intention".[1]

Therefore, committing a crime "praeter intentionem"[2] means having committed an involuntary crime and more serious than that foreseen and wanted, and which therefore goes beyond the intentions of the person committing the crime;[3] as the Latins used to say: "Minus voluit delinquere et plus deliquit" ("He wanted to sin less and sinned more").[4]

Origin and historical application

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The codes and jurists when they speak of the crime committed praeter intentionem us the alternatively term: "preterintentional" crime, crime "ultraintentional", crime committed with "preterintentionality" o "preterintentionally";[5] or again: "Praeterintention", dol "dépassé", infraction "praeter-intentionnelle", délit "préterintentionnel", "präterintentionalität", "qualifizierte Delikte", "praeter intencional", "preteritencionalidad", "praeterintentionalis", "preterintenzionale" and "preterintenzione".[6]

In legal penal terminology the Praeterintention is a typical expression application of criminal conviction for strict liability,[7] and found application both in the criminal law of ancient Rome (<<In maleficiis voluntas non exitus spe-sctaturs>>, Dig. fr. 14 ad leg. Corn, de sicar. et venef. [48, 8]).[8][9] and in the canon law of the Roman Churc.[10][11]

In fact, in the criminal law of ancient Rome,[12] the author of a voluntary criminal conduct who, against his will, had caused a different and more serious crime, but causally connected (causal link)[13] to said willful conduct, was punineed for the unintended crime without it being, concretely, necessary to ascertain an incautious conduct with respect to the latter: for the preterintentional crime thus committed, the model of objective responsibility was applied (it was sufficient to ascertain the voluntary conduct, and that because of this the involuntary unintentional crime had occurred.[14]

Structure of the preterintentional crime

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Conduct

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The preterintentional crime can be committed through an intentional active or omission conduct (One type of omission causing injury is this: <<For example, if a lifeguard who has a contractual obligation to monitor the safety of swimmers voluntarily fails to warn a person that there are coral formations in the sea, which make it impossible to walk barefoot because the coral is sharp, and if the omission of the necessary warning is intended to cause that person to suffer injuries, in the event that due to sudden pain the person in question loses his balance and violently hits his head on a rock and dies, the death can be attributed to the lifeguard as manslaughter: in the example, the injuries are caused by voluntary omission and the event of manslaughter arose from them>>.),[15] which does not necessarily have to achieve the minor crime intended by the guilty party (then absorbed by the more serious and ultraintentional event: for example, in voluntary injury with involuntary fatal outcome, the injury is absorbed by unintentional homicide, because a subject cannot be punished twice for the same act;[16] the law determines the penalty to be inflicted taking into account the crime intended and the crime committed beyond the intention),[17] but rather can stop at a mere intentional attempt at a crime: so that the judge can condemn the agent for the preterintentional crime produced and causally linked to the aforementioned voluntary conduct, even if only attempted (Example: Tizio with a threatening attitude makes a sudden movement of his arms with a closed hand towards Caio, and the latter with a reflex movement avoids the blow but stumbles and, falling to the ground, hits his head and dies; the voluntary crime of beating against Caio is only attempted and not consummated, but Tizio is still responsible for the preterintentional homicide of Caio).[18]

The aforementioned malicious attempt, in addition to being sufficient,[19] is also indispensable for the agent to be convicted of a preterintentional crime:[20] the victim of such voluntary conduct can hypothetically oppose it with the exculpatory resistance of "legitimate defense",[21] legitimized by the penal codes as a faculty that can be opposed to a dangerous and current illicit conduct,[22] and not to a criminally irrelevant conduct characterized by unsuitable and equivocal acts in committing a crime[23](Example: Caius, the victim of an preterintentional homicide, could exercise the opposition guaranteed by legitimate defense only against conduct by Titius that was actually dangerous as it was suitable and unequivocal ["Attempted crime"][24] in wanting to hit or injure Caius).[25]

Conversely, an attempted preterintentional crime is not logically configurable:[26] since if the preterintentional event does not materialize, one cannot speak of a preterintentional crime: the agent would be responsible only for the minor crime intentionally sought, because the perpetrator commits only the intended crime and not other involuntary crimes.[27]

As for the amount of the penalty, the universal principle according to which the criminal sanction must be proportionate to the disvalue of the crime committed[28] in order to make the re-educative function of the punishment effective, on the one hand prevents the application of only the punishment foreseen for the crime intended by the agent without taking into account the aggravating unintentional event (Example: John intentionally slaps Caius; Caius, in an attempt to avoid the blow, falls to the ground and dies: John did not want to kill Caius and, if he had been sentenced to the same penalty as the crime of voluntary battery, he would have considered a possible sentence acceptable if he had wanted to attack other subjects in the future: even an unjustly lenient penalty would have prevented John from repenting for the illicit conduct of battery aggravated by involuntary death.);[29] and on the other hand makes it intolerable to punish the author of the unintentional crime with a particularly severe sanction: ignoring the agent's will not to commit the event which occurred beyond his intentions (Example: John intentionally slaps Caius; John, in an attempt to avoid the blow, falls to the ground and dies: John did not want to kill Caius and, if he were sentenced to the same penalty as for voluntary homicide [and not for preterintentional homicide], he would feel like the victim of an injustice on the part of the judicial system; this would prevent John from properly repenting of the conduct of aggravated battery resulting in involuntary death.).[30]

Psychological element

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It is important to underline that an preterintentional act cannot be considered a third kind of state of will intermediate between fault and intention:[31] an event can be wanted or not wanted from the person, there is no third possibility in the middle[32] (Examples: wanting to hit Caius, Titius may also foresee and accept with indifference the risk that Caius may die because of the beating, but this always remains within the scope of voluntary conduct [Dolus eventualis];[33] on the contrary, Titius, a famous circus knife thrower, represents to himself the possibility that by throwing knives into the space occupied by the circus collaborator Mevia, even by arbitrarily increasing the difficulty of the circus act, he is convinced in the successful safety of Mevia, who instead dies: in this case, Titius does not want to harm or kill anyone, and is only liable for the involuntary homicide of Mevia [Conscious guilt]).[34] In fact, attempts by European legislators to create a third psychological criterion with: the mise en danger (deliberate endangerment),[35] the recklessness and the Leichtfertigkeit (aggravated negligence),[36] have lapsed into a substantial objective liability.[37]

Some countries (Austria) in order to adapt preterintention to the principle of subjective responsibility (No one can be punished criminally unless as a result of voluntary or at least reckless, negligent or unskilled responsibility),[38] consider preterintention as a form of mental state mixed: the intent supports the conduct of minor crime, and fault should mark the unwanted ultraintentional event.[39]

While other countries[40] (US) faithful to the ontological nature of preterintention,[41] considers it as a form of intentional crime,[42] aggravated by the unintentional event which is attributed to the author even if he did not want the event, thus introducing a form of objective responsibility:[43] in Anglo-Saxon systems the application (explicit or hidden)[44] of felony murder is still widespread,[45] a figure traced back by the doctrine to the criminal scheme of praeterintention.[46]

According to this thesis, in fact, every attempt by the some countries (Germany)[47] to make the figure of "praeterintention" compatible with the principle of guilt (criminal liability can only be intentional or negligent, and never objective!),[48] with rules requiring the presence of guilt to impute the preterintentional event, translates into an inevitable practical application of objective criminal liability, "masquerade" from presumed or objectified guilt (the defendant's guilt in relation to the unintentional crime is presumed and not ascertained concretely by the judge).[49]

Types of preterintencional crimes in the strict sense (stricto sensu)

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Preterintentional killing

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The main example of this form of liability is preterintentional killing,[50] which occurs when a person, with actions aimed at hitting or harming, unintentionally causes the death of a man:[51] the agent will be liable for objective responsibility (or fault, for the laws that require it) for the death event:[52] (Example: Tizio argues with Caio and intentionally punches him, Caio falls to the ground and dies: Tizio only wanted to punch him and absolutely did not want to kill him).[53]

The use of appropriate terminology is decidedly useful: in praeterintentional homicide the term "killing" is used and not that of "murder" (as in intentional homicide), in order to underline the agent's unwillingness to kill; as Puttmann points out: <<Triplicem intentionem in eo qui malum facinus sibi proposuit, distingui debere puto. One in eo consistet, ut VOLUERIT TOTUM, quo facinus perpetratum fuit, effectum (direct malice). Allera, ut facinus intra Certos sibi proposuerit fines, PRAEVIDERITQUE, majorem inde quam sibi proposuit effectum, facile sequi posse, neque tamen non etiam in hunc consenserit (indirect malice). Tertia ut voluerit quidem malum facinus, sed NON PRAEVIDERIT majorem inde quam voluil effectum oriri possess, qui tamen praeter Opinion inde oritur>>.[54]

It must then be added that preterintentional homicide can mature under certain factual circumstances, and therefore the penalty will be aggravated according to the type of circumstance ascertained by the judge: for example, the Italian[55] legislator regulates the aggravating circumstances of preterintentional killing in art. 585 penal code,[56] and the French[57] one in art. 222-8 penal code.[58]

Preterintentional abortion

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Another hypothesis expressly provided for by the law is preterintentional abortion,[59] which occurs when the agent, with actions aimed at causing injury, causes, as an unintended effect, the interruption of pregnancy:[60] (Example: Tizio argues with Mevia and intentionally punches her, Mevia falls to the ground and miscarries: Tizio only wanted to punch Mevia, and absolutely did not want to cause the miscarriage of the child in her womb).

Types of preterintencional crimes in a broad sense (lato sensu)

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Crimes aggravated by the event

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Then there are the preterintentional crimes in the broad sense:[61] intentional crimes aggravated by an unwanted harmful or dangerous event,[62] which reproduce the typical preterintentional criminal progression:[63] intentional unlawful conduct that produces an more serious involuntary crime:[64] (Example: Tizio intentionally slaps his daughter Filena, and Filena suffers serious injuries so much so that she goes to the hospital; in the following days Filena dies from complications from infections on the injuries sustained).[65]

Crimes aggravated by the event in very serious and exceptional conditions

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And finally, there are the particularly serious preterintentional crimes,[66] where the entire conduct of the agent is marked by a particularly and intense malice;[67] the social need to reach a conviction, with a particularly severe penalty, would be justified by the type of legal assets damaged, even if involuntarily[68] (Example: Tizio with a voluntary action wants to seriously disturb public order, introduces into the soil or subsoil a substance that can endanger human health, and from this act derives the death of one or more people; in this case the punishment is particularly severe [one is punished with life imprisonment in France]).[69]

Preterintentional crimes regulated in various States of the world:

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The crimes committed preterintentionally are presents in a lot of penal systems of the world:[70] just to name a few, in Italy the preterintentional homicide (art. 584 penal code),[71] in Germany the crime of bodily harm resulting in death (art. 227 penal code),[72] in France the fatal violence (art. 222-7 penal code),[73] in Spain (although transformed from a single crime into two crimes in competition: voluntary crime and involuntary crime),[74] in the Netherlands (qualified offences like the art. 302 s.2 DPC: inflicting serious bodily harm, with the death of the victim as a not intended result),[75] in Eastern Europe,[76] in the South America,[77] in the US the felony murder, [78][79] in the Africa[80] and in others countries.[81]

References

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