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Draft:Resolution to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership

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The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership, was passed by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Politburo of the Central Committee on June 1st 1943, in Yan'an. The work is attributed to Mao Zedong, and can be found in Volume 3 of his Selected Works, filed under Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership. There is reason to believe that the document captures either his own writing, or that expressed to his colleagues.[1][2] In the report, Mao highlights organizational principles and methods that he sees necessary for communism to flourish. Among these are an early articulation of mass line and campaign oriented mobilization - both of which were techniques that would be heavily emphasized and employed throughout his tenure as chairman.

The work is best known for its famous articulation of ideal government: leadership "coming from the masses" and going back "to the masses".[1] The CCP witnessed great success when they adhered to this credo. But when the connection between masses and leadership was undermined, tragedy occurred. In the 1960 to 1961 grain supply overestimation resulting from failures in mass line, 30 million Chinese peasants starved.[3]

Background

The report is a product of Mao's experiences in the Yan’an Rectification Movement, providing the CCP with a blueprint for mass mobilization: how to run a revolution both at a state and local level.[1] The report is thus linked to Mao's 1927 Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan or Inquiry into the Peasant Movement of Hunan, where goals and achievements of communist mobilization are proposed.

The 1943 report combines a theory-practice-theory methodology with an iteration of Lenist-Marxist Democratic Centralism. The principles outlined are similar to those enshrined by Vladimir Lenin's Vanguard Party in Russia.

Content

The report is structured in nine articles, each addressing a necessary path of action, the consequences of not adhering to some principle, or both.

The first article outlines two methods that must be adopted to accomplish any task, applied to both leadership and masses.

"The first is to combine the general and the particular, and the second is to unite leadership with the masses".[1]

The second article argues that a general slogan or party line is both necessary and insufficient for mobilizing the masses towards to cause of communism. The general slogan must be accompanied by leaders, at all levels, who make concrete, direct, and thorough application of it with the masses. This allows leaders to test their slogan's correctness through positive or negative feedback, thus ensure a positive effect. This consideration is necessary. Mao states that “any leader who… fails to observe specific units and specific individuals at the lower levels… will never be able to give the units general guidance".[1]

The third article addressed mobilization in greater detail. Mao recognizes that there are varying degrees of revolutionary spirit in the masses: those who are active, average, and backward. The middle group is the largest. It is the role of government to ensure that the leading nucleus (activists / Cadres) does not embody all revolutionary fervour. Instead, the leading nucleus must remain connected to the average majority. Thus, in any given struggle, the minority who are the activists (Mao calls them "heroes"[1]) cannot be the same makeup. The leading nucleus must instead be constantly rotated in its membership, keeping it healthy and connected to the masses.

The fourth article pivots to a discussion of leadership, where Mao articulates a political organization methodology known as mass line.

"In all our Party's actual work, correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses. This means taking the views of the masses (unintegrated, unrelated views) and subjecting them to concentration (they are transformed through research into concentrated systematized views), then going to the masses with propaganda and explanation in order to transform the views of the masses, and seeing that these [views] are maintained by the masses and carried over into their activities".[1]

The fifth article adds on to the third, highlighting several principles that must be understood by all cadres. First, correct relations should be created between the leading nucleus and the broad masses. Second, correct guiding views can only result from the process of concentrating the views of the masses, and maintaining them among the masses. Third, the general slogan must be combined with particular guidance when the concentrated views are implemented. The consequence of not heeding these principles is bureaucratic separation from the masses, which Mao argues is deeply negative.

The sixth article defines correct guiding views: meaning the general slogan presented to the masses by government. Correct guiding views are “those which are concentrated from the masses then maintained among the masses”.[1] This entails testing the general slogan in particular units, after which one gains new experiences, which can be concentrated and “established as a new guide for the general leadership of the masses".[1] Mao emphasizes that this must be applied to any work a communist undertakes: it is ones efficacy in this action that determines whether they are a great leader.

In the seventh article, Mao argues that all action must be tied to the centre. This is a method to avoid the dangers of bureaucracy by ensuring that each unit of the political chain of command is not isolated from the cause they are working towards (communism).

The eighth article highlights a general principle that Mao deems important.

"According to the concrete historical and environmental conditions of each district, leaders should plan and control the general program and make correct decisions on central tasks and the order of work during a given period, sticking rigidly to this order until definite results are achieved. This is one of the arts of leadership. It is also a problem which must be closely considered in determining methods of leadership, while applying the principles of uniting leadership with the masses and combining the general and the particular".[1]

The ninth article asserts that comrades and party members must develop their own creative abilities. "Creative" appears to be indicative of inventive and rigorous governance, not an equation of leadership with art. Like the eighth article, this serves to counteract bureaucracy by fostering “scientific methods of leadership” to combat the evils of “subjective and bureaucratic... leadership”.[1]

Legacies

A central legacy of Mao's Resolution to the Central Committee was its emphasis on mass line organizational methodology theory, explicitly explained in article four. This was seminal to the CCP in both practice and mythos during Mao's era.[4]

Political mobilization campaigns are also alluded to in the third article. The idea of constantly rotating struggles would become a central means by which the CCP controlled the masses.[5] Counter intuitively, the mass mobilization of the 1949 to 1974 Chinese campaigns were a means by which the principle of mass line was altered: leadership became ideologically absolute and unidirectional, directing the masses towards action.

Additionally, the coordinated yet flexible Marxist political organization outlined in the resolution has been employed by many social movements post Mao. Examples range from the Viet Cong in Vietnam, to Che Guevara in Latin America, to Marxist insurgents in Nepal.[1]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Cheek, Timothy (2002). Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History With Documents (1st ed.). 175 Fifth Avenue New York: PALGRAVE. pp. 117–123. ISBN 978-1-137-08687-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  2. ^ "SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING METHODS OF LEADERSHIP". www.marxists.org. Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  3. ^ Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (2nd ed.). New York: Norton. pp. 64–65. ISBN 978-0-393-92492-3.
  4. ^ Hou, Wei (2019). "The Mass Line and the Reconstruction of the Legitimacy of the Communist Party of China in the New Era". Proceedings of the 2019 International Conference on Advanced Education and Social Science Research (ICAESSR 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press. doi:10.2991/icaessr-19.2019.8. ISBN 978-94-6252-788-1.
  5. ^ Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (2004). Governing China: from revolution through reform (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-92492-3.