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The Haifa bus 37 suicide bombing in March 2003, perpetrated by Hamas, killed 17 passengers, many of them children, teenagers, and students

Palestinian suicide terrorism[1] refers to the use of suicide bombings by Palestinian groups within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, predominantly targeting Israeli civilians, with a smaller proportion aimed at military objectives.[1] This tactic emerged in the 1990s and reached its peak during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), with attacks occurring at various locations, including shopping centers, public buses, nightclubs, and restaurants,[2] resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Israelis.[3]

The majority of Palestinian suicide bombings targeting Israelis have been carried out by radical Palestinian groups,[4] who often recruit potential bombers from outside their ranks, rather than relying on internal members.[5][4] The early 1990s saw Islamist organizations, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), adopt this strategy in reaction to the Oslo Accords, which elevated the PLO's position and sidelined these groups.[6] During the Second Intifada, suicide attacks against Israel intensified and gained widespread Palestinian support, leading to the development of a martyrdom cult.[7] This led to its adoption by other groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Fatah's Tanzim, which sought to leverage the tactic to enhance their own standing.[8][7]

In Palestinian society, suicide bombings are commonly referred to as "martyrdom operations".[9] For many Palestinian suicide bombers, martyrdom represents a fulfillment of religious duty, driven by an Islamist interpretation of Jihad that equates martyrdom with a sacred obligation.[10] This perspective, combined with an animosity toward Jews and a response to perceived national humiliation, renders martyrdom a compelling choice.[11] Bombers are also motivated by a desire for revenge, personal pride and honor, and the promise of spiritual and material rewards in the afterlife.[11] Public support for suicide bombers is reflected in cultural practices such as mass funerals, the naming of public spaces after bombers,[12] and promotion through social media, written media, education, and children's programs.[13]

Suicide bombings in the 1990s and 2000s had an unexpected and severe impact on Israel's home front,[14] profoundly affecting Israeli society and hardening attitudes towards Palestinians as potential peace partners in a two-state solution.[3] The bombings contributed to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to construct the West Bank barrier inside and around the West Bank.[3]

Background

See also: Suicide attack and Islamic terrorism

Since the 1980s, suicide terrorism has emerged as a method of attack in various parts of the world, beginning with high-profile incidents in Lebanon.[15][16] The first modern attack occurred in the 1981 Iraqi Embassy in Beirut by the Islamic Dawa Party, followed by Hezbollah's 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.[16][5] This tactic has since been employed in countries such as India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, the UK, the US, and Yemen.[16] Hezbollah's attacks specifically influenced Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), leading them to adopt similar procedures for selecting and training suicide bombers.[17]

Among Palestinians, suicide bombings are commonly referred to as "martyrdom operations" (Arabic: عمليات استشهادية, romanized: 'amaliyyāt istišhādiyya).[9] This term is used by both radical Islamist groups such as Hamas, as well as more secular organizations such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the PFLP.[18]

Perpetrators

The vast majority of suicide bombings targeting Israelis have been organized by radical Palestinian groups. These organizations tend to recruit potential bombers from outside their own ranks rather than relying on internal members.[4]

Hamas

Hamas, through its military wing Al-Qassam Brigades,[19] has been responsible for numerous suicide attacks since 1993. The group has conducted more suicide attacks and caused more Israeli casualties than any other Palestinian group.[19]

Hamas presents both practical and doctrinal justifications for suicide bombings. Practically, they emphasize the harm and deterrence these attacks inflict on Israeli society. Doctrinally, they glorify martyrdom as the pinnacle of jihad and Islamic belief.[20] The Hamas Covenant articulates the group's goal, stating, "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it." Additionally, Article 7 of the Covenant declares, "The time [of Redemption] will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them, and until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees when the call is raised: 'Oh Muslim, here is a Jew hiding! Come and kill him.'"[21] The group contends that suicide bombings establish a "balance of fear" (tawazun ra'b) against Israel by inflicting significant casualties and psychological distress on Israelis, despite the group's own military limitations. Additionally, Hamas frames these attacks as a testament to "Palestinian innovative genius" ('abqariyyat al-ibda' al-filastini), showcasing their perceived creativity and strategic ingenuity in the ongoing conflict.[20]

Aftermath of the Dizengoff Center suicide bombing, carried out by Hamas in downtown Tel Aviv in March 1996, killing 13 Israelis

The first major attack by Hamas occurred on April 13, 1994, at the Hadera bus station suicide bombing, killing five people.[19] A significant escalation in Hamas’ suicide bombing campaign followed the assassination of bombmaker Yahya Ayyash in January 1996. This led to a surge in attacks until late 1997.[19] During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), Hamas was responsible for approximately 43% of all suicide attacks against Israelis, killing 161 and injuring over 1,100.[19] Ganor writes that from 2000 to 2005, Hamas orchestrated 92 out of 155 total terrorist attacks.[22] Moghadam notes that Hamas has demonstrated a high level of lethality and effectiveness in its attacks, often causing more casualties than other Palestinian groups.[19]

PIJ

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began conducting suicide attacks between 1994 and 1997.[23] The group's attacks primarily targeted civilians within Israel proper, including Jerusalem.[23]

Aftermath of the dual bombings at Beit Lid junction, carried out by the PIJ in January 1995, killing 22

The Ideology of the PIJ was influenced by Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb.[24] Fathi Shiqaqi, a co-founder of PIJ, has advocated the idea that jihad is a personal duty.[25] Former PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah expressed the group's reliance on martyrdom as a tactic, stating, "We have nothing with which to repel the killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives [...] human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs."[26]

The PIJ was behind the Bus 405 suicide attack in 1989, which killed 16 civilians and is considered by some as the first Palestinian suicide attack in Israel.[24] The group's first notable attack occurred on November 11, 1994, when a PIJ member used a bicycle bomb to kill three Israelis. On January 22, 1995, PIJ carried out one of the deadliest attacks in Israeli history with dual bombings at Beit Lid junction, resulting in 19 fatalities. During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), PIJ was responsible for approximately 20% of all successful suicide attacks, killing at least 28 Israelis and injuring 213. The number of attacks by PIJ increased over time, peaking with the Megiddo Junction bus bombing in June 2002, which killed 17 Israelis.[23]

Fatah, Tanzim, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs

During the Second Intifada, Fatah, the primary faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led then by Yasser Arafat, was a major player in the use of suicide terrorism. During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), Fatah has been responsible for nearly a third of all suicide attacks and became the most active organization in terms of the number of attacks on Israelis. The group's strategy involved leveraging the Tanzim and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to provide a secular alternative to Islamist groups like Hamas and PIJ.[27]

The Tanzim, the armed wing of Fatah, was involved in significant violence, particularly following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. The Tanzim's first major suicide attack occurred on January 17, 2002, in Hadera, killed six people and wounded 33 at a bat mitzvah children celebration.[27]

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a faction within Fatah formed after September 2000, emerged during the Second Intifada as a leading group in carrying out suicide attacks. In the early months of 2002, this group was responsible for over half of all suicide attacks, prompting the U.S. State Department to designate it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2002. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are closely linked to Fatah, with many of its members also being part of the Palestinian Authority's security forces.[27]

PFLP

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a secular Marxist–Leninist faction originating from the PLO, carried out a limited number of suicide attacks during the Second Intifada.[27] Under George Habash's leadership, the PFLP's rejection of suicide attacks led to a decline in support. However, after shifting to suicide terrorism and adopting jihadist rhetoric in 2001, the group's support levels quickly recovered.[28] Under the leadership of Ahmad Sa'adat, the PFLP was responsible for several notable incidents, including the assassination of Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze'evi. On February 16, 2002, the PFLP executed a suicide bombing at a mall in Karnei Shomron, resulting in 2 Israeli deaths and 29 injuries. Approximately three weeks later, the PFLP conducted another suicide attack in the settlement of Ariel, injuring 15 individuals.[27]

Individual motives

Martyrdom among Palestinian suicide bombers is often driven by a combination of religious beliefs, nationalistic sentiment, and personal incentives.[4][29][30] Individual motivations for becoming a suicide bomber may stem from various factors, including the desire to attain expected rewards in the afterlife, a drive to seek revenge for the death or injury of a loved one, or a response to the real or perceived humiliation associated with Israeli occupation.[4] The involvement of secular groups like Fatah in organizing suicide attacks indicates that religious fervor is not the sole determinant.[10]

Religious motives

See also: Istishhad

Religious motives are significant among Palestinian suicide bombers. Their influence can be seen in the recruitment practices of groups like Hamas and PIJ, which seek deeply religious individuals. Central to the religious motivation for some Palestinians to engage in suicide missions is the Islamist interpretation of Jihad. Jihad encompasses two main concepts: Jihad al-nafs, the internal struggle for self-control, and Jihad bi al-saif, the armed struggle or "holy war." Islamists dismiss the former as heretical and emphasize the latter as the true "Greater Jihad," supporting their view with Quranic verses that equate warfare with the religious duty of Muslims.[10] Both Hamas and PIJ maintain that jihad in Palestine is fard ayn, a personal duty, rather than fard kifaya, a communal obligation.[31] Radical Islamist groups use terms like "shaheed" (martyr) to describe suicide attackers, contrasting with ordinary suicide, which is forbidden in Islam.[10] The term derives from the Arabic word "shaheda," meaning "to witness," and refers to a martyr who dies bearing witness to their faith or principles.[32] Hamas, in particular, sees martyrdom as a crucial part of Palestinian identity and mobilization, portraying it as the ultimate act of jihad and devotion to Islam.[33]

Additionally, Islamist groups often perceive Israel and the West as significant threats to Islamic values, framing violence, including suicide bombings, as a defensive Jihad against these perceived aggressors. This rhetoric has escalated to calls for violence against Jews more broadly. During the Second Intifada, Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi's rhetoric exemplified this radical view. In an August 2001 sermon at the Sheikh Ijlin Mosque in Gaza, Madhi declared that the Quran identifies Jews as "the greatest enemies of the Islamic nation", asserting that "nothing will deter them except for us voluntarily detonating ourselves in their midst."[10]

Since the early 1990s, and particularly with the onset of the Second Intifada, martyrdom has become increasingly glorified among Palestinians, driven by a tradition in Islam and amplified by modern Islamist leaders. This trend has seen a rise in the willingness of Palestinians to undertake "martyrdom operations" against Israelis, i.e. suicide bombings, as acts of martyrdom.[10] The motivation for martyrdom is further fueled by an Islamist narrative that depicts Westerners, including Israelis, as morally corrupt and cowardly due to their perceived reluctance to sacrifice their lives.[10] In 2001, during the Second Intifada, the mufti of Jerusalem, Ekrima Sa'id Sabri, remarked, "The Muslim embraces death. [...] Look at the society of the Israelis. It is a selfish society that loves life. [...] The Jews will leave this land rather than die, but the Muslim is happy to die." This view leads Islamist figures to seek to prove their bravery by willingly facing death, contrasting their perceived courage with the alleged cowardice of their enemies.[10] Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh echoed this sentiment in March 2002, when he was quoted as saying that "Jews love life more than any other people, and they prefer not to die."[34]

Nationalist motives

Many Palestinian suicide bombers are motivated by nationalist sentiments, joining groups like Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah to fight perceived injustices and defend their land against what they see as encroachment by the "Zionist entity".[35] This sense of injustice associated with the 1948 displacement and the Israeli occupation, drives their willingness to die for their cause. The significance of land and home in Palestinian culture, combined with the feeling of humiliation and frustration, fuels their resolve.[35] Nationalist fervor is also linked to the concept of "national Jihad," which aims to bolster Palestinian identity and pride through "resistance". Suicide bombings are viewed as a potent tactic in asymmetric warfare, designed to instill fear in Israeli society and demonstrate Palestinian resolve.[35]

Hamas spokesmen claimed that suicide bombings instilled significant fear among the "Zionist occupiers".[20] They celebrated the notion that life in Israel had become akin to "hell" and argued that these attacks undermined the Zionist goal of a secure haven for Jews, and led to doubts about Israel's future as well as substantial emigration.[20] Influential Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi stated that "The Palestinian who blows himself up is a person who is defending his homeland. When he attacks an occupier enemy, he is attacking a legitimate target."[36] Former Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, reacting to the 2001 Dolphinarium discotheque massacre, stated on Al Jazeera Media Network that Palestinians "will never approve of the occupation of [their] homeland."[35]

Personal motives

See also: Martyrdom in Palestinian society and Palestinian Authority Martyrs Fund

A significant motivator for suicide bombers is the heightened status they achieve posthumously. In Palestinian society, where honor and dignity are highly valued, becoming a martyr is seen as the highest form of honor. This elevation in status is reinforced by a cult of martyrdom, where martyrs are commemorated with posters, leaflets, and large rallies.[37] For many young Palestinians, this glorification and the associated fame may make martyrdom seem like a way to attain significant social status and recognition.[37]

One motivation cited for Palestinian suicide bombers is the belief in rewards in the afterlife, including the promise of marrying seventy-two black-eyed virgins, known as Houris. Pictured: A 15th-century manuscript depiction of Houris in paradise

Another motivator for suicide bombers is the promise of rewards in the afterlife, as described in Islamic teachings, including various hadiths.[37][38][31][a] These rewards include forgiveness of sins, protection from hell, a crown of glory, marriage to seventy-two virgins ("houris"), and the ability to extend these privileges to seventy relatives.[37][31] These promises create a strong incentive for individuals to undertake martyrdom, viewing it as a way to trade their limited earthly possessions for the luxurious rewards promised in paradise.[37] Statements from individuals and reports indicate that many are convinced of these promised rewards, which significantly influences their willingness to undertake martyrdom.[37] Some suicide bombers have even taken steps, like wrapping toilet paper around their genitals, to preserve their ability to enjoy these rewards.[37] Palestinian media has framed martyrdom in terms of marriage to virgins, further solidifying this expectation.[37]

Another significant motivator for suicide bombers is the financial and social support provided to their families following the attack. Suicide bombers' families often receive substantial cash payments, ranging from $1,000 to several thousand dollars, from organizations such as Hamas or the PIJ, and occasionally from external supporters.[37] In 2002, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein reportedly offered up to $25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.[39] This financial support, combined with the elevated social status bestowed upon the family due to the martyrdom of their member, leads to significant improvements in their living conditions and public standing.[37] However, while economic hardship can drive some Palestinians to seek martyrdom, it alone does not fully explain the phenomenon. Economic deprivation has been a long-standing issue, and some suicide bombers come from relatively affluent families.[40] Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation found that nearly 60% of suicide bombers recruited by Hamas and Islamic Jihad had education beyond high school, whereas less than 15% of the general adult male Palestinian population did. Additionally, these bombers were significantly less likely to come from impoverished backgrounds compared to their peers.[41]

Another key motivator for suicide bombers is the desire for revenge. In a region heavily affected by conflict, many Palestinians are driven by personal losses and seek to avenge the deaths or injuries of close friends or family members. Revenge is a powerful motivator, often expressed during funeral processions and reflected in the personal testimonies of bombers who admit that avenging fallen loved ones was a primary reason for their actions.[37] Interviews conducted by Brym and Araj with the families and friends of Palestinian suicide bombers suggest that these individuals do not exhibit higher levels of depression than what is typically observed in the general population.[42][5]

Research by Kimhi and Even identifies four profiles of Palestinian suicide bombers. One type is the "exploited suicide bomber," driven by personal crises or a desire to atone for perceived sins such as extramarital relationships, homosexuality, or cooperation with Israel. Another profile is the "seeking retribution for suffering" bomber.[38]

Recruitment, training and planning

Recruitment

Recruitment for suicide missions by Palestinians groups generally involves a selective process where potential candidates are chosen based on their religious commitment, loyalty, and ability to maintain secrecy. Palestinian groups prefer to identify and approach individuals who have already demonstrated strong ideological alignment. Recruiters often target students and young people in mosques, universities, social activities, and in Israeli prisons. Candidates are scrutinized for their ability to handle psychological pressure, their personal and family backgrounds, and their criminal records.[43]

Training

The training for suicide bombers typically lasts from several weeks to months and is designed to prepare candidates practically, mentally and spiritually. It begins with rigorous indoctrination, involving classes on specific Quranic and Hadith teachings about martyrdom and the afterlife, as well as exposure to anti-Israeli propaganda. Candidates also undergo spiritual purification through fasting, extensive prayer, and seeking forgiveness for past sins. The process also includes psychological conditioning, with evaluations to ensure candidates are not clinically depressed or suicidal but are genuinely committed. Practical training includes handling and assembling explosive devices, performing detonations, and practicing escape routes, often through simulated missions to ensure familiarity with procedures and equipment.[43]

Planning

Targets have included shopping centers, public buses, nightclubs, eateries, and places frequented by teenagers and children. Pictured: The Dizengoff Street bus bombing in central Tel Aviv, 1994, which killed 22 civilians

The planning of suicide attacks is executed with utmost secrecy and strict compartmentalization. This detailed process involves gathering intelligence, procuring weapons—often smuggled from Egypt or Iran—and organizing logistics. The planning is divided into specific roles: organizational leadership sets strategic goals, operators manage the selection and preparation of bombers, and aides handle material acquisition and logistical support.[43] In some cases, foreign countries have been involved in training and planning Palestinian suicide bombings. For instance, after his arrest in 1996, Hasan Salama, a senior Hamas member, admitted that he had been trained in Iran to prepare for attacks against Israeli targets.[44]

As the mission approaches, candidates typically disappear from their homes and families to avoid detection. They undergo final intensive training and briefings about their specific attack. In the days before the mission, candidates often record a final message, which may include a declaration of their intent and a call for others to follow their example. These recordings are usually made against the backdrop of the organizational symbols and often include religious elements.[43]

Bombers are typically given disguises, such as Jewish religious clothing, Israeli military uniforms, or tourist clothing, and are instructed to target crowded public places while avoiding security checkpoints.[43] Targets have included shopping centers, public buses, nightclubs, eateries, and places popular with teenagers and children.[2] Final preparations include writing a will, performing religious rites, and finalizing operational details.[43]

Bruce Hoffman notes that Palestinian suicide bombings have been strategically employed to provoke a response from Israel that can be used for propaganda.[45] Hamas used suicide attacks to provoke an aggressive response from Israel, aiming to present its violence as defensive and superior to that of rival Palestinian groups.[46] This approach seeks to garner international sympathy for the terrorists and critique the Israeli reaction, thereby shaping both public opinion and international support.[45]

Involvement of women

Islamic groups initially excluded women from active participation in suicide bombings. However, this changed during the Second Intifada as groups like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades began to utilize female suicide bombers. By 2003, Palestinian Islamic Jihad took responsibility for two female bombers.[47] Eventually, Hamas also recognized female martyrs,[47] in what has been described by the group as a "significant evolution."[48] The first among them was Reem Riyashi, a young mother of two, who carried out the Erez Crossing bombing in January 2004.[47][49]

Several scholars observed that the recruitment of female suicide bombers by Palestinian groups was driven by the need to bypass Israeli security measures and checkpoint barriers.[48] There have also been reports of Palestinian women who, under psychological or physical coercion, were driven to carry out suicide attacks due to the perceived dishonor they brought upon their families.[50]

Foreign influence

The influence of Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia organization, is evident in the suicide attacks conducted by both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Both groups adopted Hezbollah's procedures for selecting and training suicide bombers, including psychological preparation, writing farewell letters, and making videotapes.[17] Khaled Meshal, Hamas’s political leader, stated in July 2000, "We always have the Lebanese experiment before our eyes... It was a great model of which we are proud."[46] Fathi Shiqaqi, founder of the PIJ, said he developed a plan for "exceptional" martyrdom operations based on Hezbollah's theological justifications.[46] PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah acknowledged that the group's suicide bombings were influenced by Hezbollah's 1983 bombings.[26]

Comparative research

Comparing Palestinian bombings to those carried out by other groups highlights several differences in tactics and target selection. Palestinian suicide attacks predominantly aimed at civilians and were often conducted by newly recruited members. In contrast, in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers primarily targeted military objectives or high-profile civilian figures and employed a specialized unit known as the Black Tigers specifically for these operations.[5]

Palestinian public opinion

Among Palestinians, suicide attacks are typically followed by demonstrations of support, the distribution of pamphlets, and large funerals attended by hundreds or thousands of supporters.[12] Instead of grieving, families are encouraged to celebrate the deaths of their loved ones.[32] Additionally, streets, schools, and public squares are often named in honor of the deceased martyrs.[12] The culture of martyrdom is deeply embedded, evident in various forms including naming sports tournaments after suicide bombers or featuring dramas about figures like the bomb maker Yahya Ayyash.[51]

Mural of Ayat al-Akhras, a teenage suicide bomber who killed two people in a Jerusalem supermarket in 2002, displayed at a girls' school in her hometown of Dheisheh

Palestinian organizations have used various methods to promote their activities, including displaying posters of suicide bombers in communities, sharing videos and photos of martyrs on social media, employing imams to incite violence in mosques, integrating such messages into the education system, and organizing summer camps where children receive training in weapon use and survival skills.[13] Victor notes that Palestinian children as young as six often express a wish to become martyrs, although they may not fully comprehend its significance. By twelve, they usually have a clearer understanding and are more committed to the idea.[52]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has also supported the commemoration of suicide bombers, reflecting a growing unity among Palestinians around this practice.[53] In 2002, the Palestinian Authority named a soccer tournament after Abdel Baset Odeh, the Hamas suicide bomber responsible for the Passover massacre that killed 30 people during the Passover Seder in Netanya. While other tournaments had been named after Palestinian suicide bombers, this was the first instance of such an honor being given by the PA to a Hamas affiliate.[53]

Before 1996, public support for suicide bombings among Palestinians was below 30 percent.[54] By 1999, support for 'martyrdom operations' was 26.1%, but it rose to 66.2% three months into the Second Intifada.[55] In the summer of 2001, support for suicide bombings peaked at over 70%, according to a Palestinian Center for Public Opinion poll. By the summer of 2002, this support had decreased slightly but remained strong, with more than two-thirds of Palestinians endorsing such attacks.[56]

See also: List of Palestinian suicide attacks

Overview

The aftermath of the PIJ suicide bombing at the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv, June 2001, which killed 21 people, mostly teenagers

The emergence of Palestinian suicide bombings in the 1990s represented a significant escalation in violence compared to the earlier First Intifada (1987–1993).[5] Almost all Palestinian suicide bombings targeted civilians,[2][5] and were carried out by newly recruited members.[5] Between 1993 and early August 2002, over 135 Palestinian suicide bombers carried out attacks targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers.[15]

One of the most devastating attacks of the Second Intifada was the 2002 Passover massacre, when a Hamas-affiliated bomber, disguised as a woman, detonated an explosive device in the dining room of a hotel during seder. The attack killed 30 guests and injured 140 others

Overall, during the Second Intifada, from September 2000 to February 2005, there were approximately 116 suicide attacks carried out by 127 bombers.[57] Notable among these was the Dolphinarium discotheque massacre in June 2001, when a PIJ suicide bomber detonated at a Tel Aviv nightclub, killing 21 people, most of whom were teenagers.[14] Another significant attack was the Passover massacre in March 2002, when Hamas-affiliated Abd al-Bassat Ouda, disguised as a woman, detonated a ten-kilogram bomb in the dining room of the Park Hotel in Netanya during Passover seder, killing 30 guests and injuring 140 others.[58] In March 2002 alone there were 23 attacks, resulting in 135 Israeli deaths.[59] Palestinian suicide terrorism reached its zenith during this year, and then saw a gradual decline, with attacks ceasing by 2005.[60]

On August 18, 2024, an attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, claimed by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, resulted in the bomber's death and wounded a passerby. The bombing, which detonated prematurely near a local synagogue, is one of the rare instances of such attacks in Israel since the Second Intifada and may be the first suicide attack since 2016.[61][3]

During the Second Intifada, the typical expense of a suicide bombing was around $150. Despite this low cost, such attacks resulted in six times more deaths and approximately twenty-six times more casualties than other forms of terrorism.[62]

Geographic origins

Palestinian suicide terrorism largely stemmed from urban centers and adjacent refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Jenin has been described as the 'capital' of Palestinian suicide terrorism, with attacks originating from the city responsible for the deaths of 124 people.[63] According to Israeli intelligence, Hamas primarily operated from the northern West Bank, notably around Nablus, while the Islamic Jihad focused its activities in Jenin. Although both groups maintained a presence in Gaza, their operations were limited by the Gaza Strip’s surrounding fence, confining their attacks to local targets such as soldiers, security personnel, and settlers.[63]

Geographic distribution

Kliot and Charney's study of 120 Palestinian suicide attacks from 1994 to September 2005 shows that most attacks targeted major Israeli cities, with Jerusalem experiencing the highest number (30), followed by Tel Aviv (11), and Haifa (7). Smaller cities and towns also suffered attacks, including Netanya (6) and cities in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area (10).[63] Around 65% of the attacks occurred in cities, reflecting their accessibility and potential to cause mass casualties. The remainder of the attacks took place in the Gaza Strip (14), the West Bank (7) and smaller, less logical targets, often due to planning limitations or proximity to Palestinian centers in the West Bank. Attacks in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were minimal, likely due to strong security measures.[63]

Impact and aftermath

Counterterrorism

Further information: Operation Defensive Shield, Targeted killing by Israel, and Israeli West Bank barrier
In 2002, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in Palestinian urban centers. Photo taken in Jenin, a major center for suicide terrorism during this period

Israel has preferred targeted assassinations to address suicide terrorism, believing that capturing their targets alive would result in higher Israeli casualties.[64] In 1995, Israel carried out assassinations of key militant leaders, such as PIJ's Fathi Shiqaqi in Malta in October 1995 and Hamas' Yahya Ayyash three months later. Ayyash, known as "the Engineer," was a master bomb maker responsible for numerous attacks and had first proposed using suicide bombings. His death, however, led to another wave of attacks.[46] Following a surge of suicide bombings in early 1996, the Israeli government established an extensive and costly security system to protect borders, roads, and key installations. This included new security units focused on public transport and school security.[65]

In early 2002, a wave of terror attacks culminating in the deadly Passover massacre challenged Israeli PM Ariel Sharon's deterrence-based strategy, as the violence intensified despite Israeli military efforts. Sharon's response evolved from targeted assassinations to a more comprehensive approach aimed at dismantling terrorist infrastructure.[66] This led to Operation Defensive Shield, which involved reoccupying areas under Palestinian Authority control to counteract terrorism.[66] The operation targeted the infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism across six major cities, including Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Jenin, with the latter—being a major source of terrorism—experiencing intense fighting.[14] Yasser Arafat was isolated in his Ramallah headquarters, which remained under siege until 2004, and his authority declined.[14] Despite the operation's success in degrading terrorist capabilities, attacks continued, leading to increased public pressure for the construction of the West Bank barrier, which began in 2002.[67]

Political outcomes

The attacks hardened Israeli public attitudes toward Palestinians as potential partners in a two-state peace agreement.[3]

The 1990s saw Hamas using suicide bombings to disrupt the Oslo Accords and the peace process, aiming to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and polarize Israeli politics.[68] Within a month of the Oslo Accords signing, Hamas launched a new series of bombings that killed twenty-six Israelis and injured many more. This violent response conveyed Hamas's position that peace and security could not be achieved "unless and until Hamas [was] recognized and its demands [were] met."[69]

In 1996, a series of devastating Hamas suicide bombings, which resulted in significant casualties and nearly half the death toll from the previous two years, is often credited with shaping the results of the 1996 Israeli general election. The bombings intensified public fear and shifted voter sentiment, contributing to Benjamin Netanyahu's victory over Shimon Peres. Netanyahu's hard-line stance on security became more appealing to voters.[17] When Netanyahu began his term, he focused his political agenda on combating terrorism. Unlike the previous government's approach of addressing terrorism and peace separately, Netanyahu's policy emphasized pursuing peace only in the absence of terror.[70]

Inspiration for other Islamist groups

The use of suicide bombing by Palestinian Islamist groups is believed to have influenced organizations such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda.[71] Al-Qaeda, a transnationalist Islamist group, employed this tactic in high-profile attacks, including the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen, and ultimately the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001. The latter marked a significant escalation in global terrorism, prompting widespread security reforms and further legitimizing the jihadi movement, attracting more foreign fighters to Al-Qaeda.[71]

Changing tactics

Following the Second Intifada, Hamas shifted from using suicide bombings to focusing on rocket attacks against Israel. By 2005, Hamas began adopting a strategy similar to Hezbollah's, leveraging Iranian support and smuggling routes to build a significant rocket arsenal.[72] In 2006–2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip from Fatah and began ruling the territory. Operational challenges, such as the Gaza–Israel barrier and enhanced Israeli intelligence, limited the effectiveness of traditional suicide attacks. Consequently, Hamas adopted rocket fire against Israeli urban centers as a primary strategy, leading to substantial disruption and casualties in southern Israel and posing an ongoing threat to a larger civilian population.[72] Between Hamas' takeover in 2007 and 2023, the group engaged in several wars with Israel.[73]

A significant shift occurred in late 2023 when Hamas led the October 7 attack on Israel, killing around 1,200 people, including children, the elderly, and 364 young people at the Nova music festival. The attacks involved multiple cases of rape and sexual violence, and the group took more than 250 hostages to Gaza. This event triggered the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.[74]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Prominent examples include Quran 2:154, which states, "And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah 'dead.' Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not," and Quran 9:111, which says, "Surely Allah has bought from the believers their persons and their property—theirs (in return) is the Garden. They fight in Allah's way, so they slay and are slain."

Citations

  1. ^ a b Moghadam 2003, p. 65; Pedahzur, Perliger & Weinberg 2003, p. 419; Kliot & Charney 2006, pp. 353, 359, 361; Cohen 2016, p. 753; Aran 2023
  2. ^ a b c Pedahzur 2006, p. 42.
  3. ^ a b c d e Mpoke Bigg & Sobelman 2024.
  4. ^ a b c d e Moghadam 2003, p. 68.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g Horowitz 2015, p. 72.
  6. ^ Gupta & Mundra 2005, p. 578; Nanninga 2019, p. 7; Hoffman 2017, pp. 159–160; Siniver 2023, p. 279
  7. ^ a b Nanninga 2019, p. 7.
  8. ^ Gupta & Mundra 2005, p. 578.
  9. ^ a b Merari et al. 2010, p. 118.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h Moghadam 2003, pp. 69–71.
  11. ^ a b Moghadam 2003, p. 87.
  12. ^ a b c Pedahzur 2006, pp. 30–31.
  13. ^ a b Ganor 2015, pp. 76–77.
  14. ^ a b c d Siniver 2023, p. 161–162.
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  16. ^ a b c Ganor 2015, pp. 142–143.
  17. ^ a b c Hoffman 2017, pp. 159–160.
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  19. ^ a b c d e f Moghadam 2003, pp. 78–80.
  20. ^ a b c d Litvak 2010, pp. 724–725.
  21. ^ Hoffman 2017, p. 94.
  22. ^ Ganor 2015, p. 157.
  23. ^ a b c Moghadam 2003, pp. 81–82.
  24. ^ a b Siniver 2023, p. 300.
  25. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 64.
  26. ^ a b Hatina 2014, pp. 99.
  27. ^ a b c d e Moghadam 2003, pp. 82–83.
  28. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 45.
  29. ^ Soibelman 2004, pp. 88–89.
  30. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 62.
  31. ^ a b c Pedahzur 2006, pp. 64–65.
  32. ^ a b Fierke 2009, pp. 167–168.
  33. ^ Litvak 2010, pp. 716.
  34. ^ Hoffman 2017, pp. 164.
  35. ^ a b c d Moghadam 2003, pp. 74–75.
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  38. ^ a b Pedahzur 2006, pp. 90–92.
  39. ^ Horowitz 2015, pp. 79.
  40. ^ Moghadam 2003, pp. 75–76.
  41. ^ Berrebi 2007.
  42. ^ Brym & Araj 2012, pp. 79.
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  44. ^ Ganor 2015, p. 70.
  45. ^ a b Pedahzur 2006, p. 43.
  46. ^ a b c d Hoffman 2017, pp. 159.
  47. ^ a b c Pedahzur 2006, p. 47.
  48. ^ a b Thomas 2021, pp. 775–776.
  49. ^ McGreal 2004.
  50. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 21.
  51. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 99.
  52. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 38.
  53. ^ a b Midlarsky 2004, p. 188.
  54. ^ Gupta & Mundra 2005, pp. 590.
  55. ^ Fierke 2009, p. 172.
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  57. ^ Pedahzur 2006, p. 56.
  58. ^ Ganor 2015, p. 111; Siniver 2023, pp. 161–162
  59. ^ Ganor 2015, p. 111.
  60. ^ Halder 2020, pp. 49–50.
  61. ^ Fabian 2024.
  62. ^ Hoffman 2017, pp. 141.
  63. ^ a b c d Kliot & Charney 2006, pp. 360–361.
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  67. ^ Ganor 2021, pp. 216–218.
  68. ^ Siniver 2023, p. 279; Hoffman 2017, pp. 159–160
  69. ^ Hoffman 2017, pp. 158.
  70. ^ Ganor 2021, pp. 166.
  71. ^ a b Halder 2020, pp. 107.
  72. ^ a b Ganor 2015, pp. 163–164.
  73. ^ BBC What Is Hamas 2024; Siniver 2023, p. 279
  74. ^ BBC What Is Hamas 2024.

Bibliography

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