Jump to content

Preterintention

Add links
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Emperor Hadrian on the Lex Cornelia and preterintentional killing
Utopian attempt to reconcile praeter intentionem crime with the principle of subjective responsibility: possible only by concealing the doctrine of illicit versa in re through presumed guilt

The term "Preter intentionem" (also spelled "praeter intentionem") is a legal Latin phrase that means "beyond intention".[1]

Therefore, committing a crime "praeter intentionem"[2] means having committed an involuntary crime that was more serious than the crime that was intended.[3]

Origin and historical application

[edit]

In legal penal terminology the Praeterintention is a typical expression application of criminal conviction for strict liability,[4] often traced back to the doctrine of "versari in re illicita",[5] and had found application both in the criminal law of ancient Rome,[6][7] and in the canon law of the Roman Church.[8][9]

In fact, in the criminal law of ancient Rome,[10][11] the author of a voluntary criminal conduct who, against his will, had caused a different and more serious crime, but causally connected (causal link)[12] to said willful conduct, was punished for the unintended crime without it being, concretely, necessary to ascertain an incautious conduct with respect to the latter:[13] For the preterintentional crime thus committed, the model of objective responsibility was applied (it was sufficient to ascertain the voluntary conduct, and that because of this the involuntary unintentional crime had occurred.[14]

Structure of the preterintentional crime

[edit]

Conduct

[edit]

The preterintentional crime can be committed through an intentional act or omission,[15] which does not necessarily have to achieve the minor crime intended by the guilty party (then absorbed by the more serious and ultraintentional event: for example, in voluntary injury with involuntary fatal outcome, the injury is absorbed by unintentional homicide, because a subject cannot be punished twice for the same act;[16] the law determines the penalty to be inflicted taking into account the crime intended and the crime committed beyond the intention),[17] but rather can stop at a mere intentional attempt at a crime: so that the judge can condemn the agent for the preterintentional crime produced and causally linked to the aforementioned voluntary conduct, even if only attempted (Example: Tizio with a threatening attitude makes a sudden movement of his arms with a closed hand towards Caio, and the latter with a reflex movement avoids the blow but stumbles and, falling to the ground, hits his head and dies; the voluntary crime of beating against Caio is only attempted and not consummated, but Tizio is still responsible for the preterintentional homicide of Caio).[18]

The aforementioned malicious attempt, in addition to being sufficient,[19] is also indispensable for the agent to be convicted of a preterintentional crime.[20]

Conversely, an attempted preterintentional crime is not logically configurable:[21] since if the preterintentional event does not materialize, one cannot speak of a preterintentional crime: the agent would be responsible only for the minor crime intentionally sought, because the perpetrator commits only the intended crime and not other involuntary crimes.[22]

Psychological element

[edit]

Some countries (Austria) in order to adapt preterintention to the principle of subjective responsibility (No one can be punished criminally unless as a result of voluntary or at least reckless, negligent or unskilled responsibility),[23] consider preterintention as a form of mental state mixed: the intent supports the conduct of minor crime, and fault should mark the unwanted ultraintentional event.[24]

In the United States, faithful to the ontological nature of preterintention,[25] it is considered a form of intentional crime,[26] aggravated by the unintentional event which is attributed to the author even if he did not want the event, thus introducing a form of objective responsibility.[27][28]

Preterintentional crimes in the strict sense (stricto sensu)

[edit]

Preterintentional killing

[edit]

The main example of this form of liability is preterintentional killing,[29] which occurs when a person, with actions aimed at hitting or harming, unintentionally causes the death of a person:[30] the agent will be liable for objective responsibility (or fault, for the laws that require it) for the death event:[31] (Example: Tizio argues with Caio and intentionally punches him, Caio falls to the ground and dies: Tizio only wanted to punch him and absolutely did not want to kill him).[32]

In praeterintentional homicide the term "killing" is used and not that of "murder" (as in intentional homicide), in order to underline the agent's unwillingness to kill.[33]

Preterintentional homicide can mature under certain factual circumstances, and therefore the penalty will be aggravated according to the type of circumstance ascertained by the judge: for example, the Italian[34] legislator regulates the aggravating circumstances of preterintentional killing in art. 585 penal code,[35] and the French[36] one in art. 222-8 penal code.[37]

Preterintentional abortion

[edit]

Another hypothesis expressly provided for by the law is preterintentional abortion,[38] which occurs when the agent, with actions aimed at causing injury, causes, as an unintended effect, the interruption of pregnancy:[39] (Example: Tizio argues with Mevia and intentionally punches her, Mevia falls to the ground and miscarries: Tizio only wanted to punch Mevia, and absolutely did not want to cause the miscarriage of the child in her womb).

Preterintentional crimes in a broad sense (lato sensu)

[edit]

Crimes aggravated by the event

[edit]

Then there are the preterintentional crimes in the broad sense:[40] intentional crimes aggravated by an unwanted harmful or dangerous event,[41] which reproduce the typical preterintentional criminal progression:[42] intentional unlawful conduct that produces an more serious involuntary crime:[43] (Example: Tizio intentionally slaps his daughter Filena, and Filena suffers serious injuries so much so that she goes to the hospital; in the following days Filena dies from complications from infections on the injuries sustained).[44]

Preterintentional crimes regulated in various states of the world

[edit]

The crimes committed preterintentionally are presents in all penal systems of the world:[45] cases in which someone commits an preterintentional offence must be regulated, as a legal protection vacuum is unacceptable;[46][47] just to give some examples of countries that have regulated crimes committed beyond intention: in Italy the preterintentional homicide (art. 584 penal code),[48] in Germany the crime of bodily harm resulting in death (art. 227 penal code),[49] in France the fatal violence (art. 222-7 penal code),[50] in Spain, Sweden and Switzerland they have been transformed by from a single crime into two crimes in concourse: voluntary crime and involuntary crime,[51][52] in the Netherlands an lethal injury (art. 302 s.2 DPC);[53] and preterintentional killing is also present in the legal system of Eastern Europe,[54] South America,[55][56] in the US,[57][58][59] in the UK,[60] in Africa[61][62] and in other countries.[63][64]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Stone, Jon R. (2003-09-02). More Latin for the Illiterati: A Guide to Medical, Legal and Religious Latin. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-96195-4.
  2. ^ Napodano, Gabriele (1878). Il diritto penale romano nelle sue attenenze col diritto penale moderno (in Italian). G. de Angelis e figlio.
  3. ^ Carrara Programma Parte Speciale (in Italian). 1872.
  4. ^ Varela, Lorena (2012). Strict-Liability como forma de imputación jurídico-penal (PDF). University Pompeu Fabra.
  5. ^ Asworth, Andrew (2013). "Principles of Criminal Law" (PDF). pp. 24 of 37. This has a Latin tag, versari in re illicita, and in its widest form it argues that anyone who decides to transgress the criminal law should be held liable for all the consequences that ensue, even if they are more serious than expected.
  6. ^ Saripolos, Nikolaos J. (1868). Systema tes en Helladi ischyuses poinekes nomothesias ... (in Greek). Phopulos.
  7. ^ Santalucia, Bernardo (1994). Studi di diritto penale romano (in Italian). L'ERMA di BRETSCHNEIDER. ISBN 978-88-7062-864-7.
  8. ^ Myrcha, Marianus-Alphonsus. "De lege ferenda in iure poenali canonico" (PDF).
  9. ^ Marchal, Jean-Louis (2011). "La complicité en droit pénal canonique : décryptage du canon 1329". L'Année canonique (in French). LIII (1): 131–162. doi:10.3917/cano.053.0131. ISSN 0570-1953.
  10. ^ Landucci, Lando (1886). Storia del diritto romano: dalle origini fino a Giustiniano; corso scolastico secondo il vigente regolamento per la facoltà di giurisprudenza (in Italian). Sacchetto.
  11. ^ Cantarella, Eva; Dauzat, Pierre-Emmanuel (2003-03-05). Ithaque: De la vengeance d'Ulysse à la naissance du droit (in French). Albin Michel. ISBN 978-2-226-33069-7.
  12. ^ La Giustizia penale: rivista mensile di dottrina, giurisprudenza e legislazione (in Italian). Città di Castello. 1948.
  13. ^ Lebigre, Arlette (1967-01-01). Quelques aspects de la responsabilité pénale en droit romain classique (in French). (Presses universitaires de France) réédition numérique FeniXX. ISBN 978-2-7059-1189-8.
  14. ^ Ferrini, Contardo (1899). ... Diritto penale romano: teorie generali esposte (in Italian). Hoepli.
  15. ^ Ramacci, Fabrizio (2016-11-25). I delitti di omicidio (in Italian). Giappichelli. ISBN 978-88-921-0521-8.
  16. ^ Buckley, Carla M.; Kamber, Krešimir; McCormick, Pamela; Harris, David J. (2022-11-23). The European Convention on Human Rights – Principles and Law. Council of Europe. ISBN 978-92-871-9191-5.
  17. ^ Ronco, Mauro (2017-08-30). Scritti patavini: Due tomi indivisibili (in Italian). Giappichelli. ISBN 978-88-921-0693-2.
  18. ^ de Asúa, Luis Jimenez (2023-12-12). Principios de derecho penal la ley y el delito: La ley del delito (in Spanish). Ediciones Olejnik. ISBN 978-956-407-261-6.
  19. ^ Elliott, Catherine (2001-05-01). French Criminal Law. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-99314-6.
  20. ^ Horder, Jeremy (2007-12-10). Homicide Law in Comparative Perspective. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84731-385-0.
  21. ^ Gallo, Marco (2017). Moralités: Bemerkungen zum Strafrecht. Aus dem Italienischen von Thomas Vormbaum (in German). LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN 978-3-643-90876-6.
  22. ^ Fabio, Basile (2015-01-28). I delitti contro la vita e l'incolumità individuale (in Italian). CEDAM. ISBN 978-88-13-35514-2.
  23. ^ "Twelveth international congress of penal law (Hamburg, 16 – 22 September 1979)". Revue internationale de droit pénal (in French). 86 (1–2): 323–334. 2015. doi:10.3917/ridp.861.0323. ISSN 0223-5404.
  24. ^ Maiwald, Manfred (2009). Einführung in das italienische Strafrecht und Strafprozessrecht (in German). Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-58451-4.
  25. ^ Weinreb, Lloyd (1986-07-01). "Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility". Law and Contemporary Problems. 49 (3): 47–80. doi:10.2307/1191625. ISSN 0023-9186. JSTOR 1191625.
  26. ^ Zamboni, Mauro (2018-11-01). Teoría evolutiva y positivismo jurídico : un matrimonio posible (in Spanish). Universidad Externado. ISBN 978-958-790-096-5.
  27. ^ Asworth, Andrew (2013). "Principles of Criminal Law" (PDF). pp. 25 of 39. John Gardner originally argued that if the criminal law puts D on notice that this will be the consequence, the requirements of the rule of law are fulfilled
  28. ^ Crump, David (1985). In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine. South Texas College of Law.
  29. ^ Pin, Xavier (2023-10-12). Droit pénal général 2024 15ed (in French). Groupe Lefebvre Dalloz. ISBN 978-2-247-22928-4.
  30. ^ Cadoppi, Alberto; Canestrari, Stefano; Manna, Adelmo; Papa, Michele (2022-06-07). Diritto penale (in Italian). UTET Giuridica. ISBN 978-88-598-2526-5.
  31. ^ Lambinet (dir.), France; Collectif (2017-08-23). L'élément moral en droit: Une vision transversale (in French). Anthemis. ISBN 978-2-8072-0104-0.
  32. ^ Trapani, Mario (2022-12-30). Il reato e le sue conseguenze. Punibilità, pena, punizione in un sistema criminale integrale e integrato (in Italian). Roma TrE-Press. ISBN 979-12-5977-141-4.
  33. ^ Lucchini, Luigi (1896). Studi illustrativi del Codice penale italiano (in Italian). Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese.
  34. ^ Ramacci, Fabrizio; Spangher, Giorgio (2010). Il sistema della sicurezza pubblica (in Italian). Giuffrè Editore. ISBN 978-88-14-15787-5.
  35. ^ "Art. 585 codice penale - Circostanze aggravanti". Brocardi.it (in Italian). Retrieved 2024-09-01.
  36. ^ Elliott, Catherine (2001-05-01). French Criminal Law. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-99314-6.
  37. ^ "Article 222-8 - Code pénal - Légifrance". www.legifrance.gouv.fr. Retrieved 2024-08-24.
  38. ^ ljusadmin (2019-07-05). "Preterintentional abortion". L-JUS (in Italian). Retrieved 2024-08-20.
  39. ^ Villalba, Jaime Lombana (2007). Derecho penal y responsabilidad médica (in Spanish). Universidad del Rosario. ISBN 978-958-8235-74-5.
  40. ^ Ramacci, Fabrizio (2016-11-25). I delitti di omicidio (in Italian). Giappichelli. ISBN 978-88-921-0521-8.
  41. ^ "Crimes aggravated by the event" (PDF).
  42. ^ Trapani, Mario. "La divergenza tra il "voluto" e il "realizzazione"" (PDF).
  43. ^ Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus (2023-08-14). Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (in German). UTB. ISBN 978-3-8252-6114-6.
  44. ^ Bell, John; Boyron, Sophie; Whittaker, Simon (2008). Principles of French Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954138-6.
  45. ^ Reed, Alan; Bohlander, Michael (2018-10-03). Homicide in Criminal Law: A Research Companion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-01629-2.
  46. ^ Dinh, Anne-Marie Ho (2007). "The "Legal Vacuum" and the "Necessity of Law": For a Return to the Hypothesis of Non-Law". L'Année sociologique (in French). 57 (2): 419–453. ISSN 0066-2399.
  47. ^ Savigny, Friedrich Carl von (1831). Of the vocation of our age for legislation and jurisprudence. Tr. by A. Hayward.
  48. ^ ROBERTO, BARTOLI; MARCO, PELISSERO; SERGIO, SEMINARA (2022-09-28). Diritto penale (in Italian). Giappichelli. ISBN 978-88-921-4388-3.
  49. ^ Hochmayr, Gudrun; Gropp, Walter (2021-06-24). Die Verjährung als Herausforderung für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen: Entwicklung eines Harmonisierungsvorschlags (in German). Nomos Verlag. ISBN 978-3-7489-2653-5.
  50. ^ Canin, Patrick (2024-01-17). Fondamentaux - Droit pénal général 2024 (in French). Hachette Éducation. ISBN 978-2-01-723570-5.
  51. ^ Pradel, Jean (2016-09-14). Droit pénal comparé. 4e éd (in French). Editis - Interforum. ISBN 978-2-247-15085-4.
  52. ^ Massaro, Antonella; Riera, Jaime Miguel Peris (2023-02-15). Derecho penal, inteligencia artificial y neurociencias/Diritto penale, intelligenza artificiale e neuroscienze (in Spanish). Roma TrE-Press. ISBN 979-12-5977-149-0.
  53. ^ Reed, Alan; Bohlander, Michael (2018-10-03). Homicide in Criminal Law: A Research Companion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-01629-2.
  54. ^ "Jurnal of law 2017".
  55. ^ Méndez, Alfonso Gómez; Monguí, Pablo Elías González (2020-08-31). Delitos contra la vida y la integridad personal (in Spanish). U. Externado de Colombia. ISBN 978-958-790-337-9.
  56. ^ Ramon, Rafael. "PRETERINTENT IN VENEZUELAN CRIMINAL LEGISLATION".
  57. ^ United States Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1971). Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. Government Printing Office.
  58. ^ Varela, Lorena (2016). "Strict-Liability como forma de imputación jurídico-penal". Indret: Revista Para el Análisis del Derecho (3): 19–26.
  59. ^ Plantamura, Vito (2016-01-01). "Preterintentional homicide". Pisa University Press.
  60. ^ Asworth, Andrew (2013). "Principles of Criminal Law" (PDF). pp. 38 of 57, 41 of 57. [...] there are cases where it is plain that D intended to cause a different result from the one which actually occurred. How ought the law to deal with such cases? Should it respect D's choice, and provide for a conviction of attempting to do X (which was what D intended to do)? Or should it regard the result as the dominant factor, ignore the difference in D's intention, and convict on the basis of 'sufficient similarity' between the intention and the result? English law adopts the latter, more pragmatic approach. The Law Commission, in introducing a provision into the Draft Criminal Code which follows the traditional approach, confirms the emphasis on results by stating that a conviction for attempt would be 'inappropriate as not describing the harm done adequately for labelling or sentencing purposes', The traditional English approach rests on three doctrines-unforeseen mode, mistaken object, and transferred fault. [...] A system of criminal law which succeeded in reflecting the varying degrees of importance which people attribute to aspects of their intention (the mode of execution, the identity of the victim, the value of the property) might be a 'law professor's dream', but it is clearly not practical. Such an individuated or fine-grained approach to fault has to give way, at least in some respects, to claims of administrative efficiency. But that does not establish that the traditional English approach is the most appropriate. The draft Criminal Code provides for the continuation of the pragmatic approach, arguing that this is simpler for prosecutors and that an attempt conviction in the above situations would ignore the harm actually done. Does its pragmatism stretch too far? Would it not be better to analyse some of these cases in terms of an unfulfilled intention, combined with an accidental (or perhaps reckless) causing of harm? Some would argue that the present law of inchoate offences would not ensure a conviction in all these cases of miscarried intent and miscarried recklessness: according to this view, the three doctrines are not merely effective in returning convictions and symbolically right in their emphasis on results, but also necessary if justice is to be done in all cases. There is, it may be argued, no serious distortion of 'desert' or proportionality involved in the three doctrines, since the doctrines do not misrepresent the class of harm that D set out to commit. Yet there remains the law's ambivalence about the importance of a victim's identity: if this really is significant to offenders and people's judgments of them, as the law of complicity implies, should not prosecutors make more use of the law of attempts, where it is clearly. applicable?
  61. ^ Tshimbawu, Tshitenge (2019-09-17). CODE GAULTHIET (in French). Lulu.com. ISBN 978-0-244-21814-0.
  62. ^ Hoctor, Shannon Vaughn (2017-06-20). Criminal Law in South Africa. Kluwer Law International B.V. ISBN 978-90-411-9490-9.
  63. ^ Pradel, Jean (2016-09-14). Droit pénal comparé. 4e éd (in French). Editis - Interforum. ISBN 978-2-247-15085-4.
  64. ^ Reed, Alan; Bohlander, Michael (2022-08-22). Fault in Criminal Law: A Research Companion. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-63052-7.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Preterintention&oldid=1244667311"