Swiss Memorandum

The Swiss memorandum is the name given to a two-page letter dated 4 May 2003 from the then Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim Guldimann.

Content and background

The Swiss memorandum contains a report on Guldimann's talks with Sadeq Charrazi, the Iranian ambassador in Paris, and a detailed negotiating proposal from the Iranian leadership, known as a roadmap, to break down the diplomatic ‘wall of silence’ between Iran and the USA. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the USA have been severed since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and are being managed on a provisional basis by the Swiss representation. Guldimann conveyed the Iranian leadership's offer of talks to the US State Department, which ignored it.^[1] Secretary of State Colin Powell, to whom the fax was presented, was unable or unwilling to get his way with President George W. Bush. 'I couldn't sell the document in the White House,' he is reportedly said.^[2]

Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Adviser at the time, stated that she could not remember the Swiss embassy's approach, while former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage attributed the lack of a reaction from the US to the fact that it had not been possible to distinguish between the Iranian and Swiss positions.^[3]

The Swiss memorandum lists the following objectives of the two states, which should be addressed during negotiations.

Objectives of the United States

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Full transparency for assurance that there are no Iranian efforts to develop or possess WMD; full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on Iranian acceptance of all relevant instruments (93 + 2 and all other IAEA protocols).
Terrorism: energetic action against all terrorists (especially al-Qaida etc.) on Iranian territory; full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.
Iraq: Coordination of Iranian influence to actively support political stabilisation and establishing democratic institutions and a democratic government representing all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.
Middle East:
1. Cease all material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad) from Iranian territory; pressure these organisations to refrain from violent actions against civilians within the 1967 borders.
2. Influencing Hezbollah to become an exclusively political and social organisation within Lebanon.
3. Accept the two-state approach.

Objectives of Iran

The USA refrains from supporting a change in the political system through direct external interference.
Lifting of all sanctions: Economic sanctions, frozen assets, refusal to join the WTO.
Iraq: persecution of the People's Mojahedin, support for the expulsion of its members; support for Iranian demands for Iraqi war reparations; no Turkish invasion of northern Iraq; respect for Iranian national interests in Iraq and religious ties with Najaf/Kerbela.
Access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology.
Recognition of Iran's legitimate security interests in the region with appropriate defence capabilities.
Terrorism: Action against the MKO and its affiliated organisations in the USA.

Weblinks

Original document on washingtonpost.com (englisch; PDF; 331 kB)

References

^ "Knut Mellenthin: US-Regierung ignorierte iranisches Verhandlungsangebot (20.2.2007)". 2007-11-21. Archived from the original on 2007-11-21. Retrieved 2024-08-30.
^ "Gesprächsangebot Irans abgelehnt". Retrieved 2024-09-17.
^ Glenn Kessler: 2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks, Washington Post, 14. Februar 2007 (englisch)

[1] "Knut Mellenthin: US-Regierung ignorierte iranisches Verhandlungsangebot (20.2.2007)". 2007-11-21. Archived from the original on 2007-11-21. Retrieved 2024-08-30.

[2] "Gesprächsangebot Irans abgelehnt". Retrieved 2024-09-17.

[3] Glenn Kessler: 2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks, Washington Post, 14. Februar 2007 (englisch)

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