Talk:Bar Lev Line

Questionable statement

"The $500 million line named after Israeli Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev was the longest (about 160 KM) and strongest forward defense line in the history of warfare." - I find this statement more than a little fishy. I'll wager that both the Maginot line and the Siegfried Line were longer and stronger. →Raul654 18:56, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

I would have to agree with you. I served in the Sinai from 2003-2004 and again in 2006. The only position that I saw that even vaguely resembled the Maginot and Siegfried Lines was the Tzeidar Position at the south end of the line. (Amtraker (talk) 12:24, 17 June 2008 (UTC))

Questionable statement

"in the end Israel has won the war despite the early shock." Does any reputable war historian claim that Israel outright "won" the war? won the war sinia is controlled by egypt no more question asked no more who won its over the winner is who controles sinia and its not Israel.

The Israelis won the war and secured control of the Sinai and in fact surrounded the Third Army on the West Side of the Canal. What happened latter is a victory for peace for both sides, because Egypt and Israel have not fought since then. Saltysailor (talk) 02:25, 2 May 2008 (UTC)

i beg your pardon but how exactly israel won the war ?????!!!! That is so not true but do you even know anything about 6 October "Yom Kebor " Battle your losses was 10 ten times more than our losses .Egyptian Army has breached Bar Lev Line. They took nearly 7 km in Sinai .They had full control of Suez canal .They costed isreal half billion dollars(Bar lev establishing cost) in that time (it would have been way more than that by todays prices),and let me end with a question . when did isreal ever gave up land or any place so isreal certainly didn't gave up Sinai for peace

comments on the Line

The lines primary purpose was to make it difficult for the Egyptians to cross the canal or to harass the Israelis on the East Side. It was not intended to be a major element in stopping an Egyptian attack. Israel depended on intelligence and reconnaissance to determine when their might be an attack. The Main failure was that neither prompted the IDF to call up reserves and mobilize. The Egyptian plan of attack was brilliant, taking advantage of Israel's weaknesses. An important ingredients to the cross canal operations was the use of new Soviet missiles. The anti- armor missiles dealt with the Israels tanks and the anti-aircraft missiles prevented use of planes. Tanks and planes were to be Israel's first response to an attack, slowing an enemy until the reserves could be called up. Fortifications were overcome because the Israelis could not bring tanks and planes to bear. So many ant-tank missiles were fired that the battlefields east of the canal the wire guided missiles sometimes left a mesh on the desert floor. The IDF eventually realized the futility of attacking against the missiles and stayed out of the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile umbrella. At the largest tank battle since Kursk, the Egyptian offense ground down and the Israelis under Sharon counterattacked. Saltysailor (talk) 02:25, 2 May 2008 (UTC)

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Non neutral image

This image in the article claims Sinai is Israel: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bar-Lev_Line-01.png --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 06:04, 17 September 2020 (UTC)

Sinai was under Israeli control during this time, so the image is accurate Tinelva (talk) 08:41, 21 January 2021 (UTC)

Unsourced statement on blockages of oil pipes

"To take advantage of the water obstacle, the Israelis installed an underwater pipe system to pump flammable crude oil into the Suez Canal, thereby creating a sheet of flame. Some Israeli sources claim the system was unreliable and only a few of the taps were operational. Nevertheless, the Egyptians took this threat seriously and, on the eve of the war, during the late evening of 5 October, teams of Egyptian frogmen blocked the underwater openings with concrete."

- This does not have a citation associated with it, but there are some I found that support it. I would add them to the article but I don't have privileges.

Ashkar, R. (1974). The Syrian and Egyptian Campaigns. Journal of Palestine Studies, 3(2), 15–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/2535797 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2535797) (claim found on page 21)

O'Ballance, Edgar. (1978). No victor, no vanquished: the Yom Kippur War . Presidio Press. (electronic version here: https://www.hativa14.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Edgar_Oballance.pdf) (Claim found on page 27).

This Youtube clip, from some existing published video, also makes the claim. If it should be included as a cite, then the source video would have to be tracked down and confirmed: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-66seomf2K4&t=95s FredericktheWise (talk) 19:06, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

I'm confused over the nature and numbers of "forts" and "strongholds"

In the "Cost, construction, and materials" subsection, second paragraph, second sentence, we have

After the War of Attrition, there were 22 forts, which incorporated 35 strongpoints.

I can't figure out what this means. It can't be "there were 22 forts, 35 of which were strongpoints"" cos the math doesn't work, but it could be:

• There were 22 forts, each of which contained 35 strongpoints.
• There were 22 forts, each containing one or more forts, such that a total of 35 strongpoints were contained within the 22 forts.

Can't think of any other meaning.

Except that... later we have forts described as small and not strong (holds a platoon, which is ~30 men with like a few heavy weapons), while strongpoints are described as huge bunkers containing a plethora of of heavy weapons which would require much more than a platoon to man. So clearly strongpoints are bigger than forts, so cannot be contained within forts, I would think. So those two meanings don't work.

So then all we have left that I can think of is

• There were 22 forts, and in addition 35 strongpoints.
• There were 22 somewhat large areas called "forts", which had a grand total of 35 (or 770) strongpoints within them; the "fort" perimeter was manned/patrolled by a platoon of troops as kind of picket line.

But it doesn't say either of those things. So I'm at a loss to what is meant here, thus I tagged the passage for clarification. Herostratus (talk) 22:34, 2 May 2024 (UTC)