Talk:Defence of the Reich

Untitled

• In places where it says "Murray 1938", should be "Murray 1983"?--Avicentegil (talk) 19:02, 30 March 2009 (UTC)
  • Yep. I fixed that, thanks --MLWatts (talk) 14:59, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

Impact of Allied aerial offensive

nice summary of "good" effects. is there no historian explaining how stupid it was to use such huge amount of ressources for this "little" effects? has somebody a book of a clever historian? the shortage of aircraft or tanks were never a real problem for germans. totally irrelevant if the dozen thousand allied bombers reduced the production a bit. german problems were shortage of fuel and so on. iam sure there a historians out there explaining how unclever the bombing campaign was planned, can somebody cite this historians please? dont understand that this articles is citing a guy who tries to explain that the reduction of 12 % aircraftproduction was a significant achievement. german aircraft didnt fly because fuel and pilots. same for tanks. the german had "enough" tanks .... Blablaaa (talk) 02:18, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Bla' we are not going to have a problem here. The bombing reduced production and prevented it from being higher than it was. And tank shortages were a problem. As was fuel, and the huge amounts of material diverted to the defence of targets. For your information, production of aircraft in 1944 was to be 33 percent higher than it was. By 1944, total output in tonnage was reduced to just c.50% of capacity. All this for just 7% of the Allied total effort. And there is clear direction that this occurred over the short 1943-45 period. Bombing up until 1943 didn't achieve much. It did afterwards. Speer's Inside the Third Reich and Adam Tooze go into detail about it. Dapi89 (talk) 15:37, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

i dont talk about how much percentage or something else i talk about significance and costs. that the bombing campaign had negativ effects on german war efforts is indisbuted but 60 years after war its time to releazise that the bombing campaign was "stupid" there were plenty better targets and other possiblilities to use the thousand heavy bombers. i claim the bombing campaign did not shorten the war significant, relativ to its costs. the article highlights the reduction of german aircraft production, but aircraft number werent the major problem, same with tanks, wehrmacht didnt need more tanks when they could fuel the one the already got.... , even when wehrmacht was 4:1 outnumbered in tanks this would be ok when enough fuel was available.... . i know my opinion is irrelevant so i hope somebody quotes the correct historian, why does the article highlight reduction of aircraft numbers, thousand of german aircraft were staying on the airfields without fuel, totally irrelevant if they decreased production. how much airmen were lost of europe 160.000 ? and 30.000 aircraft? for killing civilians .... Blablaaa (talk) 16:15, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Thats nothing but opinionated conjecture. Dapi89 (talk) 17:28, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

the article highlights the decreased aircraft production . luftwaffe had enough aircraft but not enough fuel and pilots -------> NONSENSE :-) Blablaaa (talk) 19:15, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

No it isn't. Dapi89 (talk) 21:05, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

(Hastings, Max (1999). Bomber Command. Pan Books. ISBN 9780330392044.) Has a balanced view:

"In the last phase of the war, between October 1944 and May 1945, the Allied strategic-bomber forces played a dominant part in bringing the Germany economy to the point of collapse"..."The air forces' destruction of Germany's oil resources was chiefly responsible for the breakdown of the Ardennes offensive at the end of 1944, and must have hastened the end of the war at least by several weeks. The bomber attack on German rail and water communications was choking industry to death by the last weeks of 1944."

vs

"Tizard said after the war: 'No one thinks now that it would have been possible to defeat Germany by bombing alone. the actual effort expended on bombing Germany, in manpower and resources, was greater than the value in manpower and resources of the damage caused.

"Whether or not this is precisely true, the British investment in Bomber Command was intense. Webster and Frankland suggest that the bomber offensive employed only 7 per cent of the nation's manpower, but this figure can hardly be accepted literally, since it discounts the exceptional quality and skills of those concerned. It is difficult to compute the exact proportion of the nation's war effort that was involved, but A.J.P Taylor, one of the critics of the bomber offensive, argues around one third."..."The fact that Britain was compelled to buy from America all its transport aircraft(...), most of its landing craft, a large proportion of its tanks and vast quantities of ammunition stemmed directly or indirectly from the weight of British industrial effort committed to the bomber offensive"

(Hohum ^@) 19:58, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Hasting doesn't have a balanced view, he is just regurgitating others. AJP Taylor - who was extemely contoversial (having been caught up in misquotations) during his career isn't trustowrty. Frankland and Webster have produced the best account of the bomber offensive. The 7% refers (obviously) to material and material is all that matters. Bla' was trying to indicate it was a waste. It wasn't. Dapi89 (talk) 21:03, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

bla was trying to explain that the aircraft are very bad example to explain "possible" significant effects. because: and now bla repeats himself. germans had enough aircrafts... Blablaaa (talk) 21:17, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

and yes bla thinks the bomber campaign was "stupid" the ressources had be used better... Blablaaa (talk) 21:19, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

For the final time: your opinions are irrelevant. Dapi89 (talk) 21:46, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

thats why i raised this section so that somebody takes his historian and quotes him, so we get a neutral clever point and not the opinions of some british historians. but my opinions is not irrelevant regarding the text. please explain me why the reduction of aircraftnumbers is highlighted while the main problem of luftwaffe was fuel and pilots and not aircraft. can u explain ? Blablaaa (talk) 21:49, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Max Hastings is a respected historian, he has the experience and credentials to know when to trust Taylor, or primary sources, and when not to; you do not. Wikipedia reflects respected sources, not your personal opinion. I brought references. Like Bla, you've countered with your opinion "which is irrelevant", to use your own words. (Hohum ^@) 21:50, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

good left hook Hohum. just joking... Blablaaa (talk) 21:52, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Hohum: No I havn't. I have information criticising Taylor for this assumption (which he didn't cite). And I didn't criticise Hastings, I said CLEARLY, that he was not reflecting an opinion but stating the various points of view. Get your arguments in perspective and read properly. And as for Bla', you sound like a cheerleader supporting the losing team. "LOL", or whatever other silly phrases you kids use. Dapi89 (talk) 22:17, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

i sound like a guy who has fun with watching two guys discussing. hohum "owned" u with his statement, i gave him "props" for this .... by the way dont forget to mark friesers statements when u want some refs... Blablaaa (talk) 22:19, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanyou for proving my point so thoroughly. Dapi89 (talk) 22:31, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

this was my intention! Blablaaa (talk) 22:41, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

• "I have information criticising Taylor for this assumption (which he didn't cite). "

when i explained that bergström only copies tank losses without giving his sources u explained my its irrelevant. when i said it sucks to cite a historian when he only cites another one; u explained me thats wiki. Blablaaa (talk) 22:24, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Taylor is notorious for the things he says. Its almost like quoting David Irving. This is beside the point. Taylor's claim is contrast to every other: That is the point. Dapi89 (talk) 22:31, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

u were not only addressing taylor. u explained hastings has no own opinion. this is what i exactly said about many of your authors who simply copied soviet vies of events. nevertheless the article now isnt neutral there are more than hasting who think the bombing campaign wasnt clever so it should be mentionend. what i learned on wiki: its irrelevant which opinion we prefere ;-) Blablaaa (talk) 22:39, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

I brought a representative opinion by a respected historian, who clearly says that the bombing campaign has significant effect, but also cites the opinions of people who he obviously feels are worth including - who give give their own views on the relative cost of the campaign to the allies - which he doesn't contradict.

Sadly, I find myself in the unenviable position of noting that while David Irving can be a holocaust denyier, liar, (and plenty of other uncivil things), he has also done historical research which was peer reviewed by mainstream historians for accuracy and praised. Hastings has the skills required to decide when he thinks what Taylor says is relevant or not. He included him.

I find it depressing that including what a reliable historian has to say causes so much outrage.

Also, Dapi, Bla please be civil. Insulting each other is unhelpful, even if you feel you are being provoked.(Hohum ^@) 15:08, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

I've never denied it wasn't worthy of inclusion. I never said that it couldn't be added nor would I. What I thought I should do was to bring Taylor's reputation to light (if I needed to). I was saying while Hastings sees fit to include him in serious and quite technical debate, then equally it is worth noting those that do not and have complained about his cavalier approach. I'm not attacking you or Hastings for bringing this up. Dapi89 (talk) 16:28, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

At the time the RAF bomber force was being built up the UK was not present on mainland Europe, having been forced out at Dunkirk. It was precisely because they were not present on mainland Europe that they decided on building a massive heavy bomber force, as that was the only way of physically attacking Germany at the time - around 1940. Britain - for the geographically-challenged - is an island, surrounded by sea, and unless you have an army that can walk on water, there is not much you can do short of invasion, and at the time that was definitely not a possibility. Instead, it was decided to build a large bomber force as bombing Germany seemed the only practicable method of carrying the war to the German people - it was Germany who started the war by invading Poland BTW, so they weren't entirely innocent.

Because the Luftwaffe rather unsportingly insisted on shooting down RAF bombers that went over during the day, the RAF was forced instead to send its bombers out over Germany at night, and one of the difficulties about flying at night is that you cannot see where you are or where you are going. This meant that the RAF could not find and bomb individual factories and similar war targets, in fact they could not even guarantee to find a particular city. When bombing Germany the British faced a much more difficult navigational problem than the Luftwaffe did when it was bombing Britain, London in particular, as whereas the Luftwaffe bombers were based in Northern France, and had a round trip distance to London of around 200 miles, there and back, the British when they bombed Germany had to cope with distances around three times this, the distance to Berlin being in the order of 600 miles, or 1200 miles round trip. This made night navigation much more difficult, as small errors become magnified with distance, so for them it was even harder to find their targets at night. Even this quoted 600 mile distance figure is optimistic as the RAF routes were later often flown in multiple dog legs, to keep the bombers away from known flak sites, and to delay giving away their intended targets to the Germans by flying straight towards them, so you can probably add on another 150-200 miles distance over and above the 'as the crow flies' ones. All this and trying to navigate (initially) by dead reckoning with just a compass and a sextant.

So, because of this, and because the RAF had already committed to building a massive bomber force, which needs advance planning, as factories need to be built, aircraft designed well in advance, a process which, like an ocean tanker, takes a long time to start, and an equally long time to stop, this meant that a large amount of industrial and other effort went into building the bomber force, a force that could not be practically used for much else. Now, once you have already started building up a large bomber force, it becomes very difficult to change one's mind without wasting a lot of time and materiel, so as it was not possible for the RAF bombers to find their individual targets at night, the decision was taken to aim at the cities themselves, it being assumed that as the Germans had been doing that to us in 1940, there was little to be said in opposition - although there was opposition, the general feeling in Britain towards bombing German cities would have been something like 'serve the buggers right'.

You see, because the British planners weren't psychic, in 1940 they had no way of foreseeing that Germany would attack the Soviet Union, nor would they have been able to rely on Hitler declaring war on the United States, so at the time, with Britain and her Empire more-or-less facing Hitler alone, bombing Germany seemed one of the few possible ways of forcing Germany on to the defensive, and this it ultimately did, albeit in the air only. What we now all know as 'history' such as D-day, the Battle of Kursk, etc., was then unforeseen, and so the British did what they were capable of doing at the time when they were fighting alone, which was bombing Germany. You see, we have 20/20 hindsight, they didn't.

So, at one point early in the war the British were faced with the choice of bombing Germany or doing nothing. They chose to bomb Germany, and once this decision had been made it took several years to build up a force appropriate to the task in the sufficient numbers that first Peirse, and later Harris, thought desirable - when this policy was decided no-one knew that first the USSR and then later the USA would also eventually come into the war on Britain's side, so the bomber force was always going to be a pretty large one. By around 1943-44 the introduction of electronic navigation aids such as Gee, Oboe, H2S, etc. had made night navigation much less hit-and-miss - pardon the (unintentional) pun - but the RAF night heavy bomber force had by then become so specialised in area bombing cities that they retained this policy till the war's end in 1945, simply because it was what they were for - bombing Germany.

The critic's opinions are for the most part worthless, because not only were they not there at the time, but they are giving their views from a position of no responsibility. In other words, post-WW II they can afford to be wrong, whereas at the time if tactics had been changed to act upon their views and thousands of additional Allied aircrews had died due to this change, then the critics would likely have wished they'd kept their mouths shut. It's very different when real lives are at stake. Get a decision wrong and that's 250 Allied lives lost tonight that would have been alive the next morning if you hadn't made that decision. That's responsibility.

Good article BTW. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 16:55, 29 January 2013 (UTC)

... as for 'cost', in terms of Allied lives lost, RAF Bomber Command lost around 55,000 aircrew killed or missing during WW II, compared to the British Army's loss of around 60,000 men on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in WW I.

In return, apart from the material damage to Germany and German industry, the Allies benefited (according to Albert Speer) from around a million able-bodied (at least for the majority of the war) Germans manning the AA guns around the German cities, together with thousands of heavy flak guns, that would not be available for use against them elsewhere. That's 500,000 men kept away from Normandy, and another 500,000 kept away from the Russian Front. That's a lot of Divisions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.221.26 (talk) 10:25, 8 June 2015 (UTC)

training

• "few of the experienced German pilots survived the attrition of the first few years"

2,500 "aces"....Blablaaa (talk) 02:22, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

• "Only eight of the 107 German pilots that claimed over 100 victories joined their squadrons after mid-1942"

what kind of historians are used for wiki? when a pilot joins 3 years later then its likly that he doenst get same kills like others. later pilots often flown against western allies and not against soviet41 "victims", logic that it was harder to survie. complete nonsense conclusion... Blablaaa (talk) 02:26, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Your not reading it correctly. It makes perfect sense. Dapi89 (talk) 15:39, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

no it claims a direct link between the years were a pilot joined service and Training/skill. to support his conclusion he brings this statement but this statement is explained by my points and not neccesarrily by his. his conclusion is based on facts which are effected by much more factors than training. his simple conclusion is maybe partly correct but his example is nonsense. 100% sure. maybe the quote is out of context , but u cant bring this for an proof of declined training, explanation above Blablaaa (talk) 16:20, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Ameuter opinion is irrelvant. The educated source states the facts in context perfectly well. They make sense and are accurate. I say again: the source is far superior to some anon off the internet. Making erroneous accusations about highly respected sources only makes you look silly. Dapi89 (talk) 17:32, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

yes ok the historian is more reliable than me, thats not disputed. but his example is dumb, nothing else. his example is stupid without context. doesnt madder if he is a well known historian. i explained perfectly that his example is dumb. he claims that only 8 of 107 top experten joined service after mid 42 , is a proof for declining skill/training, but thats not correct its stupid . there are at least two other significant reasons:

• when a pilot joins 3 years later then its likly that he doenst get same kills like others.
• later pilots often flown against western allies and not against soviet41 "victims",

his conclusion is destroyed by an anon wiki user. doenst madder if he is a well known historian. his example/proof is destroyed. when u look above u see that i dont need to be a historian to destroy wrong statements.... Blablaaa (talk) 19:21, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

funny is that hartmann the guy with 352 victories came in october 42 .... Blablaaa (talk) 19:44, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Your embarrassing yourself. I'm done with this one. Dapi89 (talk) 21:06, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

yes because i explained that his example isnt correct. your argument was; hes a historian and iam not, thats all. that only 8 of 107 top experten joined service after mid has mulitple reasons . iam correct the historian is wrong/incorret/oversimplifying and u too if u think hes correct. Blablaaa (talk) 21:27, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

misleading

the training sections doesnt explain that luftwaffe pilots were fighting not only over germany. the article compares western allied training times with luftwaffe without mentioning that german pilots were killed on the eastern front and had to be replacedBlablaaa (talk) 21:34, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

No it isn't. The DOR refers to Germany AND German-occuppied Europe. Dapi89 (talk) 21:47, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

are u contra everythin i say? :-) , german pilots fought in russian and mediterrane. it should be mentioned that the differene between british and german training is explained by more than defense of the reichBlablaaa (talk) 21:56, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

You're not listening. Again. I'm done with this one too. Dapi89 (talk) 22:17, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

again: u are not checking the point ! Blablaaa (talk) 22:21, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Germany didn't use the concept of a 'Tour' of operations like the RAF - 30 operational sorties and then rotated back from operations to rest, usually to a ground position - and later USAAC/USAAF did, so a Luftwaffe pilot was likely to be flying on operations almost constantly after leaving training school. This allowed the better pilots to mount impressive scores but even 'experten' could get tired and run out of luck eventually, and as for lesser pilots, many did not live long enough to gain the necessary survival skills and experience. Later in the war as fuel became more scarce training had to be reduced and so the chances of a pilot surviving long enough to gain sufficient flying and combat experience became even less. If you don't/can't train pilots properly then many will just kill themselves in accidents long before they ever get anywhere near the enemy. The Allies had the advantage of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and associated US training schools, together with good weather over much of their training areas, as well as the absence of interference from enemy action.

Germany's problems were in many ways due to them planning for a short war, whereas Britain and her Allies planned for a long one. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 17:59, 29 January 2013 (UTC)

Quality of the article..

I just read through again this article, and it seems to suffering from a lot of problems that needs to be issued. I will try to summerize these below:

• Its hectic. It often jumps back and forth in the timeline, the RAF/USAAF night/day operations, and places of bombing/air defense makes it even worse.
• Lack of good coherence or idea what this idea is about. The title says "Defense of the Reich", which took its name from the real life organisation RLV. Now that simply meant the air defense of the German Empire, as it was officially at that time. The territorial scope was strictly restricted for the territorial parts Germany in the 1940s, ie. Germany, Austria, Prussia. But this article seems to want to fit just about everything into this category, from North Africa to the bombing of Rumanian oil wells... and Croatia? Hungary..?
• Its very opinionated and seems to make a case for the success of Allied bombing offensive on economy, rather than describing the German air defense activities in World War II. IMHO this former part should be part of a seperate, proper article, say "Effects of Allied bombing on Germany in World War II" or something like that. This would also clear a lot of bickering from here... let this article concentrate on the military aspect.
• There is often undue weight on single events, and single authors, emphasizing their views to advance this or that position, usually related to the economical aspects - again these should be better moved to a seperate article. At the same time, apart from a few flashes of events, it doesn't really give the reader a good overview of what happened. Kurfürst (talk) 09:57, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

Nice to here from you again Kurfurst.

Defence of the Reich refers to all of Europe occuppied by Germany.

There is no undue weight. What an odd thing to say. The oil campaign was one of the major targets.

North Africa? EH?

The economy is not military related? Eh? Given the economy was targeted to prevent military production I find that most odd!

Opinionated? Yeah right, its sourced well.

it doesn't really give the reader a good overview of what happened. Nah. Just,...nah.

Naturally you are intitled to your opinion about the authors of the sources, but they don't really matter.

I'm sorry Kurfurst, but can you go into greater detail? Because some of this doesn't make sense to me, with respect. Dapi89 (talk) 13:25, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

• Hectic: Agreed, the timeline jumps around a lot, especially early in the article. For me, it gets far more readable in the middle.
• Coherence: Territorial scope - I don't think this is a problem currently, it mostly focusses on important regions.
• Opinionated: As long as it's reflecting the opinions of the sources, I' not so worried. However, much of the article reads like "Air attack on the Reich". There needs to be more focus on what Germany did to mount a defense, and less focus on the attacks.
• Undue weight. This is a duplicate complaint to "opinionated" IMO.
• Too long: The article is simply too long. Chop out irrelevance. Rewrite more concisely where possible.
• Wiki issues: Repetition of section title "night war" and "day war" causes wiki issues.
• Aftermath: This section doesn't seem to be about the aftermath at all. Rename or move to relevant sections.
• Jargon: The first time a Luftwaffe term is used, I think it needs a link to a note in the article to explain it (in addition to wikilinking where relevant). I don't think that just relying on wikilinking would be helpful - a reader needs to quickly know what a "JG" is - not read a whole article on it.
• Diagrams: Some supporting diagrams and maps may be useful. The training times for nationalities/phases would be greatly clarified with one.

The absolute worst thing about the article is that after reading it, I still wouldn't know how the defence was mounted, except for some to-and-fro regarding radar/countermeasures/detection.

(Hohum ^@) 18:57, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

Thats a much better assessment. One particular point is how the Germans developed a defence (or not): That is clearly deficient in the article. I guess, originally, that I was provding a historiography of events rather than just systems. I'll copy it to a sandbox and do some cutting. Dapi89 (talk) 14:15, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

Since it's just come up - I'll also note that the repeated use of exactly the same citation within a paragraph is distracting and mostly pointless. It doesn't make the referencing any more effective. (Hohum ^@) 21:24, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

I disagree. It makes things very clear. Dapi89 (talk) 17:33, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Suggestion

Perhaps this should be renamed to reflect a histography of events and a new twin set up for examining the German defence response. Dapi89 (talk) 17:33, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

I wouldn't even know where to start to help this article. Window and Wilde Sau discussed in connection with "the first six months of 1944"? Ridiculous. I don't even see any mention of the Hamburg raids of 1943 to which to move the two topics. The whole thing looks DOA. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.179.10.143 (talk) 21:51, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

You're right, you can't help. The article does not say they were introduced in 1944. You've misread it. And Hamburg is mentioned. Dapi89 (talk) 20:15, 6 June 2010 (UTC)

It mentions them right after mentioning the first 6 months of 1944. The two don't belong together. Apart from the fact the first three months of '44 had little to do with the subsequent 3 months for BC, everything's hunky-dory. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.176.118.18 (talk) 01:10, 10 August 2010 (UTC)

Section: Air defence setup

"The Bf 109G and K could fight well " ... I don't think the Bf 109 G and K versions belong in this section as the G didn't fly until mid 1942 and the K much later. It would be more suitable to mention the 109 E and F versions which were in squadron service in 1941. The next section heading says "The United States Army Air Forces join the battle (1942)" which gives the impression to the reader that the article is written in chronological order. The casual reader might erroneously deduce that the Bf 109 G and K were around prior to 1942. AadaamS (talk) 10:52, 13 June 2010 (UTC)

Corrected. Dapi89 (talk) 12:37, 14 June 2010 (UTC)

The USAAC/USAAF didn't bomb Germany until March 1943. Prior to this all their targets had been in Occupied France. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.249 (talk) 11:10, 18 December 2016 (UTC)

Defeat - Hitler did not cause significant delays to Me 262 production in my opinion

In the "Defeat" section it is stated that the Me 262 was delayed because Hitler insisted it be used as a strike fighter. That is in my opinion incorrect, the Me 262 section on design and development (it is cited too) clearly state that it was greatly delayed due to technical issues involving the engines. It is true that Hitler's request did cause additional delay but it was small compared to that caused by engine trouble. So it is disputable that Hitler caused significant delay to Me 262 production - beyond delaying Germany's general transition into a war economy for several years of course. AadaamS (talk) 11:56, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

Also correct. I agree with this, but I did not have a citation for it, so I could not add that point. Adding citations from other articles that I don't have is not proper. But if you have the source mentioned, by all means add it. Dapi89 (talk) 12:33, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, I used to have a copy of Wings or Airpower magazine about the Me262 but it seems to have gone missing. If I find a source I will let you know. AadaamS (talk) 06:59, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Some years ago a book on the 262 was published by NASA commemorating the newly restored 262 at the then Silver Hill (now Garber Facility); I know that this mentioned that Hitler didn't delay the 262 as much as its engines. I used to have a copy, but ended up selling it (arrrgh!)- however, I think I know where I can find a copy. Minorhistorian (talk) 21:13, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

The design changes necessary to allow the Me 262 to carry a decent bomb load were non-trivial. Many components had to be re-designed for higher strength, and unlike other, piston-engined, fighters carrying heavy bombs under the wings was not an option, due to CofG position. This is why the bomb racks were eventually installed under the nose - with the earlier change to the Jumo 004 the aircraft had already become tail-heavy, which is why the wings had to be re-designed with sweep back. In addition, much of the fighter Me 262's production tooling had already been set up and had to be modified to produce the new re-designed parts. This, along with additional testing, all took time. Unfortunately from the POV of the Luftwaffe, IIRC Hitler ordered all Me 262s to be modified. Otherwise the fighter version could perhaps have entered service earlier than it did. If it had then the development of the Gloster Meteor and de Havilland Vampire would almost certainly have been accelerated in response - the latter could probably have entered service in 1944 if it had been needed. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.233 (talk) 11:27, 11 March 2016 (UTC)

Steinbock

Is is beyond the subject matter to include counter offensives by the Luftwaffe? Steinbock was an attempt to prevent further area attacks and is a part of the DOTR. Dapi89 (talk) 16:47, 14 November 2010 (UTC)

Kershaw

Hi everybody. Current revision of this article has reference # 97 citing "Kershaw 1997", but the book is not in the bibliography. Is it Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, (ed. with Moshe Lewin) (Cambridge, 1997) ISBN 0-521-56521-9? Or can someone find out what else? Thanks! --MLWatts (talk) 17:37, 18 February 2012 (UTC)

It's from Image and Reality in the Third Reich. Dapi89 (talk) 19:27, 18 December 2012 (UTC)

Thanks! --M.L.Watts_{Air Mail ✈} 18:21, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

The "Defence of the Reich" map needs editing.

On the map itself on the top right of the article page, Germany (the area where Germany proper would be located on that map) is shown as the "German Empire", which was out of existence after 1918. While this may be a minor error, is it incorrect nevertheless.

Tom C. 05:34, 18 December 2012 (UTC) Tom

The Imperial German borders were restored by the Nazis during their occupation of Europe. So it is correct. Dapi89 (talk) 19:26, 18 December 2012 (UTC)

No mention of the air war on the Eastern Front

There is no mention at all of the air war on the Eastern Front, or of any Russian contribution to the war against Germany. Is there anyone knowledgeable on this subject who could supply this information? John.D.Ward (talk) 11:07, 18 December 2012 (UTC)

Hi John. I am going to rethink through this entire article. I'm not sure what it really should be about; all inclusive? German air defence systems/tactics? It will, I think, have to lose much of the operational history which could go into other articles. It would free more space for a more direct approach to German air defences and the Luftwaffe's struggle against Allied attacks.

To your question, which sort of ties in with the above, this was about a strategic campaign against German industries. I am trying to find information as to whether the Soviets can really be considered a combatant in this regard. By 1945, whith the Allies on the German borders, frontline support and Defence of the Reich campaigns sort of merged together. I'll try and rectify this issue asap. Dapi89 (talk) 19:25, 18 December 2012 (UTC)

Heavy Flak pointless ?

"In the summer of 1943, 2,132 Flak guns were protecting German industrial targets. In 1940, the number had been 791 guns. These guns could have been better used at the front. Moreover, it took an average of 16,000 shells for any particular 88 mm gun to shoot down an American bomber". Presumably the same would apply to British bombers. Heavy flak appears to have been a waste of time and better deployed as anti-tank guns against the Russians. Surprising that the normally dispassionately analytical Germans did not accept this. Were these statistics available to them at the time ? The military cost-effectiveness of AA versus fighters needs to be discussed here. Hitler is mentioned as preferring AA - how much of an impact did Hitler's opinion make ? Perhaps the real problem was the decline in experienced fighter pilots - they couldn't be just manufactured like guns and aircraft. Rcbutcher (talk) 05:54, 6 January 2014 (UTC)

How many men does it take to man an AA gun? How many does it take to man a single-engine fighter aircraft? The efficiency of aircraft versus AA guns was a no contest in both manpower and munitions terms. But Hitler the politician, thought for morale purposes AA guns would be a better option. The Germans did have radar-assisted artillery, so he was not entirely off base. He was an army man after all. Artillery he knew about, aviation he did not. Besides, the concept of a purely ground-to-air defence was not adopted. The Me 262 program was evidence that the deficiency in experienced fighter pilots was to be overcome by fewer of them in superior aircraft. So Hitler's influence an air defence was not far-reaching as some have supposed. I'm certain the Germans had those statistics at the time, especially since they brought that eventuality about.

I also believe the efficiency of fighter aircraft is discussed in this article (or it was originally). Regards. Dapi89 (talk) 18:54, 6 January 2014 (UTC)

The heavy flak fulfilled a purpose of making the attacking bombers fly higher, thus reducing their bombing accuracy. If the heavy flak had been removed the bombers could have flown lower, and thereby caused more damage to their targets. So the heavy flak was important not so much for what it achieved in bombers shot down, but for what it prevented. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 15:17, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

It achieved nothing. Bomber Command gained in accuracy (and was more accurate in its bomb-aiming than the Eighth Air Force). Flak did not stop the extremely effective attacks on German targets in 1944-5. Its indirect impact was non-existent. Dapi89 (talk) 15:46, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Condensing the article

We need to remove a lot of this information. It is in other articles and is not really the focus of this article. This article is about the defense of germany from bombing yet it reads very much like an overview of the whole air war not just the german defense. This article needs to be rewritten as to focus on the methods germany used. If no one objects I will begin working on condensing this article and expanding the information about the german strategy and tactics. --Youngdrake (talk) 13:59, 2 July 2014 (UTC)

To be comprehensive on the subject, a lot needs to be included. That content overlaps with other articles is common across Wikipedia - and necessary often. You should be wary of removing material that gives important context. GraemeLeggett (talk) 15:04, 2 July 2014 (UTC)

Should it not primarily focus on the topic on hand? This instead covers the entire air war involving germany. Instead of how they protected the reich. --Youngdrake (talk) 15:51, 2 July 2014 (UTC)

I know this doesn't help, but I'm in entire agreement with both of you! Sorry about the current state btw. I still have no idea how I ever intended this article to look. More or less an overview, split with German defensive measures, with main articles for both those subjects siphoned off in to sub-articles. Dapi89 (talk) 19:56, 2 July 2014 (UTC)

Confusion on casualty numbers

I don't understand the casualty numbers here. According to this, approximately 80,000 Americans and 80,000 Brits + Canadians were killed in the strategic bombing campaign against the Axis. But per the US Army's official documents, only 36,461 members of the US Army Air Force were killed in ALL European/Atlantic area theaters. Similarly, the US military's official history (page 478) pegs total non-American Allied losses from D-Day to VE-Day (outside of Italy and the Atlantic) at ~60,000 dead. This includes the French and Poles. So what gives? Is this bombing campaign just not counted as part of the Western Front? That's probably true but even if it was it wouldn't explain the USAAF's total losses in all Atlantic area theaters not being half of what they are supposed to be for this one campaign which doesn't include either the Western Front or Italy.--Nihlus1 (talk) 21:15, 23 February 2016 (UTC)

Casualties can be wounded plus dead. (Hohum ^@) 01:14, 24 February 2016 (UTC)

The cited source specifically says dead though. So does the US Army's Strategic Bombing Survey.--Nihlus1 (talk) 05:56, 24 February 2016 (UTC)

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Losses

50k are general Luftwaffe losses, on both eastern and westren fronts. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5.144.97.11 (talk) 11:46, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Order of infobox flags

There has been recent edit-warring over the order and significance of the flags for the Allied forces in the infobox. This has been done with little explanation and should be discussed before the reverting continues. Pinging most recent contributors: @162.239.125.209, Denniss, and Nihlus1:. Eggishorn (talk) (contrib) 16:32, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

• Well, my rationale is pretty simple. As shown by the chart on the page, the USAAF dropped more bombs on Axis-occupied Europe than the RAF and destroyed more enemy aircraft. On top of that, as stated by the article text, the USAAF's attacks were much more efficient and dangerous than the RAF's attacks according to Albert Speer (a fact he stated to both British and American interrogators after the war), so you can't even argue that the tonnage the Americans dropped was less efficiently applied than the lesser tonnage that the British dropped. Honestly, it seems very straightforward.--Nihlus1 (talk) 21:44, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

If you believe that you'll believe anything.

RAF BC could, and did, drop on a target in a single night a tonnage what would take the USAAC/USAAF a week to do. And the RAF could do it in any weather, day or night.

A B-17 could carry 4,000lb to Berlin, a B-24, 8,000 lb, while a Lancaster or Halifax carried 12,000 lb to Berlin. The US sent its bombers out in raids of 300, while the RAF was sending out 600 to 1,000 bombers. In winter bad weather would stop the USAAC/USAAF from flying at all, while the RAF carried on as-normal.

The only way your assumptions and figures could be true is if the RAF had taken a two-year holiday in 1943-44. In fact in those two years the RAF dropped its heaviest tonnages of the war.

... and the RAF measured its tonnage in long tons, not short tons which are smaller. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.52 (talk) 10:21, 30 December 2017 (UTC)

My numbers come from the RSs cited on the main page, specifically in the last image with the Strategic Bombing Survey. Please provide an actual set of statistics for the whole effort along those lines if you object to using them, not just anecdotes and single incidents.--Nihlus1 (talk) 07:12, 8 January 2018 (UTC)

The US Strategic Bombing Survey was a propaganda exercise, so not really a reliable source, even though a number of historians who ought to know better have treated it as one. Albert Speer, in his initial interrogation, was intent on flattering his American captors to save his own neck. (He succeeded, obviously.) In later life, when he could speak more freely, he said that US bombing was not well planned or directed until the last stages of the war, because the USAAF would address a particular target system for a short time and then move on to other things, allowing Speer to arrange a recovery. Only from September 1944 did both the USAAF and the RAF consistently maintain the pressure on oil and rail targets. As Speer told the BBC in 1978 (The Bombers, BBC Radio 4, 5 April 1978), the most decisive effect of Allied bombing, which was achieved by RAF Bomber Command well before US bombing became effective from February 1944, was the diversion of German resources into air defence. 'The real success of the bombing of the Royal Air Force is in fact that you succeeded in tying up tremendous forces. Those forces, if they had been free, would have caused great damage to the Russians. I doubt if, with them [in action], the Russians would have succeeded in their offensive at all. We had to pile ammunition everywhere, because we never knew where the attacks would take place. We were forced to increase the production of the ammunition of the anti-aircraft guns larger than 8.8 centimetres in 1940 to 1944 by 70 million rounds. And this was much more than we could produce for the anti-tank guns, which we could provide only with 45 million rounds. You had a second front already from the beginning of 1944 and this second front was really very effective.' (Quoted in Norman Longmate, The Bombers, Arrow Books, London, 1988, ISBN 0-09-955820-3, p.363; Longmate had interviewed Speer for the BBC programme.)

Speer wasn't kidding. By the time of Kursk, the most decisive battle of the European war, in July 1943, Germany was devoting more manpower, weaponry and materiel to the fight against RAF Bomber Command than to the fight against the Red Army. That is how the Red Army was able to win. The late German official historian Horst Boog, in Germany And The Second World War, Vol.VI, Global War (translation Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, ISBN 978-0198228882), concurs with Speer and argues that the diversion of resources forced by Bomber Command was critical to Germany's defeat on the Eastern Front and thus Germany's loss of the whole war. It is not entirely coincidental that the destruction of Hamburg (causing Goebbels to note in his diary, not for the only time, that the RAF bombers had 'night air superiority' over Germany) occurred just after Kursk.

The USSBS was governed by the political pretence that the USAAF had carried out a 'selective precision bombing' campaign. They hadn't. They had mostly bombed blind through cloud, an obvious requirement in European skies, and they were less well trained and equipped to do that than the RAF. The 'precision' element consisted mainly of naming a 'precision' target on the operation order for the benefit of the press; in practice the bombers would just plaster the general area, though their navigation was not great and they would sometimes attack the wrong city or even, on a couple of notorious occasions, the wrong country (mistaking Prague for Dresden and neutral Zurich for Aschaffenburg). According to Professor Richard Overy, in The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945, Penguin, London, 2014, ISBN 978-0-141-00321-4, p.345, 'Calculations by the Army Air Forces' Director of Weather in late 1942 found that the average number of days per month when the sky over the target was absolutely clear was one or two in the winter months, rising to a peak of seven in June, a total of 31 days in the year. Days when the major limiting factors of high wind, ice or more than 3/10ths cloud were absent were more numerous, but still numbered only 113 out of the year, again with a low of 6 in the winter months and a peak of 12 in June.' This was rather difficult for an air force whose doctrine relied on visual bombing, and in most cases Eighth Air Force had to adopt a primitive version of the RAF method, using radar-equipped 'pathfinders' with everyone else bombing on the pathfinders' smoke-markers, but the Eighth weren't as well drilled in such techniques as the RAF were. As Jimmy Doolittle told a post-war conference, 'We area-bombed "precision" targets and the British precision-bombed "area" targets and it came to the same thing.' True, except that 55% of RAF Bomber Command's tonnage was actually delivered against 'precision' and not 'area' targets. For instance the Germans told the USSBS that the single most effective Allied air strike against German tank production was the RAF attack on the ZF tank gearbox factory at Friedrichshafen, by 322 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito of 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups, dropping 1,234 tons which completely destroyed the factory, on the night of 27-28 April 1944, perfectly timed in the run-up to D-Day. This was a genuine 'production bottleneck', the lost production could not readily be made good from other sources, and German tank output never recovered. (Martin Middlebrook & Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, Midland Publishing, Leicester, 2000, ISBN 1-85780-033-8, pp.500-501.)

Consider also the case of Ford-Werke at Cologne, an American-owned factory producing military vehicles for the Reich (and repatriating the profits to the US through shell companies in Switzerland). After the war, aerial photographs of this untouched factory, only a mile or so from the devastated centre of Cologne, led to a conspiracy theory that US bombers had been ordered not to attack US-owned factories. In fact the Eighth Air Force had made two attacks in October 1944, neither of which actually hit the factory, despite the commitment of one combat wing of B-17s on 2 October and two combat wings on 18 October, visual bombing being carried out through broken cloud on both occasions. In the first attack, the nearest hits were a mile away. The second attack didn't do anything either. Further attacks were not ordered because intelligence came to hand, from laid-off foreign forced labourers, that Ford-Werke was operating at severely reduced capacity due to the effects of area bombing, mainly lack of power. (Though one might add the effects of area bombing on the other cities that supplied Ford-Werke with raw materials and components, and on the transportation system.) Where US 'precision' bombing failed, even in the rare circumstances that allowed for visual aiming, RAF area bombing had already done the job. https://jasonweixelbaum.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/debunking-conspiracy-ford-werke-and-the-allied-bombing-campaign-of-cologne/

I don't know who inserted the 'Bomber Command and the Ruhr plants' section into the article, but it's not good. None of it is true and none of it has any bearing on reality at all. Khamba Tendal (talk) 20:01, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

I suspect the 'official' often-quoted US bomb tonnage figures are actually for the tonnage delivered to the UK bomb dumps, which of course, the RAF also used, British and American bombs being designed with two sets of hanging lugs so that either nation's aircraft could carry them, the RAF used a considerable number of US bombs, mainly the 1,000 lb demolition bomb, because at times the RAF were dropping bombs quicker than they could be re-supplied from normal stocks.

It is also possible the inflated figures include the figures for US Tactical Air Forces tonnage dropped in Europe, in which case the figures are not comparable, as the RAF tonnages are for RAF Bomber Command operating over Germany only, and do not include the tonnage dropped by the RAF's Tactical Air Forces.

The US air forces did a great job over Europe, but they could not have dropped a greater tonnage than the RAF did, for the reasons outlined earlier on this page, i.e., the RAF would have needed to have stopped bombing completely for two years to allow the USAAF to 'catch up'.

BTW, in 1944's Operation Hurricane the RAF Bomber Command dropped over 10,000 tons of bombs in a 24 hour period, something the US was not to do until Vietnam. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 11:04, 1 December 2019 (UTC)

Removal

I don't have Cooper's book "The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy of Failure" but the exact same quotation appears in "Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in World War II" from Samuel W. Mitcham.

Mitcham notes:

By the end of 1942, the R.A.F. had lost 2,859 aircraft in night operations and 627 British bombers had been lost in daytime raids over occupied Europe. The Reich's air defenses were generally taken for granted. As lates as December, 1942, 150 flak batteries had been transferred to Italy. Jeschonnek went so far to say: " Every four-engine bomber the Western Allies build makes me happy, for we will bring these... down just as we brought down the [British] two-engine ones, and the destruction of a four-engine bomber constitues a much greater loss to the enemy."

I consider this statement to be inappropriate to use in the context of the "German view[s]", which is mainly sourced to Caldwell and Muller. Please, let me know if there are any concerns with my remove. Regards. Dircovic (talk) 09:43, 4 August 2017 (UTC)

Another tidbit i'd like to have removed, is that the SS "killing" squads would only recurit "highly educated personnels and engineers", while the Luftwaffe failed to do so. Caldwell and Muller actually summarized it:

"1. The standards for fighter pilots were not tightened to the “elite” level soon enough. 2. The bomber arm was clearly given preference for the best personnel in training. 3. The supply of commissioned pilots for fighters was neglected early; thus there were not enough leaders later. 4. Trainees received too few flying hours. At first there were too few aircraft; then fuel ran low. 5. The emphasis in the flight schools was not shifted soon enough toward the supply of fighter pilots. 6. Gaps in flight training included: hours on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training, and an almost complete lack of instrument training [fifth on this list!]." Dircovic (talk) 10:14, 4 August 2017 (UTC)

"The bomber arm was clearly given preference for the best personnel in training." by late 1942 these bomber pilots were being re-trained as night fighter (Nachtjager) pilots, as the bomber pilots were some of the few aircrew who were already trained to fly at night.

... and you don't use your average pilots for night fighting unless you aren't that bothered if sooner or later they end up killing themselves and their crew, as well as destroying a valuable aircraft. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 20:14, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Misinterpretation

The claim of "99% loss rate" is untenable, and appears to be deliberately misinterpreted. The average pilot strength per air fleet (Luftflotte) is probably about 2,283 as tabulated, but that does not mean that the Luftwaffe lost 99% percent of its fighter pilots in the Western Front. "Luftflotte Reich" and "Luftflotte 3", the organizations defending Germany and occupied western Europe, still maintained 80% percent (avg.) of pilot strength, for the total fighter establishment (avg. 56%) in the first half of 1944. Dircovic (talk) 14:14, 18 August 2017 (UTC)

Month	Fighter Aircraft losses	Fighter Pilot losses
Jan	30.3%	12,1%
Feb	33.8%	17.9%
Mar	56.4%	21.7%
Apr	43.0%	20.1%
May	50.4%	25%
June	48.3%	-
Avg.	43,7%	19.36%

Source: Murray, Williamson, "Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945" p. 239 - 240

Once again the aforementioned source have been misinterpreted, diff.

Table LIII "Fighter Pilot losses", notes that during Jan - May 1944 a total of 2,262 pilots were killed; which figure corresponds to a entire German air fleet (Luftflotte) that contained an average strength of 2,283 pilots. But, as noted before, Luftflotte Reich and Luftflotte 3, were the organizations defending Germany and occupied western Europe. Meaning, that at least 4700 pilots were actively earmarked. However, the calculated arithmetic mean for pilot strength, should not be viewed separately, nor its comparison to the loss of lives. More importantly, Table LIII provides information regarding the loss percentage per month, in which the actual pilot losses of Luftflotte Reich and Luftflotte 3 were summarized. On top of it, Murray Williamson notes for the pilot losses during Jan - May 1944:

In January 1944, the fighter forces wrote off 30.3 percent of their single-engine fighters and had lost 16.9 percent of their crews by month's end.

The Luftwaffe wrote off over 33 percent of its single-engine fighters and lost 17.9 percent of its fighter pilots during February.

Luftwaffe units wrote off 56.4 percent of single-engine fighters available on March 1, while crew losses reached nearly 22 percent of pilots present on February 29.

Not until May did a significant decrease in bomber attrition begin, reflecting the continued arrival of new crews and aircraft as well as the final collapse of the Luftwaffe's fighter force.

I hope that clarifies it. Regards Dircovic (talk) 22:17, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

The 99% figure is clearly misleading given that there was a substantial inflow of (typically poorly trained) replacements at this time - it's the usual confusion between stocks and flows. Nick-D (talk) 23:00, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

Flak?

There's not much here about AA artillery; how much of it was there? I think I read somewhere over 500,000 men were involved in AA defences (that's about 30 divisions!), but I don't know how many guns that works out as, or where they were concentrated, or how effective they were overall. Does anyone know? And is it worth putting it in? Xyl 54 (talk) 01:33, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

It would be a great addition if some valuable information can be provided. I welcome any approach in that direction. Regards Dircovic (talk) 22:10, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

a bit at the bottom of Battle_of_the_Ruhr#Offence_and_defence mentions amount of flak in the Ruhr. Might be worth following the cites to see where that takes you.GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:35, 16 September 2017 (UTC)

Westermann

As stated per "diff", Westermann called Hans-Georg von Seidel's estimation of ammunition expenditure per aircraft shootdown as "biased" and a "statistical aberration" and presented another LW assessment. However, I do not own the book "Flak: German Anti-aircraft Defeses, 1914-1945" but strangely enough, the same quote appears in "Defending Hitler's Reich: German Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1914-1945" p. 535-540

The economic and materiel costs of maintaining the flak arm are often noted in much of the post-war literature as a justification for implying that the flak arm consumed a great deal of resources while providing a relatively small return. One of the most consistently cited examples of flak inefficiency involves the contention that flak gunners expended an average of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm/Model 36-37 ammunition per aircraft destroyed in 1944. At a cost of 80 RM per round, this equated to 1,280,000 RM or $512,000 per aircraft destroyed. While technically accurate, using the figures for 1944 as a measure of flak effectiveness is equivalent to using share prices from the Dow Jones on October 25, 1929, the day after the infamous crash, as an indicator to track the performance of the stock market for the 1920s. A detailed analysis of the many factors that contributed to the rise in the expenditure of 88-mm ammunition in 1944 demonstrates that the figure of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm ammunition per aircraft shootdown was in many respects a statistical aberration.

The total of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm ammunition per shootdown in 1944 is biased by a number of factors. First, the overwhelming majority of German heavy flak guns in this period were 88-mm/Model 36-37. These guns had an effective range up to 26,000 feet, in excess of the B-24s average bombing altitude, but near the lower limit of the B- 17s normal bombing profile of between 24,000 and 27,000 feet. Therefore, the Eighth Air Force's overwhelming use of B-17s over German targets in 1944 meant that the majority of Luftwaffe flak batteries were stretched to, and beyond, the limits of their effective engagement range. Second, many batteries were forced to continue using guns that had been effectively degraded by firing beyond their normal operational lives. This decreased firing accuracy because of excessive barrel wear and risked the danger of the guns exploding and killing or wounding the gun crews. Throughout 1944, the flak lost 380 88-mm flak guns per month due to excessive wear or destruction, a rate of consumption twice that of 1943 and nine times greater than 1942. In addition to the problem of limited ceilings and worn out barrels, it is important to keep in mind that throughout 1944 there were an average 262 Home Guard heavy flak batteries operating within the Reich. These units lacked sophisticated fire control equipment and were only equipped with 88-mm/Model 36-37 guns or modified 75-mm flak guns firing 88-mm ammunition. As a matter of necessity, these units used general barrage fire procedures. The number of the Home Guard batteries combined with their relatively obsolescent equipment also helps to explain the high number of rounds expended in 1944. Another factor was the Allied employment of improved electronic countermeasures including the use of a "Chaff Screening Force," consisting of several bombers equipped with special dispensers, improved the distribution of chaff and degraded German attempts at radar targeting. Finally, the massive influx of auxiliaries into the flak arm in 1943 and 1944, combined with increasingly obsolescent weapons and equipment, degraded the qualitative performance of the 88-mm flak batteries and resulted in rising numbers of rounds per shootdown.

[...]

In contrast to the 1944 estimates of rounds expended per aircraft destroyed, the average number of rounds per shootdown over the course of the first twenty months of the war stood at 2,805 heavy flak rounds and 5,354 light flak rounds. During November and December 1943, the flak arm averaged 4,000 rounds of heavy flak ammunition and 6,500 rounds of light flak ammunition per shootdown in a period where the flak was battling to overcome the combined effects or Allied jamming efforts and poor weather. Over the entire course of the war, one source estimated that the flak arm averaged 4,940 rounds of light flak ammunition and 3,343 rounds of heavy flak ammunition per shootdown. Using the latter figures, the cost of bringing down an aircraft with heavy flak totaled 267,440 RM or $106,976 while the cost per aircraft brought down with light flak totaled 37,050 RM or $14,820. Admittedly, using flak munitions expenditures per aircraft destroyed provides only a very rough estimate of the total cost per aircraft shootdown. This estimate omits the value of the resources used in the manufacture of the weapons and their associated equipment as well as the costs associated with training flak personnel. Likewise, it is difficult to establish a direct comparison between the cost of a fighter kill and a flak kill, as there were enormous hidden costs associated with the design, production, and operation of fighter aircraft. In the case of fighters, one must take into account the infrastructure costs associated with the construction and maintenance of airfields, aircraft upkeep and repair, fuel costs, as well as the expenditure involved in pilot training with its specialized training and hundreds of flight hours.

One method by which the cost of an individual flak kill can be placed into perspective involves examining the production costs of some of the aircraft that they were intended to destroy. For example, the cost of a fully outfitted B-17 was approximately $292,000 while a fully equipped B-24 cost approximately $327,000 in 1942. In comparison to the heavy bombers, the unit cost of a North American B-25 and Martin B- 26 medium bomber in 1942 was $153,396 and $239,655, respectively. These unit production costs for the medium bombers do not include expenditures for maintenance, ordnance, and fuel, or the costs associated with the training of the bomber aircrews. In any event, it is apparent that a cost of $107,000 per shootdown for the heavy flak guns and $15,000 per shootdown for the light flak guns was not excessive in comparison to the costs involved in the production of these aircraft.

A link to the aforementioned book can be found here: Defending Hitler's Reich: German Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1914-1945 Regards, Dircovic(talk) 22:49, 29 October 2017 (UTC)

Nazi Germany and Occupied Europe from around 1941-on included a forced- and slave labour economy so production costs, spending figures, etc., are not directly comparable with Allied figures.

In addition, the resources, raw materials, labour, etc., of all the countries in Occupied Europe were available for the Nazi regime to draw-upon at little cost to Germany.

... from around 1942-on the largest single budget expenditure by Germany was on air defence with the other arms of the German war machine having to fight each other for their share of the remainder. In addition, almost the entire output of the German electronics industry was taken up by the need for radars for the German Night Fighter force. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.137 (talk) 12:03, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Title

Is Defence of the Reich really the best title for this article? I'm not familiar with the literature on the topic, so if it's universally used in secondary sources then forgive me for my foolish question, but it strikes me as both not especially descriptive and ever so slightly POV. After all, Nazi Germany wasn't the only reich (although admittedly it's the one English speakers almost always think of when they hear the word) and air defence wasn't the only way in which it defended itself during WWII. Would a title like "German air defence in World War II" (or something else, IDK) possibly be better? ❃Adelaide❃ (talk) 09:53, 1 February 2018 (UTC)

While 'Defence of the Reich' is used in some sources, I would also prefer that title. It's 'flatter' and more neutral: few people in Germany's 'Reich' (including many Germans) wanted the German military to defend them. Nick-D (talk) 10:30, 1 February 2018 (UTC)