Talk:Dream argument/Archive 1

Archive 1

argument against simulated reality

"The main counter argument against simulated reality is the brain's own physical limitations. The brain has a limited capability for imagination (in it's capability for creating synapses, and physical reality as we know it exceeds it in complexity. Another counter point is that simulated reality disregards the intelligence barrier to achieving genius ideas."

The brain, in fact, creates "simulated realities" so there isn't really a debate about whether it happens or not. In fact, what you perceive as "reality" is actually simulated by the brain as well, since the brain doesn't directly experience anything.

The Simulation Hypothesis is that everything we see is simulatd all the time, nto that there are lots of little mini-simulations going on in an unsimulated, shared reality. Dreaming doesn't prove the SH any more than computer games do.1Z (talk) 15:58, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

The brain even edits out a lot of the details potentially available for in brain simulation for precisely the reasons you point out.

Lordvolton (talk) 01:54, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

Simulated reality section

--Qualiam (talk) 10:24, 14 January 2008 (UTC) This claim is dubious:

This also silences those who claim a simulated reality requires far fetched scientific technology, since the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality is a human brain.

If the only apparatus needed to construct a reality simulation is a human brain, then we no longer need to imagine brains-in-vats or brains-in-bodies, we just need to imagine brains-in-and-of-themselves. A brain by itself cannot construct a simulated reality, a brain also necessarily requires 'appropriate' stimulation. True, brains can generate their own signals, to a point. But even this ability requires energy, chemicals, blood, etc which the brain is incapable of producing without being in/part of an appropriate environment, hence the necessity for bodies...or vats (far fetched scientific technology).

You're lost in your own semantics.

Imagine if I said it would require a computer a billion billion times more power than the most powerful computer we'll have a million years in the future. You could make an equally questionable analysis by saying, "Ah, but it would require someone to build it. And that would require carbon or atoms. And that would need a universe of some sort. And that might require motion which must come from somewhere. How silly to say it requires only a powerful computer."

Or maybe I could say something like, "Tennis only requires two people to play a game." And then you could say, "Ah, but you need tennis rackets. And that requires humans to build them. And how can you play tennis without a tennis court? Aha! So it takes more than two people after all."

That's a really long way of saying, you've missed the point. Lordvolton (talk) 23:31, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

...absolute rubbish. I think youve missed my point. To keep with your (dodgy) tennis analogy, I can play tennis on my x-box, which only involves one person...me. Whats of crucial importance here is the assumptions we make based on the statements context. "Tennis requires only two people to play a game" immediately sets the tone, by using the concept 'playing', of an activity involving intentional agents. That is, your statement is meaningfully part of a context such as 'Tiddly winks is a game that requires only one player". What tools, implements, artifacts or devices are necessary to this game-playing are totally irrelevant and superfluous to the statements context...which you correctly pointed out. However, there are two people in my lounge right now, and we are playing a game, does this necessarily mean that it is tennis we are playing (2 people + playing game = tennis)? Of course not. Playing tennis requires other 'things' beyond just two people.

Playing tennis cannot be reduced, as much as you wish it to be, to two people. This fact dosnt make the statement "Tennis requires two people to play a game" false, anymore than "Driving a car requires petrol" is falsified or refuted by fan belts, spark plugs and accelerator pedals. What is important here is context. My gripe with the 'we dont need far fetched technology re: brain sims' is that this is over reductive, past the point of usefulness and meaning. The whole point is to propose what, at an absolute minimum, is req'd for X to occur. For a game of tennis, it is two people/appte venue/appte equipment. Astroturf or cork based courts are not explicitly necessary: we can play tennis in my lounge using the sofa as a net, or frying pans as racquets. Again, we are trying to establish THE BARE ESSENTIALS. A brain, by itself, is simply not enough to 'create a simulated reality'. It requires appropriate input/stimulation...be it electrical signals from a computer or light photons.

Your counter argument is a red herring. You are being a greedy reductionist.--Qualiam (talk) 12:52, 11 July 2008 (UTC)

You can play alone? Ah, but did you build the gaming console? And what about the chair you're sitting in to play the game? Using your logic we could extrapolate hundreds, even thousands of people are required for you to play tennis alone.

But as long as you're stating "I can play tennis on my xbox, which only involves one person" it isn't much of a leap for us to conclude that you can dream alone too. And this brings up back to the original point. No super computer required -- just neurons firing away. Even Helen Keller dreamt.

And as a final point, a simulated brain wouldn't need chemicals. Anymore than simulated rain requires H20. And even what you consider to be "reality" is itself a simulation all running inside your head. The computer screen you're reading right now isn't being teleported across space, your brain is reconstructing a copy (a rough copy at that) in your brain. Lordvolton (talk) 08:08, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Whohoa, hold on a second there Tonto. You seem to be conflating a number of issues here, and making a mess of things in the process. Your last paragraph is philosophically dodgy, to say the least. On one hand you are proposing a simulated brain, and a simulated reality, then in the next breath youre stating that this simulation is a reconstruction performed by, err, a 'real' (ie non-simulated) brain?! I mean, c'mon, that kind of undergrad reasoning is not going to cut it. Just reconsider your last sentence: "...your brain is reconstructing a copy...in your brain." As Wittgenstein might say of that: utter nonsense. Your going to have to present your argument in a less circular and dogmatic form to convince me that you know what youre talking about.

Forget the tennis analogy, I know I rather would. Its similiarities to the topic on this page (simld reality/dream argument) are metaphorical, and so prone to misunderstanding. My objections to the section removed still stand, and as per discussion others have agreed. You must present an argument as to why "the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality is a human brain" should be acceptable as true. Until we come to some agreement, the section that mentions this should remain off the main article. Your coming back with what you see as a viable retort and then replacing the text to the main page is annoying, not educative or helpful. If you actually present me with a good argument, Ill be more than happy to accept you are right. Engage me in the argument at hand, dont resort to red herrings.

Why is the brain the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality? Remember, there are brains-in-jars in autopsy labs throughtout the world. Are these brains capable of generating simulated realities? Of dreaming? Were the contents of Keller's dreams based, at least in part, on waking experiences? That is, experiences she had not just as a brain, but a whole body? These kinds of questions, though you might find them annoying ("I want to simplify it ALL to just the brain!!"), are very important. I see no reason why the stimulus should be ruled out as a necessary element a priori, as you are wanting to do. I see 3 necessary things here: stimulus/stimulant, stimulated, and simulation. Yes, arguably, dreams demonstrate that the brain could 'do' all 3 by itself. But using this as decisive 'proof' and "well, if it can happen then, it can happen all the time!" is a bit like a brain surgeon claiming that all he needs to be a brain surgeon is his neurological tools. No, all he needs to perform surgery is his tools. To actually be a brain surgeon required years at medical school too. Yes, he also needed to eat food and breathe. But we dont need to bring them into the equation (which is what you erroneously think I am trying to do regarding my objections to the brain simn). Why dont we need to? Because those things are what every living human needs to be a living human. And since the question was what the surgeon needs to be a surgeon, and not what the surgeon needs to be a living human being, we need not concern ourselves with Universals such as food and air. Food and air are common sense assumptions. However, when we are arguing about what is required to create a reality simulation, ALL assumptions are OFF. We are arguing bare-bone basics here. Qualiam —Preceding unsigned comment added by 222.154.86.77 (talk) 10:43, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Tonto? Obviously you don't speak Spanish or you're a fan of the Lone Ranger whose handle on Spanish was equally condescending. It means "fool". I also noticed that your only edits are to this article which raises my suspicion that your account was created specifically for that purpose, but thankfully we have your ip address so we can verify that: 222.154.86.77

Using secondary accounts to stir the pot is a violation of wikipedia guidelines.Lordvolton (talk) 15:59, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Here are the results of the ip search.

Asia Pacific Network Information Centre, APNIC, PO Box 2131, Milton, QLD, 4064, AU

Are there any other contributors editing the page from Milton, QLD, Australia? If so, that's our huckleberry. Milton is a coastal community which looks pretty nice. Here is some more information on Milton, Australia.

http://www.southcoast.com.au/milton/index.html

Lordvolton (talk) 16:27, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Good grief. Did no-one catch my name at the end of my post: 'Qualiam'. I had written the latest post without signing in. Nothing insidious, no conspiracy. Im actually in New Zealand. If there was any 'real' (ie non-simulated) investigative work done, it wouldve been obvious that my 'unsigned' post had the same ip as all my properly signed posts. Sheesh.

Apologies for calling the user LordVolton a fool. His philosophical skills are what I have concerns about. He still has not addressed my argument, and persists in replacing the removed section without resolving the debate.

So what if this has been the only article Ive debated? Im a lurker, largely. Ive demonsrated that Im not a vandal, Im more than willing to debate the section in question. It is LordVolton who is making this an issue of personality. Rubbish. All my arguments are philosophical. Let Volton step up to the plate. Signed, Qualiam.--Qualiam (talk) 22:25, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

If this is the only article you're ever edited that's fine, but if this a secondary account that you've created to stir that pot that's a violation of Wikipedia guidelines. For example, if you have another banned account and you've created this account that would be a violation. Or if you created this account to create a consensus with your primary account that is also a violation.

A little more investigative work on our part will reveal your other primary account, if indeed one exists. Removing sections as "rubbish" and then asking for calm, cool debate is hypocritical at best. This isn't the first time you've forgotten to sign an edit -- I'm sure we'll find a match with your other accounts if you want to put us to the trouble.Lordvolton (talk) 17:50, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

Good Lord, I am not 'out to get you'. Im not here to cause trouble, vandalise, create sockpuppet accounts, or conspire against you. As I said, Im primarily a lurker. I read this article back in the beginning of the year. I thought the 'simld reality' section of the article displayed poor reasoning. I couldntve cared less who wrote it. Obviously, it was you. I still could care less. I proceeded to voice my objection to the section, here, and left it at that. Some time later, TWO other editors agreed that the section was dubious, and should be removed. Again, I did not remove the section. Youve since come back, retorted, reworded slightly, and then without further discussion taken it upon yourself to reinstate the section. Your actions, I think, are suspect. If anything, they reveal that the section has personal, vested interest for you, and is most likely OR. As far as Im aware, I have only made one unsigned edit. If I have made any more, my apologies. As youve noted, my contributions have been minimal, so Ive probably 'been a newbie' and missed a sig out of ignorance. Again, my problem is that the dubious section is 'confused'. If I find it confused (whats its point? Is it even relevant to the article?), then there will be others too. There have been others. You said that I missed your point. At least two other editors, then, have missed your point as well.--Qualiam (talk) 05:43, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

...as a postscript: Im sure you (LV) do not want this to become a lame edit war. Which is why this argument should be settled here in discussion, not in a to-and-fro-undoing of each others edits to the main article. I think the section that has been removed should remain removed until this argument is resolved. I dont think you have the editorial upperhand here, and your reverts are nonproductive. Why? I initially proposed discussion on the dubious section, and I did not remove the section. Several other posters agreed with my concerns, and someone else, NOT me, removed the dubious section. You came into the discussion after the fact, which is fine, but then decided that your retort was effective enough, without further discussion, to reinstate the dubious section. I find this highly questionable. Again, I did not originally remove the dubious section, someone else who agreed with my points did. Ive been more than accomodating concerning the proper procedure for resolving topic conflicts. You have a vested ineterest in keeping the dubious section on the topic page, which is why you are resorting to red herrings and making this a 'personal' thing. Please, lets stick with the philosophical issues. Lets debate. You have shown no willingness to see my arguments points, and dismiss them with a wave of your hand without further discourse. I think you are fundamentally wrong regarding your assertions on this topic. Can we please keep the dubious section off the article page until we come to some sort of understanding?--Qualiam (talk) 02:40, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree, Qualiam. Actually, the whole section is dubious. I'm in favor of removing it. Graymornings (talk) 02:12, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

Agreed. Section should be removed, OR and irrelevant. 1Z

Article

I'm submitting an articl, (not sure of category) that examines the biological basis of dreaming and nightmares. Here's the link: http://www.artsandopinion.com/2004_v3_n6/lewis-13.htm Thanking you for the consideration, Artsandopinion (talk) 17:37, 14 January 2008 (UTC)Robert Lewis

Not really about the Dream Argument. 1Z (talk) 18:14, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

Simulated Reality Section II

This is still unresolved. Seeing as this section is unsourced, I assume it is OR. If that is the case, if it can be shown to be dubious, it should be removed. In all honesty, I cannot determine what the point of the section is: what is it trying to demonstrate? There are only two points I see it as making: one is trivial, the other is irrelevant to the article.

Dreaming provides a springboard for those who question whether our own reality may be an illusion. The ability of the brain to trick itself into believing a neuronally generated world is the "real world" means at least one variety of simulated reality is a common, even nightly event.

Those who argue that the world is not simulated must concede that the mind — at least the sleeping mind — is not itself a reliable mechanism for an analysis attempting to differentiate reality from illusion by nature of its own inability to distinguish between reality states.

A couple of issues here. Firstly, our minds are the only 'mechanisms' by which illusion can be differentiated from 'real'. To argue that the mind is an unreliable mechanism in this regard is like arguing that the earth is an unreliable place to live because people die here. As far as we know, the earth is the only viable place to live. We're stuck with our minds, and stuck with the earth. I find the claim that 'the mind is unreliable' to be circular and self-defeating: it is your mind, afterall, that enables you to make such a claim, and it is your mind that has enabled you to be a sceptic in the first place. If the mind were not reliable, you could not make such claims. Being reliable does not equate to being infallible. It is by virtue of our minds reliability that we can in fact determine when it has been erroneous.

What is a 'neuronally generated world'? Ive never heard of such a world. Do I have to go visit 20 other wiki pages to find out what this means? How do we distinguish between 'neuronally generated worlds' and 'non-neuronally generated worlds'? Is there even such a distinction?

This could be seen as a challenge to those who claim a simulated reality requires highly advanced scientific technology, since the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality capable of fooling the unconscious mind is a human brain.

Firstly, I have no idea what is meant by 'fooling the unconscious mind'?? How does the brain fool the unconscious mind? Is this dualism? Freudian? Theres a mish-mash of concepts here. Secondly, we better head over to the brain-in-a-vat page and alert everyone that there is a much more economical thought experiment: brain-in-a-petrie-dish. Or better yet, brain-in-a-vaccuum. Since when has dreaming been proof that the only apparatus needed to construct...is a human brain? I still dream whether Im postulated as being a BIAV, in a Matrix, or part of an ancestor simulation. Yes, the brain plays a crucial causal role in the 'simulation' experience, but then so does the environment the brain is in.

So, what is this section trying to demonstrate? If, as per the sections last statement above, the point is that advanced scientific technology is not a requirement to generating a simulation, then I doubt anyone over the age of 10 needs to come to wikipedia to acknowledge this. My body, the one I am conscious of, has no wires coming from it, no electrodes exiting my head and feeding into some supercomputer. So, as far as Im concerned, common sense and not a wiki entry has me believe that what I see is real, and any contribution I am making to my experience of said reality is all 'me' and not a computer. For this reason, the section is trivial.

If, however, the section is trying to demonstrate that sceptical arguments (BIAV, Matrix, Ancestor simn) are based on superfluities, then this article is hardly the place to do so. Again, any 'brain' in any of the ontological scenarios will still have dreaming and waking experiences. The point of such sceptic arguments is to demonstrate the limits of empiricism. Dreaming hardly provides any kind of evidence in this matter. Also, assuming the brain to have ontological status a priori is fallicious. Why should the brain have ontological primacy over any other macro-object that one can see/touch/etc? So again, the assumption that the brain is all that is needed in order to generate a reality simulation is dubious. And once more, what has this got to do with dreaming?

I think the author of this section needs to better explain his points. Signed, Qualiam —Preceding unsigned comment added by Qualiam (talk • contribs) 06:57, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

At least you're acknowledging that the real problem people have with the dream argument stems from biases flowing from the simulated reality article. So they come here to continue grinding that axe. It's amusing.

But the fact remains that your dreams fool you almost every night. Not a super computer 100 years in the future. 20 watts of power running through some neurons completely tricks you into believing a simulated reality is the real mccoy. So we need not speculate about some distant future where you might find yourself in a simulated reality you cannot differentiate from the true reality.

Bostrom goes to great lengths to imagine a future where simulated realities might exist in order to conclude we might be living in a simulated reality today. The whole argument rests on a theoretical that is not necessary since we know for a fact that our brains, the same brain(s) that a computer is supposed to trick, is hood winked every 24 hours.

So that apparatus is not trustworthy. I need not imagine a future reality that might trick me when I live in one today that tricks me. And yes, the brain in a vat people need to come back and more carefully consider dreams. Descartes imagines a world that is made of Papier-mâché, but we don't need an "evil genius" when we're perfectly capable of creating such worlds in our own minds -- or so the story goes.

If your brain were on trial over whether it could distinguish "reality" from "simulation" the very first question it would be asked is, "Have you ever confused an illusion with reality?" And the answer would be, "Yes. Every night." After a lot of pacing back and forth in front of the jury the prosecutor simply say, "Why then, after admitting that every 24 hours you're tricked, are you so sure you're not being tricked right now?"

Silence...

"Mr. Jones? Please answer the question." =-)

Lordvolton (talk) 05:32, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

All Im concerned with here is a good article. As Ive said before, I came here some months back and read the article. The article was/is fine up unitl the simulated reality section. This section should not be there. But not because Im a Bostrom sympathiser: on the contrary, I think his argument is flawed and refutable. However, by including the simtd reality section here, by having a link from the SH page to this article, is only fanning the fire that irks you. Youve provided the flame that the moths are drawn to...and then you are amused at the response.

I think youre reasoning regarding dreams, especially as a retort to Bostrom/advanced tech, is assumptive. You appear to be assuming your own conclusion. Rephrasing your argument using different analogies and metaphors is unconvincing, and just amounts to a 'change of clothing'. But it seems you are not interested in hearing critiques of your position, so I guess Ill have to let that sleeping dogma lie.

So back to the article. The articles strength, or rather the Dream Arguments strength, is that as a sceptical proposition it is metaphysically neutral. It is not a materialist intuition pump, it is not dependant on idealism or dualism. The dream argument dosnt assume the ontological reality of any object, be it butterflies or brains. And that is the thrust of the argument, why it is useful: all objects are ambivalent and ontologically indeterminable. The butterfly could be real, or could be illusory. It is both and neither.

The simulated reality section is therefore inconsistent with the dream arguments thrust, or premise. The simd reality section undermines the rest of the article, because it assumes the ontological existence of an object, the brain. The intro section explicitly states that we should not trust our senses because, as dreams demonstrate, we can be decieved (or words to that effect). The bulk of the article is entirely consistent with this premise...except for the simd reality section. To assume the brain to be real in this context is to adopt a metaphysical position (materialism): the brain causes dreams, and 'fools' itself. This totally goes against the dream arguments premise. Why should the brain be given ontological status where butterflies are not?

In keeping with the dream argument, one would say that the brain is a dream object like all other dream objects, and there is no way we dreamers could transcend our illusions and empirically confirm that there is a 'real' brain 'outside' of our dreams and illusions. As Ive said previously, these sceptical arguments are primarily demonstrations of our empirical limitations.

Can you see now that the simd reality section does not belong in this article? The dream argument, to be of value, must have its premises preserved. It needs to be a stand alone idea, and not 'worked in' with the other skeptical thought experiments, less it lose its uniqueness and value. If a person jumps to this article from the SH article they should read something that is importantly different to Bostroms ideas. The dream argument is intended to be as neutral as possible, not scientifically based or metaphysically biased. Qualiam--Qualiam (talk) 06:44, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Psychosis

While we're on the topic of the simulated reality article there is a reference to psychosis. An individual suffering from schizophrenia that is having hallucinations would probably not be an excellent reference point to determine if something is simulated or real.

And that point is missed by those who have faith that rivals Moses when it comes to their senses.

These are the same people, many of them wikipedia editors and others fine folks, who are experiencing nightly hallucinations and then waking up and writing about the world being exactly as it appears using the same brain that moments ago they couldn't trust. For some reason they view those who are having "waking dreams" as unreliable sources, but their own senses which are at least partially unreliable as somehow above the fray.

Perhaps part of the reason they dislike the dream argument so much is because it puts their own senses on trial. After all, if you cannot trust your own brain... what can you trust?

Lordvolton (talk) 06:06, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

LV,

when I am dreaming, I am not hallucinating. Please, dont get all up in arms, try and understand what Im about to (re)explain to you. It is only after I wake up that I am in any position to judge what I previously experienced as being illusory. Once awake, what can I compare the waking state to apart from dreams? I can compare dreams to a more real state, waking, but what more real state can I compare waking to? Nothing. Your scepticism is extermist, as you are disintegrating all measn of distinguishing between real and illusory. In your ontology, both words now become meaningless.Generally, but not absolutely, when one is hallucinating they do not know they are. I can only judge my dream experience as a hallucination because I have awoken, and by a method of comparison have deduced that what I previously experienced as real was not. I have never had a dream where I think 'this is real and moments ago when I was eating tea, well, that was illusion'. The distinction only occurs when I am awake. I never make such ontological comparisons when I am asleep.

Those ontological comparisons, to keep with your reductionism, are made possible by my brain. The very same brain that you are arguing as untrustworthy is being trusted, by both you the sceptic and me the realist, to make judgments about experience and to reason. Perhaps those reasoning capacities are non-active in sleep, which is why the dreamer does not think 'hey, this is a dream!' But then again, despite those capcities being active during waking hours, I very rarely qusetion the ontological status of objects.

As far as trusting the brain, I trust my brain even though I have dreams every night. Dreaming does not disturb me in the slightest. I trust my car even though it is prone to breaking down. I trust things in general because, in general, they work. If something consistently proves undependable, I no longer trust it. And this is where your scepticism is inconsistent: you trust your brain when making the judgment and arguments that your brain cannot be trusted. Have you heard of battered wife syndrome? Qualiam--Qualiam (talk) 07:16, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

A dreaming brain is not the same as a waking brain or you would dream all day. 1Z (talk) 16:36, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

"It is only after I wake up that I am in any position to judge what I previously experienced as being illusory." - Peter Jones

Have you noticed that we tend to talk at each other, rather than to each other? I completely understand what you're saying. Yes, only after you wake up are you in a position to judge what was previously illusory.

"Once awake, what can I compare the waking state to apart from dreams? I can compare dreams to a more real state, waking, but what more real state can I compare waking to? Nothing." - Peter Jones

I understand that you're saying that there is no upper level from dreams. In your experience there is something different about dreams, perhaps less vivid that allows you to differentiate. Again, I completely understand your point.

Now I want you to take a second and attempt to understand my point.

The "waking up" state itself cannot be trusted. I speak from experience! I have woken up and started my day and fully believed I was in the "real world" only to wake up again. So what do I compare that "waking up" state to since I cannot differentiate it from the dream world?. And I'm not alone.

Reply to LV above: You cannot keep waking up. Youre either awake or youre not. When Im dreaming, my dream for all intents and purposes is real. It can only be judged as not real when I question its ontological status. What is the difference between living as if a dream is real and living as if waking is a dream? Morally, I find myself obliged to live every experience as if it were real. Harming another being has consequences. Harming someone within a dream has no consequences whatsoever, and this is what distinguishes the two. I will live the experience I am having right now the only pragmatic, morally upstanding way I can: as if it were real. I have no reason to live it any other way. True, I might wake up and realise I was dreaming, but so what? What reason would I have now for believing that I was really awake and not dreaming again? Infinite regress into moral oblivion is unappealing. Besides, I can differentiate waking life from dreaming because my waking life has a continuity and reliability dreaming severely lacks.--Qualiam (talk) 10:50, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_awakening

I realize that from your subjective life experience your dreams and waking states may be easily distinguished, not so for all of us. So for you it's a trivial matter to say this is dreaming and that is waking.

Some of us have brains that can very closely mirror the real world so much so that we cannot always tell the difference. We don't always know when we're "awake" or "dreaming." In fact, I've woken up several times in a row.

Reply to LV above: Waking up several times in a row makes no sense. How can one awaken to another dream? That is an analytical contradiction. You are trying to convince me that some bachelors are in fact married.--Qualiam (talk) 10:50, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

We're all wired differently, so your matter of fact statements are not universal. Until you experience a false awakening you may not fully appreciate it.

Reply to LV above: Personal anecdotes do not make for good philosophy, let alone good encyclopaedia entries.--Qualiam (talk) 10:50, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

"I have never had a dream where I think 'this is real and moments ago when I was eating tea, well, that was illusion'." - Peter Jones

Even short of experiencing a false awakening many people have lucid dreams in which they realize they're dreaming. In those situations they may be drinking tea and then suddenly realize that it's a dream. On the flipside I've had friends tell me, "I have a memory of something but I don't know if it really happened or if it was a dream."

Reply to LV above: Again, appeals to conformity do not make for good philosophical arguments. I could care less if everyone but me has had false awakenings: philosophy operates by logic and reasoning. It does not successfully operate by using hearsay.--Qualiam (talk) 10:50, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucid_dreaming

This is all brings us back to the main point. Your senses cannot be trusted. The tool (brain) you use to determine "real" from "fabrication" isn't untrustworthy. Or perhaps your tool is different from others, but this is wikipedia and it's not just your personal experience.

My brain is capable of creating a simulated reality so vivid I cannot always tell the difference. I sometimes wake up, and wake up, and wake up... until I stop waking up. And then I go about my day wondering if I'll wake up again.

That's not your world. Your world is clean and crisp. I understand that, but that's not the world everyone experiences. Perhaps for good reason.Lordvolton (talk) 04:28, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Firstly, why the heck are you quoting me as Peter Jones? Your paranoia is starting to get a little worrisome. Secondly, Im not in the minority with my 'crisp, clean experiences' as far as dreaming/waking goes, so your attempts at self-alleviation here are plainly unwarranted. I could equally counter your position by agreeing that yes, perhaps I am in a minority, as I would be if I entered a prison as a free man, or entered a psychological institute as a visitor of a patient. This line of reasoning is vacuous and unconvincing.

Your claims really are a mish mash of contradictions. You accuse me of trying to exert my 'crisp, clean' agenda on this article, then have the gaul to argue that for personal reasons your view and points should be reflected in the article. Double standards?!

You havnt even bothered to reply to my main argument as to why the simd reality section does not belong in the article. Instead, your 'retort' is to resort to playing the sympathy card. Hey, Im fully aware of hypnagogic states and lucid dreaming. But you are trying to tie them all together with the dream argument from your personal metaphysically-fixed position. How many times do I need to say this: in the dream argument, the brain has the same ontological value as the butterfly. Yet your argument assumes, ASSUMES, that the brain is a real-actual thing and NOT illusory. Cant you see how self-defeating your argument is? Cant you see that by asserting your brain to be real and NOT an illusory object you are already positing a non-dream object, a real object?

In the dream argument, ALL objects could be illusory or real, there is no way of telling for sure which is which. By claiming that your brain is real, that it decieves you, that it creates illusions, you are contradicting yourself and being inconsistent with the article. On what grounds are you supposing that an empirical object, your brain, is real and NOT illusory, when you then also claim that your real brain creates illusions that deceive you? In order to be consistent, you are going to have to adjust your position to either:

1) Your brain itself is illusory, as are your senses, because you have no grounds for ascertaining in any trustworthy manner whether they are in fact real or not. So the only solid ground you had permitted yourself has been pulled from under your feet. You really are consistent with the dream argument now, because the reality-illusion distinction has become meaningless without any means for differentiating the two.

2) If your brain is real, why is it real? Perhaps because it is something which can be seen, or touched, and because it has causal properties which can be empirically verified. Fine. But then why, on these grounds alone, should only the brain be trusted as a real object, where other objects are not? I can see my hand, and it picks up the red apple which I eat. Why is my brain real, but my hand and the apple are not? On what grounds are you affording the brain special existence? If your brain is real for the reasons above, then all empirical objects are real for precisely the same reasons. Otherwise you are being plain unreasonable, inconsistent, and self-contradictory.

If your brain is deceiving you about anything, it is that it is deceiving you about everything. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Qualiam (talk • contribs) 06:48, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I guess I need to pay closer attention to the signatures. No offense to Peter Jones. The point remains - your brain is capable of creating a simulation that you generally cannot differentiate from the real world. You place great faith in the "waking up" to defend your position that your senses are highly reliable.

If we were in court and your brain was the star witness in defense of its ability to ferret out simulation from reality, it would be a very weak witness indeed. As we've already discussed. And we don't need to debate the advent of future supercomputers -- all we need is your 20 watt brain to resolve whether you can be tricked.

This is important for future simulation developers as they need not recreate the real world in exact detail, so long as they mimic the signals already creating simulations in your head. That will require dramatically less processing power. But simulation design is another topic.Lordvolton (talk) 18:58, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Qualiam is not me. I l do not have the time to waste on long debates with your. 1Z (talk) 16:53, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Why is this a paradox?

Isn't this more like a fallacy (non sequitur)? Asking "Am I dreaming in a dream?" doesn't cause dreaming, nor is it only possible to ask that question while dreaming. Just like asking "Is it raining?" doesn't cause rain or can only be asked during a rainstorm. Kinda reminds me of solipsism... -92.228.81.103 (talk) 07:05, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

Of all the criticisms I have read of Hutton's Paradox, this must take the biscuit for being the stupidest. Who said that asking "Am I dreaming?" in a dream causes dreaming? Where is it stated that this question can be asked only in a dream? (It is in fact stated that Hutton thought as a child that this question would never occur to him in waking life, but later realised his mistake.) Either you haven't read the section on his paradox with due attention or your brain just isn't capable of understanding abstract concepts.

I have often noticed that it is the intelligent – members of high IQ societies, for example – who appreciate this paradox. In the less cerebrally endowed it generally results in a puzzled look and barely coherent mumbling about it not making any sense or even contradicting itself, as if a paradox shouldn't do this!

I note, furthermore, your ignorance of basic grammar and use of the illiterate kinda. Have you no respect for the English language? To quote George Bernard Shaw: "Remember that you are a human being with a soul and the divine gift of articulate speech: that your native language is the language of Shakespeare and Milton and The Bible...."

By the way, I am Eric Bond Hutton.

alderbourne (talk) 18:32, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Are you sure that Shaw said/wrote that? Claiming that English is the language of the Bible, passes by foolishness and flounders into ignorance.

Moreover, our native language can hardly be said to be that of Shakespeare and Milton, much less that of Chaucer, and others who wrote in the English of their days. English is an evolving language and many of the rules and forms they followed are alien to our own. Even to assume that English is the native language of the previous writer is terrible arrogance in the realm of an international internet.

Finally, as this is the Internet, picking fights over something as trivial as "kinda" is kinda asinine. 129.97.250.140 (talk) 02:54, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

Yes, those really are the words of George Bernard Shaw; they are from act one of Pygmalion. He was of course referring to the King James Bible, which is as much a part of English literature as are Shakespeare and Milton. All three belong to the period designated Modern English, as indeed do we.

alderbourne (talk) 06:33, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

This isn't a paradox. It's an internally inconsistent argument, but not a paradox. Spelled out, the argument goes like this:

1. The act of questioning whether I am dreaming, proves that I am dreaming,
2. since the act of questioning "would never occur...in waking life";
3. however, the act of questioning does "occur...in waking life";
4. therefore, (1.) is unsupported.

So, allegedly, being in the state of dreaming is a precondition of questioning whether one is dreaming or waking, thus, questioning whether one is dreaming or waking necessarily implies that one is actually dreaming. But there is no paradox, since as soon as we bring in the third premise, the second is falsified, and the first is left without any support.

A similar, but valid, argument could be made from the dream-experiences which cause one to question whether one is dreaming (i.e., being in the state of dreaming is a precondition for certain experiences--which just happen to lead one to question whether one is dreaming--thus, those having those experiences necessarily implies that one is dreaming). 24.243.3.27 (talk) 08:02, 25 October 2008 (UTC)

To put an even sharper point on the matter, let's call the following argument "YH" for "Young Hutton":

1. The act of questioning whether I am dreaming, proves that I am dreaming,

2. since the act of questioning "would never occur...in waking life";

3. therefore, when I question whether I am dreaming or waking, I am necessarily dreaming.

Now, let's call the following argument "OH" for "Old Hutton":

1. The act of questioning whether I am dreaming, does not prove that I am dreaming,

2. since the act of questioning does "occur...in waking life" (~YH.(2.)).

So we have no paradox between YH and OH--OH simply poses a defeater against YH, by attacking the second premise of YH. When you combine YH and OH, you get an inconsistent argument--not a logical paradox. For a real paradox, see for example the liar paradox or the set of all sets 24.243.3.27 (talk) 08:58, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

All very cleverly and – on the face of it – convincingly argued, unlike some criticisms I have read of my paradox. There is, however, a flaw in your reasoning. Let's forget what I thought as a child, as that is not strictly relevant. (That was your mistake.) Here is my paradox in a nutshell:

True, asking oneself "Am I dreaming?" in a dream would seem to prove that one is. And yet that is precisely what he [Hutton] had often asked himself in waking life. Therein lay a paradox. What was he to conclude? That it does not prove one is dreaming? Or that life really is a dream?

Perhaps one day somebody will point out a flaw in my reasoning. Till then, however, I will continue to maintain that finding oneself asking "Am I dreaming?" in a dream proves that one is, even though one can ask the very same question in waking life. And therein lies the paradox.

I cannot dispute the issue of notability discussed by you in another posting to this talk page. Yet I can't help thinking that my paradox might become notable if left on Wikipedia! It would be interesting to see what regular contributors to this talk page have to say on this matter.

By the way, I'm 46. Old Hutton, indeed!

alderbourne (talk) 18:40, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Well, I do hope I'm not disrespecting my elder (you have 16 years on me), but I fail to see any significant difference between your statement of the alleged problem, and mine. What the issue comes down to is the falsification of the first premise: namely, that one must be dreaming to question whether one is dreaming or waking. In other words, I see no real paradox (i.e., two necessarily true premises which are--seemingly--contradictory of one another). To say that questioning whether one is dreaming or waking, necessarily implies that one is dreaming, is undermined by the experimental data that one can raise the same question while waking (i.e., what I termed as "YH" vs. "OH"). So the premise (i.e., one must be dreaming to question whether one is dreaming or waking) is not necessarily true, as demonstrated by the the counter-factual (i.e., that such questioning occurs during waking). So, it is only if we uncritically grant from the start that "Young Hutton" was right (viz., that one must be dreaming to question whether one is dreaming or waking), that we reach a paradox. But since the counter-factual supplied by "Old Hutton" falsifies that premise, we have no paradox--only an inconsistent argument.

Ps. I have no problem with the inclusion of your "paradox" (which I dispute the validity of, as per above); but I question whether it is really pertinent to a discussion of the dream argument, as posed by Chaung Tzu, since it seems to delve into the process(es) of differentiation of the dreaming and waking state, while the Taoist quandary focuses more on an existential conflict than an epistemic one (i.e., "What is Chuang Tzu," rather than, "How does Chuang Tzu know what he is"--kind of subtle, but a real difference, I think). 24.243.3.27 (talk) 22:26, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

No, you haven't understood again. Let me explain. If you find yourself asking "Am I dreaming? Is this the house I live in? Do I really have that picture on my wall, that book on my shelves?" in a dream it proves – somehow – that you are. At least in my experience it does. Yet, strange to say, you can ask exactly the same questions in waking life, and then presumably it doesn't prove that you are. Perhaps I'm a bit simple, but it seems to me that there's a paradox here.

As for your postscript, I would point out that the article is not specifically about Zhuangzi. It is, rather, as stated in its opening paragraph, about:

the postulation that the act of dreaming provides preliminary evidence that the senses we trust to distinguish reality from illusion should not be fully trusted, and therefore any state that is dependent on our senses should at the very least be carefully examined and rigorously tested to determine if it is in fact "reality."

But I have a feeling that this discussion could go on and on without either of us convincing the other of the validity of his case.

alderbourne (talk) 19:57, 17 November 2008 (UTC)

alderbourne: You said "...it proves – somehow – that you are..."--this is what I meant when I said "...it is only if we uncritically grant from the start that "Young Hutton" was right (viz., that one must be dreaming to question whether one is dreaming or waking), that we reach a paradox." The proof that YH is right (the "somehow" in your reply), is that the act of questioning "would never occur...in waking life". But then, OH comes along (old bugger that he is ;P), and throws a wrench in the clockwork, by noting that the act of questioning does "occur...in waking life". Now, YH's seemingly obvious premise is rendered useless (not false, mind you--but it currently lacks any support, as it's only supporting premise has been falsified by OH's rejoinder). So unless YH's premise is just taken to be true for it's own sake, there is no reason to believe it. Hence no paradox, since logic and argument, in the nature of the case, demand support for any premise. 24.243.3.27 (talk) 18:24, 25 November 2008 (UTC)

By example, take this argument; we'll call it "CD":

1.) If an animal has a tail, it is a dog,

2.) since only dogs have tails;

3.) therefore, my cat is a dog (since it has a tail).

Suppose someone comes along and presents a defeater, arguing that dogs are not the only animals with tails; we'll call it "NCD":

1.) If an animal has a tail, it is not necessarily a dog,

2.) since other animals have tails as well.

We do not have a paradox--we simply have an unsupported premise (CD.(1.)) that animals with tails are necessarily dogs, since its supporting premise (CD.(2.)) that only dogs have tails, has been falsified (NCD.(2.)) by the fact that other animals have tails besides dogs. Now maybe CD.(1.) can be proven to be true--just not by CD.(2.). This is basically the same thing as I see with your dream argument, just substitute CD and NCD for YH and OH, respectively. 24.243.3.27 (talk) 18:55, 25 November 2008 (UTC)

No, that "somehow" does not have the meaning you ascribe to it. True, I can't explain why asking oneself "Am I dreaming?" in a dream proves that one is. Even so, I am convinced it does. Likewise, I am convinced that deliberately raising my hand proves I have free will, despite all the ingenious arguments to the contrary I read many years ago in Schopenhauer's On the Freedom of the Will and the equally ingenious experiments of Benjamin Libet, John-Dylan Haynes and others, which have shown that brain regions involved in decision making and motor activity fire before test subjects are aware of choosing to push a button. So, too, am I convinced that the fact that I think proves I am not a character in somebody else's dream but exist in my own right. But don't ask me to justify any of these contentions! All I can suggest is that you ask yourself "Am I dreaming?" in your dreams.

alderbourne (talk) 15:46, 21 January 2009 (UTC)

"I can't explain why asking oneself "Am I dreaming?" in a dream proves that one is. Even so, I am convinced it does."

I agree with your conclusion, my dispute is regarding the reasoning which leads to it. My contention is that the simple fact of questioning whether one is dreaming or waking does nothing to show that one actually is dreaming or waking (since the same act of questioning can be equally engaged in while dreaming or waking, ala Chaung Tzu); rather, the dream experiences that lead one to the question (e.g., floating, or other events which are non-commiserate with physical laws as we know them), are the proof that one is dreaming. That is to say: the proof that one is dreaming or waking is the continuity of events with physical reality, as we know it, which in most people, leads to the question of whether one is dreaming or waking. In other words, the precondition of dreaming is established by certain dream events which defy reality, not the fact of questioning whether the events are reality (which is a consequence of the fact that the events do defy reality). 24.243.3.27 (talk) 08:54, 2 February 2009 (UTC)

False Awakenings

While we're on the topic of false awakenings, you might enjoy this...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3SSV13DXk

Lordvolton (talk) 13:51, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Epistemology

Shouldn't there be something about epistemology in this article, like, how does science for example deal with dream argument? As far as I know, the possibility for dream argument being true is kinda refuted by many based on epistemology, but that idea does not appear in the article.

Joni Hanski 213.130.236.173 (talk) 14:35, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

More work needed

The article doesn't come across as very serious about its topic. It is significant that the "Popular culture" section, at best the dessert of any article, is the longest. The "Recent Discussion" section needs to be filled out, with the arguments at very least sketched, but really require discussion at length. JKeck (talk) 14:38, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

part of a series on Descartes?

too much primacy is given to Descartes. this article has a Western slant. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.237.222.1 (talk) 19:21, 22 September 2011 (UTC)

History

Any information on how they both came up with the butterfly argument ion the east and west? I don't mean the philosophical question itself, I really mean the image of the "butterfly", and not the bee in the east and the frog in the west. was there any cultural exchange? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.151.130.14 (talk) 18:57, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Arguments for and against the Dream argument

I think there needs to be a description of arguments for and against the dream argument. Throughout this talk page, the list of paradoxes is mentioned. One might say that the existence of the paradoxes present themselves as evidence for the dream argument. --Cyberman (talk) 04:25, 22 April 2014 (UTC)

Add Bloodborne into the popular culture section?

In Bloodborne, you begin in the waking world, and are told that once you undergo a procedure, everything may seem like "a bad dream". Then you appear to wake up somewhere else and go through the city of Yharnam. However, in an ending, you are killed and 'wake up' in the city at daytime, something you never see in the game, while someone tends to your gravestone.

However, while it is suggested that the city of Yharnam you see is really a dream you are unaware of, it also deals with other layers. There are two further layers, the 'Hunter's Nightmare', where hunters are rendered comatose and trapped, and the 'Hunter's Dream', where hunters go when they are 'killed', and effectively can be resurrected from it. The inhabitants of the Hunter's Dream are aware of the fact that it is a dream, but the inhabitants of the Hunter's Nightmare aren't aware, and the inhabitants of Yharnam itself are not aware that their reality may be a dream, despite the illogical happenings there throughout the game.

185.69.145.92 (talk) 10:23, 24 August 2016 (UTC)Archangel