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Need to be careful

@TrangaBellam: I don't have time to offer the kind of critique I had foreseen, but let me just deconstruct one paragraph in the lead:

... had stably constituted between 4% and 6% of the population of the Kashmir valley in censuses from 1889 to 1941; the remaining 94 to 95% of the population was Kashmiri Muslim.[15] By 1950, their population declined to 5 per cent as many Pandits—owning over 30% of the arable land—moved to other parts of India due to an uncompensated land redistribution policy, the unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, and the threat of socio-economic decline.[16]

Here are the issues:

  • The population figure of 4 to 6% is cited to Mridu Rai [15] (A version of this I had added long ago to the Kashmir page long ago with 4–5%. But as you, TrangaBellam, and others, including I, pointed out in an earlier discussion, the 1891 census was an outlier (the Pandit population was 6%ish). So we changed it to 4 to 6% which is fine.
  • But "by 1950, their population declined to 5 per cent" is both OR and an inadvertant citation error. It was added to Kashmiri_Pandits#Population_distribution by Kautilya3 in 2016 in this edit. (He later added a footnote stating the actual figure is 5.34%.)
  • The 6% in 1947 is cited to Sneddon's Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. But Sneddon has made errors. In his 2021 book, Independent Kashmir published by the University of Manchester Press, he says on page 108, In the tumultuous times of 1947, therefore, ... he then states a little later: Most Hindus living in Kashmir comprised Kashmiri Pandits, who were ‘from the same stock’ as Kashmiri Muslims. They comprised 5.20 per cent of Kashmir’s population, with about 85 per cent of Pandits living in Anantnag District, which included Srinagar, and 15 per cent living in Baramulla District.; he gives the impression that the population figure he is talking about is from 1947,
  • but in the table of the Census of India 1941 on page 107, he says:Kashmiri Hindu Pandits living in KV 76,171 1.89 of all J&K-ites 5.20 of KV population (Source: (1) Census of India, 1941, Volume XXII, Jammu & Kashmir State, Part II: Tables, Srinagar, R. G. Wreford, Editor, Jammu and Kashmir Government, 1942, various pages; (2) Appendix II.
  • Thus, the 5.20% is not really the 1947 population; it is the 1941 population. (NB: there was no Census in Kashmir in 1951; the next one was in 1961). There is little likelihood that a community, viz. the KPs, whose literacy rates were high and population growth low, could have grown from 5.2% in 1941 to 6% in 1947 (a spurt of 15% in six years, i.e. an unheard of 25% in ten.) If 20% left in the wake of land reforms, there is little chance the population was 5% after the first exodus. I see the bit added in Kashmiri_Pandits#Population_distribution to be OR for countering the 20% in Kashmiri_Pandits#Exodus_from_Kashmir_(1985–1995). You will need to fix this.
  • "due to an uncompensated land redistribution policy" This was added by Kautilya3 to the Population distribution section, cited to Chitralekha Zutshi's Language of Belonging. Zutshi says on page

    Furthermore, by deciding not to compensate landlords for the expropriation of their lands through the reforms, the Jammu and Kashmir constituent assembly may have saved the state from a huge financial burden, but in the process it alienated a large section of the landlord population. Since a majority of landlords were Hindu, the reforms led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. Additionally, the land reforms notwithstanding, the problems of acute scarcity of grain, high food prices, widespread unemployment, and starvation continued to beset the state during this period.148 The unsettled nature of Kashmir’s accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950.149

  • She is saying (after having said that the land reforms were revolutionary at least on paper etc)
  • the land reforms led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state.
  • Additionally, the land reforms notwithstanding, the problems of acute scarcity of grain, high food prices, widespread unemployment, and starvation continued to beset the state during this period.148
  • The unsettled nature of Kashmir’s accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950
  • (Analysis) The landlords included the Dogras of Jammu who owned 70% of the arable land in the valley (in absentia, ie. were absentee landlords for the most part) and 100% of the (less fertile) arable land in Jammu.
  • (Analysis) The reference to starvation etc. is to the dirt poor Muslim peasants, not to the KPs who were never in danger of starvation. It is basically saying that the land reforms did not always benefit the segment of the population it was supposed to benefit.
  • (Analysis). The last sentence is Zutshi's summary which attributes the drop in the KP population from the exodus to a number of factors ((a) the unsettled nature of the accession, (b) the threat of economic and social decline resulting from the land reforms) is in the nature of a summary. We are not really at liberty to alter her summary. It doesn't matter what was the nature of the land reforms (uncompensated or not), she says that it was interpreted by the KPs as a threat to their economic and social standing. Also, it is not true that the KPs were not compensated. Several authors allude to this:
  • (Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects):
excerpt from Mridu Rai

However, corruption in the National Conference machinery mitigated the harsher aspects of the reforms for the big landowners. The commonest way, typical also of land reforms enacted in the rest of India, to evade resumptions was by breaking up joint families, thereby entitling each adult male to the limit of 22¾ acres... Although not all Kashmiri Pandits were by any means wealthy landowners, nor the only members of the landed elite, large landholdings were certainly common among them. It is said that over 30 per cent of the land in the valley belonged to them prior to the reforms, ... Considering that the Pandits comprised approximately 5 per cent of the Kashmiri population, their control of over 30 per cent of the land speaks for significantly large holdings. However, Pandits did not resist the abolition of big landed estates quite as shrilly as did their Dogra counterparts. To a certain degree this can be attributed to the flaws in implementation referred to above. Yet, these loopholes would have worked to the advantage of Dogra landowners too. Here a crucial distinguishing factor may have come into play in the valley. This had to do with the provision of the Act that exempted orchards from appropriation, and thus paved the way for big landholders to escape the ceiling by converting cereal acreage into orchards. Thee returns from orchards, especially from apple orchards, tended to be much greater than from the cultivation of foodgrains. So by retaining their orchards as well as converting some of their cereal acreages, the bigger landlords of Kashmir, whose ranks included Pandits, reversed some of their losses by entering into the highly profitable world of horticultural exports. Once again, while the beneficiaries of this exemption were by no means only the Pandits or indeed all the Pandits, there were certainly prominent elements among them who were given an important stake in supporting the new state. However, an arena in which the National Conference made conspicuous concessions to Pandit privileges was in administrative employment. Their primary vocation, especially of the Karkuns, being employment in government service, 10 per cent of the state jobs were reserved for Pandits. While it is true that a much larger proportion of 50 per cent was reserved for Muslims, the smaller numbers of the Pandits made this an impressively generous allowance. Indeed the Pandits were getting much more than their proportion of the population entitled them to and, through the liberality of the National Conference, were said to be better represented in state service than they had ever been before.

  • Sumantra Bose says in Kashmir at the crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict (Yale, 2021) :
excerpt from Sumantra Bose

Abdullah’s government ‘introduced the most sweeping land reform [ever seen, then and since] in the entire subcontinent’. Until then, almost all of (Indian) J&K’s privately owned farmland of 2.2 million acres was the property of 396 big landlords and 2,347 medium-sized landlords, ‘who rented to [landless] peasants under medieval conditions of exploitation’. Between 1950 and 1952 about 700,000 serfs became peasants working their own land as over 1 million acres expropriated without compensation from the feudal lords were transferred to them, and another sizeable chunk passed to government-run collective farms. The majority of the beneficiaries were Muslims in the Kashmir Valley but about a third were in the Jammu region, including tens of thousands of poor, low-caste Hindus. In the Valley the Pandit community, less than 5 per cent of the population, owned one-third of the arable land, and Abdullah softened the blow for them. They were allowed to retain their fruit orchards and 10 per cent of jobs in the J&K state government were reserved for them. ... (p. 51) The agitation was led by the Praja Parishad (Subjects’ Forum), an organisation formed in Jammu city just after the shambolic demise of the princely state by ex-officials in the last maharaja’s administration and leaders of the local wing of the RSS, the militant Hindu nationalist group.41 These elements would not quietly accept the ascendancy, and supremacy, of a new Valley-based Muslim political elite. The agitation was joined from 1950 by Jammu’s Hindu landlords dispossessed by the National Conference government’s land reforms (unlike Pandit landlords in the Valley, there were no concessions to them)

  • If a large number left, it was likely despite the concessions. It could be that they were more attached to India than to Kashmir, and they saw the unsettled future of Kashmir (whether independent or a part of Pakistan) to be equally threatening. Numerous authors have alluded to this.
  • Barbara D. Metcalf (Professor Michigan and UC, Davis; and former president of the American Historical Association) and Thomas R. Metcalf (Emeritus Kailath Professor of History at UC, Berkeley) in the Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge, 2012, say: The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force.
  • To this Kautily3 offered the riposte that authors of tertiary sources were not in a position to summarize adequately. This—said about Barbara Metcalf, whose field of specialization is Islam in South Asia—is the kind of objection that won't stand up in a page such as India or even Kashmir which many editors watch and to which they contribute.
  • Or it could be that the years of "ethnic oppression" of Muslims to which the Pandits were a party, might have created a grim outlook in a more egalitarian dispensation.
  • But Kautilya3 objected to that implication on the grounds that Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh's Partition of India, Cambridge, 2009, is not reliable because the second author is a "noted POV scholar" (or somesuch). This sort of objection can only stand in a page that typically flies under the radar, and in which a false consensus can be created among a few editors.

Thus, even if you decide to limit the lead sentence to the 1990s exodus, to drastically change the this version of the background and the exodus, is the reason I quit. It is not worth my time. I trust that you, TrangaBellam, will fix this page. Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:49, 18 January 2022 (UTC)

Acknowledging that I have seen this message, thanks. I will reply in a day or so. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:30, 18 January 2022 (UTC)
Thank you. No hurry. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:51, 18 January 2022 (UTC)
PS I will note one other thing, a personal observation about the kinds of changes that sometimes take place on WP. The Kashmiri Pandits page's Exodus section (of which this page is a spin-off) had this version after my edits in June 2012. It made a simple reference to an exodus in 1950. As I have already observed, the page now also has a Population distribution section. Both sections in the current version mention a 5% Pandit population. (See here ("by 1981 their population amounted to 5% of the total") and here ("by 1950 their population declined to 5%)). Both 5% sentences are cited to Rahul Pandita's memoir. Well, what does that say? It has in its timeline the following remarkable sentence: In the 1941 census, Kashmiri Pandits constitute about 15% of the Kashmir Valley's population. By 1981, they are reduced to a mere 5%.! So there you have it. If the so-called scholars ("Scholar Christopher Snedden states that the Pandits made up about 6 per cent of the Kashmir Valley's population in 1947"), let alone the impressionistic sketches (of Rahul Pandita), are not able to summon forth the rigor I generally bring in semi-comatose musings on talk pages, am I merely being arrogant when I insist on citing only the best scholars, in having a hierarchy: tertiary (textbooks), scholarly monographs, and journal articles, each supplementing the previous, but not changing the overall emphasis? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:51, 18 January 2022 (UTC)
Agree with Kautilya3 that this page has always been about the 1990s exodus when the almost entire population fled the valley. Fowler started adding the 1950s migration starting in this edit on 14 August . It seems to have been reverted on 24 August. It was reinstated twice.
1950 Kashmir land reforms is a separate topic, which should idealy be a separate Wiki page.
The page title may be changed to 1990's Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, if there are attempts to dilute the focus by adding minor migration in 1950. Also, if multiple migration/displacement events like 1950 are to be added, then they should begin with the first recorded exodus of KP in 1400's under Sikander Butshikan as widely recorded by Scholars, especially KP scholars. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 11:56, 20 January 2022 (UTC)
Please tell me in your 640 edits to Wikipedia what signal contributions have you made to Kashmir-related articles for you to repeatedly only say, "I support X, Y, or Z" or "a ruler who lived in the 14th century for whom there is nothing reliable available," should be mentioned in same breath as the Pandits of the late 1940s? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:54, 20 January 2022 (UTC)
I have provided over 20 scholarly sources, many with quotes to highlight missing points to make the article more neutral. For example, Regarding the issue of 1950 land reforms, I provided several scholarly sources mentioning "uncompensated land acquisition of KPs", which was accepted by K3 & Learning-Indology as useful contribution. Please find below a brief reminder. Jhy.rjwk
When highlighting the 1950 land-reforms, an important point missed is KP's land was acquired without any compensation, forcing some dispossessed KP landowners to leave Kashmir. Here are some relevant quotes below from multiple scholarly sources:
Extended content
A quote from Chitralekha Zutshi · 2017, Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation - Page 100
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kashmir/g09bDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA100&printsec=frontcover

In the early 1950s... As these reforms affected landowners, the majority of whom belonged to the Hindu community, they considered the compulsory acquisition of land without compensation a deliberate ploy to alter their socio-economic status and ensure the domination of the Muslim majority.

A quote from Pramoda Kumāra Agravāla · 2010, Land Reforms in States and Union Territories in India - Page 182
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Land_Reforms_in_States_and_Union_Territo/eP_rQWpQZuoC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA182&printsec=frontcover

Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950… no compensation was paid to the landlords. Under this law, the tiller was made owner of the land.

A quote from Christopher Snedden · 2021 Page 127, Independent Kashmir: An incomplete aspiration
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Independent_Kashmir/ZfEuEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PT127&printsec=frontcover

This lack of compensation seriously disenchanted dispossessed landowners, both Dogras and Pandits.

Jhy.rjwk
Shahla Hussain has also looked into the state records and found the arguments made by Jammu landlords. The Pandit landlords would have faced similar issues:

Jammu’s zamindars petitioned the state to differentiate between categories of landlords as it decided about compensation. They complained that about 30 percent of the land owned by their community had not been received as a jagir, or land grant, but had been secured in the late nineteenth century when the maharaja allowed people to cultivate barren lands. In the case of landlords who had purchased their own lands and made huge investments, the zamindars argued, nonpayment of compensation was unjust. They pointed to disparity of implementing socialist principles on the land while allowing “capitalists” like businessmen, contractors, and traders to accumulate money: “Our ancestors labored hard, earned money and purchased lands, while others utilized their earnings in gold, silver, houses and shops. The government should not interfere with our legal rights.”[147: Letter from Zamindears of Jammu, 1948] The land being taken away from them without compensation had been purchased with their hard-earned money, in the hope that it would yield good returns for future generations. The community emphasized that it was not against agrarian reforms in theory but wanted equal and just treatment in practice to preserve their community from economic ruin and future migrations. They suggested, furthermore, that the state “dispose of the properties of evacuees and raise funds to pay compensation to the landlords” since the government lacked pre-existing resources for this.[148: Letter from Zamindars of Jammu][1]

So, the complaint was not about jagir lands (which the Pandits didn't have anyway), but about chak lands and purchased lands.
A descendant of one of those pandits that left in the 1950s (despite admiration for Sheikh Abdullah) writes:

My father, like the majority of Pundits over the years, had to leave his home and work in “India” because there were no jobs for the “educated” in the valley, regardless of their religion.[2]

So there were many factors at play. Fowler&fowler just picks and chooses what he likes to believe. And what he believes is basically that the "Hindus" were guilty. They deserved to be punished. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:38, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
Not really seeing how this is a counter to the dispute about "uncompensated" nature. Multiple works (other than what F&F has cited) note that Pandits managed to extract various kind of favors in return and a large percentage outwitted the reforms using loopholes. Some go as far as to state that NC administration was in cahoots with the KPs in this process; socialists penned stinging critiques in contemporary newspapers.
Nostalgia about how their industrious ancestors took insurmountable risks to venture where no man had ventured before etc. has been always a favorite trope among S. Asian landlords in postcolonial India (and Pakistan) whenever faced with the prospect of losing their serfdoms - this is not exclusive to Kashmir. However, as works of Sheetal Chhabria et al show, such claims are mostly spurious and obfuscates a ton of privilege that allowed them to be so adventurous at the first place.
More later including quotes. TrangaBellam (talk) 13:24, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
However, I object to the statement: If a large number left, it was likely despite the concessions. It could be that they were more attached to India than to Kashmir. Provocative and incorrect. For an example, there was widespread unemployment in the region and consequently, a large number of KPs migrated to India; obviously, they had the privilege to do so unlike KMs. Regrettably, these aspects are rarely covered in scholarship apart from one-off articles. TrangaBellam (talk) 13:31, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
Very well summarized, TB.
PS I apologize for those sentences. I should have been more careful, especially in a section titled "Need to be careful." It wasn't entirely provocative, though. I was referring to the part about "the unsettled nature of the accession." I meant that the Pandits (except for Bazaaz and a few others who happily stated they wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan) have never been enthused about an independent Kashmir (let alone one in Pakistan). The KPs that left in 1950 because of "the unsettled nature of the accession" very likely did belong to this cross-section, the one that Metcalf and Metcalf refer to as "who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India." Note Zutshi said, "unsettled nature of the accession and economic and social decline in the face of land reforms." Obviously, the ones that were already unemployed did not migrate because they faced either economic or social decline from the land reforms; they weren't working as labor on the farms; they migrated because they wanted to improve their lot, and as you stated, they had that option. If the Kashmir Valley had gone to Pakistan during the partition, e.g. had Kashmir been a part of British India, say, where the Pandits would have gone is interesting historical speculation. My vote: there would have been an en masse KP migration to India in August 1947, but then it assumes that Kashmir would have remained serfdom-like under the British until 1947, which is very unlikely.
PPS Also, I should add: it is not as if Kashmiri Muslims (the better off ones) have not migrated. The traditional direction was down the Jhelum valley into the Western Punjab. Iqbal's family had done so a generation or two earlier eventually settling in Sialkot (below the Chenab). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:42, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
As for K3's post, not sure what to make of it. Shahla Hussain's book, of course, is a good one, with plenty about land reforms. The proliferation of smallholdings that she refers to happened in part because the elite KPs split their estates among the male relatives. Besides, Jammu's Hindu landlords, the foundation of the RSS in Jammu and the Praja Parishad, were not the same as the KPs, who despite their anger at the land reforms, did not protest as "shrilly" as MR says, not only because they were granted more concessions, but also because they had a tradition of education and were less inclined to cook up grandiose mythologies about themselves. But SH also says, on page 188:

Kashmiri Hindus, despite a deep-seated resentment against the state’s land reform policies that shook the foundations of their economic life and forced nearly 30,000 Kashmiri Hindus to migrate to India, were eager to declare the Indian part of Kashmir “free and democratic.”

Now 30,000 seems incredible as there were only 73K KPs in 1941. And 30/73, as any schoolboy in Srinagar knows, is 41%. But let's say it is a slight exaggeration, as neither Bazaaz nor Hussain conducted a census between 1947 and 1961, but regardless, there was an en masse migration of KPs out of the valley in the wake of land reforms, and they did have a soft spot for India. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:08, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
And Jhy.rjwk there is no point dumping a Google search, "dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=" We can all do that. It is better to read the books, to digest them, and to summarize their theses and nuances in general language. A talk page discussion is meant to communicate, not to declare which side you are on. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:20, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
The "30,000" figure occurs in a paragraph that is summarising Prem Nath Bazaz. I don't believe Shahla Hussain is making her own claim here.
Likewise, the passage I quoted above is also summarising the Jammu zamindars. Since the Pandits didn't make any complaints of their own in writing, I am using this as a proxy to get some understanding of the situation. There were jagirs, there were chaks and there were purchased lands. How people saw the ex-propriation by the state would depend on what kind of land they were holding. (Size is not the issue.)
TB's arguments also amount to whataboutery. There is no evidence that the Pandits who "outwitted" the system also migrated. It is very likely one or the other. When we are trying to describe the migration, the other issues cannot be randomly linked to it. That is ridiculous WP:SYNTHESIS (and WP:OR). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:12, 21 January 2022 (UTC)
But that is not how Shahla Hussain summarizes that section on pages 110 and 111. Says she:

Overall, Kashmir’s minority communities were apprehensive about their future in a Muslim-majority state that had introduced reforms and legislations placing them, as a group, at significant disadvantage. The fear visible in their discourse was attenuated by the disputed nature of Jammu and Kashmir and the United Nations’ promise of self-determination; in the event of a plebiscite, Muslim-majority Kashmir might vote for Pakistan and jeopardize their future. Hindu rightist groups in Jammu played up these fears and launched a virulent campaign against the National Conference’s demand for autonomy, which was the basis of Kashmir’s political partnership with India

The Jammu landlords' petition, by the way, was in a submission to the land-to-tiller commission, made in 1948. The commission was appointed under Mirza Afzal Beg (chairman and revenue minister under Abdullah). It had two members: Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq (Development Minister) and G. L. Dogra (Finance Minister). The committee had three non-official members: Thakur Kartar Singh (representative of the Jagirdars of Jammu); Ghulam Muhammad Mir, zaildar of a tehsil in Anantnag district; and a Kashmiri Muslim gentleman representing the cultivators. Beg's report published later was an ideological document, much lauded by socialists across India, not a religious document. When India's Home Minister Vallabhai Patel, asked Abdullah if he might reconsider not compensating the big landlords (many of which were Hindu, though not all), Abdullah's reply was: "Our support for Kashmir's accession to India" was contingent on the Naya Kashmir proposals of 1944 being implemented." Patel had no answer, and neither did Nehru, as long as Abdullah was in power. This is what I have been attempting to say without quoting sources. You can't object to this 70 years later insinuating objections of the Pandits to be those of the Dogras, whether the Pandits had the right reasons to migrate or not, whether the migration was forced or not. Many Kashmiri Muslims, in the end, did not receive the reforms for which they had put their implicit faith in Abdullah: that being a major point in Shahla Hussain's book.
As for the migration, we now have two notable works published by Oxford University Press (Zutshi, 2004) and Cambridge University Press (Hussain, 2021) which mention Bazaz's two different works without irony or qualification. You object to that. You were doing the same with Metcalf and Metcalf (they can't summarize, apparently) and Talbot and Singh (Talbot, the smart one, let his POV-pushing co-author summarize the Kashmir bit, apparently). But are you suggesting reminiscences in The Hindu can be used? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:28, 21 January 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Hussain, Kashmir in the Aftermath of the Partition (2021), pp. 108–109.
  2. ^ Pradeep Magazine, From the Valley, a selective remembrance of things past, The Hindu, 8 February 2013.
A suggestion: although I can't say I am a big fan of the Rekha Chowdhury book, it does have a reasonably balanced account of the 1990 exodus, pp 123–125. You could use that to write the lead and worry about the nuances later. Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:19, 21 January 2022 (UTC)

"Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus" listed at Redirects for discussion

An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2022 March 13#Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. Kautilya3 (talk) 15:50, 13 March 2022 (UTC)

Genocide

Genocide of innocents by Islamic terrorists 2601:2C2:8180:4BD0:F4AC:3B7F:7EB5:E4B (talk) 12:20, 13 March 2022 (UTC) Please go to Redirects for discussion

Edit request to complete RfD nomination

Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus has been listed at Redirects for discussion (nomination), but it was protected, so it could not be tagged. Please add:

{{subst:rfd|content=

to the top of the page and }} to the bottom to complete the nomination. Thank you. Kautilya3 (talk) 15:50, 13 March 2022 (UTC)

 Done TrangaBellam (talk) 17:26, 13 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 14 March 2022 (3)

CHANGE The reasons for this migration are vigorously contested. In 1989–1990, as calls by Kashmiri Muslims for independence from India gathered pace, many Kashmiri Pandits, who viewed self-determination to be anti-national, felt under pressure.[29] Political violence, especially the killings in the 1990s of a number of Pandit officials, may have shaken the community's sense of security, although it is thought some Pandits—by virtue of their evidence given later in Indian courts—may have acted as agents of the Indian state. TO The reasons for this migration are vigorously contested. In 1989–1990, as calls by Kashmiri Muslims for independence from India gathered pace, many Kashmiri Pandits, who viewed self-determination to be anti-national, felt under pressure.[29] Political violence, especially the killings in the 1990s of a number of Pandit officials, may have shaken the community's sense of security. TheKumar98 (talk) 17:34, 14 March 2022 (UTC)

"although it is thought some Pandits—by virtue of their evidence given later in Indian courts—may have acted as agents of the Indian state." is not inline with the subject at hand nor does it offer any constructive information related to the subject, it is a wild conjecture made to shift blame on the victims and as such, in adherence to moral codes of Wikipedia to abstain from Victim Blaming, this sentence needs to be redacted.

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. The statement appears to be supported by current inline citation 30, which also includes a quote for verification. Please discuss on the talk page and establish a consensus for change first, as your suggestion appears controversial. Jr8825Talk 18:07, 14 March 2022 (UTC)
 Done – I looked at this again, and removed that clause per MOS:LEADREL as it seemed inappropriately prominent in the lead (more broadly, the lead should be heavily shortened). The change wasn't made on the basis of the reason given here, victim-blaming and conjecture, as the claim was supported by a source. Jr8825Talk 02:58, 15 March 2022 (UTC)

Strange wording

"Occasional calls were made from mosques on loudspeakers asking Pandits to leave the valley."

Asking or more so demanding or threatening? I'm also wondering why my previous addition of "and invoking the creation of an Islamic state" was removed? Please also provide a source that makes it clear that the calls were "occasional"

As per sources listed: "Some other slogans were clearly directed against pro-India Kashmiri Pandits. ... by the end of January 1990, loudspeakers in Srinagar mosques were broadcasting slogans like 'Kafiron Kashmir chhod do [Infidels, leave our Kashmir]" from [[1]] and [[2]] and [hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PT73&printsec=frontcover] and [[3]] — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sumsshire (talkcontribs) 05:55, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

Sumsshire (talk · contribs) Welcome to Wikipedia! I hope your stay here will be enjoyable. I had reset the text to the consensus version created by user:TrangaBellam in mid-January 2022. There is nothing strange about the paraphrasing. All it means that the calls were infrequent. They were not broadcast five times a day.
Please also note that what you have added in another edit is: "Many Kashmiri Pandits believed they were forced out of the Valley either by Pakistan and the militants it supported or the Kashmiri Muslims as a group in order to expunge Kashmir's minority community and establish a theocratic Islamic state " What Shahla Hussain states is: "Most Pandits viewed their own forced exodus from the Valley as a deliberate Kashmiri Muslim plan to expunge the minority community in order to establish an Islamic theocratic state. " Please note that the logic of the paraphrase is slighly faulty. Also, your edit would constitute WP:Close paraphrasing, a minor form of copyright violation. It would be better if you paraphrase Hussain accurately and logically in your own words. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 06:07, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 17 March 2022

Delete "Shikara" as a film on the Kashmiri Pandit genocide. Shikara was NOT REPRESENTATIVE and was NOT A FILM on the Kashmiri Pandit genocide. it was a LOVE STORY - a BOLLYWOOD LOVE STORY, that merely included Kashmiri Pandits as characters. It had nothing to do with the facts.

https://theprint.in/features/shikara-review-beautiful-but-not-the-untold-story-of-kashmiri-pandits-it-is-marketed-as/361417/ Myocardium-leviosa (talk) 03:38, 17 March 2022 (UTC) Myocardium-leviosa (talk) 03:38, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done please establish a consensus for this change, as multiple sources do in fact describe it as being about the exodus, and the change you want is thus contentious. Vanamonde (Talk) 04:04, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
Shikara is a false depiction of situation in 90s Kashmir, rather it was accepted by the author and film maker himself that it is a mere imagination and has no connection with Kashmiri Pandit's forced exodus. Having any reference of Shikara in this article clearly violates the neutrality and trustworthiness of this article. Shikara reference needs to be removed or it needs to go to DRN.
Ref: https://www.newsbharati.com/Encyc/2022/3/14/The-Kashmir-Files-a-propaganda-and-Shikara-a-truth-Kashmiri-Pandits.html 115.114.136.244 (talk) 06:28, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

Title should be Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits

Title should be Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits as all sources use that phrase to refer to this. Per WP:COMMONNAME. Venkat TL (talk) 10:18, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

"Pandit" has many meanings which came to be disregarded in the Valley on account of the KPs being the only Hindus. They are the Hindus of Kashmir who were also brahmins. But there are many brahmins in India: Tamil brahmins, the Kanyakubjas of Kannauj, the Kulin brahmins of Bengal and so forth. "Pandit," will give primacy to their "brahmin" aspect in the manner of, "discrimination against Tamil brahmins," but the injustice done to them has nothing to do with being brahmins, but everything with being the major minority group in the Valley. "Pandit," can mean an expert, a learned person and so forth. Will be confusing. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:01, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
Pretty sure the scholars, authors media etc all know that yet they call it "Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits". There should be a very good reason to stray away from the commonly used title in the reliable source. For example, just look at the titles of cite used in the section above named #Numbers. --Venkat TL (talk) 14:11, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
KP might be the commonly used term in Indian journalism where the context is understood, or even used by some scholars such as Evans once the context is understood, but it is inappropriate for a global encyclopedia in a title. We give the alternate term in the lead sentence. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:13, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

Misleading infobox commentary

A note at the bottom of the infobox states:

According to official Indian statistics, 30 Hindus were killed, but the civilian deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim.[1]

References

  1. ^ Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina, "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir", Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia, Australian National University Press, ISBN 9781760461898,  Swami's (2006: 175) official Indian data show a pattern where civilian deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim. Yet, when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process.

The data from Praveen Swami does show more Muslims getting killed, but not "overwhelmingly". Not by a long shot.

In the first place, the Hindu fatalities in 1990 were 177 (I don't know where 30 came from) and Muslim fatalities were 679. That means 20% of the fatalities were of Hindus, even though they made up only 3% of the population. Secondly, Hindus were fleeing the Valley whereas Muslims were staying put, participating in protests, and getting targeted by the security forces. One could argue that the majority of the Muslim fatalities would have been from the security forces rather than the militants. If so, the differential becomes even greater.

The second striking aspect of Praveen Swami's data is that the Hindu fatalities continue all the way up to 2005, even after the Hindus had supposedly left the Valley. After 1990, more than a thousand Hindus (1,406 to be exact) were killed even though only a miniscule number of Hindus were left in the Valley. This is truly shocking! The per-capita fatalities of Hindus was astronomically high.

Here is the summary:

  • Muslim fatalities, 1988-2005: 12,245 (or 1.8 deaths per 1000 population)
  • Hindu fatalities, 1988-2005: 1,583 (or 11.3 deaths per 1000 population)

"Overwhelmingly Muslim" is complete nonsense. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 02:33, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

I did make an error. Their statement is: "Swami’s (2006: 175) official Indian data show a pattern where civilian deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim. Yet, when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process, ..."
Those two sentences are not cited to Swami, only the first is. Also, I mistakenly assumed that "overwhelmingly Muslim" was their characterization of the deaths during the period of the exodus, i.e. the early months of 1990. In fact, it is the characterization of total deaths between 1988 and 2005. During that period the total number of civilians killed from both communities was 13,828. The number of Muslims killed was 12, 245, which is 88.55%, and indeed apt for "overwhelming."
The authors have some other way of determining the Pandit deaths during the exodus which they estimate to be 30. We have to take their estimate to be accurate in the same way we take as accurate the migration estimates of the Metcalfs, Sumantra Bose, and Mridu Rai to be 100,000. Both John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa are noted academics at ANU. Their book is published by the ANU press. They conducted interviews and examined primary sources besides. To aid understanding, another way of paraphrasing Braithwaite and D'Costa is: "Even though Muslims bore the brunt of deadly violence during the period 1988–2005, when the uprising gathered force in the early months of 1990 some 100,000 Hindus fled the state, with 30 dying in the process."
I suggest we rephrase the deaths in the infobox to: "30 Kashmiri Pandits died during the exodus. During the period 1988 to 2005, the number of deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim." Unfortunately, we can't make the estimates ourselves by doing original research in Swami's book as we don't know anything about which deaths occurred during the exodus which did not even for 1990. We can certainly cite both Braithwaite and D'Costa and Swamy. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:20, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
They say Praveen Swami's data shows "overwhelmingly Muslim" deaths. I don't see it. That is comparing apples and oranges. When you factor in the population levels, the Hindu deaths were humongous.
I have revised the footnote to something that is fair and accurate. I don't accept this blatantly misleading comment. WP:VNOTSUFF. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 04:31, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
You have not understood Braithwaite and D'Costa's meaning. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:33, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
12,245 Muslim civilian deaths during the period 1988 to 2005 out of a total of 13,828 civilian deaths is not overwhelmingly Muslim? The corresponding Hindu deaths were 1,582. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:37, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
But you cannot do original research in the manner you have done. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:40, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
Why are Muslim deaths mentioned at all on this page? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 04:43, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
Good point. That was my error, a result of misinterpreting B&D'C. Please change it to: 30 Kashmiri Pandits died during the exodus. cited to: Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina, "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir", Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia, Australian National University Press, ISBN 9781760461898, "... , when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process."
But if you are going to mention the total Hindu deaths during the period 1988 to 2005, then you will need to also mention the total Muslim deaths to disabuse our readers from any interpretations of genocide of Hindus by Muslims. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:55, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
@Sumsshire: Please quickly remove the information cited to the Jaffrelot edited Hindu Nationalism Reader, which is a collections of readings about Hindu nationalism. The particular page you have cited your edit to is taken from: "Preface to The Study Committee on Kashmir Affairs," BJP on Kashmir, New Delhi, BJP Publications, 1995. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:24, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
Done. Sumsshire (talk) 05:34, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: Again, Mortality rate is demographic usage, used in epidemiology, undernutrition, maternal deaths, and so forth. They are not typically used in wars and genocides. We don't say six million Jews died in The Holocaust at a mortality rate of X/thousand or hundred thousand contrasted with 1.5 million Roma in the Roma genocide at a mortality rate of Y per thousand. Applying that reduction to "overwhelming" would be an example of original research, especially because during the period 1992 to 2002 , when the Hindu mortality due to multiple violent causes was relatively high, the Hindu population was very small (as 100,000 had left according to later reconstructions) but not officially estimated. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:59, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
The term I used is "fatalities", which is the same term used by Praveen Swami and possibly the Home Ministry records. (I would guess it would include, for example, getting injured in a bomb blast and dying in hospital, but not dying of diseases or otherr natural causes.)
Since the Hindus were a tiny minority in the Kashmir Valley (3%), setting up any kind of comparison between the Hindu fatalities and Muslim fatalities would be misleading. If you don't agree, I am happy to do an RfC. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:22, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
Well, then please stick to the period of the exodus, which is the first few months of 1990 for which Braithwaite and D'Costa and Sumantra Bose are two good sources, both published by academic publishers. You may cite the figure of Pandit deaths during the exodus (30–32) to Braitwaite and D'Costa (above) and *Bose, Sumantra (2020), Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict., Yale University Press, pp. 121–122, ISBN 978-0-300-25687-1,  On 15 March 1990, by which time the Pandit exodus from the Valley was substantially complete, the All-India Kashmiri Pandit Conference, a community organisation, stated that thirty-two Pandits had been killed by militants since the previous autumn. This plausible figure amounted to a third of about one hundred targeted killings by JKLF militants since autumn 1989. Otherwise, please leave the death argument blank. Leave the exodus numbers at 100K of 140K etc. This is my final proposal, if you do not agree to it, please start an RfC. PS But you cannot simply add the Hindu numbers for the period 1988 to 2005 without comparing them to the Mulsim numbers. Another reason you cannot compare rates is that you don't have any idea in the Swami statistics where the fatalities took place. If a large number of Muslim fatalities took place in a small neighborhood of Srinagar, then computing rates using the whole Muslim population would be meaningless.Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:45, 16 March 2022 (UTC)
The Pandit organisation's figures are what most scholars are reporting. These 30-odd individuals seem to be better known and their names were published in the news (even India Today). But the governent apparently knows about other deaths, which are only tracked in its internal data. If you are picky about the first-half of 1990 only, I can use Manoj Joshi's data:

By the middle of the year some eighty persons had been killed with great brutality, and the fear psychosis had its effect from the very first killings. Beginning in February, the pandits began streaming out of the valley, and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and Delhi.[1]

But I would prefer Pravin Swami's data because it is better evidenced. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:20, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: I didn't say anything about wanting to stop in mid-year-1990. I said only that the major scholars consider the out-migration to have been essentially complete by mid-March 1990. I'm afraid we can't second-guess leading scholars such as John Braithwaite, Bina D'Costa, Mridu Rai, Sumantra Bose, Haley Duschinsky, Ian Talbot, Gurharpal Singh], Barbara D. Metcalf or Thomas R. Metcalf whose books have been published by ANU Press, Princeton, Yale, Cambridge, Cambridge, and Cambridge respectively. If they have judged the deaths to be 30, the migration to be essentially complete by mid-March 1990, or the number to be 100,000, then we can't claim to have dug out their motivations and then find fault with them. I don't know who Joshi is. He seems to be some kind of a journalist who wrote a trade book in 1999 that has been cited four times in Google Scholar. Swami has made no deductions about the Pandit deaths. He has simply reproduced some Indian government data which he then proceeds to discuss in the context of the conflict between the Indian security forces and the Jihadists. We can't use that primary data to make our own deductions. The 100K figure has been in the article for over six months even during my absence and in the Kashmir article for 15 years, which you have edited. You are welcome to go to RS/N about the two sets of sources (Joshi/Swami vs the academics above). In my view there is simply no comparison, and I have known you to be a rigorous editor. I'm surprised you are stooping that low. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:07, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
Joshi's book has 90+ citations and is well-regarded. He is a Senior Research Fellow at ORF, a world-ranked thinktank.
I added a footnote with his information, and I am ok with the current state of the death figures. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:22, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: Thank you for your references. I have incorporated both Joshi and Swami. I was leery about the latter as he never interprets the data, but luckily others such as Evan and Manzar have interpreted the same data well within the margin of error displayed by Radhanath Sikdar when he came running out of his office in 1852. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:26, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

Dear Fowler&fowler«Talk» Please talk here before making critical edits regarding Kashmiri Hindu death numbers. As mentioned by Kautilya3 (talk), current consensus is for Pravin Swami's data until any new consensus is formed here. Thanks for your kind cooperation & contributions. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:31, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

I have known Kautilya3 for a very long time and have had cordial relations with him. He does not need your help. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:10, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
I have no idea who you are. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:11, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Joshi, Manoj (1999), The Lost Rebellion, Penguin Books, p. 65, ISBN 978-0-14-027846-0

False Information About Kashmir

No. Of death figures are totally. Incorrect 2409:4050:2D85:DE5D:568A:F224:324D:A94E (talk) 10:35, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

A sentence requires a verb. Therefore three require three verbs. Please supply. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:52, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

Requested move 19 March 2022

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: procedural close The proposed title would entail fundamental changes to the current version of the article, which appears to have been arrived at after extensive discussions on this page. Before "genocide" could be inserted into the title, there would need to be consensus for changing the text first. (non-admin closure)Uanfala (talk) 17:20, 19 March 2022 (UTC)


Exodus of Kashmiri HindusExodus and Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus – A large number of requests have been made on this page to change the title to 'genocide'. So consensus can be achieved here. The box in the article also shows a number of incidents where fatal attacks took place. So the article can include both 'exodus' and 'genocide'. Kpddg (talk contribs) 16:17, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Numbers

An Indo-American Kashmir Forum pamphlet says that over 1100 KPs have been killed in Kashmir since militancy began. Teng and Gadoo claim that more than 700 Hindus were assassinated between Autumn 1989 and Summer 1990, a figure contradicted by offcial Indian figures that indicate 228 Hindu civilians were killed between 1988 and 1991. An offcial who dealt directly with compensation claims at the time states the figure was nearer 490, although this includes state offcials in the count. There is no reason for the Indian government to underplay these numbers, especially given that it was directly in charge (through governor’s rule and the security forces) between January 1990 and September 1996.

Official record suggest that 219 Kashmiri pandits had been killed by militants since 1989.

Alexander Evans suggests that the number of Pandits killed in the valley prior to the exodus is, at most, between 228 and 490 and that that around 160,000 KP’s lived in the valley in 1990. His reasoning is that the number of deaths is sourced from the Indian government and official sources, which were in control at the time and wouldhave little reason to underplay the number of deaths.

Till date nearly 1,500 memebers of Kashmiri pandit community have been brutally murdered.

It is not possible to give details of all Pandit killings in this Study paper. Panun Kashmir, a political organization of the displaced Pandits, has published a complete list of about 1341 Kashmiri Pandits who were killed by Jihadi armed men in the course of armed insurgency in the Valley of Kashmir in 1990 and after. This includes the disappeared and fished out Pandits, whose identity was not established and the police kept no record of them.

LearnIndology (talk) 03:48, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

  • Since I was responsible for the last revert: I'm well aware there's wide discrepancies in the number of reported deaths; however, if we're framing this article as one about the mass exodus of 1990, then the infobox needs to include only the deaths during the exodus. Other deaths belong in the background section, and possibly in the aftermath section, but not in the infobox, which is supposed to summarize the article. Vanamonde (Talk) 04:49, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
    But how we will decide a particular date for the exodus? The sources talk about 'mass exodus of 1990'. The infobox says:
    "the exodus mostly took place in the first few months of 1990" but that is misleading and even if true, it say 'mostly', not 'entirely'. Another concern is that why we should use Government's statistics when we have scholarly sources like Evans who has been cited by multiple scholars? LearnIndology (talk) 05:15, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
    @Vanamonde93: I entirely agree with you I've rephrased the infobox fatality estimates, giving primacy to the period of substantial migration, but leaving in the wider estimates for context. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:33, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
@LearnIndology: Evans' exodus estimate had been in the infobox; I've reinstated it. Thank you. Thank you also for his mortality estimates which I have also incorporated in the infobox with a slight correction. Thank you also for the excellent article of Bashir Manzar, which too I've incorporated in the infobox. Your other sources, however, are unreliable, in my view. Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:28, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
Since we have multiple sources with Death Numbers between 30 to 700, as per WP:NPOV it is a neutral point of view to mention
number of deaths is estimated to be between 30 to 700 according to different sources.[14] [11][13] [10][5][note 3] [18][note 4]
Fowler&fowler Please try for consensus here before making any extreme number on the lead . Can you give your input LearnIndology

Jhy.rjwk (talk) 21:45, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

PLEASE do not miuse User:Kautilya3 brief absence from Talk page to push POV numbers like 30 in the lead
Akshaypatill can you also input on consensus on numbers. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 21:52, 19 March 2022 (UTC)
These are K3's numbers. Joshi is his. Please don't insinuate motivations. You are being disruptive. There is already an affirmation here by Vanamonde93 that this article be about the migration in the first few months of 1990. It was substantially complete by mid-March. We can't count deaths until 1991, 1995, 2000, or 2005. Again you are being highly disruptive. You are creating needless work for others and are mangling well-constructed sentences. Please be warned. ~~~~ Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:59, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

Deaths

The infobox has an essay against 'Deaths'. Is it necessary to write such a long piece of text there? Something like

Count 1 (source 1)

Count 2 (source 2)

should do. User talk:Indielovtalk 05:28, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

Hi talk Please discuss in the Numbers section, where this issue is being discussed It's not so simple because the number of deaths is estimated from 30 to 700, according to different sources. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 22:33, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

@Indielov: Have done so in bulleted form. Thanks for the suggestion. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:08, 20 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 20 March 2022

There is killing of kashmiri pandit is more than 2000 there is so much of source available for that book of Rahul pandita , our moon has blood clot , Book of Mr Jagmohan who was governor in 1990 of Jammu & Kashmir My frozen turbulence in kashmir. 2409:4063:4002:E911:C91E:1F0B:2D0F:6DED (talk) 15:32, 20 March 2022 (UTC)

Please read Mridu Rai's Narratives from exile referred to in this article. Rahul Pandita's memoir, according to her, repeats some old myths Pandits tell about their histories: that they are all Saraswat Brahmins (when in fact many types of Brahmins immigrated into Kashmir), that they were all trained in Sanskrit (when in fact Sanskrit was lost in Kashmir in medieval times and they were trained in Persian and were particularly inconvenienced when the Dogras changed the court language to Urdu.) More pertinently he engages in criticizing the Pandits who have chosen to remain in the Valley and who take a more tempered view of the events. Here she is:

Motilal Bhat, a headmaster and the president of the Pandit Hindu Welfare Society established in the mid- 1990s to restore ties between Pandits and Muslims, also chose to stay back in Kashmir. He insists that both communities were equally guilty of chauvinism. Pandits like him are strikingly reluctant to claim any heroism in not leaving Kashmir. As Bhat put it, ‘we thought we’d watch events play out and then take it on a week to week basis. But these became months and then years’. This low- key assertion contrasts markedly with the tone of extreme umbrage in which Rahul Pandita writes about the Pandits who stayed. ‘Another untruth that leaves me fuming’, he says, ‘is the assertion that nobody touched the handful of Pandit families that had chosen to remain in the Valley’. Consciously or otherwise, Pandita has appropriated the right to speak on behalf of those of his community still in Kashmir, ignoring their own more textured stories. Bhat is clear-eyed about how the exiles view Pandits like him. He says that in the early 1990s those who stayed on in Kashmir were maligned by those who left; ‘they “felt betrayed by the families who stayed behind” as if their continued presence in the valley undermined the experiences of those who had fled to difficult conditions in Jammu’. Perhaps, the harshest aspect of the transformed relations between those who left and those who stayed is a form of ostracism exercised on the latter by the former. Tickoo speaks of a ‘stigma’ attaching to the children of those who remained, especially to their daughters, for having lived in the Valley through the troubles. ‘On the one hand, they [the exiles] are afraid to send their daughters, while on the other, they say things like our daughters’ chastity has been torn by Muslim men’. If one were to apply Bühler’s test of connubiality, a new fracture has opened up among Pandits.

Please read the scholars for the facts. The diarists, memoirists, poets are to be read for sure also, but for documenting the inner life (the inner turmoil experienced in exile); but they are not trained in history, in reading and assessing primary sources. Luckily we now have a generation of historians trained at some of the best research universities who have written about the insurgency. It is they we employ in this article. Best regards Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:28, 20 March 2022 (UTC)
The same applies to Mr. Jagmohan Mehrotra's reminiscences. Officials, politicians, and soldiers, have written about their version of events for over a century now. But we don't use Churchill, or Eisenhower, or Montgomery, or Slim ... to write about the second world war. We might quote them now and then. But that would be it. Thank you for your post. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:45, 20 March 2022 (UTC)

Displacement.

User:Fowler&fowler, I think you forgot the discussion we had. Espacially Talk:Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus#Displacement. You are back to square one. Akshaypatill (talk) 16:22, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

I agree with that. Also, why do we need to mention "The Valley, which is a part of the larger Kashmir region that has been the subject of a dispute between India and Pakistan from 1947, has been administered by India from approximately the same time" on the first paragraph when we all had agreed not to mention anything unrelated to this event on the first paragraph per Talk:Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus#POV template and Talk:Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus#Displacement? There are several other pages on Kashmir that mention about the geo-political regional aspect & this page's lead is not the place to duplicate that information Jhy.rjwk (talk) 16:47, 19 March 2022 (UTC)
It is required. See the citations. Akshaypatill (talk) 17:05, 19 March 2022 (UTC)
Done, on both counts. Thank you. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:07, 19 March 2022 (UTC)
User:Fowler&fowler, I think 'felt compelled' isn't suitable here because they actually left. We are implying a action than a feeling. Akshaypatill (talk) 16:19, 20 March 2022 (UTC)
"Compelled to leave," which is Shahla Hussain's language indicates that they thought about their situation and the threat the insurgency posed, made an assessment that leaving was best, and then left. One can use "impelled." But neither means that they did not leave. Plain old "left" would be unnuanced; it would give no indication of their thought processes. That level of nuance is a must in an encyclopedia article which is not written with the brevity of say Bedecker's Guidebooks. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:53, 20 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 21 March 2022

Instead of Exodus it really should be genocide or ethenic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits. 103.208.71.165 (talk) 05:04, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

What is genocide and what is ethnic cleansing? Please tell us. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:11, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Edit to the background section of the wikipedia page - Semi-protected edit request on 21 March 2022 (2)

Change "Islamization of Kashmir began in the 1980s when Sheikh Abdullah's government changed the names of about 300 places to Islamic names.[71][note 4] "

to

"From the 14th century to when British left India in 1947, hundreds and thousands of Kashmiri Pandits were forcibly converted to Islam[1]. A major resurgence of the Islamization of Kashmir began in the 1980s when Sheikh Abdullah's government changed the names of about 300 places to Islamic names.[71][note 4]" 2607:FEA8:BA5:C00:DC65:B4AF:2CEC:D951 (talk) 14:28, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Please read Wikipedia:SOURCETYPES, Wikipedia:SCHOLARSHIP, and Wikipedia:TERTIARY, which together assert that especially in controversial topic areas we use third-party, internationally-known, and widely-used text-books, authored by scholars published by academic publishers; those are the sources employed in this article, and they have made no such claim. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:25, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 21 March 2022 (2)

There almost 2000 kashmiri pundits that were killed in 1990 Utkarsh Cosmos (talk) 16:59, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Please read Wikipedia:SOURCETYPES, Wikipedia:SCHOLARSHIP, and Wikipedia:TERTIARY, which together assert that especially in controversial topic areas we use third-party, internationally-known, and widely-used text-books, authored by scholars published by academic publishers; those are the sources employed in this article, and they have made no such claim. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:28, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 17 March 2022 (4)

Line: Kashmiri Hindus residing in the Valley also mourned Burhan Wani's death. ref[150] Please remove the above line on the basis on of a defunct and incorrect article, where names and details were riddled with ambiguity. The details of this supposed article aren't verifiable from source material which makes this information factually unreliable/misleading. Spockane (talk) 23:21, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

Link to archived article in question. Noting that Greater Kashmir is a daily newspaper with more than 500 references on en-wiki and no mentions in WP:RSP. Hemantha (talk) 04:11, 18 March 2022 (UTC)
@Spockane There is already a reference which supports the fact. signed, 511KeV (talk) 14:24, 18 March 2022 (UTC)
The stress here is on quality and non-ambigious references, which are important for factually accurate content. Need for further references to support the claim Spockane (talk) 15:10, 18 March 2022 (UTC)
 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 23:44, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Please keep an eye

Dear All: This page, a sleepy old page until a movie was released in India, is suddenly seeing much traffic. All and sundry (if I may be allowed to use them in a grammatical subject) are tramping through, looking to dicker over the fatality statistics. Why? Because they want to make the case that the exodus was a genocide. They think if they can bump up the numbers from the tens to the high hundreds, they have a case. Several thousand would seal the case. Red-linked new user pages have sprouted like mushrooms (or is it toadstool) after rain. I spent several hours this morning attempting to return the lead and info box to some semblance of order. See here.

According to quite a few scholars, the bulk of the exodus took place in the first few months of 1990. There is some general consensus that the article is about the bulk of the exodus, not what was trilling out in footsteps and poetry for three decades thereafter. In the sections above, I have attempted loosely to explain the evolution of the lead paragraph to its current form, which is: It describes the exodus. It gives the numbers. It gives the latent causes to clue in the reader as to why it could have happened so quickly. It then states that it was not a genocide.

People don't seem to realize how much of an effort needs to be made to find the sources and to then paraphrase them both precisely (without resorting to close paraphrasing), and judiciously (when there are several saying ever so slightly different things). Kashmir as you know is the scene of the longest-running dispute before the UN. I have been editing the Wikipedia Kashmir article since 2007. If you trust that I am not looking to push any one POV, please keep an eye on this page. Please. I just don't want to endure again the travails of this morning. {@Vanamonde93, RegentsPark, El C, Bishonen, DaxServer, Dwaipayanc, Abecedare, and SpacemanSpiff: @Mar4d, Mehrajmir13, Mathsci, Johnbod, Kautilya3, Akshaypatill, Venkat TL, and Sitush: Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:26, 21 March 2022 (UTC) Also pinging @Doug Weller, Uanfala, and Johnuniq: Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:35, 21 March 2022 (UTC) Apologies, I forgot @ScottishFinnishRadish: Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:53, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

Extended confirmed protected indefinitely. Logged AE action. Best wishes, Fowler&fowler. El_C 23:37, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
Thank you. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:54, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

1950

Does this article primarily focus on 1990 ? I found a citation that highlights other reasons for the Exodus in 1950.

Zutshi 2003, p. 318 Quote:

"Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950."

This may be helpful if appropriate. Thankyou. signed, 511KeV (talk) 06:36, 22 March 2022 (UTC)

Yes, the 1950 happenings are covered in the second paragraph of the lead. This particular quote has been discussed quite extensively on the talk page, either here or in the archives. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:43, 22 March 2022 (UTC)
Thankyou for the information. signed, 511KeV (talk) 15:53, 22 March 2022 (UTC)

Pictures?

Nearly 100,000 Kashmiri pandits migrated out from the valley to camps and other destinations in early 1990. The exodus was substantially complete by 15 March 1990 according to many scholars. That is an average of 1,350 a day. Granted, they were spread out over a large region, but, some cities must have had such an unusual number of people turning up at the bus station or other such transport hub for people to have taken a picture. There seem to be no pictures of the Pandits leaving, only quite a few of them protesting about not being allowed to return to the Valley. This seems to be a little perplexing. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:16, 17 March 2022 (UTC)

PS Pictures of a family in front of a house or a car don't count. An exodus by definition is an out migration of large body of people. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:25, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
You clearly have no idea about this topic. Migration happened in different phases, that started from 80's and continued as early as 2003. Even as early as 2016 many were attacked and forced to leave[4]. Also see this[5] 15 min documentary, maybe you will learn something. LearnIndology (talk) 02:53, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
My main concern in opening this thread was to find some pictures for this article, to give its text some context and credence. Your cited Indian Express report says without claiming authority, "Nearly 600 Kashmiri Pandits working for the state and central governments are believed to have left the Valley and returned to Jammu, along with their families, in the wake of the violence that followed the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani." So, these are people who had returned earlier to the valley from the refugee camps or other domicile in Jammu. It also says, "Officials said the last such migration by Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley was registered in 1996-97 when Assembly elections were held after nearly eight years resulting in the return of the NC government." So there was no migration out of the valley between 1996–1997 and this re-out-migration 20 years later (in 2016) of 600 returned Pandits.
Obviously, the second out-migration is not the scope of this article. But even so, my point remains: the Indian government gives benefits to some KPs to return to the valley a generation after their original out-migration; they return but are frightened rightly or wrongly by the outrage in the Valley over the killing of a popular militant Burhan Wani and re-return to Jammu. Yet, there are no pictures of the re-out-migration, only one of their protesting in Jammu after their return there. You would have thought they'd have taken a picture or two of their leaving the Valley a second time, with the widespread smartphone coverage there was in India in 2016. Some of them seem to be holding up their smartphones.
So, again, does anyone know about Creative Commons (public domain) pictures of the original out migration of KPs from the Valley in 1990? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:37, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

Mulling this over more, I suspect the lack of corroborating visual evidence may have to do with both the atmosphere and atmospherics of the pro-independence protests that preceded the migration (i.e. of the mood created among their supporters and detractors). Alexander Evans speaks to it when he says:

KPs migrated en masse through legitimate fear. Given the killings of 1989 and 1990, and the ways in which rumour spread fast in the violent conditions of early 1990, might KPs have been terriŽfied by uncertainty as much as by direct threats? There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’.

I think in an atmosphere of all-round uncertainty, fears of every sort multiply, and panic ensues. It doesn't have to be a major storm, just the perfect one. Taking pictures is not uppermost in mind then. We may need to allude to this in some appropriate encyclopedic fashion early on. It might be more important that documenting numbers. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:27, 19 March 2022 (UTC)

Indeed, I have not seen any pictures of the exodus on the web or newspapers either. It is said that most people left stealthily in the dead of night, fearing that they might get attacked by the militants even en route. There is however excellent visual coverage of the events at that time, by a TV channel called Newstrack (perhaps under India Today?), some excepts of which got recently released on youtube. Worth watching. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:06, 22 March 2022 (UTC)
Thank you. Very interesting. It does support our interpretation that the bulk of the migration happened in early 1990. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:33, 22 March 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 23 March 2022

This is not exodus, it's a genocide of kashmiri pandits 2409:4041:D02:82CA:F64D:9C6:2B49:E723 (talk) 01:11, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done. Please see various discussions above. -- Tamzin[cetacean needed] (she/they) 01:26, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

Dating of Exodus

The version of this page until 15 March supported the dating of the exodus as "1989 and afterwards" which is largely supported by the scholarly sources.

Consensus should be developed before reduction the scope because this unilateral reduction in scope of the exodus is causing great confusion and contradiction with the article itself. LearnIndology (talk) 08:49, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

PS I have added an "inuse tag" so I have you will not interrupt until I remove it signalling I'm done. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:09, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (1) Please note Vanamonde93's post (04:49 17 March 2022) on this talk page explaining their revert of an earlier attempt by you to make the infobox fatalities cover a more extended period than the one during which the bulk of the migration took place, which according to several scholars was the first few months of 1990. Vanamonde93 stated:

    Since I was responsible for the last revert: I'm well aware there's wide discrepancies in the number of reported deaths; however, if we're framing this article as one about the mass exodus of 1990, then the infobox needs to include only the deaths during the exodus. Other deaths belong in the background section, and possibly in the aftermath section, but not in the infobox, which is supposed to summarize the article.</ref>

  • (2) Please see also my reply to them, with ping, of 13:33, 17 March 2022 (UTC), stating, "I entirely agree with you I've rephrased the infobox fatality estimates, giving primacy to the period of substantial migration, but leaving in the wider estimates for context. " Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:12, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (3) As for Joshi's statistics not being reliable, please see Kautilya3's post 07:22, 17 March 2022 (UTC) stating that

    Joshi's book has 90+ citations and is well-regarded. He is a Senior Research Fellow at ORF, a world-ranked thinktank. I added a footnote with his information, and I am ok with the current state of the death figure

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:13, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (4) Please also see my reply to him of 14:26, 17 March 2022 (UTC) with ping stating,

    Thank you for your references. I have incorporated both Joshi and Swami. I was leery about the latter as he never interprets the data, but luckily others such as Evans and Manzar have interpreted the same data well within the margin of error

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:17, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (5) Please note that your final edit you have left the article in a seriously compromised state: In the second sentence in the lead, you state: "Some 90,000–100,000 Pandits of a total population of 120,000–140,000 felt compelled to leave,[4][6][5][8] and 228–700 individuals were killed.[21][22][23][note 2]" whereas in the infobox you state: "another scholar estimates: 228 Pandit civilian fatalities, or 388 if the deaths of officials are included, but considers the higher figure of 700 to be gravely undependable." So, in some sense you have already copied out the error in Teng and Gadoo, as you state it is gravely undependable (which is the language of my previous edit). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:22, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (7) For the full record this is what Alexander Evans says on page 23 and 24:

    An Indo-American Kashmir Forum pamphlet says that over 1100 KPs have been killed in Kashmir since militancy began. Teng and Gadoo claim that more than 700 Hindus were assassinated between Autumn 1989 and Summer 1990,48 a figure flatly contradicted by official Indian figures that indicate 228 Hindu civilians were killed between 1988 and 1991.<Footnote 49>

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:28, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (8) And Footnote 49 in Evans says: The Indian government figures are set out in its Profile of Terrorist Violence in Jammu & Kashmir (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, March 1998). Between 1988 and 1991, the government claims 228 Hindu civilians were killed. Even if the bulk of government officials and politicians killed over the same period were Hindus and this is added, this figure would increase by a further maximum of 160. Hence the figure of 700 appears deeply unreliable.
  • (9) I had paraphrased "deeply unreliable" to "gravely undependable." which you have reproduced.Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:28, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (10) The bulleted form of the infobox stats which you have undone is a response to the post above by User:Indielov 05:28, 19 March 2022 (UTC) stating that the infobox read like an essay and a suggestion for it to take a more discrete form. See also my reply to them with ping of 00:08, 20 March 2022 (UTC) stating that I had changed the infobox to a bulleted form and thanking them for the suggestion. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:30, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (11) Both Kautilya3 and Vanamonde93 have been active on Wikipedia since. Akshaypatill has been active as well, they made an edit on page on 16:20 20 March 2022. I have been engaging them on the talk page. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:31, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (11)In addition, I have engaged VenkatTL and they have thanked me through the "thank" ping. No one can say that my edits have lacked a complementary talk page engagementFowler&fowler«Talk» 14:34, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
  • (12) I will now be editing the page and restoring the NPOV edits added with great care by many editors to the article and overseen by various people. I request that you not interfere with them, for you not only add unreliable and POV text, you also interfere wit the prose, the references, and the coherence of the text. If you interfere or if you edit war I will be pinging several admins, right here. I have removed the inuse-tag. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:39, 21 March 2022 (UTC)
Fowler&fowler But, several Reliable sources including this source mention that the Exodus started in 1989. Why you are dating it to the beginning of 1990s? Also for the article to be NPOV, I think we should remove the deaths figure from the first paragraph of the lead because the 2nd paragraph discusses the possible estimated death figures already in more details (Death figures are apporoximate estimate, as mentioned in different sources)Italic text. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 20:54, 22 March 2022 (UTC)
Multiple sources including the recent sources (below), clearly mention that the killing of KP Leader T.L. Taploo on Sep 14, 1989 triggered the KP Exodus

* How killing of this Kashmiri Hindu leader led to exodus of Pandits from Valley Every year 14 September (1989) is remembered as ‘Martyrdom Day’ by Kashmiri Hindus and organisations that support the cause of those who had to flee the Valley in the face of terrorism in 1990. https://theprint.in/india/how-killing-of-this-kashmiri-hindu-leader-led-to-exodus-of-pandits-from-valley/732572/

* Killing of Taploo, Lassa Kaul, others triggered KP exodus: Dr Jitendra https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/killing-of-taploo-lassa-kaul-others-triggered-kp-exodus-dr-jitendra/

Based on several WP:RS, I agree with LearnIndology that exodus dating should start in September 1989, as mentioned in multiple sources, and exlemplified by the murder of T.L. Taploo on Sep 14, 1989. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 21:17, 22 March 2022 (UTC)
Jhy.rjwk, please stop this. Your own RSS think-tanker (whom you call a "reliable source") says that the exodus happened after 19 January 1990.
Please, in future, make an effort to give WP:Full citations to your sources. You don't expect us to share you own view of what a "reliable source" is? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:54, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

Timeline issues

At long last some figures became available as a result of this movie.

In 2010, the home ministry had stated in Lok Sabha that their figures for "displaced" families, 59,542, included Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims. A community-wise breakup for all families was not officially available for a long time. Then, the NDA government shared the 2002 numbers for those who had moved from Kashmir to Jammu. And in 2021, the NDA government replied in the Rajya Sabha that of the 44,167 Kashmiri migrant families, 39,782 were Hindu migrant families — meaning there were 4,385 families of other faiths.

A group of human rights scholars visited J&K around 15 March 1990, and they say:

According to information supplied to us by the migrants in Geeta Bhavan, about 17,000 families were camping in Jammu. We were also told that 1,500 Sikh families had also migrated. They were asked by the militants to stop "gurvani" from the gurudwaras. According to official sources however, 13,000 non-Muslim families had been registered so far with the government. According to the union home ministry 8,455 families or 45,700 persons have left the valley so far. These also include some Sikhs and Muslims from Kashmir.[1]

The Union home ministry figures seem to be behind the times a bit (undderstandably). But, even taking the highest of these figures, it would seem that about half of the total migration had happened by 15 March.

Manoj Joshi wrote:

By the middle of the year some eighty persons had been killed with great brutality, and the fear psychosis had its effect from the very first killings. Beginning in February, the pandits began streaming out of the valley, and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and Delhi.[2]

So, it would seem that it took till June for the migration to get completed. Joshi also explains the reasons.

However, [Jagmohan's] security adviser, Ved Marwah, has said that the real reason for the pandits' migration was a feeling that they had been abandoned by the administration when Jagmohan, beset by pressures from V.P. Singh and Rajiv Gandhi, left Srinagar and sulked in Jammu.[2]

This "sulking" very likely happened between March and June, which is when the rest of the Pandits gave up hope and left. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:04, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

There is also corroboration from newspapers at that time. According to India Today, 31 March, "about 40,000 people had reached Jammu, 2,500 Udhampur, 600 Kathua and about 2,000 Haridwar and Delhi".[3] According to Toronto Star, 14 May, "100,000 Indian Hindus" had to flee.[4] -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:12, 23 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: That is very interesting. And yes, if the Captain left, then the passengers had little choice but to jump ship in the wake (even literally) of a mutiny. Still, the major scholars, Sumantra Bose, Mridu Rai, Braithewaite and D'Costa, and quite a few others, seem to be sure that it was all over by mid-March. (Not that everyone had left, but that 90-100K of 120-140K had) I'm happy to change "early months of 1990" to "early 1990." It would accommodate the timeline of Joshi whose numbers we have already accommodated. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:47, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
Only Sumantra Bose is specific about the 15 March date. And he cites the Tapan Bose et al. paper. So, I think he just misunderstood what they had said. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:43, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: But there are others who speak in the same broad categories, March 1990, winter 1990. I doubt that Sumantra Bose—a professor at LSE with half a dozen books on the region, and many on Kashmir, published by the best-known academic presses in the world—has misunderstood anything; he has spent time in Kashmir and in the camps of Jammu interviewing people. I've offered to change it to "In early 1990," which includes Joshi's 80 fatalities. You are welcome to take this matter to RS/N and compare your sources with mine. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:04, 24 March 2022 (UTC) Update Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:09, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
I could even go with, "in the first half of 1990 between 30 and 80 fatalities were recorded." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:14, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Bose, Tapan; Mohan, Dinesh; Navlakha, Gautam; Banerjee, Sumanta (31 March 1990), "India's 'Kashmir War'", Economic and Political Weekly, 25 (13): 650–662, JSTOR 4396095
  2. ^ a b Joshi, Manoj (1999), The Lost Rebellion, Penguin Books, p. 65, ISBN 978-0-14-027846-0
  3. ^ Pankaj Pachauri, Nisha Puri, Kashmiri Hindus flee Valley creating a communal crisis, India Today, 31 March 1990.
  4. ^ Hindus flee reign of fear in Kashmir, Toronto Star, 14 May 1990. ProQuest 436199360

“Compelled to leave”

The lead paragraph uses the words "compelled to leave," which are the words used in one of the sources. The words were added (replacing the earlier "became displaced") by Fowler&fowler who offered this explanation: "ch[ange] to active voice: "became displaced" to "felt compelled to leave."" and further when prompted by Akshaypatill on the talk page, stated that: ""Compelled to leave," which is Shahla Hussain's language indicates that they thought about their situation and the threat the insurgency posed, made an assessment that leaving was best, and then left. One can use "impelled." But neither means that they did not leave. Plain old "left" would be unnuanced; it would give no indication of their thought processes. That level of nuance is a must in an encyclopedia article which is not written with the brevity of say Bedecker's Guidebooks."

  • I think that 'compelled' is not fully appropriate; it implies, or leaves sufficient room for such implication that the action was considered 'righteous' by the Pandits and does not fully state the fear and distress. Compelled can be paraphrased to "forced", which would be a term much simpler than "impelled" as suggested. "Forced" also more accurately summarises their feelings. Or the whole phrase "felt compelled to leave" can be replaced with "fled" which somewhat incorporates the thought process (you dont flee unless you feel you are in danger). UnpetitproleX (talk) 10:17, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
"Forced" is too strong. As per the evidence we have, the majority of them left due to fear. Frightening someone (even if doen actively) is not "forcing". I am ok with the current wording. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Kautilya3 (talkcontribs) 12:07, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
'Forced' is definitely appropriate. As UnpetitproleX said, you do do not flee unless you are forced to. It was due to the various acts of violence that such a large number of people fled. Kpddg (talk contribs) 04:53, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3:Thanks for proving my point that "compelled" does not fully capture the feelings of Pandits who left, doesn't belong in the lead paragraph. Also the wording is not about whether they were indeed "forced" but about how they felt. They felt forced. And adding the one source that does use "compelled" while ignoring the others doesn't really defend the current wording. UnpetitproleX (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: How many times, in how many places and how many accents yet unborn will you be conducting this conversation. Next time, please post in the section in which the conversation was being conducted. Please also do not distort Kautilya3's remark, especially not in the paternalistic fashion you have, by both misstating his comment and grossly simplifying his implication. I hope that is clear. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:54, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
  • Here's how the migration and feelings of Pandits are described by sources cited in the article itself:

Duschinski

“Kashmiri Hindus describe migration as a forced exodus diven by Islamic fundamendalist elements in Pakistan that spilled across the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley.”[1]

Evans

“Most KPs believe that they were forced out of the Kashmir Valley; whether by Pakistan and the militant groups it backed, or by Kashmiri Muslims as a community.”Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).


Talbot and Singh

“…150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu.”[2]

Metcalf and Metcalf

“The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of some 140,000, perhaps 100,000 Pandits fled the state after 1990.” Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 274

Braithewaite

“ ... when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process.”[3]

Kapur

“By early 1990, in the face of some targeted anti-Pandit attacks and rising overall violence in the region, approximately 100,000 Pandits had fled the valley, many of them ending up in refugee camps in southern Kashmir.”[4]

Evans

“…KPs migrated en masse through legitimate fear. There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. … The public rhetoric of some of the more Islamist militants in the Valley, with calls for an Islamic state, although aimed primarily at Indian rule, struck a chilling chord with KPs. This in turn sparked off an exodus, …”[5]

Ganguly

“…the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the Hindus of the valley. By early March, according to one estimate, more than forty thousand Hindu inhabitants of the valley had fled to the comparative safety of Jammu.”[6]

"Felt compelled" is used once in one source (even in that the author uses "felt threatened" alongside it). "Felt forced" is used more times. "Fled" is used across the board. UnpetitproleX (talk) 15:08, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Who do you think added those sources? I did. I have read them all cover to cover. There are many more sources in the lead that I have added as well. What I have written is my judicious summary of their predominant viewpoint. We've had discussions on whether it a "migration" or "flight" (the nominalization of fled). The sources that are arrayed in the use of each are stacked in the very first sentence of the article. Please don't talk about "across the board" when you have even read the first half of the first sentence with any care. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:54, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
And it is not like we don't use "flee." We use "fled" in the infobox. And we use "left" in the second paragraph where we discuss numbers. We have had discussions on usage before. Please read WP:Lead fixation Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:11, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
Just because we say "felt compelled", one shouldn't think that our objective is to describe the feelings of the Pandits in this sentence. That will come somewhere later in the body.
"Fleeing" is entirely consistent with feeling "compelled to leave".
I don't see a problem. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:35, 25 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: But Fowler&fowler, who added the words "felt compelled", and is now vehemently protesting the removal or modification of this wording, says they did it for this precise reason:"Plain old "left" would be unnuanced; it would give no indication of their thought processes." So the objective seems to be to describe the feelings of the Pandits. This is why they say they changed the wording. UnpetitproleX (talk) 09:50, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@Fowler&fowler: Here’s what you offered as the reasoning behind changing the wording: “Plain old "left" would be unnuanced; it would give no indication of their thought processes.” Now if we are to describe their feelings or thought process, then why must we ignore the predominant view in the sources added by you, and use the wording mentioned in one of them once? Is there a specific reason for that that I might be missing? UnpetitproleX (talk) 09:56, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: >>> "Now if we are to describe their feelings or thought process, then why must we ignore the predominant view in the sources added by you, and use the wording mentioned in one of them once?" What is the predominant view? Please clarify that sentence. Thank you. Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:26, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
As cited in the sources above, which you rightly point out were added by you, “Pandits believe they were forced out”, “describe the migration as forced”, “felt threatened”, “felt under seige” is the predominant view about how they feel/felt. UnpetitproleX (talk) 11:35, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
(edit conflict) @UnpetitproleX: In the absence of a response from you. It is because it is not clear whether the insurgents reliably did the intimidating or whether the Pandits felt either intimidation from the insurgents, pressure from the Governor Mr. Jag Mohan Malhotra, or both. If we could say all that in the lead sentence, we would blithely say left, fled, took flight, departed, migrated, or exited. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:17, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
I have no problem with saying “fled the valley” instead of “felt compelled to leave”. You do. Which is why you reverted such an edit. UnpetitproleX (talk) 11:36, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: I did not say that, I said if we could have added some version of Martin Sokefeld's description in the lead sentence, I would be happy to use any of the synonyms for left. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:54, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@Fowler&fowler: But you reverted these changes made (“felt compelled to leave” to “fled the valley”) here. That’s why I’m assuming you have a problem with this wording. UnpetitproleX (talk) UnpetitproleX (talk) 12:02, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
Again @UnpetitproleX: that was because no kind of qualification described in Martin Sokefeld was present in the lead sentence. Again, please respond to Sokefeld's major point. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:15, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: Martin Sokefeld does just that:
Sokefeld, Martin (2013), "Jammu and Kashmir: Dispute and diversity", in Berger, Peter; Heidemann, Frank (eds.), Anthropology of India: Ethnography, themes, and theory, London and New York: Routledge, p. 91, ISBN 978-0-415-58723-5,  Since the time of Madan's fieldwork. the situation of the Kashmiri Pandits has changed dramatically. Instead of 5 per cent, they now make up less than 2 per cent of the Valley's population. After the beginning of the insurgency, in early 1990, most of the Pandit families left Kashmir for Jammu, Delhi or other places in India. It is still disputed whether the Pandits' exodus was caused by actual intimidation by the (Muslim) militants or whether they were encouraged to leave by the Indian governor Jagmohan, a 'hardliner' who was deputed to Kashmir by the government in Delhi in order to counter the insurgency. Alexander Evans concludes that the Pandits left out of fear, even if not explicitly threatened by the insurgents, and that the administration did nothing to keep them in the Valley (Evans 2002). Since then the ethnography of the Kashmiri Pandits has had to be tuned into the ethnography of exile. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:21, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
He says that the Pandits constitute “2 per cent” of the Valley’s population, but that is incorrect. The 2% includes all Hindus, whether Kashmiri, Dogri, Pahari, Punjabi or others. Not just Kashmiri Pandits. UnpetitproleX (talk) 11:51, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: He said less than 2%. Please respond to his major point. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:17, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Guys, "felt compelled to leave" is the wording we settled on after considerable discussion. "Forced to leave", "driven out" etc. are descriptions used by the Pandits, and they may be right, but they are WP:PRIMARY sources. The facts that they narrate are not in public domain, and we have no independent corroboration of what they say. So, neither the scholars nor we can use their information without attribution. Blame the Indian government and the Indian media for not bringing the facts of the situation to the public sphere. There is nothing we can do about it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:10, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

X@Unpetitprole: The point is that when a major scholar of Kashmir such as Martin Sokefeld, Chair of Anthropology at the University of Munich, and President of the German Anthropological Association, who speaks Kashmiri, did his fieldwork in Gilgit-Baltistan in the early 1990s, and has since then spent time in the Kashmir valley, say something, which user:Kautilya3 has already stated in similar form, our hands our tied. I think arguing over petty semantics and posting snippets is not fruitful here. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:30, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: Would you be so kind to point out where this considerable discussion was held. Would be appreciated because I can’t find a considerable discussion about the wording anywhere on the talk page prior to this section initiated by me. UnpetitproleX (talk) 11:31, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: I have given you Martin Sokefeld, who in turn cites Alexander Evans. Please respond to that instead of dickering over semantics. Let's settle this matter once and for all. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:40, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: Forget about the many past discussions on whether it was a "migration" or "flight" (cited with stacks in the lead sentence; whether it was en masse or large-scale, also cited). Please just respond to my quote above from Martin Sokefeld. Let's settle this anew. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:48, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
I am formulating a response. Please be patient, I can’t reply right away. And also please do not threaten administrative action if you plan on scrubbing the threat out. Or just don’t scrub the threat out. Thanks. UnpetitproleX (talk) 11:56, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: When you have a substantive response to Martin Sokefeld, please post. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:20, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
The discussion has majorly gone off the tracks, though I have tried to stick to the point. Let me bring back the discussion to what it is meant to be. Please look at the beginning of the conversation. It isn’t about Sokefeld. And btw, the lead does include the Jagmohan conspiracy theories. UnpetitproleX (talk) 12:27, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@UnpetitproleX: No it has not. It is an effort to disabuse you of a gross misinterpretation. We are not talking about the lead, but the lead sentence. That is your focus; for, we do use both "fled" and "left" in the lead. We don't talk about Mr Jag Mohan Malhotra in the lead sentence, but later in the lead. "Felt compelled to leave" is the best short summary of the longer posited reality of Martin Sokefeld and Alexander Evans. If you dispute "felt compelled to leave," you will need to dispute Sokefeld in a substantive way, and yet as you are doing every thing but that. So, for the third time, please address Sokefeld in a substantive way. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:26, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Bringing back to track

The wording “ felt compelled to leave” was added on 20 March 2022 by Fowler&fowler, replacing the earlier “became displaced.” The wording was changed by me to “left the valley” on 23 March, and then by Kpddg to “fled the valley” later. It was then reverted back to “felt compelled to leave” by Fowler&fowler. This discussion has begun after that. Prior to that, this particular wording was discussed once very breifly after its addition on March 20, 2022 on this talk page.

I have no problem with either the original “became displaced”, the “left the valley” added by me or the modified “fled the valley”. But as I mentioned above, the wording “felt compelled” takes way too much on itself to describe the feelings of the community in a way that the community itself may not agree to. Which is what the original reasoning behind adding this wording given by Fowler&fowler is: “Plain old "left" would be unnuanced; it would give no indication of their thought processes.”

Also, they claim now that it is the best summary of Sokefeld and Evans, but the original reasoning given by them was to summarise Pandit thought processes. This is shifting goalposts, and trying to make it look like I take issue with Somefeld or Evans. My issue is not with with Sokefeld or Evans, neither of whom use "felt compelled to leave", but do use "believe they were forced". The wording is taken directly from Hussain, and even Hussain also uses "felt threatened" as well. — Preceding unsigned comment added by UnpetitproleX (talkcontribs) 13:46, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

There are other works, there is Christopher Snedden, Professor of South Asia at the East-West Center for Security Studies in Honolulu
  • Snedden, Christopher (2021), Independent Kashmir: An Incomplete Aspiration, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 126, ISBN 978-1-5261-5614-3,  This is because many Pandits have left Kashmir, or felt compelled by militants' violence and antipathy against them to leave, since Muslim Kashmiris began their anti-India uprising in 1988 Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:52, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
Also the head of the department of sociology at the University of Kashmir, Bashir Ahmad Dabla:
  • Dabla, Bashir Ahmad, Social Impact of Militancy in Kashmir, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, p. 98, ISBN 978-81-212-1099-7,  The third migration from rural-urban areas of one place to urban areas of other places involved people who felt compelled to migrate due to political, religious, ethnic, and other such factors. The migration of ... Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir to different parts of JK state and India in 1990–91 fit in this type of migration. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:05, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
There is also Rajput:
There is also Siegfried, one of my favorite actor's daughter Justine Hardy:
  • Hardy, Justine (2009), In the Valley of Mist: Kashmir: One Family in a Changing World, New York and London: The Free Press, p. 63, ISBN 978-1-4391-0289-3,  Children born in Kashmir since 1989 have not heard that song of symbiosis. Just as the young Pandits in the refugee camps have only their parents' memories to portray the homes they felt forced to leave, so, too, do young Kashmir Valley Muslims have only stories and photograph albums as proof of how it used to be before they were born. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:56, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
Tangential
I had bought Sudha Rajput's book up in the discussion we had some time ago and here is Fowler's comment on the book -

I have just taken a lot at Sudha Rajput's embarrassingly third-rate book that reads like the common claptrap published in the back alleys of Old Delhi.

Seems like the book aged very well in couple of months. See Talk:Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus/Archive_3#Emigration?. Akshaypatill (talk) 15:16, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
She is an expert on disaster and displacement, not a demographer of populations, which is what I had criticized her for. She is describing an interview with a KP, not estimating numbers of Pandits who had migrated, which is what the older discussions were about. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:20, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
It wasn't cited for population. It was cited for proposal of adding 'internal displacement' in lead and you had fought tooth and nails to not include it, even critised the book with inappropriate language. Today she is expert on disaster and displacement. Now I hope you won't mind calling the exodus a internal displacement and adding it in lead. Akshaypatill (talk) 15:27, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
@Akshaypatill: Even so, that is a different issue. I still hold firmly that we cannot use displacement because most sources do not. But here she is describing a case study of a Pandit family, an interview. Please stop arguing about inconsequential things. Have you read the two sources (Sumantra Bose Shahla Hussain) which you had promised to read in the discussion above. Do you acknowedge that you made errors of interpretation? Please stick to your engagement with me. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:52, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
I have now added five more sources for "compelled to," making for a full half dozen. As the lead is unsightly with long strings, I will very soon make stacks of all. Please bear with me. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:54, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States", Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, Rutgers University Press
  2. ^ Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal (2009), The Partition of India, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, ISBN 9780521672566
  3. ^ Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina (2018), "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir", Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia, Australian National University Press, ISBN 9781760461898
  4. ^ Kapur, S. Paul (2007), Dangerous Deterrant: Nuclear Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, pp. 102–103, ISBN 978-0-8047-5549-8
  5. ^ Evans, Alexander (2002), "A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001", Contemporary South Asia, 11 (1)
  6. ^ Ganguly, Sumit (1997), The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War; Hopes of Peace, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, Washington DC and Cambridge, UK: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, p. 107, ISBN 9780521655668

Hriday Nath Wanchoo

I think the line needs to go or else, be rewritten in a NPOV manner. Consult our article on the subject. Thanks, TrangaBellam (talk) 20:39, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Should Kashmir genocide be redirected instead to this page?

The page Kashmir genocide currently redirects to Human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, which is about human rights in a part of Indian-administered Kashmir. The redirect was created by a very fine and knowledgeable Wikipedian, @Mar4d:, over five years ago. At that time the redirect made very good sense, as the fatalities by raw numbers (at least) were mostly Kashmiri Muslim ones at the hands of the Indian armed forces.

This brings me to a comment or two or three I had posted at: Wikipedia:Redirects_for_discussion/Log/2022_March_13#Genocide_of_Kashmiri_Hindus, where, in the process, I ended up misinterpreting once, twice, or three times something @Tamzin: had stated. Well, what she said was: My view is simply that, if there's a fringe view popular enough that many people are coming to Wikipedia to promote it, it probably should be mentioned somewhere. Part of our encyclopedic mission is documenting misconceptions.

So here's my argument: These days "Kashmir genocide," has found infamy in its new meaning of "Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus." Moreover, our article Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus seems to be doing a decent job of disabusing the new meaning of the implication "genocide." (It is its fourth sentence.) So, ipso facto, per Tamzin, not only should Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus be redirected to Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus (which it currently does pending the guillotine), but so should "Kashmir genocide." QED

I'd like to hear what people have to say. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:05, 23 March 2022 (UTC) Update. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:08, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

I agree, it should be redirected to Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, since this is the only page that meaningfully covers the term "genocide". LearnIndology (talk) 07:09, 23 March 2022 (UTC)
This page ranks at the top of the 8 million hits on Google for "Kashmir genocide". No redirect necessaay. It looks like the Indians have soundly defeated the Pakisanis in the misinformation war. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:01, 23 March 2022 (UTC)
I skimmed scholarly sources that discuss the term "genocide" in relation to Kashmir. I see no consensus on which aspect of the Kashmir conflict it is most used for; some use it for human rights abuses in Indian-administered Kashmir, others for human rights abuses in Pakistani-administered kashmir. Certainly the Kashmiri Pandit exodus is not the most common use. I would honestly like to see the redirect deleted altogether; failing that, I think it should redirect to Kashmir conflict, as the broadest overview. Vanamonde (Talk) 03:10, 24 March 2022 (UTC)
  • Thanks Fowler&fowler. In my view, redefining (or 'redirecting') the use of the term 'genocide' to mean the Kashmiri Hindu exodus would smack of WP:RECENTISM and something we should therefore totally avoid. I agree with Kautilya3 insofar as the Indians winning the "misinformation war". As the article (which you've alluded to above) self-explains, it's at best a nationalist, if not futile, attempt to shift the goalposts from the wider conflict to a narrower topic of the conflict. Basically a revisionist project where you magnify the sufferings of one select group of people, and downplay the rest. Happens all the time. There's nothing deeper. Wikipedia isn't under compulsion to cater to that narrative, even if we agree that the narrative is academically unsound. Best to keep the target as is, it ticks all the boxes and at least the article is about the conflict. Mar4d (talk) 08:19, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
I would at least wait until that rfd has closed, so as not to bypass the discussion there. LCU ActivelyDisinterested transmission °co-ords° 22:25, 27 March 2022 (UTC)