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On concepts much discussed in treatments of 'free will'

The article presently includes this paragraph:

"Though it is a commonly held intuition that we have free will,¹ it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether we have free will, but even how to define the concept of free will.²"

Sources

¹Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher.

²Stanislas Dehaene (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. Penguin. p. 263. ISBN 0698151402.

This thought was supplemented by the following remark deleted without Talk page commentary:

"Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases like "ability to do otherwise" or alternative possibilities."

Of course, the use of Google links to pull up over 3000 hits for each of these phrases with their connection to 'free will' is not a standard in printed articles, but it makes the point needed here. If there is objection to this manner of presenting the issue, then a more standard and extensive presentation of the confusion surrounding these phrases and their role in the definition of 'free will' should be attempted. At the moment, the subject of "alternative possibilities" is mentioned in a sub-subsection on two-stage models while the phrase "ability to do otherwise" is not even mentioned. Given the prominence of these ideas as evidenced in the references provided by the Google book links above, this underemphasis and even omission should be rectified. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

In case there is some confusion over these terms:

ability to do otherwise

As an introduction to this term, see for example Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter §4.2 The Meaning of 'Ability' Argument: "I have free will only if it is at least sometimes true that I have the ability to do otherwise."1

"alternative possibilities"

As an introduction to this term, see for example: Moses Mendelssohn's Metaphysics and Aesthetics "Having a free will means having alternative possibilities to act" 2

Of course, there are many views as to the role of these phrases, as the 3000+ books identified in the links provided indicates. Brews ohare (talk) 20:40, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

I don't see a concrete proposal for change ----Snowded ^TALK 14:46, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The concrete proposal is to leave the reverted material in the article. A less concrete proposal is to explore the terms in detail. Advice upon the choice is solicited. Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Here is Thomas Pink on "doing otherwise". Brews ohare (talk) 14:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

A change that could be discussed

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is an explanatory few lines and a bit of re-organization to consolidate scattered discussion. The version you prefer is:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The need to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[13] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[14][15]"

Much later in the same subsection is a paragraph continuing the first thought, which is unrelated to the moral issue raised above as a second thought:

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:[28] blah blah blah"

The version you reverted explains the status of the ideas causing the dilemma. It reads:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism or nomological determinism is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The validity of causal closure has long been debated.[20] One form of criticism of causal closure is to claim science itself does not support determinism.[21] Other objections revolve around the subject-object problem and the applicability of scientific method: are subjective events understandable in principle as physical events and at bottom subject to scientific theory?[22]"

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:[23] blah blah blah

"Regardless of these reservations, the attempt to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe continues and is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[28] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[29][30]"

The dangling later paragraph of the version you prefer has been moved into a position to complete the thought of the first paragraph and the idea of moral responsibility is placed separately after the context for the dilemma has been established.

The link to nomological determinism is separated from that of physical determinism (they are not the same, obviously). It is pointed out that there are those that contest the issues leading to the dilemma, with links to sources and other WP articles. That seems appropriate.

Perhaps you wish to discuss these changes further? Brews ohare (talk) 17:00, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Another change that might be discussed

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is an amplification of the uncertainties about free will. The version you prefer has as its second paragraph:

"Though it is a commonly held intuition that we have free will, it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that is true, but even how to define the concept of free will. How exactly must the will be free, what exactly must the will be free from, in order for us to have free will?"

The version you reverted retains this paragraph, but adds this sentence with two sources to describe this uncertainty further:

"Some philosophers despair over any 'solution' to these issues.^{1, 2}

Sources

¹Thomas Nagel (1989). "Freedom". The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 9780195056440. Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.

²John R Searle (2013). "The problem of free will". Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 9780231510554. The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.

Searle and Nagel are two very well known philosophers on this topic. Perhaps you would like to discuss further the possible inclusion of this sentence? Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

The one change that has received some comment here

In this reversion to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is a sentence placed at the end of the reverted Intro, which is the only change that fits your Edit Summary, namely:

"In discussing these positions, the analysis of free will often is presented in one of three ways:¹ either as the ability to decide unimpeded (freedom of volition ),² or as the ability to act unimpeded (freedom of action ),³ or as the combination of both the ability to decide and to execute a decision unimpeded (freedom of conduct ).^{4, 5}

Sources

¹Robert Kane (1998). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press. p. 3. ISBN 9780195126563.

²Henrik Walter (2011). "Chapter 27: Contributions of neuroscience to the free will debate — The cognitive neuroscience of volition and intention". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 522 ff. ISBN 9780195399691. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

³McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Compatibilism: §3.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). The word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent's will.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

⁴Rudolf Steiner (2011). The Philosophy of Freedom (English translation of 1916 by Hoernlé reprint ed.). Lulu.com. p. 26. ISBN 9781257835126. the nature of human action presupposes that of the origin of thought

⁵Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron (2011). "Determinism tout court". In Judy Illes, Barbara J. Sahakian, eds (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 9780199570706. Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

I think the sources speak for themselves. However, if you are ready to discuss what other sources say on this matter, please bring them forward. I am not interested in your own personal opinions, but in those found in published sources. Brews ohare (talk) 19:49, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Read up on WP:SYNTH ----Snowded ^TALK 21:02, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Reporting what sources say is OK. No synthesis here unless you see something I don't. Brews ohare (talk) 21:47, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

I do see something you don't and I have explained it to you in two different places. Sorry Brews I am not prepared to engage in interminable repetitious conversations on talk pages. Two editors have reverted you and a lot of this is very similar in content (and approach) to attempts you have made in the past. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:16, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Your unwillingness to attempt to point out or link to where you have "already" made clear where the "synthesis" occurs is simple avoidance. I'm afraid that you have no valid objection and your "exhaustion" is with that realization. Brews ohare (talk) 05:29, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

You have that problem with many editors and many editors have my problem with you. That should tell you something. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:42, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

I have to say I agree witht the careful, thoughtful and well referenced analysis of User:Brews ohare. I commend him for the care and time he puts into this discussion, and particularly his patience. Frenchmalawi (talk) 13:52, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

It is agreeable to get support, but of course progress depends upon assistance in portraying the sources accurately. I think that has been done here, and apparently Frenchmalawi agrees, but Snowded says he disagrees. He refuses to say why he has this opinion, citing non-existent prior explanation and refusing to point it out or summarize where he is coming from. A blunt recommendation to read WP:SYN is not a substitute for an explicit recommendation, and does not help to evolve the article.

I expect that Snowded remembers the discussion of this sentence here where it was proposed as a lead sentence. His comment at that time was

Snowded, given this resistance on your part, how about addressing the other 4 remarks about reversions of yours where only matters of presentation are involved and we might progress? Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

I have searched for earlier discussion by Snowded, following up on his reluctance to do so himself. I have found that his objections result from a misinterpretation of WP:SECONDARY.

Snowded's discussion of the presently disputed sentence took place earlier when it was proposed as a lead sentence. His objection then was:

"Proposal seeks to make a general definition based on a synthesis of sources which look at aspects of the field in the main. The Neuroscience perspective is one, but only one take. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:45, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The idea that WP:SYN is involved here is a result of Snowded's confusion about the role of secondary sources on WP, as will become clear shortly.

This comment was followed up with this one:

"The names of your sources indicate their orientation Brews. Find a third party source, if you are 'right' it should not be difficult. Then propose a new wording, the one you used has been rejected by two editors. Continuing to insist you are right rather than accommodating others concerns is problematic to say the least." ----Snowded ^TALK 06:29, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

As was pointed out at the time, the title of one of the sources that involved the word 'neuroscience' was used only for its general philosophical background on the subject, not its neuroscience. The other sources' orientation and their titles are not in dispute. These second remarks of Snowded also were addressed at the time.

Snowded's insistence upon a third party source is contrary to the WP policy WP:SECONDARY which states:

"Policy: Wikipedia articles usually rely on material from reliable secondary sources. Articles may make an analytic or evaluative claim only if that has been published by a reliable secondary source."

The policy description of a secondary source reads:

"It contains an author's interpretation, analysis, or evaluation of the facts, evidence, concepts, and ideas taken from primary sources. Secondary sources are not necessarily independent or third-party sources."

It is obvious that the cited sources are all secondary sources, and that the sentence objected to by Snowded is an appropriate use of secondary sources, provided only that it makes no claim not espoused by these sources. Objection should therefore be based upon identifying some misrepresentation of what these sources say (which has not occurred, IMO) or, if there is some lack of objectivity in these sources, then opposing views based upon alternative secondary sources should be provided. Snowded has not attempted this approach.

Instead of a content-related discussion, Snowded has elected to move the discussion to a dispute of WP:SECONDARY as I have portrayed this policy. Although I think his opposition is misguided and inarticulate, particularly in its confused dragging in of third-party sources as essential to avoidance of WP:SYN, there will be no resolution of this difference of opinion. So I think it is better to move on to the other 4 reversions where choice of sources is not at issue. Brews ohare (talk) 16:44, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Well, instead of writing this lead based on articles like uhm maybe one entitled "free will" or why not Chapter 1 of these books, where key concepts are defined, you pick whatever section of these otherwise reliable sources that fits your agenda. This is the lead paragraph and it should reflect how the topic is handled in the literature. It should not be some idiosyncratic synthesized representation based on whatever fragments we like. There are so many problems with the source usage here. For example, when Robert Kane discusses his distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will, he plainly states that this is a minority view. Kane certainly deserves adequate weight, but the entire phrasing above is biased against the mainstream view and is therefore unacceptable for the lead paragraph. Vesal (talk) 23:21, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Vesal: I am happy to see you aim to approach this matter based upon what sources say. There is no doubt whatsoever that free will is traditionally the combination of a decision to act along with the ability to execute that decision.Baertschi & Mauron, for example. That being the case, there is also no doubt that "free will" has these two facets. Now whether you decide to define "free will"" as item A + item B or item A alone or item B alone is a choice that different authors will make differently. The sentence at issue does not say one or the other of these three choices is preferable, but only that these three choices are available and sometimes one and sometimes the other have been chosen. Do you dispute the existence of these possible choices? Now one could follow up by saying the first choice is traditional (as has been said) and the other two are less common. But is it a balanced introduction to the topic of "free will" to focus upon only the first choice as though it were all that there is? Brews ohare (talk) 01:03, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Its one aspect Brews but I'm not at all sure it belongs in the lede. The Oxford Companion says that it is two problems (i) metaphysical and (ii) moral. The distinction you make is not mentioned in the summary as a defining one, ----Snowded ^TALK 06:15, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: The Oxford Companion of Neuroethics and The Oxford Companion of Free Will have already been linked to show that the two aspects of volition and execution are well-recognized aspects of what is called "free will". The Oxford Companion to Consciousness suggests "Free will is about the compatibility of prior causes over how we act with power which is our own control over our actions." [Some liberties taken in omission of some clauses] This article by Thomas Pink stresses the unconscious vs. the conscious control of our actions, the limitations of "volition". In §4 it says "In Libet's view the exercise of freedom is inherently conscious...Libet concludes, our actions are free only to the degree that we can intervene and block their final causation once we begin to be aware of their likely production" Here we have an attempt to conjoin "exercise" with "volition".

These "Companions" envision two aspects to free will: volition and action, and stress one or the other or both as the need arises. You have pointed out nothing objectionable about the added sentence, so far as I can see, and it is clear that both aspects play a role in the concept of free will acknowledged in the published literature. This sentence should be added. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

In fact, this sentence should be expanded upon. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Okay, Brews, this distinction might even be suitable for the lead paragraph, but the objection is to frame this in a way that implies compatibilist accounts are somehow defective. Both IEP and SEP do take this up, not quite in their lead, but close enough, so this can and maybe should be done. It just needs a much more neutral phrasing than what's being suggested above. On the other hand, I concede there are problems with the current lead: it seems strange to say that the mere freedom to make choices can be constrained by chains. Vesal (talk) 15:23, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Vesal: I may be a bit tone deaf here. I don't see how pointing out that an action involves two aspects, and they are sometimes included under "free will" together or sometimes individually, prejudices any subsequent discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

You can't cherry pick stuff from a neuro-philosophy perspective, or for that matter use Pink (who is not a philosopher) as an authority to define the overall subject. It is valid in a section and can be summarised in the lede. Brews you really need to work on agreeing changes here first. It may take an extra day or so but it will get more co-operation unless you simply keep asserting the same position without change ----Snowded ^TALK 15:52, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: My recent introduction of the practical example of addiction to the main article had the purpose of showing there was more than semantics involved in "free will", a point lost upon the article's intro that is way overboard into semantics. This recently attempted addition had a purpose different from this thread. This thread has the purpose of pointing out that even within the present Intro's myopic focus upon meanings of "free will", it omits the very widely acknowledged semantic division into two parts: "volition" and "exercise of volition", as documented now by at least four sources.

Hopefully you can separate the issue of a definition in full accord with various Oxford Companions from the issue of practical importance (and main interest) versus academic word play. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

OK Brews you seem determined to carry on as before so some points:

1. You had a response to all your suggested changes which was the response that you were using partial references out of context. The fact that other editors are not prepared to spend hours indulging in detailed explanations under multiple sub-headings when they have already made the point does not justify you in simply reimposing your position.
2. To say 'per talk page' when you do not have agreement on the talk page is a misleading edit summary
3. Saying that there has been no response to your comments and suggesting they be reinstated is fine. Waiting only two hours (when you know those of us in the UK are probably in bed) then making those changes as there has been no response is simply not on
4. You have taken the position that the intuition v natural law conflict is 'semantic' which is a perjorative label
5. Your general rephrasing of incompatibilist and compatibilist views has created some rigid categories which are a partial perspective at best.
6. You have given undue prominence to Maslow by creating its own sub-section. Its very dubious if that paragraph even has value in a philosophy article and it should probably be deleted. It should certainly not be made a separate section.
7. Once again (as in the 2014 round on this article) you are defining the whole field by a partial set of sources you find interesting and useful. And using those without qualification.

Of all the changes you made, some brief (but not partial) summary of the objections would be useful but NOT solely from a particular scienctific background. To be very direct please read the first point above and gain AGREEMENT on the talk page before making changes ----Snowded ^TALK 05:32, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

The value of the thirteenth century view of free will

I have been reading Tobias Hoffmann (2014). "Chapter 30: Intellectualism and voluntarism". In Robert Pasnau (ed.). The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy: Volume 1. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139952927.. This discussion is such an enormous relief after reading this WP article. The views of the thriteenth century described here are so close to common-sense understanding that it is clear the discussion of free will has not only not progressed as said by Thomas Nagel (1989). "Freedom". The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 9780195056440.

"Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed."

but has regressed, affirming Searle's depiction of it as a scandal John R Searle (2013). "The problem of free will". Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 9780231510554.

"The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress."

A presentation of Hoffmann's discussion would be a good addition to this article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Searl is notable enough that his opinion could be incorporated in the body of the article as his opinion. A full history section could sensibly include summary material from the source mentioned ----Snowded ^TALK 15:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

And Nagel is not sufficiently notable? Brews ohare (talk) 16:01, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

What for? Searl's overall status means that his commentary is probably worthy to be included as his opinion. Not sure what you want to use Nagel for, you seem to be arguing that he is right which is fine as an opinion. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:17, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

An interesting aspect of this summary is the discussion of the relation between "will" and "reason". The basic idea, as I understand it, is that the "will" is the executing agent that causes something to be done, and "reason" informs the will about the value of alternatives. In this process, "reason" may miscalculate, leading to bad judgment, but the "will" has always the final say as to whether the recommendation of reason will be followed, and may decide against reason in favor of "lower powers of the soul". The connection to morality is clear, as is the connection to thought. The two aspects of "free will" - volition and execution are clearly outlined, showing that this bipartite division was well established in the thirteenth century. Brews ohare (talk) 16:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Its always been an aspect of the debate Brews, it just doesn't define it. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:55, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The idea that splitting free will into two aspects "defines" it is nonsense and nowhere suggested. Brews ohare (talk) 21:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Lets start again

I think we can all agree that the lede needs improvement and there is a need for some change elsewhere. But those changes have to be agreed. This is not going to work if one editor keeps making the same changes. So how about we treat this more as a project and tackle one issue at a time on the talk page, rather than multiple issues at a time on the main article. The question of the lede should be left to last so for the moment I suggest we agree an agenda of areas that need change, then agree the principles of those changes and agreed sources, then draft changes. There is no great rush here or need for conflict.

As far as I can see we need to:

1. Prune material which properly belongs to psychology (such as Maslow) and generally tidy up all other references
2. We need a better summary of compatibilism and incompatibilism and their various permutations ideally from a third party source, not one perspective.
3. We need to more clearly separate some of the ethical from metaphysical aspects

OK so that's my take - other opionions? ----Snowded ^TALK 05:44, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

My suggestion is to look one by one at the four separate changes recently made and reverted by yourself. Each has a thread already set up where it can be individually and separately discussed. Each is a rather simple matter, and probably can be resolved easily through discussion in its own particular thread. This approach avoids taking a mouthful too large to chew and so getting nowhere.

I think the complexity increases in the order they are presented, so as a first step let us look at setting up a parallel construction that presents compatibilism and incompatibilism in a similar manner? Brews ohare (talk) 06:22, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

That is not starting again, its continuing a line you are taking which has been rejected ----Snowded ^TALK 07:41, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Compatibalism et al

In summary (using The Oxford Companion but open to others which cover the field as a whole)

• incompatibilists believe that determinism (if true) would destroy moral responsibility, those who are incompatibilists who think determinism is wrong are Libertarians, those who think it is true, per William James are hard determinists.
• Compatibilists believe that freedom and determinism are compatible, they are sometimes called soft determinists but that label is deprecated. Their argument rests in part on the I would have done otherwise if I had chosen point
• Determinism is contrasted with randomness, some modern thinking based on complexity offers a different ontology but that only has limited references so we probably can't include it yet, ditto some of the thinking on quantum mechanics which doesn't really have enough material yet.
• An approach suggests that having one conception of freedom is false and this both compatibalism and incompatabilism are wrong. In effect we have two notions of freedom one involving origination and voluntarism and the other voluntarism alone. That is referenced. More recent discussions (I remember them with Honderich and others at Hay last year) are starting to link that idea with complexity but again it is far too early to include any such material here.

In terms of a summary I think that is all we need to cover. We can then have a history section with the major thinkers - not as quotes but summary, Thoughts?----Snowded ^TALK 09:06, 5 April 2015 (UTC) All of those use the moral issue to illustrate the metaphysical one.

Do we retain the present lede and use 'constraints' as the starting point? I think that is a good approach. If it is retained, the next step is not incompatibilism and compatibilism, but how constraints are related to determinism in a broad sense that includes reductionist, enactivist, and theological aspects. The various compatibilist-incompatibilist arguments tend to pick their own strawman version of determinism and talk past each other. We can do better by presenting a broader spectrum of published opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:14, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

The present Intro takes a stab at this by linking to physical, nomological, theological determinim articles. That is too incomplete because the connection is not made and tailored to the context of free will. Connection has also to be made with reductionism (neuroscience and genocentrism in particular [ Rosenberg, eg? ]), and antireductionism (including enactivism). Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I have a feeling that a good Intro along these lines will make the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate more vivid and interesting. Brews ohare (talk) 15:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

In particular, it will allow us to bury nomological determinism and logical determinism as completely removed from modern views and focus on views that have some credibility. Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews we need to be very careful about synthesis here. We don't make connections we summarise ones that other people make. I'm not clear what structure you propose and to be honest I think this is a fairly short article with references to others ----Snowded ^TALK 16:06, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I agree that synthesis has to be avoided. That may be a narrow line in some regards. It can be navigated only with specific sources in mind. However, you have not addressed whether the 'constraints' approach is satisfactory as a starting point? Brews ohare (talk) 16:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think it is. As I pointed out above its mainly a historical illustration ----Snowded ^TALK 16:39, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think constraints are an historical issue only. If you are a neuroscientist like Eric Kandlel, brain activity is neurons and synapses at work, and free will is an illusion because there is no "thought" that could not in principle be predicted from a fine-grained understanding of the neurons and synapses and knowledge of the stimulus from the inanimate universe.

In very broad outline, my view is that the two major divisions are the reductionists that reduce all mental activity to synapses and further suppose that ultimately the brain is a machine, and the antireductionists who are opposed to this idea in various ways. If you are a reductionist, free will is simply something correlated with brain activity observable with scopes, and the brain activity is fundamental. There may be some semantic nuances here, but basically free will is an illusion. On the other hand, if you are an antireductionist there are a lot of options, and I'd guess that whatever option you choose, free will is a possibility. This is the big canvas, and the compatibilist-incompatibilist debates have to be fitted into this puzzle. Do you have some comments on this as a broad picture, nevermind the details of what sources can be found, if they can be found? Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

That is a perspective from one approach to the issue. It is not supported by the whole field sources I checked. I summarised one of those above. Your synthesis (and it is a synthesis) is not even up todate on post-cartesian ideas of consciousness or for that matter the implications of autonomic/novelty receptive processing for freewill. Now that is an area I do know about, but I also know its not even close to being in reliable third party sources which is what we reflect here. So I'm sorry but I do not find your summary supported by third party sources, only by your synthesis of selective sources. Other editors have told you this as well but instead of moving on you continue to assert your original position. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:00, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Well "post-Cartesian consciousness" and "autonomic/novelty receptive processing" are pretty intimidating monikers. I gather that you think Kandel's views and the Blue Brain Project are out of date and need not be presented because today no-one today thinks of the brain as a machine governed in principle by mathematically formulated laws. My take is that there are many very recent discussions of this as a position to be reckoned with.e.g. this As for the contrary views, which are legion, I take it that your stance is that compatibilism and incompatibilism are both incorrect. I might subscribe to that stance, but of course as these positions are defined in terms of their view of determinism, it is hard to say what they are about until you pin them down on the version of determinism they involve. In most cases, existing discussion is about forms of determinism that are of no interest. Comments? Brews ohare (talk) 17:12, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't find them intimidating, my point is that I would not attempt to insert that material until it is covered by a third party source. You are cherry picking original sources. Sorry I've explained this too you far too often. I am not prepared to engage in a discussion about the subject, only about what reliable third party sources say about the subject.----Snowded ^TALK 17:20, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Well, one can google "post-Cartesian consciousness" and "autonomic processing" and maybe track down some relevance to free will. However, I had hoped to come to further understanding of your viewpoint. A retreat into the "third-party sources" theme isn't going to get us anywhere. I take it to be a warning shot that any attempt to use secondary sources will be reverted as synthesis, despite the obvious contradiction of that stance with WP:SECONDARY? Is this the best we can do together? Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Why can't you indent your comments, I shouldn't have to do it for you. Its not a retreat its the way we work here. You constantly want to synthesis material that you consider relevant. That is why you keep getting into problems with other editors. My viewpoint on the subject is note relevant to Wikipedia - come along to the Hay Philosophy festival this year and I'll happily debate it with you but this is not the place.----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

So now I am to be chastised for your introduction of the "third-party sources" routine? I made several content-related inquiries above, all ignored. Go ahead and propose a specific package for commentary. Brews ohare (talk) 19:47, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

See previous comments ----Snowded ^TALK 05:21, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Your 3 points at the top of this thread are broad objectives, like "prune", "summarize" and "separate". It is not feasible to discuss the adequacy of execution of such directives without specifics. In the present sub-thread you are presumably providing an amplification of the "Summarize" directive to be clear about varieties of compatibilism and incompatibilism. Apart from the lack of specifics like sources and proposed wording, this four-asterisk summary settles upon "determinism" as the antonym of "randomness" (all other discussion ruled as "premature"), a very narrow view of determinism indeed - basically a mathematical definition devoid of philosophical or scientific content. This restricted definition will curtail the understanding of compatibilism viz a viz incompatibilism. So IMO you have glanced over the terrain, made a few tentative missteps, and are yet to sally forth. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I summarised the definition in a reliable third party source Brews to see if we could move forward. If you want to write an essay on the subject go and get it published in a journal. To be accused of missteps in my own subject has of course mortified me. I will take my self for a long walk to reflect on my failure to appreciate your wider project. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:37, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Again you wish to assert your role on WP as being an expert, adopting the role of authority in this subject area. Of course, WP does not recognize expertise. The value of expertise is to guide a contributing editor to a judicious presentation of sources in their field, based upon their knowledge of them. Unfortunately, it is a very common hubris of experts to have great impatience with the less knowledgeable and to expect automatic agreement with expert pronouncements. In my experience, the Wikipedian determination to treat experts like everyone else and to rely upon published reliable sources is well-founded. Many experts are only expert in a very narrow area, and have a pronounced tendency to extrapolate their self-importance to arenas where they have no expertise at all. Brews ohare (talk) 14:58, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

These are, of course, simply general observations, and should not be taken personally, but as an elucidation of how things work on WP. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

No Brews I simply made an ironic response to your little attack, sorry you didn't get it and now you have gone over the top in response. Work with third party sources and no problem. I suggested doing that and all we got was you going back to the same edits and same sources that had already been rejected by other editors. That is tendencious editing, something that many people have mentioned to you in the past including ArbCom. When you are ready to move forward let us know ----Snowded ^TALK 15:06, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm ready for you to propose something specific, as pointed out innumerable times already. These vague "third-party sources" comments are a stall on your part. You seem not to want to implement your plan but just to wave the flag around. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

A named third party source is not vague, neither is an attempt to agree a structure for the change before putting the effort into detailed writing. Understanding that would help you on this and many other pages. At the moment you assertion of your original edits means (I think) that you do not support that structure so I'm not putting effort into detail. When there is an agreement happy to engage. Oh and please lay off the personal attacks (especially the ones that you require to make a second editor to say they were not attacks) . OK they are mild by your usual standards but still tedious.

Your claim to have summarized a reliable third-party source (an unspecified Oxford Companion, obviously a secondary source, whichever Companion you refer to) actually disagrees with The Oxford Companion to Philosophy which has as its entry under compatibilism and incompatibilism: "Compatibilism is a view about determinism and freedom that claims we are sometimes free and morally responsible even though all events are causally determined. Incompatibilism says we cannot be free and responsible if determinism is true" The entry is written by R.C.W., a single author. The entry has no in-line citations but appends Honderich, Kane and Inwagen as three general references with no specification of page numbers. Not a very good model for a WP article. As pointed out here, two Oxford Handbooks (again secondary sources) don't agree with you either. Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, we have discussed the Oxford Companion before so I assumed you would understand the reference. I have it on the desk in front of me at the moment - 2nd edition 2005 edited by Honderich. If you think I have summarised it incorrectly point out why. It is a peer reviewed summary of the field as a whole so it is far better to use that than your selection of sources. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:03, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I have linked and quoted the 2005 edition you mention edited by Honderich. Its entry under "compatibilism and incompatibilism" is one paragraph, and can hardly be seen as much more than a dictionary entry, having no detail whatsoever. Aside from its paucity of sources, it is not different from the other secondary sources cited throughout this talk page. Brews ohare (talk) 16:20, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The section on Freewill and Determinism is the best part of two pages and the section there on compatibilism and incompatibilism is around half the entry. Otherwise I'm sorry but to determine the overall important of different aspects of the field a peer reviewed directory or companion from a major university with an authoritative editorial panel has more status than your cherry picking sources to decide what should be included. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:34, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Your abbreviated attempt to elevate this Oxford Companion above various other Companions and Handbooks, never mind on-line encyclopedias like The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a separate and interminable discussion.

To return to content, IMO this entry disagrees with your "summary" in several respects. First, it draws in the idea of responsibility as an essential part of the compatibilism/incompatibilism difference, and second it does not specify "lack of randomness" as its meaning for determinism. Brews ohare (talk) 16:41, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not elevating it above other companions etc. The point I made about your one on neurobiology was it was focused on one aspect not the field as a whole. If you want a to propose a schema based on another full field directory or equivalent feel free, or on your interpretation of Honderich if you want. Just to be clear though I am using Honderich's article on Free Will not on one aspect. It seemed appropriate to do that given the title of this article. Just don't based it on a synthesis of your own choosing or an opinion piece from an on line one which does not go through the same referee process.----Snowded ^TALK 16:48, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

So now the "third-party source" idea yields to the "full field directory or equivalent"? The idea being, I guess, that for instance The Oxford Handbook of Consciousness, or The Oxford Handbook of Freewill is not "full-field" and so is not an acceptable secondary source? And I suppose further (please clarify) that although The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy or The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy are undoubtedly full-field when seen in their entirety, nonetheless any given article in these compendia is not full-field and so is not acceptable? Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Relax Brews. The one on consciousness is obviously applicable to that subject, but one on Philosophy with a section on consciousness probably more so for a Philosophy article. The one on Freewill looks interesting and I've ordered a copy. The issue there was you chose the section on Neurobiology and the wider objection was that you were only tackling the subject from a science perspective. Hence the point about synthesis. I've explained the point on the online ones ad nausea and there have been discussions elsewhere on that in Wikipedia. I'm not wedded to Honderich but I haven't seen you suggest a comparable alternative yet. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:14, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The point I wish to emphasize is that a secondary source on, say, neurobiology, that enters into a discussion of free will, for example, as might arise in discussing Libet's experiments, provides a perfectly acceptable point of view and may be used in complete accordance with WP:SECONDARY to present that viewpoint in accordance with WP:NPOV. It is undesirable, in fact, to limit discussion to the views of philosophers, who have completely botched the job so far (at least, in Searle's and Nagel's opinion). Presenting the neurobiology view is not saying it is the one-and-only view, as you seem to imply, and any such impression is readily dispersed by including other opinions from other secondary sources. Brews ohare (talk) 17:26, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Ok so philosophers have botched the job and Brews like the 5th Cavalry will ride in and rescue them with his preferred sources. Nice try. Source is fine to support a neuro-biological perspective but NOT to define the field as a whole. There you may just have to learn to live with Philosophers ----Snowded ^TALK 17:54, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Two points: (1) Who gets to "define the field as a whole"? Can philosophers say "free will" is strictly a philosophical issue and while neurobiology may enter the discussion, the principles lie completely outside neurobiology? And if so, who is to decide whether the philosophers have adequately understood the neurobiology they use in their philosophy? Who arbitrates? And (2), who said that what is at stake here when a neurobiologist is cited is the BIG question of "defining the field as a whole"? It isn't.

The field as a whole is under negotiation, with reductionists saying it is fundamentally a correlation with subliminal neural activity most properly lying within neuroscience and its advances, and the antireductionists saying science is disqualified from subjective phenomena and can deal only with objective aspects. Brews ohare (talk) 21:26, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

In any of the modern books I have on the subject philosophy incorporates near-science and indeed there are common practitioners - people who work in both domains. So the idea that something could be a strictly philosophical issue without incorporating findings from science (which are not just confined to the Neuro side in free will debates) is not one I have seen many advocate. Most would incorporate it. The one thing you can't do is take a particular neurobiologic stance or just address the article from that perspective. Your definition of reductionist and anti-reductionist is terribly Newtonian if I may say so. I've seen far more nuanced treatments than that simple dichotomy. Even if your perspective was right (which I don't think it is by the way) then we still couldn't reflect it until the broader treatment of the field reflected it - reliable sources and all that. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:34, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think we are conversing here, so goodbye. Brews ohare (talk) 21:43, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Maslow

I propose deletion - its not rerferenced in Philosophy and even in theory of the Organisation has been replaced by people like Vroom. Inclusions is a formof synthesis. ----Snowded ^TALK 09:07, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I have not looked into Maslow. Perhaps this could be postponed until more important issues are settled ? Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Its pretty brain dead - no mention in any philosophical literature and not uptodate anyway so it fails the reference test. But happy to hold it for the moment ----Snowded ^TALK 14:49, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded's reversions

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Snowded, among your reversals are such simple matters as paragraphing: the version you prefer is:

¶"Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been blah blah blah. Those who define free will as freedom from determinism are called incompatibilists, blah blah blah

¶"Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists blah blah blah.

The reverted version separates the preamble from the discussion of incompatibilists and provides a parallel construction with a separate paragraph for each of compatibilism and incompatbilism:

¶"Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been blah blah blah.

¶"Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists" blah blah blah

¶"Those who find free will can coexist with determinism, are called compatibilists." blah blah blah

To make the reading easier this version uses parallel construction for both terms: parallel paragraphs and parallel use of the widely used verb "coexist" that makes simple sense of the terms compatibilism (can coexist) and incompatibilsm (cannot coexist) that is absent in the confusing version you prefer.

This change to parallelism was made all by itself in this edit clearly labeled with the Edit Summary give each view its own paragraph separate from the introductory segue.

Now, Snowded, you claim that you cannot live with this change or the others equally clearly identified and individual, and instead have deleted all of them en masse. You request that each be individually discussed here, but do not adopt your own advice. Instead of blanket deletion, you easily could have chosen the specific changes that you disagree with and brought them here with your objections. That would constitute a cooperative approach, in contrast with removing them all at one swoop with zero Talk page comment.

This article is a mess of poor organization and opaque discussion, and Snowded, you seem unwilling to cooperate in sorting it out.Brews ohare (talk) 15:59, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:50, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded removed these changes without comment in this thread. In a different thread Snowded made a comment that I take as his reasons for reverting this change:

"5. Your general rephrasing of incompatibilist and compatibilist views has created some rigid categories which are a partial perspective at best."

Of course, I might have misunderstood Snowded's meaning, and he may not have made any comment at all about his reversion of this paragraphing to obtain a parallel construction. In either case, Snowded's oblique reference to "rigid categories" and "partial perspective" are assertions without amplification, and are hard to respond to given their vagueness.

My own attempt to guess what Snowded was objecting to is that these definitions of compatibilism and incompatibilism are somehow restrictive upon the meaning of these terms. These definitions are:

• Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists
• Those who find free will can coexist with determinism, are called compatibilists

In assessing the use of the word "coexist" in this connection, such usage is widespread:6,140 hits on Google books.

Instead, if we use the WP article on Incompatibilism, the article defines the subject as:

"the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that people have a free will; that there is a dichotomy between determinism and free will where philosophers must choose one or the other."

This definition does not conflict with the "coexist" formulation. Likewise, the article on Compatibilism defines the topic as:

"the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics."

The first sentence suggests the matter is simply one of definitions, and the second sentence that it goes beyond that to involve a belief about a state of affairs. The word "coexist" allows both.

My assessment is that either Snowded said nothing at all to explain his reversion of this change, or that what he said (his comment #5) has no merit. I am therefore reinserting this change. If Snowded does have some objection to this change, I suggest that he indicate his reason in this thread where it will be clear that he intends his comments to apply to this particular change. Brews ohare (talk) 12:56, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, the constant attacks on anyone who disagrees with you do not encourage collaboration. I'm not happy with your changes but I think aspects might be OK. I will review it later and make changes. If you don't like that then we go back to the stable state. Why oh why or why cannot you not simply try and agree principles before you plunge into what you know may be controversial? Why can't you simply address content issues without pejorative statements and section headlines? You are your own worst enemy ----Snowded ^TALK 13:14, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Why do you make reversions without any attempt at support in the relevant thread? Brews ohare (talk) 13:15, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not the only one Brews, other editors have given up on you and done the same thing, you have problems with LOTS of editors not just me and that should tell you something. That comment almost triggered me simply reverting you again. Try and listen. You create multiple threads on the talk page and seem to want every other editor to match you way of thinking/acting. I had responded to this change already in ONE place not three.

The purpose in making one change at a time is to follow your request to do so. That is a good idea because it keeps a narrow focus upon one change, avoiding wandering responses that are hard to relate to specifics. Brews ohare (talk) 13:28, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Another Snowded reversion

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Snowded, among your reversals are such simple matters as repositioning an irrelevant paragraph: the version you prefer is:

"¶The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. blah blah blah

"¶The connection between autonomy (self-determination) and the ideal of developing one's own individual self was adopted within the psychology of Abraham Maslow, who saw the goal of human development as "self-actualization". For Maslow, the most developed person is the most autonomous, and autonomy is explicitly associated with not being dependent on others.[16] For others, true free will must involve self-realization, which is a maturing of the self that allows the dissolution of one's counter-productive obsessive, internal pre-occupations and assumptions, including unrecognized peer-pressure and the like, all of which reduce our actual choices, thus reduce our freedom.[17]

¶"Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as blah blah blah

The middle paragraph about Maslow has nothing to do with the preceding or following paragraphs and interrupts the flow of discussion. The version you reverted moved the Maslow paragraph to a sub-subsection of its own, taking it out of this discussion, avoiding breaking up its flow. This change was made in the successive edits Move material on Maslow to sub-subsection on Self-acutalization; it is a distraction where it was and Maslow has been moved to Self-actualization.

Again, this change is clearly labeled and individually made and could have been left standing if you chose to look at your reversion more carefully. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

It appears that the motivation behind introduction of Maslow is related to this discussion of constraints. This connection has to be made clearer to warrant retention of this material. Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Replacement of chains or imprisonment

An example of constraints limiting free will was provided as "physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment)". Technically "imprisonment" might fit better under social constraints, so I moved it there along with censure. The example of chains is trivial, and not any philosopher's real concern. A better example, and one of importance, is the constraints of laws of science. So for example, one cannot defy gravity whatever one's choice, and there is much discussion over whether in fact thought can influence events at all (not being one of the fundamental forces recognized by laws of science) and whether in fact original thought is a chimera should it be found that all "thought" is merely an accompaniment to more fundamental events that are indeed due to forces included in the laws of science. So I replaced "chains" with "requirements of the laws of science", which is in fact a topic of concern to almost all philosophical comment on free will. Brews ohare (talk) 05:47, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

I made a minor modification to put back some of the old text but otherwise I think that is OK. Otherwise the last set of changes seem fine but with the removal of a logical position with no adherents (that statement I have referenced) so I also removed the picture as it implied such a position was real ----Snowded ^TALK 07:42, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

Filled in citation template for your source and removed the "that have been studied" phrase that seems neither here nor there. Brews ohare (talk) 17:42, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

OK will live with that and thanks for the template. Not sure why you are breaking the wikipedia convention on indenting - not like you ----Snowded ^TALK 03:39, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unimpeded

The title of this thread is the definition of free will provided in this article. The use of the term "agent" presumably is not intended in the sense of a "sales agent", but would seem to be connected with philosophical agency, the ability to act. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "An agent performs activity that is directed at a goal, and commonly it is a goal the agent has adopted on the basis of an overall practical assessment of his options and opportunities. Moreover, it is immediately available to the agent's awareness both that he is performing the activity in question and that the activity is aimed by him at such-and-such a chosen end."

Adopting this as the idea behind the choice of the word "agent", I believe the first sentence of the lede should be more clear about this intention, as the word "agent" is to be read by those for whom philosophy is not their calling. The intention of this sentence would seem to me to be more clearly expressed by saying:

"Free will is the ability of agents to assess and/or to make choices unimpeded."

If we go back to the thirteenth century, "Freedom — that is, acting or refraining from acting as one wants — requires the self-movement of the will and the cognitive capacity for reflecting upon one's act...Even if reason judges an act of the will to be evil, the will has the option of desisting from this act or not." This view describes the two phases of assessment and action and suggests "free will" is their combination.

Some more modern opinions are:

"Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own." — Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron; Determinism tout court

Here again the combination of deciding and then acting constitute free will.

"Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" — Michael McKenna, Justin Coates

Here the stress is less clear: the role of doing something is clearly included, but what wanting to do it means is not spelled out. What does a drug addict "want" - the drug, or to be free of the drug — and how do we know what the addict really wants? Is the "assessment" idea built into this definition or not?

In psychology, the idea of setting a goal and acting to achieve it are separated in the so-called Rubicon model of action phases.Achtziger & Gollwitzer

In any event, the proposed change is clearer in emphasizing what is meant by "agent", and indicates the two aspects of free will, the division into action and volition, that permeates the subject. Brews ohare (talk) 09:01, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not wild about it given some of the modern meanings of 'agent' in AI and CAS, in fact 'agency' is increasingly problematic as a word. We need the lede (as I have said many time) to reflect a third party source not be a synthesis of discussions of the subject by editors ----Snowded ^TALK 11:28, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

We need some clarification here, Snowded. You use the term "third party source" with your personal definition, and not that of WP. WP explains a third party source in the context of finding an unbiased observer: "one that is entirely independent of the subject being covered". Obviously, no such source exists to define what "objectively speaking" is meant by 'free will'. For example, sources like The Oxford Handbook of Whatever or The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contain articles that are what WP calls "secondary sources", that is,

"A secondary source provides an author's own thinking based on primary sources, generally at least one step removed from an event. It contains an author's interpretation, analysis, or evaluation of the facts, evidence, concepts, and ideas taken from primary sources."

Possibly you mean to use the term tertiary source defined by WP:TERTIARY as: "publications such as encyclopedias and other compendia that summarize primary and secondary sources." However, the role of such sources is primarily to argue that a position has not been given undue weight, and so far as establishing veracity:

"Some tertiary sources should not be used for academic research, unless they can also be used as secondary sources or to find other sources." [My emphasis]]

I would conclude that the role of a tertiary source in establishing a definition, particularly when (as is usually the case) its viewpoint is that of a single author, may rest upon seeing it as a secondary source. In that regard, as WP:SECONDARY points out:

Policy: Wikipedia articles usually rely on material from reliable secondary sources. Articles may make an analytic or evaluative claim only if that has been published by a reliable secondary source.

With all this in mind, your remark " We need the lede (as I have said many time) to reflect a third party source not be a synthesis of discussions of the subject by editors" should be reworded. IMO, what we need is a lede that either:

• (1) provides a single definition widely adopted by secondary sources of all stripes as a starting point (whether they are compatibilists, incompatibilists, or whatever). This approach is utopian, IMO.

or

• (2) provides several assorted definitions with appropriate secondary sources sufficient to satisfy WP:NPOV. For example, definitions acceptable to compatibilists and others acceptable to incompatibilists, and so on.

Both approaches require some judgment to establish that indeed the selected definition is (or definitions are), in fact, representative. And both require quotations for definition(s). Would you adopt a strategy such as this as a substitute for your own wording? Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

You are just repeating old arguments Brews, and as ever at length. Sorry don't agree. I'll have time to work on your other edits this weekend ----Snowded ^TALK 05:19, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

It's a simple question: how does your idea of a "third-party source" square with WP policy definitions? It is clear that it does not, and the relevant policy is WP:SECONDARY in conjunction with WP:NPOV. Brews ohare (talk) 13:15, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

Its been explained to you by multiple editors on article pages and also on policy pages when you have tried to change them to support one of your content disputes. Sorry Brews I'm simply not prepared to carry on saying the same thing over and over again ----Snowded ^TALK 19:32, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

Apparently you believe you have dealt with the problem that your concept of "third-party sources" is yours and yours alone. It is my opinion that has not happened, and you have never faced the fact that secondary sources are the backbone of WP sourcing as pointed out in WP:SECONDARY. However, this failure to connect with WP policy is not a critical factor in attempting to establish an adequate & sourced definition of "free will". In particular, we have two candidates already quoted at the start of this thread.

1. "Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" — Michael McKenna, Justin Coates

2, "Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own." — Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron; Determinism tout court

Of the two, the last one seems to me to be the least ambiguous, as terms like "unencumbered ability" and "doing what one wants" bury a host of difficulties, among them: whether "do" involves both decision and action, either of which could be "encumbered". According to MMcKenna & Coates, that allows the compatibilists to limit laws of nature to action and leave will unencumbered. Somehow, I don't think this interpretation is the only way to look at the two-aspect formulation and incompatibilists could work with this definition. Anyway, choose one, or provide an alternative sourced version you like better with some reasons why. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm loosing track of what you are proposing Brews and I don't have to choose one of yours if I am happy with the present wording or think it preferable. Of the two quotes yo give the second is preferable but I really don't see what your issue is. Maybe summarise exactly what change you are looking for ----Snowded ^TALK 03:43, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

The second definition says 'free will' as a capacity, a capacity both to decide and to act. It identifies two aspects. Now some authors focus on one or the other, not both. So this "traditional" view does not satisfy WP:NPOV. The lack of unanimity about the "traditional" point of view should be explained and cited.

The present first sentence is a bit oblique, but adopts the traditional view by using the word 'agent' linked to the WP article on philosophical agency (which implies action directed toward a goal selected after due consideration). It has therefore two defects: it is unclear, and it is unsourced.

So my issue is to fix the first sentence to be 1) clear & 2) sourced & 3) identified as a common but not universal view. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Claims that dualism is largely an incompatibilist view

In the introductory paragraph to In Western philosophy the following stand-alone sentence occurs:

"Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions,[15] including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,[21][22] compatibilist theories have been developed based on the view of complementary vantage points in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the [third-person] neural correlates of choosing."[23][24]

Sources

[15] Shariff, Schoolker & Vohs, pp. 183 etc.

[21] Libet

[22] Robert Kane

[23] Shariff, Schooler & Vohs, p. 193

[24] Velmans

According to the article libertarianism, it posits that agents do have free will, and that, therefore, determinism is false. This formulation assumes that "agents have free will" is an empirical fact, and the definition of free will then logically implies that determinism is false. This is a precarious assertion, as the 'empirical fact' is doubtful and the logical contradiction depends upon a particular choice of definitions not considered by everyone to capture the problem.

However, the statement beginning this thread has other difficulties. One is its use of the words "non-materialist constructions" that conveys nothing to the average reader. Another is the claim that the "bulk" of non-materialist views is comprised by metaphysical libertarianism. That statement is untrue, both historically speaking and in terms of the modern views of the limitations of causal closure.

Can't we do a bit better? Brews ohare (talk) 17:16, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Use of term 'natural law'

The term natural law appears to have been appropriated by the legal system as a reference to morality. So where science is meant, the laws of science or physical law appears to be a better choice of words. Unfortunately, the WP articles on these topics border upon the views of Laplace or Leibnitz and hardly reflect a modern position. Brews ohare (talk) 18:08, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't agree with you there and Natural Law is more commonly used. If you have more recent references happy to look at it again but even science is not fully agreed on the idea of 'laws' ----Snowded ^TALK 03:38, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Please do that. Here is a link to a definition Also, look at the WP article natural law. And here is a Google book search. The common understanding of 'natural law' relates to "an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature and discoverable by reason". From context, this topic is not the one intended.

The second philosophical meaning in the linked definition is 'A nonlogical truth such as a law of nature'. In contrast to natural law, the laws of science or physical law is on target and unambiguous. Brews ohare (talk) 06:48, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

As a compromise, I have substituted "laws of nature" for "natural law". Hope that works. Brews ohare (talk) 15:23, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

It's your view again Brews, in this context I want a reference which makes that point in the context of free will and says it has replaced natural law. I'm tempted to do a mass revert but I will look at it. Please accept that if something is reverted you DISCUSS it before reinstating ----Snowded ^TALK 17:03, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I don't understand your remarks. The substitution of "laws of nature" for "natural law" makes no claims about "free will" and has nothing to do with it. Its just a question of everyday usage, and the Google books link shows that the usual interpretation of "natural law" is its legal context. Switching to "laws of nature" just avoids a possible misdirection. Brews ohare (talk) 17:47, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

I am assuming that you agree that the ensuing discussion of causal closure is related to the "laws of nature" (scientific laws) and is not pertinent to "an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature". Brews ohare (talk) 17:53, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

It can related to ethical laws drawn from 'nature' that in effect provide restrictions. The legal context derives from the philosophical use so you were wrong to change it, There are also restrictions from laws of nature in the sense you mean them but your phrasing does not help that. I'll go through the recent changes in then next day or so. I'm flying to the US tomorrow so I won't have time for a day or so ----Snowded ^TALK 21:57, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

I am surprised by your remarks because I don't find any connection to ethics in this particular paragraph, which IMO is entirely devoted to what you call " laws of nature in the sense you [i.e. myself] mean them", namely the laws of nature that form science. Brews ohare (talk) 00:23, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The context in question is:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and laws of nature arises when either causal closure or physical determinism or nomological determinism is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). However, despite our attempts to understand nature, ... " [bold font emphasis added].

If there is any indication that ""an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature and discoverable by reason" is the subject of interest here, perhaps you can point it out to me? Brews ohare (talk) 04:55, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

It's a philosophical position Brews, I doubt you agree with it I have some sympathy with it, The point is that you are conflating a term incorrectly to mean what you think it should. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:56, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The linked definition provides three philosophy related meanings. The first is about ethical principles. The second is about 'laws of nature'. The third is about rationally supported legal principles. The question here is which meaning applies to the context at hand. It is the second: laws of nature. So ambiguity about which meaning applies is removed by saying simply 'laws of nature' instead of 'natural law'. I am sure you understand the advantages of clarity. So your objection would seem to be that the 'laws of nature' meaning does not apply in a discussion of causal closure. I await some argument that relates the ethical and legal meanings to discussing causal closure, an exercise in futility, IMO. Brews ohare (talk) 13:07, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

As I said I will look at it, but I am happier using a common term than one preferred by Brews albeit with links, to my mind that is clarity. Neither am I happy with you focusing on causal closure I think its partial at best. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:01, 14 April 2015 (UTC

Snowded: this sentence is old text and not a recent introduction of mine. However, I agree with it that causal closure is worth bringing up. After all, the whole free will problem predating Chrysippus is the reconciliation of our intuition that we are free agents with our everyday observations that similar circumstances lead to similar results. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The issue yes Brews, its your use of it as a focus I am more concerned about. But I'm not getting sucked into a discussion of the subject with you, we are not here to co-author an essay but reflect what third party sources say. I'll review the recent changes in the next day or so ----Snowded ^TALK 14:25, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

I hope that review will include specific references to sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

Try not to be snarky Brews, it's more likely to result in a mass revert than a willingness to wade through yet another set of edits ----Snowded ^TALK 22:52, 14 April 2015 (UTC)