Talk:Greek government-debt crisis/Archive 2

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The German dimension

If the section The German dimension shall remain in the article, it needs to be entirely re-written with a neutral fact-based prose. Beside of changing the prose from POV to fact based, the section should also pick sources for the subject in a far more balanced way. As a minimum you can find just as many sources with the opposite view point compared to those sources currently picked for the section, but none of those "opposite sources" have so far been used in the section! It is fair enough to highlight, that Germany throughout the Greek debt crisis had certain interests and certain views about the best way to solve the crisis. It should however at the same time be noted, that these view points are in no circumstances isolated for Germany, but rather some general view points shared by the majority of European economists + majority of EU countries (as the agreement about the European Fiscal Compact imply) + IMF + the Greek central bank (Bank of Greece).

To be frank, the most skeptical economists who criticized the new European Fiscal Compact, are the economists from UK and USA. Not because they oppose the idea about fiscal discipline, but because they believe the timing is unfortunate (read: they think fiscal austerity should only be implemented, at times where the nations experience some stable positive Real GDP growth rates). If you perform an unbiased research on the "debt policy disagreements", you will however learn that the true reason for the agreement about the new European Fiscal Compact in EU -and the need for stricter economic policies in EU-, not is because EU are acting too hasty and certainly not because of any nationalistic agenda in Germany. The reason why the European Fiscal Compact was agreed, was simply because the EU financial opportunities and interest rates, to a much higher degree depend on the trust of foreign investors (and thus also call for much higher fiscal discipline), compared to nations like USA+UK+Japan. Nations like USA+UK+Japan, are "being allowed by the market" to run higher "budget deficits" and "Debt-to-GDP ratios", without their interest rates exploding to unsustainable levels. Several reasons exist for that. But on the bottom line, all nations in the Eurozone have to comply with much more economic responsibility, due to our finiansial fragile lending position in the global world.

It is correct Germany and the Eurozone believe that we now need many years with: "low inflation" + "fiscal discipline" + "Economic reforms to adjust the current size of welfare-states" + "Economic reforms to improve competitiveness towards our main competitors in USA+Asia". And this is by the way, also one of the misunderstandings in the written German dimension section, as it fail to analyze the competitive situation in a global perspective, but only provide opinions about it from a narrow isolated European perspective. The truth is, that European growth also highly depends on Germany succeeding to maintain their current fine level of competitiveness. If Germany starts to push up wages and inflation to 10% p.a. the writers of the section are right that it theoretically would help on the competitiveness of Southern Europe compared to Germany. But this unfortunately does not change the situation for the better, because when the competitiveness of Germany decline, they will also start to face an economic decline due to a decreased export out of Europe, and such a decline will in the end have a negative impact on all European countries. The only solution for Europe at the long term, is that all European countries do their utmost to implement economic reforms to improve their competitiveness in the Global World, and regain a reasonable size for their budget deficits so they are not mounting up permanent debt problems (which in the long term would hamper the prospects for future economic growth). Danish Expert (talk) 16:19, 4 May 2012 (UTC)

I suggest that, for the sake of clarity and brevity, we keep this to just discussing the perceived deficiencies of the section, instead of prescribing our own solutions or opinions about the crisis. These facts and comments are all supported by reliable sources therefore verification does not appear to be a problem. If you can find something which is not supported by the sources you are free to remove it. Also if you wish to add other opposing views please do so. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 16:43, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
Also please note that there is no justification in policy for blanking a sourced section while it is under discussion. Hiding the section makes it difficult for editors to read it and improve it and, if repeated, it can actually be considered vandalism. So no more blanking please. And no edit-warring to support said blanking. Thank you. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 16:59, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
Your 3rr warning is too hasty and uncalled for, as I straight from the beginning -my first undoing- launched the POV template, and created a discussion chapter about it right here, to solve the matter. The POV issues of the section are so serious, that they call for at least a tempoary hide (or in worst case a complete removal). The fact that the section was created few weeks ahead of the Greek election, smells a lot like a few editors (and perhaps this is not related directly to you, but in fact some other editors), are using it as a "Germany bashing" section, trying to convince other readers of Wikipedia, about their personal political stand point about Germany. I think it is so seriously wrong to use Wikipedia for personal political campaigns, and that is why I opted to hide the section straight away. At the same time I posted a link to the unhidden section right here at the top of the debate, so that it was easy still to read it, for those wanting to debate about it. I see nothing wrong about that.
Finally, I also need to inform you that another editor than me opted to hide the same section back in March (due to POV concerns). Then I think the editor "I love Andrea" went on to unhide it by the end of March, and it suddenly evolved to a big POV essay during April. I only had time to read it today, and thus only reacted today. All this just to say, that it seems like the section also back in March was in dispute, with the solution to hide it.
My in depth description above, about "the important views and info currently not being reflected at all in the section", proof my point is correct, that the section is completely unbalanced. Out of recpect, I will assume you only had good faith while writing it. But if you fail to post good valid arguments, that there is no need to rewrite the entire section from "POV-language" into "fact-based language" within 24 hours, now after I pointed out my concern, then I will go back and hide it again a third time (and keep on hiding it until the point of time it has been re-written). Beside of my dissatisfaction about "missing important content and counter arguments" (possible to reference with the double amount of new references, compared to those already listed in the section), you really have to post some good sound arguments, why on earth you want to keep the prose like it currently is, in order to win this argument. In regards of the prose, we should all remember that Wikipedia policy forbids us to post our own personal reviews. All written material needs to be balanced + neutral, and the prose is only allowed to be fact-based and not POV. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 18:05, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
This business of hiding, unhiding, blanking etc is ridiculous. That's why we have tags. If you don't like a section, you tag it. You put the POV tag, job done. No more negative action is needed. The step after that is to engage in discussion to resolve the issues. There is no reason to blank the section. The section must remain visible for discussion, editing and improvement at all times. Please cite to me which policy says that you can blank things that you don't like. What policy is that? Can you please quote it? Second, I think that you confuse POV with cited criticism of the German policies. These are not the opinions of IloveAndrea or any other editor. This is cited commentary of experts backed up by reliable sources. If you think it is unbalanced, then add positive commentary from people backing the German position but do not blank the section. Criticism of the German policies undertaken by experts and backed up by reliable sources is legitimate and should be included in this article. Your opposition to this so far is your personal opinion and thus your own original research. It is obvious from the opening statement which you made that you back the German policies, but this is your own POV. Please set this POV aside during this discussion, especially when you propose drastic steps like blanking of text criticising the German position. By blanking verifiable, cited, criticism of the German position from the article you actually make a clear statement that criticism of the German policies will not be tolerated. That, in itself, is POV and perhaps playing politics. Best regards. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 21:41, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
No, Danish Expert! You have to learn to take the criticism! It's hard, I know, when your country is engaged in naughty activity—you think I like sucking it up from people about the terrible Iraq War and its truly god-awful aftermath? Well, the situation in Iraq continues to be atrocious. Here's a nice recent summary called "The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World's Next Failed State":

Nine years after U.S. troops toppled Saddam Hussein and just a few months after the last U.S. soldier left Iraq, the country has become something close to a failed state. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presides over a system rife with corruption and brutality, in which political leaders use security forces and militias to repress enemies and intimidate the general population. The law exists as a weapon to be wielded against rivals and to hide the misdeeds of allies. The dream of an Iraq governed by elected leaders answerable to the people is rapidly fading away.

The Iraqi state cannot provide basic services, including regular electricity in summer, clean water, and decent health care; meanwhile, unemployment among young men hovers close to 30 percent, making them easy recruits for criminal gangs and militant factions. Although the level of violence is down from the worst days of the civil war in 2006 and 2007, the current pace of bombings and shootings is more than enough to leave most Iraqis on edge and deeply uncertain about their futures. They have lost any hope that the bloodshed will go away and simply live with their dread. Acrimony in the political realm and the violence in the cities create a destabilizing feedback loop, whereby the bloodshed sows mistrust in the halls of power and politicians are inclined to settle scores with their proxies in the streets.

Well, that is life. Sometimes one's country is in the wrong and deserves the criticism. And do you see us entertaining even the notion that we should pay Iraq, I mean, just enormous reparations? Well, that's us and the Yanks for you, and this is about the Germans.

If the German government wants to mercilessly crucify countries like Greece on the cross of national self-interest, the very least any reader of Wikipedia should be allowed to do is find out about it. My carefully crafted section cites world-leading economists, banks, bog-standard sources like The Economist, and so on. You don't get to go around chopping out entire sections of articles seemingly, at root, because you are simply an unhappy nationalist. If that is an unfair accusation, please accept my apologies. Additionally I'm English, and I couldn't care less about German elections. Why any German voter is going to be picking over the English version of a Wikipedia article on Greece is not immediately apparent to me.

I don't see why the facts are to be truncated simply because your German nationalism can't take the criticism—and they aren't going to be. I'll rejig some of the language tomorrow, but the section stays, as does all of the criticism. If you want to balance it out with "the case for Germany", such as it exists (the recent flurry of articles and rhetorical shifts, even from the French, calling out Merkel's sadism, means not many left to argue the German case apart from the Germans now), be my guest. And desist with the "pesky Anglo-American economists" ad hominems!!

Peace and respect. ~ Iloveandrea (talk) 23:12, 4 May 2012 (UTC)

For the record, as a Dane I have no relations to Germany (or special feelings for Germans). I live in Denmark. And I have master of science degree in engineering, and an economic bachelor degree from Copenhagen Business School. I might have provoked you with my harsh judgment about the content of the "German dimension section". But your heated replys posted in this section, did nothing than to proof my point of concern. Because the core problem with the "German dimension section" was exactly the same as your replies suffer from, that it was written from a biased angle based on selective references/belief. No effort was made to put it into a neutral context or evaluation.
The fact that we currently have a political discussion in some of the European nations (like ie. France), if the policy about speed/timing of current "austerity measures and economic reforms" should be reconsidered, has nothing to do with people opposing "German nationalism/selfinterest" as you call it. Instead, as I pointed out right from the beginning of this debate, this is related to a difference in belief about "The most effective solution for how to move Europe back on the growth track". The truth is that 75% of all economic experts preach that the "German medicine" is the best for Europe, while 25% of all economic experts argue for a more soft approach (supported by Hollande in France). When that is the case, we as good Wikipedians need as a minimum to write sections reflecting both views (while searching for sources/answers why the experts disagree). Otherwise you create an unbalanced POV section. Moreover, it is really a general political discussion related to the "European debt crisis" article, rather than content justifying big elaboration about it in the "Greek government-debt crisis" article.
To be short and frank, it is OK to keep the section "The German dimension" if the prose is re-written and if you also add sources to reflect the opposing views on the matter. Otherwise it will be completely out of context with reality, and not appropriate to include. In example, its OK to write that:
"The public debate in Greece was heaten up with a lot of anti-sentiment feelings towards Germany, as this country was depicted be many of the journalists in Greek media, as a country only acting/thinking in self-interest without prescriping the best economic medicine for Greece to overcome its financial troubles. Indeed Germany had special interests, as they hosted the majority of private creditors of Greek debt. In regards of the prescriped economic medicine for Greece, this was however not something invented by Germany (with the sole purpose to save their own creditors), but instead the medicine being officially recommended by neutral organisations like IMF, IIF and the entire Eurozone, and something the Greek central bank also supported in full. While the majority of economic experts agreed with the political stand point in Germany that: (1) Greece needed to implement immedeate severe austerity measures and economic reforms to improve competitiveness and restore the fiscal balance (just like the 3 Balticum nations proofed was fully possible to do in the years from 2009-2011, when they had faced similair fiscal problems). A few other economic experts argued for: (2) A more soft/slow approach to restructure the Greek economy. And finaly a small group of economic experts also argued that: (3) Greece by all circumstances would never be capeable to overcome their problems to restore their economy (due to a past record of only showing irresponsible economical behaviour in the time of economic crisis), and thus should be expelled and cut off for good from the Eurozone, to save the rest of the Eurozone for a continued amount of economic losses."
I can provide good quality sources for the paragraph I have written above. And basicly think "The German dimension" section needs to be written in that form of neutral style, compared to only referencing a single onesided point of view. Critisism is good. But only as long as it is balanced and neutral. It is OK with me, if you leak some/all of your referenced info, into the section I wrote above, but it needs to be presented by that type of neutral telling style. Danish Expert (talk) 23:03, 5 May 2012 (UTC)
Just to provide a final extra example, to underline my point above. If you can find 1 article from a newspaper unrightfully claiming that Greeks doesnt work enough hours per week. Then it is wrong when you take such a reference and claim "this is the general viewpoint in Germany". You can only keep the reference, if you write the text in this more neutral and appropriate way:
Articles/statements like the one claiming that "Greeks doesnt work enough hours per week", went on to spur anti-sentiment feelings in Greece about Germany. Despite the fact, that the vast majority of the articles published in Germany/Europe, at the same time however did not share the particulair articles viewpoint. According to OECD and the vast majoritiy of articles published in Germany and Europe, the Greeks indeed had a fine and sufficient length of their working week at XX hours, but instead faced a problem with a too bad competitiveness (due to a plethora of difficult beucratic procedures for Greek companies to comply with, and due to a low productivity of Greek workers with high unit costs, being caused by the very high salery increases they received during the past 20 years).
Sorry if I provoked you with my straight forward language. After now having fully explained what I was concerned about and how it should be fixed, I propose you help me to re-write the entire section as I called for in my examples above. I have not sufficient time to do it myself during the next couple of weeks, and that is also why my first action was to hide the section, until the point of time it had been re-written. If you can do it faster than me (during the next two weeks), it is okay with me that we keep the section visible to the readers (as long as the POV tag stays until it has been re-written). Danish Expert (talk) 23:03, 5 May 2012 (UTC)
Hey, Danish Expert! Sorry for the very late reply. No offence taken with your "straightforward language", and I certainly never meant to impugn your knowledge of economics! It's obvious from your editing that you're knowledgeable about the subject; I can't say the same about myself. I promise my only complaint, at root, was the proposed 100% cull. I am happy to do more balancing up; however, if you feel you could do a better job, be my guest.

Also apologies for the false charge of being German! That was a grave insult, and I'm sorry. Ah, I love the Germans really, maybe a bit of jealousy about their awesome economy! Well, look at the shitty, deindustrialised wasteland Thatcher left us with; you'd be vexed too if you were English!

OK, so let's turn to what you said:

"German nationalism/selfinterest" as you call it. Instead, as I pointed out right from the beginning of this debate, this is related to a difference in belief about "The most effective solution for how to move Europe back on the growth track".

It's a very minor point, but I feel I must emphasise that, while I use the term "self-interest", it is not mine but that of my source. Whilst it's true I share the opinion that Germany has been nakedly pursuing its national self-interest during the eurozone crisis—or, to put it slightly differently, been completely unwilling to make the necessary adjustments—the words "naked self-interest" are from my source. That said, it is unquestionably a blunt turn of phrase, so I would be happy to chop it out and phrase things differently.

I fully agree the fundamental discussion is about the best approach to the disaster, and I am certainly happy to summarise the opposing the pro-austerity argument. You are correct that that section of the article, as it currently stands, represents The Truth. This is Wikipedia, and The Truth is not allowed! :-)

The truth is that 75% of all economic experts preach that the "German medicine" is the best for Europe, while 25% of all economic experts argue for a more soft approach...

Going to have to ask for a source for the 75/25 split! If you provide one, I am perfectly happy to put it into the article though, of course.

Also something you said earlier:

If Germany starts to push up wages and inflation to 10% p.a. the writers of the section are right...

Again, I feel I must emphasise that economists, or at least the ones cited in the article, are not calling for 10% inflation from the Germans, but rather a moderate 3–4% over about five years. According to them, that would allow the eurozone to rebalance. The fact that Germany refuses to allow this moderate inflation... Well, I feel one can draw one's own conclusions!

Long and short: yes, the section needs some work.

What do I think for the future? Well, you won't be surprised to hear that I believe that if the Germans do not allow the zone to rebalance, the euro has had it. Simple as that. The Greeks will be leaving—enough is enough, and they would be insane to stay—but the same problem applies to the other peripheral countries! So they will end up having to leave too—if Germany doesn't allow adjustment, the euro has had it. In my view, this talk of stimulus is missing the fundamental point. Yes, these austerity measures are a catastrophe, but the reason they are being instituted is from, at best, a misunderstanding of the problem. In other words, providing a stimulus is not going to rebalance the eurozone! From my point of view, it is astonishing that this fundamental problem is still being missed completely or completely ignored when it comes to proposing solutions. Yeah, so a stimulus is just going to be throwing good money after bad. It will have a brief, positive effect, but it can't last forever because eventually it will have to be withdrawn. Once it is withdrawn, and assuming everything else stays the same, all the same problems are still going to be there!!!

No, either the Germans allow readjustment, or else I see no reason not to predict that the euro's days are numbered.

~ NotOnIsraPal (talk) 16:34, 28 May 2012 (UTC) of

While the 'causes of the crisis' section is more or less balanced , the criticism on Germany's role is clearly anti German. Typically, the critisism on Germany's role is a longer section than the causes of the crisis section, giving it in my opinion undue weight.
Let's not forget here, that the failure to establish open markets, get taxes collected and fraud by a seriesGreek governments underly the problem, not some evil scheme by Germany. The Germans have taken the major part in guaranteeing Greece, upon Greeces reequest and following treaties voluntarily entered by Greece, 210 Billion Euro. This amounts to about 20,000 Euros for each of the 11 Million Greek citizens, it also means that each single German (and citizen of other Euro countries) more or less involuntarily loaned over 1,000 Euros to the Greeks. At least, let's make sure that we get a balance in length between the German evil mastermind section compared to the fraud by the Greeks section....... Arnoutf (talk) 18:26, 23 July 2012 (UTC)
I agree with Arnoutf, that the German dimension chapter still is too long with a too onesided view. Compared to the version a couple of months ago, I was however happy to find that the POV language problem now has been solved. We however still need to chop down the length of the chapter, and improve neutrality of the information presented with other sources improving the context of the info provided and lighting up some opposite view points. Here is 5 very important points, that we really need the German dimension chapter also to reflect:
  • It is true Germany have scored some benefits of the debt crisis so far, and that it would be helpful for Greece if Germany slightly boost their salery and inflation up from 1% to 3%. But it is blown out of proportion to claim the Greek recovery mainly depends on that. For a start the Greek export/import with Germany only has a 11% share of the total Greek export/import. And for the second, Greece is already moving towards competitive improvements by lowering its salery and also currently experience deflation (which is far more important as it directly impact the competitiveness towards the entire foreign market). So Greece is already well headed at that road to improve competitiveness.
  • The main reason why some economists want Germany to fire a bit more up for inflation+spending is because of the need to kickstart the European economy. This could help Greece a bit. But it will certainly not solve the Greek debt crisis.
  • Another mis-understanding is, that Germany believes Greece can recover only by implementing harsh austerity measures. This is very wrong. Instead both Germany+EU+IMF pointed out that austerity would indeed widen the recession, but that it unfortunately was needed in order to minimize the Greek debt burden. If Greece in 2000-2008 had minimized the debt from 100% of GDP to 60% of GDP, then Greece could have afforded to finance some tempoary big deficits in the turmoil of the financial crisis, and thus recovered much much faster. But because the debt burden reached an unsustainable level above 120% already in 2009, the austerity measures was a necessary evil to implement.
  • Germany+EU+IMF have also pointed out, that beside of "fiscal consolidation through austerity measures and privatisation", it was of key importance for Greece also to implement economic reforms of the country improving competitiveness, while also improving the cost effectiveness of the "Public sector".
  • Beside of granting Greece bailout loans worth €240bn to refinance debt and making it possible for Greece to continue having big budget deficits throughout the crisis, EU+IMF also forced the private creditors to cancel €106.5bn of the debt that Greece owned them. Why? Only because this deal together with bailout loans, mean that private creditors gradually will get the remainig 46.5% of their money back from secure sources as EU+IMF (compared to the risk of only getting 0-20% back after a bankruptcy). This debt repayment is the main reason why the bailout loans are primarily used to pay out private creditors (who no longer want to borrow their money to Greece). Because of the signed "debt deal" in March 2012, we now slowly experience that the total amount of Greek public debt soon will be held 90% by EU+IMF with only 10% remaining to be held by private creditors. This is not because Germany only want to save German banks and private international creditors, but simply because there is and was no other alternative than to buy out the private creditors. It is a fact that all Private creditors has opted out and no longer want to borrow money to Greece, and that is why EU+IMF stepped in to replace the private creditors.
The German dimension chapter will only be neutral and balanced, the moment it also reflect what I have written above. There is a plethora of sources out at the Internet to back my points above. So I now invite other editors with more time than me, to dig them up, and start improving the chapter with the 5 bullet points written above. :-)

Danish Expert (talk) 08:46, 7 August 2012 (UTC)

"Germany+EU+IMF pointed out that austerity would indeed widen the recession, but that it unfortunately was needed in order to minimize the Greek debt burden."
Devastating recession increases the debt burden. If GDP plummets, the debt-to-GDP ratio goes up. "Growth is undoubtedly the best way to get out of the debt trap. After World War II, the American economy grew at a faster rate than the national debt. As a result, the debt ratio was automatically reduced." What should have happened is not bailing out worthless German and French banks, but writing the debt off. That Financial Times editorial sums it up well: "from the start, its [the eurozone's] approach has been a halfway house of resisting a sovereign default but not doing enough to remove the risk altogether. The reason is obvious: core governments find it politically impossible to put up more money. So it is unfathomable that they did not demand more from private creditors. The debt restructuring leaves Greece and its helpers with €100bn of debt that could have been written down entirely and left funds to address future 'accidents' without resorting to a third rescue. If there is another showdown with Greece it will have been caused by this." That wasn't done by Merkozy, meaning any write off is now immeasurably more difficult politically because it will now fall on European taxpayers instead of the idiots of bankers who lent Greece money. The winner, as always, is Big Finance, to the punishing cost of the rest of us. Finance people think they're so smart, but I see nothing but unalloyed stupidity.
Anyway, the Germans want to have their cake and eat it. They say they love the euro, want to keep it, but then complain when people have the temerity to make demands on them. What do we think would happen if the euro vanished? The German currency would shoot through the roof compared to the strugglers', shoot up against other major global currencies, and so farewell to those lovely trade surpluses. To be honest, I'd quite like the euro to fall apart just to see the Deutschmark soar, to see the smug smiles torn off those self-satisfied German faces. I bet Germans tell themselves the reason their economy is doing so well right now is because of some kind of intrinsic superiority! Comical.
And what a hoot to hear La Culona Inchiavabile whimpering about balanced budgets. "Not a single German finance minister has balanced the budget since 1970." Or take their responsible (I prefer the word shitty) banking system: the hypocrisy is utterly incredible. "WestLB is rescued for the fourth time in four years". "German lenders will be among the biggest beneficiaries of a Spanish bank bailout, with rescue funds helping to ensure they get paid back in full for poor lending decisions made in the run-up to the financial crisis, and helping politicians in Berlin avoid a politically sensitive bank bailout of their own. … German banks were facing deep losses linked to potential Spanish bank failures. However, a bailout of Spanish banks - backed initially by Spanish taxpayers and potentially later by the European Stability Mechanism - will ensure creditors won't take losses, making the bailout effectively a back-door bailout of reckless German lending.". Back in October last year, one could read that "the Germans are pushing for all banks in the euro zone and the UK to have a standard capital ratio of, for example, 10 percent". Six months later? "Deutsche Bank No. 1 In Europe As Leverage Hits Valuation … Deutsche Bank is the second-most leveraged and third-least capitalized of Europe's 10 largest banks … Deutsche Bank AG (DBK), adding assets as other lenders trim their balance sheets, leapfrogged France’s BNP Paribas SA (BNP) to reclaim the title of Europe's largest bank. Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann, who has called proposals to limit bank size 'misguided,' will leave behind a balance sheet about 40 percent larger than in 2006, and more than 80 percent as big as Germany's economy, when he steps down in May." Yes, these are the reasons I admire "German prudence". Yes, the Germans are such paragons of fiscal and financial virtue. Hilarious. "As for German complaints that they are filling Greek cash machines with euros, what about Greece's large gold reserves, taken away by the Germans during the war? They are still in Germany: requests for their return are ignored, nor has any interest ever been paid." The biggest debt transgressor of the twentieth century, who cynically refused to pays its debts and reparations after WWI, now cries about people paying it back? Piss off… "Half of Europe Suffers While Germany Profits". Do they still wonder why people hate them?
Our German masters can't have it both ways: either get lost, or start making the sacrifices necessary. What I'd love is for the Greeks to now just default on their debt, give a big "fuck you" you to Herr und Frau Deutschland. Hairgelmare (talk) 14:33, 9 August 2012 (UTC)
France never made reparations after the Napoleontic wars, neither did Italy for the conquest by the Romans, nor the Greeks for the sack of Troy.... This is ancient history. WWI repayment has been renegotiated. If Greece wants out of the treaty they voluntarily entered they have to renegotiate. If Germany does not want to let them off the hook, that is their right. The Greeks can't have it both ways: Get the profit from the Euro while it lasts, but not the burden when their own corruption catches up with them. Arnoutf (talk) 16:53, 9 August 2012 (UTC)
The comment above by Hairgelmare, is both illusive and ignorant at these 4 important points:
  • In regards of the debt restructure, it is a misunderstanding EU+IMF could simply dictate the amount of haircut. Only reason why it ended at 53.5% was because this was evaluated as being the maximum level, at which the required 67%-95% of all private creditors would voluntarily join the deal. EU+IMF+Greece needed minimum 67% of all private creditors to accept the deal in order to activate CACs to force the remaining creditors to accept. To be blunt the private creditors had the choice either to declare Greece bankrupt (a scenario giving them a payback equal to 40% of their money; while all Greek citizens would suffer heavily as it would immediately drain all public liquidity out of the country) or to accept the deal (giving them a payback equal to 47.5% of their money). Fortunately 85.8% of private holders of Greek government bonds and 78% of private holders of Greek government bonds regulated by foreign law, opted to say yes to the 53.5% haircut. If the private creditors had been offered a 70% haircut, it would most likely have resulted in NO DEAL, with the only result that Greece would have gone bankrupt. Because the private creditors in that situation would have achieved a bigger repayment by saying NO, and instead declaring Greece for bankrupt.
  • Second ignorant misunderstanding is in regards of the term "Financial stability". As part of any introduction class in economics, you will learn that we today live in a globalized economy with financial blood vessels linking all economies together; meaning that Greece going bankrupt would not only affect Germany in a negative way, but also the entire EU and in fact also the rest of the world. The reason why EU+IMF+Germany prefer Greece not to go bankrupt and instead to "buy out" private creditors (as the only other alternative), is not because they love the private creditors, but because they want to protect "Financial stability".
  • Third ignorant misunderstanding, is to claim that the best medicine for Greece would have been if EU+IMF had introduced no austerity demands at all. The truth is, that without the demand of austerity, EU+IMF most likely never would have got any repayment of their money borrowed to Greece. It would have been like throwing good money after bad money. The problem is, that without austerity Greece would slowly have suffered the interest payment death. It is true the debt-to-GDP level could have been slightly improved by the extra GDP provided by a "no austerity" policy, but on the other hand the ratio would anyway skyrocket due to a increase in the debt pile caused by the yearly budget deficits. In example calculations show, that without austerity measures the budget deficit would have been higher with 15% of GDP for all subsequent years. The implemented "austerity policy" permanently improve the budget figures, and thus pave the way for Greece to slowly return to a situation with financial sustainability. It should also be remembered, that the bailout plan offered by Germany+EU+IMF in fact accept and allow Greece to continue having budget deficits throughout the crisis. They are not demanding so much austerity, that Greece basically will try for the first time since the "healthy 70s" to get a budget surplus. But instead accept some continued small deficits at 1% of GDP, so that the debt-to-GDP level gradually will decline to a sustainable level in 2020, due to both a "steady amount of debt" and some healthy "GDP growth". So the amount of required austerity is not unreasonable high.
  • Fourth ignorant misunderstanding, is that the "Financial crisis 2008" is the root cause behind the "Greek debt crisis". It is true that it triggered the current crisis, but it is definitely not the root cause of the crisis! You only have to take a brief look at the financial statistics, to realize that Greek politicians created some huge economic imbalances in the Greek economy during all years in 1980-2010. In the 80s and 90s the problem was "solved" by Greek politicians, by their lax accept of having hyper inflation and multiple devaluations. When Greece in 2001 replaced the drachma with the euro this tool to "restore the economy" disappeared, but on the other hand the euro now provided the country with ultra low interest rates, and thus a unique opportunity now to lower the nations debt-to-GDP ratio, and restore the great imbalance between Government Revenues and Government Expenditures. If Greece had done exactly that and behaved economically responsible in 2000-2009, this alone would have prevented the debt crisis in Greece to ever erupt. The main problems is, that Greece already had borrowed so much ahead of the crisis, that the private creditors refused to borrow them any more money in 2010, as the Greek Economy at that point of time was deemed to be "financial unsustainable". At the same time it was also a fact that Greece had serious competitive problems, not only towards Germany but strictly speaking towards all other nations in the world. This was mainly caused by too big increases in Greek salary and too high inflation during the years from 1999-2009, and this made it impossible for Greece to cling of the crisis by having a healthy increase of industrial production. So the economic illness of Greece, is not because of Germany's great competitive economy, but simply because of the great and many financial imbalances Greek politicians created during the past 15-30 years.
Danish Expert (talk) 20:09, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

I am shocked that such a biased article is allowed to appear on Wikipedia, sounds like some evil empire is sucking up some innocent small country. Every reader must think that Germany is only setting its economic parameters for this purpose and completely ignores the fact that there is competition outside the Eurozone which industrial countries need to face (China, South Korea, Japan, US, Poland, to name a few). Also, there are several other countries in the Euro zone which have a similar position as Germany, such as the Netherlands and Finnland, why arent they mentioned? Maybe because Germany is obviously a better poster boy for bashing and attracts a far higher media coverage because of its size? So if the author of the "Germanys role" article wants to illustrate that the Euro does not work in the current setting (which is correct, problems with trade deficits etc), then please add such a list to the general Wikipedia article about the Euro. Any country that would follow the initially agreed terms of the Euro (low inflation, no financing of states by the central bank, no bailout via money transfer), would automatically run into conflicts if other countries run into financial problems, and hence want to bend the rules. (Yes, Germany was one of the first countries to violoate the 3% deficit rule, but at least they never asked for money). Moreover, the article sounds like Germany (and by the way France was an even bigger lender) forced Greece not to declare bankruptcy, is that really true? Why hasnt Greece simply defaulted, and then left the Euro zone? Maybe because it was easier to push the blame on in this way? Also, if a country has the largest economy (by having the highest population) it will almost always be the biggest lender, so it would make much more sense to talk about relative numbers. Wiktim (talk) 19:11, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Oh, you have to be German. Do you actually have anything of substance to refute what the articles says, rather than simply complain that you don't like that the article exposes your country's atrocious behaviour?
Obvious guess (but living in Switzerland, thank god, so not taxed to death), in the same way that this section was obviously written by an Greek guy on a bad day with access to google. My theory is that he had a German girlfriend who dumped him.
Listen: the article is not biased; Germany simply is the major problem. Similarly, an article that is critical of the US and the UK regarding the Iraq War is simply stating the facts. The article is built on reliable sources like the business press, leading economists, research papers by investment banks, German economic historians, and so on, and so on. Germany is not an evil empire; it is a country just like any other, i.e. its leaders do whatever they want without consideration for the people who get in their way.
The problem is not Germany but the way the whole fiscal union was designed (independent central bank, no money transfer). At some point it is said in a negative way that the ECB is a "reincarnated Bundesbank". Correct, it was basically modelled in this way, trying to gain some of the reputation the Bundesbank had build up over the years, so this comes at no surprise. Many countries would not have joined the fiscal union without this design. Also many countries had an advantage in the beginning by getting cheap money (with the expectation that this would be paid back in Euro). Of course, the design could be changed, but this would in fact lead to another currency (maybe with the same name). There are many suggestions, but every suggestion basically boils down to money transfers, either directly or indirectly. Even if this would be the best solution such that trade advantages (which definitely exist) could be somehow quantified and then split, implementing this is an impossible political process. Just imagine forcing Greece to directly support Albania, or even better, Macedonia or Turkey (not that they need it), there would be riots! The section gives the impression that there is an easy button "Germany" could push to solve all misery of this world. It also seems strange that Germany is referred to as a single entity all the time, there are lots of different interest groups (parties, unions, 16 relatively autonomous states, many significantly larger than Greece). For instance, the doubtful statement that german finances are "the envy of the world" is the personal opinion of one specific German guy. I am pretty sure that i will find strange statements from random Greek guys, but i would still not write it down in this way, all this has clearly not the goal to give an informed statement, but to raise antipathies. This holds as well for the section "Charges of hypocrisy", which mixes up more or less random stuff to this end.
"Every reader must think that Germany is only setting its economic parameters for this purpose..."
It is. You might not like it, but reality is what it is, not what you want it to be.
"there is competition outside the Eurozone which industrial countries need to face..."
Every country faces competition from other countries; your statement is vacuous.
There is somewhere the suggestion to raise inflation/wages. I would not mind that, but this would make you less competitive with respect to the named countries. So what is vacuous here? The section somehow gives the impression that all this is happening in a bubble with no connection to the outside world. Actually, wages are increasing significantly at the moment, hopefully this makes you happy, but this is purely the result of the market. Thank god we have not a planned economy, so there is no way for "Germany" to call for wage increases.
The economic catastrophe, and so human catastrophe (have you read about what its like for people in Greece? I'd encourage you to do so), that German/IMF policy has left in its wake has meant that our Teutonic friends have been enjoying an artificial exchange rate 20–30% below the one it would have if it reintroduced the D-Mark. If Germany left the euro, its new currency would soar, and it would say goodbye to those totally undeserved trade surpluses. This is all in the article and fully and reliably sourced, so please re-read the article and its sources.
No doubt that most of the Greek people (i know quite a few expats), are hit by the crisis for no reason. Also no doubt that most of the debt of the Greek state has not been turned into infrastructure but into Swiss bank accounts owned by a happy few. "Germany" has definitely advantages by having an artifical low exchange rate, although i doubt that this holds as well for the average tax payer who gets less worth. But does this make Germany responsible for all the misery in this world? In the end, the economic share of Germany of the Euro zone is only 25%, why does Norway not give a few billions, they have it in cash from all the oil, pretty selfish. I agree that Germany leaving the Euro would be the best option, then the ECB could start printing money until all problems are solved, maybe. There would be definitely a recession in Germany, but at least the problems would be at home where they can be solved. Also Switzerland had an 30% value increase of the Franc in the last years, which gives the export industry a hard time, but it did not collapse, more the opposite.
"So if the author of the "Germanys role" article wants to illustrate that the Euro does not work in the current setting (which is correct, problems with trade deficits etc), then please add such a list to the general Wikipedia article about the Euro..."
Please, do be my guest and add this crucial aspect of the crisis to the eurozone-crisis article. If that article doesn't make clear that Germany has been the biggest obstacle in resolving this disaster, then it is uninformative to the point of virtual worthlessness.
The biggest obstacle is the design of the currency is the naivity that this could work, Germany is only taking the blame for that.
"Netherlands and Finnland..."
If you want to make two little sections expounding the minuscule importance of tiny countries like Finland, be my guest.
Finnland is relatively important because if it would decide to leave the Euro, then it would probably collapse. Sorry to inform you, but tiny Finnland has almost half the size of Greece. The Netherlands are not so tiny, i think. I also think that somebody writing such an obvious one-sided bashing should take all sides into account, cherry-picking the facts that you want to hear is as bad as writing sth completely wrong.
"the article sounds like Germany ... forced Greece not to declare bankruptcy, is that really true?"
The article doesn't claim that, so I'm not sure what to say. How could Germany force a country to stay in the euro?
Still, the article sounds like that, even if it is not explicitely said.
"Why hasnt Greece simply defaulted, and then left the Euro zone?"
Because its leaders are apparently clinically insane.
In the end, these are the leaders elected by Greek public. They do not accept any kind of criticism from the outside, so they should not take any money. When Lagarde said that better collecting taxes would be a good start, which i think is not such a bad comment, i would not mind beeing criticised in this way, there was a political uproar.
"if a country has the largest economy (by having the highest population) it will almost always be the biggest lender..."
Let's concede your premise—so what? You're missing the whole point that it isn't the fact of lending by Germany banks that is important, but its recklessness. Again: it is trivially obvious that you cannot have reckless borrowing without reckless lending. So for German leaders to cry about reckless Greek borrowing, without recognising the massive and reckless lending emanating from Frankfurt, is ridiculous. That is all the article is emphasising in that section.
The lending has been done by banks, probably some German ones, which have not taken the risk into account. Simply default and show them that they were hopelessly naive. Everybody will lose money (probably including myself). I read somewhere (dont remember where, so i would not write this in the official article) that the German government was more in favour of declaring Greece bankrupt in order to bail out the local banks, but the French government did not like that, since the French banks were much more involved in absolute and especially relative terms. So that is why they designed all the "help". It is definitely a fact that French banks were much more involved in Greece, i would definitely find these numbers. So the whole attempt was not there to save only German banks, but to save the banks of many European countries (Luxembourg probably would have blown up right away). But the section gives the impression that Germany was the only country that had an advantage. In fact, the public opinion in Germany is exactly the other way round. So please illustrate exactly how much lending was done from each country, cherry-picking is again as bad as writing sth wrong.
Long and short: I believe your objections lack substance, and that is because the article is accurate rather than biased.
Finally, i believe that the goal of this section is not to give an informed overview, but to rather raise antipathies by cherry-picking some facts. This is usually called propaganda and should not be part of a Wikipedia article. At the moment this section should have the headline "Perception of Germany by an angry Greek guy". I would recommend to add some of the content to the general article about the euro crisis, so it can be discussed there. It is fair to have a section maybe called "Public perception of the involved countries", where it should definitely be written that Germany lost many credits by getting the lion share of all the blame because of the listed reasons.Wiktim (talk) 19:11, 29 March 2013 (UTC)


LudicrousTripe (talk) 23:44, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Without intermediaries movement

Can an article and link to the Without intermediaries movement be made ? See also

According to Tomáš Sedláček, Greece is recovering from the economic crisis and is introducing this new way of commerce into the economy. In addition, they also seem to embrace barter networks like TEM (currency), ....

KVDP (talk) 13:35, 14 September 2013 (UTC)

"root cause"?

"The root cause behind the problem with accelerating debt-to-GDP ratios, was however that Greece had failed to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio during the good years with strong economic growth in 2000-07, and instead had opted to continue on a path of running high structural deficits."

This is at best speculation. Why, for instance, could the Greek state borrow at nearly the same interest rate as the German state up to the financial crisis? Markets financed Greek public debt, so where was the problem? --Alex1011 (talk) 08:41, 20 June 2013 (UTC)

The problem was, that the financial markets ahead of the Great Recession, made the mistake to assume there would be several decades of continued solid economic global growth, and that no Eurozone country would ever be in danger of a default. There was so high trust towards the EU system, that the market thought there was no real risk, and thus the interest rates towards all sovereign Eurozone states were basically identically ahead of the Great Recession. When the Great Recession erupted, the investors woke up and started to ask higher and higher interest rates towards countries with "unhealthy economies" (being mostly Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and later also Cyprus). Greece was worst off, because of their combination of having a debt-to-GDP ratio at 130% in 2009 in combination with a structural deficit in the same year at 15%. This is way the 10yr interest rate on Greek Government bonds suddenly sky-rocketed up to 30%, and why there erupted an apparent need for EU+IMF to rescue Greece by offering them some cheap bailout loans to survive during the course of the crisis. If you compare all EU member states, in regards of their structural deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009, you will find Greece was the only country posting such severe figures, that it was not enough just to offer cheap bailout loans as a rescue attempt, but in addition it was also needed to enforce the infamous 53.5% debt haircut towards all private holders of Greek government debt, to ensure the country could escape to suffer an acute "interest rate death".
Top13 of the highest structural deficits in EU in 2009 (along with the states debt-to-GDP noted in parenthesis):
01) Greece = -14.8% (130%, and increased to 176% in 2013 - after it was adjusted down from 217% due to a debt haircut towards private bond holders)
02) Ireland = -9.4% (64%, and increased to 124% in 2013)
03) Romania = -9.4% (24%, and increased to 39% in 2013)
04) UK = -9.2% (67%, and increased to 94% in 2013)
05) Portugal = -8.6% (84%, and increased to 128% in 2013)
06) Spain = -8.5% (54%, and increased later to 95% in 2013)
07) Poland = -8.2% (51%, and increased to 58% in 2013)
08) Slovakia = -7.6% (36%, and increased to 54% in 2013)
09) Lithuania = -6.6% (29%, and increased to 40% in 2013)
10) Cyprus = -6.4% (59%, and increased to 116% in 2013)
11) France = -6.1% (79%, and increased to 93% in 2013)
12) Czech Republic = -5.5% (35%, and increased to 49% in 2013)
13) Latvia = -5.1% (37%, and increased to 42% in 2013)
All four bolded Eurozone states had both a high structural deficit and high debt-to-GDP in 2009/2013, and all received a sovereign bailout loan.
Italy had a structural balance at -4.2% in 2009, but only at -0.8% in 2013, and thus barely escaped being forced by markets to ask for bailout support, despite of having a debt-to-GDP at 133% in 2013.
Many people are unfortunately not aware, but the "budget deficits" itself, is actually towards a professional market investor almost irrelevant. When investors evaluate the long term health of a country, they solely look into the structural budget balance, as these figures have been cleaned from misguiding potential "one-off measures" and the short-term "cyclical GDP effects". Reason why the Greek debt-to-GDP ratios started to accelerate so fast after the Greek Recession erupted, was certainly the combination of a too high debt-to-GDP ratio along with a too high structural deficit. The high structural deficit itself meant, that the worsend economic cycle automatically would introduce some "exploding" budget deficits. When financial markets realized what the true figures for the structural deficit and debt-to-GDP was for Greece in 2009, it also meant they all ran scared away, because they knew anything would only start to get worse during the years ahead. The worst thing for a sovereign country is, if it has no other choice than to enforce austerity measures during "recession years". With such a high "structural deficit" in combination with such a high debt-to-GDP ratio, investors realized this was the only short-term future awaiting Greece, and they knew this would only cause a worsened recession, where the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise further due to the nominal GDP decline and the accompanied decline of revenues due to the downturn. An environment where interest rates on sovereign bonds were expected only to grow, and with the same pace they grew, then it became apparent the budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios would grow even faster - due to the drag of the additional costs associated to the fact the government had to pay higher interest rates on all its debt. This created a negative self-enforcing loop, where investors started to ask higher and higher interest rates to cover the growing risk for investors of suffering loan losses, through a sudden partly/entirely sovereign default. Until the moment in April 2010, where EU+IMF realized there was now no other option, than to offer Greece some very cheap bailout loans in combination with demanding the infamous 53.5% debt haircut (towards the private investors holding the Greek government bonds). The attached demands for austerity, economic reforms and privatization were also needed. But in case the Greek government in 2008 had posted a structural budget balance along with a debt-to-GDP at 80%, then for sure Greece in all circumstances could entirely have avoided the bailout, as financial investors would not have ran away (partly because no austerity then would have been needed during recession years - which significantly had improved the future economic outlook for the country, and partly because the debt-level could have risen extraordinary with up till 40%, without any investors starting to blink or feel scared). Danish Expert (talk) 18:59, 23 January 2014 (UTC)

who wrote this???

"The second period with accelerating debt-to-GDP ratios was in 2008-13, where the ratio grew from 107% ultimo 2007 to 176% ultimo 2013; and in fact would have been up at a record high 217% ultimo 2013"

What the hey does "ultimo" mean? Volunteer Marek (talk) 11:02, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

Mucho ultimo? Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 22:43, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

Private sector domestic debt. Domestic Bank Credit to private sector. Also (as a P.S.) the Real Estate thing.Also External Debt. I.e. :Picture(s)-Graph(s) of HUGE GREEK BUBBLES that practically nobody talks about

I've just created and uploaded this graph-chart.I've added it into the gallery of Economy of Greece article but I think it could be useful here (and elsewhere), in fact very useful....;-) I won't include it, add it in myself, I'm letting others find a spot and use for it.
Now to the point and the usefulness of this graph:
The focus on Greek (and of others) government debt is imo(and of others) misleading;the fact that this article is called Greek government-debt crisis is misleading, it's a misnomer;don't get me wrong, Greek government debt size and dynamics are very important.But they're hardly the whole or the greater, clear and causative picture despite the global (also our as editors) focus on it.
Apart from the hugely important -in fact I think it clearly owns the primacy- external debt (private+public or either-each and both;i.e. having an external debt-currency-balance of payments crisis) that I've since long ago in the past tried to highlight by the historical data chart (second image in the article), a debt that most people (here at the wikipedia and in the real world; well except Krugman and the likes) commonly don't mention, deal with or think about, we here, along with most of the rest of the world have also neglected and omitted looking at the private domestic lending-borrowing-credit point of view of the crisis in Greece (again this is just the domestic and private part of the capital flow bonanza of the external debt-currency-balance of payments crisis).The fact that Greek banks hadn't for the most part been into complex and exotic derivatives(like in many other countries), and hence have been thought of as more of traditional creditors, does not negate that they have also been very irresponsible in a traditional manner creditors (don't even get me started about things like this). The same is valid when reflecting on size; private debt and lending (to the private sector, both individuals and businesses) need not be (like in the bubbles at other countries) so many times the GDPs for a great, a huge BOOM-BUBBLE to have happened or to be considered as one!!!
In both cases just look at the graph!!!!!!
Loot at the explosion -and then implosion of some- of relevant various debts-credit-loans!!!!
We Greeks (especially as individuals but also our companies-corporations) basically-traditionally had-owed no (major or of real significance) private debt (just like we Greeks (as a private sector and/or a public sector) had traditionally-basically no (major, of real significance) external debt, public or private); but starting at about the Kostas Semites period and getting to the full €Ζ membership period, the (really really really cheap money for the first time) PARTY-BOOM-BUBBLE got going, a party that kept on going and ended only after the global crisis had taken place... ;-)
P.S.I'm thinking of also creating the same graph but with credit-loans as GDP-percentages;couldn't do it now;1.had-have no time(in fact even the time that I've spent creating this was a huge mistake for me (real life, thesis pending at uni, inter alia));2.was thinking of including %GDPs in this picture-graph whilst creating it, along with the abolute magnitudes, but I thought it would get even more complex a graph to understand and decypher; too many graph-lines already; well doubling them (i.e. providing %GDP for each and every one of them) would certainly not have made them less...; may perhaps do it, hopefully some time in the future... ;-) P.P.S.To realise also that we in Greece also had a real estate crisis of our own (a huge long one) albeit mostly not of the exotic derivative sub-prime kind or nature, that hardly anyone talks about, see also another one of my graphs at the aforementioned gallery, i.e. Dwelling Price Index, Greece... Thanatos|talk 06:33, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

I get your point. The credit figures alone, however is not enough to proof there was a "private consumption" BOOM-BUBBLE in Greece. If the data is presented in combination with other chart data, then we could perhaps reach some interesting conclusions, but standing alone its hard to conclude anything for sure. Along with the "credit chart" its also interesting i.e. to know the corresponding chart of how the value of "tangible assets" developed during the same years.
In any case, it is however also important to remember, that the sovereign bailout packages were granted to Greece in 2010, not because of the eruption of the Greek Recession itself, but because the financial markets suddenly stopped to offer lending opportunities to the Greek government, after they had compared how the current debt-to-GDP ratio and budget deficits were forecasted to develop in 2010 + beyond. My point is, that if Greece in 2008 had posted a debt-to-GDP ratio of 80% and a structural budget balance, then the country for sure could have continued to finance its budget deficits and debt refinance throughout the Greek Recession in 2008-2014, via the normal credit markets. Please note, this would moreover have meant, that their would have been no acute need to enforce fiscal austerity adjustments during the Greek Recession, as the economy ahead of the crisis would have been fully healthy by posting a structural budget balance, and this would most likely mean the Greek Recession would have ended already in Q3-2009, instead of only now (five years later). So the root cause behind eruption of the Greek Recession might indeed have been the burst of a "boom-bubble" and the negative turmoil associated to the global GDP decline in Q3-2008 until Q1-2009. But the root cause behind the Greek Government-Debt crisis, remain to be mostly a: too high debt-to-GDP ratio in combination with a too high structural deficit in the Greek Economy throughout the years in 2000-2009. Because this bolded fact alone, was the reason why investors since May 2010 decided no longer to offer Greece any more lending money at affordable enough prices. They started to ask a risk premium so high, that Greece would very soon suffer a quick "interest rate death", and the only realistic alternative rescue out of the mess was to say yes to the rescue bailout funds being offered to Greece by EU and IMF.
I do not deny we have several major additional stories attached to the Greek Government-debt crisis. The too high inflation in combination with too high public salleries, lack of structural labour+product reforms to ensure competitiveness of the economy, perhaps also eruption of a negative boom-bubble consumption cycle, all together indeed caused the Greek Recession to be deeper and longer, compared to what happened for an average country in Europe. But honestly, I think most experts agree (including IMF experts), that the major reason behind the prolonged Greek Recession has been the need to enforce fiscal austerity during the course of recession years, putting an additional drag on the Greek Economy. And once again the terrible need to do that, was solely because of the existence of a too high debt-to-GDP ratio in combination with a too high structural budget deficit, during the years where the Greek Recession erupted. To say it with different words, Greece had no saved fat to burn (like in the UK or Denmark, where the economy fortunately was structural healthy ahead of the recession), and consequently unfortunately then had to suffer more and longer, because of the need to cut down on its public activity during "recession years", rather than how we did it in UK+Denmark, where we were cutting down on our public spending and debt-to-GDP ratios during the happy "Growth years". Basically, the entire story can really be cooked down to that. :-) Danish Expert (talk) 18:05, 23 January 2014 (UTC)
It seems we have a long pause punctuated discussion; anyway..
To put it simply, I'm a structural(-deficit-labour-product-competitiveness-etc)=codename-buzzword-for-you-know-which-ideology kind of guy.
So sorry, I'm being frank, blunt, but this whole comment of yours seems void of real arguments to me.
DK is not in the EZ. Nor is the UK. DK has run good, positive NIIP or at least insignificantly low negative (previously); the one of the UK, though negative, is not in any way really bad. DK has consistently run current account surpluses, while the UK though more or less in a consistent deficit has not been in any way comparable to GR. DK and the UK are located in or very close to the blue banana, the industrial, financial, political, etc core. Etc, etc, etc. GR is far far away, never anyway has been such a country, and has over the last decades become a predominantly low added value services economy addicted in the last ~2 decades to foreign debt, denominated during the last ~15 years in an essentially foreign currency, etc, etc, etc...
In other words apples and orange, very orange, very very orange, oranges... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 18:13, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Germans

Can we get a bit into the article about how the Germans were pulling out all the plugs to influence to the point of violation the most recent Greek elections? Also the hypocrisy section needs some expansion. Hairgelmare (talk) 14:16, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

As far as I know, the Germans emphasised that regardless of the election results, international treaties regarding help should be honoured; and that unilateral decision by the new Greek government not to accept international treaties, would cancel all obligation for any party providing bail-out funding to continue doing so. That thus a government consisting of the Greek political parties claiming to overturn conditions for bailout packages would result in the immediate stop of any further money being provided for Greece. That this comes down to influencing the election is true; to the point of violation is however very strong, especially since Greek government had already violated multiple international treaties (which trump national law in international legislation).
Hypocrisy, there may be some hypocrisy in the German position; especially in relation to their earlier breach of the conditions.
This is all however not a root cause, although painful to Greece. In the context of the whole crisis Germany's role seems minor compared to the role of the financial world (hedge funds, credit rating agencies, Goldman Sachs) and the serious problems created and maintained by Greek government between 1980-2010 (nepotism, corruption, clientelism, overregulation of occupation (e.g. in the taxi, lorry business, as well as mandatory cooperation membership(effectively making it impossible to grow high quality produce, as the additional costs needed cannot be recooped through higher sales prices), huge public service employment (about 25% as compared to about 10% in Northern Europe). Looking however at the article there is a huge section on German in comparison to those issues. While the position of Germany may warrant some text, in my opinion the size of the current section already overemphasises the role of Germany. So reduce, rather than expand. Arnoutf (talk) 16:46, 12 August 2012 (UTC)
A year and a half have passed but the problem remains. The overemphasis on Germany should be reduced. There are people who argue Greece should default and leave the euro, there are others who support maintaining euro and getting basics sound, and Greece now has budget surprlus and current account surplus [1], [2] so there is their logic too. If the Greeks wanted to remain in euro, that was their choice. You can't have the best of both worlds and you can't blame Germany for bringing their position to the logical end of it.Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 23:42, 5 March 2014 (UTC)
This would perhaps be true if common Greeks had and were actually been objectively -as much as possible, that is- informed by the people and entities whose work is supposed to do this (directly or indirectly aided by the Troika), on the pros and cons of both possible worlds (limiting possibilities to these 2). Greeks are not and have not been thus informed in any reasonable measure or way; there is and has been, over the last years, an almost universal (in the panhellenic sense; exceptions characterised, instantly waved off, by the mainstream as fringe, graphic, etc) information (or misinformation; selection of type, characterisation, depending on...) blackout other than the parallel universal media campaign whose soundbite and message is essentially that 1. if Greece were to, inter alia, exit the €Ζ, she would return to the Stone Age and 2. Greece is just around the corner of salvation and prosperity (trust us). Both messages ad infinitum and ad nauseam repeated, after intermissions of blah blah blah, when reality begs to differ...
PS And no, it's not the Right-wing that is doing this, solely, alone; it's Right and Left, spanning the greatest part of the Government's (and more) part of the Parliament, related media and interested private parties (including that is, when referring to Message No.1, be it due to de facto political reality compromise or real belief, the more or less official message of the main, leading, party of the Opposition, i.e. of the left-wing Syriza, and of its, let's say, righ-wing counterpart, i.e. the Independent Greeks; Golden Dawn and KKE each are sui generis, so I won't discuss them presently)... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 17:53, 9 March 2014 (UTC)
Ideological rubbish is being repeated by all major parties, no relation as to NPOV so far. Even SYRIZA claims they are going to keep Greece in the eurozone which is impossible, because their other policies would necessitate the Grexit. Of course the argument that leaving the eurozone would leave Greece to Stone age is an exaggeration. However, it won't be easy to leave the euro, either. Now, though I'm from a country that has euro as its currency, I'm also more inclined to the view that euro is a mistake and that Greece will never become competitive again under euro. There are some examples of countries quickly getting out of the misery by abandoning the currency peg such as Russia 1998 and Argentina 2002, despite that fact that (especially in case of Argentina) there were countless economists arguing against the floating rate/devaluation. Euro as a whole is not a recipe for success but rather an unwelcome reality we have that actually should be dismantled as safely as possible. Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 18:59, 9 March 2014 (UTC)
1.Did I say that a Grexit would be easy? 2.Agreed on practically everything (introducing my relevant views in short: the Currency crisis#Eurozone crisis as a balance-of-payments crisis (minus the MMT stuff) was my addition to that article; for a longer version, see next talk section here). 3.Glad we could finally really talk... :) Thanatos|talk|contributions 22:18, 9 March 2014 (UTC)
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