Talk:McMahon Line

NPOV tag

This article depicts the McMahon Line primarily as a territorial dispute between China and India and the cause of the 1962 war, a view I can't agree with. Mao is on record as saying that the disputed territory was worthless [Auhtor: Could you point out a source for your strange claim?] If the Chinese had really thought the territory they occupied in 1962 was their's, they would not have withdrawn so quickly. I am sure they logistical problems and so forth, but I assume such problems were anticipated by Chinese military planners.

[The following is entirely personal biased view] The purpose of the invasion of 1962 was to enhance the prestige of China and the Maoists by giving some foreigners a beating. It kicked off a propaganda campaign which glorified the Chinese army and Lin Biao, at that time China's defense minister and Mao's intended successor.

Why did Mao picked India and not some other country? Aside from the obvious (military opportunity), India was a prominent Soviet ally and China had recently broken with the Soviets.

The only historically Tibetan town south of the line is Tawang. Chinese maps show a large swath of Indian territory as "South Tibet" and therefore belonging to China, but this is sheer mapsmanship.

The McMahon Line is also significant for a reason not mentioned in the article: It was establish through a bilateral treaty between Britain and Tibet. Recognition of the line by Britain and India implies recognition of Tibet's power to concluded treaties at the time of the Simla Convention (1914).

Kauffner 14:02, 23 February 2006 (UTC)Kauffner

China's military is governed by an underlying doctrine called "Active Defensive". Many outside analysts were puzzled by China's seemingly impulsive, irrational military campaigns in the Sino-Vietnamese War and the Sino-Indian War. Google "China" and "Active Defense" and read it. Then you will see the clear consistency in China's military campaigns. That doctrine explains China's strategies, patterns and behaviors in the Korean War, Sino-Vietnamese War, and Sino-Indian War (plus few other conflicts.) And it will help you predict how China will react in any future conflict. ktchong 17 August 2006

Its funny China doesnot recognize the already demarcated boundaries of countries it occupied i.e, Tibet and East Turkestan(Xinjiang), boundaries which these countries agreed to, as a result it squeezed thousands of square kilometeres out of land out of Pakistan, Nepal and soon to Bhutan. On the other side after the fall of soviet union it forced Kyrgyzstan and Kazkhstan to cede territory to China. India is the only country resisting so far, but china occupies Askai Chin as a result of 1962 war anyways, Aksai Chin has been a part of Ladakh for centuries. March 21, 2006 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.117.79.209 (talk • contribs) 08:09, 22 March 2007

What government(s) recognised Tibet and East Turkestan as a "country"? --PalaceGuard008 (Talk) 00:43, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

if you read the article on wikipedia, some of the land "ceded" was not even signed and agreed by the 'defacto' administration, the british just grab whoever didn't escape and make them sign an agreement to cede land, surely a treaty signed under such conditions cannot be considered legal? else everyone will be grabbing people of the street and cede land from each other. the british did the same with Singapore, they recognise another king and sign treaty with him. it impresses me what diplomacy is during imperial times. ;) Akinkhoo (talk) 10:16, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

Recent edits by 219.79.122.73

I have a few issues with recent edit by 219.79.122.73. First off, the gist seems to be that not only was China always right, but everyone else knew it. By the end of the article, you're wondering if there is any real dispute.

• The April 1943 British Foreign Office report questioning the validity of the Simla Convention is an internal memo, but it is presented as if it was an official position. The report just says that defending the convention is "difficult" which I see as a lot of weasal words. But the way the quote is positioned in the text, it sounds like the Foreign Office is siding with China against the British government, which had adopted the McMahon Line officially six years earlier. Eden's August 1943 letter to Soong is most official statement of the British position (Goldstein, p. 401). This describes Tibet as enjoying "de facto independence." As Foreign Minister, Eden certainly outranked whoever wrote the earlier report. Britain's 1943 communications with Washington concerning Tibet can be found here. Highlights: "The [Simla] convention was ratified by Tibet and the Government of India"; "The Government of India have always held that Tibet is a separate country in full enjoyment of local autonomy, entitled to exchange diplomatic representatives with other powers." No suggestion in any of this that the Foreign Office disputes the validity of the Simla Convention.

• To the cut and paste so much stuff from from Maxwell is a copyright violation. Also Maxwell has a lawyerly style of writing that's inappropriate here. (How many times do we need to be told that China rejected Simla?)

• The significance of the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan treaty for this article it that is was concluded between Tibet and Britain without the participation of China. This aspect of the treaty is glossed over. Tibet refused to recognize the earlier Sino-British treaties, hence the Younghusband expedition aimed at getting Tibet's consent. This edit makes it sound like it was the other way around, i.e. that the agreement Younghusband made was a temporary expedient pending China's confirmation.Kauffner 03:04, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

• Ultimately, China's position is summed up in one simple, straightforward, easy-to-understand sentence: McMahon Line is a põart of Simla Convention treaty between Britan and Tibet, entirely without China's participation, and China refuses to accept it. ktchong 17 August 2006

1stly the source give on point one is withdrawn from the tibetan website "This page is busy meditating, preparing for the Kalachakra initiation and an audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Please try back later." they are neitehr having some fun, server trouble or no longer support that article. we will need to ignore it for now until the source is reaffirmed. point number 3, i wouldn't call invading people a means to reach an agreement; would you? are we to start accepting land ceded to nazi germany by the use of force? i don't think so. the treaty neutrality itself is questionable, even if we take china out of the equation. what do you think? Akinkhoo (talk) 10:26, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

NPOV Violation commited

This article is written from an extremely Sino centric point of view and needs to be cleaned up

--> "cleaned up"? In my opinion we can offer the two points of view, saying that are two points of view (from India and from China). The things about which all people agree, we can write them in the first part. Why always "clean up" things?

because it leave people with a confusing picture. if we present the stance of both sides, it is much more easier of people to understand the conflict of interest here. Akinkhoo (talk) 10:30, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

Problem of sources

Several editors of this page seem to have relied on unreliable sources of modern Chinese history, most notably Jung Chang (see Mao: the Unknown Story for details for problems with her works). While some of these views are commonly espoused, it is a grave WP:NPOV error to present them as facts. For example, Mao starting a war to groom his successor is almost purely speculation, and should be presented as such. --PalaceGuard008 (Talk) 06:34, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

I don't see a problem with adding that information; do you have a source we can cite to? --David Shankbone 22:06, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

I have restored a suppresed text citing Jung Chang. --Rédacteur Tibet (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 11:18, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

where the **** is the McMahon Line?

does anyone have a map of exactly here the line is? an indian map has all the borders, how am one suppose to know which part is part is covered by the line? Akinkhoo (talk) 10:32, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

New Section Started Under History

New section called "British Discards the McMahon Line" has started under History section. Due to British's policy change in Oct 2008, this entry has to be updated to reflect the change. The section includes British's policy change, and some of its implications. If anyone wants to change it, please bring the change up here for discussion first. Thanks. Xingdong (talk) 04:31, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

The Miliband statement doesn't mention the McMahon Line or even Simla, so heading is untrue. Not only that, but to devote an entire section to this issue gives WP:UNDUE attention to Barnett's views, who is not a specialist in international law. Kauffner (talk) 05:52, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, see titles of this entry: "Drawing the line", "Britain attempts to enforce line", "India and China dispute boundary", the next one would be more appropriate to be called "British discards the line". This is not only consistent with the titles, but also consistent with Britain's policy changings. The McMahon Line was a colonial legacy, and now British abandons it.

Since you mentioned so much about international law, I would challenge your understanding of Tibet's status according to international law. In your various posting regarding Tibet, you mentioned many times that Tibet was an independent country. But surely you don't understand international law, or in Tibet's case you have wrong understanding.

Tibet's self-proclaimed independence from China was not recognized by China, neither it was recognized by any country as a de jure independent nation. By any international law, Tibet can not be treated as an independent nation. Period.

Xingdong (talk) 02:08, 25 March 2009 (UTC)

By the way, Barnett's view obviously worth quoting since he is considered as an world renown experts on Tibet issues. Even NY Times quoted what he said.

If you have anyone credible enough on British policy change, I welcome your contribution here.

Xingdong (talk) 02:15, 25 March 2009 (UTC)

Line of Actual Control

The phrase Line of Actual Control comes from a 1959 diplomatic message by Zhou Enlai to Nehru. Zhou defined the LAC as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west."[1] The LAC therefore pre-dates the 1962 war and is at a fixed location. If India goes north of the line or China south, the line stays where it is.
Many authors more prominent than Robert Barnett have commented on this subject over the years. To put his comments in the lede is both WP:UNDUE and WP:RECENTISM. Kauffner (talk) 04:29, 6 June 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, to say the McMahon Line is a demarcation line is a conceptual mistake. It is good we removed that. Also, to say the McMahon Line is the "effective boundary between China and India" is not exactly right. The boundary between these two countries has never been settled. To be exact, the Line can only be called "Line of Actual Control". As it is called, the LAC can be changed any time due to advance of one side and retreat of another side. The term has been used on both Chinese and Indian in many occations (both official and unofficial). WP:UNDUE or WP:RECENTISM does not apply here. So, I suggest we change the "effective boundary" to "Line of Actual Control". Xingdong (talk) 02:16, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

As it happens, Nehru asked Zhou in 1962 whether the LAC moved south when Chinese forces advanced. Zhou told him it did not: The line was, "basically still the line of actual control as [it] existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on 7 November 1959. To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China."[2]

Here is what Maxwell says: "On November 4, [1962] Chou En-lai replied that the "line of actual control" was referred to the same line that he had proposed in 1959. He explained: "The fact that the Chinese Government’s proposal has taken as its basis the 1959 line of actual control and not the present line of actual contact between the armed forces of the two sides is full proof that the Chinese side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained in the recent counterattack in self-defense."

As you can see, Zhou defined the LAC in terms of the McMahon Line and as something different than the "present line of actual contact". To define the McMahon Line in terms of the LAC is therefore circular. Kauffner (talk) 08:07, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, I don't have too much objection to your explanation of the LAC. Only that there is no official boundary between China and India yet. I suggest the last sentence of first paragraph be changed to "Although its legal status is disputed, it is where the Line of Actual Control between China and India currently lies." —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xingdong (talk • contribs) 17:05, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Did you read anything I wrote? "Currently lies" implies that is it possible for the LAC to move, which is not the case. Kauffner (talk) 23:59, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Yes, the LAC is possible to move, why not?? DID you read anything I wrote? Xingdong (talk) 01:50, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

Do you have a reference for this claim? "LAC" was just Zhou's name for the McMahon Line. Kauffner (talk) 04:16, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, when I googled "Line of actual control", thousands popped up. Here is one of them from India source.[3] Maybe Zhou named it, but it is widely used by both sides. Now I suggest the sentence be changed to "'Although its legal status is disputed, the current Line of Actual Control between China and India coincides with the McMahon Line." You have any objection? Xingdong (talk) 18:58, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

And you claim that the McMahon Line is "effective boundary" between China and India, Do you have any reference for that claim? who(China or India) recognize that? and when? Xingdong (talk) 19:04, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

What I meant was, do have a reference for your claim that it is possible for the line to move? The link that you gave certainly doesn't imply that. If you read the quotes from Zhou I gave above, he's obviously talking about a line corresponding to the McMahon line and not some moving line. The phrase is now enshrined in treaty.[4] If you want a more recent example, in 2005 the Chinese Foreign Minister called on India to "respect and 'strictly honor' the line of actual control."[5] That doesn't make sense if you think of the LAC as a line that moves whenever either side advances or retreats. Note that these sources don't say "current Line of Actual Control" or otherwise imply that the line the has moved in the past or is likely to move in the future.

It is common enough to refer to the LAC as a "border" or "boundary".[6] Are you objecting to the word "effective"? Kauffner (talk) 02:14, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, it is a commonsense that a Line of Actual Control depicts only current situation, and is subject to change. It can not be used as a boundary between two countries. Boundary between two countries needs to be negotiated and rectified by both sides.

In 1962, Zhou proposed the LAC along the McMahon Line, but Nehru refused it. And now, border situation may change from time to time. For example, according to the treaty you provided above, both sides shall avoid large army movement(no more than one Division). However just recently India moved 2 Divisions to the border area, and they apparently are targeting China. Should India invade China again, China would do another counter-back, then reclaim Tawang area. The Line of Actual Control would be changed again. In this case the Line of Actual Control would no longer conincide with the illegal "McMahon Line". Make sense? Xingdong (talk) 20:48, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

I understand you fine. I just don't happen to agree. You might try reading what I write and engaging with it instead of just repeating the same flawed argument over and over. The idea of an LAC the can move might seem "common sense" to you, but it is not the way diplomats or historians who deal with this issue use the phrase. You need to based your argument on references rather than common sense. "a Line Actual Control" -- You imagine that there is more than one LAC? There is only the LAC as it is defined in Zhou's 1959 and 1962 notes.[7] Zhou does not define the term the way you do. Look up line of control -- it's a totally different thing than LAC.

So you are looking forward to a war India? Will you volunteer? Kauffner (talk) 00:32, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

Kauffner, Chinese people do not like a war to settle things, however if they are forced to do so they have no fear. And it has been proven they have ability to win a war. Thinking of Korean War, the war with India was just too small scale(battalion level - Calvin).

The LAC is a term reflecting the situation at a specific time. It can be changed when the situation changes. That is a common sense to everybody, not only to me. In 1962, Zhou mentioned the LAC back to 1959. That means he would like Indian forces to retreat to whatever it was in 1959. That doesn't mean he agreed that India could use that line as a boundary.

Again, let me ask you, the last sentence of the first paragraph, "Although its legal status is disputed, it is the effective boundary between China and India." do you have any reference?? If you don't, then please remove it. "Effective boundary" is not a right statement. I think it is better we change it to "Although the legal status of the McMahon Line is disputed, the current Line of Actual Control between China and India coincides with it." Xingdong (talk) 14:46, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

That is completely wrong. "LAC" is just another name for the McMahon Line. It cannot move. Even Neville Maxwell admits this. Find a reference that says otherwise and you can put this stuff in. In 1962, Zhou was refering to a note he sent to Nehru in 1959, a note that defines the LAC as the McMahon Line. Kauffner (talk) 15:07, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

LOL the "LAC" is just another name for the McMahon Line?? Listen, the LAC is the line of actual control. It happened to conincide with the McMahon Line. In 1962, Zhou refered to the ML to indicate where was the LAC laying in 1959.

What Zhou meant in 1962 is that India had to stop encroaching Chinese lands, it had to go back to the ML, where both sides controlled in 1959, and started negotiating the border issue from there.

He didn't mean he was taking the ML as a legal boundary. India is still occupying a large part of Chinese terrotory and illegally building military and migrating people from outside of occupied terrotory. This makes situation more difficult and dangerous. If you look at the history, you will understand a lot. The British Indian's Outter line laid in parallel with the south border of Nepal, at the foot of the Hymalayas. Later they moved a little bit north, and a little bit north. Tawang track, for example, is traditional Tibetan terroritory, and 6th Dala Lama was from there. India in fact doesn't have any legal ground in this border dispute. After these years, it is time to get facts straight. Xingdong (talk) 14:10, 18 June 2009 (UTC)

Zhou sent a note to Nehru on 7 November 1959 that defined the LAC as, "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west."[8] Then in 1962 Chinese forces advanced south of this line and Nehru asked Zhou if the LAC had moved. Zhou responded that the LAC is "basically still the line of actual control as [it] existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on 7 November 1959."[9] Why does Zhou give the date 7 November 1959? Because this is the date of his previous note! In other words, the LAC stayed in the same place even though Chinese forces were well south of the line at the time of the 1962 exchange. Kauffner (talk) 15:28, 18 June 2009 (UTC)

POV

The article seems to echo the Chinese contention. SDas (talk) 07:25, 2 October 2009 (UTC)

From one extreme we falled into another extreme. Some edits made earlier are nothing but typical Indian side's wishful thinking. For example, I replaced "...1962, when Indian and Chinese forces struggled to control the state of Arunachal Pradesh" because AP didn't exist until 1972.

Political motivation shall have no place here. MainBody (talk) 09:00, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

It did exist, and it had a different name "North-Eastern Frontier Angency" But we are supposed to use the current names. Like Mumbai and not Bombay. --HFret (talk) 13:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

I see zero credibility on the above "answere", AP is the institutional name for a political establishment which has no pre-1971 historical root, as you said it is the "State of AP". And no evidence shows it existed before 1971, neither geographic nor political. (Or you can show us any pre-1972 document which uses this name.)

FYI, the name of AP is nothing but Indian unilateral invention. I believe the Chinese side still officially regarded it as South Tibet. Charles Bell even call the Simla Convention invalid becasue of non-existence of Chinese and Russian signatures. (Goldstein, 1989)

We want professional editorship instead of baseless original research. MainBody (talk) 01:10, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Me too! (I totally agree with you for once) --HFret (talk) 01:28, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Therefore, per WP policy I with no doubts revert the Oct 2009 edits including the undiscussed/no-consensus wordings of "international boundary"[etc] and recovering the original term "Line".

Undiscussed edits include:

• [10]
• [11]

User:HFret is once again urged to provide third-party sources claiming the existence of the "State of Arunachal Pradesh" in the 1960s. Indian propaganda does't count.

For the definition of "vandalism", read WP:VANDAL. - MainBody (talk) 10:11, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

OK.. as I have no evidence... all hail Main-Body! Haha! roflol XD --HFret (talk) 12:17, 4 November 2009 (UTC)

Recent edits by 71.233.170.181

Various changes by an IP here, but no additional sources or discussion to justify them. This was added: "However, the Chinese delegate also signed the McMahon line map part of the treaty, hence making it legal from even this point of view " Says who? This was removed: "Simla (along with the McMahon Line) was initially rejected by the British-run Government of India as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention." This convention was renounced in 1921. After Simla, the McMahon Line was forgotten until 1935, when British civil service officer Olaf Caroe convinced the government to publish the Simla Convention and use the McMahon Line on official maps." Some cruft was added to the top of the article: "The Chinese eventually withdrew." (no context) Kauffner (talk) 04:43, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

Chinese point of view

Practical significance of the McMahon Line—— McMahon Line is neither "official boundary" nor "effective boundary" and even the line of actual control not. It is roughly the same line of actual control, India's unilateral claim of the border.--天下第一菜 (talk) 02:23, 28 January 2012 (UTC)

You realize that you need sources before these kind of generalities mean anything? "Line of Actual Control" was originally Zhou Enlai's phrase. Now it is enshrined in treaty. Either way, it was never, "India's unilateral claim".Kauffner (talk) 08:56, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

The main article and the sub-heading "Drawing the Line" is almost surreal. The main article in the first line states "Tibet which was not the official representative of the Peoples Republic of China". Of course Tibet was not then "the representative of the PRC", because the PRC did not exist before October 1949!! Then the second paragraph states that Sir Henry McMahon wad the Foreign Secretary - he was not. Then it is stated the McMahon Line was found contrary to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and in 1921 it was "renounced". Does this refer to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 or the Simla Convention of 1914? Renounced by whom and on what authority? The three parties to the Simla Confernce in 1913-14 were Britain, China and Tibet (yes, Tibet!) and they were represented by their Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries (that is, authorised to enter into negotiations on soverign basis and to conclude agreements). The credentials were checked by each and were accepted and the Conference began. After about 8 moths of negotiations, the draft agreement was tabled on 22nd April 1914 and was signed/initialled by the three Plenipotentiaries on 25th April 1914. The Simla Convention was repudiated by China on 27th April 1914. Thereupon, with the full knowledge of the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Ivan Chen, the bi-partite Anglo-Tibetan Agreement including the provision on the McMahon Line was signed on 3rd July 1914. At no stage during the deliberations on the Simla Agreement of April 1914 or the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of July 1914 or the even in the months and years that followed did Mr. Chen or the Chiense Foreign Office raise any objections to the Mcmahon Line. These are matters of record, supported by official documents. For authentication, one may refer to Dr. Alastair Lamb's volumes on the McMahon Line, Dorothy Woodman's "Himalayan Frontiers", Margaret Fisher & Robert Huttenback's "Himanlayan Battleground" and Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh's "Himalayan Triangle". For those seriously interested, further references may be furnished as to what the then Chinese President and the Chinese Foreign Ministry said or did (or failed to say or do)with respect to the Sino-Indian border and specifically about the McMahon Line in the following months and years. It is high time that the main article was thoroughly reviwed on the basis of published documents about the Simla Conference of 1913-14 and the McMahon Line that emerged from it. Pidiji (talk) 02:47, 6 September 2012 (UTC)

I fixed the PRC reference. The British renounced the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention in 1921. Kauffner (talk) 07:31, 6 September 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for the PRC correction. To help improve the authenticity and therefore the credibility of the article, further corrections would be useful and I suggest a few for the section "Drawing the Line" - (1) Tawang is not "Tibetan territory" but is the site of an important Tibetan Lamaist monastery around which some estates of the landed gentry of Tibet came up. This was admitted by the Tibetan Plenipotentiary to the Simla Convention in 1913-14; (2) The point about the "Outer Line" along the Himalayan foothills is entirely erroneous as the Bengal Frontier Regulations of 1873 had an "Inner Line" more or less along the foothills (depending on the sector)as there were frequent clashes between the tribals of that area and the local cultivators, with looting and burning, and the Inner Line was an administrative measure to prevent any such clashes. The "Outer Line" was more or less according to the alignment given in the McMahon Line, as may be seen from the surveys conducted around that time and incorporated in the Survey of India map of 1874 that roughly covers the area between Longitudes 87 Deg. 50 mins. East to 96 Deg. East and Latitudes 34 deg. 20 mins North to 28 deg. 20 mins North;Tawang is shown at approx. 92 deg. 30 mins.Longitude, 27 deg. 30 mins. North.(3) It is true that Tibet refused to accept the Sikkim boundary drawn up between Britain and China and that really shows up that as sovereign or suzerain China could not make Tibet agree (irrespective of the merit or demerit of that boundary). (4) Younghusband did have a Treaty in 1904 with Tibetan officials with all the necessary seals (the Dalai Lama had escaped to Mongolia at that time, but that is a different story)and this Treaty was recognised in the subsequent Treaty between China and Britain with respect to the trading posts within Tibet and facilities for British officials manning the Trading posts (incidentally these facilities continued up to 1954, when independent India relinquished these posts in a fresh Treaty with PRC), (5) the pillage, looting and burning by the Chinese forces under Chou-Erh-feng in the eastern boundary areas on Tibet between 1910-12 was enough to make Tibet realise the usefulness of having peace and stability in that area and she now possibly felt that Britiain could play a moderating/mediating role - hence the Simla Conference in 1913. The principal aim of the Simla Conference was to settle the eastern boundary of Tibet with China in the middle of claims and counter-claims over that border. The rest is history. One could go on and on but it is requested that reliance may be made at least on Dr. Alastair Lamb, Dorothy Woodman and Margaret Fisher's books to give some solid credibility to the article and sections. Pidiji (talk) 02:20, 7 September 2012 (UTC)

Didn't Tawang pay taxes to Lhasa? That's about as much as "Tibetan territory" means. Granted that the local population is a related ethnic group rather than Tibetans per se.—Greg Pandatshang (talk) 13:35, 7 September 2012 (UTC)

As far as records indicate, the people in and around Tawang used to give donations for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and this was admitted as such in course of the Simla Conference of 1913-14 by Lochen Satra, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Tibet, and again later by the Tibetan authorities (prior to 1950. There are several books by scholars on the deliberations at Simla and later British-Tibetan exchanges. Such donations and gifts may be distinguished from taxes and tributes - Pidiji (talk) 02:44, 12 September 2012 (UTC)

Goldstein says in A History of Modern Tibet on page 307 that "In April 1938 ... Captain G. S. Lightfoot led a modest force to Tawang. He reported that the Tawang area north of the Se La pass was controlled by Tibet and that Tibetan officials collected taxes south of this area into the areas of Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang, whose inhabitants were Tibetan Buddhists of either Bhutanese or Mönpa stock." Earlier, on page 300, Goldstein concludes, "Unquestionably, then, prior to 1914 Tawang was under Tibetan control."—Greg Pandatshang (talk) 03:44, 12 September 2012 (UTC)

Usually when there are such claims and counter-claims being made, the balance of evidence has to be examined as also any understandings or clarifications accepted by both sides, here British India and later India, and Tibet, up to 1950. There are two aspects, one the donations, contributions, gifts etc. made by the local people for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and education and training of the lamas, and the other, some agricultural holdings by Tibetans near and around Tawang (it would be appreciated that apart from traditional and customary acceptance of the frontier, it had not been specifically designated or delineated - far less demarcated - in 1908) and the taxes if any imposed on them. That may have been the situation in 1908 when Capt. Lightfoot visited the area. However, in 1914 at the Simla Conference, this aspect of status of Tibetan landholders in Tawang was discussed and sorted out between Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra, the Tibetan Ambassador, by exchange of notes (as any authoritative account of the Simla Conference will show up) and this understanding was also accepted later by the Tsona Dzongpon of Tibet. Pidiji (talk) 01:27, 13 September 2012 (UTC)

Tibet accepted it

It was signed by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra on behalf of the Tibetan Government and was clearly accepted by the Tibetian government as per references.171.76.52.67 (talk) 21:59, 26 May 2017 (UTC)

It was signed, but there's condition for the agreement and the condition was not met. Please refer to the reliable source (author Tsering Wangdu Shakya is a Tibetan historian) and and understand the reason. Relevantsnippets from the book "Lochen Shatra's acceptance of the new border alignment in 1914 was not without conditions.", " Tibetans would concede to the new border on the condition that the British would secure Chinese acceptance of the Simla Convention, which would have in turn secured for Tibet a clearly defined border with China", "Since the British were not able to obtain such an acceptance, the Tibetans considered the line proposed by MacMahon invalid." Eipviongll (talk) 13:53, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

As per WP:NPOVthe grounds on which China is opposing is that Tibet was not sovereign to sign the accord nowhere does it state that Tibet invalidated the accord after they had signed it.China rejects the Simla Accord and the McMahon Line, contending that Tibet was not a sovereign state and therefore did not have the power to conclude treaties which Tibet signed and accepted.171.78.145.236 (talk) 17:03, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

Tibet or Lonchen Satra never issued a statement rejecting or invalidate the accord.Further the Dalai lama accepts to say Tibetans or tibet disputed it is wrong.171.78.145.236 (talk) 17:10, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 2 external links on McMahon Line. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added {{dead link}} tag to http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2017/stories/20030829001604900.htm
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080822215146/http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm to http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080822215146/http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm to http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm
• Added {{dead link}} tag to http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2017/stories/20030829001604900.htm

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 5 June 2024).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 03:11, 7 June 2017 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 3 external links on McMahon Line. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added {{dead link}} tag to http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?id=b5dab68p4rrp8fd8
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20060912194623/http://www.mssu.edu/projectsouthasia/history/primarydocs/Treaties/Tibet/Schedule1914.htm to http://www.mssu.edu/projectsouthasia/history/primarydocs/Treaties/Tibet/Schedule1914.htm
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20071013172913/http://hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2018/stories/20030912002104800.htm to http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2018/stories/20030912002104800.htm
• Added archive https://archive.is/20130118142756/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/natarajan.html to http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/natarajan.html

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 5 June 2024).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 09:00, 10 December 2017 (UTC)

External links modified (January 2018)

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on McMahon Line. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20120122230449/http://news.21cn.com/junshi/pl/2008/11/18/5490785.shtml to http://news.21cn.com/junshi/pl/2008/11/18/5490785.shtml
• Added {{dead link}} tag to http://www.kampanyarchivum.hu/files/300/8/3/10-3-106.html

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 5 June 2024).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 17:06, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

Notice for RfC about the definition of the McMahon Line

There is an RfC about the definition of the McMahon Line here. — MarkH₂₁^talk 09:28, 21 July 2020 (UTC)

Following the comments above, we should use the actual McMahon line as the lead image (I think the complete McMahon line is in two different maps). The two maps are at the bottom of the page currently. Chaipau (talk) 16:04, 19 August 2021 (UTC)

Addendum: The line of control today is not necessarily the McMahon line. Chaipau (talk) 16:18, 19 August 2021 (UTC)

Outer Line

1888 Survey of India map of India

Here is the Survey of India map of 1888, which counts as an official map of India. Where is the "Outer Line"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:52, 10 August 2021 (UTC)

The "Outer Line" is always the international boundary. In this case, the red line. Look for a spot called Odalguri just below the red line. Google search for "Udalguri". This was the trading center for goods that came down the Tawang track. In 1910, the outer and the inner lines were coincidental in the north and it ran along the foothills. The 1888 map agrees with the 1911 map in the main page as far as the boundary is concerned. Chaipau (talk) 00:38, 11 August 2021 (UTC)

Kautilya3 I have asked for a ruling on Neville Mawell's book at WP:RSN: [[12]]. Chaipau (talk) 00:41, 11 August 2021 (UTC)

We have lots of speculation and WP:SYNTHESIS going on. I would like to see a source state that the map shown on the Imperial Gazetteer is the Outer Line or Inner Line or whatever. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:49, 11 August 2021 (UTC)

"Inner lines" are inside the boundaries. That is why they are called "inner" lines. There was an inner line between Assam and Nagaland, for instance, which is not shown in the maps, except for maybe the "Eastern Bengal and Assam with Bhutan" map, where you could make out part of it. Please read Mehra p9-10 carefully. Chaipau (talk) 14:29, 11 August 2021 (UTC)

Ok, even granting that the line shown here is the "Outer Line", the map says "Boundary undefined" in 1888, whereas the sources claim that it was fully laid out in 1873 or 1875. So something still doesn't fit. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:59, 11 August 2021 (UTC)

Why should it fit? The British interest kept shifting and the boundary kept moving. 1873 was when the Inner Line came into being, so it is expected that boundaries were fixed for a while before things began moving again. The most dramatic display of this is the 1907 map and then the McMahon Line. This isn't much of a puzzle, really. Chaipau (talk) 10:08, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

1873/74 was also when the new Assam, a Chief Commissioner's Province, came into being. Earlier newly colonized regions were tagged under the Bengal Presidency. Chaipau (talk) 10:26, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

It is important to note that just to the east of Bhutan was the Tawang tract. Tawang was a part of Tibet but the people who lived there were Bhutanese who were influenced by Tawang Buddhism and not tribal people. The foot of the hill was a trading zone, called Kariapar duar, that was not wholly part of the Ahom kingdom. So this tract did not become a part of British India till about the 1840s. The main point is that not all those who lived north of the outer line were tribal people. Chaipau (talk) 16:30, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Yes, a separate paragraph on Tawang is needed. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:27, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Chaipau edits

Chaipau, I am afraid the edits you have been making to the lead bit by bit [13] are not satisfactory and do not follow what the sources state. For example,

• The region to the south of the McMahon Line was ungoverned tribal territory and did not become part of "British India" until 1940s. Nevertheless the British wanted to extend their influence there and exclude any foreign power. So the region formed part of the "British Raj" or "British Indian Empire" but not "British India".
• Secondly, the region south of McMahone Line also included Burma. So it was not all India. Another reason the term "British Raj" has been used here.
• The bits about "spheres of influence" was added precisely for this reason, supported by quotation from scholarly source. I cannot fathom why you removed it. (There might have been similar "spheres of influence" on the Tibetan side too, e.g., Monyul/Tawang, Pemako, Pome and Zayul, but these aspects have not been that well-studied.)
• I also can't see the need to replace "agreed" by "settled".
• That the "demarcation was the result of informal discussion between Charles Bell and Lonchen Shatra" is not stated in that form in any source. Certainly those discussions contributed a great deal to ironing out the issues, but it is the formal agreements that count. We do not know what discussions took place between McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, but we cannot jump to the conclusion that Bell's discussions were all that there were to it.
• I don't like the wording "even as the tripartite convention was on". This sounds like a yet another POV-ridden conspiracy theory. It is quite common for informal sub-meetings to be held in summit meetings for ironing out issues. And this particular summit meeting ran for more than a year! Numerous sub-meetings took place in between the formal sessions.
• I have already objected to the "in the north" wording for the Outer Line.

I should also say that you are also exhibiting a WP:Lead fixation on this page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 05:12, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: I should say that you are exhibiting WP:OWN. Combined with the fact that you know very little of the situation there (e.g. your confusion with the "Outer" and "Inner" lines, seen above) your efforts to block other edits has become a hindrance to developing the quality of this article.

• I do not understand your quibbles about "British India", "British Raj" etc. At the time the McMahon line was drawn, Burma was part of the "Indian Empire". [14]
• I did not remove any "sphere of influence" detail from the text. I do not see the details you have mentioned in the text in any form. These details go elsewhere, in any case, not in the lead sentence. "Sphere of influence" in the lead sentence looks to me like editorializing. First define what the McMahon line is and then mention what the intentions were (unfortunately, the intentions are not so clear).
• Again, I don't understand your quibble regarding "agreed" and "settled". I used "settled" following Mehra p 233 (The long and short of it was that by 25 March the 'Red Line' on McMahon's map had been settled), but the major point is that the McMahon line is defined as the "red line" settled on 25 March 1914. The lead that I used The McMahon Line is the demarcation between British India and Tibet settled between the respective plenipotentiaries Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on 24 March 1914 in Delhi amidst the 1914 Simla Convention. is in alignment with both RfC as well as Mehra p.233. Your preference, The McMahon Line is the demarcation line agreed between Tibet and British Raj as part of the 1914 Simla Convention, separating their respective spheres of influence in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar). OTOH has a number of problems. It specifies "spheres of influence" (leave contentious matters to later) and "northeast India" and "northern Myanmar" (these are post colonial formations---there was no northeast India then, just Assam).
• I agree that "even as the tripartite convention was on" could be seen as POV-laden, though it was used to specify that the McMahon line was a bipartite settlement (Mehra p233) in a tripartite convention. I shall reword it.

The above point brings us to the major problem with this article. As it is structured now, it looks like it is written in the context of the Sino-Indian War. Nearly every sentence in this article reads like it is trying to explain the war and it is making the article look like a revisionist essay. For example the sentence The Republic of China was not a party to the agreement,[3] but its representative had agreed the overall boundary of Tibet, which included the McMahon Line in the lead seems to suggest that China had accepted the McMahon line—which is not true because even though the Chinese plenipotentiary had initialed the map including the McMahon line, the Chinese government did not accept it. When McMahon drew the line on the map the war was still a half century away and the bigger concerns were Russia, China and Tea from the British perspectives and in this context the British tried to use Tibet as a buffer. The McMahon line was essentially a British line on a map, and it was the product of these British perspectives. Finally, it was the product of a series of discussions between Charles Bell and Lonchem Shatra, in which Tibet intriguingly gave up its claim to Tawang but continued to collect taxes. Unlike what you suggest, it is the Sino-Indian War which is giving this article the "tunnel vision".

I think I have covered all the points you have made. If you still insist on playing WP:OWN then we will have to go the 3O, RfC and DR route.

Chaipau (talk) 13:16, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

I suggest that we avoid discussions of "what it looks like" and just focus on facts first. There is no WP:OWN issue either. This article had existed long before I came upon it. I just fixed the lead to remove some of its ridiculous fallacies. The whole page needs to be rewritten but it is not going to happen in a day. (Also, I don't appreciate your bragging about your knowledge of the "Outer Line" for eternity. Yeah, perhaps I was wrong, but not in any consequential way. Arunachal is not Nagaland.)

• The difference between British India and British Raj are well-known and covered in their respective pages, and also debated on their talk pages respectively. Indeed, "British Raj" is the present day term for what was then called "Indian Empire". It should not be identified with "India" or "British India" without good reason.
• The "spheres of influence" are mentioned in the first sentence. Van Eekelen explained it using Mortimer Durand's words for the boundary in the northwest:

I was to try to induce him (the Amir) to stand back behind a certain line: that is to say, he was to agree that he would not interfere beyond a certain line. It by no means followed that we were to advance up to that line. We were, however, free to do so if we saw fit; he was not to interfere with us.

It is wrong to assume that the empires of yesteryear operated similar to modern nation-states.

• Regarding "agreed" vs. "settled", it is too early in the life of this article to quibble about such fine points. But do you see that "settled" suggests that the boundary was actually implemented on the ground, which wasn't really the case?
• The terms "northeast India" and "northern Burma" refer to the modern terminology. There is no need to get into the deep history of the Raj here. And, for your information, Assam was a "province" and Burma was an "autonomous province" in the period under discussion. Burma was designated as a separate colony in 1937.
• Whether the Republic of China had agreed or disagreed with the McMahon Line is not known with any degree of certainty. PRC today claims that it had rejected it but there is no evidence for it. The Chinese were concerned at that time about the border between the "Inner Tibet" and "Outer Tibet", not so much about the Arunachal area.

It is necessary to underline that the [Chinese] Minister's protest did not concern itself with the ML boundary: a graphic representation[8] bears out clearly that its preoccupation was with the contours which the Chinese wanted etched as between Inner and Outer Tibet.

We can't worry about this aspect right now, until the corresponding sections in the body are written.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:04, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

I brought up the Inner/Outer line incident to cut out the haughtiness you display—and not to brag as you suggest. I don't think your replies addressed the concerns I had regarding this article. I agree that the whole article needs rewriting. And a good place to start is the lead. I shall address it first. Chaipau (talk) 19:14, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

The lead is hardly a good place to "start". It is meant to summarise the body. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:59, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

By lead, I mean the lead sentence. Chaipau (talk) 21:06, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

I want to be careful here.

• The boundary is between Tibet and British India
• The agreement was between the plenipotentiaries McMahon and Shatra, and that was on 24-15 March 1914 in Delhi.
• Since we agree it is a boundary, there is no need to use such phrases as "spheres of influence" etc. I am removing this part and the citation. We can bring it up later when we need it.

Chaipau (talk) 22:23, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

I fail to see how deleting well-sourced content counts as being "careful". "Spheres of influence" is needed because neither side administered the Assam Himalayan territory at that time and for several decades afterwards. Removing it would amount to a misrepresentation of facts. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:44, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

As I mentioned in the edit summary, the lead paragraph is not the place to "qualify" the nature of the boundary. I think the second paragraph could be used to define the boundary in a little more detail and we should mention Tawang as well as the un-administered eastern portion.

I am not yet happy with the lead sentence, though I think it covers most of information it should contain. I am struggling with "is the boundary" for one thing.

Chaipau (talk) 23:52, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

References

Bibliography

• Mehra, Parshotam (15 May 1982), "India-China Border: A Review and Critique", Economic and Political Weekly, 17 (20): 834–838, JSTOR 4370923
• Van Eekelen, Willem Frederik (1967), Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, Springer, ISBN 978-94-017-6555-8
• Van Eekelen, Willem (2015), Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China: A New Look at Asian Relationships, BRILL, ISBN 978-90-04-30431-4

Lead

@Kautilya3: you moved back the "sphere of influence" sentence to the first paragraph, without giving a proper edit summary. If you object to my reason for moving it to the second paragraph please say so explicitly. I stated clearly why it should not be in the lead. Chaipau (talk) 21:30, 22 August 2021 (UTC)

And I have disagreed. It may be time to use WP:DR. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:33, 22 August 2021 (UTC)

We will do there, but I am still trying to work with you. We cannot improve this article by going to DR with every sentence. Chaipau (talk) 21:36, 22 August 2021 (UTC)

I would like to work with you as well. But your arguments are quite far from being decisive. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:06, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

What do you mean? I have given you my argument, but I haven't even heard yours—neither here nor in the edit summary. I would like to remind you of WP:LEADFIX and WP:UNRESPONSIVE. Chaipau (talk) 00:31, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

Your arguments are merely your personal opinions. "There is no need", "Lead paragraph is not the place" etc. They cannot trump the RS. I have also explained to you that the boundary remained unimplemented for several decades. So it was a notional boundary. It is in the nature of this particular boundary (and also the Durand Line in the northwest) and that feature of the line certainly belongs at the very top. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:56, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

OK, I feel that you do not care to listen either. I am not making an argument against the references you are using. What I am arguing for is that the lead paragraph should just lay out the facts and events around the McMahon line. The "spheres" of influence are comments made by British officers and these are part of the propaganda. This should be be part of the lead paragraph. I am afraid you are displaying WP:LISTEN issues as well. I am not disputing the RS you are providing in this case. Chaipau (talk) 02:47, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

Yes, you are disputing the RS when you call it propaganda whereas the sources do no such thing. Everything said by British officers doesn't become "propaganda". I have no idea what world you are living in. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:08, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

No, I am not disputing the citation. The reason it is propaganda is because there are alternative narratives which dispute these "intentions" which state that it was Chinese movement that triggered this "forward" policy. Such issues we should get into but not in the lead. The first paragraph should just deal with NPOV facts, contexts, notability and mention of major controversies (not litigate them), as laid down in MOS:LEAD. Chaipau (talk) 11:31, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

"to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries"

In this phrase from the sentence—"The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)"—the impression is that we are dealing with the two independent countries. British India and Tibet. But did the British at that point consider Tibet to be independent? It obviously did not (Mehra 1974, p29-30ff). Chaipau (talk) 11:48, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

The second citation (Mehra 1974, p225) makes quotes selectively and gives a wrong impression. The preceding paragraph given the context of why this particular arrangement was sought:

Somewhere in the middle of 1913, the Army Department in India submitted a ‘ Note on the Military Frontier on the North-east ’ wherein it endorsed, for most part, the Chief of the General Staff’s earlier recommendations. Opportunity, however, was taken to stress, inter alia, the maxim that a mountain-barrier is a ‘satisfactory’ military frontier, that owing to the Chinese disposition to expand in the direction of Burma and Assam, the frontier to the east of Bhutan was more important than to its west. Again, the ‘ideal’ to be aimed at in determining a frontier in mountainous country, was that

and then Mehra quotes directly:

the line chosen should follow some prominent geographical feature, preferably the main watershed of the mountain system and...to facilitate effective occupation if necessary, the communications upto the frontier should be such as to afford reasonable access to the line selected. A lateral communication running parallel to and a short distance to the rear of the frontier is also a considerable asset.

The intention of the British is thus clear - to check Chinese expansion. But this sentence gives the wrong impression that this was an arrangement between British India and Tibet merely.

Chaipau (talk) 13:37, 23 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) 13:40, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

"Countries" is the term used by Lord Crewe, the British Secretary of State for India. It does not necessarily imply "Independent".

Britain did regard Tibet as being independent in 1914, but I don't want to sidetrack the issue right now. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 04:58, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

And, oh, British India was a "country" as well, not an indepndent one. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 05:01, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

Replacing ellipses with text from source

Kautilya3 when you inserted the citation Mehra 1974, p225, the quote you cited had ellipses [15] The text you had omitted is crucial and it changed the entire meaning of the cite. This is the entire quote, with the part you left out highlighted:

there was no intention of 'administering' the country 'within the proposed frontier line' much less of undertaking 'military operations' in the area in question. And yet, as Chinese incursions at Hpimaw had demonstrated, it was 'desirable' to maintain some semblance of authority that could be backed by force, 'if necessary'.

As you can see, the entire meaning of this citation changes when we quote fully. I have changed the text to bring it in alignment with the full quote [16].

This is also a request to you not to cite selectively and misrepresent sources.

Chaipau (talk) 14:26, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

I don't see how the meaning has changed. Please feel free to explain it. Where is Hpimaw in the first place? And what happened there? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:51, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

You may google it and find out what happened. The operative part is that the British were concerned and were looking to protect the Northeastern parts (which had Tea). The McMahon line follows the recommendation of this military report - trace out the boundary along the watershed. Chaipau (talk) 16:21, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

It doesn't bother me whether the quotation is full or not full. But it is bothersome that you accuse me of changing the meaning of the quote, but can't explain how the meaning has changed. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:37, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

I obviously gave the change in meaning when I changed the text [17]:

• Your version: "The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries in the eastern Himalayan region"
• My version: "From the British point of view around 1913, the line was intended not to demarcate a boundary for administration, but to create a semblance of authority in light of Chinese incursions."

Are they same?

Chaipau (talk) 20:21, 23 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) 21:01, 23 August 2021 (UTC)

"Sphere of influence" in general meant something less than full administration. It could be a 'semblance of authority' or something even less, such as "external sovereignty" in one scholar's terminology. I already gave you the Mortimer Durand quote several days ago. So I don't see what you are banging on about.

The sphere of influence was formed sometime before 1910, but the Chinese incursions around that time brought it to the fore. See the Lamb's quote I added yesterday. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 04:55, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

You know very well what I am banging on about. But I shall not go into it. Just that after all your maneuvers you now have two citations that contradict each other seemingly supporting the same text, and both the citations were inserted by you. You are effectively trying to use Lord Crewe's words against Mehra's words. When you did this you effectively replaced what Mehra was saying by what Crewe was saying. Sphere of Influence has a specific meaning whereas Mehra is specific that the Army wanted to be able to go into these areas if the need arose—in 1913. What was the need for the Army to require that in 1913 if the "sphere of influence" was already established by 1910? Chaipau (talk) 11:44, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

Furthermore, Mortimer's quote you used presupposes a line for a "sphere of influence". There was no line before 1914, so there was no sphere of influence. The quote from Lamb, therefore, has to say (after you changed the quote) yet it was felt that they fell within the sphere of British influence. So the British felt they had a sphere of influence? I can see that you are struggling to get a citation to support the "sphere of influence" claim, from Crewe to Mehra to Lamb, and have not found a satisfactory one yet. Chaipau (talk) 17:35, 24 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) Chaipau (talk) 17:47, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

I am afraid all contradictions are within your WP:OR. The sources are quite clear that the Arunachal region was deemed to have been within the British sphere of influence, and this sphere was what was delimited by the McMahon Line (with the usual exception for the Tawang tract, which was a separate issue). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:46, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

We can take this to DR. Mehra quotes Crewe directly, according to you own citation: understands the Government of India to mean an agreement as to the spheres, at present undefined. On 23 October 1913, Lord Crewe considered the spheres to be undefined. You cannot have undefined spheres of influences. Chaipau (talk) 23:23, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

Yet more WP:OR. Spheres are fluid enough a concept that a region could be deemed to be included in it without knowing its boundaries. But the British did have an idea. And they needed to run it by the Tibetans and get their agreement before it could be laid down formally. That is exactly what the McMahon Line was (again with the notable exception of Tawang). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:41, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

Yet more fantasy. You are trying to create your own definition of a sphere of influence. The British sure did know what they wanted, but they did not have it till 24-25 March 1914. Spheres of Influence had to have a boundary, that is why Crewe says it was undefined on 23 October 1913. Look at the definition from the Encyclopedia Britanica - Sphere of Influence: The term may refer to a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from interference within the sphere of influence. It is in the latter, legal significance that the term first gained currency in the 1880s when the colonial expansion of the European powers in Africa and Asia was nearing its completion. The last stage of that expansion was characterized by the endeavour of all major colonial powers to carry on the mutual competition for colonies peacefully through agreed-upon procedures. Agreements on spheres of influence served this purpose. So if you are using sphere of influence, then you will need to have a boundary. BTW, the British did not have any influence in the Tawang Tract before 1914 (or even after for a while). That was why the boundary was important. Chaipau (talk) 01:57, 25 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) 02:21, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

I have added "hitherto undefined" to bring the sentence in alignment with Crewe's quote, where he says "at present undefined". Chaipau (talk) 11:12, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: if you disagree with the change I have made here we will go the DR route. Chaipau (talk) 13:33, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

I have no problem with that edit, even though I think it is quite unnecessary. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:08, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

OK, this is great progress. We will move on then. Chaipau (talk) 15:47, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: This part is problematic: "along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)". This is because there was nothing called Northeast India in 1914. In fact the definition of Northeast India, as we understand it now, depends on the McMahon line. In time, McMahon line came first and then Northeast India. Furthermore none of the citations mention this either. So I propose,the following sentence should be: "The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries, hitherto undefined, in the eastern Himalayan region." Do you have an objection to this? I have already made the changes [18]. Do you have a problem with that? Chaipau (talk) 16:15, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

No problem with that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:01, 25 August 2021 (UTC)

Comments

This entire article needs a rewrite but I am keen to hear what issues Chaipau take with the current version — arguably, the busiest page on my watchlist for last few days. TrangaBellam (talk) 21:17, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

This page is a battlefield. Needs NPOV-ing very badly. It will be trench warfare here. Will need a lot of reading. So not just a rewrite, but cleasing. Chaipau (talk) 21:41, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

We can tone down the war by focusing on just the ground facts for now. Chaipau (talk) 22:37, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai

An editor called Kauffner (long gone) added this sentence:

In the 1950s, India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet. Indian Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).

The citation was given was Maxwell's India's China War, which says only "But in the middle 1950s, when resentment and alarm at the assertion of Chinese authority in Tibet had died down, the policy and slogan of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai, or India-China brotherhood, became popular in India.." There is no mention of who promoted it. Moreover, the context makes clear that the slogan arose during Zhou En-lai's visit to India in 1954, after signing the Sino-Indian Agreement 1954.

The current text says:

In the 1950s, when India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai.

and the citation is gone. I suppose the weakening of Nehru as the originator of the slogan to "Indian government under Nehru" as the originator, is in the right direction. But the alleged involvement of Nehru in the slogan is still unsourced. A book review of Maxwell's book says:

He [Maxwell] has seriously and with significant data questioned the popular view that Prime Minister Nehru was taken in by the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai [Indians and Chinese are brothers] and did not wake up to the Chinese danger until it was too late.

This implies that Nehru was not a party to the slogan. We need more clarity on this issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:10, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

[To reply soon.] TrangaBellam (talk) 18:45, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Fait accompli

An editor Rigley added in 2010:

Zhou Enlai offered to accept the McMahon Line in 1956, but only in the context of border negotiations as equals, because simply accepting the British boundary would leave the stigma of the unequal treaty and hurt Chinese pride. But Nehru maintained his 1950 statement that he would not accept negotiations if China brought the boundary dispute up, hoping that "China would accept the fait accompli.

The term "fait accompli" appears in the source on page 100:

Upon further consultations with defense minister Krishna Menon and K. M. Pannikkar, Indian ambassador to China, Nehru decided that India would refuse to subject the border question to serious negotiation even if the Chinese did raise it,[4: Maxwell, "Un-negotiated Dispute", 50] in the hope that China would have no recourse but to accept the fait accompli. Preoccupied with consolidating their rule and socializing the economy, the Chinese Communist leadership did not pursue the boundary question until Premier Zhou Enlai raised that issue on his first visit to New Delhi in 1956.

The italised text following the citation to Maxwell is clearly the scholar's personal interpretation. I can't see how it can be attributed to Nehru's supposed intention, as if it were a fact. Did Nehru write anything or say anything that he was "hoping for a fait accompli"?

Secondly, Maxwell cannot be taken as the sole authority on the subject. He was a journalist that reported publicly available information, padded it with his own interpretations. Scholars who have done archival research state that K. M. Panikkar, who was India's ambassador to China, was instructed to raise the border issue with Zhou En-lai, but he found Zhou reluctant to discuss it. After Panikkar returned to India, he briefed Nehru and gave him his view that India had to wait until Zhou was ready to discuss, and this view was accepted (at least by Nehru). During the 1954 negotations, Zhou made it a point to underscore that only "matters that were ripe for settlement" would be negotiated, thereby implying that border would not to be discussed, and indeed it wasn't.

Regarding the 1956 discussions, what is claimed in the text is not in the source. Chung says:

According to Nehru’s subsequent account, Zhou Enlai informed him at their summit in 1956 that China was prepared to accept the McMahon Line.[6] As Zhou was to repudiate this position in a later correspondence with Nehru, it seems clear that his offer was forthcoming only in the context of comprehensive boundary negotiations between the governments.

Maxwell has explained that Zhou's 1956 observation was in the context of the border with Burma (Myanmar), when, in Nehru's account of this conversation, Chou En-lai told him that China had accepted the McMahon Line as the boundary with Burma because, although 'this line, established by the British imperialists, was not fair... it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.' This is all that we know. The rest is all scholars' interpreations.

As is clear, this was not an "offer", but rather a statement of policy, and Nehru honsestly believed that China would stick to it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:07, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

References