Talk:No Gun Ri massacre/Archive 12

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Proposed edit - Background 2

The Background section pre-August 2013 dealt with the infiltration subject perfectly well. After the Lead section established that refugee infiltration was the concern that led to the mass killing(s), the Background section elaborated by saying troops were being attacked from behind, reports spread that NKs were disguised as civilians and infiltrating via refugee columns, and Gen. Gay declared he believed most of the people on the roads were infiltrators.

But then supposed “examples’’ of infiltration were unnecessarily piled into the section, one after another, five separate elements, some weakly sourced, giving the article the look of one about irregular warfare in 1950 Korea, not about a massacre of unarmed civilians. And eventually two more, patently false “examples” were added, and there was a flat refusal to remove them. (Uniformed NK units that “infiltrated,” i.e., via gaps in the line, according to the official history, were transformed by this anonymous hand into soldiers disguised as refugees.) Other hands had to remove the bogus examples. The purpose was clear, especially when it was declared that every “example” that could be found would be inserted into Background.

Here’s a proposed edit to restore some balance, retaining “examples,” although I consider them unneeded and not necessarily solid:


With miles-wide gaps in their front lines, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns[1]: v  Reports told of uniformed and civilian-clad North Koreans emerging from behind and among a refugee crowd to attack 1st Cavalry Division troops at the central South Korean town of Yongdong, and of a refugee woman’s “pregnancy” turning out to be a smuggled field radio .[2][3]: 251  At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines.[4]

Research in declassified archives decades later found orders were being issued at this time to fire on Korean civilians.[5][6] Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees on the road were disguised enemy. [7] War correspondent O.H.P. King recalled in his memoirs that Gay in late July 1950 ordered all Koreans in the war zone shot on sight, as well as all rural structures burned down during the retreat. [8] William C. Kaluf, an officer with the division’s 7th Cavalry Regiment, would recall that on the night of July 24, 1950, the regiment’s first day at the war front, a staff officer radioed that Lt. Kaluf’s patrol should fire on a refugee group. He said he disregarded the order: “We had enough enemy to shoot at in uniform without shooting civilians.” [9]: 85  The next night, the 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion ,[nb 1] hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. [3]: 203  [10] It was later that day, July 26, 1950, that the dug-in troops saw an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, most from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
  3. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  4. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  6. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents ... show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield
  7. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
  8. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  9. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.
  10. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.

In addition to the rebalancing:

  • I remembered King’s memoir reporting Gay ordered civilians shot (cited in Conway-Lanz’s book, but I also have a copy of King’s).
  • I rediscovered the disclosure by Lt. Col. Kaluf, a young officer in Korea, about an order to shoot refugees before NGR, and realized it belonged here in the lead-up to the mass killing.
  • The 2nd Battalion panic of the night of July 25 appears later in the current article, in the midst of the disorganized, problematical “Events" section, out of sequence. It belongs in Background.

Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk)

The "pre August 2013" background section ignored all Nork irregular warfare which many WP:RS's cite as a significant factor in the events. Also, Bruce Cummings is too unrelated a source to be used for a topic like this.

Any direct quotations or snippets of document from the AP must be confirmed by another source considering their well documented misrepresentation of this material in the past.

An alternative text:

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[1] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [2] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[3] In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas[4]: 721–724 >. On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[4]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  2. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  3. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  4. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Ill deal with a follow up paragraph later. WeldNeck (talk) 02:29, 9 August 2015 (UTC)

Your uninformed smearing of The Associated Press is fooling no one. For the sake of this discussion, please cease and desist. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 14:42, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
WP:NPA -- things are going well so far. On a side note, Bruce Cumings' article cited in the paragraph deals with No Gun Ri, and I believe it is a good (if slightly outdated) source to use. GABHello! 14:47, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
I think we need to resort to Timothyjosephwood's "Hitler protocol": "I don't care if one of you is literally Hitler." GABHello! 15:19, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
The suggestion by WeldNeck is not appropriate as it brings in later events which could not possibly have any bearing on the NGR massacre. Binksternet (talk) 17:38, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
Binksternet All events In the above text pre date July 26th. WeldNeck (talk) 13:26, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

The article as of June 2013 had 10 sentences totaling 329 words dealing with the concern over infiltration. More than enough. (And I would sincerely urge all to read that article, already too long at 5,151 words, and compare its coherence and readability with the current one, which has added 1,238 words in order to shoehorn in various chunks of out-of-place POV material.)

Now my revised Background section above would expand the sentences dealing with the infiltration concern to 12 totaling 469 words, more than enough, and thensome.

And please step back and consider the factors, besides fear of infiltrators, that contributed to the No Gun Ri killings and that are not dealt with in this article:

  • Racism. There’s plenty of potential material on that, beginning with Gen. Gay’s description of the Koreans as “trash,” war correspondents’ observations about GIs’ open contempt for them, and NGR survivors’ own observations on the subject (“They played with our lives like boys playing with flies.”)
  • American ineptitude. The SK police, who could have handled the refugees, were evicted from the area by the 1st Cav Division; the Americans, simultaneously, were telling villagers to stay put, head south and go north. (Remember, the 5th Cav forced these villagers, who wanted to stay put, into the guns of the 7th Cav.)
  • American unreadiness. They intervened in a strange country without any Korean speakers, with experience only as “parade-ground soldiers,” and with a severe shortage of sergeants, an army’s backbone.

I'm not saying we need 1,000 more words on those subjects. I'm saying 12 sentences dealing with the infiltration concerns are plenty. After all, a woman with a hidden radio in Yongdong doesn’t justify killing hundreds of women and children at NGR. Iryna Harpy, GeneralizationsAreBad, Wikimedes, Irondome,Binksternet, Newzild, I hope we can discuss this expeditiously and get on to more challenging matters. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 21:09, 9 August 2015 (UTC)

I just noticed a potentially serious issue with the text as proposed by Mr Hanley:

At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines.[1]

References

  1. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)


The report citing the "unconfirmed" reports of civilian-clad infiltrators is actually referring to unconfirmed reports of Nork troops using US uniforms to infiltrate. This would also appear to contradict many other reports from the time frame in questions where Nork troops were found to have hid themselves among refugees. I would suggest Mr Hanley provide a copy of the report for all interested parties to evaluate. Since its a work of the US Gov't it could be uploaded on commons. WeldNeck (talk) 18:49, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
WeldNeck, please, you're not making sense. Don't you realize that by saying you "know" what the report says, you're saying you have the report? But what you "know" isn't true, and therefore ... Please, no time-wasters, no ploys. We've got enough to deal with. How about simply acknowledging that we don't need every example we can find of reported infiltration, that two is plenty? Or if you want to argue we need more than two, that we need four, five, six, in descending order of credibility .... do so. I'll then argue we need four, five, six war correspondents/historians saying the threat was exaggerated. And then we can decide and move on to meatier matters. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 19:18, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
I have a snippet of the report, not the entire thing which leads me to believe the report is talking about Nork troops using US uniforms to infiltrate. I stated that I believe I have accurately summarized its contents and that your representation is not accurate. Are you stating you cant or wont provide the report in its entirety? I dont think we need to provide every instance, but we do need to provide the most important (Taejon) and they most relevant. While some war correspondents/historians have stated the threat was exaggerated others do not. Leaving out one part of the argument is a violation POV. WeldNeck (talk) 20:11, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This little transparent game ("I have here behind my back a snippet, but you show me yours first") is getting us nowhere. More than that, of course, it's an outrage. Please, all, do you have issues, suggestions regarding the proposed edit? I hereby propose to sub it for the bottom of Background. Any objections? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:51, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This isnt a game, I only have a snippet because its from a library archive that only shows a small portion.
I do have issues with the edit. It largely not entirely) ignores reports of infiltration, doesnt mention guerilla activity at all, does not mention the Battle of Taejon and places too much emphasis on correspondents/historians who believe the threat was exaggerated to the exclusion of those that do not. WeldNeck (talk) 21:17, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
I don't know what you're reading, but it's not Proposed Edit - Background 2. Does anyone else have issues, objections? If not, I'll sub the passage tomorrow. And then we can plunge into "Events of 25-29 July, 1950" and begin by getting rid of that military dating convention. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 22:09, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
You'll sub it tomorrow? I think not. WeldNeck (talk) 22:42, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

3 general principles on the content of this part of the article

This one has gotten off to a rancorous start. Which is too bad, because I think most of us agree on the general outline of what needs to be said here:

1) There are reasons that the massacre occurred. I don't think all the reasons have been brought up yet, so I won't try to list them. The reasons should be included in the article.
2) There are mitigating factors. Chief among these is the refugee situation and the perceived and actual use of the refugee situation by North Korean forces. The mitigating factors should be included in the article.
3) Neither reasons nor mitigating factors are excuses. Killing civilians is still a crime. Ordering the deaths of civilians is still a crime. In covering the reasons and mitigating factors, the article should not be turned into an apologia.

There are many ways to write this section within the constraints of the above 3 principles. If everyone agrees to the above 3 principles, it might save a lot of time wasted on assumptions of bad faith. Are we all on the same page on these 3 basic principles? --Wikimedes (talk) 00:48, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

Could not have said it better. This is not going to go anywhere if attacks continue. More insults only add to a long, tired list of personal attacks hurled at this page by one editor or another. GABHello! 01:07, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
Agree with all three statements. My current issue with Haley's proposed texts is although he states infiltration by Nork forces and guerrilla activity has been addressed at length, it is only addressed with emphasis on downplaying the threat giving an undue weight to one particular POV, the AP's POV in this case.
Numerous examples can be found of the Nork army using refugees to mask regular forces, screen for offensives, infiltrate small groups of soldiers and provide cover for guerrillas. My text has only a handful of those deemed most relevant by secondary sources with the use of disguised KPA forces at Taejon to be the most significant in context of this discussion because its directly addressed in the Mussio letter. WeldNeck (talk) 13:32, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This particular portion of a source we have in the article is an excellent summary of my issues with the proposed changes

The AP version does warrant some level of criticism. The reporters relied heavily on the testimony of Korean witnesses and told the story primarily from the Korean point of view. While the Koreans were probably not intentionally lying, studies have shown that a person’s memory changes as they age, and memories of early childhood events in particular become distorted through time.2 While focusing on the Korean point of view, the AP does not clearly address the complexity of the battlefield. They downplayed reports of guerrillas intermingling with refugees as exaggerations by soldiers. They do not mention North Korean attacks that used the refugees to mask their movement as recorded by army records and press accounts on 24 July, 26 July, and 28 July. The AP does not mention guerrilla attacks in rear areas of the division during this period. On midnight 25 July, just an hour before 2-7 CAV’s panicked withdrawal, thirty guerrillas fired on the division headquarters at Kwan-ni. At 1415 hours on the 26th in the same area guerrillas wounded two American soldiers.3 Other documents report enemy snipers in rear areas and attacks on artillery units.4 The Division Artillery reported that the enemy was even using children as young as ten years olds to observe and report on positions.5

This is mostly a weight issue to me. WeldNeck (talk) 13:56, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

I trust everyone else reading the fat paragraph immediately above realizes that "guerrilla" does not equal "refugee." Indigenous leftist guerrillas were active in South Korea from years before the war; the U.S. lines had gaps of up to seven miles between units, an invitation to such surprises in the rear; and the entire American left flank was wide open, from the 1st Cavalry's leftmost north-facing positions, 80 miles west to the Yellow Sea. And the NK 6th and 4th Divisions were rolling down that western corridor. Who needs disguises?

Meantime, Irondome, seeing your comment below, I would ask whether others also fail to see the brilliance of my suggestion (immediately below this comment), of starting with a workable base, instead of an unholy mess of an article. I do think it's a more practicable approach. Meantime, while awaiting further discussion, I will note that Proposed Edit - Background 2 has stood there for more than 48 hours without real comment (well, the existing text was offered as an "alternative," but that wasn't necessary). If we're going to fix this article, I'd urge that we get down to it, and we discuss the proposal or take a vote. The proposal includes two supposed "examples" of infiltration via refugees, and two items suggesting the threat may have been exaggerated. I say go with it. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:03, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

Yes, of course, on the 3 General Principles. And again I would strongly urge all to read the article as of June 2013. It flows; it makes sense. Trying to untangle the current article is going to be a herculean task. In all seriousness, in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, I suggest instead taking the June 2013 version, tweaking such things as the Legal Framework section (which I believe initially caught Wikimedes' eye), updating casualties etc. as necessary, and then holding the 3 General Principles up against it and adding/rewriting as necessary. If we want to add a couple of supposed cases of infiltration, fine. If we want to elaborate on troops' unpreparedness, we have the material. If we want a whiff of the racism, it's at hand.
That way we have a good chance to get the job done, not just in a reasonable time frame, but get it done at all. (I, for one, must bow out from Aug. 20 to Sept. 5 because of travel.) Otherwise, here's what we face, and now's as good a time as any to lay out this extremely important point, in hopes of heading off a lot of grief:
Plowing on through the current article will present us countless times with a choice of "Cut or Bloat." This Background section is minor stuff. Everywhere one turns, if we go on, we will find the article seeded since 2013 with land mines, untruths, each of which, if left in, will require the insertion of a counterpoint. And, believe me, we're talking about the article ballooning with many hundreds of additional words, dealing with truly insignificant matters.
Please consider these concrete examples. It begins in the "Events" section with the Ha Ga Ri deaths. The NKs were not "advancing," there was no "crossfire," the official investigators jointly agreed American soldiers killed those people at Ha Ga Ri. Moving on to the pointless discussion of the "TACPs" etc.: There were air and ground controllers spotting targets in the area, there were myriad ways to call in air strikes, there were mission reports/summaries showing air attacks in the NGR area, and no one should care whether a couple of these surviving peasants thought some soldier radioed in the air strike. And all agree there was a strafing, although these needless sentences hint otherwise. And then we have Wenzel speaking of gunfire from the refugees. But Wenzel said otherwise in earlier interviews. And Carroll says he didn't order his men to fire; well, then, why does he say on videotape that he did give an order and, "We had to shoot them to hold them back"? And, by the way, regarding Wenzel and infiltrators, Carroll says he, Carroll, "went down there" and "there weren't any North Koreans in there the first day." Should we quote him? Believe me, I could go on and on with these pointless problems.
Should we go on forever, expending everyone's valuable time, cherrypicking men's changeable quotes, citing one unreliable source's misreading of documents to be countered by a correct reading, setting up endless point-counterpoints, larding on more confusion and hundreds of words, almost exclusively on matters that don't belong in the article in the first place, or that can be summarized in a single sentence?
Or do we go back to a sound, sensible version, acceptable then to all but one of those who cared, and build on that, using Wikimedes' excellent 3 General Principles and our own general common sense? Please think about it. And please, everyone, let's hear your thoughts. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 13:59, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
TCAP’s: All published sources agree there were no were none in the region during these events. The 7th didn’t have one, even though they requested one after their regimental HQ’s was attacked by the USAF. The 8th did have one, but was nowhere near the bridge. This is notable because many of the Koreans
As for Wenzel .. don’t mention something if you are unwilling to produce the source which the AP never has and has refused to when asked. There are currently WP:RS citing Wenzel’s statements.
As for Carroll, I suspect his statement to the AP has been taken out of context (something which the AP has been caught doing many times with respect to this story)

However, retired Col. Robert Carroll, who was a lieutenant on the scene at No Gun Ri, tells CNN he is convinced no slaughter of civilians took place. He called the allegation "selective and imaginative memory on the part of a lot of people." Carroll said the orders he received, while ordering troops to fire on anyone trying to cross the front lines, also urged discretion in the case of women and children. "'Use discretion' was part of that order," he said. "We used discretion. We did not fire automatic weapons. There was a few riflemen fired at them when they came around the bend. I stopped that. I personally stopped all the firing. "If there was any firing at those (people), it had to be later in the day, after I left. And somebody would have countermanded that order," he said. "We were not using our machine guns except when we were under attack because we were short on ammunition," Carroll said. "We had not been resupplied; we had been moving, retreating, falling back for about a week. So that guy is dreaming."

Your pleas to revert back to a “sound, sensible version” continues to show ownership issues which is why I have not withdrawn the ArbCom request. WeldNeck (talk)


Thank you for the further concrete examples of what lies ahead if we plow on.

Irondome once suggested starting from scratch, with a fresh article, an idea that has obvious merit. But I would think that would be much more time-consuming than taking an earlier, largely satisfactory version, critiquing it, updating it and applying Wikimedes' 3 General Principles (sounds like a Greek math theorem), something that gives us a framework for what the article must do. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:19, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

Apologies for not being on line for the past 48 hrs. I would fully agree with the 3 principles, and plough on. Let us deal with the points that we can broadly agree on in a timely fashion, and leave the real tough stuff to the last, within a framework of working section by section. We could list and put aside the most intractable issues, and address them at the end of the process. Something like Section two (for example) major controversies. This approach will speed things up. I suspect the majority of material has broad consensus. Lets deal with that first, instead of increasing our efforts, time and blood pressure levels on small stuff. Irondome (talk) 16:33, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

A wild editor appears

My apologizes to all involved. Unfortunately I have been moved to the periphery of this review. My schedule has gone from consistent night/evening shifts where I have nothing to do but this, to total insanity, including weeks in the field where I barely have cell service. Also unfortunately, this moves forward so quickly it is difficult to keep up even if one is gone for several days. Thanks to everyone who has kept this going in my absence. I wish I could say my life will organize itself soon, but it's anybody's guess.

So as penance, here is my best attempt to piss off both sides of the debate and cut all the fat from both proposals. This is a background section; it should, as quickly as possible, orient the reader to the situation with the absolute minimum of extraneous information not directly relevant to the topic of the article. So let the flame war begin, or cordial compromise, you know...whatever.

With miles-wide gaps in their front lines, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind US forces suffered from rear attacks, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns[1]: v  (Note 1)

Reports told of uniformed and civilian-clad North Koreans emerging from behind and among a refugee crowd to attack 1st Cavalry Division troops at the central South Korean town of Yongdong, and of a refugee woman’s “pregnancy” turning out to be a smuggled field radio. ...engaging in combat at the Battle of Yongdong, the Battle of Taejon, and conducting reconnaissance operations. [2][3] Note 2

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[4] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [5] Note 2

In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas Note 3

At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines. However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports. [6] Note 4

Research in As a result, declassified archives decades later found orders were being issued at this the time to fire on Korean civilians.[7] Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees on the road were disguised enemy. [8] War correspondent O.H.P. King recalled in his memoirs that Gay in late July 1950 ordered all Koreans in the war zone shot on sight, as well as all rural structures burned down during the retreat. [9] William C. Kaluf, an officer with the division’s 7th Cavalry Regiment, would recall that on the night of July 24, 1950, the regiment’s first day at the war front, a staff officer radioed that Lt. Kaluf’s patrol should fire on a refugee group. He said he disregarded the order: “We had enough enemy to shoot at in uniform without shooting civilians.” [10]: 85 Note 5

The next night, The 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion ,[nb 2] hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. [3]: 203  [11] It was later that day, July 26, 1950, that the dug-in troops saw an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, most from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.Note 6

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
  3. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  4. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  5. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  6. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  8. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
  9. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  10. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.
  11. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  • Note 1: Tightening
  • Note 2: Getting my pound of flesh. Link to the main articles on Yongdong and Taejon; no reason to go any deeper. No reason to commit any words to the one "pregnant" "woman". Get used to modern combat. This kind of thing is as common place as saying that combatants in Iraq or Afghanistan used IEDs. Just link to the reference and point out the important issue: namely, they were engaged in recon ops. Also the capture of this one general is not relevant unless he himself was involved in NGR, which it does not appear he was.
  • Note 3: There is no need to list every hardship the troops had to endure simply because we can find a source for it. This goes into the same category as ammo shortages or Russian air support. It's simply more information than the reader needs to understand NGR.
  • Note 4: The core issue seems to be that some people said A while others said B. We don't need to specify that PFC Snuffy at Camp Carroll issued a report that a search from 0900 to 2100 on 21 August returned no results.
  • Note 5: Same as Note 4 really. Just get to the point. References are there for people who want to dig deeper. If it's super important but only tangentially related to NGR, then make a separate article like Infiltration by North Korean assholes or Genocidal idiots during the Korean War, and then link to them. Too much WP:COATRACK.
  • Note 6: The first sentence is actually directly relevant to the article. Remove "the next day" because this is not a novel. The last sentence just seems like bloat that is mostly loaded or overly colorful language: "later that day", "dug in", "throng"...and is unsourced to boot. I'm not sure I care what villages they were from. And "most" is a quantitative statement (i.e. more than 50%).

So when we take all this together we get:

With gaps in their lines, US forces suffered from rear attacks, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns, engaging in combat at the Battle of Yongdong, the Battle of Taejon, and conducting reconnaissance operations.[1]: v [2][3][4][5] However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports.[6] As a result, declassified archives later found orders issued at the time to fire on Korean civilians.[7][8][9][10]: 85 

The 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion, [nb 3] hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. [3]: 203  [11]

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
  3. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  4. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  5. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  6. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  8. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
  9. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  10. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.
  11. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.

Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:06, 13 August 2015 (UTC)

Two issue from my persepctive
1. However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports.. This isnt true in this instance. The report referenced (I will post a copy of it to commons in a few days) refers to KPA soldiers and guerrillas using US uniforms to infiltrate.
2. hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, Appleman does not call the breakthrough rumors false.
3. As a result, declassified archives later found orders issued at the time to fire on Korean civilians. I would like this to be more specific. The ROE's for refugee control might deserve an entire section to themselves, but it needs to be stated that lethal force against refugee groups was a last option after verbal orders and warning shots. WeldNeck (talk) 18:11, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
Good work, Timothyjosephwood. I'm a big fan of cutting the fat in the background section. Nothing should stop the reader from quickly understanding what happened at No Gun Ri. Binksternet (talk) 18:32, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
WeldNeck To point 1: NBD. Change to "US Army reports conflicted" or something similar. Point 2: NBD remove "false". Point 3: Let's be serious now. I understand you're prior service. No idea if you're a combat veteran or not, but the inclusion of the ROE is at best a distraction. When the ROE says "Don't shoot these fuckers until they almost shoot you in the head", and your CO says "shoot these fuckers they're about to shoot your in the head," the decision is pretty clear. Some paper drafted by some bureaucrat in DC doesn't make everything better. The paper in DC is at best a footnote, the orders issued by the CO is a subtitle, the actions taken by people on the ground hoping to get home to their children is the main freaking headline. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:46, 14 August 2015 (UTC)
Very nice to see you back, TJWood. Do you promise never to leave us again?
On second thought. ...
At this rate we'll end up with a bite-sized article that will leave readers wondering what this No Gun Ri thing was all about. Some of what you've written would need clarifying, such as the reference to intell reports. But at another level, although the trimming works in places, you've deleted material very relevant to NGR, most worryingly dropping the fact that Gen. Gay (incredibly) declared half the refugees on the roads were infiltrators, and ordered civilians shot. Couldn't be more relevant: He was commander of the division that shot the NGR refugees.
The joy of communal editing: Many moons ago I had to cajole an editor out of identifying and describing the railroad line under which the refugees were killed. Now you don't even want to identify their home villages. They should be named; in fact, at some point the article should feature a map showing the locations and sequence of events.
By the way, you may or may not be aware that a charge sheet has been filed against me at ArbCom by one of our merry crew. The hanging judges are pondering my fate. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:39, 13 August 2015 (UTC)

Before the consolidation of the Pusan Perimeter in early August 1950, gaps between US units allowed the KPA to infiltrate soldiers and guerillas dressed as peasants among the large groups of refugees[1]: v [2], described as “the single greatest headache to us forces”. [3]: 10  KPA infiltrators played a large role in the Battle of Taejon [4], Battle of Yongdong [5], and several other notable incidents in mid to late July.[6]: 199 . North Korean forces had also drove large columns of refugees towards US positions in preparation of attack. .[7] While the overall threat of KPA infiltrators may have been overstated [8] the threat led to engagement rules authorizing US forces to fire on refugee groups if they approached US lines and did not respond to orders to stop or warning shots. The 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion, [nb 4] hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. [6]: 203  [9]

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ John Osborne. From the Orient. Life Magazine. August 21, 1950
  3. ^ John Beebe, Beating the Guerilla Military Review December 1955:
  4. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  5. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  6. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  8. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  9. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.

I dont want to keep throwing out proposed edits .. but here's another try that I think might satisfy everyone here. I believe all points are covered in the proportion they warrant and the text is tightened up quite a bit. WeldNeck (talk) 21:35, 13 August 2015 (UTC)

This just seems like a lot of extraneous information. This is not a book on NRG; it's an article. It should not make the reader into a subject matter expert; it should take a completely ignorant reader, make them into a generally competent reader, and give them sources to follow up if they want to dig deeper.
The "single largest headache" comment is editorializing. This should only be included if it is established to be thoroughly mainstream...as in, a Joint Chief said it, or the President, or the Sec of the DoD. "Several other notable incidents" is vague to the point of meaninglessness and adds nothing. Citation 8 is a citation within a citation, and, while it might be permissible in a junior term paper, is generally poor. Also, I'm generally wary of the use (and my own use) of "US forces" as opposed to "UN forces", because, you know, that's officially what it was. The use of "large" is vague to the point of meaninglessness. Quantify it or don't include it.
I feel that, by and large, this proposal is saying "so you removed all this other extraneous content, but what about this other extraneous content?" Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:07, 14 August 2015 (UTC)

Counter 1 (revised)

In response to Wikimedes’ two points below – seeking certainty on infiltration episodes, and questioning the “anachronism’’ of mentioning “decades later” research – I revise my counter-proposal thusly:

  • The infiltration reports and rumors have varying degrees of credibility, none 100 percent. To me, the simplest, best solution, saving words as well, is a quick sentence telling of the reports, losing the sentence skeptical of the reports, and leading immediately to a sentence saying these concerns led to “shoot” orders.
  • I feel the “decades” time span is needed, now tied to “Secret” classification, so the reader understands these orders were long hidden and, as now noted in this revision, were illegal.

With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns. [1]: v  Because of these concerns, orders were issued to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas, a violation of the laws of war, which prohibit indiscriminate targeting of noncombatants. .[2] [3] Such orders, classified “Secret,” were found decades later in declassified U.S. archives. [4] Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be “enemy agents,” a U.S. war correspondent and U.S. diplomat recalled in their memoirs. [5] [6] On the night of July 25, that division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 5] hearing a rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the central South Korean village of No Gun Ri. .[7]: 203  [8] Later that day, July 26, 1950, these troops saw hundreds of refugees approaching, many from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.[9]: 90, 116 

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  3. ^ "Korean vets could have been court-martialed but not today, experts say". The Associated Press. 1999-10-02. American soldiers sent to Korea a half-century ago were issued a palm-sized booklet telling them the Hague Conventions of 1907 forbid targeting civilians. 'Hostilities are restricted to the armed forces of belligerents,' it said.
  4. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents recently found in the U.S. National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield
  5. ^ Noble, Harold Joyce (1975). Embassy at War. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 152. ISBN 0-295-95341-1.
  6. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  7. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  8. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  9. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.

Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:52, 14 August 2015 (UTC)

It looks like you're honing in on an acceptable version. I'm a bit out of my depth here on the events themselves, but I do have two suggestions:

  • Avoid anachronisms: If orders were given to fire on civilians, at this point in the article, just say so. It's unnecessary, in this section, to say that these orders were rediscovered decades later.
  • If there were actual cases of infiltration prior to the No Gun Ri Massacre, the article should say so once without qualification ("word spread of", "reports of"). Otherwise the article implies that no such infiltration took place.--Wikimedes (talk) 06:58, 14 August 2015 (UTC)
In addition to WM's comments (which are correct): "Sometimes" is vague and unencyclopedic. The entire laws of war line is a WP:COATRACK. The entire third sentence adds nothing at all. The fourth sentence should either be generalized because it was a normal event, or it should be removed because one guy saying one thing isn't really that big of a deal (in the largest proxy war since WW2). Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:14, 14 August 2015 (UTC)
My comments:
  • "Such orders" sentence does not seem to really fit, so I suggest either finding a way to integrate it into another sentence or moving it to another paragraph on orders in general.
  • Maybe a couple of other examples of orders given, just to show that it was extending beyond the 1st Cav? There are plenty to choose from. I can get some more together. Maybe also include the other 1st Cav orders given. (Perhaps quote the war diary?)
  • Change sentence 4 to, "Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be 'enemy agents', according to a U.S. war correspondent and a diplomat."
  • I have no issue with the "laws of war" line, although it's a bit Coatrack-y. GABHello! 22:42, 14 August 2015 (UTC)

Counter 1 (Revision 2)

Revising in response to TJWood and GAB (above):

  • ”Sometimes” is gone; the “Such orders” sentence is gone, and instead “classified” is placed before the first mention of the orders (in hopes the reader will deduce these were not widely known until years later); and the diplomat/correspondent attribution is smoothed out.
  • Just as a mention of the orders is needed here, to give the reader an inkling of what’s behind the events to follow, the reader needs the briefest mention of the laws of war (now tightened), or otherwise he/she will be left wondering through several sections to follow, Is what they’re doing legit or not?
  • The logical flow of the sentences is clear: Gay gives an order to shoot civilians, one of his units faces refugees, and (immediately in the section to follow) his unit shoots refugees. Gay is much more than just one guy.
  • GAB’s inclination to cite more orders is understandable; they’re powerful. But I say only this token mention (a very pertinent one, with Gay) is desired in Background, a quick setup, so we get to the action quickly. Later in the article, the reader sees some specific other orders and policies emerging from the archives.


With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns. [1]: v  Because of these concerns, classified orders were issued to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas, a violation of the laws of war prohibition on targeting noncombatants.[2][3] [4] Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be “enemy agents,” according to a U.S. war correspondent and U.S. diplomat.[5] [6] On the night of July 25, that division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 6] hearing a rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the central South Korean village of No Gun Ri. .[7]: 203  [8] Later that day, July 26, 1950, these troops saw hundreds of refugees approaching, many from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.[9]: 90, 116 

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  3. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents recently found in the U.S. National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.
  4. ^ "Korean vets could have been court-martialed but not today, experts say". The Associated Press. 1999-10-02. American soldiers sent to Korea a half-century ago were issued a palm-sized booklet telling them the Hague Conventions of 1907 forbid targeting civilians. 'Hostilities are restricted to the armed forces of belligerents,' it said.
  5. ^ Noble, Harold Joyce (1975). Embassy at War. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 152. ISBN 0-295-95341-1.
  6. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  7. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  8. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  9. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.

I still think the laws of war reference is a WP:COATRACK, introduces bias, and should be removed. Two reasons:

  • There is no reason to assume the reader is either a complete idiot or a sociopath. Compare "Mr. Jones shot and killed Mr. Miller, a violation of the Vermont state law prohibiting murder." What it says is "Mr. Miller did this bad thing, and in case you didn't get it, this bad thing was really bad". Let's assume that the reader is a relatively normal person and as such, understands that killing civilians is a no-no.
  • See Perfidy. Both sides violated the laws of war. The only way to balance the bias in this WP:COATRACK is to add even more coats about how feigning non-combatant status is also a violation of the LOW. Alternately, we could remove the rack to begin with and, again, assume that the reader is not a sociopathic idiot. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 14:02, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
As a sociopathic idiot, I take offense, but I'm going to defer in this case. GABHello! 14:12, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
Strongly disagree on TJW's points. This is war, not a Vermont sidewalk. The “relatively normal person” knows a hell of a lot of killing goes on in war, including of civilians, and it’s considered legal (collateral damage in bombing etc.). Here we’ve just laid out a rationale for killing civilians. The reader should not be held in suspense as to whether this is countenanced or prohibited under international standards. How can it be “bias” to explain the relevance to NGR of a legal proscription? And how can a brief phrase about that highly relevant proscription “treat the nominal subject as if it were an empty coat-rack… obscured by the ‘coats.’” We need to establish the legal framework of the massacre at some point (and not the legal framework of NK infiltration; that’s another article). And I think these few words are a good way to do it, just as we note with a few words in this section that kill orders were issued, so the reader isn’t left wondering in the next section, Wow, why did they start killing these people? Charles J. Hanley (talk) 14:54, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
Charles J. Hanley It is biased, in a paragraph where both sides are described as committing war crimes, to explicitly point out that what one side is doing is a crime while saying nothing about the other. Perhaps it would be more accurate an analogy to say "Mr. Miller had broken into Mr. Smith's house, stolen his stereo, and Mr. Smith shot and killed him, a violation of the law against murder." They're both crimes. Describing Mr. Smith's actions explicitly as a crime while ignoring that what Mr. Miller did was also a crime does nothing but emphasize Mr. Smith and minimize Mr. Miller. The options to ensure a WP:NPOV is to either describe both actions as war crimes or neither.
The substance of my Mr. Smith example is irrelevant. What is relevant is the wording. The case is the same when comparing any two things that share a quality, but where the quality is only pointed out for one of them, emphasizing the one and minimizing the other. "For my birthday, Joey got me a three week old dead dog. Tina got me a literal bag of horse shit, which smelled very badly." This implies that the dead dog was somehow less smelly because the horse shit warranted mentioning and the dog didn't. In the article, both actions referenced are war crimes; you either point them both out or you point out neither. Compare the inverse: pointing out that dressing as non-combatants is a war crime, and conveniently omitting that killing civilians is as well. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:32, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
As a side note, is there any guidance on Cite 9, linking to The Bridge at No Gun Ri as if it was a link to the book? I guess we could call WP:EGG. I certainly expected to be taken to google.books. May also be a violation of self-promotion. Thoughts? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 14:23, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
WP:SELFCITE reads: "Using material you have written or published is allowed within reason, but only if it is relevant, conforms to the content policies, including WP:SELFPUB, and is not excessive. Citations should be in the third person and should not place undue emphasis on your work. When in doubt, defer to the community's opinion." GABHello! 14:30, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
GAB, no, what I meant was that the link in the citation leads to the WP article about the book and not to the book itself. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 14:35, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
Ah. My mistake, I was replying to the part on self-promotion. It's probably much more helpful to include the Google Books link. GABHello! 14:39, 16 August 2015 (UTC)

A side note from me: I see that, at the moment, one used copy of the SK “Review and Restoration” committee’s book is for sale at Amazon, if anyone’s interested in some light beach reading. Besides its own inquest-like work identifying victims, the committee summarizes the entire history of the No Gun Ri case and investigations, in English, of course. (The SK 2001 investigative report is only briefly summarized, not reprinted.) Charles J. Hanley (talk) 11:59, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Thanks. With luck, I'll have Suhi Choi's "Embattled Memories" within a few weeks. GABHello! 13:11, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
By the way, her book's title isn't referring directly to NGR, but to the different ways the Korean War is memorialized at various sites. She has two chapters on NGR, with considerable material from her interviews with victims. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 14:09, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

I seem to be missing something. Were the orders "classified" at the time they were issued or at the time of the massacre? (If so, then how were they transmitted to front line soldiers who didn't have security clearances?) If they were later classified as part of a coverup, this would probably be better dealt with in the Aftermath section.--Wikimedes (talk) 16:52, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

All such operational documents were routinely classified "Secret" from the time of issuance. It was SOP, not specific to NGR, and so there's no suggestion that this was part of a cover-up. The Korean War documents began to be declassified in the 1970s, and that was still going on in the 1990s. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:43, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Counter 1 (Revision 3)

One more go at it...

With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were attacked from behind suffered attacks on rear units and activities and reports spread that by disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns. Note 1 [1]: v  Because of these concerns, classified orders were issued to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas. , a violation of the laws of war prohibition on targeting noncombatants. Note 2[2][3] [4] Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be “enemy agents,” according to a U.S. war correspondent and U.S. diplomat.[5] [6] On the night of July 25, that division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 7] hearing a rumor Note 3 of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder Note 4 from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the central South Korean village of No Gun Ri. .[7]: 203  [8] Later that day, July 26, 1950, these troops saw hundreds of refugees approaching, many from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.[9]: 90, 116 

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  3. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents recently found in the U.S. National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.
  4. ^ "Korean vets could have been court-martialed but not today, experts say". The Associated Press. 1999-10-02. American soldiers sent to Korea a half-century ago were issued a palm-sized booklet telling them the Hague Conventions of 1907 forbid targeting civilians. 'Hostilities are restricted to the armed forces of belligerents,' it said.
  5. ^ Noble, Harold Joyce (1975). Embassy at War. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 152. ISBN 0-295-95341-1.
  6. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  7. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  8. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  9. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.
  • Note 1 - "Were attacked from behind" just screams that it was written by a civilian. It sounds like something from a Michael Bay film. Changed to reflect the language used in the report that is cited. BTW thank you to whomever for uploading the full text to Wikisource.
  • Note 2 - See above rationale for LOW reference introducing a biased WP:COATRACK
  • Note 3 - The source provided does not seem to support the language of "a rumor", implicitly casting doubt as to whether or not there was an actual breakthrough.
  • Note 4 - I don't see in the source where it indicates that this was a route or a disorderly retreat.
@Timothyjosephwood: We can put in Donghee Sinn's 2009 conference paper to support this: "[2nd Battalion] soldiers retreated to No Gun Ri in disarray..." (page 7). GABHello! 19:32, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
  • Note 5 - Changed cite book template on cite 9 to refer to the books.google link and not the wiki page for the book. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:56, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
  • Note 6 - The US Diplomat and War correspondent for Cites 5 and 6 should be WP:ATTRIBUTED, as in, US Diplomat John Smith and war correspondent Jane Doe.

So we end up with this:

With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces suffered attacks on rear units and activities by disguised North Korean soldiers infiltrating refugee columns.[1]: v  Because of these concerns, classified orders were issued to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas.[2][3] [4] Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be “enemy agents,” according to a U.S. war correspondent and U.S. diplomat.[5] [6] On the night of July 25, that division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 8] hearing of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the central South Korean village of No Gun Ri. .[7]: 203  [8] Later that day, July 26, 1950, these troops saw hundreds of refugees approaching, many from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.[9]: 90, 116 

References

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  3. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents recently found in the U.S. National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.
  4. ^ "Korean vets could have been court-martialed but not today, experts say". The Associated Press. 1999-10-02. American soldiers sent to Korea a half-century ago were issued a palm-sized booklet telling them the Hague Conventions of 1907 forbid targeting civilians. 'Hostilities are restricted to the armed forces of belligerents,' it said.
  5. ^ Noble, Harold Joyce (1975). Embassy at War. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 152. ISBN 0-295-95341-1.
  6. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  7. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  8. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  9. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.

Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:56, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Looks good. As for the first sentence, could we potentially reword it to something like, "With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces suffered from attacks on rear units by disguised North Korean soldiers infiltrating refugee columns?" Or is the "activities" part referring to something else? If so, then we ought to clarify that. GABHello! 18:27, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
The "activities" is the wording used in the source. It's not going to keep me up at night if it isn't included. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:36, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Regarding two major issues:

  • The article even in its current sad state makes clear that the U.S. No Gun Ri Review is a highly unreliable source, in view of its suppression of countless documents and testimony, and its nonstop “spinning” on page after page. The bias is self-evident: This is the alleged perpetrator investigating itself.
  • Therefore, to have WP say flatly in the first sentence that U.S. troops were attacked from the rear by disguised infiltrators with refugee groups, because the USNGRR says so, is wrong.
  • The very few available stories of refugee infiltration range in credibility from flimsy to a single newspaper report that is not corroborated by a unit document. Even the one that appears in a unit document, of the “pregnant” lady with the radio, is qualified as a “reported incident.”
  • The solution is simple: Since it’s not the veracity of the reports that’s at issue anyway, but the concern they generated, the first sentence is better phrased, “With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were attacked from the rear, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns.” Any number of reliable sources could be cited.
  • The second issue is the laws of war: Are you saying, TJW, that any mention in the article of how the LOW apply to NGR would be a show of bias?

Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 19:17, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

If "reports" is more correct it can be included. But generally, per WP:ALLEGED, words like this that implicitly cast doubt on veracity should be avoided. As to the second issue, I'll simply repost my reply from above. It's probably better anyway to keep things flowing in a logical order.
It is biased, in a paragraph where both sides are described as committing war crimes, to explicitly point out that what one side is doing is a crime while saying nothing about the other. Perhaps it would be more accurate an analogy to say "Mr. Miller had broken into Mr. Smith's house, stolen his stereo, and Mr. Smith shot and killed him, a violation of the law against murder." They're both crimes. Describing Mr. Smith's actions explicitly as a crime while ignoring that what Mr. Miller did was also a crime does nothing but emphasize Mr. Smith and minimize Mr. Miller. The options to ensure a WP:NPOV is to either describe both actions as war crimes or neither.
The substance of my Mr. Smith example is irrelevant. What is relevant is the wording. The case is the same when comparing any two things that share a quality, but where the quality is only pointed out for one of them, emphasizing the one and minimizing the other. "For my birthday, Joey got me a three week old dead dog. Tina got me a literal bag of horse shit, which smelled very badly." This implies that the dead dog was somehow less smelly because the horse shit warranted mentioning and the dog didn't. In the article, both actions referenced are war crimes; you either point them both out or you point out neither. Compare the inverse: pointing out that dressing as non-combatants is a war crime, and conveniently omitting that killing civilians is as well. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:32, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
I disagree 100 percent with the logic. But the LOW can wait, and be raised in a later "legal framework" section. Now, give me a moment to cite better sources for that first sentence, and post a proposal that I hope we can go with. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 19:58, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Counter 1 (Revision 4)

This rewords the first sentence and cites better sources for it. It also goes with TJW's deletion of the laws of war, and eliminates the source for that, which was inadvertently left in his Revision 3. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:17, 17 August 2015 (UTC)


With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were attacked from the rear, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns. [1]: 131, 158, 202  [2] Because of these concerns, classified orders were issued to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas.[3][4] Among those issuing the orders was 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, who deemed Koreans left in the war zone to be “enemy agents,” according to a U.S. war correspondent and U.S. diplomat.[5] [6] On the night of July 25, that division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 9] hearing of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the central South Korean village of No Gun Ri. .[1]: 203  [7] Later that day, July 26, 1950, these troops saw hundreds of refugees approaching, many from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.[8]: 90, 116 

References

  1. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  2. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13.
  3. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  4. ^ Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents recently found in the U.S. National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.
  5. ^ Noble, Harold Joyce (1975). Embassy at War. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 152. ISBN 0-295-95341-1.
  6. ^ King, O.H.P. (1962). Tail of the Paper Tiger. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. pp. 358–359.
  7. ^ Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
  8. ^ Hanley, Charles J.; Choe, Sang-Hun; Mendoza, Martha (2001). The Bridge at No Gun Ri. New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0-8050-6658-6.

I can get on board with this with the exception of the use of "classified". Per the discussion above, if orders were routinely classified, then specifying that it was classified adds nothing but a false sense of "this was super secret and they totally wanted to cover it up because bad people" instead of "it was war and everything was classified because war". Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:59, 17 August 2015 (UTC)

Rather than revisit that discussion (the original longer formulation was intended to inform the reader that these were not discovered until decades later), take it out. We'll get back to that later, just like LOW. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 21:28, 17 August 2015 (UTC)
This looks good to me too, with the removal of "classified". I'd like to revisit later whether there was actual infiltration or only "reports" of infiltration, but this can wait.--Wikimedes (talk) 06:03, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
I've looked at every source I have on this to see what it says about the infiltration issue (not just at NGR, but in general):
  • Donghee Sinn says the U.S. soldiers were "prone to panic about North Korean infiltration," and that there may have been infiltration.
  • Major Moo Bong says there was indeed infiltration.
  • Cumings states that there was guerrilla activity and that the U.S. took extreme countermeasures.
  • Christopher Booth says there was infiltration.
  • Hanley (2010) says there were fears of infiltration, but generally disregards actual infiltration at NGR and elsewhere.
  • Dong-Choon Kim says that the U.S. freaked out and feared infiltration, but says there are "no records" to show that North Koreans in disguise attacked U.S. soldiers.
  • Sahr Conway-Lanz, citing the NGRR, mentions some incidents of infiltration, but says that it was an overblown fear. GABHello! 13:28, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
  • The AP story does not support the possibility of infiltration. GABHello! 13:28, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
Yes:3
No:4
Maybe:2
Given this, I'm fine with "reports". Whether there was actual infiltration seems debated in the sources. Whether there was fear of infiltration does not seem to be. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 13:48, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

Unresolved issues, Proposed edit - Background 2

Irondome suggested listing unresolved issues so that we could move on. These are what appear to me to be the unresolved issues remaining after the minor tweak of removing the word "classified" from Counter 1 Rev 4. These are meant to be memory jogs rather than exhaustive discussions, but if I'm leaving important issues out, or the existing issues are too egregiously worded, more can be added or the existing ones modified. I'm jumping the gun a bit, as there should be buy in from more editors than CJHanley, Timothyjosephwood, and me, but this section can be edited if more issues arise. This section will probably be archived before we come back to it, so I've made a copy in my sandbox at User:Wikimedes/sandbox/No_Gun_Ri/unresolved_issues, in case it is easier to find there.

1) Should the background section mention that orders to fire on civilians were classified? Should the background section mention that these orders were rediscovered decades after the war?
Issues:

  • The orders were classified.
  • All orders given at the time were classified.

2) Should the background section mention that the orders to fire on civilians violated the laws of war?
Issues:

  • The orders did violate the laws of war.
  • It may be obvious that the orders violated the laws of war, and mentioning them here could be considered pointy.

3) Should the background section state that North soldiers infiltrated groups of civilian refugees, or only that there were reports of North Korean soldiers infiltrating groups of civilian refugees?
Issues:

  • Is it widely accepted by reliable sources that such infiltration occurred prior to the No Gun Ri Massacre?

--Wikimedes (talk) 06:03, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

1) Looking at the BBC source provided, the wording used is that declassified documents were the source for knowledge of the orders, not that the orders themselves were classified at the time. So I suppose the core issue is: A) Were these super secret orders intended to be super secret because bad stuff, or B) Was documentation from this period blanket classified because war? If we are going to imply that this was an intentional cover up at the time, we are going to need a better source than the BBC one provided. Don't have access to the other source. Maybe someone can provide quotation supporting the current wording.
2) No problem with including it. My issue is with including one and not the other. I would be perfectly agreeable to wording along the lines of "both presenting yourself as a non-combatant as well as firing on civilians are war crimes" or what have you. Maybe this would be better presented in a section on war crimes per se, which would offer a platform for detailed coverage without it being a coatrack.
3) I have no idea. Not arguing a position other than the devil's; just asking which description is more accurate. My intuition is that infiltration was actually occurring. I mean, if I was a commander in their position, that's what I would do. A noose at the Hague is a distant threat compared to a bayonet 100m away. Either way we need sources, preferably publicly available ones. The BBC source provided addresses the fear of infiltration. Skimming the other source, I don't see where it covers the issue of the veracity of those fears/reports. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 12:10, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

I believe WM established this section for (much) later discussion, while we move on. Meantime, I suggest, for the sake of decluttering, deleting that item re "classified." This necessarily' will be referred to later when we detail the various orders, and say they were found in "declassified" archives. It's not an issue. Classifying wartime operational documents (and many peacetime documents) is simply routine. They were declassified beginning in the 1970s. There's no suggestion of hidden motives etc. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 12:48, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

Alright, then I'm going to go ahead and pull the trigger on it since everyone seems to be either in agreement or in agreement to postpone. If anyone takes issue, feel free to revert my edit. We probably are belaboring minor points. I apologize. Trying, again, to argue for the devil. I feel like this discussion still needs someone to stand in as an opposition figure. Since apparently Weld has been banned as a sock, I guess it falls to me. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 13:10, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
Side note, added a [who?] tag for the US war correspondent and diplomat. This should be too easy to fix. But they should be identified. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 13:16, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
The diplomat is Harold Joyce Noble and the correspondent O.H.P. King, as in the footnotes. Will you insert? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 13:43, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
Go head and insert and remove the who tag. Spending the day with my wife and doing this on smoke breaks. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 13:49, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
Already put it in. GABHello! 18:48, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

To move on to 'Events'

For two weeks from this Thursday, I will have to bow out of this discussion (until Sept. 6 or so). Before then, in hopes of helping keep up the momentum, I plan to post a likely overly long version of the "Events" section -- either at my User page or here at Talk -- whose elements could be considered raw material for your ongoing discussion.

I think the "Events" section should just tell what happened, leaving the "why" for "Investigations" etc.

The current section is loaded with land mines:

  • The first graf is wrong. There was no "crossfire" at Ha Ga Ri (the joint US-SK statement of 2001 said these refugees were killed by US soldiers); the North Koreans were not advancing. Appleman, [1], on page 200, says they stopped at Yongdong. And I have Army intell's coordinates for NK positions throughout, which agree with Appleman. Also, next graf, all the Americans were gone.
  • With the exception of the Yang Hae-chan quote, everything from "Survivors said the U.S. troops…" to "…dangerously close to U.S. forces" (181 words) is mostly untrue and a pointless waste of words. The only point would have been obfuscatory, to insinuate there was no strafing. Everyone agrees there was a strafing. Plus, there are mission reports, suppressed by the U.S. Review, showing air strikes in the NGR area (and other mission reports telling of attacks on other refugees). And there were plenty of air and ground target spotters in the area. That's all documented and published in RS. (You can see the mission reports at Wikimedia's NGR page.)
  • Graf 4's disorganized retreat is now in the Background section.
  • The description of the killings ought to start with a brief summary, the consensus account of the basic sequence of events from official Korean sources. That can be followed by descriptive quotes from survivors and soldiers. I hope to post too many of those, so discussants can pick and choose.
  • Graf 6, Buddy Wenzel, is problematical. He was interviewed multiple times and at great length by AP, and then BBC, and never spoke of "gunfire out," until after a visit by a Korea buddy, one "Shotgun" Williams. After that, "Some of the guys say they was firing on us, and I believe it." And that evolved to what you read in the current article. Changing stories are an ever-present hazard with NGR. Least common denominator is best. In this case, if we don't want to simply hold off on "gunfire out" until the Investigations/AP Story section (and this element was in the original AP story), we can write that three of 52 battalion veterans interviewed spoke of gunfire out, according to the US Review, but no documentary or other concrete evidence emerged supporting that.
  • Bob Carroll. What can I say? Our recently departed friend WN was cherry-picking quotes like crazy. Carroll, a retired colonel, claimed he had men cease fire early on and then he left the scene, and had no idea what transpired after that, and he was so quoted in the early journalism to that effect. Fine. As for this article, I don't know why we need one officer saying HE didn't give orders to shoot, when there were a couple of dozen other officers around, and a hell of a lot of shooting going on.
  • The business toward the end about NK "incursions" or somesuch is overstated.

I wish I had time to, but I can't get into deep detail at this point about the above. I simply want to background everyone on why I'll suggest what I'll suggest for "Events." Then others can discuss, and I can rejoin in two weeks.

As for the mechanics, Wikimedes, where do you suggest I post this lengthy material, at my User page or here at Talk? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 13:59, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

It's generally best to discuss everything about the article on the article's talk page, that way future editors can see the decisions that led to the article and ideally won't have to rehash old arguments that have been settled. (If your post is going to be complicated, it can be useful to polish it up in your sandbox before posting here.)--Wikimedes (talk) 20:03, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

Of course, makes sense. It's nice and clean, not complicated in the sense of mechanics. And it sticks to the action, so there's no esoterica about documents, no TACPs, no jargon. I'll post it tomorrow. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:55, 18 August 2015 (UTC)
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