Talk:Occam's razor/Archive 3

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Science

The claim that Ockham's razor is a principle of science is nonsense. The problem with the concept is that in science the method for preferring one explanation over another is not the application of Ockham's razor, but by observation of and experiment on nature. In order to decide if a given explanation has entities multiplied beyond necessity one only needs to test the explanation against the entities. Once observation and experiment has shown that a given entity has no effect then it is completely unnecessary to invoke Ockham's razor. One does not need it because one now has observation and experiments to show that a given entity is not necessary. And of course this can't be determined until one goes to nature. Appeals to Ockham's razor as some kind of method of science is just silly. Science unlike philosophy has no need for such "principles" because it has a far more effective method to determine if an entity of an explanation is unnecessary.

There are those that claim the Ockham's razor is not so much used by science as a whole but is used by individual scientists in the course of concocting scientific explanations. However yet again this is irrelevant since it matters not how one comes up with the explanation, be it dreams, luck, brute force, persistence or whatever. In the end what matters is how well the concocted explanations do at describing and revealing reality. To give Ockham's razor some sort of special place is nonsense. Serendipity is far more important. Also until the experiment is done an honest person has no idea if they have multiplied entities beyond necessity. Until the actual observations and experiments are done Ockham's is nothing more than a cover for the biases of what is considered unnecessary by a given scientist.

And lastly if Ockham's razor is some sort of scientific principle then Ockham's razor can be applied to Ockham's razor. One will find that it has nothing to do with how science prefers one explanation over another. For some strange reason advocates of Ockham's razor seem to ignore all the simple scientific explanations that were just wrong. -- Somebody

Apparently you have never heard of philosophy of science as you seem to think philosophy is irrelevant to science. See also the scientific method, which says e.g. the following:

The procedures of science typically include a number of heuristic guidelines, such as the principles of conceptual economy or theoretical parsimony that fall under the rubric of Ockham's razor.

Somebody - I have no problems with philosophers deciding what is appropriate for philosophy. I think they should leave science to scientists. And there are philosophers that agree with this sentiment.

The philosophy of science article has this to say about Occam's razor:

As interpreted in contemporary scientific practice, it advises opting for the simplest theory among a set of competing theories that have a comparable explanatory power, discarding assumptions that do not improve the explanation. The "other things being equal" clause is a critical qualification, which rather severely limits the utility of Ockham's razor in real practice, as theorists rarely if ever find themselves presented with competent theories of exactly equal explanatory adequacy.

Somebody - Yes it does limit its application. I know of no case at least in physics where competing theories that predicted the same results ended up with one theory being discarded for another. In the case I am aware of it was shown that they were two different but equivalent representations. Also "simplest theory" is a matter of opinion. It presumes that an explanation only applies to one instance of a phenomenon. As theories get better their area of application enlarges. Some explanations would be "simpler" for some phenomena but not for others and visa versa. The problem with Ockham's as it is claimed it works in science is that it presumes an overly simplistic situation and application.

Thus, this statement of yours is rather strange:

Once observation and experiment has shown that a given entity has no effect then it is completely unnecessary to invoke Ockham's razor. One does not need it because one now has observation and experiments to show that a given entity is not necessary.

What you're doing here is applying Occam's razor. What Occam's razor says is that you should prefer the simpler of two explanations of comparable explanatory power. Note the condition, which you achieve here by "observation and experiments". Then you apply the razor while saying that you don't need it.

Somebody - Hey, no problem with me. It you want to use entities that have been shown to have no effect on the outcome then have at it. As long as your predictions come out correctly that is fine with me. But one does not need Ockham's razor to realize that using something unnecessary is unnecessary. That is just the definition of the word unnecessary. But Ockham’s is useless for actually determining what is unnecessary. 82.103.198.180 17:02, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Can you two please format your discussion in a way that would make it possible for other people to follow it? (That is, block a reply together rather than as separate indentations, and sign your comments). --AceMyth 20:32, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

Birth and death dates

The Occam's razor article has a blockquote that says "1295–1349". However, the William of Ockham article and its references seem to mention 1280, 1285, and 1287 as his rough birth date, and 1347, 1348, and 1349 as his date of death.

We can't change the date in the quote, so I suggest we do one of the following.

1. get a better quote
2. start quoting from the middle
3. drop the dates, and use [...]
4. something else that's good

--Kjoonlee 07:16, 23 September 2006 (UTC)

Anti-Razor

It seems the anti-razor listed on this page isn't an anti-razor it all. It doesn't disagree with Occam's Razor. In the anti-razor it says that if 3 postulates can't explain something then a 4th must be added. Therefore the 4th IS NESSISARY to explain it, this doesn't not violate Occam's Razor, only if it was decribed at the 4th and a 5th postulate is added (which is not observed since if it is observed then the 5th postulate would explain something) then it violates Occam's Razor, just like Lorentz' Ether which explained everything, but was unobservable so Einstein's Special Rel which did not violate Occam's Razor was accepted instead. Just like Moon haox theories that postulate unobserved sound recording studios at area 51 etc etc. That anti-razor is not anti- at all. Gelsamel 00:55, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

"Nessisary "??? =:-O —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.6.66.193 (talk) 11:28, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

No, it isn't, strictly speaking. But on one hand, you have Ockham's razor advocating parsimony, and on the other you have people such as Walter of Chatton and Kant arguing that it shouldn't be taken to extremes ;) -- Palthrow 02:50, 31 October 2006 (UTC)

So basically the 'anti-razors' are just arguing against ignorance and absurdity within Occam's Razor? If that is the case 'anti-razor' really is the wrong word. Gelsamel 05:54, 5 November 2006 (UTC)

Religion

It is often claimed by many advocates of Ockham's Razor statements such as is given in the main article:

"In the philosophy of religion, Occam's razor is sometimes applied to the existence of God; if the concept of God does not help to explain the universe, it is argued, God is irrelevant and should be cut away (Schmitt 2005). While Occam's razor cannot prove God's nonexistence, it does imply that, in the absence of compelling reasons to believe in God, unbelief should be preferred."

I have no idea why it is thought that Ockham’s razor is any kind of an argument to dismiss god. The universe explained using a god of one kind or another is not the same universe explained by science. In many cases it implies a super universe inhabited by the purported god and often includes all sorts of additional explanative constructs such as heaven, hell, souls, sin, angels, demons, devils and so on. It posits all sorts of purported phenomena such as resurrection, transubstantiation, demon possession, halos, and auras and so on. The universe of the supernaturalist is not the universe of the naturalist. There is no basis of comparison between the two universes and thus Ockham's razor just doesn't apply because the two explanations do not predict the same universe.

See Jean Baudrillard's "The Impossible Exchange"

And that is the funny dang thing about it. Many of the Ockhamites seem to think that somehow a universe explained with probability waves, photons, atoms, energy and so on must be preferred over god and its accompanying constructs because somehow the natural constructs are simpler. And yet most small children find it easier to comprehend a universe explained by god than one explained by science. Which is the simpler explanation - "Let there be light", or Maxwell’s Equations?

In the end science does not prefer natural explanations because of some lame philosophical principle. It prefers the natural explanations because they have much greater predictive power before the fact than any god explanation.

It has nothing to do with Ockham's razor.

Somebody - Gkochanowsky 05:47, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, if you trivialise simplicty and consider it to be the quality of being easily understood by small children. What causes predictive power before the fact in theories? The fact that they successfully "predict" past events with a minimum of ad-hoc modification, so you can expect them to predict future events with the same degree of success. The ad-hoc in weak theories is what deprives them of their predictive power, and that's exactly what Occam's razor - in its rigorous form - admonishes against. For example, that God would decide to let there be light doesn't directly follow from assuming the existence of a God; it's postulated that he did that to make the theory fit with the fact that our world has light in it. This postulation comes back to bite us in the figurative rear when we try to use it to figure out pretty much anything about light we haven't already assumed. --AceMyth 16:39, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

I am not an advocate of Ockham's razor. I don't consider it a good reason to prefer scientific explanations over supernatural explanations. And Ockham's is of no real use in science because the primary goal of scientific explanations is to predict phenomena before the fact, not after the fact. Any dang fool can predict reality after the fact. Ockham's has no predictive power because the "simplest" explanation is no more likely to have any better predictive power than the more complicated explanation. That is because the concept of "simplest" is a purely subjective call. And there is only one way to find out which explanation is better at predicting before the fact. And that is to find predictions that differ and then look in nature. Ockham's is a philosophical principle that is only of use for armchair realists that don't have any compunction to actully look at nature. At best it is a bias for concocting explanations but has no effect on how well they work before the fact. Scientific explanations are not getting simpler over time, no matter how important you may think Ockham's is. God is not part of scientific explanations because god is useless at predicting reality before the fact. But hey, I would be very happy if someone came up with an explanation using god that did a better job of predicting reality before the fact. That would be progress. But until that happens god advocates are just screwing things up. Put up or shutup. Gkochanowsky 16:09, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

I'm saying this for what seems like the millionth time: Simplicty is not trivial. People keep throwing the word "simple" again and again all over this talkpage as some vague naive quality of lack-of-equations-and-wordiness that Occam's razor supposedly glorifies, while utterly disregarding the nuance it carries in this specific context. "Simple" reduces to more probable; "Complicated" reduces to less probable. That's all. The whole "simple" thing is a convenient term that sort of applies because extra postulations are such a wonderful example of how to make your theory needlessly less probable, and theories without extra postulations in them are, well, simple. But that doesn't mean that suddenly now the vagueness of "simplicity" per se implicates the entire branch of probability theory due to guilt by association. Since absolute certainty about almost anything is impossible, it says, at least pick a theory that, say, holds itself together rather than arbitrary well-that's-how-it-turned-out-isms carrying its burden. Because arbitrary well-that's-how-it-turned-out-isms have a nasty tendency to turn out to not to have turned out that way.

The problem with probability is that in order to assess the probability of something you have to know all the possible outcomes and their frequency of occurrence. And the problem with exploring and explaining reality is that we don't know all the possible outcomes and their frequency of occurrence. We are after all very much still trying to explore and explain reality. Thinking that Ockham's razor is applicable to scientific explanations as a probabilistic statement is extreme hubris. So anyone that thinks that a probabilistic method is how to do science assumes more than they actually know. How in the world would one prefer GR over CM before actually checking their unobserved conflicting predictions based on probability? The reason we do science is because we do not know. Otherwise we could just sit back in our armchairs and compute the odds that one explanation does a better job of predicting reality before the fact than another without actually checking that it does. Ockham's razor as you claim it applies is very much magical thinking. Because those that apply it only consider confirming results and ignore the disconfirming result. If any form you care to choose of Ockham's razor was put to the test you would be forced to discard it because it is either wrong or unnecessary.Gkochanowsky 15:13, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

I say scientific theories have become simpler over the years, unless you ignore the crucial role new data plays in the adoption of new theories. Consider some "equally-as-simple" theory of yore challenged to give as simple an account as a rival contemporary theory, given the quality and quantity of data that led us to abandon it. Phrenologically encompass findings in evolutionary biology. Formalise modern applications of game theory to human conduct in terms of divine morality and the original sin. That ought to put the "complicated" nature of the theories we've come to work with in perspective...

And this is "simpler" how? This is "more probable" how? Gkochanowsky 16:57, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Bottom line is, it's true that Occam's razor has plenty of metaphysical baggage and a history of misunderstanding and misuse, and certainly there are cases where the question of which framework of axioms is the "simplest" is far from trivial. But strip that away and you're left with math, and I /still/ don't get what there is about this logial principle that draws so much verbal fire from wiki-passers-by when you could just as easily start an argument over at Euler's identity about the subjective existence of imaginary numbers. --AceMyth 20:13, 18 February 2007 (UTC)

Call it whatever you like. Everyone else does. But the bottom line is no matter how you may think Ockham's should be restated, William of Ockham didn't say it. Why in the world would anyone that had a valid principle for investigating reality choose to call it Ockham's Razor when it is obvious that Ockham would not have a clue as to what they were talking about. At least those early Greeks that postulated the atom would recognize their principle in modern Chemistry but this Beyseian restatement is a huge leap of faith. Gkochanowsky 15:13, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

I'd continue this discussion, but running discussions in talk pages in Wikipedia is a time-consuming hobby that consumes time I just don't have available these days. So I'm swallowing this frog and letting you have the last word, though I'm left with the impression that a lot of what I said has been misunderstood (for one, I think that "actual data from observations" is absolutely necessary for any conclusion outside the domain of philosophy and mathematics, so I'm slightly puzzled by your implication that I ever as much as hinted otherwise.) --AceMyth 16:53, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

My point is and always has been that if you have data then who needs Ockham's? As far as I can tell the use of Ockham's in science is nothing more than a cover for personal preference. But one has to start somewhere so why not start with the explanation one most prefers. But it doesn't help anyone one bit by pretending that their preference for the "simplest" is based on some lame principle. Gkochanowsky 17:03, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Gkochanowsky, Have you bothered to read the references on the Ockham's Razor page? There is a rich literature establishing Ockham's razor as a quite useful methodologically, and not a "lame principle" (See Simplicity at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, esp.). If you have data, you still have underdetermination of theory by data. Consider the problem of model selection-- of the theories (functions, or distributions) compatible with the data (points), you must select one for predictive purposes. Which do you choose and why, if not using OR?

As I have stated before, I have no doubt that it is useful for philosophy. After all, it is not as if philosophers are bothered all that much by data. And in the end the only thing available to philosophers to prefer one philosophy over another is personal preference. Might as well pretend it is for more significant reasons and call it "parsimony". As for the "theory of model selection" it is mathematics not science. In science the method of model selection is experiment on nature and I hope for the sake of science that it never changes. Gkochanowsky 17:28, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Wow. you have managed not to address one substantive point and merely repeat yourself, as if that were an justification for your views. Moreover disparaging philosophers as you do throughout your replies is not an argument, but simply a cheap ad hominum distracting form actual debate. It is perhaps useless to address you, but, here it goes...

Never said dispairing philosophers was an argument. Just an explanation for why the lame concept of Ockham's Razor still lives when it should have been cast onto the junk heap of history along with philogiston. Gkochanowsky 22:06, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Model selection, in case you are unaware, is not just a philosophical problem. And, again, why is underdetermination not a problem? How do we select from competing, empirically adequate theories, if not (in part) from simplicity? Actual responses to these questions would be helpful. Johnny Logic 18:56, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Explanation selection is a scientific problem, however modern science figured out how to do that long after Ockham's and it was not Ockham's principle that was chosen. I repeat myself over and over again because you insist it was Ockham's when it is common knowledge that explanations in science are prefered based on how well they do at fidelity and prediction as demonstraited by experiment on nature. Any theory of model selection that does not do this is not science. It may be mathemeatics or philosophy, but science is what it is today because of the criteria of preference of fidelity and prediction. Probablity, simplicity, complexity, Ockhams, parsimony, "Truth" or what ever other philosophical criteria you may want to toss in there has little to do with it.

As for probability and simplicity, that is a complex subject. Suffice to say that the assignment of probabilities need not as you say "know all the possible outcomes and their frequency of occurrence". Rather, a prior probability can be assigned and true probabilities can converged upon over time (See A Better Bayesian Convergence Theorem for some details).

As I have stated earlier, you can presume, assume, dream, concoct, [place your mechanism of imagination here] or anything you like for a candidate scientific explanation. If you want to impress people with it you can even claim it was come by using Ockham's razor. But if it is actual science, as opposed to philosophy there is only one way to actually prefer it, and that is to see how well it accounts for known phenomena and how well it predicts phenomena before the fact as compared to competing explanations. Ockham's has nothing to do with it when it comes to science. Perhaps philosphy but not science. My comments have been directed at Ockham's purported role in science. I could care less what philosophers do with it. Gkochanowsky 17:28, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Again you conveniently ignore my point, heap abuse, and restate your assumptions, which are the very point of contention. No modern version of OR as a methodological principle in theory selection is taken to be an a priori acceptance of simple theories-- that is a strawman argument. Actually, the balance of simplicity and fit, it has been argued, tends to increase predictive accuracy (See Malcolm Forster's The New Science of Simplicity for an excellent overview of this argument). Johnny Logic 18:56, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Do not point out straw man arguments when you insist that Ockham's razor is to be restated as a principle that William of Ockham never wrote nor would he recognize it as anything like what he wrote. Gkochanowsky 22:06, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Further, OR does not imply that scientific theories become simpler over time. They only need be as complex as needed to explain the evidence, but no more. The transition from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics is an excellent example of a transition from, you might say, a simpler to a more complex theory, necessitated by anomalies.

Gosh, why do you think that happened? Was it because of Ockham's or because it had nothing to do with Ockham's? Gee did they go look at the data and compare that with what the explanations predicted? Where was Ockhams? The goal of science has never been to come up with the "simplest" explanation (whatever that is). But to come up with the explanations that best statisified the preferences of science. Which is not simplicity, but fidelity and predictablity before the fact. Science is very pleased if it can satisfy those criteria in any way it can. For science simplicity will just have to take care of itself. It is hard enough satisfying fidelity and predictablity. Or to quote Feynman who was an actual scientist, not some presumptious philosopher, "Shutup and calculate." Gkochanowsky 17:28, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

This "presumptious [sic] philosopher" would like your arguments rather than your categorical assertions about the nature of science. OR works in conjunction with these other goals, many philosophers and scientists have argued. Johnny Logic 18:56, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

And many have argued that they do not. So what? Feynman is a notable modern example. If you think I have been hard on philosophy you should find out what he thought. Gkochanowsky 22:06, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

True, there are competing definitions of simplicity, and even a tenable rejection of the existence of a language invariant notion of simplicity, but this plurality does not imply that simplicity has no role in inductive inference. I guess my main point is that while I see your snipes, I do not see your arguments. Johnny Logic 18:32, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

It may indeed have a role in inductive enterprises, but so what? Science is not restricted to induction, and inductive conclusions backed by Ockhams are not acceptable reasons to prefer a conclusion by any scientist. Gkochanowsky 22:06, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Who claimed that science is restricted to induction and that OR alone is suffienet for theory-choice? This is a non sequitur.Johnny Logic 18:56, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

I didn't bring up induction. You did. Gkochanowsky 22:06, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

The final arbiter is reality itself, not some lame philosophical principle. Gkochanowsky 17:28, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

You have had your sarcasm, allow me mine: Oh, I see. Ockham's razor is a "lame philosophical principle" and reality will sort it out. QED. Pack your bags philosophers, statisticians, machine learners, and other methodologists, we have an answer to our centuries-long inductive problems. Johnny Logic 18:56, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps it has never occurred to you but Ockham's is a statement of criteria of preference for explanations. Its advocates like to assert that it is used by science. However science has no need for it because it has much better and more effective criteria of preference. I can understand why philosophers might find it compelling because philosophy is an ancient and historic tradition that does not use the criteria of modern science and without some principle like Ockham's they would be forced to admit that all they have is personal preference (As if that was not what they were actually doing anyway.). Science uses criteria which I have restated often enough, it has experiment on reality and it prefers explanations that win in fidelity and predictability, not simplicity. Simplicity is nice, but hardly a criteria of preference in scientific explanations. A striking example is Einstein’s aversion to QM. He seemed to think that reality should conform to some notion he had of what was "simple" but was not able to produce any explanation that worked any better. That is why QM is still the current preferred explanation. Few that have studied it would say it was "simple", but it has the annoying property of predicting reality before the fact very well. And if anyone were to come up with an explanation that did a better job, no matter how "simple" or "complex" it would then become the preferred explanation. Ockham's is as much use to science as screen doors on a submarine. Yes there are a few instances were it may come in handy but it is hardly necessary. As such it would be refreshing if advocates of Ockham's would demonstrate the honesty and fortitude to apply it to Ockham's. At least when it comes to claims that it is an important criterion of preference for science. Gkochanowsky 19:45, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Your characterization of philosophy is ridiculous (again a straw man argument). Do you forget that the origin of some of our sciences is in philosophy? Adam Smith, father of modern economics, philosopher; Gottfried Leibniz, co-creator of the calculus, philosopher; William James, pioneering psychologist, philosopher; Bertrand Russell, great logician aiding in the production of a logical foundation for mathematics and much more (paving the road for computer science), philosopher, etc. I anticipate that you will say that their contributions are science and their failings are philosophy, by definition-- a cheap tautological victory that shields you from ever having to learn anything about philosophy.

Science uses criteria which I have restated often enough, it has experiment on reality and it prefers explanations that win in fidelity and predictability, not simplicity. Simplicity is nice, but hardly a criteria of preference in scientific explanations.

I'm afraid that what you list is insufficient for uniquely identifying a theory; underdetermination is a specter that cannot be banished that easily. There are quite literally an infinite number of theories/models/inferences logically consistent with any finite number of data points in a possibility space equivalent to the reals. Curve fitting is an excellent example to illustrate this point. How do we determine which curve wins-out in "fidelity and predictability"? I can tell you why a particular one wins in terms of simplicity and fit, and, better, how it enables important epistemic goals (reliability, predictive accuracy, etc.). Again, please look at the literature.

How often do you think the situation arises where there are two competing explanations that predict the exact same outcomes? And if you can name just one instance can you tell me what actually happened? Do you actually think that everyone asked, 'which is the "simplest"?' Of course not. Has it ever occurred to you that scientific explanations have become broader and broader over time? That in many cases seemingly more complex explanations are actually simpler in application in certain circumstances. And because the explanations are now so broad this happens all the time. This idea that somehow the "simplest" explanation wins out is just nonsense. Gkochanowsky 01:35, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

• "How often do you think the situation arises where there are two competing explanations that predict the exact same outcomes" Pretty often, actually. For example, flat vs. round Earth, geocentricity vs. heliocentricity, relativity vs newtonian motion, quantum theory vs. classical mechanics... For a given set of observations, all pairs gave the exact same predictions. In all cases the simplest was accepted first, and the most complicated one later on, when it was the simplest that could explain the observed fenomena (because new, finer, fenomena had been observed, contradicting the formerly accepted theory). When no observation could tell relativity from newtonian motion, it was quite safe to assume Newton's motion equations held. Actually, it was the correct thing to do. Nowadays it happens again, for example with the superstring theories. They are too complex and predict too little (nothing, in fact) beyond the theories they try to supersede. For that, they are being taken cautiously, and careful experiments are being crafted, to test situations where some superstring theory would predict X, and present theories would predict Y. Rest assured that, until such experiments are invented, and carried out, superstring theories will not be generally accepted among theoreticians. And when the experiments are done, maybe superstrings will be ruled out. In the meantime, we have saved the hassle of handling too complex equations, and too complex concepts, to explain exactly the same that is already explained. Guess why the complexity of scientific theories grows with time? Because at any given time, the simplest of the ones available are taken as correct, and only after they are found unsatisfactory are they rejected for the new simplest satisfactory one. — isilanes (talk|contribs) 13:37, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

The "pairs" you mention do not give the same predictions. 1Z 15:05, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

• Of course they do, albeit only for some given observations. For example, the flat Earth approximation is indistinguishable from the actual shape of the Earth if we concentrate on reduced areas (actually, Earth is assumed flat nowadays for local-scale engineering, such as building a house. Taking into account the curvature of the Earth for that would be silly, when local topography is much more relevant than global curvature). Before Middle Ages, geo- and heliocentrism were both acceptable, in the light of observations available. Both relativity and Newtonian equations predict exactly the same movements for balls in billiards. The bouncing of a soccer ball is equally well described by quantum and classical mechanics. It is precisely because of other observations, that discriminate between the members of the pair, that we can drop an "obsolete" theory, and embrace the "modern" one. The ideal case of two theories that give the exact same predictions for all possible fenomena is somewhat forced, or directly impossible (unless one or more of the theories consist on an infinite set of ad hoc statements, such as religions). — isilanes (talk|contribs) 19:13, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

That is just silly. Long ago people knew that ships sailing into the ocean would drop below the horizon. But that if you climbed a tall building you could see them again. This is why the lookout climbed to the highest point of the ship. They could see further at the horizon. This is a local phenomenon that is not predicted by a flat earth, local or otherwise. And if the purpose of a building was to observe ships further out to sea sailing to shore then indeed the curvature of the earth would play a part in the engineering of that building. As for your point regarding QM (Quantum Mechanics) approaching CM (Classical Mechanics) as dxdt >>>>>> h that is the case for most dynamic systems except for degenerate fluids like super cooled helium and SQUIDs, not to mention many electronic devices such as Zener and laser diodes. These are large scale phenomena that are not accounted for by CM at all at any scale. However you seem to be agreeing with me that the criteria of preference between the two explanations QM and CM was not which was the "simplest" or any of the myriad versions of Ockham's razor such as they are, but which did the better job of predicting reality before the fact. Gkochanowsky 23:27, 30 October 2007 (UTC)

From whence does your monolithic understanding of scientific methodology come? Any references? Does it change your mind that scientists have also written on the significance of simplicity as a theoretical virtue (e.g. Zellner, A., Keuzenkamp, H. & McAleer, M. (eds.) (2001) Simplicity, Inference and Modelling: Keeping It Sophisticatedly Simple, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.): The editors of [Simplicity, Inference and Modelling] "sent out surveys to 25 recent Nobel laureates in economics. Almost all replied that simplicity played a role in their research, and that simplicity is a desirable feature of economic theories (Zellner et al. 2001, p.2)." (from the article on Simplicity at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

Why do you keep citing philosophies take on science. I could care less what philosophy has to say about science. When philosophy comes up with a 'philosophy of philosophy' perhaps I might consider it authoritative on itself but until then I wish philosophers would mind their own business. I am very much aware that each person has their own concept of what constitutes "simple" or "elegant" or "beautiful" or whatever. So what? As I have stated before it matters not what mechanism you use to concoct your explanation. Use dreams for all I care. Use any esthetic you like. But in the end as far as science is concerned it will not be judged on any of those things, but on fidelity and predictive power. If such esthestics were the actual criteria of science then QM would never have seen the light of day. Do you have any idea how many explanations have been created by well respected scientists that thought they were "simple", "elegant", "beautiful" or whatever and they were flat out wrong? It far, far, far outweighs the number that statisfied these estheics but were right. To ignore this is to practice magical thinking. To concentrate on the confirming instances but ingore the disconfirming instances is self foolery. Of course we don't normally hear about the failures but only an idiot with no actual experience and knowledge of science would think that they are not there. Dirac's big number hypothesis comes to mind, and I was there when he gave the talk, and it is still just a "simple" idea but it is not science. I doesn't have any predictive power. And just because Dirac came up with it doesn't mean it was any good. Gkochanowsky 01:35, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

It's "philosophy's" and you "couldn't" care less. God is in the details. Plumlogan (talk) 20:57, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

My efforts are better spent editing this entry. Like AceMyth, I will swallow a frog and leave you to your ad hominems and categorical statements; maybe (hope beyond hope) you will actually look at the resources that I have provided and try to see what use OR might be in theory selection, and thus, science. Johnny Logic 23:23, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

You seem to think you know something about philosophy. Perhaps you never learned that argument from authority is a fallacy. At best all you can do is present what they thought, but it doesn't make it right. If you are going to convince me how about doing some science instead of philosophy. Present observations of instances of competing scientific explanations where the preferred explanation was chosen using Ockham's razor. Otherwise make all the claims you like, the emperor has no clothes. Gkochanowsky 01:35, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not a forum. Since none of this has feed into the article, perhaps you might consider continuing your debate elsewhere? Banno 02:24, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

I've tried that in the past but it soon gets edited out by Ockham enthusiasts. That leaves the discussion. Which of course is exactly what has been going on. Gkochanowsky 03:56, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

Hopping in: If the issue actually is improving the article rather than taking slights at each other regarding our understandings of the relation between philosophy and science then there shouldn't be much of a fundamental problem here. This isn't the first time Wikipedia has ever stumbled upon the challenge of a controversial subject, after all. As long as you can cite a few prominent sources in the literature of science that take the position that Occam's razor is irrelevant or useless (so as to avoid original research) and fairly represent the gist of their arguments, a "Is Occam's Razor important to science?" section or something to that extent should work just fine. (Plus on the other hand some of Johnny Logic's references to sources that find the razor useful/important could definitely find their place in the article, as a counter-balance to this or otherwise). --AceMyth 15:50, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

That is a good point. However the onus is on those that contend that Ockham's is an important criteria of preference in science. And the only way they can honestly support that claim it not to cite philosophers, but to cite instances in science where one explanation was preferred over another solely on the basis of Ockham's. And cases of particluar scientists claims of use in concocting their proposed explanation are only applicable in those instances where the competing explanations the particular scientist was considering, and the claimed "simplest" explanation are also presented for examiniation. Otherwise they have nothing to back up their claims. What you are asking of me is to prove a negative, something as you all know is impossible to do if we are talking about actual reality. Gkochanowsky 20:09, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

What you can or can't prove isn't the point here. Your argument could be the most spectacular piece of absolute brilliance and the opposing view a huge staggering mistake, and Wikipedia would still be about reporting controversies, not ruling in them. As long as there's anybody of significance who shares your opinion you should just present their arguments and let them speak for themselves (note that said arugments might very well be of the very form you used, namely that the burden of proof lies on people who claim the razor to be important, and you can't prove a negative etc.). If you can't find any significant existing literature to take this point of view, on the other hand, then there are plenty of good places to construct an argument, present your own conclusions and get a discussion going. Wikipedia just isn't one of them. --AceMyth 20:32, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Just to chime in on an old argument, I'd say that the razor is used fairly frequently in a scientific context and that the part of the phrase that I think that Gkochanowsky is missing is "beyond necessity". Take nuclear force for example, it's useful on an atomic level, and it certainly has an effect on a satellite orbiting a planet, but when you're computing the satellite's velocity, there's almost certainly no need to take nuclear force into account. Classical mechanics should give sufficient accuracy. So while it's probably not a good tool to decide which theory is the best for all cases, it's useful for finding the best theory in a specific case. At least that's my take on it. 209.82.43.120 15:51, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

I don't think I missed that. However in that case a "philosophical principle" is not needed. It is covered under the definition of the word "unnecessary". And we know it is unnecessary not because of Ockham's Razor but because we can do the calculations, run the experiments and make the measurements and realize that taking into account nuclear effects makes little or no effect in that circumstance. If you applied Ockham's Razor to this situation you would discard Ockham's Razor because it is unnecessary. For some reason advocates of Ockham's Razor are either unwilling or unable to apply Ockham's Razor to itself. I may not know much about philosophy but I always thought that just about the only decent criteria of preference that philosophers had was consistency and fairness but philosophers appear to ignore that when it comes to Ockham's Razor. Gkochanowsky 14:17, 7 November 2007 (UTC)