Talk:Principle of plenitude

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Lewis[edit]

This article needs to include a section on D.K. Lewis's principle of plenitude.Wadh27NK (talk) 22:35, 9 February 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leibniz[edit]

Removed Leibniz section which said:

Leibniz believed that the best of all possible worlds would actualize every genuine possibility, and argued in Théodicée that this best of all possible worlds will contain all possibilities, with our finite experience of eternity giving no reason to dispute nature's perfection.

He did not believe this. His idea of the best possible world was one in which God has chosen the overall best world out of all the possible worlds. All of the POSSIBLE worlds would contain all possibilities but the best world would contain no possibilities at all since everything would be a necessary truth, nothing would be possible or contingent.

Please list Leibniz without the objectionable wording[edit]

I linked directly from the Leibniz article - this one should include him. Lovejoy certainly includes... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.99.114.102 (talk) 01:02, 16 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Aquinas[edit]

Removed the statement that Aquinas rejected the principle. The cited source was a brief mention in a page about extraterrestrial life, which is relevant, but the Aquinas argument cited there seems to depend on the principle being true.

St Thomas Aquinas...argued against both the plurality of worlds and the principle of plenitude. His logic was simple, if God had made other worlds they would be either similar or dissimilar to this one. If similar, then they would be in vain and this would not be consistent with divine wisdom. If dissimilar, none of them could contain all things and therefore none would be perfect, and an imperfect world could not be the work of a perfect Creator.

This is an argument against the plurality of worlds, but not against the principle. -- Margin1522 (talk) 14:39, 12 February 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Aristotle[edit]

The claim in Note 1 that Arist. Phys. III, 4, 203b25-30 says that no possibilities which remain eternally possible will go unrealized is incorrect. That section of the Physics deals instead more narrowly only with the infinity of space and matter and hence of "worlds." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.130.13.223 (talk) 19:15, 19 October 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Human counterpart[edit]

"Everything that humans determine can happen, they will make happen." --71.116.235.10 (talk) 22:52, 8 February 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Article gives an odd impression[edit]

I notice that in Wikipedia (actually not only in this article) the principle is treated as if it were creationist. Actually it was in classical times often associated with the arguments against creationism: a large number of planets increases the chances that one of them has life on it for example. See for example David Sedley's book on classical creationism, part of which is on Google Books.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:51, 9 April 2015 (UTC)[reply]