Talk:Pro se legal representation in the United States/ABA info

(Moved from Talk:Pro se legal representation in the United States for discussion)

Let's put these references back in the article

The ABA emailed me the link when I asked them for input as to this article.

The ABA has developed proposed forms and an analysis of the rules that enable lawyers to serve pro se litigants. The ABA has a web site entitled "Pro Se/Unbundling Resources Center". "otherwise self-represented" means "otherwise pro se" Advocates contend that unbundled court appearances provided to otherwise self-represented litigants are generally in the best interest of the judiciary, since attorneys are aware of local rules and procedures, rules of evidence, and the scope of legally relevant issues. Counsel can give judges a clear presentation of the case, saving significant court resources, while at the same time providing the key attorney services, such as argument of a motion or trial representation, which are desired by self-represented litigants.

Pro se history in U.S. Litigation without lawyers Among the 30,000 people…Ma…1630 and the outbreak of civil war in England, 24 years later, there were very few men, I think practically no one—who could be called a practicing barrister in England or one familiar with actual practice as a lawyer...From 1640 on in Mass Bay the number of lawsuits was comparatively large…it is not too much to say that in the 17th cent in the Colony of Mass Bay, sooner or later every inhabitant of every town was brought into court either as plaintiff, witness, or defendant. Our ancestors were a litigious people. We need only go back to the foundation of our Commonwealth to find precedents, if not a justification, for the immense volume of litigation that is going on at the present time…..Practically everyone had a right of appeal and that meant to have his case tried de novo on all the evidence…an appeal taken in half the cases…one genuine contribution to the science of law—they complied and enacted the first code in English jurisprudence...The laws and Liberties of 1648…what was intended to be a codification of existing civil law, both written and unwritten."

For most of history an attorney began representation at the beginning of a case. Representation didn’t end until the end of the case. People needing legal services had two choices: either pay an attorney a fee for the entire case, or go it alone. There was no in-between. It was almost unthinkable for an attorney to provide help filling out one form or attending one hearing. It was all or nothing. There was nothing wrong with this system for those with the substantial assets needed to pay an attorney. But people that did not have much money were out of luck.

In the legal context, "unbundling" refers to the process of breaking down the multiple roles an attorney might play into smaller simpler groups of tasks. Unbundling (also called discrete tasks representation) offers clients a middle ground between dispensing with lawyers altogether or signing on for the full service package. The client is in charge of determining which services are to be performed by the client, which services are to be performed by the lawyer, and the extent or depth to which the lawyer will perform the services. Perhaps the biggest selling point for unbundling is that it costs less. When the parties do most of the work themselves and hire an attorney only for what they need, they save money. But that's not the only benefit from unbundling. It also allows them to stay in control. They decide what issues to negotiate. They decide when to discuss what.

Private practitioners may gain opportunities to tap into a market of consumers who do not now seek legal assistance, and providers may gain potential partnerships and expansion of services without the sacrifice of quality. (An ABA publication says) There is little disagreement that individuals have a right, rooted in the U.S. Constitution, to represent themselves in a court of law.

(An ABA publication says) In theory, statutes, prevailing case law, and the rules of court apply to all litigants equally." The Compleat Lawyer "Facing a Pro Se Opponent" ABA General Practice Journal kay sieverding (talk) 23:03, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

The ABA has developed proposed forms and an analysis of the rules that enable lawyers to serve pro se litigants. The ABA has a web site entitled "Pro Se/Unbundling Resources Center".

Advocates contend that unbundled court appearances provided to otherwise self-represented litigants are generally in the best interest of the judiciary, since attorneys are aware of local rules and procedures, rules of evidence, and the scope of legally relevant issues. Counsel can give judges a clear presentation of the case, saving significant court resources, while at the same time providing the key attorney services, such as argument of a motion or trial representation, which are desired by self-represented litigants.

For most of history an attorney began representation at the beginning of a case. Representation didn’t end until the end of the case. People needing legal services had two choices: either pay an attorney a fee for the entire case, or go it alone. There was no in-between. It was almost unthinkable for an attorney to provide help filling out one form or attending one hearing. It was all or nothing. There was nothing wrong with this system for those with the substantial assets needed to pay an attorney. But people that did not have much money were out of luck.

In the legal context, "unbundling" refers to the process of breaking down the multiple roles an attorney might play into smaller simpler groups of tasks. Unbundling (also called discrete tasks representation) offers clients a middle ground between dispensing with lawyers altogether or signing on for the full service package. The client is in charge of determining which services are to be performed by the client, which services are to be performed by the lawyer, and the extent or depth to which the lawyer will perform the services. Perhaps the biggest selling point for unbundling is that it costs less. When the parties do most of the work themselves and hire an attorney only for what they need, they save money. But that's not the only benefit from unbundling. It also allows them to stay in control. They decide what issues to negotiate. They decide when to discuss what.

Private practitioners may gain opportunities to tap into a market of consumers who do not now seek legal assistance, and providers may gain potential partnerships and expansion of services without the sacrifice of quality.

Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of New Jersey. January, 2001 A Guide to Filing for Litigants without Lawyers [2] Richard T. Seymour, February 14, 2000, Suggestions for Handling Pro Se Claimants in Handbook Arbitration [3]

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 206 (District of Columbia District Court 1985)) "'One of the basic principles, one of the glories, of the American system of justice is that the courthouse door is open to everyone--the humblest citizen, the indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien...That principle of access to the courts consists not merely of the right to file a complaint but it includes the right to file other papers, including motions apprising the court of possible changes in the facts, the law, or the position of the litigant"[4]

This entire section was deleted from the talk page (I think by Lar on 9/23/08 about right after I wrote it)

"Access to the courts is a constitutionally protected fundamental right and one of the privileges and immunities awarded citizens under Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143 (1907). The First Amendment right to petition the government has as one aspect the right of access to the courts. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1363 (5th Cir. 1983). Judge Thornberry's writing in Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (1983), serves to guide our analysis today. Relying on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) and Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979), we learn in Ryland that,

"A mere formal right of access to the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Courts have required that the access be "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852 (5th Cir. 11/28/2000)

I searched on Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt in all the circuits and Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander was the most recent use.

"The Substantive Right of Access to Courts:

The right of access to the courts is basic to our system of government, and it is well established today that it is one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. In Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143 (1907), the Supreme Court characterized this right of access in the following terms:

The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each state to the citizens of all other states to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. Equality of treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon comity between the states, but is granted and protected by the Federal Constitution.

207 U.S. at 148, 28 S. Ct. at 35 (citations omitted). It is clear that the Court viewed the right of access to the courts as one of the privileges and immunities accorded citizens under article 4 of the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment.

In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S. Ct. 609, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1972), the Supreme Court found in the first amendment a second constitutional basis for this right of access: "Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." Id. 92 S. Ct. at 612.

This court recognized the first amendment right of access to the courts in Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.1979), where we stated: "It is by now well established that access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances." Id. at 1387. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 336, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1363 (5th Cir.1983).

A number of other courts have also recognized that this right of access is encompassed by the first amendment right to petition. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir.1972); Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 317 (7th Cir.1971); Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F. Supp. 914, 921 (E.D.La.1981); Crews v. Petrosky, 509 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 n. 10 (W.D.Pa.1981).

A third constitutional basis for the right of access to the courts is found in the due process clause. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court defined the right of access in a civil rights action under section 1983 in the following terms

The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery [ Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969)] was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ.

Id. 94 S. Ct. at 2986. See also Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647, 648 (5th Cir.1981); Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir.1979). The due process clause has also been construed to allow prisoners meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971).

A mere formal right of access to the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Courts have required that the access be "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. at 1495; see also Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d at 1078. Interference with the right of access to the courts gives rise to a claim for relief under section 1983. Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.1969) (destruction by jail guards of legal papers necessary for appeal supports claim for damages under § 1983); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d at 6 ("Of what avail is it to the individual to arm him with a panoply of constitutional rights if, when he seeks to vindicate them, the courtroom can be hermetically sealed against him by a functionary who, by refusal or neglect, impedes the filing of his papers?"); Crews v. Petrosky, 509 F. Supp. at 1204 ("An allegation that a clerk of state court has negligently delayed the filing of a petition for appeal, and that the delay has interfered with an individual's right of access to the courts, may state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (emphasis added). See also Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 317 (7th Cir.1971) (prison authorities may not place burdens on right of access to courts); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.1972).

In conclusion, it is clear that, under our Constitution, the right of access to the courts is guaranteed and protected from unlawful interference and deprivations by the state, and only compelling state interests will justify such intrusions.

Procedural Due Process:

As stated above, the Rylands' complaint may also be construed to allege a deprivation of their right to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. Our analysis must begin with the inquiry whether the Rylands possessed an interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Rylands claim that they have been deprived of property without due process. The Supreme Court has long held that "the hallmark of property . . . is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause. '" Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735-36, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2708-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, supra note 4, defines the right of parents to institute wrongful death claims as a property right.*fn5 We have previously recognized the rights of survivors to bring a wrongful death action under sections 1983 and 1988 where authorized by state law. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S. Ct. 243, 7 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1961). In Brazier, we held that in enacting section 1988, "Congress adopted as federal law the currently effective state law on the general right of survival." 293 F.2d at 405 (emphasis added).*fn6....

In essence, the allegations in the complaint may be characterized as wrongful interference by the defendants with the Rylands' access to the courts. Alternatively, the actions of the defendants can be analyzed as a conspiracy to obstruct justice.

An analysis of the extent of a constitutional deprivation is not an exact science capable of quantification; rather, it is qualitative in nature. Thompson v. Washington, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 497 F.2d 626, 636 (D.C.Cir.1973). However, we have previously held that "if state officers conspire . . . in such a way as to defeat or prejudice a litigant's rights in state court, that would amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws by persons acting under color of state law." Dinwiddie v. Brown, 230 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 971, 76 S. Ct. 1041, 100 L. Ed. 1490 (1956). Conduct by state officers which results in delay in the prosecution of an action in state court may cause such prejudice. As we stated in Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S. Ct. 1392, 67 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1981):

Delay haunts the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly accused. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. But even these are not the worst of what delay does. The most erratic gear in the justice machinery is at the place of fact finding, and possibilities for error multiply rapidly as time elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination"\

Id. at 303-04 n. 10 (quoting Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Stoot, 530 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex.1975) (emphasis added).

The actions of the defendants may also have amounted to a violation of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides in section 22 of its Declaration of Rights that "every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to [his] . . . property . . . ." La.Const. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).

The decision goes on to say that a conspiracy to deny access to court is actionable on its own.

Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 07/05/1983) kay sieverding (talk) 23:03, 10 October 2008 (UTC)