Talk:Winter War/Archive 1

The given number of foreign volounteirs vary quite a lot. It would be good to see some references to reliable statistics aswell as a distinction between number of arrived willing, number of volounteirs deemed fit to fight, and the number of men really active at the front.
-- Ruhrjung 19:23 15 May 2003 (UTC)

Manner of fighting

As I recall from a military history class long ago, the manner in which Finland's troops fought was quite interesting. Some things are mentioned briefly in the article, such as ski troops and their experience with the weather. However, does anyone have more information that could be added? I remember things about their barracks, which were dug underground (and thus quite warm). Also, I believe there was more information about how they kept their fuel from freezing like the Russians' did. I'm sorry I can't be more helpful, but I thought some of the unique aspects of the Winter War fighting might have been left out. I know we saw a video, I will post the name if I can remember and find it. --BekiB 13:55, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

More source info needed

This article would really need more source info!

Definitely. Or maybe a VfD.

"After the war it became known that the commander of the Allied expedition force actually was instructed to avoid combat contact with the Soviet troops."

It is possible that this really happened, but since respected historians (Heikki Ylinkangas comes to my mind) debate about issues concerning the events and decisions leading to not accepting help (?) from England and France and the events that would have followed if Finland had accepted this help.

Also more info regarding this issue and Finland's relationship to the Allies would in my opinion improve this article.

-- Somebody

There was a huge mistake in text... It claimed that the Russians out-numbered the Finns by 3 to 1 , but perhaps 10 to 1 would be more correct...

-Just another Finn--

On Communists in the Winter War

There is a considerable difference between barring political extremists, and not expecting them to participate in armies build on the idea that absolutely all men who are able to has to take part in the country's defense. I guess you have good sourses?
--Ruhrjung 16:39, 25 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I thought this was an "expect"/"accept" confusion, which is pretty common in English. Maybe a better was to phrase it would be "not accepted into fighting units because of their political background".

Lack of Western Support

I'm preparing an article on the concept of Western Betrayal (User:Halibutt/Western betrayal). I need some info on the pacts Finland had signed with the West, allied support for Finland during the Winter War (or lack of support) and the feelings towards the Allies in Finnish society. Could anyone help?Halibutt 11:46, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Well, it's not the easiest thing to tell. On one hand, it's something we got with the mother milk, on the other hand, the officially and academically purported truth don't fully support the feeling of betrayal - but the feeling is no less real.

With my father's words: there were no alliances or treaties they could break, only the band of blood and our trust in the Western countries' honesty.

Sweden's betrayal was the gravest, but the League of Nations led by France and Britain had nothing but words of sympathy to offer, when what we needed was soldiers of flesh and blood. There had been a long debate in Finland, and people had become convinced that the System of the League and the adaptation to Scandinavian expectations would give Finland the best protection against the "Red Threat" from Russia. It turned out that those authorities that had advocated policies oriented at the League and at Scandinavia, they were naive and mistaken - and so was the people who believed them. The Finns were literally naïve — From the diplomatic corps to the crofters — With very, very few exceptions (chiefly: Mannerheim and Paasikivi). They had every right to be literally naive. Before Finland's independence in 1917, no Finn had been responsible for any country's foreign policies for at least over a hundred years.

The Finns were led to believe that Sweden and the other Western countries would come to Finland's support if we were attacked by Russia. Many Finns had only reluctantly accepted the government's pro-Scandinavian and anti-German line, and the convincing argument was that blood is thicker than water. Sweden had two incentives to come to our support. Firstly, since Finland is Sweden's shield against Russia, and secondly due to our long shared history and "everything we have in common." It might be true that the Charter of the LoN, and the lofty rhetoric from international diplomatic banquettes fooled some contemporary Finnish journalists, for instance, but primarily it wasn't really "the Swedes" or "the Europeans" who gave us promises. It was our Finnish leaders and experts who explained the world to us, who also made us believe that if we did this-and-this then the other nations were obliged to solidarity. Unfortunately, that solidarity turned out to be words and very little else.

In this context it ought to be said that the Swedes see their support as much, much more than "words and little else". The credits and gifts from Sweden to Finland's support, in connection with the Winter War, were greater than Finland's yearly state budget. Additionally 55,000 Finnish children in school age and pre-school age were evacuated to strangers' homes in Sweden, another 5,000 to friends and relatives in Sweden, another 5,000 hospitalised children were evacuated to sanatoriums in Sweden, another 5,000 children were evacuated to Denmark. These children returned first after the war (20% remained in Sweden). This was no insignificant commitment, but in all honesty, it was bad for the kids - and their traumas make it hard for the Finns to recognize this great sacrifice by the Swedes. If you ask Swedes who experienced this time, all give the picture of a total mental mobilization for the sake of Finland's. Everyone wanted to help — With much or with little, depending to capacity. Housewives knitted protective gears against the 40-degrees cold for the soldiers; factories worked extra Sundays and sent the money corresponding the day-wages to Finland, and so on, and so on. Finns can't take this seriously. It doesn't count. The only thing that counts is the 8,000 volunteers at the front, and that they only were 8,000 men. Sweden didn't send her army, and therefore Finland lost Karelia. That loss tears our eyes and makes it impossible to appreciate that the LoN actually did expel the Soviet Union, and that ordinary Swedes actually made sacrifices. They didn't send regular troops, they didn't send regular troops, they didn't send regular troops - damned Swedes! (...and damned hypocrites in Paris and London!)

As a legacy of the Civil War, the society's elite was much more right-leaning than in the countries the people felt kindered to — that is to the West. Anyhow, people our contemporary Americans would call Wilsonian won the debate in Finland but lost their face when they met reality in the Winter War. International law, international esteem, the League of Nations, and such Wilsonian concepts were of little use when Russia attacked. Their opponents (from our contemporary time, Rumsfeldt comes to my mind as an equivalent) were rehabilitated by the end of the Winter War, and both for reasons of prestige and due to the dire need to reorientate Finland towards Germany in haste, they made minced meat of the Wilsonan beliefs which had been the basis for Finland's foreign policy up to November 1939, and the whole society suddenly saw everything differently — from the President to the crofters — America's experience of September 11th comes to mind as a similarly impetus blow. And the rather strong feeling of betrayal is in company with this earthquake in the minds of the Finns. The one isn't possible to understand without the other.

The allienation was reinforced by London's and Washington's agreement with Soviet lies. Finland was twice attacked from Russia. And evertime someone refers to this in English, the second blow is said to have come from Finland. Such a heinous lie! And in Russian, of course both occations are described as Finnish attacks on Russia. And many Anglophones are happy to believe that too. ...and on top of this the nefarious Paris Peace Treaty...

There are of course some "hard facts" to give as examples, for instance Finland's choise of Swedish munition instead of German, a decission made in the mid-1930s in the hope of Swedish reinforcements being more realistic than German. However, history tought us otherwise. But the hard facts are, in my opinion, diverting the understanding of Finland's feeling of betrayal. /Tuomas 14:30, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Great, that's exactly what I needed. I'll let you know as soon as I finish turning it into an article.Halibutt 14:39, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

There could be much added, of course. But the most important aspects are all above. Maybe with one exception. All nations may have problems to recognize how the world seems for other nations, but in this case it's pretty obvious, that some of the feeling of betrayal is based in a profound lack of understanding how Finland was viewed in other countries. Maybe it was Finland's luck that the Finns didn't understand how fragile the new Finnish state could be deemed in other capitals, and how allienated the population in Scandinavia was made by the chain of 1/ the Language strife won by the anti-Scandinavians, 2/ the Civil War, 3/ post-war concentration camps where thousands of trade union leaders were reported to die as flies, 4/ pro-Polish and anti-Scandinavian foreign policies in the 1920s including militarist expansionism, stubborn disregard for the Ålanders' wishes to determ themselves which state to belong to, and the first Finnish president's refusal to make a state visit in Stockholm, 5/ government support for the (semi-) fascist Lapua movement, 6/ the election of Lapua's candidate Svinhufvud to a president who didn't believe in parliamentarism and put an honor in suppressing the political influence of Social Democrats. This hardly warmed the hearts of Swedes who had good experiences of parliamentarism and Social Democratic ministers playing leading roles since 1917. Unfortunately, for the Finns, the Swedes who were the most enthusiastic advocates of support for Finland were also known as the least sympathetic for neutrality, democracy and parliamentarism. Even Paasikivi, otherwise competent, failed miserably as an Ambassador to Stockholm in the late 1930s. He nurtured contacts with the wrong, uninfluential, rightist monarchist and pro-German circles, and forgot totally to communicate with Liberals, Agrarians, trade unionists, Social Democrats, the influential Temperence Movement and the Co-op Movement.

The Finnish worldview of the 1930s never absorbed the Scandinavian fear for Nazi Germany. Or, maybe more correct: those few Finns who did were the very same who above are called "Wilsonian". But even Väinö Tanner shows clearly, both in his contemporary letters and in his book later written in prison, that he didn't recognize a Swedish danger for being invaded from the South -- or after an Allied "support" to Finland being made a battlefield between Franco-British forces in the North and Russo-German forces in the South.

"Karelia" stands for the uniquely Finnic root to Finnishness, few Finns can see the loss of Karelia as a small price to pay for national survival. Other countries, with longer history as independent states, have other and greater losses to compare with. The suspicion that Sweden had been more interested to fight for other, less "Finnish" parts of Finland is irritating. Also if Finns today can recognize that Finland from January 1940 did no longer fight for her national survival, and that the reasons for foreign governments to send troops hence diminished, it is still not right that Finland should suffer alone for Russia's breach of international law.

I happen to agree - but let's keep this to the context of an encyclopedia of facts please. --/Mat 15:39, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Sure. That's why converting it to encyclopaedia style and format takes so long and is so hard... Halibutt 22:02, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I'm sure you aren't supposed to include everything above. :-)) I support your ambition wholeheartedly, thinking that people's sentiments and feelings in some critical cases may be relevant even in encyclopedias. Compare the article on Anti-American sentiments. --Ruhrjung 17:57, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I came across a small detail just a few days ago, when confronted with the belief that the front-line at the end of the winter war by and large coincided with the post-war border. I'm convinced that this is not how most Finns would describe it. I remember many late-night unsober rantings on the loss of the city of Vyborg and the towns of Käkisalmi and Sortavala, non of which were conquered by the Red Army in the war, but lost at the negotiation table. In that context I remember to have heard the figures 25 kilometers at the Bay of Vyborg, 100 kilometers from Taipale (i.e. along and past Ladoga's southern shore, passing Käkisalmi halfways), and 50 kilometers at Sortavala/Ladoga's northern tip — for the difference between end-war frontiers and post-war border. Since the three towns and the relatively densely populated Ladoga-shore lie in this zone, many more homes (if not square kilometers) were lost in the peace negotiations than on the battle field.

Although this bitter loss can be blamed on the Russian Stalinists and the Finnish herrat (the elite, the masters), the international community, the Swedish king and prime minister Per Albin Hansson bear a heavy part of the responsibility since the Swedes declined in public statements to follow the Swedish opinion that demanded troops to be sent to the Karelian isthmus, and barred France and England from sending help through Sweden. Particularly the King's role seem to have left bitter marks in the Finnish soul.
--Ruhrjung 17:57, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)

---

"Already within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider to blew the operation off" - I presume this is meant to be "blow the operation off"? But I don't know enough terminology on this subject to correct it. --/Mat 15:39, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Disputed

How come there now is an announcement at the top of the article of it being disputed? Where does it come from? Why is it there? --Johan Magnus 08:25, 10 May 2004 (UTC)

I think it is work of 174, who tries to write texts were Soviet Unions acts are embellished. Kahkonen 09:26 10 May 2004 (UTC)

According to Wikipedia:NPOV dispute: If you add the above code to an article which seems to you to be biased, but there is no prior discussion of the bias, you need to at least leave a note on the article's talk page describing what you consider unacceptable about the article.. So I am going to remove the notice. -- Jniemenmaa 08:44, 10 May 2004 (UTC)

Winter War and World War II

Is the Winter War considered a part of World War II or, like the Continuation War, a somewhat distinct affair? Oberiko 14:54, 16 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I think it is part of WWII, so does European Theater of World War II for instance. In my opinion both the Continuation War and the Lapland War are part of WWII too. Actually it would be much easier to argue that the Winter War was a separate war. (This argument started at Talk:Mannerheim Line over the inclusion of that article in category:World War II defensive lines) -- Jniemenmaa 15:33, 16 Jun 2004 (UTC)

What makes the Winter War "a separate war" is probably only the Moscow peace treaty, and there is absolutely no need to emphasize it's separateness in other articles (in my humble opinion).

The Continuation War and the Lapland War are separate wars seen from a Finnish, or maybe Scandinavian, perspective as they were temporally distinct. But I don't remember to have met any Finn who would say that they were separate from World War II. The separate war dogm served the purpose to put sufficient political/diplomatic distance to the supportive Nazi Germany.

--Ruhrjung 17:23, 2004 Jun 16 (UTC)

Yes, Continuation War is said to be (and is) separate from Operation Barbarossa (Germany - Soviet War). Kahkonen 11:46, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)

Oh, well. Take a look at Operation Silberfuchs and the German XXXVI Corps for instance. Are these part of the Continuation War? (They take place in Finland and Finnish units were involved) or the Eastern Front? I'd say both. They are definetly part of Operation Barbarossa too. (whoops, slipping from the subject... :) -- Jniemenmaa 19:08, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Yes, but official Finnish liturgy is that ;-) Kahkonen 19:29, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)

They are more connected to the War against the Axis in Europe than the War in the south Pacific/SE Asia. say1988 03:49, 13 September 2006 (UTC)

Vote 1/0/2

Alright, just so I'm certain, I'd like to hold a vote here before I change anything.

The proposition is that the Winter War and Continuation War are both theatres of World War II (Like the Eastern Front or the North African Campaign). Oppossing will mean that you believe that they are separate, concurrent wars (like the Spanish Civil War).

This vote will be over in one week (June 28th) unless an extension is asked for.

Support

1. Of course they are part of WW II, because they occured during it. Kahkonen 11:43, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)
2. Jniemenmaa 13:46, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Oppose

1. Nope. Winter War was an "internal affair" of Finland and USSR. Anyway, Finns were clever enough starting WWII in support of Axis and ending it in support of Allies :-) --jno 11:20, 13 September 2006 (UTC)

Neutral

1. Oberiko 00:57, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)
2. Tuomas 04:38, 22 Jun 2004 (UTC) Indeed separate wars in a technical sense, since that was purposful for Helsinki, Moscow, London, Washington and Stockholm. Does it matter?

Comments

Why is a poll needed in the first place? Seems to be a consensus that the wars are part of WW2 (so far). Or did I miss something? (BTW, how can the Spanish Civil War be concurrent with WW2 if it ends in April 1939?) -- Jniemenmaa 08:01, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I'm going to be changing catagorization with this, I just want to be certain everyone's on the same page before I do so (as is, there were only three responses to the original question). Naturally if there's an obvious gap then we don't have to wait until the time is up.

As for the Spanish Civil War, I'm not sure, I think it's because it's just around the same time and had intervention from the Axis and some of the Allies. But you're right, I'll change it to Related Wars. Oberiko 10:19, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

So, is Winter War part of WW2 and if it is, shouldn't it be mentioned at main WW2 article?

Proposed minor edits

I'd like to make the following minor edits:

First, under Background, the phrase "the Soviets attacked with 23 divisions of 450,000 men who quickly reached the Mannerheim Line" could be interpreted as "23 divisions with 450,000 men each." I'd like to clarify this, changing the sentence to "the Soviets attacked with 23 divisions, totalling 450,000 men, which quickly reached the Mannerheim Line."

Also, under Foreign Support, this sentence sounds awkward to me: "Sweden, that had declared herself as a non-belligerent and not a neutral country, as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers, contributed with military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to die for Finland."

I'd like to change it to: "Sweden, which had declared herself as a non-belligerent rather than a neutral country (as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers), contributed military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to die for Finland."

Is this alright with everyone? These are pretty minor edits which don't change the meaning of the sentences, but I'd like to get approval anyway.

Go ahead! /Tuomas 07:58, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I have added the quote by President Kekkonen. If there is a way to edit it so it goes better in the text, go ahead! Finnish President U. Kekkonen stated in September 1963, "When now, after more than 20 years, we put ourselves in the position of the Soviet Union, then in light of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the concern that the USSR had, and should have had, in relation to its safety at the end of the 1930's becomes understandable." Rakovsky 00:26, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

A source link would be good here.

Alex Kanavin 62.78.255.126 19:42, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

I'd like to move "...and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to die for Finland." to the section about foreign volunteers on the finnish side, as this would make the article more "tidy". 85.164.59.93 14:51, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Factual Discrepancy

This article states that the Soviets outnumbered the Finn's 3 to 1 (and a person above stated that 10 to 1 may be more accurate). The History of the Soviet Union article goes as far as to say 50 to 1; quite a different statistic! So...which one is accurate? Jsan

factual discrepancy all over it

3:1? 10:1? 50:1?

All wrong. The Finns had, at the Karelian Isthmus, 6 infantry divisions (4, 5, 11, 8, 10, 6), 4 infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade and 10 battalions. That makes 80 battalions. The Russians had there, at the beginning of the war, 9 rifle divisions (24, 90, 138, 49, 150, 142, 43, 70, 100), one machine gun brigade and 6 armoured brigades. Which makes 84 battalions. 3:1, huh? The total strength of the Finns (at the Karelian Isthmus) was 130 thousand, of the Russians 169 thousand. 10:1? Not to mention that, e.g., the 138th rifle division entered the battle on the 11th of December, and the 100th on the 21st of December.

The total Russian strength, at the beginning of the war, was 20 divisions and one machine gun brigade (185 battalions), versus the total Finnish strength of 9 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, 35 detached battalions and 38 reserve battalions (170 battalions). So much for 50:1.

...They started the offensive without having a decisive numeric superiority. Which must have been 3:1 by any book. When they realised the mistake, they simply stopped the advance, amassed more troops, which took the rest of the year and January, reconnoitred the forts, and pulverized them with their 203mm howitzers and 280mm mortars...

As for the losses, then the number of Russians KIA was 127 thousand, Finns KIA 48 thousand. This article needs serious face lifting.

User:194.7.94.82 20:45, 7 Mar 2005

Well, it depends what you measure.

• Size of population: 170.5m vs. 3.5m -> 49:1
• Size of Armed Forces: 1 800 000 vs. 337 000 -> 6:1
• If Sep 9 Soviet mobilization is taken into account (add 2-3m) -> 10+:1
• Against Finland at start of Winter War: 450 000 vs. 317 000 -> 1.4:1
• At Carelian Isthmus: 180 000-190 000 vs. 133 000 -> 1.5:1
• Tanks against Finland: 2000 vs. 32 -> 62:1
• (Finns had even 112 37mm AT guns)
• Artillery: 2050 vs. 489 -> 4:1
• Daily shell usage: 230 000 vs. 4850 -> 47:1
• Combat planes: 800 vs. 119 -> 7:1

You are missing separate Soviet battalions from your order of battle, which produce additional personnel to the count. Also, you take into account three Finnish KT divisions, which were called to exercise but disbanded at end of October (to be called back into the duty at the beginning of December).

The bare 3:1 ratio for all troops in the front is never needed as was proved in France. It is only needed in the location of the breakthrough.

And where did you get that 48 000 Finns KIA?

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) See Simon Sebag Montefiore, "Stalin", p. 337 (paperback). He in turn cites a joint Russo-Finish work by O. A. Rzheshevsky and O. Vechvilayninen, "Winter War 1939-40" vol. I, detailing as follows: Finland 48243 KIA, 43000 wounded, 1000 POW; USSR 87506 KIA, 39369 MIA, 5000 POW. I was a bit off originally, quoting from memory.

Ok. I heard this same number exist in the book "Тайны и уроки зимней войны. 1939-1940" ("secrets and the lessons of winter war. 1939-1940 "), publisher "Издательство Полигон", St. Petersburg, 2000. It uses only Soviet sources, so it's value is questionable.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) The books I quoted used Finnish sources as well. If we start to say "written by Russians, ergo false", then, first of all, you should not refer to any Russian/Soviet materials (which you do), second, we might as well say "written by Finns, equally false". Then what's the point? The above mentioned materials represent the latest state of the research, done in Finland and by Finns, they were recognized as accurate by reputable historians, yet you cling to what sounds awfully like official Finnish propaganda.

At war, it is always hard to estimate how many casualties opponent suffers, and generally those are just educated guesses, typically overestimating own efficiency. So, if author uses only Soviet sources for Finnish casualties, I doubt very much their values. Similarily if author uses only Finnish sources for Soviet casualties, I doubt the values as well. Also it seems that I demand stricter adherance to first-hand sources, so that I like to know exact documents which are used by author, and value less those who do not give their primary sources at all. It is much easier to believe something which is based on the papers written and/or published at the time than those who present claims without a single paper for evidence.

I checked the book you mentioned, but couldn't find one with exactly the same name, so I believe that it is a Russian translation of a book Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: Talvisodan poliittinen historia ("Alone against major power: The political history of the Winter War") by O.A. Rzesevski (Finnish translittering) and Olli Vehviläinen, 1997, published by Finnish Historical Society and Soviet Academy of Sciences, ISBN 951-710-072-8. Russian translation is published 1998.

Well, the book is not exactly the consensus between Finnish and Russian historians, as O. Vehviläinen and A.O. Tsubarjan write in Foreword: ...in other questions there are still differing interpretations. When research can only progress through contradictions and disagreements between researchers, these differences with their reasonings are presented to the reader.

Did you check the numbers from the Stalin book or Winter War book? Because in the Vehviläinen's book Finnish casualties are given as 21 396 KIA, 1 434 MIA, 43 557 WIA and ~1 100 PoW (only 847 returned alive, ~20 refused to return and stayed in SU). In those numbers are missing those who died to their wounds later.

The Finns had very peculiar way to handle those killed in combat: They didn't bury them to the field but did everything they could to transfer them to their home parishes and they were buried there to separate "Sankarihautausmaa" (Hero's cemetaries) in separate graves with separate tombstones with name and birth and death dates. (This gave birth to the Finnish proverb "Kaveria ei jätetä!" (Pal will not be left behind!)) If the body was totally destroyed or it was impossible to recover it, the empty casket was buried and tombstone raised. If he disappeared and wasn't recovered in exchange of war prisoners, he was declared dead six months afterwards and tombstone raised.

Sometimes it was impossible to transfer bodies immediately to the home parishes, then temporary military graveyards were created, but regularly they were emptied when military situation allowed. And if they couldn't be evacuated after the war, those soldiers had their empty graves in their local parishes. (Not all of those graves are empty nowadays, as after the Soviet collapse, Finnish volunteers had combed known Finnish military burial places and locations of known Finnish casualties in Karelian Isthmus and in Ladoga Karelia and brought the remnants of over two hundred soldiers back to Finland.)

In that kind of environment it is impossible to hide casualties. If somebody's son has left to war and he receives the message that his son is dead, he would automatically assume that his son would have tombstone in local Hero's cemetary. If that doesn't happen, do you think he would be quiet?

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) This does not prove anything at all. You're referring to anonymous persons whom we can never ask.

Even worse: I was referring to non-existing people.

Even after the Continuation War, when Communists were legalized in Finland, they never questioned the official body count and never found a single man or woman whose relative were not buried to the hero's cemetaries but had disappeared somewhere. It is totally impossible to hide half the casualties.

Everyone can go and count the number of graves.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Have you done it yourself? What can you prove with this kind of argument?

In my home parish, yes. Some friends of mine have done it in other parishes, most of those on the same general area I'm living. Number of graves match the number of fatalities recorded in books.

And what does it prove? It proves that there is no contradictory numbers between number of graves and numbers of recorded casualties. That nobody is crying about missing graves indicates that there are no missing graves. And both of those together indicate that the official Finnish number of casualties is the correct one and the one from Soviet sources is highly exaggerated. --Whiskey 23:21, 7 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Several books has been written describing the names of casualties in each parish, or each region and there is even a database available in the web where you can search all casualties. So I'd say that there is no question how many deaths Finland suffered during the World War II.--Whiskey 00:59, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Whiskey 00:33, 9 Mar 2005 (UTC)

A splendid summary! Ought to be put into the article under a heading of its own. Very different figures for comparisons of the strength-relation are common in texts on the Winter War. Here we have a chance to establish it authoritatively with references to sources and so on! /Tuomas 16:36, 9 Mar 2005 (UTC)

All the x:y comparisons in the article and earlier in the discussion were not qualified; the obvious guess would be the head count of the fighting armies. And that one is far from 3:1 even if a few battalions are miscounted (then again, what about 100K+ Suojeluskunnat? 10K+ foreign volunteers, almost a division?). Comparing the populations or even the armed forces overall is useless except from the political point of view, but let's address that separately.

It is true, that at most cases it is not said, what were compared, which is unfortunate. But head count of the armed forces had not been for over 400 years the defining factor, but technology, training and economic potential has been that. That's why it would be much more important to compare number of modern equipment instead of number of men with rifles.

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Then you must also factor in the fortifications, which the Finns possessed in abundance, and the Russians lacked; proximity to the supply stores (inversely proportional to the distance in kilometers multiplied by their throughput); knowledge of the terrain (inversely proportional to the time since latest survey); and the list goes on and on. Even though I tried to give meaningful metrics for the factors mentioned above, they are much less dependable than head counts. Technology is good, but not decisive. The Russians had plenty of tanks but they were essentially useless on the terrain. The biggest offset was in the heavy artillery; the numerical superiority was the second; in just about any other respect, the Russian fared worse than the Finns.

The Karelian Isthmus was the best (and only) area suitable for tanks in Finland. And later in 1944, according to S.P.Platonov in Bitva za Leningrad 1941-1944 (Battle of Leningrad) claimed that STAVKA considered that Soviet manpower ratio of 1.2:1 was enough in Karelian Isthmus to breach Finnish lines when ratio of heavy equipment was 3-5:1. And fortifications in Main Defence line or VT-line were much stronger than they ever were in Mannerheim Line.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) "Russian, ergo false". Tanks are useless when the infantry cannot support them.

You cannot blame me for foolish Soviet commanders and their incompetence. Finns lacked artillery ammunition (also recorded in Soviet sources, btw.) to efficiently protect their installations.

There is no need to have separate count for Suojeluskunnat because their members formed 1/3 of the Finnish army, soldiers, underofficers and officers. They never had their own units but were distributed to their home units. (Finnish system during Winter War was such that men for each company were collected from the same parish, so they all knew each other beforehand, adding unit cohesion.) At the beginning of the Winter War, there were no foreign volunteers. (And those numbers I gave were concerning the situation at Nov 30, 1939 except the daily average of artillery shell usage.)

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The Suojeluskunnat members could and did fight where they lived, drafted or not. Much like the Russians during WWII in the occupied territories.

Nope. Only those members who were unfit for military service due to their young or old age were left home to serve in guard duty guarding bridges, rail yards etc. All those who were capable to serve in military were drafted and placed to their local units and transferred to the front. They were never intended to be used in a manner Soviet used their partisans.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Wonderful. We're talking about this spiritual war, yet you're claiming that the Finns would not fight if not officially in military service. I thought better of the Finns, quite frankly. Even the French did better than that.

Well, then you have to factor in grandpa's and kids from Leningrad on Soviet side also. The area Soviet forces occupied was evacuated, so there was no-one to start guerilla war.

"3:1 is only needed in the location of the breakthrough" is a property of Blitzkrieg warfare. Which is not practicable in Finland. Adjusted to Finland’s conditions, the entire Karelian operation was a breakthrough. In February, when the Russians had about 3:1 and artillery to spare.

No, it is as old as the oldest city walls. It was never necessary to breach walls everywhere, what was needed was single breach point which could be used to move forces inside the fortification. And it truly was usable in Finland. The Feb offensive proves the point, as Soviets did NOT try to breach Mannerheim Line everywhere but concentrated their efforts to Summa. You can see it clearly if you check where Soviet units, especially the new formations, were at the time. They were not spread equally along the line but concentrated to Summa.

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The city walls analogy is flawed. Attackers must be significantly stronger than the defenders. Otherwise, if the attackers amass most of their forces at one particular spot at the wall, the defenders may simply outflank them and the "attackers" will suddenly find themselves between a hostile wall and hostile troops, with no supplies. Guess what will happen then. Blitzkrieg has the same property: the breakthrough spot must be 3:1 or greater, but the flanks must also be strong; otherwise, the "Blitzkrieg" will result in self-encirclement (c.f. the massacre of the Russians in the north; also Stalingrad, 1942-43). It is only at the tactical level that the attackers need only have local superiority, because the tactical level is limited temporally and does not deal with the question "what happens if the enemy switches his troops from 100 km away".

With Soviet material superiority,

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) See above. It was offset by other factors.

the strong enough flanks would be more like 0.8:1 which leaves a lot of troops to be massed against the breach point. In most cases Soviets didn't have the 3:1 when breaking through enemy lines in WWII. For example in Bagration they had overall 2.5:1, but overwhelming in breakthrough points.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Thank you for the confirmation. There was about the same ratio in Finland, second attempt.

But it still failed to reach 3:1 you claimed was necessary.

And like I wrote above, Platonov claims that STAVKA considered 1.2:1 enough to crush Finland 1944.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) You really ought to decide, whether you trust or mistrust Russian sources.

I trust Soviet low level sources, like copies of orders, maps, reports etc. Higher level sources tend to be less trustworthy. Basically, if you catch them few blatant lies, then it becomes much harder to believe anything they say. The two most common lies are perhaps the existence of Secret protocol in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and shelling of Mainila when speaking about the Winter War. --Whiskey 23:21, 7 Apr 2005 (UTC)

...

User:194.7.94.82 18:40, 9 Mar 2005

Could you please sign your entries (with four tildes for example)? It would make them much easier to read. I'll answer your political considerations under the new subsection. --Whiskey 15:22, 10 Mar 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) I prefix my replies thusly. I have no idea how I could make myself a user like you.

In the top right corner there is a "Create account/log in" link. By pressing it you can create an account you can use. --Whiskey 00:59, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

According to the latest study Finnish losses were 26,662 KIA and DOW, including those who succumbed to their wounds by the end of 1940. -- Mikko H. 1 July 2005

Political Considerations

The other parts of the article are just as amusing. One the one hand, it claims "the Russians had had enough" and so it was a good time to negotiate honourable conditions, while, on the other hand, "The Finns were shocked by the harsh peace terms". Why, then, could the Finns who were doing so stellarly well, not negotiate mild conditions?

The real history of that war is very simple: the Russians seriously underestimated the strength of the Finns and the quality of their fortifications (in fact, the Russians did not even know that the Finns had modern flanking/interlocking fire forts, let alone where they were). They started the offensive without having a decisive numeric superiority. Which must have been 3:1 by any book. When they realised the mistake, they simply stopped the advance, amassed more troops, which took the rest of the year and January, reconnoitred the forts, and pulverized them with their 203mm howitzers and 280mm mortars. By the 12th of February, the Summa sector of the Mannerheim line collapsed (hence the armistice draft). Following that, the Finns were doomed, and they started peace negotiations in March. At that time, the Russians could have done anything they wanted, annexation of the entire country included.

User:194.7.94.82 20:45, 7 Mar 2005

Finns were all the time ready to negotiate peace treaty, and tried to open contacts to SU since early January. It was Soviet Union which until January 29 when they first admitted that there is a war going on and Finnish government exists in Helsinki. It is possible, that SU didn't knew architecture of the most recently built fortifications, but it is only self-delusion that they were unaware of most of them, as only their doors were locked but they were not guarded or located in restricted area, so anybody could have walked in and drawn a picture.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) This is naive. You cannot extend your contemporary ideas of borders in Europe to the pre-WWII situation.

Could you please clarify? Soviet spies were vary active before the Winter War as was exemplified by the "Red Army Marching Guide to Finland", small book found on a dead Soviet officer near Suomussalmi, where all main roads, their chokepoints, workarounds, bridges with their weight limits etc. were described. It is not believable that Soviet intelligence failed to check bunkers by the main road leading from Leningrad to Viipuri.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) What is there to clarify? Conducting field reconnaissance of fortifications in the border area of a hostile country, where each local will immediately see and report a stranger is not exactly easy. It takes much more than "drawing a picture" to create useful maps of fortifications, when you consider that GPS will be invented only in fifty years. Besides, practically all Russian accounts, some of which you do seem to trust, mention that they knew very little about fortifications.

Soviet spies managed to spectacularly collect information from bridges and their capabilities. Also being a Soviet spy doesn't mean that one has to be Russian, there were enough Finns to do the job. Viipuri was the most cosmopolitan city in Finland at the time, and many residents had their holidays at Terijoki, close to Soviet border. Also Finnish geographic administration has made very good maps which were available to all willing to buy them. (Even today their copies are useful to tourists traveling outside main roads in Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia.) And all this during the two decades before the war. At least Molotov was very aware of Finnish fortifications during negotiations before the war. It was the stupidness of army leadership if they failed to inform field commanders about them. And it was really interesting that few concrete reinforced machine gun nests without necessary artillery protection proved to be so hard to breach. On average there was one armed (armed with mgs, but six gun bunkers north of River Vuoksi) bunker for every 3km. And the amount of concrete used for Pentagon one could have built 22 Mannerheim Lines.

The Finns were doing stellarly well, considering material situation, but even that wasn't enough. The main reasons why Finns accepted the harsh peace are 1) No foreign intervention (Swedish no to regular troops and allied troop transportation, insufficient allied participation) and 2) No more ammunition.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Yup. The Germans in 1945 also were doing stellarly well, considering material situation, but even that wasn't enough. The main reasons why Germans accepted the harsh peace are 1) No foreign intervention (Swedish no to regular troops and allied troop transportation, insufficient allied participation) and 2) No more ammunition.

Nope. German fronts had collapsed and allies are marching forward several kilometers each day,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Which is all that matters.

capital was occupied,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Does not mean anything at all. The capital of Prussia, for example, was once occupied by Russian troops, moreover, all the Prussians made an oath of loyalty to Russia, yet the King and the army continued to exist and regained control of Prussia, never surrendering.

It was at the time before industialization and total war. Cannot compare.

all of the industrial

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Which practically did not exist in Finland.

Everything is relative. For what existed, hadn't been occupied.

and economical heartland was occupied when Germany surrendered unconditionally and was occupied.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Does not matter when the enemy troops "are marching forward several kilometers each day".

So all that is important is "marching forward several kilometers each day" and Finland was to see that if she had been controlled by a madman like Hitler. Much like I dislike that Finnish govt, they finally opened their eyes and realized what was going on.

But in Finland fronts were not marching several kilometers each day. During the last two weeks of war, marching speed was several hundred meters each day at best locations.

Soviet Union ditched the original plan and settled less because

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The Soviet Union did not ditch the original plan; the post-war demands were actually slightly bigger than the pre-war.

I have to clarify: Soviet Union postponed the original plan.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) What original plan? The original plan was fulfilled; the USSR received the land and the naval bases, and then some.

The original plan was to occupy and annex Finland.

I am sorry to interrupt. The original plan was to install a communist dictatorship in the form of Democratic Republic of Finland under Otto Wille Kuusinen.

It was only sometimes near the end of the Continuation War, when the original plan was ditched. The original plan was to annex Finland,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Did you ask Stalin himself? There is no reliable evidence as to this "plan". Even if there is some evidence, then it will necessarily come from Russia, and you seem determined to ignore such evidence anyway.

Oh, there are lots of evidence! The most shining one is the creation of Terijoki government, Molotov's international declaration that there is no war between Finland and Soviet Union, radio broadcasts, leaflets and published newspaper by Terijoki government where new Finnish territory included not only Repola and Porajärvi but large areas from Olonets and Viena Karelia, captured orders from destroyed Soviet divisions in middle Finland where they were ordered to behave politely to Swedes at Tornionjoki, etc.

and after the ditching it was changed to making Finland communist satellite state, but even that had to be postponed to the unseen future 1948, when communists were kicked from the government.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Same question, same remark.

Given demand for unconditional surrender at June 1944 (declassified document is available), published interviews of Finnish communists after the war, actions and declarations of Finnish communists after the war.

1) Need to reorganize and train army before somebody else takes advantage of the sorrow state of it,

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) To dispatch it somewhere else, like in the Baltic States or Poland, perhaps.

You are not aware of extensive reform done in Red Army based on the experience from the Winter War? It was still ongoing when Germans attacked.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) And you're apparently not aware of the small enterprise in the Baltic States that followed within weeks and having to maintain military presence in the occupied Polish lands?

Soviet Union was increasing the size of the army very fast during the time, and it was estimated that only 40% of manpower was included to Winter War. The occupation of Baltic states could have been done at any suitable time, it was not timed to be done June 14, but the end of Winter War released troops to that enterprise. And you proved my point when pointing the occupation of Poland: SU couldn't spare time to finish Finland but had to move troops elsewhere.

2) Allied intervention could push SU to general war too early

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The allies never even considered for a second sending any expedition to rescue the Finns. The force they were preparing was to occupy parts of Norway or Sweden. Read Churchill’s memoirs, or any WWII book that deals with the battle of Norway. The Winter War was just a pretext.

You know that. I know that. In hindsight. At the time it happened Stalin didn't knew that.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Of course, you again asked Stalin himself. Please understand that ever since 1938 and until 1953 all the Russian foreign policy was made precisely by two persons, Stalin and Molotov. And we know exactly zero about what influenced their decisions most. Unless, of course, you want to trust all the Russian literature that you find so questionable on other occasions.

Declassified documents are quite revealing, and it was those documents Stalin and Molotov had to base their decisions. One recent research used declassified material of the meetings where material from Paris and London were handled and how Stalin reacted to those presented.

In fact, Soviet spies from Paris were feeding exaggerated reports of the troop numbers and the seriousness of preparations to send troops and material to Finland through the first months of 1940. Only few days after the peace was concluded he received correct numbers and plans.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) And we know that Stalin pushed aside similar reports until the 22nd of June, 1941. So it is hardly convincing.

Well, he didn't push them totally aside, as many units were upgraded to full war readiness before that date and Red Navy was issued to war footing day before actual attack.

3) German pressure to end conflict before allies arrive

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Source? As far as I know, the Germans would actually prefer to keep the war going.

Germans were fully aware of allied help offers and their real intentions of occupation of Swedish ore fields. And also what that would mean to German war machine. So Germans started to pressure both sides to the peace to thwart allied excursion. Officially German diplomats informed their Finnish counterparts that Germany will not help Finland and warned about allied participation. Unofficially Göring delivered letter through Swedish intermediates where he strongly pressured government to accept any kind of peace. On the Soviet side, German ambassador in Moscow, von der Schulenburg, announced German worries for dragging war and hoped it would end quickly.

4) Finns were still resisting furiously

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) As did the Germans in 1945, see above.

But contrary to Germany, the heartland was still unconquered and fronts were holding. Barely, but still holding, and Soviet advances could be counted in tens or hundreds of meters each day after the retreat to back line.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) It was not holding anywhere. It was wide open and easily exploitable. The Russians may never have tried to exploit, but it was probably because they simply expected that the Finns would finally stop playing fool.

Until the peace Soviet forces were under an order to capture as much ground as possible, as was evidenced by declassified documents. This lead for example a foolish assault in Viipuri lasting two hours at the morning of March 13, several hours after the peace treaty was signed.

One of the most striking features of this discussion is your conviction that the Russians do something nasty simply by default; and when they do something less nasty (they cannot do anything decent by definition, so it can only be less nasty), it necessarily means they are forced.

I don't think Soviets did nasty by default and I could imaging many things they could have done more nasty. It is only so, that the evidence available supports my interpretation better. And Stalin really understood the meaning of force.

Have you ever considered, even for a second, that the Russians genuinely wanted to safeguard their country against a Finnish invasion (having some post-revolution reminiscences) and they merely wanted a strip of land and a couple of islands, and did not want to escalate the conflict beyond that? Then all their actions make sense, eliminating any guesswork.

I have considered it and found that it doesn't fit available evidence. If they were genuine in their interest to safeguard their border, they would have acted very differently before the war. --Whiskey 16:15, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Even your aftermath analogies with the Baltic States do not make much sense. The Russians knew that if they should have a war, the enemy would come from the West, through the Baltic States, which is why their annexation was strategically sound. They knew that no serious force would come from the North, so annexation of Finland was strategically useless. You may have noticed that in the actual event, only one year later, it happened exactly like that: the real enemy came from the West, and the North only deposited a token force. Which was, however, sufficient to cut-off and starve Leningrad; without the buffer gained at the Winter War, Leningrad would probably have been consumed entirely.

In Soviet plans fight would be taken to the enemy ground immediately. Controlling Finnish territory would have strategic signifigance, as it provides threat to the Swedish ore fields and ore transport, control of Northern shore of Gulf of Finland and provide strategic depth to the Murmansk. I disagree the significance of Winter War to the survival of Leningrad. Without the war it could have been likely that no attack from Finnish soil to Soviet Union would have happened and Finland could have provided some food to the civilians of the city, but Winter War and Soviet policy after the war guaranteed the Continuation War.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) By the same argument, Germany's enemies should have hurried to transact peace in March 1945.

They would have done it, if there had been the threat of attack from two almost equal opponents as German enemies and if German leadership had been willing to negotiate. :-)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Almost equal opponents? This is nonsense. They had to transport their troops by sea, which is already limiting. Further they could not transport much, because that would have naked the Western front.

5) was the phoney war really a phoney and in truth Germans and allies were negotiating peace and common attack against SU. --Whiskey 18:04, 10 Mar 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Source?

Paranoid like Stalin couldn't count on that not to happen. Germany had been vocal critic of Soviet Union and had clear intentions to attack it. Britain and France had participated in Russian Civil War less than two decades earlier in an attempt to overthrow communist regime. (Stalin had kept three divisions in Murmansk to defend the area against possible allied invsion through the whole Winter War.) And like you said, phoney war was kind of phoney: in half a year neither side had made a real offensive. No serious blood had been spilled in an amount that negotiated solution would become impossible, and allies had sold Checks before... Lots of reasons for mistrust.--Whiskey 08:40, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) So there is no proof except that "Stalin was paranoid". Which is also not granted, by the way.

Stalin never counted on the goodwill of France and Britain towards Soviet Union. In fact, he used British as an example to the threat to Soviets about the same seriousness as a Germany. --Whiskey 22:01, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

There exists a phase of the war, spanning over most of February 1940, when it seems as if Finland's Cabinet interpreted the fresh Russian preparedness to discuss peace terms as a sign of weakness that had to be exploited, and in effect focused on their hope for a more favorable attitude from Stockholm and more substantial support from France and the United Kingdom. It may be said that the Finns were "all the time ready to negotiate a peace treaty" but then it must be kept in mind that they were so on their own terms — terms that most of all didn't take into account that the Soviet Union in fact was a 50 times as populous country.

/Tuomas 15:46, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the political establishment was partly still living the time of Russian revolution and their expectations of Soviet military capabilities were based of the collapsing tsarist army and fresh unexperienced red army, which had failed so spectacularly in Poland and Estonia.--Whiskey 12:14, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Speaking of the political point of view, the position of Finland can only be characterized as inadequate. It is obvious now and was obvious back then that Finland would lose. So her only hope was for external help. But that was even more inadequate, after the (then) fresh examples of "Western help". Czechoslovakia was not helped; Poland had a GUARANTEE for military help, which never materialized (the "Phoney War" as military help is, well, phoney). And Finland was not exactly well situated for help in the first place. It would not have received help from Germany, and it would not have received much from Sweden (who could not risk irritating Hitler's biggest ally too much); the British could not have landed anywhere in Norway without causing Germany to invade Norway (which happened anyway because of their "preparations"); the only port into the Atlantic that Finland had would have been (and was) cut off in the first days of war. Both Russia and Finland paid dearly for this inadequacy.

User:194.7.94.82 18:40, 9 Mar 2005

You analysis is correct in hindsight, but one can not forget that there is a certain inertia in peoples' thoughts — particularly when under stress — so in fact it was not understood in Helsinki that the guarantee system of the League of Nations was totally defunct, or that the Swedes really feared, and had reason to fear, the threats of invasion from Britain and Germany. Virtually all leading Finns were bound by old impressions and perceptions, and also disadvantaged by a certain lack of understanding for important leaders and movements in other countries. An important explanation for this is that independent Finland had a ready set of civil servants, but absolutely no experience of diplomacy beyond that kind of "diplomacy" that the semi-autonomous Grand Duchy had pursued with Russian powers. And the era of the League of Nations prepared the Finnish diplomatic corps very badly for the needs after the Abyssinia Crisis. Another partial explanation is that the outcome of the Civil War removed a generation or two of Social Democrats, and pushed the Liberals far out in rightist direction, thus they who could have been bridges to their counterparts in other countries were incapacitated.

So, in effect, the foreign ministry in Helsinki didn't understand the power-relations between public opinion, politicians and bureaucrats in France, Britain or Sweden, nor the thinking in leftist movements that had gained influence due to democratization (and the Great Depression), most notably the Social Democrats who were the de-facto rulers in Stockholm. Neither did they understand Nazi Germany. And, by the way, also Kremlinology was a subject they flunked. So, yes, Finland's position was inadequate, and hopefully our diplomatic corps of today has learned some lessons.

...But, it's a matter of definition what you call a victory and a defeat. If Russia wanted all of Finland and Finland wanted preserved independence, then Finland won,

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) There is no indication whatsoever that the USSR actually wanted Finland entirely. The negotiations stopped when Finland refused to lease, sell or exchange Hanko.

For other proof that SU wanted Finland entirely, see above. The Soviet insistence of Hanko was another proof to Finns, that Soviets had something different in store for Finland that simple basing rights. SU didn't even try to change Hanko to some offshore islands, which would have been more acceptable to Finns.

although to the price of economically and emotionally very valuable territory at Lake Ladoga and the Karelan Isthmus. This, basically, is an echo of the position of Berlin and Stockholm when they pressured Helsinki to "give in". In retrospect I think many ministers in Finland's cabinet had too much of sisu for the good of the country, but that's of course a sacrilege to say.

:-)

/Tuomas 15:46, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)

One has to take into account the certain overjealous regard of land which is very common to newly independent states. And you certainly hit to the point with your analysis of Finnish diplomatic skills and experiences. I'm, as a Finn, more than ready to admit that Finnish leaders (maybe it is a national trait?) were stubborn and hanging too strongly to the legatimacy of treaties and papers and not seeing political currents beneath.

But, so was Soviet leadership also. If SU had negotiated more skillfully and Bona Fide, it had taken also into account Finnish security concerns

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) "An objective examination of these terms suggests that they were framed on a rational basis, to provide a greater security to Russian territory without serious detriment to the security of Finland. They would, clearly, have hindered the use of Finland as a jumping-off point for any German attack on Russia. But they would not have given Russia any appreciable advantage for an attack on Finland. Indeed, the territory which Russia offered to cede to Finland would have widened Finland’s uncomfortably narrow waistline." Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War.

This makes me wonder if Liddell Hart has really looked the maps. Repola and Porajärvi were located south from the narrowest part of Finland.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) I do not doubt that for a second. Moreover, you can check his maps, they are in the book.

The area SU offered was located south of Kostamus, but the narrowest waistline is well north of Kostamus.

but it failed to do it by keeping demanding a base at the Finnish coast of the mouth of Gulf of Finland and breach of Mannerheim Line at isthmus.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) "The re-adjustments of the frontier would still leave intact the main defences on the Mannerheim Line." Ibid.

Ok. This makes it. He has never looked the maps. The Soviet demands to the end of negotiations included Koivisto peninsula at the mouth of Bay of Vyborg thus breaching the Mannerheim Line which reached Gulf of Finland 20km east of Koivisto at Inkilä.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) He says "main defences" anyway. The Russians were willing to pay, so the Finns could use the money to restore that small sector.

The payment they offered was from Hanko, not from ceded fortification. Building fortifications takes time, and for that time Soviets have free access. Also that small Inkilä sector would have been replaced by a lot longer and less defensible line. And the new border would have given control of Bay of Viipuri to SU.

Although small movements on border corrections were made, they didn't solve any security concerns Finns had.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) See above.

Similar treaties with Baltic countries proved to be kiss of death to their independence, as Soviet military and their free access inside their territory made resistance impossible. And Soviets were adamant with Hanko base, which included the transportation through Finnish territory.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) You cannot use that argument. The Baltic States were annexed after the Winter War. Finland had no grounds whatsoever to believe she was to be annexed.

Poland had been already annexed. Also there was floating around versions about the contents of the secret protocol of Molotiv-Ribbentrop-pact, so most politicians in Finland had clear opinion what was to come. It is true, that some politicians, most notable being Paasikivi, considered that Baltic states had behaved more wisely during and right after the war, but when Baltic states were occupied June 14, even Paasikivi considered Finnish decisions not to accept demands correct and the best option for Finland.

The same thing is evident also in peace negotiations: It would have been major political strike against Finnish political system, if SU had refrained to it's original demands instead of more than they controlled militarily.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) I do not understand what is said here.

If Soviet Union has taken only what it demanded before the war, then public support to the government, which had led them to "avoidable" war with loss of life and no compensation from Eastern Karelia, could have collapsed. Although after the Terijoki Government the question become more complicated. --Whiskey 08:40, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) After your explanation, I understand it even less. Do you mean that the govt would have preferred to give more to the USSR? As for the "public support to the government", it should have collapsed much earlier. I have been trying to put it mildly, but I just cannot: that govt was a typical "war mongers" govt, and I just do not understand why it was never tried for its crimes.

Hypothesis: 1) Before the war: Soviet demands areas and offers compensation for those areas. 2) After the war: Soviet demands same areas and offers nothing in compensation. If those were the options, then which one would you have taken? In reality those were not the options and in it SU blundered it's opportunity to make coup in Finland. By it's blunders in diplomacy it only strengthened the Finnish government and undermined it's own cause.

Which government do you consider typical "war mongers" government, Ryti or Cajander? And why? --Whiskey 22:01, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

(There are only two wars, where Russia/Soviet Union received more land than they militarily controlled: Winter War and Continuation War.) It would have discredited whole political leadership before and during the war and possibly enabled communist coup before Barbarossa.--Whiskey 12:14, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

The difference: It turned out, they could afford it. ---Johan Magnus 15:41, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Yes, that is the way it works with major power-minor power relations: Major power can afford even very bad bluders without fatal consequences, minor powers don't, and they have to be much more careful with their actions, not to make or take promises lightly and not to tie itself too tightly with majors. Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was a good example of this kind of behaviour. --Whiskey 09:30, 15 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Timeline of Peace Negotiations

I'd like to add this here, as it could provide future material to article itself.

• December 24, Author Hella Wuolijoki writes a letter to Tanner where she offers to mediate peace negotiations.
• January 8, After negotiating with Ryti and Paasikivi and receiving information from Günther that Mme Kollontai would receive Wuolijoki, accept her offer.
• January 29, Günther delivers message from V. Molotov where he announces Soviet readiness to discuss with Finland.
• February 2, Finland proposes as a starting point the results from negotiations of previous autumn with additional concessions from Finland (through land exhange).
• February 5, Soviets reject proposal
• February 5, Allied high command decides to send troops to Finland
• February 11, Red army starts offensive at Summa
• February 12, SU presents territorial demands: Karelian Isthmus, Ladoga Karelia and Rybachi Peninsula.
• February 15, Mannerheim orders retreat to rear line.
• February 19, King of Sweden announces his rejection to officeal help to Finland.
• February 21, Tanner asks Günther to mediate with SU.
• February 23, SU respons with exact borderline for territorial demands.
• February 28, Finnish government decides that the only option is to make peace immediately.
• February 29, Mannerheim express very pessimistic view of military situation.
• March 3, Tanner informs Günther that Finland is ready for negotiations if Viipuri and Sortavala are left to Finns.
• March 5, Molotov rejects the demand.
• March 6, Finnish government selects peace negotiators.
• March 8, negotiations start, Salla is added to ceded territories.
• March 9, President Kallio and government gives authority to sign any kind of peace treaty to negotiators.
• March 12, Moscow Peace Treaty signed
• March 13, Ceasefire, the Winter War ends

--Whiskey 12:17, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

My correction

1) comander od Finns: Mannerheim (C-i-C), no Wallenius 2) soviet forces in Finland: minimal 1,3 milion man, porbably more - cca 450,000 is state from start of war only. 3) my balance of loses of soviet union is from soviet modern war literature.

Cinik (cswikipedia). 62.209.237.4 12:50, 10 Apr 2005 (UTC)

"Decisive Finnish Victory"???

What's this claim about Winter War being a "decisive Finnish victory"? Yes, we did well considering the circumstances, but didn't exactly march to Moscow! I suggest this is changed into "Soviet victory" because that's what it was.

-- Mikko H. 1 July 2005

It was a Finnish victory: Soviet Union tried to conquer Finland and Finland tried to prevent it. And Finland succeeded. – Zeal 1 July 2005 12:26 (UTC)

Sorry, but what kind of a victory forces the 'victor' to cede territory? Not to speak of 'decisive' victory? I'm afraid 'victory' is being redefined in a way that is simply not viable. -- Mikko H.

Victory in war doesn't mean that the one to win wouldn't have suffered any loss. Soviet Union didn't reach its goal, but Finland did. I'm not denying that Finland didn't lose anything, but it didn't lose the war when it repulsed the enemy's attemp to conquer the whole of Finland. – Zeal 1 July 2005 21:02 (UTC)

Soviet Union certainly did reach at least some of its goals. The Soviet-Finnish border was pushed over 100 km from USSR's second largest city; Soviet Union established a military base at the mouth of Gulf of Finland; the terms of Moscow Peace Treaty were essentially dictated by Soviet Union. All that was achieved with lower Soviet casualties per capita than Finnish casualties ( even if we accept Finnish official casualty estimates of 27,000 and Soviet "unofficial" numbers of 200,000 - although we know that official casualty numbers are never accurate and always underestimated ).

So, whatever it was, it certainly wasn't a decisive Finnish victory. Two good examples of "decisive" victories are Soviet victory in World War II ( where Soviets took Berlin and Germans ended up paying reparations ), and North Vietnam's victory in Vietnam war ( where Americans had to withdraw ). Soviet victory in Winter War does not even qualify as pyrrhic ( by definition, a pyrrhic victory requires that the victor is worse off after the war than he was before it started ). Pyrric victory is, for example, what Americans have now in Iraq. --Itinerant1 1 July 2005 22:11 (UTC)

Actually it might be best called a pyrrhic victory for the Soveit Union. They gained territory but at a terrible cost and humiliation. Falphin 7 July 2005 21:08 (UTC)

I have taken out the sentence that "The Finns were shocked by the harsh peace terms." They might have been very unhappy, but could not have been surprised, because they were in a very bad military position at that point, as even Mannerheim stated. Rakovsky 00:06, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Soviet-Finish victory

I don't think it was a victory on either side. Finland wasn't conquered and proved itself as a valuable ally to Germany while the Soviet Union despite it masss gained very little territory and was humiliated. However the Soviet Union did gain territory. So the wording should be that the outcome was disputed. Falphin 7 July 2005 21:07 (UTC)

If considering only outcome on the map, it was Soviet victory. If taking into account the losses in material, manpower, political prestige and military clout, it fills the definition of Pyrrhic victory: Gained something with too high, almost unacceptable, cost. For Finns, even though keeping sovereignty, Finland still lost territory, so it cannot be said that Finns won outright. I think, adapting from the words of Finnish novelist Väinö Linna: Finland won the silver medal. :-) -Whiskey 8 July 2005 06:15 (UTC)

The word "Pyrrhic" is a POV. "Unacceptable cost": You are looking from the modern perspective, when Americans rise a tremendus fuss over 2-3 pesons lost in action. For Stalin the losses were more than tolerable. mikka (t) 15:13, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

It wasn't only the loss of few soldiers which counted. The worst was the loss of political and military prestige, which undermined Soviet international standing tremendously. Although Stalin and STAVKA started corrective actions on military side immediately after the war, they were far from finished before Hitler launched Barbarossa. On political side the Winter War increased mistrust towards communists making their political work around the world much harder and stiffened the resistance of anti-communist forces.--Whiskey 23:06, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

Also, the phrases like "humiliated", "poor showing of Soviet Army", etc. show a very little understanding of what actually happened there. It was a winter war. It was not Californian of British winter. It was -40 Celsius. It was naturally impenetrable terrain. It was Mannerheim Line (broken). It was like climbing up the crystal mountain from fairy tales. And Soviets did climb it up. It is plain shortsightedness of a person sitting in an air-conditioned room to write "ability of the Red Army was put into question". mikka (t) 15:13, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

It is not correct to put whole Finnish-Soviet borderline under the same notation. During December at Karelian Isthmus it was between 0 and -10 Celsius. It was during January when there was this cold era (and even then it was Suomussalmi and Salla where those highest grades were reached. When it came to February the weather become -eh- warmer, over -15 Celsius when Soviet offensive began and rising to -10 soon afterwards. The snow depth at Karelian Isthmus in December was less than 10cm, becoming thicker only after the Christmas. Also Karelian Isthmus was very developed region with lot of roads and railroads dating to the age before Finnish independence, when there were active connections between the capital and Grand Duchy. Only north of Lake Ladoga become the terrain more difficult and roads more scarce. And the strength of the Mannerheim Line is highly exaggerated: One armed bunker with 1-3 machine guns every third kilometer, with no depth in most places. When taking into account that Finns had chronic lack of artillery ammunition, meaning they couldn't effectively protect the Mannerheim Line fortifications against Soviet artillery, it is a real wonder that Mannerheim Line held as long as it did. On the December conditions at the Isthmus with the numbers available by Soviets I bet British or German army would have breached the line in 3-4 days. It could be seen later when Soviets get their act together, they managed to breach the line quite fast, even though they decided to breach the strongest location of the line. Even later in the war, 1944, the half-ready but still much stronger and shorter VT line could hold them only two days. The questioning of the ability of the Red Army wasn't invented by me or any other historian after the WWII, but it was presented in contemporary reports and analyses of the war.--Whiskey 23:06, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

The Russians did not win this war

THE GOAL WAS TO MOVE BORDERS AND WE WAS MADE IT The goal of the USSR was to conquer ALL of Finland. Not just a portion. The Finnish goal was to remain an independant nation. I don't see, by any criteria how you could consider this a Soviet victory. One of the largest and arguably the most powerful military in the world at that time was utterly crushed and repulsed by a Finnish force less than half it's size. Not only did the Russians suffer huge casulities, but they also were badly humiliated. The Russians did not accomplish their goal. The Finns did. Finland not only won this war, but they achieved one of the greatest victories in the history of warfare. The Finns did lose some land, this is true, but they accomplished their ultimate goal and totally humiliated the Russians.-An anonomous historian

"The goal of the USSR was to conquer ALL of Finland".....what?!?! Bogdan 16:43, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Finland and Nazi Germany in the Continuation War

I edited the following into the article: "[Finland gained international] goodwill, which however was of limited use when Finland, allied to Nazi Germany, invaded the Soviet Union only fifteen months later (known in Finland as the Continuation War)." This was first modified to read "with Nazi Germany" because Jniemenmaa claims my version is POV. This is a patently ridiculous idea. Take any elementary level university textbook on Finnish history and check if you insist. For example, Henrik Meinander, Tasavallan tiellä (Oy Nord Print Ab, Helsinki 1999), a university textbook, recounts the events and negotiations with the German General Staff where the Finnish army agreed to join in Operation Barbarossa. The whole idea that the Continuation War is a "separate war" is contemporary propaganda and nothing more.

Later the whole sentence was removed by an unregistered user without any kind of explanation, restored, and removed again without any understandable explanation. This is completely unacceptable. To return to the previous modification, if you want to claim that the factual information in Finnish university textbooks on Finnish history is POV, I'm looking forward to some references. -Elrith, 13.8.2005

Well, I removed it once, and the reason is that the gained international goodwill proved to be useless far before Continuation War started, when Soviet Union continued it's aggressive pressure towards Finland, including threatening Sweden in Defence alliance and political union. Also England provided support to Soviets in a hope they would turn against Germans.

This sentence is not relevant in this article, much more in Continuation War. One of the reasons I like to write into Wikipedia is that I can research whole picture in the article, not just simplified and one sided version of it. We are not limited to half-a-page or two-paragraphs as is typical in printed books. Meinander's book has 542 pages and it tries to provide information from everything between Finnish independence and Finnish membership to European Union. I'm not saying it's a bad book, it's a good one, but it has it's limitations because of available space.

I don't think useful to write everything in the single article, but if you insist keeping it here, also attempt to capitalize that support with Sweden and England should be mentioned and the Soviet pressure and English tacit support to them. By that it would come closer to Continuation War and duplicate text from there, which I do not recommend. (I still think its a good idea to write article about interim peace and move part of the Continuation War there...)

The same thing with "hostilities resumed" vs. "invaded". I'll prefer to let it to "resumed" form, and let everybody decide themselves who started it by reading the facts. Not only one-sided selection of facts, which was so popular during the Soviet Union and Finlandization, but all the facts. --Whiskey 00:49, 14 August 2005 (UTC)

If you wanted it removed because it wasn't relevant, you should have said so. Someone else already changed the sentence once citing POV, and I can't accept that as a reason. Its relevance is a different question. I feel that since the section discusses the aftermath of the war, i.e. its effects on the decision to launch Operation Barbarossa and so forth, a mention of how it affected Finland's international standing also seems to be in order.

As for the latter change, I find it highly offensive that you compare my edit from "hostilities resumed" to "Finland invaded" to Soviet historiography. The only thing that resembles Soviet and Finlandized history here is the insistence on vague euphemisms like "hostilities resumed". A war doesn't simply happen. Anyone who reads the Continuation War article in Wikipedia will learn that Finland agreed to invade the Soviet Union in concert with Nazi Germany, and did so.

I'm happy to address any rational counter-arguments you may have. However, if your arguments in favor of your version of the text are limited to calling my version "one-sided" and comparing it to Soviet history without any reference to facts, then I don't see how it's possible to discuss this matter sensibly. -Elrith, 14.8.05

I said in my edit: "Tried to capitalize, but failed due to Soviet and German actions. See Continuation War#After the Moscow Peace Treaty". I admit that I should have been more vocal there.

About Finland's "international standing"... One shouldn't be over-enthisiastic here. People could admire many people, but if it comes to the point where hard decisions are to be taken, then distant folks are forgotten very easily.

"Finland invaded" is over-simplification. Even official history of Soviet air force (pre-perestroika) states that SU started Continuation War with pre-emptive strike, which is contrary to official "ideological" policy. (Military tends to speak with straighter terms than politicians...) I have not hided the negotiations and deals Finns made with Germans, but if those deals are presented here, then why not the deals Finns tried to make with Sweden and England and which failed not because Finns or Swedes or Brits didn't want them or wasn't satisfied with results, but because of Soviet and German actions? It was in those deals where Finland tried to use that "goodwill", and they failed miserably in the test of realpolitik. If you fail to mention them, you are only presenting the facts which support your interpretation and dismiss contrary evidence.

I'd recommend that you either add also those contrary evidences to the article or remove yours there and only point to the Wikipedia location where both of them can be found. --Whiskey 13:05, 14 August 2005 (UTC)

Firstly, you don't understand the point at all. Yes, Finland tried to use the international goodwill for several projects, which failed. The point is that the goodwill vanished when Finland attacked the Soviet Union. The only thing I'm trying to say is that the Winter War generated international goodwill, but the goodwill disappeared when Finland attacked.

It is quite strong to say it vanished. I'd say it diminished but didn't vanish. It can be seen in a way Western allies handled Finland during and after the Continuation War and even nowadays when Finnish participation to WWII is remembered almost exclusively through the Winter War.

I'm not at any point saying anything about what Finnish politicians tried to use that goodwill for.

No, you are not. It was only in the sentence you wanted to add (see above) where the possible usage was referred. My point was that Finland tried really to use the goodwill before the war but it failed.

The level of hypocrisy required for statements like "'Finland invaded' is over-simplification" is amazing. I don't even want to know what you call it when a country agrees with its allies to attack on a certain date, mobilizes its army and stations it on the border, and then attacks on the date it had previously agreed. Apparently it isn't invasion but something "more complicated".

The wars don't "just happen". The Continuation War was so insignificant event in world scale during that time, that general historians has summarized it (if they even notified it at all) by: Finns wanted revenge - they granted access to Germans - they attacked. This was promoted by Soviet Union and even common in Finland during cold war. This interpretation can be seen from all western histories starting from Liddell-Hart and Churchill.

But this IS over-simplification. It fails to mention how Finland tried to find security from Sweden and England and tried to fulfill the extra demands SU was demanding in excess of those in Moscow peace treaty BEFORE giving anything to Germany. Finns lost their belief to peace long before the first staff negotiations at May. (And Soviets never believed the peace at all.)

Even the beginning of the Continuation War is complicated: Finns planned the war and provoked SU, but it was SU which started open hostilities upon the false premises of Finnish strength and offensive capabilities, and it was Finns who advanced to Soviet soil. So who started it? It has generally held that the country who starts open hostilities is the inva... starter of the war, even if it was provoked to the action. (f.ex. Six-Day War)

Given this attitude, and your accusations, I see it's useless to continue a conversation with you. -Elrith, 16.8.05

I know I'm sometimes quite stubborn and boneheaded, and written words become easily harsher as they are intended, so I apologize if I have offended. --Whiskey 22:22, 16 August 2005 (UTC)

Finnish- German Relations in the Winter War

Most scholars focus on support from Britain, France, and Sweden for Finland in the Winter War. I am curious as to the level of weaponry and advisory support provided by Nazi Germany to Finland, as I found an article on the internet. Are this author's claims legitimate?

Shortly: Yes and no. Many instances he describes do have grain of truth, but he falls to the same trap that happens in almost every book of Finland in WWII: Too little pages to tell properly on an issue which was a sideshow with very limited effects to any major player. It means that facts have to be selected, their timeordering forgotten and relative importance distorted. And it seems that there are some errors and traces of Soviet propaganda.

Michael Sayers, "The Second World War" The most intimate working relationship existed between the German and the Finnish High Commands. The Finnish military leader, Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim, was in close and constant communication with the German High Command. There were frequent joint staff talks, and German officers periodically supervised Finnish army maneuvers. The Finnish Chief of Staff, General Karl Oesch, had received his military training in Germany, as had his chief aide, General Hugo Ostermann, who served in the German Army during the First World War. In 1939, the Government of the Third Reich conferred upon General Oesch one of its highest military decorations...

Personally, Carl Gustav Mannerheim (no von) despised Germans. Part of the reason for that was his experience in WWI, where his former life as Russian officer crumbled because of Germany. The working relationship, which hardly could be seen intimate happened during the Continuation War, after the Winter War. Imperial Germany had helped Finland to gain independence from Russia during the WWI by training an infantry battallion, Oesch, Österman and great number of higher officers of the army had their background in that unit. One should also remember, that also many former Finnish officers from Russian army were in the prominent positions in Finnish army (Mannerheim, Nenonen, Enckell...). Oesch was before the Winter War Chief of the General Staff, and in that status visited Germany and Britain 1938, and 1939 German Chief of the General Staff, Co. Gen. Frans Halder, made a return visit to Finland and gave this medal to Oesch. One should notice, that British Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, Gen. Walter Kirke, had visited Finland (and Oesch) only few weeks before and exchanging military decorations between leaders of military were part of the normal "political courtecy" of the day.

Political relations between Finland and Nazi Germany were also close. The Socialist Premier Risto Ryti regarded Hitler as a "genius"; Per Svinhufrud, the wealthy Germanophile who had been awarded the German Iron Cross, was the most powerful behind-the-scenes figure in Finnish politics...

Before the Winter War Finland was working in Scandinavian context, where she together with other Scandinavian countries refused non-agression pacts with Germany. It would be nice to have exact examples how political relations were close. Ryti wasn't socialist but liberal. That Pehr Evind Svinhufvud was the most powerful behind the scenes politician at the time could be true, as more powerful figures didn't were behind the scenes at the time: Mannerheim, Paasikivi, Kallio, Tanner...

With the aid of German officers and engineers, Finland had been converted into a powerful fortress to serve as a base for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Twenty-three military airports had been constructed on Finnish soil, capable of accommodating ten times as many airplanes as there were in the Finnish Air Force. Nazi technicians had supervised the construction of the Mannerheim Line, a series of intricate, splendidly equipped fortifications running several miles deep along the Soviet border and having heavy guns at one point only twenty-one miles from Leningrad. Unlike the Maginot Line, the Mannerheim Line had been designed not only for defensive purposes but also for garrisoning a major offensive force. As the Mannerheim Line neared completion in the summer of 1939, Hitler's Chief of Staff, General Halder, arrived from Germany and gave the massive fortifications a final inspection... http://www.shunpiking.com/ol0207/0207-MSAK-GC-chap22.htm (Rakovsky 04:13, 27 March 2006 (UTC))

And now to the propaganda part... :-) It is true that German Col. von Brandenstein proposed the location of the line, but he did it at 1918. After that it was French officers who helped to design the oldest bunkers 1919, but renovation of the bunkers at 30s was done by Finnish officers and engineers. Finland as powerful fortress, Hah!, with Model Cajander soldiers. The airports in question were not only in military use, but they served as civilian airports also, and one should notice that the time between the World Wars was a great boom in air traffic. German technicians didn't supervise the construction of the Mannerheim Line, and it is pure fantasy that with less concrete than what is needed in one modern opera house, one could have intricate, splendidly equipped, several miles deep, 135km long fortified line. The Finnish border was 34km (21 miles) from Leningrad at closest point, but closest point of Mannerheim Line was almost 90km from Leningrad. The line didn't have accommodation even for troops needed for defending the line, so it is ludicrious to claim it capable for garrisioning offensive force. At the summer and autumn of 1939 there was a great rush in building the line, but when the Winter War started, the line was far from ready. And like I said, British general Kirke "inspected" the line few weeks before Halder. --Whiskey 22:58, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

Oh, and there was some military co-operation in naval issues: 1930 Germans built Submarine Vesikko and tested it in Finland. It was a prototype of later IIA-class U-boats. But also that was during Weimar republic before nazi era.--Whiskey 23:02, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

Eh?

I dont see how people can consider Winter War as Soviet victory.

Soviets Casualties were massive and they failed to conquer Finland which was their objective..

Finns retained their sovereignty which was their objective.

Casualties has nothing to do with it. Take a look at the Moscow Peace Treaty. Winners don't usually cede 10% of their territory to the loser. -- Jniemenmaa 11:51, August 17, 2005 (UTC)

Soviet Union did not conquer Finland, which was the objective. Finland remained as independent country.

You're confusing survival with victory. If I'm ambushed by a gang of criminals who intend to kidnap and enslave me, but fight back and manage to escape with broken limbs and losing my wallet, I don't claim I beat the criminals -- I just survived the attack. -- Mikko H.

From what I gather from reading The Winter War, the outcome was rather like that of Rocky, the Sylvester Stallone film; Finland lost in the end, but it went the distance. Certainly Finland came out of the war a lot better than Poland, for example. The sense of heroic failure appeals to me because I am British. Also, because I am British, I tend to see Finland in patronising terms as plucky little Finland standing up to the Soviet bully. Nonetheless, Finland lost. Put up a hell of a fight, though. -Ashley Pomeroy 20:45, 23 August 2005 (UTC)

This is just my opinion, but it sure seems like this could go from anything to a Finnish victory to a Soviet Phyrric victory. Stalin did gain some territory, but it was at an appaling price. I think that the term "victory at any price" does not just mean the body count. Stalin lost a great deal of support from the international community, especially in the West. He utterly failed his objective which was not to to Karelia, not to take a few miles of the border, but to seize ALL of Finland. Say it with me, ALL of Finland.

As to the criminals thing, it is closer to kill all but one, wound that one severly, than watch as he runs away while you faint of blood loss. Stalin was pissed at this incident, leading him to start purges on most of the Red Army Brass, which, to quote Shelly Klein's The Most Evil Dictators in History: "Stalin killed 3 out of 5 marshalls, 15 out of 16 commanders, 60 out of 67 corps commanders and all 17 commisars." Unquote. This ironically is more likly than not what, along with the superior experience and training of the Finns, to be what saved them in the Continuation, as Stalin's slaughters killed off decades of experience from the Red Army (which is half the reason why Hitler literily ran over Russian resistence with his Panzers in the early stages of Barbarossa) and thus failed again to drive the Finns into the sea. It also took the USSR's good cred it earned in the Spanish Civil War and put it though the sausage grinder. This is just my guess, but it seems like the only reason the West sided with Stalin in WWII is because he was against Hitler.

Ultimatly, I would advocate a compromise: Draw, with it being noted that Stalin did get territory, but at too high a price both militarily, strategicaly, and diplomaticly. .P.S. Cannot sign, not registered.

The effect of Stalin's repressions of some RKKA commanders is greatly exaggerated. Soviet victory or Soviet pyrrhic victory seem fine to me. With respect, Ko Soi IX 03:13, 5 March 2007 (UTC)

Soviet manpower and losses

Please quote the sources of 1.5 mln forces and 1 mln losses. "the Soviets died at a rate of 10,000 per day" looks a wild speculation to me. mikka (t) 15:16, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

And to me also. Krivosheev gives 126 875 killed and 264 908 wounded (sicks not included), and it is perhaps the best available number. From Krutchev comes that 1 mln, but it is exaggerated. 1.5 mln forces seems a little bit high, as my sources at hand cite 1 mln at the end of the war. Have to check some more sources... --Whiskey 23:17, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

I removed the "moral victory" thing. That's nothing more than a judgment about who was "right" in the war. Everyking 01:08, 5 September 2005 (UTC)

So...

...if the war had continued few days longer, Soviets would have totally, magically destroyed Finnish Armed Forces?

Not magically or totally, but especially in the southern Isthmus and western shore of the Bay of Viipuri Finnish forces were reaching the end of their encurance. Had the war lasted a week or so longer, it's very probable that the Red Army would have broken through. And given the Finnish lack of reserves, there's no telling how, when and where Finns could have reconstituted the front. Whether the coming thaw had hindered the Soviet advance is, IMHO, questionable. - Mikko H. 15 Sept 2005

Of course Finnish Armed Forces were not in best condition, but claiming that Finnish Armed Forces would be "totally" destroyed if war had lasted days or week longer is stupid.

Better pictures needed

The article needs better pictures. The maps are Ok, but we need photograps as well. The Winter War was primarily a Soviet operation, so we need pictures of Soviets. The picture of Finnish solders standing is really trivial. The main picture could be of abandoned Soviet vehicles on the Raate Road (Raatteen tie) after the Battle of Suomussalmi. [1] [2] [3]

-- Petri Krohn 21:29, 3 October 2005 (UTC)

Soviet casualties at Mainila before the war

The article relating to the Shelling of Mainila says documents show no Soviet troops were killing in the shelling. Is this true? Should the article be changed to reflect that? Richard Cane 06:11, 15 October 2005 (UTC)

The "Karelia question"

Moved this comment from my talk page. Restored and edited the deleted section in the article. -- Petri Krohn 23:19, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

Your subtitle "Post Soviet times" and rewroting "to remove POV" was not very good edit. Sadly, your own edit was very POV and irrelevant in article of Winter War. There is already an article of Karelia question and in Finnish wiki it is peer-reviewed and rather good: fi:Karjala-kysymys.

Teit muokkauksen, jolla yritit poistaa POVia. Tässä vain ei ollut mitään POVia: "After the war, the Karjalan liitto started to work for the Karelia question." Ennemminkin lisäyksesi oli vahvasti värittynyt "[question] has clogged many Internet discussion groups and forums (including Wikipedia)." Palautin tekstin siitä, että Karjalan liitto alkoi työskennellä Karjala-kysymyksen hyväksi. Karjalan luovutus talvisodassa johti Karjalan liiton perustamiseen, jonka tavoitteisiin on sen omien sanojensa mukaan aina sisältynyt Karjalan palautus. Kommentoin eli piilotin pov-tekstisi, koska se ei oikein liity talvisotaan vaan enemmänkin artikkeliin Karjala-kysymys. Ja sittenkin vain korjattuna, koska se sisälsi virheellistä tietoa (korjasin sen). Kahkonen 12:29, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the Finnish article on the Karelia question is good. The English article is crap. Because of the ambitions involved there is little hope of ever producing a NPOV article on the "issue". (In fact the name of the article is in itself POV, calling a non-issue a "question" gives it undue weight. Compare this with the Jewish Question.) Personally I will not touch the "Karelia Question" article, not even with a ten foot pole.

-- Petri Krohn 23:19, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

With my very good English knowledge I couldn't find any mistakes in English article. The Finnish article about case is NPOV. So why English-version can not be NPOV? Ok, it is stub article but you can translate... The name "Karelian question" is a straight translation of Finnish "Karjalan kysymys" which is the name used about the dispute in Finland. I don't know how to translate it other way. Do you? Please notice that I corrected your highly POV edits with better one. Kahkonen 15:35, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

The Finnish article discusses the "Karelia Question" as an issue in Finnish domestic politics. This is OK. The English language article tries to portray the "Karelia Question" as an open issue in international relations. This is untrue, and only serves to push a revanchist agenda and point of view. The direct translation of the article title serves this narrow POV. The correct name for the English language article would have been "The Karelia Question in Finnish domestic politics". -- Petri Krohn 23:08, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Ok. Moved under name Karelian question in Finnish politics. Kahkonen 14:44, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Casualty numbers

Please revise casualty numbers in the box. The way the article is written right now, it appears that Red Army lost more soldiers killed, MIA, and wounded, than it had soldiers in the first place. --Itinerant1 09:08, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

Eh?

Please, name these so called "official statistics".

The Number of Finnish POWs

I changed the amount of Finnish POWs in the War Box, 2,000 is about two times too much. As the sources at hand have conflicting information on the exact number, from c. 850 to c. 1,100, I chose the round number nicely at the middle: 1,000. -- Mikko H. 21:39, 4 December 2005 (UTC)

Discrepancies Between the English and the Russian versions

I've read the Russian version of the Winter War article, and find that it differs substantially from the English version, mainly by attempting to downplay the Soviet aggression and fiascos. Two specific examples of assertions either made in the English version or commonly thought, and subjected to doubt in the Russian version:

1) The Soviets fabricated an artillery attack on the Mainila, and pointed the finger at the Finns

2) One of Stalin's goals was all along to make Finland part of the Socialist block

Besides this, the introductory Russian paragraph contains certain half-truths and rather ambiguous statements. An example of a suspiciously uninformative ambiguity is the first two sentences, which run, "Starting in the spring of 1938, the USSR and Finland were carrying out negotiations about changing the underlying principles of the Soviet-Finnish relations. Since the negotiations process was failing to bring positive results, each side began military preparations in the middle of 1939." Nothing is said about the "principles" at the time, nor about the goals each side was pursuing in the negotiations. The term "positive" is completely vague.

Further, it says that, by signing the "Friendship and Border Treaty" with Germany, the Soviet Union "to a certain extent untied its hands" [for invading Finland].

All this sounds highly subjective (pro-Soviet), as written by someone who aims to conceal, as much as possible, the degree of aggression shown by the Soviet Union in the affair, and to downplay the losses suffered by the Soviets. (E.g., there is a statement that, after the Soviets broke the Mannerheim line, they had a "perfect opportunity" to capture all of Finland.)

Not sure whether anything can or should be done about this, but as a Wikipedia multilingual user, I find such manipulation of content highly inappropriate.

- Kiowa Jones, 31 Dec 2005

The author of the russian text has written a response to Kiowa Jones' criticism, and has asked me to translate and post it here.

Concerning facts:

1) There is a separate article describing the failed negotiations and how those led to the war. It contains everything that you can’t find here. (that in fact has now been integrated into the main article — Alex Kanavin)

2) Mainila incident also has its own article. Strictly speaking, the staging is still unproven, all available data points to it indirectly, which is, indeed, what the article says. Of course, it’s almost certain that the shootings were made by the Soviets, but there are no documents that prove it.

Yes, there isn't any documents found yet with shooting orders. The most documentary material we have are (If you know more, pleace add...):

i)Reports from Finnish Border Guard lookouts who describe 5 artillery (14:30-15:00) and 2 mortar (15:00-15:05) shots fired. Both firing and landing positions could be triangulated to Soviet territory.

ii)Interrogation of Soviet POWs. From these Finnish interrogators found out that Leningrad area NKVD commander komissar S.A.Goglidze was seen on the area at the time of the shooting. Also outside guards were removed from Mainila one hour before shooting.

iii)Andrei Zhdanov's private notes. Among his private notes there are three very short undated papers which could be seen as a preliminary plan. (The text of the first: "1)NKVD batallion 2)shooting* 3)meetings 4)people 5)30 000 flyers 6)Molotov's speech, where he counts all incidents... beginning at 6-7... In a radio speech declaration of Communist Party of Finland to Finnish workers." The count 2-6 is documented in Soviet newspapers, the war started at 7 Moscow time and the declaration came out from radio even before Kuusinen government was set up. *Zhdanov uses russian word 'rasstrel', which means rifle fire and is used especially about executions.)

iv)Interview of KGB general Okunevitsh by historian Igor Bunitsh 1985. Then NKVD major Okunevitsh was November 26 at Karelian Isthmus with 15 men to test new artillery piece. Two 'ballistic' experts from Moscow joined the group and 5 shots were fired...--Whiskey 14:57, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

And some more:

v) Finnish artillery unit war diaries and orders given to them (freely available from war archive) describe how all Finnish artillery units were out of the reach of Mainila at that date.

vi) In Soviet casualty lists no unit located in Mainila reports any casualties at that date. (Based on this Baryshnikov claims that the whole incident never happened and it was only propaganda from Moscow.)

vii) Message transfer between Moscow(STAVKA) and Leningrad military district HQ, where Moscow seems to know more about the situation than Leningrad. Leningrad MDHQ ordered colonel Tihomirov (Chief of operative office) to investigate issue. Leningrad also reports that Tihomirov had returned and has prepared a report. The report itself cannot be found anywhere.

The Zhdanov papers mentioned above concern exclusively Winter War.--Whiskey 08:54, 27 January 2006 (UTC)

3) Concerning joining Finland to the USSR. There is no documental proof that the original goals of the war only included this task. These are speculations, more or less logical, more or less plausible, but unconfirmed. Moreover, there is a published Stalin’s speech from a meeting where the war results were discussed. He said: «We wanted to ensure Leningrad’s safety and get a war base. We could do it by conquering the whole of Finland, and placing our own government there, or by conquering only part and settling with the current government. The finns have decided to settle, so we accepted the latter variant.» (the quote is not exact, but I can find the document, I have it). Note that the assumption about the possibility of the goal is mentioned in the article, and exactly in the way it exists: as an assumption.

Concerning interpretations:

I’m convinced (and it’s consistent with the NPOV principle) that Wikipedia should contain facts and neutral descriptions of interpretations, rather than provide politicized assesments. Facts cited in the article agree with reality, as far as I know. The reader is free to interpret them according to his judgement. It’s wrong to try to push him to this or that conclusion. That’s why there are neither any attempts to blame USSR for the agression nor attempts to prove that the USSR had noble goals in the war.

Alex Kanavin 62.78.255.126 13:39, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

You should expect such discrepancies, whether you agree with it or not. If that is what the author believes, be he Russian, Finnish, or American, it is not an ill-intentioned "manipulation". He may just have been convinced that the Finns started it.

On the other hand, you have your own POV which is not necessarily correct either.

The assertion that "One of Stalin's goals was all along to make Finland part of the Socialist block" is just that, an ANTI-Soviet assertion. If you can read in Russian, you should read: Проблема обеспечения безопасности Ленинграда с севера by V.N. Baryshnykov. http://www.around.spb.ru/finnish/baryshnikov/pvp1932.php He argues that the potential for an enemy attack on Leningrad from the direction of Finland was what caused the Russian invasion, not a long-held scheme to occupy the whole country. In fact, a number of books by American authors written during WWII also say that Russia invaded to defend Leningrad, which was within artillery range of the border.

Once the "positive results" (haha as you mention, from the Soviet point of view) were not possible through diplomacy, Stalin THEN decided on total occupation, as shown by the Terijoki government. But then later he changed his mind again and let Finland stay under Mannerheim.

By signing the nonagression pact with Hitler, Stalin did untie his hands to deal with Finland militarily, there is nothing subjective about that.

To say that after the Russians destroyed the Mannerheim Line they had a "perfect opportunity" to capture all of Finland is not to downplay their losses. For example, you could simply say:

"The Russians suffered terrible losses attacking the Mannerheim Line. They just couldn't get through, after sending masses of troops. Then they figured out what they were doing wrong, bombed the bunkers, and got through in just 2 days. Such a rapid advance shows that at that point they could have taken Helsinki if they had wanted to."

I have also read in American, non-Soviet books, that Stalin could have taken over Finland if he wanted to. It is not "subjective pro-Soviet manipulation."

=============================================

Finnish had concentration/"relocation" camps where they tortured the civilian population in the continuation war. I am curious if they existed during 1939-1940 as well. Since you say you can read Russian, have a look too, Kiowa. Helga Seppiala, FINLAND AS OCCUPIER 1941-1944, in the journal "NORTH" http://www.around.spb.ru/finnish/sepp/sepp2.php The Finnish author has witnessed the starving POWs herself.

No they didn't. They were created on the occupied territory to hold part of local population deemed to be security risk. (So not all Slavic inhabitants were put to the camps. The maximum amount of people was around 25 000.) In Finland, almost 1 000 communists or extreme left socialists were put to prison as security risks during 1939-44.

"Finland, which officially deported only eight Jews to Nazi Germany during World War II, also sent thousands of Soviet prisoners of war to Hitler's concentration camps, a new Finnish book claims." http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/bi/Qfinland-germany-nazi.Rb4Y_DN3.html

Elina Sana gives in her book 2 829 which were given to Germans. Based on the namelist of the prisoners, she calculated that 74 of them were Jews. Finnish government started an investigation on the issue, and in a preliminary report, Prof. Heikki Ylikangas produced a memo (http://www.statsradetskansli.fi/tiedostot/pdf/fi/57413.pdf) where in his first opinion those 74 were given not because they were Jews but because they were officers or political officers in Soviet army. In total, 118 political officers, 74 Jews and 400-500 communists were given, but over 2000 of those given were given because they wanted to either join Vlasov's army, trained to be spies or joined army units of Soviet minorities.

"said Ohto Manninen, a leading war historian and history professor at Finland's war college[:] "Finland, as the occupying power, ran a network of some 20 prison camps throughout the occupied territories, separating Russians from Karelians, males of combatant age from women and children and so on," Manninen said." http://www.htcricket.com/news/181_672498,00110004.htm

This belongs more to the Continuation War but anyway... At first there was blanket order to collect all Russians to the Concentration or Transit Camps. As the true demographics of East Karelia became known to Finns, this blanket order was quickly moved to concern only those with security risks: Police and NKVD officials, important industry managers, inhabitants close to important military targets or frontlines etc. It should be noted, that most of the military age males had already been conscripted or moved away before Finns arrived. I still try to find proper statistics of the population at the time, but from about 470 000 populace one third was Karelians and about one third was evacuated (both Karelians and Russians). --Whiskey 20:37, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

WWII

If it was a part of WWII, the article Red Army should be corrected. Xx236 10:55, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Winter War Avoidable

I have seen articles on the web over whether or not the winter war was avoidable. Should the Finnish government have agreed to Soviet demands for Leningrad's protection?

In her article, "The ladies of St Petersburg could not sleep peacefully as long as the Finnish border ran so close" http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=30 the author points out one man who thought so: Marshal Mannerheim.

That Mannerheim resigned because the Finnish government would not agree to the demands is a historical note often overlooked. Rakovsky 07:41, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

That's an interesting issue, but to give a definite answer we'd have to find out what were Stalin's intentions. Most Finns at the time felt that Stalin intended to annex Finland into the USSR, as would happen to the Baltic States, and any substantial concessions would only endanger Finland. If Stalin wanted to end Finland's independence, then only way to avoid the war would have been for Finland not to offer any resistance. If Stalin really wanted only to secure Leningrad, then it's another issue. Of course the most straightforward way of avoiding the Winter War would have been for Stalin to let Finland be. Hopefully the opening of Russian archives will cast light on Stalin's plans in this regard.

BTW, Mannerheim threatened resignation many times over several issues at the time, I don't recall whether the concessions to the USSR was one of them. However, Mannerheim did not resign at any point.

- Mikko H. 08:50, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

During the negotiations before the Winter War Finnish government did consider ceding parts of Karelian Isthmus to Soviet Union. At first they offered "Kuokkalan mutka" that is the area between River Siestra and Gulf of Finland south of Mainila. Subsequently they increased their offer to include Terijoki, and there were considerations if Finland should cede coast up to Ino fortresses. That would take Finnish border over 20km away from Leningrad. For Stalin that wasn't enough, but into the end Soviet Union demanded Hanko peninsula and also Koivisto thus breaching the Mannerheim line at it's coastal sector. --Whiskey 13:37, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Edit war

I fear that edit war will start soon...

You have deleted so much information and added some without any sources how can you even think of deleteing this paragraph

It was recently confirmed in a study by Finnish historian Lasse Laaksonen that the Finnish army was on the verge of total collapse when the armistice was signed.[1] It is speculated that since Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus in Finland during the purges, he was not aware that continuing the war for only a week longer would have led to the inevitable and total defeat of the Finnish army. Despite the heroic resistance of the Finns, the Soviets would have inevitably won through attrition. http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1101978837065

How can you delete such paragraph?????? (Deng 12:42, 1 April 2006 (UTC))

Well, well...

If you bother to read this page you will discover that it is not that simple.

I did read it here is the whole page and here it is

The end of the Winter War was in sight when the Mannerheim Line broke in Summa in mid-February, 1940. About three weeks earlier Finland had agreed to peace talks to avert the destruction of its army. If the army had been defeated, there would not have been much to negotiate about. For decades there has been speculation over whether or not the fight could have been continued, instead of agreeing to the harsh terms of the peace. Dr. Lasse Laaksonen, who wrote his doctoral thesis on the final weeks and days of the war, says no: the defences of the Isthmus and the area near Vyborg were collapsing. "The question was one of days, rather than weeks. The army could not have held all the way to the melting of the ground frost", he says. In March the forces were dwindling fast, but the reality of the situation did not reach the central command. Laaksonen blames the splintered command structure, faulty communications, and conflicting information. A Russian attack across Vyborg Bay also came as a surprise. Thanks to the exceptionally cold winter, the ice was thick enough to carry Soviet tanks. When the peace was reached, the Russians had 100,000 soldiers in the area, while Finland had just 25,000. The Finns had neither well-equipped positions, nor anti-tank capability. Artillery shells were running, out, and only three battalions were in reserve that had any real fighting capability.

The grim assessment given by Marshall Mannerheim to the government on the situation at the front on March 9th led to a decision to seek peace. The government considered an official request for aid from the Western powers. However, the feeling was that the aid would be insufficient, and that it would come too late. When he sought peace, Stalin was not concerned so much about Finnish resistance, as he was of the prospect of Britain or France coming to the aid of the Finns. The war might have escalated to a conflict between great powers. When the guns fell silent, the Red Army had cut the highway between Vyborg and Hamina, and had taken parts of the city of Vyborg itself. A breakthrough on the bay would have opened the way to Helsinki. The territorial concessions came as a shock. "It was a bitter disappointment, that after defending every ditch and hole, the Finns had to withdraw from positions that they had held all the way to the end", Laaksonen says.

Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 13.3.2005

So stop removeing that super important paragraph (Deng 16:02, 1 April 2006 (UTC))

Resolving the dispute

I'm glad of all corrections to grammar SuperDeng has introduced.

Then, the two most persistent stumbling blocks in the article:

Kekkonen: He is propagating his own (and Paasikivi's) foreign politic line. He doesn't say here, that Finland should have accepted Soviet proposal, but critisizes his predecessors in foreign policy for failing to create similar trusting relations with Soviet Union than he and Paasikivi had done. So, it is not relevant where it is now, where it is assosiated with negotiations of 1939, but it could be used when presenting the background situation before the negotiations at 30's.

Laaksonen: The situation of Finnish army at the end of the Winter War has been discussed among academics and military historians for decades, and the views of the endurance varies a lot: from days to couple of months. The general consensus is that without foreign help Finland couldn't last long alone. Laaksonen's study doesn't present the consensus among historians, but most historians prefer the few weeks in this what if-situation. So, the chapter as it is now, should be removed and replaced with another like: "After the war, the situation of the Finnish army at Karelian Isthmus at the end of the war had created a lot of discussion. The estimates how long the opponent could be held had varied from few days to couple of months, most circling around few weeks, too little for any foreign help to make a difference." --Whiskey 07:43, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

First dont attack me or my gramma second of all sure make the change (Deng 08:04, 3 April 2006 (UTC))

Well, well

"continued a few more days Finland would have been destroyed."

Finnish troops in the southern Isthmus and western shore of the Bay of Viipuri were reaching the end of their encurance. Had the war lasted a week or so longer, it's very probable that the Red Army would have broken through, but this would have not magically destroyed Finnish Armed Forces or Finland.

It dosent say that And if you would have bothered to read what you are deleting you would see that this is what you are delteing

"It was recently confirmed in a study by Finnish historian Lasse Laaksonen that the Finnish army was on the verge of total collapse when the armistice was signed.[1] It is speculated that since Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus in Finland during the purges, he was not aware that continuing the war for only a week longer would have led to the inevitable and total defeat of the Finnish army. Despite the heroic resistance of the Finns, the Soviets would have inevitably won through attrition."

Also you have removed many key paragraphs such as what the president said and many other key issues

(Deng 09:32, 3 April 2006 (UTC))

Result of the War

In military conflict template, it is advised that the result-field should be stalemate or victory. And the victory can be clarified by an additional adjective. There is a separate field territory, which is used for explaining the territorial changes.

In this particular case, the most important result internationally was i)Hitler considered Soviet army weak and his planning underestimated Soviet will and skill to fight and ii)It was the wake-up call to Soviet leadership who had had an impression that Soviet army was the strongest of the world, promting string of the reforms in the army.

The Pyrrhic victory describes quite correctly the outcome of the war: Soviet Union could pay the price... this time. But if nothing changes, it wouldn't be so sure that Soviet Union would come out victorious in the war with major power opponent. --Whiskey 11:14, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

I wouldn't call the victory Pyrrhic. Pyrrhic is that victory which is worse than defeat. Encyclopaedia is not supposed to push POV conclusions. Let's see what other editors think. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 11:16, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

No, please check Pyrrhic victory. It is not worse than defeat, as an outcome defeat is always worse than any kind of victory, including Pyrrhic. The Pyrrhic victory is a victory where one had to pay too much compared to the gains victory produced. --Whiskey 11:23, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

No we have to decide whether the substantial gains of territory and preservation of the Northern Capital during the WWII were worth the human toll. It is the heaviest POV imaginable to give answers to such questions in an encyclopedia. Please stop it: it was the Soviet victory, while passing judgments whether it was ""Pyrrhic" or no - is none of our business. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 11:31, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

The only positive side of the Witer War to Soviet Union was that it punched home in what a sorry state the Red Army really was. Several studies on the issue has questioned the value of the terrain gained in the war, as it together with Soviet foreign policy after the war guaranteed Finnish participation to the next round. The safety of Leningrad would have been better guarded if Finland had been neutral like Sweden. I don't dispute the Soviet victory, I just refer in a one word what several studies had pointed out: Heavy costs with little gains. --Whiskey 12:01, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Hey, what's this argument all about? The outcome is a Soviet victory. The rest belongs to the article. --Irpen 12:28, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

I gave user "Ghirlandajo" strong arguments for pyrrhic: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Winter_War&action=history but he decided to ignore them and reverted it. Is this vandalism?--80.186.100.180 23:22, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

---

Result box should state the fact of what resulted from the war, which was Interim Peace. In Finland the peace was called merely "interim" after the Winter War. The final peace treaty was to be signed only after all the fighting in Europe would halt and a new Versailles treaty could be signed perhaps treating Finland more equitably considering wide sympathies all over the world.

It is a matter of opinion and chosen conditions to attribute which side won or lost. Soviet Union certainly underachieved as Finland excelled relative to expectatons and resources. Relative to officially stated goals Finland did loose more territory than Soviet union demanded initially. However Finland won a certain degree of international respect, self-respect and most importantly Stalin's respect for it's sovereignity that the Baltic states did not. And Baltic states ended up being swallowed all together. Then who won on the battle field? Since the peace was signed before conclusive attempt to break through we couldn't say before 1944. The war was decided in the diplomatic cabinets and not on the battle field.Spespatriae 07:12, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

About Laaksonen's book...

Lasse Laaksonen has used in his book counterfactual history to extrapolate future from the situation of March 13. As most historians don't consider this method to be in accord with historical research standard, it makes giving the whole paragraph to this book and it's conclusions too much credit. As a complementary, I could add Colonel W. Halsti's book "Suomen Talvisota" here, where he claims Finns could have held Soviets until Summer.

As a better idea, I think we should use simple reference to the book to note that it is notified and point out that most writers (f.ex. Paasikivi, Mannerheim, Oesch...) consider Finns to had few weeks time left, like I have done in previous chapter.

Anyway, all those editing the article should start using references... --Whiskey 23:54, 8 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm going to remove the paragraph of Laaksonen's book unless someone comes out with convincing reason why it should be included. In that case, I'll add a notification to the paragraph about his usage of counterfactual history. --Whiskey 09:03, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Just because you dont like what it says dosent make it wrong. How big was his study and how deep do you know. And when was it made. And compare that to the other studies that say things that you want to hear. (Deng 01:54, 20 April 2006 (UTC))

The book was based to his doctorate thesis, and it mostly concentrates to the situation reports on different levels of command during March and how upper level reports were more optimistic and not in touch with the situation on ground.

The book is entertaining, thought provoking and its counterfactual parts have good reasoning, but like his opponent, docent Martti Turtola, and Professor of History in University of Helsinki, Heikki Ylikangas, have pointed out, he used counterfactual history and the method is not approved by majority of historians.

I'm not claiming it being wrong. It is one possible outcome, how propable I cannot say. But what I say is that majority of historians don't consider the method used valid for academic research. The point is well taken, as for example there has been counterfactual studies how the assasination of archduke of Austria effected to the World War I. One study says that WWI would be averted altogether, the another says that some other incident would have started it soon afterwards. I would take cautious line when referring this kind of studies in Wikipedia. --Whiskey 08:38, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Most historians???? and you have made a poll and know this. Your approach is all wrong what you should do is say a paper says this and another paper says that. But what you are doing is saying this paper is all wrong just look how wrong it is. (Deng 17:08, 20 April 2006 (UTC))

Sorry, cannot do, because that would be against no original research. So I have to trust on studies published in Scientific journals, like Richard Ned Lebow, What's so Different about a Counterfactual?, World Politics. A Quarterly Journal International Relations. Volume 52, Number 4, July 2000. He is one of the leading supporters of the counterfactual history, so I doubt he'd like to downplay its stature among scientific community.

And no, I'm not saying that paper is wrong. I just say that the method used is not accepted to fulfill academic criteria by the majority of historians. I have Lebow's article to support my point. What texts do you have to support yours?

In the previous paragraph I'm saying just what you wanted me to say: The estimates how long the opponent could had been held had varied from few days to couple of months, most circling around few weeks, too little for any foreign help to make a difference. It has all there: Balanced approach to different studies without taking a stand among them other than telling the most common estimate. --Whiskey 23:45, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

What I want it to say? It has always said that.

No it hadn't. It says:It was recently confirmed in a study by Finnish historian Lasse Laaksonen that the Finnish army was on the verge of total collapse when the armistice was signed. It is speculated that since Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus in Finland during the purges, he was not aware that continuing the war for only a week longer would have led to the inevitable and total defeat of the Finnish army. Where is the couple of months? Where is even a few weeks? And it says confirmed, so this would be THE study which overrides all previous studies of the issue. And absolute certainty that a week more had lead to inevitable and total defeat of the army.

What you are doing is discrediting the study that dosent agree with your views. By useing the words "entertaining value" you are not only saying that the whole study is wrong you are also suggesting that any study that shows that the war would have ended within days is wrong. And let us not forget that you close and personal friend first just tried to delete the whole study but when that failed you did a much more advanced thing which is discrediting it and all future studies that say that things might have been diffrent if the war hade gone on for just a week more. The words "entertaining value" are pure POW and it shows that you have no intrest in giving an objective version.

Hmm... I intended the "entertaining value" to point to counterfactual history. It is found in the Wikipedia article and Lebow's article describing how most historians consider counterfactual history. In fact, you are right: It casts serious doubts about the conclusions. Especially when they are presented previously with so absolutely, so strong words. Typically, in other studies, when the future is extrapolated, there is number of words which indicate that it is not a fact but estimation. It could be so, not that it would be so.

An objective version would be; a study shows that if the war would have gone on for a few days more then things would have ended different but another study says that a few more weeks was needed for a diffrent outcome. But you dont do this you discredit the study that says that the war if it hade gone on for a few more days would have ended differently. And you also discredit all future papers that will show that. What you fail to see is that it is not wikis place to discredit other studies just as you have done by adding the words "entertaining value" because the people who you CLAIM say that might have an axe to grind with the publisher of the study.

I don't understand? Why should Lebow, who is one of the most visible supporters of counterfactual history, in his study claim that most historians consider counterfactual history having mostly entertaining value? It cannot be that he has an axe to grind with himself?

So a neutral version would be a study shows that if the war hade gone on for a few more days then things would have ended differently LINK/REF. Another study says that if it hade gone on for a few more weeks then things would have ended differently LINK/REF. That is the only true and neutral way to put it.(Deng 18:22, 21 April 2006 (UTC))

Please, calm down. I'll reformat the two paragraphs and add few references and let's hope the outcome would be more acceptable to both of us. --Whiskey 21:59, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Reason of War

Stalin's goal was dual. In no particular order: The moving of the border from Leningrad. And naval bases in the baltic (on par with those of the Baltic States). From those bases the Soviet submarines could disrupt german-swedish iron trade. However, considering that Stalin was re-gathering lands lost by the Russian Empire due to WW1 and a series of subsequent events, perhaps re-annexing Finland was also a possibility.

Given the installation of Kuusinen's Finnish Democratic Republic annexation of Finland was certainly the goal (or significant part of goal) initially. We'll have to wait for the opening of last Soviet-era archives to find the definite answer to what was Stalin's goal before Finns refused to give him what he wanted in the pre-war negotiations. -Mikko H. 12:23, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

I would disagree that annexation of Finland was the goal. It was the means to a larger goal - war with the West. Hitler's iron trade with Sweden (btw, ain't it profitable to be neutral) would be in a very vulnerable position, weren't it for German successes in 1941

If you are going to have total figures in the battle box then you must add finish total nummbers

The finns also increased their numbers during the war so if you are going to have Soviet increasements in the battle box then you must have finnish as well. (Deng 13:57, 25 April 2006 (UTC))

Done. I also added how the number of tanks and aircrafts changed during the war. I'm not sure how these numbers should be added, as Finns had in the beginning 32 Renault tanks and 32 Vickers without armament. Should those Vickers be added to total? During the war Finns armed 16 Vickers, but five(six?) of them were lost in Honkiniemi. 9-11 Renaults were buried/meant to be buried to the ground for additional strongpoint, and they were also lost when Soviets passed them. At Soviet side, there were 1,275 tanks broken due to mechanical failure at the end of war, should they be added to total? --Whiskey 21:59, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Uhm 1 million is way to high the total Soviet army was 1.8 million when the campagin started. I doubt that they would have put 56% on one front so you better source your numbers because I doubt that it was 1 million and if they hade 400 thousand casulties then that would mean that only 400 thousand were left on other fronts. I find that very strange (Deng 01:42, 28 April 2006 (UTC))

And sources the figures or they will get changed back to the original sourced figures (Deng 00:22, 29 April 2006 (UTC))

It has almost been a month source the figures please. (Deng 01:16, 23 May 2006 (UTC))

Ooops! Sorry, I forgot. Well, at least Tomas Ries in the Cold Will cites that SU had 45-48 infantry divisions at the end against Finns. This is in accordance with original Finnish estimates and other literature written during the Cold War. But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some military archives were opened, and Ohto Manninen by using Stalin's history commission of 1940 collected data that in truth there were 60 infantry divisions against Finland at the end of the war (Research published in Sotilasaikakauslehti 3/1991). This amounts over 200,000 more troops than previous estimates. Some of those "new" divisions were only moving to the frontline at the time when peace was made, f.ex. 119.Mot.D and 144.D which were preparing for invasion of Sortavala over the ice, or 172.D and 131.D of which one had only partly arrived to Kem before the peace. Others had only small exposure to the battles like 87.D, which started using ammo March 12. And naturally, how many casualties Soviets really suffered during the war affects the numbers. --Whiskey 07:33, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

Troop strengths

Kurt, I do find it relevant that both starting and ending numbers of troop strengths are given. It was part of the Soviet re-evaluation of the situation that they increased the number of troops participating heavily during January. So, despite the heavy losses they suffered during the war, at the end they had doubled the available men at the front, while Finns were barely managed to train and equip 25% more troops, making the numerical odds even more unfavorable to Finns than in the beginning. --Whiskey 08:23, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Indeed, but increased strenght's are not mentioned in most articles battle boxes. Should this be an exception? Kurt.

You can not remove sourced numbers, finland is not part of scandinavia therefore it can not have a scandinavian winter but it is part of the north and can have a nordic winter, you not only commit sneaky vandalism but also geographical vandalism. And you remove vital information from the article (Deng 09:52, 2 June 2006 (UTC))

In some cases the whole battle box is omitted and in some cases only the strengths are omitted altogether. The template doesn't help either, because it doesn't make a stand to the one way or another, only saying that strength is optional field. Of course, we could omit the strengths altogether from the battlebox and put them only to the text, but I still consider the version where both of them are in battlebox better.

Oh, BTW, it is nordic, not Scandinavian. Scandinavian is specific region including Denmark, and it would be hard to say that winters in Denmark are harsh. :-) Nordic, on the other hand, is more diffuse and is more assosiated with "northern", thus making it better selection here. --Whiskey 10:01, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes, we would could include the ending numbers in the article's text itself. It would be good if the battle box is not touched (in this case) until we are done with this issue. Kurt. PS. Yes, Nordic. My apologies for this.

Deng, the word Scandinavia has effectively two distinct meanings: geographical and political. In geographical sense Finland indeed is not part of Scandinavia, but of larger entity called Fennoscandia. But in political sense, where Scandinavia is synonymous with Nordic, Finland is in common usage counted as a part of Scandinavia, also abroad. And please, don't be so eager to call edits dissenting from your point of view vandalism. - Mikko H. 09:51, 3 June 2006 (UTC)

Attitude to Winter War in Russia

Kokkokanta made this edit:

In Russia Winter War is often referred to as border skirmish. Also, children are taught in schools that it was Finland who attacked Russia (in Mainila), or the question of aggressor is set aside. President Boris Yeltsin had a more objective view of the war and admitted that Russia started the war.

which is apparently contentious. I added a {{fact}} tag when it was deleted by an anonymous user, but Ghirlandajo has called Kokkokanta a troll (or perhaps Ghirlandajo was referring to me). Is the Russian attitude to the Winter War off limits for inclusion here? -- JHunterJ 11:46, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

The language and wording used by Kokkoranta is not the most polite one, so at least it should be corrected. For the contents, I'd like to ask Ghirlandajo, who lives in Russia, to visit library and check how Winter War is presented in different Russian histories. (Ghirla, please check the printing dates of the works?) Unfortunately I don't have access to Russian/Soviet material handy, but I could check one co-produced post-Soviet Russian-Finnish research on Winter War, if there is something on the issue.--Whiskey 12:25, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

It's not that simple

I feel that it is not that simple. I think that the result should be Moscow Peace Treaty in the battle box. Kurt.

Agreed, also to Whiskey who reverted it because it should be "simple". In many articles this is not the case. For example: Dutch-Hanseatic War.

"00:07, 21 July 2006 80.186.100.180 (Talk) (Reverted edits by "Mikkalai". Pyrrhic because: large losses, failure to achieve the original goal of conquering Finland, Finland also posed no threat to Leningrad in 1939, made soviet army look bad)"

"06:39, 20 July 2006 Halibutt (Talk | contribs) (this perfectly fits the definition of a Pyrrhic victory: minor gains, yet tremendous losses, to a completely inferior enemy)"

--Pudeo 23:04, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

So what are the arguments against it being a phyrric victory? Stephen B Streater 06:22, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

This has been discussed a million times before on the talk page, some simple scrolling will show this

• Soviet Union certainly did reach at least some of its goals. The Soviet-Finnish border was pushed over 100 km from USSR's second largest city; Soviet Union established a military base at the mouth of Gulf of Finland; the terms of Moscow Peace Treaty were essentially dictated by Soviet Union. All that was achieved with lower Soviet casualties per capita than Finnish casualties ( even if we accept Finnish official casualty estimates of 27,000 and Soviet "unofficial" numbers of 200,000 - although we know that official casualty numbers are never accurate and always underestimated ).

• So, whatever it was, it certainly wasn't a decisive Finnish victory. Two good examples of "decisive" victories are Soviet victory in World War II ( where Soviets took Berlin and Germans ended up paying reparations ), and North Vietnam's victory in Vietnam war ( where Americans had to withdraw ). Soviet victory in Winter War does not even qualify as pyrrhic ( by definition, a pyrrhic victory requires that the victor is worse off after the war than he was before it started ). Pyrric victory is, for example, what Americans have now in Iraq. --Itinerant1 1 July 2005 22:11 (UTC)

• If considering only outcome on the map, it was Soviet victory. If taking into account the losses in material, manpower, political prestige and military clout, it fills the definition of Pyrrhic victory: Gained something with too high, almost unacceptable, cost. For Finns, even though keeping sovereignty, Finland still lost territory, so it cannot be said that Finns won outright. I think, adapting from the words of Finnish novelist Väinö Linna: Finland won the silver medal. :-) -Whiskey 8 July 2005 06:15 (UTC)

• The word "Pyrrhic" is a POV. "Unacceptable cost": You are looking from the modern perspective, when Americans rise a tremendus fuss over 2-3 pesons lost in action. For Stalin the losses were more than tolerable. mikka (t) 15:13, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

• Casualties has nothing to do with it. Take a look at the Moscow Peace Treaty. Winners don't usually cede 10% of their territory to the loser. -- Jniemenmaa 11:51, August 17, 2005 (UTC)

That is just some of the things on the talk page, I could copy more but I am to lazy FishHeadAbcd 08:09, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

The argument you missed is that the difficulty the Russians had may have encouraged Hitler to attack Russia, though this is speculation. In fact, Finland was near collapse militarily, though Russia didn't know this. On balance, I'd say Russia was ahead after this war. So far I'd prefer it without Phyrric. Stephen B Streater 08:24, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

The latest wording at a cost looks good to me. Stephen B Streater 22:42, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Except that every military victory (or loss) has come at a cost. It provides no value itself. -- JHunterJ 22:44, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, USSR lost atleast 127,000 men (or are Russian lives really that cheap? No.), thousands of horses, hundreds of tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces, thousands of weapons, a lot of ammunition, hundreds of trucks, medical equipment, armored cars etc. Red Army humiliated, divivisions destroyed compeletely, generals killed like in Kenraali-Motti, most and the decisive battles won by Finnish forces. That's very costy. Yes, there is a cost for every war but "at a great cost" would sound too much? And for the argument that it has to just victory or defeat, check Vietnam War, but that's probably because. On the other hand the battlebox's result is a bit unhandy, but Peace treaties are marked as results too. It is a "soviet victory". But can you call Winter War the same "great patriotic USSR victory" as Battle of Kursk. The both are marked as Soviet victory. --Pudeo 10:44, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

I don't have any issue with putting in more detail in the results, a la Vietnam War. My observation is that "at a cost" adds only words, not detail, since every military operation has a cost, regardless of outcome. -- JHunterJ 11:02, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Look at the current version. I had hard time thinking a suitable one, please say what you think about it. It is often referred as defence victory here, after all, Finland won all decisive battles and kept Soviet troops out of Mannerheim line until the very end. I thought that Military victory wouldn't be suitable atleast.--Pudeo 17:55, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

I think this version is better, but I'll fire off the questions I have anyway: Where's "here"? What does "defence victory" mean? Holding territory "until the very end" is the same as losing territory, as far as "Result" is concerned, right? If you win the battles and lose the war, the result is still a loss. I think, if more detail than one winner is needed here, that rather than try to describe the degrees of victory, you should simply identify what each side ended up with as a result of the war. Territory changes, other stipulations of the treaty, that kinds of thing. Completely NPOV. -- JHunterJ 18:12, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

What about "Soviet victory; Soviet forces repelled but very harsh terms in the armistice for Finland", it's the current. I think that's the best one yet as it's described, agreed JHunterJ? I'd request that you who change it reply here instead of leaving any note. I have no problems contributing to a debate on this matter instead of revert war. --Pudeo 15:16, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Nikita Khrushchev's estimates on Winter War

There are no figures whatsoever in Khrushchev memoirs regarding Winter War casualties. The only sentence mentioning "millions" is the folowing:

"I would say here that Finland war cost us millions of dead. Why do I think so? [...] Hitler thought he would be able to overcome the USSR very easily. And he got influenced by the Finnish campaign. Because if we conducted this campaign properly, History would be different."

So, these "millions" are actually "indirect" deaths resulting from Soviet-German war, and not a literal estimation to be taken directly.

The only other sentence is "I don't know how many thousand soldiers died there, but I think, a lot. How does that translate into millions of casualties, I don't know. -- Grafikm ^(AutoGRAF) 20:05, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

The ending numbers

Please, show me another battle box which contains both the starting and ending figures. The ending figures are not nessecary. Kurt.

With a short statistical survey of articles about wars, it seems that overwhelming majority of articles favor the numbers of combatants at the end or at their strongest in the battlebox (when they are given at all). So, it should give ending numbers if only one set of numbers is allowed. --Whiskey 21:24, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

NPOV problems

Whilst reading this article, I noticed that it has very bad NPOV issues. The statements used biased words, such as "poorly" or "insufficiently", and such biased statements as, "Soviet arrogance and incompetence were important factors", and "the Soviets failed to take advantage of their numerical superiority at the start of the war". This article needs major repairs to fit NPOV standards. That makes me wonder why this isn't at the top of the page:

--Kschwerdt514 05:01, 3 September 2006 (UTC)

"Finland ceded 10 % of it's land" and "and Continuation War in 1941"

Ire these line truly nessecary? The details conserning the peace be viewed by simply clicking the link, so I do not find the line to be nessecary. Also, Continuation War was not the ending result of Winter War. --Kurt Leyman 13:04, 29 September 2006 (UTC)

Again on result

To avoid revert war again I want to put some facts up. This topic is quite controversial and should be told in article, why do you want to tell whether the result was a victory or it was nothing? The result was a peace treaty, and then comes the controversial part.

Finland: Independence kept against much larger nation and army (Population of Finland, 3.7 million, USSR what 194 million?), Soviet advance halted on most battles, five times more Soviets killed etc. Immediatly said after war (from YLE radio records): "We survived from this war better than anyone could have imagined!"

USSR: Finnish border from Leningrad moved, 20% Industrial capacity taken from Finland, some Soviet army flaws discovered

Was the border move a victory for USSR?: The move was very important for the moment but the price was high; atleast 127 000 Soviets killed, thousands of tanks destroyed captured, loads of equipment lost, "humiliation" for the red army. As a result Adolf Hitler admitted in Finland-visit that he underestimated USSR by Winter war; which of course resulted in Barborossa, Siege of Leningrad etc., millions of civilians dead.

Then the border move; yes it was great for the USSR for the year but it was too harsh. Finns wanted the areas back which then resulted in Continuation War Siege of Leningrad. USSR rather got in to a deeper mess by making too harsh demands.

Therefore the result should be the peace treaty (as in Vietnam War), and the interim peace as it is a undoubtable result. It should be discussed in the article presenting facts. Sorry for the quite confusive and mistakeous text, hurry--Pudeo (Talk) 15:21, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

"On March 6 Finland sued for peace, and a week later the Soviet terms were accepted" (Britannica) -- if Finland sued for peace and accepted the Soviet terms, I believe that qualifies as a Soviet victory. Yes, all victories come at a cost; that isn't in question. Yes, Finland survived and kept its independence; that also doesn't mean it wasn't a Soviet victory. Yes, the terms of the Soviet Union were harsh enough to lead up to the Continuation War; other victors have had to fight subsequent wars too. -- JHunterJ 15:39, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

I agree. The Soviet victory in WWII came at an incomparably greater cost. Still, it is a victory. Revisionism is not good for encyclopaedias. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 16:21, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

I suggest the compromise. The result of the war is to be simply: Moscow Peace Treaty (1940) but the territorial changes to say "Soviet territorial gains" or something to that order. --Irpen 19:22, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

You win or you you win, you lose or you lose. Finland Lost The Soviet Union won there is no other way. Who cares how many died if you have a greater reserve then you can lose more. Lokqs 19:31, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

It would be nice if things were so simple. I'd prefer simple "Soviet victory" or "Soviet Pyrrhic victory" here. If we look narrowly only the resulting peace treaty, it was a Soviet victory without a question. Costly, but a still a victory. But there were also other consequences of the war: The prestige of the Red Army was hit severely, so Hitler decided that Soviet Union was ready to fall with a small push, so he decided to attack already at 1941. The war also raised the Allied interests towards the Scandinavia, and as a countermeasure Germany attacked Denmark and Norway, thus endangering Arctic convoy routes later in the war. Also, together with Soviet foreign policy towards Finland it secured that Finland would be on the opposing camp when the new war started instead of being neutral. None of these factors cannot be seen as "victory" to the Soviet Union although all of them were direct results from the war. --Whiskey 22:00, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Whatever way you look at it-and no matter how costly-it was a Soviet victory. I do not think the poor performance of the Red Army either added too or detracted from Hitler's ultimate aim to make war on Russia. What it did do was create a serious misconception in his mind about the Soviet capacity to resist such an invasion. Painful as it was the Winter War provided a steep learning curve for the Red Army; and when it next came to fight a major winter campaign it did so with troops both better trained and equipped. The allies were already interested in Scandanavia, in particular German iron ore supplies coming from Sweden via the port of Narvik through Norwegian costal waters. It was merely a matter of time before one side or the other violated Norwegian neutrality. The chief object of the Winter War was to increase the security of Leningrad and Russia's northern flank-an objective which was generally attained. White Guard 01:33, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

By the way, this interesting document "Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia" by MastersWork Media, USA. There was quote from Khrushchev: "We all, including Stalin, knew it was a defeat. It showed we indeed were a giant on clay collumns." And the document ended to the words of some American historian: "Finland won. If it did not win, it would have ended just like Estonia which was occupied. Finland won, obviously". --Pudeo (Talk) 18:04, 29 November 2006 (UTC)

Baseless Claim

Josef Stalin had expected to conquer the whole country by the end of 1939, but Finnish resistance frustrated the Soviet forces, who outnumbered the Finns four to one.

Excuse me, where the fuck is the evidence for this? In the original proposal USSR gave to Finland, USSR would only annex a small strip of territory along the border in exchange for territory twice as large. At no time was Finland as a whole to be annexed. "Finnish resistance" is particularly laughable and had nothing to do with the outcome.

Written orders captured from destroyed Soviet divisions at Suomussalmi, interrogations of captured Soviet soldiers, interviews of Soviet veterans after 1989, from the timetable some peculiar things were to be ready, like Sostachovits music piece and preparations of Kuusinen government.--Whiskey 06:26, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

"Finnish resistance" is particularly laughable and had nothing to do with the outcome. Hmm... had nothing to do with the outcome? So what took three months for Russians to advance even some kilometers? The snow? You doesn't seem to respect Red army much? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.27.11.114 (talk) 18:30, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

None of these are as reliable as the Soviet proposal which offered to annex territory surrounding Leningrad in exchange for a piece of territory twice as large. While facing initial setbacks in the harsh winter climate, USSR eventually persevered and could have easily taken over all of Finland by April 1940.

What Soviet diplomats were trying to achieve before the war has nothing to do with what Soviet military were ordered to achieve after the November 30. (Eh... In fact the orders were given about the month before that, but you got the idea...) --Whiskey 00:20, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

> How to bulletproof anything about Soviet Unions and Stalins failed aims on 1939 ? On Lenin's autiobiography is written, that Stalin disagreed Soviet Unions decision to recognice Finlands undependance. Stalin even critized (very rarely, if even ever earlier seen) publically Lenin about this undependance recognition. Due to their weak power situation, Soviet Union communists tactics 1918 was, that they gave undependace recognition to several former Russian state and months or some years later, communists took power on those countries and included them back to part of Soviet Union. Please, study Soviet Union communists tactics between 1880-1950. There exists half of dozen examples of such countries, where this rejoing to Soviet Union was succeed before 1930s. Exeptions to that rule were Finland and Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithua), in which civil war ended to victory of non-communists parties. Soviet Union started negotiations with similar kind of requirements for all Baltic countries and Finland on late 1930s. Baltic countries assented piece by piece to always newcoming Soviet Union requirements. In the end, Soviet Union occupied Baltic countries completely and attached them to itself. Finlands negotiators understood the hard situation (as small poor country, population 3.5milj, it is best to give up as much as possible to Soviet Union, population 150milj, requirements but without endagering military capability to defence itself) and assented to many of Soviet Unions requirements. Looking backward, it is still clear, that nothing would have been enough for Soviet Union regime. Remember also, that eg Karelian Istmus was quite narrow and much more optimal place to defence Finland against Soviet tanks and large human power than places on innerland wider areas. There also already existed some fortification on Karelian Istmus. Also, eg. Soviet Unions requirements for rent areas existed in such places, that they threatened Finlands capital, Helsinki. Finland negotiators proposed some other areas for a rent, in which Soviet Union could supervise and protect gulf of Finland (Leningrad), but these were not good for Soviet Region. In every areas (which I am not able to write in here and in English), Finlands negotiatiors tried to propose compromises but which Soviet Unions regime declined. So, to put all these together: 1. Communist idelogy included idea of expanding its system worldwide, starting on neighbour countries. 2. 1938 baltic countries had wery similar history and situation than Finland. Approximately at same period similar kind of negotiations started. In the end of this path, Estonia, Latvia and Lithua were included to Soviet Union (as they were part of Russian since 1800 up to 1918). Tactics was: When baltic countries agreed to Soviet Union requirements, Soviet Union made the next ones. Baltic counries were step by step occupied, Soviet Union requirements by requirements. 3. Soviet Unions requirements for Finland were impossible to fullfill without endangering Finlands the best protection, geographical fortifications. Even, Soviet Unions required its military troops to be let to such areas, where it could immediately threaten Finlands capital. 4. On negotiations, Finland assented as much as possible. Soviet Union was not ready for any compromises. It is clear that Stalin had several kind of targets, when he decided to begin Winter War. One of those was to expand communist rules to Finland also. Soviet Unions empire was at least as aggressive than Great Britains empire 50-years earlier, but luckily to world, Soviet Union was relative weak empire on its first decades. My sources for these facts are two autobiography books of Mannerheim, autobiography book of Paasikivi, autobiography books of Lenin and Stalin, autobiography book of Otto-Ville Kuusinen, black book of communism and half dozen of historical books of Second World War Finland-Russian campaigns.

SU / USSR

Suggest replacing all instances of "SU" with "USSR". The term "Soviet Union" is commonly used in English, but this is the first time I've seen it written as "SU". --24.58.14.1 20:41, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Winter War:Finland's Concessions

The aforementioned map is not accurate. The Salla territory was in fact twice as large as depicted on the map. The map needs revising. Landau7 17:44, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

Winter details

I changed the conversion of celcius to fahrenheit. -104 degrees fahrenheit is in fact -75 degrees C, whereas -40C is, oddly enough, -40F. Small point in case the moderators get stressed at my editing.

Some one who knows the script, please help clean this up

Seems like the graphic table is messy quite a bit when I get in today. Any writer who knows what to do, please help. (May 17, 2007)