User:Gitz6666/sandbox/AlfredVerdross

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My working notes, materials, etc.[edit]

Alfred Verdross's father, General Ignaz Verdroß-Droßberg, Commander of the Kaiserjäger Division, after 1915

Alfred Verdross received numerous high awards. He was elected honorary senator of the University of Vienna (1960), received honorary doctorates from the universities of Paris, Salamanca, Frankfurt, Thessaloniki, the Doctor theologiae honoris causa from the University of Vienna and the Doctor philosophiae honoris causa from the University of Salzburg. He was a member (since 1928), and since 1977 an honorary member, of the Institut des Droit International, of which he was president from 1959 to 1961; since 1950 he was a full member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. In 1954 he received the Great Silver Decoration of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria, in 1959 the Austrian Decoration of Honour for Science and Art, and in 1960 the Ring of Honour of the City of Vienna. On his 90th birthday in 1980, he was awarded the Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold with Star for services to the Republic of Austria. At the University of Vienna he was also honoured in 1998 by the naming of one of the "Gates of Remembrance" on the campus of the University of Vienna (Verdross Gate, passage from courtyard 3 to courtyard 5).[1]

"Verdross posited a universalistic conception of law that overreached both (in technical terms, ‘legal monism’). Following Kelsen, he argued that the law is hierarchal, in his case a pyramid whose various levels are commonly understood domestically with constitutional law at the apex, followed by statutory law, executive decrees, administrative ordinances and decisions, in descending order. He argued that the hierarchical character of law is “immanent in law, not extraneous”; that is, it is part of law’s nature as law. The pyramidal structure accordingly raised the question as to the original source of law. On that source, he argued that law is a universal practice—all social orders are based on laws—and as such, legal practice can only rest in a common or universal legal consciousness. On this basis, he advocated the unity of international and domestic law, with international law (or the universal conscience) enjoying primacy."[2]


honorary member of the American Society of International Law[3]

"Alfred Verdross broke with Kelsen as early as 1923 and returned to an objective idealism and to natural law. In so doing he swam with the swelling basic current of anti-positivism and with the tradition of Aristotelian-Thomist natural law, which now flourished again within the context of the Austrian corporative state."[4]


(more precisely, Verdross theorised the primacy of what he called the "constitution of international law"[5])

"Also the "Abendländische Rechtsphilosophie. Ihre Grundlagen und Hauptprobleme in geschichtlicher Schau" ("Occidental Philosophy of Law. Its Foundations and Main Problems in Historical Perspective") (2nd ed., 1965) became a standard work, which owed its creation not least to the fact that Verdross had been deprived of his licence to teach philosophy of law by the National Socialists[6].

After World War II, Verdross worked, among other things, on the theoretical foundation of Austrian neutrality; the changes in the international community brought about by the United Nations, in which Verdross played a leading role, were finally reflected in "Universelles Völkerrecht. Theory and Practice", the late work written together with Bruno Simma in 1976”.[6].

"Alfred Verdross (1890–1980) was a Catholic. Initially a diplomat, he was a founder and professor at the Austrian consular academy from 1922, university professor at the University of Vienna from 1924 to 1960 and judge at the European Court of Human Rights from 1958 to 1977. He was also a member of the International Law Commission and the Institut de Droit International. A student of Hans Kelsen, he took from Kelsen the idea of the unity of law (e.g. Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes, Tubingen, 1923, translated as "The unity of the legal world view on the basis of the international law constitution"). He was “one of the first scholars who transferred a meaningful concept of constitution to international law” (Kleinlein 2012, 385), but he turned away from Kelsen’s positivism and based his structuring of international law directly on the School of Salamanca, "which was so influential on Verdross that he virtually adopted it as the Leitmotiv of his entire international legal thinking" (Simma 1995, 39)."[7]

In the interwar period Verdross had an ideological Catholic (German)national orientation (weltanschaulich katholisch-(deutsch)national).[8]


the hope for a Christian-occidental Europe in the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire - German Nation! With the corresponding influence on Nazi power politics in the Christian occidental sense, National Socialism could serve as a corresponding vehicle: a political lifeline for "a reactionary European ideology".32) A fatal fallacy, as it was to turn out all too soon. This interpretative scheme unfolds high explanatory potential both with regard to the scientific - especially legal-philosophical standing in the medieval Christian tradition - and the political attitudes and actions of Verdross in the interwar and Nazi periods. Some essential questions and (supposed) contradictions in Verdross' (legal) biography, such as the lack of reception of central elements of modern Enlightenment philosophy in his legal-philosophical doctrinal edifice33) or the contradictoriness between his "upright" (German)national, but partly "reprehensible" (still) legitimist convictions, which was sometimes noted with astonishment, especially by the National Socialists,34) can be well brought together in the Christian occidental German imperial ideology.35)

While Kelsen argued that the choice between primacy of international law and primacy of national law could only be made on the basis of extra-legal considerations, such as the pacifist ideal, Verdross claimed that it was juridically necessary to assume the primacy of international law over national law since this was the only way to account for all existing "legal material" (Rechtssatzmaterial).[5]


Lingens, p. 649: "... gehört zu den angesehensten Völkerrechtlern des 20. Jh.s."


"Already in his Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), Verdross introduced the notion of an international community and, with it, an international public order based on the ethical values of the community. In his first reading, the most fundamental international rules are those that serve the common interest of states. A more humanistic vision of law will eventually impose itself and will accompany the constitutional analysis of the United Nations Charter with which Verdrossian thought is still most often associated today. In his article "Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law", published in the American Journal in 1966, Verdross evokes the international humanitarian principles that existed before the Second World War and that the Charter confirmed and even increased "in the interest of all mankind". From this reflection, Verdross draws several lessons, notably that the 1945 Charter should not be reduced to the sole supreme law of the Organisation. Through its essential rules, which permeate the entire international legal order, and which no longer simply attribute rights to states but also impose absolute obligations on them, the Charter embodies the world constitution." [9]

"Verdross, who was one of the architects of the Permanent International Court of Justice installed by the League of Nations, maintained that the court should adhere to and objectify “general principles of law”, and was not completely free in determining its findings". [10]

"The establishment of the United Nations, with its international conventions and treaties that banned atrocities, human rights violations, and genocide, made recourse to natural law-arguments.78 “Natural law”, Verdross claimed at the 1962 Salzburg workshop, “is cultural law anchored in the being (Wesen) of man”.79 For Verdross, international law was rooted in the “natural-legal idea of the unity of mankind which not only comprises the […] sovereign peoples organised in states, but is also recognised in the principle of human rights as sanctioned by international law”."[11]

"the uncrowned king of Austrian jurisprudence after 1945"[12]

Porträt der Frau Maria Verdross, geb. von Giovanelli [1]

"Verdross’s claim that Catholic natural law was the sole effective safeguard of liberty and dignity in the battle against totalitarianism" [13]

"As a judge of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, he participated in the formative phase of the most advanced system for the protection of human rights worldwide. Within the German-speaking countries, Alfred Verdross shaped international legal thinking in a way unparalleled in the past and, almost certainly, also in the future. As such his work forms an influential part of the history of European legal and social thought of this century."[14]

"The fact that the "influential personalities" intervening in favour of Verdross were the deputy of the Führer and the Wehrmacht general Jodl, executed as a war criminal in 1946, and not exactly those "who were not prepared to go along unconditionally with the madness of the new masters", can hardly have been known or conscious to the celebratory speaker. He was, however, buying into the victim myth of Austria's post-war society, to which Verdross, despite his merits and upright democratic-legal stance after 1945, had himself contributed to some extent through his own handling of his behaviour before and during the Nazi era, and which the 90-year-old had himself perhaps long since believed at this point."[15]

"In the series of his numerous honorary doctorates150) , the Salzburg honorary doctorate stands out in connection with the Viennese school of legal theory and its diaspora caused by the political conditions before and during National Socialism. Verdross received this from the Faculty of Philosophy there on 1 June 1967, at the same time and together with his academic companions from the early days of his academic career, Merkl and Kelsen.151) The personal friendship with his early academic patron, which had been disgruntled because of the episode about the ZÖR in 1934 described above, had been restored after 1945. Kunz succeeded in mediating, and Kelsen then addressed Verdross on 10 March 1948 with the following lines: "It is true that I was somewhat disgruntled. I was upset that I was forced to resign as the main editor of the Zeitschrift für oeffentliches Recht even before the Anschluss. I was also of the opinion that you had gone too far with certain political value judgements in your 'Voelkerrecht' - by far the best presentation of the subject in the German language. But I have never blamed you in the least for staying in the homeland and have always fully understood that this was not possible without making certain concessions.)" [16]



wurde jedoch im Juli 1935 zum außerordentlichen Mitglied des Bundesgerichtshofes ernannt. (Nach Art. 179 Abs. 2 Verfassung 1934 gehörten dem Verfassungssenat des Bundesgerichtshofes, welcher die meisten Kompetenzen des ehemaligen VfGH geerbt hatte, vier derartige ao. Mitglieder an.). Von 1935 bis zum »Anschluß« 1938 war Verdroß Senator der UniversitätWien; 1936 wurde er zum Präses der staatswissenschaftlichen Staatsprüfungskommission und 1937 zum korrespondierenden Mitglied der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien gewählt.326 (Staudigl-Ciechowicz)

Er weigerte sich anzunehmen, dass die Grundnorm jedes beliebige Rechtssystem in Geltung setzen könne, und nahm einen materiellen Inhalt derselben – pacta sunt servanda – an.328 (Staudigl-Ciechowicz)

In der von ihm herausgegebenen Festschrift für Hans Kelsen zu dessen 50. Geburtstag 1931 erklärte er, dass es neben dem Völkergewohnheitsrecht und dem Völkervertragsrecht auch allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze gebe, welche dem Rechtsbewusstsein aller modernen (Staudigl-Ciechowicz)

Die unbestreitbar überragende Bedeutung für das Völkerrecht und das hohe Renommee, das Verdroß bis heute auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene genießt, sowie auch sein tief verwurzelter christlicher Glaube stehen in einem eigentümlichen Spannungsverhältnis zur auffallenden Tatsache, dass Verdroß schon vor 1938 kaum Berührungsängste mit dem NS-Regime hatte, sondern z.B., wie erwähnt, seine Berufungsverhandlungen mitMünchen auch nach 1933 weiterführte. Unbegreiflich

Nach 1945 wurde Verdroß vollständig rehabilitiert (Staudigl-Ciechowicz)


Motivated by the contemporary axiology (Wertphilosophie) of Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950)[17]

After the re-establishment of Austria in 1945, Verdross became one of the most prominent academic figures, not only in Austria but also in Europe as a whole.[18]


On AV being very influential/authoritative: [14][18][12]

Thus, he dismissed the Kelsenian notion that the basic norm is merely hypothetical and formal, such as to underpin the validity of any legal system, irrespective of the content of its norms, and instead postulated a substantive content for the foundation of the legal system: Verdross's basic norm is neither hypothetical nor formal, it is rooted in the objective realm of values and is both positive-legal and ethical in nature

Thus, he dismissed the Kelsenian notion that the basic norm is merely hypothetical ("if the existing legal order has to be conceived as binding, then we must assume that there is a norm conferring such validity") and formal (that norm has no substantive content, but marely commands obedience to the supreme norms of the legal order).

Thus, Verdross rejected the Kelsenian notion that the basic norm is merely "presupposed" by legal science, rather than created by some political or divine authority,[19], and is "formal", i.e. purely procedural, lacking substantive normative content.[20] While the basic norm theorised by Kelsen is such as to underping the validity of any legal system, irrespective of the content of its norms, Verdross's basic norm is neither presupposed nor formal: it is rooted in the objective realm of values and is both positive-legal and ethical in nature.

Raz, p. 125-126: "Only a non-positive law can be the ultimate law of a legal system; only it does not presuppose another norm from which it derives its normativity. This non-positive law is the basic norm."

it commands to behave as the constitution prescribes

Raz, p. 127: "The content of basic norms varies according to the facts of the systems to which they belong. Kelsen explains that the content of a basic norm 'is determined by the facts through which an order is created and applied'" ( GT 120 ). and 132-133

  • Raz, Joseph (1979). "Kelsen's Theory of The Basic Norm". The authority of law: Essays on law and morality. Oxford University Press. pp. 122–145. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.003.0007. ISBN 9780198253457.


"Of course some episodes we wish had never taken place; of course, especially with the wisdom of hindsight, some positions and expressions we wish had never been adopted. And of course, we wish, as we do in relation to so many of those who lived through those years, that more civic courage had been displayed more frequently. We wonder, as we should, if we would have behaved differently (...) Our conviction that Verdross deserves an honourable place in the European tradition of intemationallaw remains unshaken".[21]

"He lacked the desirable distance to National Socialism - probably partly in a naïve, partly in an opportunistically calculated manner - especially before the Nazi seizure of power in Austria. He "settled" even before 1938 and then lived this settlement - albeit very passively - for long stretches of Nazi rule. He only decided to become more actively involved in the intellectual resistance against the regime in the face of the foreseeable collapse in the last years of the war, and this did "nothing to change his previous basic attitudes (towards and in the wake of National Socialism, note), about which he had spread the cloak of silence after 1945".168)" [22] " when it came to the Nazi past, he behaved ... silence and denial"[22]


Relationship with Nazism[edit]

Verdross was a Catholic conservative whose political views during the interwar years have been described as attachment to the values of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and hostility to the people's right of self-determination,[23] hope for a "Christian-occidental Europe" in the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire,[24] and endorsement of pan-Germanist nationalism under the influence of Othmar Spann's communitarianism and Austrofascism.[25][26]

The exact extent of Verdross's sympathy for Nazism remains debated, and his relationship with the fascist government is a matter of controversy.[27][28] He was an early sympathiser with Nazism and was active in DNSAP circles even after the party was outlawed in 1933.[1] He was popular among German nationalist and Nazi students and often intervened on their behalf,[1][29] but on one occasion he also protected Jewish and democratic students from a Nazi attack at the university.[23] In 1933–1934 his assistant at the Consular Academy was Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, at the time an SA member, whom he had recommended to Kelsen in Cologne.[30] In 1934, his personal friendship with Kelsen came to an end when Kelsen was forced by the editorial board of the Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht to resign as editor on the grounds that he was Jewish.[a][32]

In his successful 1937 textbook on international law, Verdross attempted to bring Nazism and Catholic-inspired universalism closer together.[33] The book calls Mussolini a defender of Christian values, characterises the Nazist doctrine of international law as "anti-imperalist and federalist",[b] and contains significant traces of a völkisch approach to legal studies and international politics.[c][36][28][26][37]

Verdross showed no qualms about contact with Nazism, but never joined the Nazi party either before or after the annexation of Austria into the German Reich in 1938.[1] After the annexation he was temporarily suspended from his teaching assignments in the summer of 1938, but accommodated to political pressure[38] and, from 1939, thanks to the support of the Nazi rector of the university, the legal historian Ernst Schönbauer [de], and the intervention of General Jodl, he was allowed to resume the teaching of international law, after adapting the content of his lectures to the demands of the new rulers.[39][40] He was never allowed to resume the teaching of philosophy of law, probably because his natural law theory based on Christian values was deemed incompatible with the ideology of the regime.[41][42] He managed to come to terms with the Nazi government[1] and in 1942 was appointed alternate judge at the German Prize Court of Appeals (Oberprisenhof)[43][41] and director of the Institute of Legal Sciences at the university of Vienna.[44]

Legacy[edit]

Verdross is regarded as the founder and leading exponent of the Viennese School of international law and legal philosophy based on natural law theory.[14] According to his disciple Bruno Simma, "[w]ithin the German-speaking countries, Alfred Verdross shaped international legal thinking in a way unparalleled in the past";[14] in the Austrian community of international law scholars, "everybody was exposed to and, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced by the teachings of the Viennese master".[45]

Verdross's disciples include Stephan Verosta [de] (1909–1998), who was his assistant in the 1930s and succeeded him in the chair of International Law and Legal Philosophy in 1962; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern [de] (1918–2001), who was Verdross's assistant immediately after World War II and became professor of International Law at the universities of Saarland, Cologne and lastly Vienna; Karl Zemanek [de] (born 1929), who became professor at the university of Vienna and also worked as a legal advisor at the Austrian Foreign Ministry; Herbert Miehsler [de] (1934–1986), who became professor at the universities of Karl-Franzens University of Graz and Paris Lodron University of Salzburg;[46] and Bruno Simma (born in 1941), who met Verdross in 1967, when he was already emeritus, and became professor at the University of Michigan Law School and at the University of Munich, and served as a judge on the International Court of Justice.[47][48]

Alongside his academic capacity, Verdross contributed to the development of international law as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights in the early stages of this new system of international rights protection, and as a member of the International Law Commission. Thanks to his long membership of the International Law Commission, he was in a position to contribute his ideas to the international codification process.[14]

The most prominent disciple of the second generation

of themsecond generation of

Within the German-speaking countries, Alfred Verdross shaped international legal thinking in a way unparalleled in the past and, almost certainly, also in the future


"distance' vis-a-vis Verdross's ideas was not easily to be accomplished in the world of Austrian international legal thinking in which I grew up and in which everybody was exposed to and, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced by the teachings of the Viennese master"[45]

"Through his long-standing membership of the International Law Commission, Verdross found himself in a position where he could contribute many of his ideas to the international codification process even more directly than through the influence of his scholarly writing. As a judge of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, he participated in the formative phase of the most advanced system for the protection of human rights worldwide. Within the German-speaking countries, Alfred Verdross shaped international legal thinking in a way unparalleled in the past and, almost certainly, also in the future. As such his work forms an influential part of the history of European legal and social thought of this century".[14]

"In Austria, his teachings were dominant, and he is regarded as the founder and head of the Viennese School of International Law and Legal Philosophy based on natural law thinking".[49]

first generation of Verdross’ disciples (pp. 72-75). Stephan Verosta [de] (1909–1998), who was Verdross' assistant in the 1930s and succeeded Alfred Verdross on the chair of International Law and Legal Philosophy, which he held from 1962 to 1980 [46]

Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern [de] (1918–2001) became the assistant of Alfred Verdross immediately after World War II, and became professor of International Law at the universities of Saarland, Cologne and Vienna.

Karl Zemanek [de] (born 1929) Vienna

Herbert Miehsler [de] (1934–1986) taught the universities of Karl-Franzens University Graz and Paris Lodron University Salzburg

second generation (pp. 75) international lawyers who were in constant contact with him at a time when he was already emeritus. While the most prominent of them, Bruno Simma,

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e Kniefacz & Mühlberger 2014.
  2. ^ Navari 2021, p. 112.
  3. ^ Simma 1975, p. 134.
  4. ^ Stolleis 2004, p. 151–152.
  5. ^ a b Staudigl-Ciechowicz & Olechowski 2014, p. 535.
  6. ^ a b Lingens 2001, p. 650.
  7. ^ Navari 2021, p. 111.
  8. ^ Busch 2012, p. 142.
  9. ^ Laval n.d.
  10. ^ Fillafer & Feichtinger 2019, p. 436.
  11. ^ Fillafer & Feichtinger 2019, p. 445.
  12. ^ a b Fillafer & Feichtinger 2019, p. 448.
  13. ^ Fillafer & Feichtinger 2019, p. 449.
  14. ^ a b c d e f Simma 1995b, p. 54.
  15. ^ Busch 2012, p. 159.
  16. ^ Busch 2012, p. 163.
  17. ^ Koeck 2020, p. 66.
  18. ^ a b Koeck 2020, p. 70.
  19. ^ Kelsen 1967, pp. 194–195: "It must be presupposed, because it cannot be 'posited,' that is to say: created, by an authority whose competence would have to rest on a still higher norm".
  20. ^ Kelsen 1967, p. 197: "The basic norm supplies only the reason for the validity, but not at the same time the content of the norms constituting the system".
  21. ^ Simma & Weiler 1995, p. 32.
  22. ^ a b Busch 2012, p. 169.
  23. ^ a b Seidl-Hohenveldern 1995, p. 99.
  24. ^ Busch 2012, p. 144.
  25. ^ Carty 1995.
  26. ^ a b Simma 1995b, p. 36.
  27. ^ Busch 2012, p. 139.
  28. ^ a b Staudigl-Ciechowicz & Olechowski 2014, p. 537.
  29. ^ Carty 1995, p. 80.
  30. ^ Busch 2012, pp. 141–142.
  31. ^ a b Busch 2012, p. 161.
  32. ^ Busch 2012, p. 155–156, 163.
  33. ^ Amorosa 2022, p. 418.
  34. ^ Verdross 1937, pp. 28–29.
  35. ^ Verdross 1937, p. 40, as translated by Bernstorff 2010, p. 59–60.
  36. ^ Bernstorff 2010, pp. 59, 283.
  37. ^ Carty 1995, p. 80–81.
  38. ^ Carty 1995, p. 78.
  39. ^ Stolleis 2004, p. 305.
  40. ^ Busch 2012, pp. 159, 163.
  41. ^ a b Seidl-Hohenveldern 1995, p. 100.
  42. ^ Bernstorff 2010, p. 283.
  43. ^ Simma 1995a, p. 103.
  44. ^ Busch 2012, p. 162.
  45. ^ a b Simma 1995b, p. 34.
  46. ^ a b Koeck 2020, pp. 72–75.
  47. ^ Simma 1995b, p. 33.
  48. ^ Koeck 2020, pp. 75.
  49. ^ Koeck 2020, pp. 70–71.


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